



Distinguishing Sōtō and Rinzai Zen: Manas and the Mental Mechanics of Meditation

Author(s): Rui Zhu

Source: *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 426-446

Published by: [University of Hawai'i Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4487969>

Accessed: 07-02-2016 22:20 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Philosophy East and West*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

DISTINGUISHING SŌTŌ AND RINZAI ZEN: MANAS AND THE MENTAL MECHANICS OF MEDITATION

Rui Zhu

Philosophy Department, Lake Forest College

Modern scholars have never successfully distinguished Sōtō 曹洞 (Chin. *Cao-dong*) from Rinzai 臨濟 (Chin. *Lin-ji*), the two major schools of Zen Buddhism, because they have tended to fall into one of two camps: either they accept the traditional polemics of the two schools as representing the facts of the matter, or, following Carl Bielefeldt and T. P. Kasulis, dismissed these polemics as not reflecting any substantive difference. By means of proposing a new point of departure in addressing this issue, this essay seeks for the first time to explain the polemics between Sōtō and Rinzai as reflecting real disparity, while refusing to join the two adversaries in their polemical stances.

Since the crux of the issue is located in the question of whether or not the form of seated meditation (*zazen*) practiced by the two Zen schools involves a distinct “non-thinking” technique, the attention of scholars has correctly been devoted to deciphering the two enigmatic phrases for “non-thinking” in Japanese: *fu shiryō* 不思量 (Chin. *bu-si-liang*) and *hi shiryō* 非思量 (Chin. *fei-si-liang*). While *shiryō* 思量 (Chin. *si-liang*) means thinking, *fu* 不 (Chin. *bu*) and *hi* 非 (Chin. *fei*) are negative prefixes, the meanings of which are generally interchangeable. Because Zen masters use both these phrases—*fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*—to describe the state of mind in meditation, sometimes privileging one phrase over the other, the following seems to us a workable hypothesis: if any significant distinction can be found between *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*, we may have located clues to important theoretical and practical distinctions between Sōtō and Rinzai Zen.

Both Kasulis and Bielefeldt have worked under this hypothesis. They endeavor to find a solution to the question of how the two negatives—*fu* and *hi*—might negate thinking differently. By comparing the connotations of the two negatives in association with the stem word *shiryō* (thinking), they have declared either that the differences have resulted from distinctions in the two negative prefixes (Kasulis), or that their lack of substantive difference (Bielefeldt) lends little support to the claim that Sōtō and Rinzai are at variance with each other with regard to non-thinking. Through this means, what seemed to be doctrinal and practical disputes are reduced to the status of institutional politics.

The thesis of this essay is that Kasulis and Bielefeldt have failed to notice subtle differences in the earlier technical meaning of “thinking” and therefore are not in a position to see the doctrinal differences at stake in this dispute. *Shiryō* is a Japanese rendering of the Chinese phrase *si-liang*, which is a standard translation for the Sanskrit word *manas*. While all these terms can generally be paraphrased by the term “thinking,” their technical specificity is obscured by the familiarity we feel toward

the English word “thinking.” An adequate explanation of seated meditation must take into account not only the differences between the two negative prefixes—*fu* and *hi*—but also the cognitive theory inherited by Zen from the ancient Indian “mind-only” philosophical/meditation tradition. The mystery of *manas* hidden behind the innocent word “thinking” holds the key to one significant question in the history of Zen: are Sōtō and Rinzai really different?

The situation, therefore, comes to this: while Zen sectarianism inflates the truth about the distinct character of each sect, disinterested scholars have unduly downplayed the genuine disagreements between the founding figures in these two classical forms of Zen. If passion and historical conservatism are to blame for partisan polemics, the failure of modern scholars such as Bielefeldt and Kasulis is attributable to the deceptive, unproblematic nature of the concept “thinking” as we experience it in our own language. Focusing on differences in the negative prefixes rather than on the root word for “thinking” (*shiryō*), they have not appreciated subtle differences in the root word “thinking.” If we keep in mind that “thinking” in Zen is traceable to the Sanskrit word *manas*, we are more likely to notice that this technical term included two distinct cognitive functions: intentionality and discrimination (*vikalpa*; Chin. *fenbie* 分別; Jpn. *bunbetsu/fenbetsu*). Rather than being used to negate a singular meaning of “thinking,” the Japanese negative prefixes *fu* and *hi* are used to negate one or the other of these two distinct mental functions. Once this is understood, we are not far away from the goal of sorting out the disagreements between Sōtō and Rinzai without falling victim to sectarianism or dismissing the difference altogether.

In our progress toward the goal, we will first examine the sectarian dispute within its historical context and suggest a moderate position between partisanship and total disregard. We will also substantiate further the criticisms of Kasulis and Bielefeldt by making clear the distinction between *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*. A significant part of the first half of this essay will be devoted to the elucidation of the concept of *manas* in the context of the cognitive theories of the “mind-only” tradition. There we construe *fu shiryō* as rectifying or negating the intentional, and *hi shiryō* as negating or rectifying the discriminative aspect of the mind in meditation. In the closing three sections it will be argued that meditation in Rinzai Zen is a series of self-contained processes beginning with *hi shiryō* and ending with *fu shiryō*, whereas in the Sōtō tradition of Zen, *hi shiryō* displaces and absorbs *fu shiryō* in higher levels of meditation. These subtle differences in understanding mental states of Sōtō and Rinzai practitioners will be sufficient to justify and interpret the disagreements between the classical Zen masters in these two schools, while setting their institutional sectarianism aside.

1. Sectarian Feud

More and more scholars today have come to believe that the feud between Sōtō and Rinzai is more sectarian than indicative of fundamental disagreements, especially when the matter comes to the practice of *zazen*. Practitioners from both sects might have reproached each other for failing to follow the right path of cultivation, but

their theoretical dispute could hardly make any difference to the practice of seated meditation. This is the prevailing belief of today.

There is strong evidence to support this sober view in the midst of the sectarian sound and fury. Traditionally, Rinzai Zen is branded by its opponents as *kanna* 看話 (Chin. *kan-hua*), "looking at a saying," whereas Sōtō Zen is labeled as *mokushō* 默照, "silent illumination." Both terms are somewhat derogatory and misleading. Followers of Sōtō Zen use the label of *kanna* to accuse Rinzai of practicing the demonic cult of words. According to them, *kanna* represents a degeneration that betrays the characteristic rejection of words by patriarchal Zen. In contrast, Rinzai blames Sōtō for its single-minded attachment to dead sitting and for its failure to appreciate the dynamics of *zazen*. In the history of Zen, these criticisms have played certain roles in combating Zen dilettantism. But the significance of these criticisms is often exaggerated and used to obscure the fact that both *kanna* and sitting were adopted by the ancient masters of the two sects. Hakuin, the illustrious master of Rinzai of the late seventeenth century, did not hesitate to urge a sick monk to exploit the opportunity of being unburdened from daily activities due to his illness and focus on seated meditation, although Hakuin's criticism of silent illumination was by then already well known. He writes to the monk, in "Orategama II": "For effective meditation nothing is better than practice when one is ill" (Hakuin 1971, p. 75). Dōgen uses the *kōan* frequently and describes seated meditation as the "realization of the *kōan*" (*kōan genjō*). Despite his harsh criticism of Rinzai masters such as Ta-hui, Dōgen never regards himself as the founder of Sōtō in Japan. His disinterest in partisan polemics speaks best against the sectarian opposition of the later generations.

2. Forms of Zazen

Since we have acknowledged the fact that the feud between the two schools of Zen is mostly a mere sectarian gesture, shall we endorse the belief that there is no difference in the meditation practice between Sōtō and Rinzai? But, then, isn't it odd to say that while masters such as Ta-hui (Rinzai), Dōgen, and Hakuin are involved in the dispute, all the wringing of arms amounts to nothing? After all, there is little Zen outside *zazen*. If their dispute were in no way indicative of the underlying divergence in their respective practices, it would look as if the recurrent warnings in Dōgen's and Hakuin's writings against the perceived heretical paths of Zen meditation were much ado about nothing. Perhaps this is exactly the message that many of today's scholars are itching to spread. Bielefeldt once concluded that "[Dōgen's] vaunted *shikan taza* [只管打坐; Chin. *zhi-guan-da-zuo*, just sitting], when stripped of its theoretical trappings, is a rather unremarkable concentration exercise" (Bielefeldt 1988, p. 150).

Neutralizing the partisan polemics to either a purely theoretical level (Bielefeldt) or a matter of perspectives (Kasulis) is troubling for two reasons. First, one of the fundamental stances of Zen is that no theorization is necessary if it does not have any practical ramification. If the two scholars' views were right, the ancient Zen masters must have committed the sin of excessive theorization. But there is little incentive for

them to do have done so, for they are clearly not as sectarian as some of their followers.¹ Second, how could the perceived mechanical identity of *zazen* in Sōtō and Rinzai be compatible with the fact that while Rinzai prioritizes active meditation, Sōtō prefers quiet and silent meditation? It is hardly disputable that one's mental condition during seated meditation differs from that during walking or working meditation.² The fact that sitting and working are both employed by Dōgen and Hakuin as meditative measures does not dissolve the puzzle of why Dōgen prefers sitting and Hakuin working. The magnitude of the difference between the preferences of the two masters cannot be neutralized to a matter of personal taste or whimsical hubris on either side. The mechanical details of *zazen* must offer clues to the difference of prioritization in Sōtō and Rinzai, despite the danger of sectarianism.

Our task is twofold. On the one hand, we need to cool the zeal of partisans on both sides and give prominence to the fact that masters of both Sōtō and Rinzai share almost all the meditative techniques, *kanna* and sitting, active and "passive." On the other, we shall study the mechanical details of *zazen* in order to justify the initial choices of the preference of masters such as Hong-zhi (Sōtō) and Ta-hui, Dōgen, and Hakuin.

3. *Fu shiryō*, *Hi shiryō*, and *Manas*

The mechanical details of *zazen* are encoded in the two intriguing but elusive phrases *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*. *Fu shiryō* is the Japanese rendering of the Chinese *bu si-liang*, while *hi shiryō* is the Japanese for *fei si-liang*. Both Kasulis and Bielefeldt use "not-thinking" to translate *fu shiryō*, but Kasulis uses "without-thinking," and Bielefeldt uses "non-thinking" for *hi shiryō*. The best way for us to examine the two phrases is to start by reviewing Dōgen's two manuals of *zazen*—the focus of a brilliant book by Bielefeldt.

Dōgen modified his first version of *Fukan zazen gi* (the Tenpuku version) and replaced it with the second, so-called Vulgate version:

[Tenpuku] Whenever a thought occurs, be aware of it; as soon as you are aware of it, it will vanish. If you remain for a long period forgetful of objects, you will naturally become unified. This is the essential art of *zazen*.

[Vulgate] Sitting fixedly, think of *fu shiryō*. How do you think of *fu shiryō*? *Hi shiryō*. This is the essential art of *zazen*. (Bielefeldt 1988, p. 181)

While Tenpuku obviously represents the traditional technique of no-thought (Chin. *wu-nian* 無念; Jpn. *munen*), the individual character of the supposedly new technique, suggested by the use of the fresh phrase *hi shiryō* (*fu shiryō* is hardly different from *munen* as they are used in Classical Chinese), defies our understanding. The phrase *hi shiryō* by itself does not say much, for the negative prefixes *fu* and *hi* are, more often than not, interchangeable.

Out of the reason that there is practically "little to choose between the techniques of no-thought (in Tenpuku) and *hi shiryō* (in Vulgate)" (Bielefeldt 1988,

p. 150), Dōgen's modification looks to Bielefeldt as nothing but recapitulating "the old move from practical prescription to higher description and renders opaque what had once seemed fairly clear" (ibid., pp. 148–149). According to Bielefeldt, the mental mechanics of *zazen* remains virtually the same, but the mental mystery of *zazen* is augmented by the more poetic description in the Vulgate version.

Bielefeldt's diagnosis is significant, if correct. On the one hand, it virtually identifies *hi shiryō* with *fu shiryō*. On the other, since *fu shiryō* arguably represents the traditional no-thought technique adopted by Rinzai, there is no difference in *zazen* between Sōtō and Rinzai. It is this conclusion that leads Bielefeldt to observe, as already mentioned, that there is nothing remarkable about Dōgen's vaunted *shikan taza*.

In contrast to Bielefeldt's approach, Kasulis' laudable exploitation of phenomenology has led to some surprising discoveries. Kasulis believes that the differences between *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō* can be captured by disclosing their noetic attitudes and noematic contents. According to Kasulis, *fu shiryō* is negative thinking, "the negation or denial of *shiryō*" (Kasulis 1981, p. 72), but *hi shiryō* goes beyond *shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, accepts "the presence of ideation without either affirmation or denial" (p. 72), and assumes "no intentional attitude whatsoever" (p. 75). Apparently, Kasulis chooses to interpret *hi shiryō* along the line of the traditional no-thought (*munen*), and *fu shiryō* rather as something leading up to *hi shiryō*.

Like Bielefeldt, Kasulis is also committed to the view that there is little difference in the matter of *zazen* between Sōtō and Rinzai. According to Kasulis, the difference between Dōgen and Hakuin is a matter of perspectives. Dōgen stresses the unification between cultivation and authentication because he speaks "from the enlightened viewpoint of the Zen Master"—whereas Hakuin centers his discussion on realization, for he chooses to speak "from the unenlightened viewpoint of his students" (Kasulis 1981, p. 104).

It is not difficult to see the weaknesses in Bielefeldt's and Kasulis' exegeses. First of all, they cannot both be right because they contradict each other on the matter of *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*. While Bielefeldt admits that it is hard to separate the meaning of the two phrases, Kasulis' interpretation has a few apparent difficulties. His rendition of *hi shiryō* as the terminal state of *zazen* (cf. Kasulis 1981, p. 105) contradicts the Vulgate text. For the Vulgate clearly states that *hi shiryō* is the means to *fu shiryō*, not the other way around. In addition, his *fu shiryō* is ambiguous. It might mean the state of the absence of *shiryō*, or the process of eliminating it.³ The first meaning (the state of the absence of intentional thinking) ought to seem proper, but it contradicts Kasulis' characterization of *fu shiryō* as intentional (positional). He seems more inclined toward the second interpretation, although it receives little support either from language or the general literature of Zen.

There is a common weakness in Bielefeldt and Kasulis, too. They both find little to say about *shiryō*. This is unusual, for *shiryō* occupies the important position of being the stem word for the two phrases. Neither of them is apparently aware of a sophisticated doctrine of *shiryō* in the Buddhist tradition that Zen follows: that is, the doctrine of *manas*. *Manas* is the seventh consciousness in the mental spectrum

of the “mind-only” tradition.⁴ In order to understand fairly the phrases *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*, we must investigate the meaning of *manas*. We hope that the difference between *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō* can be captured based on evidence from within the Buddhist tradition. Their semantic difference should offer clues, we hope, for an eventual explanation of the Zen polemics.

In the next four sections we will investigate the cognitive functions of thinking (*shiryō*) per se before we return to the differences between *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō* and between Sōtō and Rinzai. Lack of research on *manas* in the West will inevitably hamper our exegetical study of *zazen*, despite the tremendous progress made in the last couple of decades in the study of Yogācāra (the most important school of the “mind-only” tradition).⁵ Because of this drawback we have to take a slight detour in introducing the concept of *manas*. Our point will eventually come down to this: there are two most significant mental features of *manas*: intentionality and discrimination. While *hi shiryō* transcends the discriminatory operations of the mind, *fu shiryō* represents a non-intentional stance toward mental objects.

4. *Manas and the Eight Consciousnesses*

The cognitive theory of the “mind-only” tradition divides the mind into three levels of eight *vijñānas*—the Buddhist term for consciousness—of which *manas* is the seventh. The first six *vijñānas*—eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body- and co-arising (*mano*)—are made possible by their corresponding six organs.⁶ The “mind-only” doctrine believes that the organs are the bases (*shadayatana*) for these *vijñānas* but not themselves conscious.

These organ-based *vijñānas* are apparently directly stimulated by things in the world and constitute the first level of consciousness.⁷ *Manas* forms the second level, the base of which is identical to the *vijñāna* itself. This non-separation of base and consciousness is significant for *manas*, for it means that *manas* is not conditioned by a material base in the same way as is the first group of *vijñānas*. As we will see in section 7, *manas* is able to turn itself away from its normal objects, an act called “revulsion” (*pravartate*; Chin. *zhuan* 轉; Jpn. *ten*), for no other reason than that it achieves its relative freedom from a foreign base.

Since the objects of *manas* are the outputs of the *vijñānas* at the first level, *manas* is apparently insulated from direct contact with external things. The last, also the third, level of consciousness, *ālaya-vijñāna* (Chin. *a-li-ye-shi* 阿梨耶識; Jpn. *ariya-shiki*) (the eighth consciousness), is the origin of all mental phenomena and functions primarily as an ontological concept in the “mind-only” theory.

5. *Manas: The Discriminative Mind*

In order to appreciate the cognitive significance of *manas*, one needs to grasp its role as the necessary condition for our knowledge of the external world. This puts the “mind-only” doctrine squarely in opposition to the once popular theory of direct perception (championed by the Sautrāntika school). The latter represents a position

to the effect that perception starts with and is completed by the sensory experiences. The “mind-only” doctrine insists that the outputs of our sensory experiences are unorganized, chaotic, and hardly deserving of the name “knowledge.” The editorial and organizational work that is necessary for the formation of knowledge out of the chaotic informational flow has to be completed by *manas*. It is *manas* that performs the discriminatory function of classification and categorization, which is all-important for knowledge to be possible.

That our sensory experiences are nondiscriminatory (*avikalpaka*) is reflected in their passive nature, their being placed at the receiving end of the flow of information. They are fed information by external stimulants and do not reprocess whatever they receive. “The operations of the five consciousnesses are crude and unstable. . . . [T]he five consciousnesses are incapable of intellectual operation; they only function externally” (Dharmapala 1973, p. 479).

Constructing a coherent image of an object requires collaboration among the sensory experiences—an image of an apple is an amalgam of various representations of its shape, smell, taste, and other features. But the content of visual perception does not of itself align with the auditory output. “Since the various consciousnesses are simultaneous, why are they not ‘associated’ (*samprayukta*)? Because they do not have the same object; even if they have the same object, they are different as to the nature and the number of their supporting bases (*asraya*)” (Dharmapala 1973, p. 497).⁸

Not only are particular properties not cognitively discriminated; universals (*samanyalakshana*) are not abstracted from particulars (*svalakshana*), either. An eye detects a particular shade of a color but does not see the color itself. Unable to draw the universal from the particular, the sensory perception leaves behind the tremendous arrays of veridical information as raw data. The informational flow is piecemeal and scattered. This inability on the part of perception to generalize over individual experiences also explains the momentariness of the sensual impressions. Recurrent identical particulars are never recognized as such. Memory is practically impossible, for it relies on conceptualization. Impressions come and go. Once an earlier impression vanishes, a new impression rushes in. This distinctive flow of information is described in the “mind-only” doctrine by the technical term “equal and no-gap dependence” (*samanantara-pratyaya*).

Peripheral perception does not involve thinking or reasoning. It lacks intelligence or understanding of its own cognitive activities. Although a sense can register the form and feature of an external object, it is never able to present a coherent picture of any object without the help of a higher cognitive faculty. The cognitive processes at the sensory level are intermittent and discontinuous, leaving their outputs always incoherent.

The significance of *manas* is easy to grasp once one understands the cognitive inadequacy of the senses, for *manas* accomplishes what the senses fail to do. Corresponding to the threefold inadequacy of sensory perceptions (no particularization, no conceptualization, and no articulated flow of information), *manas* as the discriminative mind achieves a threefold engineering feat. First, it reorganizes the chaotic

sensory output and composes out of it an articulated image of an external object. Second, *manas* is able to abstract the universals from the particulars and draw logical inferences that are essential for identifying, recollecting, and grouping the external impressions. Third, through cutting and pasting, *manas* channels and breaks the originally seamless informational flow and creates lines and boundaries that form distinct networks of informational categorizations.

D. T. Suzuki depicts a vivid picture of *manas* at work in the introduction to his translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Chin. *Leng-jia-jing* 楞加經; Jpn. *Shokikyo*): “What [the six *vijñānas*] experience is reported to the headquarters with no comment or interpretation. *Manas* sits at the headquarters and like a great general gathers up all the information coming from the six *vijñānas*. For it is he who shifts and arranges the reports and gives orders again to the reporters according to his own will and intelligence. The orders are then faithfully executed” (Suzuki 1932, p. xxiv).

6. *Manas: The Intentional Mind*

The fundamental difference between the theory of direct perception and “mind-only” cognitive psychology lies in the fact that while the theory of direct perception takes the perceptual objects as given, “mind-only” theory attributes the existence of these objects to the creative genius of *manas*. Objects seen in any meaningful fashion at the sensory level are nothing but feedback from *manas* after it has been fed the chaotic sensory outputs. The so-called given objects are actually the results of the editing work of *manas*. One sees an object as if it were ready at hand, whereas the truth is that the labor of *manas* has created this illusion. *Manas* objectifies—this reveals its second major characteristic: *manas* is a mind that carries cognitive intentionality.

For a perception to occur, all of the following three factors are necessary, according to “mind-only” psychology: the five sense organs (*indriyas*), the sense data (*viṣaya*; Chin. *jing* 境), and the intentionality (*manaskara*; Chin. *zuo yi* 作意).⁹ Intentionality is the foremost condition among the three, for it directs the mind to a particular mental image formed through *manas*’ discriminatory operations. It imputes the object image to the senses, isolating an object against its background and externalizing an internally selected group of sense data. According to “mind-only” theory, it is only after the commencement of the operation of *manaskara* that a perception in the true sense of the word begins to proceed.

Paramārtha, the ancient Indian Yogācārin who traveled to China and became one of the most important Samgraha (Chin. She-lun 攝論) masters, comments on the intentional aspect of mind:

[With] intending (*manaskara*) as the immediate cause, and external sense data as the secondary condition, consciousness occurs. If one’s intending, at first, desires to apprehend the two sense data of color and sound, then vision and hearing occur simultaneously and there will be two types of sense data [imputed onto an “external” object]. If one’s intending is directed toward a certain locus to see colors, hear sounds, and smell odors, then these three [vision, hearing, and smell] occur simultaneously and there will be three types

of sense data [imputed onto an “external” object] and so on; all the five consciousnesses may occur simultaneously or sequentially in a similar fashion. (Paramārtha 1975a, 62b10–14, at p. 1587)¹⁰

Intentionality as objectification also means the maturation of ego-awareness. Since knowledge consists of not just mental faculties (*grahaka*) and objects (*grahya*) but also a distinctive subject, the formation of an “I” concept constitutes the kernel of *manas*’ activities. As a result, two cognitive missions are accomplished through intentional objectification: an object image is projected and the ego formation comes into fruition. The externalized sense data are loaded with the imprints of an inner self as if they were the mirror image of the latter. What you see is what you are. Paramārtha speaks of the rich metaphysical implications of a plain act of cognition: “Discriminating refers to attachment to an ego (*ātma*), to sentient beings and to one who has sensations relating to the aggregate of form” (Paramārtha 1975b, 870c3–6, at p. 1617; cf. Paul 1984, p. 87).

In a word, *manas*, the intentional mind, is a creative and meticulous, albeit unconscious, laborer. It fashions an object image out of the sense data and draws attention to it. Epitomizing a person’s ego, *manas* becomes metaphysically significant because it reveals the centerpiece of that person’s worldview.

7. Ālaya and Revulsion

Before I use the mechanical details of thinking to explain *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, I must confront the over-delayed issue of the historical relevance of *manas* to the *zazen* practice of the Sudden School. There is no need for me to go on at length here. My pleading of relevancy will be brief and sketchy, but hopefully sufficient for its purpose.

(1) Initially, no other work than the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (where the theory about *manas* was first expounded) was used as the main text by patriarchal Zen. Its status as the *sūtra* for Zen remained unchallenged until Hui-neng 惠能 sanctified the *Diamond Sūtra*. But even afterwards, the influence of the mind-only tradition was still visible throughout Zen’s evolution.

For instance, Hui-neng uses *ālaya*, the eighth consciousness, to explain the original mind. His description of *ālaya* remains consistent with the earlier psychological literature. *Ālaya* is, according to him, calm and tranquil, and functions as the storehouse of everything there is. “Since the essence of mind is the embodiment of all dharmas, it is called the *ālaya-vijñāna*” (Hui-neng 1990, p. 143).

(2) The Sudden School’s sudden enlightenment (Chin. *wu* 悟; Jpn. *satori*) is obviously indebted to the concept of revulsion associated with *manas*. Since *ālaya* is the only ultimate true reality, all cognitive creations of *manas* amount to nothing but the “waves of multiplicity” in the *ālaya* ocean.¹¹ In the normal circumstance, *manas* is deluded by its own cognitive outputs. Once it realizes the suchness (*tathāgata*; Chin. *ru-lai* 如來; Jpn. *nyorai*) of *ālaya* and returns to *ālaya*’s absolute tranquil reality, the worldly entanglement derived from cognitive judgments will be cast off in a single

swoop. The “mind-only” doctrine calls this fundamental change of attitude originating in *manas* “revulsion” (*paravrtti*).

It is not difficult to see that the concept of revulsion foreshadows *satori*. Revulsion is drastic, radical, nonintellectual, and, most importantly, sudden. Before revulsion, *manas* thinks of its objects as real and mutually independent. After revulsion, things are laid bare in their original face (Chin. *ben-lai-mian-mu* 本來面目; Jpn. *honrai no memmoku*), shorn of their descriptive and normative extraneous superimpositions. Objects are seen by an awakened mind not as independent existents but rather as mere waves of the same water. This radical change in worldview is effected through a rude turnaround of a person’s whole existence. This radical turnaround can occur only in *manas*, for it is *manas* that is truly responsible for ego-vision and ego-manifestation, and *manas* is the only faculty that is able to “turn around” because of its relative freedom from a foreign, conditioning base (see section 4). In this sense, both the worldly entanglement and the hope of emancipation hinge on *manas*. If *manas* is deluded, we are deluded; if *manas* turns around, we are delivered. The Soteric significance of revulsion is evidenced by this famous *gatha* by Hui-neng: “When our mind is under delusion, Saddharmapundarika-sutra turns us around. With an enlightened mind we turn round the sutra instead” (Hui-neng 1990, p. 114).

Revulsion is also dubbed in Zen the “return to the source” (*fan-yuan*). For its elaboration, one can refer to sayings by masters such as Hong-zhi Zheng-jue 洪智正覺 (Jpn. Wanshi Shogaku) and Ma-zu Dao-yi 馬祖道一 (Jpn. Baso Dōitsu).¹²

In general, although the concept of *manas* and its cognitive features are only occasionally mentioned in the literature due to Zen’s characteristic aversion to excessive theorization, we can confidently say that much of *manas*’ mechanical process is tacitly assumed rather than rejected. Prior to the popularization of Zen, there is a long-standing tradition in the Chinese Buddhist literature to use *si-liang* (*shiryō*) to translate *manas*. Unless there exists evidence to show that there is a special usage of *si-liang* (*shiryō*) in the Zen tradition, we have no reason to refuse explicating by way of *manas* such concepts as *shiryō*, *fu shiryō*, and *hi shiryō* in *zazen*.

8. *Fu shiryō* or *No-thought*

In the ensuing exegesis, I will employ some necessary pedagogical means, even if this may lead to a slight distortion of the original picture. I will explain *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō* separately, despite the fact that the two modes of thinking interpenetrate each other in an actual process of *zazen*. A hair’s breadth is the difference between Heaven and Earth, as the Zen saying goes. A narrow difference such as that between Sōtō and Rinzai commands a hair-splitting, somewhat contrived analysis for features of which the distinctiveness is otherwise undetectable.

My working hypothesis takes *hi shiryō* as a rectification of the discriminative aspect and *fu shiryō* as a rectification of the intentional aspect of *manas*. My reason for this lies in a combination of factors including textual analysis, philosophical understanding, linguistic study, and, last but not least, intuition.¹³

Fu shiryō, or *munen* (no-thought), as a technique described in Tenpuku, represents the orthodox Zen approach to *zazen*. Hui-neng explains no-thought as unceasing thought (Chin. *nian-nian-bu-xi* 念念不息) that flows smoothly without sticking to objects. This reminds us of the pre-*manas* sensory sequence that is technically labeled “equal and no-gap dependence” (see section 5). Hui-neng states: “No-thought is to see and to know all *dharma*s with a mind free from attachment. When in use it pervades everywhere, and yet sticks no where” (Hui-neng 1990, p. 85).

If a mode of thinking were attached to its object, it would retard the fluidity of the sensory flow. As shown in sections 5 and 6, the attachment is derived from the objectifying effect of ego, or “the error of reification,” in Louis Nordstrom’s terms (1981, pp. 89–95). A rectification or negation of “reification” aims at a state where intentional thoughts are eliminated and objects are “forgotten” or de-objectified, and then one “will naturally become unified” (Tenpuku, in section 3).

This mysterious transition from one’s forgetting objects to one’s unifying the mind is no longer impenetrable, thanks to our knowledge of *manas*, the culprit of attachment. According to the “mind-only” doctrine, cognitive objects do not come into contact with us through direct perception but rather are externalized from within *manas*. Forgetting objects is therefore de-objectifying, which depends on the debunking of intentionality. For it is intentionality that creates an object image by projecting and externalizing the internally selected sense data. Debunking intentionality and the forgetting of objects are possible only after a fundamental change in one’s worldview such that one’s cognitions will be purified of all entangling elements, the foremost of which is ego-awareness. After a revulsion or turnaround, *manas* dissolves the entangling effect of ego and its self-externalization and returns to *ālaya*, the original storehouse of all things. Because of this, we can identify the process of mental unification achieved through de-objectification—which is described as the terminal state of no-thought in Tenpuku—with the process of *manas*’ returning to *ālaya* and seeing everything in its “original face.”

There is no reason to believe that debunking intentionality would throw the cognitive mind back to the pre-*manas* state of chaos and nondiscrimination. Zen clearly believes in the possibility of severing the intentional from the discriminative aspect of the mind. Although it may be impossible to discriminate without intentionality at the initial stage (for all initial discriminations arguably always carry the imprints of ego preferences), *zazen* is designed to enable the mind to withdraw its intentionality from discriminatory cognition after it is fulfilled. There is no perversion in this doctrine from the Zen perspective, for there is, after all, nothing wrong with discrimination itself as long as *manas* sees each thing in its suchness. What goes wrong with a deluded mind is not cognition per se, but a deluded worldview behind the cognition. Intentional debunking represents a metaphysical turnaround in the worldview, leaving cognitive discriminations purely descriptive, freed of all their emotional and normative elements. Hui-neng describes the non-intentional no-thought in the following manner, illustrating the state of the six consciousnesses when they are freed from intentional interferences: “[the six *viññānas*,] in passing through the six organs, will neither be defiled by nor attached to the six objects” (Hui-neng 1990, p. 114).

Emphasizing the contiguity of cognitive activities before and after revulsion, Hui-neng says, "These so-called transformations of consciousnesses are only changes of appellations and not a change of substance" (Hui-neng 1990, p. 117).

Before the revulsion of *manas*, a mountain is seen as a mountain and a river as a river. After the revulsion, a mountain is still seen as a mountain and a river as a river. The only difference between the mountain-river cognitions before and after the revulsion lies in the debunking of intentionality that happens during the revulsion. The Zen mystery of an awakened mind lies not so much in the fact that it sees a different world as in the fact that it sees the same world differently.

Corresponding to the delusions of the intentional mind, as revealed in section 6, the mechanical blueprint of *fu shiryō* shall contain three aspects. First is de-objectification, which does not mean that objects are literally wiped out of the mind, but rather are viewed without emotional or normative attachment. Second is deflation of ego or intentional striving. Dōgen says, "To study the self is to forget the self. To forget the self is to be actualized by myriad things" (Dōgen 1985, p. 70). He also warns his students against personal craving for Buddhahood: "Do not desire to become a Buddha; letting sitting or lying down drop away" (ibid., p. 29). Third is unification with thoughts in their original suchness, or, as quoted above from Dōgen, "to be actualized by myriad things."

The non-intentional nature of no-thought is epitomized in Zen by the state of everydayness. When hungry, eat; when thirsty, drink. Any striving based on personal ambition, including seeking Buddhahood, is derided as demonically heretical. As seen by a discriminatory but non-intentional mind, things leap out by themselves and display true multiplicity without defilement. Perhaps no one says this better than Dōgen: "To carry yourself forward and experience myriad things is delusion. That myriad things come forth and experience themselves is awakening" (Dōgen 1985, p. 69).

9. *Hi shiryō*

Unlike *fu shiryō* or no-thought, *hi shiryō* is not a widely used term. Its importance for Dōgen is obvious unless one denies its distinctive status in relation to *fu shiryō*, as happens in the case of Bielefeldt. The word "*hi*" in *hi shiryō* does not suggest an absence of thinking but rather a continuous act of going beyond thinking. At another place in Dōgen's writing, *hi* is used in the same sense as going beyond.¹⁴ How much value one should place on this linguistic analogy in construing *hi shiryō* is largely a philosophical decision. Whatever one's choice is, it is difficult to find any substantive evidence to support that choice. I have no intention to overplay this coincidence.

While *fu shiryō* is a rectification of intentionality that preserves discrimination, *hi shiryō* is a rectification of discrimination that preserves certain aspects of intentionality. In *hi shiryō*, the maintained intentional stance does not represent ego-attachment but only reflects the effort one makes for one's cultivation. As a rectifying process, *hi shiryō* does not annihilate but transcends discrimination. If a mind of no-

thought (*fu shiryō*) sees a mountain as a mountain and a river as a river, a mind of *hi shiryō* would refuse to see them as a mere mountain or river. It sees them from a much larger perspective. According to Dōgen, seeing from a larger perspective is the true meaning of transcending.

Dōgen illustrates the act of transcending (i.e., transcending cognitive discrimination) by giving physical movement a phenomenological reinterpretation:

When you study someone's movement, the movement is not merely starting or stopping. The movement that starts or stops is not that person's. Do not take up starting or stopping and regard it as the person's movement. The cloud's flying, the moon's traveling, the boat's going, and the shore's moving are all like this. Do not foolishly be limited by a narrow view. (Dōgen 1985, p. 132)

From a larger perspective, the ordinary distinctions between boat and shore, moon and water, body and mind, and moving and stopping drop away. A blade of grass is a sixteen-foot golden body.¹⁵ Dōgen's fondness of this theme is evidenced by much of his deconstructionist hermeneutic play of words. In "Twining Vines," he takes up Bodhidharma's comments on the achievements of his students. In the comments, Bodhidharma compares the first student's understanding to the attainment of his skin, the second student's to that of his flesh, and the third student's to that of his bones, and, when Hui-ke finishes his speech by not speaking at all, Bodhidharma compares Hui-ke's understanding to the attainment of his marrow. Dōgen claims that only the vulgar would think that Bodhidharma implies that Hui-ke is better or more advanced than the first three students. According to Dōgen, there is in fact no difference between "skin, flesh, bones and marrow" (Dōgen 1985, pp. 169–171). We will return to this theme in section 11.

Although we try to go beyond the ordinary appearances of things and think of them from a larger perspective, their individual characters are retained in the mind. In fact, *hi shiryō* gives thoroughly individualized treatment to each blade of grass, each piece of skin and flesh, and each drop of morning dew. In *hi shiryō*, all relative relations drop away. Each individual at each moment and place is complete by itself. This state of Zen momentariness Dōgen calls *zenki* 全機, (Chin. *quan-ji*), "undivided activity." *Hi shiryō* strives to study each individual existence, positing an intentional abidance that is remarkably different from the everydayness of no-thought. In his "Instructions for the Tenzo 典座 [Chin. Dian-zuo]," Dōgen uses the story of a monk's meticulous washing of rice to illustrate this point: "Watch closely with clear eyes; do not waste any one grain. Wash it in the proper way, put it in a pot, make a fire, and boil it. An ancient master said, "When you boil rice, know that the water is your own life" (Dōgen 1985, p. 55).

As a rectifying process, *hi shiryō* manifests a strenuous effort to transcend the usual conceptual categorizations. Corresponding to the functions of a discriminative mind, as seen in section 5, the mechanical blueprint of *hi shiryō* shall also contain three aspects, paralleling the structure of no-thought: (1) Go beyond the particularization of things. Refuse to see a mountain as a mountain or a river as a river. (2) Go beyond the conceptualization of individual things. See things in their momentari-

ness. “The moon you see tonight is not last night’s moon. You should thoroughly study that tonight’s moon, from beginning to end, is tonight’s moon” (Dōgen 1985, p. 130). (3) Maintain intentional abidance. Focus on and be attached to the current mental or physical phenomenon, however insignificant it is. Identify your whole life with it and live in the moment. When you read a *kōan*, you realize the *kōan*. When washing a grain of rice, you become the grain.

10. Dōgen’s Tripartite Progress

Dōgen’s tripartite illustration of actualizing a *kōan* concords with our theory of *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*:

[1] As all things are Buddha-*dharma*, there is delusion and realization, and birth and death, and there are Buddhas and sentient beings.

[2] As the myriad things are without an abiding self, there is no delusion, no realization, no Buddha, no sentient beings, no birth and death.

[3] The Buddha way is basically leaping clear of the many and the one; thus there are birth and death, delusion and realization, sentient beings and Buddhas. (Dōgen 1985, p. 69)

In [1], things are discriminated according to their phenomenal properties. There is a difference between Buddhas and sentient beings, and the difference lays the foundation for the need of enlightenment. In [2], enlightening represents a transcending effort going beyond ordinary discriminations, and things are seen from a larger perspective. The difference between Buddhas and sentient beings is transcended and there is no realization or Buddhahood to be reached. In [3], when the distinction between the many and the one is transcended, things are perceived in their true multiplicity again. Cognitive discriminations are cleared of the entangling intentionality, and the phenomenal properties of things are given the utmost justification for their completeness.

In other words, [1] represents *manas* or thinking, [2] represents *hi shiryō*, and [3] represents *fu shiryō*.

11. Sloughing off, Figuring, and Riding

Having revealed the difference between *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, we are still one step away from our final goal: to show that there is a genuine theoretical and practical disparity between Sōtō and Rinzai. Both schools practice *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, even if the two processes are separable, as this essay has been arguing. In addition, this essay does not deny Bielefeldt’s thesis that *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, due to a typical ambivalence on the part of Zen (cf. Bielefeldt 1988, p. 150), are not separated in actual *zazen* practice. It is this ambivalence that has prompted Bielefeldt to conclude that the theoretical discordance between Sōtō and Rinzai is not reflected in the mental mechanics of *zazen*.

However, it is well known that Dōgen stresses the cultivating aspect of sitting in meditation (Chin. *zuo-chan* 坐禪; Jpn. *zazen*) more than one's attaining and maintaining an enlightened state of mind, whereas Ta-hui is inclined to the contrary. It is also well known that, at least in theory, Sōtō generally tends to collapse ends into means, whereas Rinzai takes the attainment of ends as the sole justification of means. If *hi shiryō* primarily as means is separable from *fu shiryō* primarily as goal, it would be very surprising that the methodological difference in combining the two makes no difference to *zazen*.

In combining *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*, if the latter is absorbed into the former, the *zazen* of *hi shiryō* would represent, based on our hypothesis, one's continuous striving for going beyond particularization and conceptualization while maintaining one's intentional abidance with an occurrent momentary phenomenon (section 9). It is to our satisfaction to confirm that this intentional effort of constant transcending fits well with Dōgen's *shikan taza*.

Shikan taza represents such a radical effort in transcending the discriminatory cognition that every possible dichotomy falls away, including that between practice (Chin. *xiu* 修; Jpn. *shu*) and verification (Chin. *zheng* 證; Jpn. *shō*), body and mind, Buddhas and sentient beings, word and meaning, beginner and advanced, in motion and still, "skin, flesh, bones and marrow," et cetera. The act of transcending itself ceases to be a mere means for the realization of an extraneous goal. Instead, the act of seeking enlightenment is enlightenment, and sitting in meditation meditates on nothing but sitting itself. The completeness of sitting or transcending, which needs no extraneous justification, is approved by Dōgen in his famous saying, "the practice of an embodied Buddha does not make a Buddha [Chin. *zuo-fo* 坐佛; Jpn. *sabutsu*]," nor does a "seated Buddha" (Chin. *zuo-fo* 坐佛; Jpn. *zabutsu*) interfere with making a Buddha (Dōgen 1985, pp. 145, 149).

Dōgen's advocating means over ends, or cultivation over verification, makes it possible for us to offer a comparison between him and today's postmodernism, especially in the aspect concerning philosophy of language.¹⁶ Words become curious "toys" in Dōgen's hands. When Dōgen reads a *kōan*, words are the activities, games, and lives of those masters who issued them, a far cry from the static imagery of a finger pointing at the moon. "Words are bits and pieces of leaping out" (Dōgen 1985, p. 171). It is clear that he identifies actualizing the Buddha with actualizing a *kōan*, through whose words a sitter inherits the lives of the past masters, and the lives of the masters and disciples become entangled like "twining vines."

In contrast with Rinzai's mental vacuity (Chin. *xiong-zhong-wu-shi* 胸中無事; Jpn. *kyōkin buji*), which is a state of calm and peace (cf. Bielefeldt, p. 136), Dōgen's *shikan taza* takes on a strong intentional feature in being a "single-minded exertion" (Chin. *zhuan-yi-gong-fu* 專一工夫; Jpn. *sen'ichi kufū*) in pursuing the way (cf. *ibid.*, p. 146). The master Nan-yüeh once asked Ma-zu, who always sat in meditation, "Worthy one, what are you figuring to do, sitting there in meditation?" Dōgen focuses his attention on the word "figuring" (Chin. *tu* 圖): "Does it mean that there must be some figuring above and beyond seated meditation? Is there no path to be figured outside of seated meditation? Should there be no figuring at all? Or does it

ask what kind of figuring occurs at the very time we are practicing seated meditation?" (Dōgen 1985, p. 191).

Figuring is the intentional effort to make a Buddha. But the meaning of the act of figuring to make a Buddha lies not in making a Buddha but in the figuring itself. A figuring to make a Buddha is the act of "sloughing off" and going beyond the duality of mind and body, Buddha and sentient beings. According to Dōgen, the entire tradition of transmitting mind-seal (*ishin denshin*) is entangled in this figuring (Dōgen 1985, p. 192).

The situation of your making a Buddha is like your riding a boat. According to Dōgen, "The boat gives you a ride and without the boat no one could ride. But you ride in the boat and your riding makes the boat what it is" (Dōgen 1985, p. 85).

Shikan taza is the act of singled-minded riding. Its riding is not aimed at reaching a destination but rather at making the boat what it is. The rider does not plan to reach "the other shore" but simply rides out the meaning of the boat by continuously rowing with the oar.

12. Sōtō and Rinzai

Rinzai's *zazen* definitely contains *hi shiryō*, too—that is, an intentional effort at transcending discriminatory cognition. For example, disciples of Ta-hui are constantly urged to make a great effort in studying a *kōan*, removing "the paths of birth-and-death," eliminating "the paths of the profane and the sacred," stopping "discriminative thinking," and transcending "gain and loss, right and wrong" (Ta-hui 1996, p. 191). Since both Dōgen and Ta-hui embrace the *kanna* practice, Bielefeldt argues that there is no reason to believe that their philosophical difference affects the mental mechanics of their respective approaches to *zazen*. This essay claims that the methodological difference in engineering the combination of *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō* does make a difference to the mechanics of *zazen*, as long as there are some discernible differences between *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō*.

The fact that *hi shiryō* remains primarily a means to *fu shiryō* in Rinzai shows the uniqueness of its response to this common Zen question: if everyone is already Buddha, why do we need to be concerned with a goal that is already "attained"? In contrast to Sōtō's radical rejection of the dichotomy between means and ends, Rinzai's resolute focus on the obtaining of the goal (Buddhahood) necessarily limits the play of its means (cultivation).

A Rinzai disciple is urged to use a *wato* 話頭 (Chin. *hua-tou*), or "saying," to seek a breakthrough. Looking at a *wato* is primarily a process of *hi shiryō* or transcending discriminative thinking. But different from Dōgen's "just keep looking" (Chin. *kan-lai-kan-qu* 看來看去; Jpn. *kan rai kan kyo*), which is a continuous, prolonged process of attentive meditation on the words themselves, a Rinzai disciple looks instead for a breakthrough.¹⁷ In a Rinzai training session, once a breakthrough is reached, this particular process of *hi shiryō* ends. It often happens that a breakthrough takes a long time to be reached or even may never be reached, but that means no more than the elongation of an intentional struggle before the state of calm and peace is

reached or, in the second scenario, simply an utter failure. No matter how long the intentional struggle continues, the ultimate goal of *zazen* in Rinzai is not maintaining this struggle but getting over it and attaining peace. As Hakuin describes in his autobiography, he suffered so severe a mental crisis (trying to break the Mu *kōan*) that he “stretched in the mud as though dead, scarcely breathing and almost unconscious” (Hakuin 1971, p. 119).¹⁸ The reason a Rinzai session could be so intense lies in the fact that *hi shiryō* remains a means to *fu shiryō* and a non-attainment of *fu shiryō* threatens to undermine the meaning of *hi shiryō*. None of this sort of intense struggle happens in *shikan taza*, during which process a person seeks no extraneous goal, and only looks back and forth at the words when he or she takes up a *kōan*. The setup of *zazen* in Rinzai assumes a separation of ends and means and the disparity between the beginner and the advanced. The practice of *hi shiryō* is a maturation process, a process of intermittent training. But the means becomes, or displaces, the end in Sōtō, and the difference between beginner and advanced is dissolved by the act of sitting itself. The practice of *hi shiryō* in Sōtō is not so much a training session or a maturation process as the ongoing communication between the past masters and living students.

The mechanical difference between Rinzai and Sōtō can therefore be recapitulated as follows. *Zazen* in Rinzai is a series of self-contained training processes, in which each individual process starts with an intentional effort of *hi shiryō* and ends with a non-intentional *fu shiryō*. When an old *wato* is broken through, a new *wato* restarts the whole process. But in Sōtō, *hi shiryō* is *fu shiryō*. *Zazen* is a single process of sitting and looking, starting with the ancient masters and being carried on by each individual practitioner. There is never a breakthrough, nor a progress.

It should now become clear how the details of *zazen* practice can explain the Zen polemics, without excusing sectarianism. Rinzai seeks multileveled breakthroughs in *zazen*,¹⁹ whereas Sōtō seeks the perpetuation of *zazen* itself. A breakthrough can happen at any time or place. Secular activities do not interfere with enlightenment, but facilitate it. Since breakthroughs cannot be planned or anticipated, an act with a mind of no-thought (*fu shiryō*) can prepare an unprepared mind for a breakthrough to alight. In contrast, Sōtō sees *zazen* as enlightenment itself. Seeking enlightenment is seeking *zazen*. What could possibly serve the purpose of seeking better than *zazen* itself? There is no need to be distracted by mundane activities beyond what is absolutely necessary.

13. Concluding Remarks: The Intentionality of Sitting

Without a clear appreciation of the mechanical differences between Sōtō and Rinzai, a person can easily be confused by the intentional features of each sect's *zazen* practice. On the one hand, since *hi shiryō* is itself an intentional effort at transcending discriminations, Sōtō meditation is naturally tinged with intentionality. On the other hand, while Rinzai meditation displays an even more dynamic intentional struggle in its seeking a breakthrough, Sōtō meditation appears to be placid and uneventful and apparently lacks intentionality. Because of this phenomenon, a Rin-

zai master could criticize Sōtō practitioners for putting too much intentional effort at “making a Buddha,” while simultaneously blaming them for making no effort and behaving like a piece of dead wood.

In fact, Bielefeldt notices this quirky phenomenon, but his denial of the mechanical disparity between Sōtō and Rinzai has rendered him powerless to explain away the paradox. In one place he comments:

Unlike the famous Ch’an teachings that emphasize the spontaneous, unintentional character of the practice and tend to reduce it—at least in theory—to a sudden return to, or recognition of, the original nature of the mind, Dōgen prefers to stress what might almost be called the intentionality of enlightenment and to interpret Buddhahood as the ongoing commitment to make a Buddha. (Bielefeldt 1988, p. 145)

In another place, Bielefeldt acknowledges the traditional sectarian view on this matter:

[The tradition of modern Zen polemics] understands the two terms *shikan taza* and *kanna* as referring to mutually incompatible techniques of mental training—one [*shikan taza*] that abandons all fixed objects of concentration and all conscious striving for *satori* and simply abides in the undefiled awareness of the Buddha nature, the other that focuses the mind on the *wato* and intentionally strives to break through the “great doubt” (*daigi*) in a sudden experience of awakening. (Bielefeldt 1988, p. 152)

Being unable to offer a good explanation of the apparent paradox, Bielefeldt chooses to dismiss in toto the latter view and attributes it to sectarian spite and exaggeration. Bielefeldt’s conviction in the identification of *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō* deprives him of the chance to offer an adequate explanation of the feud between Sōtō and Rinzai.

In this essay, my effort at separating *hi shiryō* and *fu shiryō* should not be taken out of context and interpreted as evidence for my commitment to sectarianism. Both *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō* figure in each sect’s *zazen* scheme. The two sects share almost all the known techniques of *zazen* training. However, their technical affinity does not void the significance of the Zen polemics. After all, there are minute but significant differences in the mechanical details. This essay has tried to achieve a delicate balance between sectarianism and a total disregard for it. In this essay we introduced the concept of *manas* and, with its help, explained *fu shiryō* and *hi shiryō*. As far as I can see, this endeavor by itself, although sketchy, should constitute an initial call for the attention of many better-equipped scholars in the field to study the largely neglected topic concerning the legacy of the mind-only tradition inherited by Zen.

Notes

- 1 – Although Bielefeldt’s above-mentioned comment is directed against Dōgen only, he might as well have said something similar against Hakuin.

- 2 – For instance, in seated meditation, a person can register no discrimination of an individual object against others. A grain can be seen as a speck of dust. But in a working meditation, a grain needs to be seen as a grain, not as a speck of dust. The phenomenal boundaries of individual objects have to be cognized in working meditation in order to steer one's way among a myriad things.
- 3 – Kasulis also talks of blanking out one's mind as *fu shiryō* (cf. Kasulis 1981, p. 74).
- 4 – I use the mind-only tradition to refer to both the school of Yogācāra and the views associated with the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is generally accepted as an earlier text than Yogācāra. Both hold the mind-only theory, although "mind-only" in the former is often *cittamatra* in Sanskrit (Chin. *wei-shi* 唯識; Jpn. *yuishiki*) while it is *vijñaptimatra* in the latter. There are subtle differences between *citta* and *vijñapti*. But they are marginal to the issue of *manas*. Views on *manas* on both sides are very much consistent with each other.
- 5 – Scholars such as Diana Paul, Thomas Wood, Alex Wayman, and Thomas McEvilley, among others, have published books and articles on the study of this field.
- 6 – As it appears, the name of the sixth consciousness (*manovijñāna*; Chin. *yi-shi* 意識; Jpn. *ishiki*) is the same as *manas*, the seventh. But there is no reason here for us to be confused by this license of naming. I recommend a reader to rename the sixth as the co-arising (or accompanying) consciousness, for "co-arising" is its chief function. Furthermore, since the significance of the sixth consciousness and its comparison to *manas* are irrelevant to the mechanical details of the thinking process, we will skip over the sixth consciousness in the rest of this essay. Whenever we talk about the sensory experiences in the ensuing sections, we refer only to the first five *vijñānas*.
- 7 – Here I describe the cognitive phenomena based on their apparent operations. But, as the next two sections will show, these appearances belie a much more active role in the objectification of *manas*.
- 8 – This is equivalent to saying that the five senses are, in today's terms, domain-specific and information-encapsulated. See Fodor 1989.
- 9 – Intentionality is the mark of the mental and the core function of *manas*. See *Da Zang Jing* 1975, vol. 31, p. 851, or Dharmapala 1973, p. 479.
- 10 – This translation is based on Diana Paul's rendition (1984, pp. 76–77).
- 11 – See *The Lankavatara Sutra* (Suzuki 1932, p. 42).
- 12 – Zhen-jue: "When the six senses return to their source, they are thoroughly effective and clear" (Cleary 1997, p. 85). Ma-Zu stresses that in *fan-yuan* 返源 (return to source) there lies the thread-thin difference between the ignorant and the enlightened: "All the ignorant from the past eons have never wandered off the *samādhi* of the *dharma* nature, clad in clothes and fed on food, talking

to others and using their six senses—all their actions are *dharma* nature. Only because they do not know how to return to the source, they pursue fame and go after objectivity. . . . [I]f they just return to the original illumination in virtue of a single idea, all would be the sacred mind” (Dong-qun 1997, p. 147).

- 13 – I have decided not to be too concerned with defending my hypothesis before we proceed to investigate whether or not it is working. For people who are concerned with the exegetical validity of my approach—a legitimate concern by all means—I urge them to examine the evidence I will present when I flesh out the details of my hypothesis.
- 14 – Dōgen quotes in his “Going Beyond Buddha” a conversation between Dongshan Wu-ben and a monk. Wu-ben told an assembly: “You should know something going beyond Buddha.” A monk asked, “Who is someone going beyond Buddha?” The master said, “hi (Chin. *fei*)-Buddha” (Dōgen 1985, p. 205).
- 15 – A famous *kōan* and cited in Yuan-wu-ke-qin (1992, case 4).
- 16 – We are not going to pursue this theme in this essay. Readers are urged to read Foshay (1994, pp. 543–558) and Appelbaum (1983, pp. 469–477).
- 17 – Hakuin urges students to read the verses of Fu Ta-shih if they want to test their seeing into their own nature. Understanding Fu’s enigmatic verses, such as “empty-handed, but holding a hoe,” or, “it is the bridges that flow and the water that stands still,” demands a mental crisis before breakthrough is reached. See “Orategama I” (Hakuin 1971, pp. 59–60).
- 18 – Suzuki also relates that a Rinzai disciple in the process of looking at a *wato* often suffers terrible despair and even the prospect of death in his failure to reach a breakthrough (Suzuki 1965, p. xxi).
- 19 – Hakuin speaks of the view that a person needs no breakthrough as “trashy understanding.” According to Hakuin, many-layered, great or small, and countless breakthroughs constitute the dynamics of a master’s *zazen* experiences. See “Orategama I” (Hakuin 1971, pp. 64–69).

References

- Appelbaum, D. 1983. “On Turning a Zen Ear.” *Philosophy East and West* 33 (2): 469–477.
- Bielefeldt, Carl. 1988. *Dōgen’s Manuals of Zen Meditation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cleary, Thomas, trans. and ed. 1997. *The Five Houses of Zen*. Boston: Shambhala Publications.
- Da Zang Jing*. 1975. *Dazheng yuan ban, Xiu ding ban 1 ban*. Taipei: Xin Wen Feng Chuban Gongsi.

- Dharmapala. 1973. *Vijnaptimatrasiddhi [Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun]*. Translated by Wei-tat. Hong Kong: Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun Publication Committee.
- Dōgen. 1985. *Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master Dōgen*. Edited by Kazuaki Tanahashi. New York: North Point Press.
- Dong-qun, ed. 1997. *Zheng Fa Yen Zang*. Taibei: Fo Guan Publisher.
- Fodor, J. 1989. *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Foshay, T. A. 1994. "Denegation, Nonduality, and Language in Derrida and Dōgen." *Philosophy East and West* 44 (3): 543–558.
- Hakuin. 1971. *The Zen Master Hakuin: Selected Writings*. Translated by Philip B. Yampolsky. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hui-neng. 1990. "The Sutra of Hui-neng." In *The Diamond Sutra and The Sutra of Hui-neng*, translated by A. F. Price and Wong Mou-lam. Boston: Shambhala Publications.
- Kasulis, T. P. 1981. *Zen Action, Zen Person*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Nordstrom, Louis. 1981. "Mysticism without Transcendence: Reflections on Liberation and Emptiness." *Philosophy East and West* 31 (1): 89–95.
- Paramārtha. 1975a. "Zhuan Shi Lun." In *Da Zang Jing* 1975.
- . 1975b. "San Wu Xin Lun." In *Da Zang Jing* 1975.
- Paul, Diana. 1984. *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China: Paramartha's "Evolution of Consciousness"*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Suzuki, D. T. 1932. "Introduction." In Bunyiu Nanjo, ed., *The Lankavatara Sutra*, translated by D. T. Suzuki. London: G. Routledge and Sons.
- . 1965. "Early Memories." In *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk*. New York: University Books.
- Ta-hui. 1996. "Selected Letters of Ta-hui Tsung-Kao." In Nelson Foster and Jack Shoemaker, eds., *A New Zen Reader*. New York: Ecco Press.
- Yuan-wu-ke-qin. 1992. *The Blue Cliff Record*. Translated by Thomas Cleary. Boston: Shambhala Publications.