

Purifying Zen

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Purifying Zen

Watsuji Tetsurō's *Shamon Dōgen*

Translated and with Commentary by
Steve Bein



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To the memory of my *sensei*
Yuasa Yasuo

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FOREWORD

The Japanese book *Shamon Dōgen* is important for multiple reasons. First, it represents a crucial turn both for modern Japanese philosophy and for its author, Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), a major Japanese thinker of the twentieth century. At the beginning of that century Japanese intellectuals heatedly debated the meaning of the term “philosophy” and whether it applies to premodern, pre-Westernized Japanese thought. As an academic subject, philosophy arrived in Japan with the waves of Western influences in the late nineteenth century. The philosophy faculty of the newly founded secular universities, often foreigners brought to Japan for that purpose, typically taught in English or German. The young generation of Japanese philosophers often specialized early in their career on a specific philosopher or school of philosophy. Even as a university student, Watsuji was already becoming Japan’s promising new expert on the existentialist philosophies of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. So it was noteworthy when he suddenly turned to analyzing the life and thought of a medieval Japanese thinker, Zen Master Dōgen (1200–1253). By Watsuji’s own account, a conversation with his father sometime around 1918 precipitated the change. A small-town doctor practicing Chinese traditional medicine and steeped in the Confucian classics, the father chastised his son for the direction his career was taking. How, he asked, does such scholarship help Japanese society, indeed help humanity, address the social upheaval and cultural crisis of the times? Did not the *au courant* fascination with existentialism and its Western brand of individualism erode the foundation of traditional Japanese values? Stunned by the reproach, Watsuji turned his critical skills, honed by his studies in Western philosophy and literary criticism, to reengaging his own culture and its traditions, studying its art, architecture, texts, and spiritual foundations. The essays that became *Shamon Dōgen* grew out of that shift in focus.

Shamon Dōgen also radically altered Dōgen’s status in Japanese

intellectual history, transforming him from being a revered and little-read patriarch of Sōtō Zen Buddhism into one of the major philosophers of East Asian Buddhism. A gifted writer as well as astute philosopher, Watsuji's narrative gave his general readers access to the broad details of Dōgen's life and thought, while simultaneously opening the intricacies of Dōgen's ideas to the more technically inclined philosophical audience. Because of Watsuji's book, Dōgen the man could now walk among us as a fellow human being on a spiritual quest; Dōgen the thinker could now engage us in intellectual roundtables, holding his own as a creative and perceptive philosopher.

The English-language book *Purifying Zen: Watsuji Tetsurō's "Shamon Dōgen"* is also important for multiple reasons. First, it makes available in a clear and fluid translation this early classic in modern Japanese philosophy. Steve Bein's annotations, introduction, and commentary bridge the gap separating not only the languages but also the cultures of its original readers and its new Western audience. In the initial years of this project, Bein worked closely with Yuasa Yasuo (1925–2005), who was not only one of Watsuji's most prominent students but also a major philosopher in his own right. Throughout his career, Yuasa pondered the similarities and differences between Japanese and Western thought. When Shigenori Nagatomo and I worked with Yuasa in translating his *The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory*, we were repeatedly stunned by his vast knowledge of both Western and Asian thought. Steve Bein was fortunate to have such a first-rate scholar and philosopher as a mentor. Both the influence of Watsuji on Yuasa and the influence of Yuasa on Bein are visible in *Purifying Zen*.

Purifying Zen is an important addition to the corpus of Watsuji's writings available in English. Watsuji has only recently begun to receive the attention in the West that he deserves. Most of the European and American focus on modern Japanese philosophy has centered on the Kyoto School philosophers, especially Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). As Bein explains in the introduction to this book, Watsuji was only marginally associated with the Kyoto School, and in many ways he represents a different model of philosophizing. Much of the early Kyoto School was steeped in the rhetoric and problematics of German idealism, frequently leading to the abstract interplay of Hegelian-like concepts enriched by key Buddhist ideas such as “nothingness.” Whatever influences from Asian thought one might discover (or read into) Nishida's writings, for the most part, he avoided direct references to Eastern philosophers. In

his early writings, Tanabe was not much different. As the Kyoto School developed, however, some of its major figures, such as Nishitani Keiji, Takeuchi Yoshinori (1913–2002), and Ueda Shizuteru (1926–), began to attend more to the existential and concrete implications of the theories. Moreover, this second and third generation of Kyoto School philosophers embraced in their analyses such premodern Japanese thinkers as Shinran (1173–1262) and Dōgen. As a result, the Kyoto School is no longer detached from Japan’s past and its cultural traditions. Watsuji’s writings were an impetus—generally unacknowledged by the Kyoto School writers themselves—to this shift in focus and style. Let us now consider Watsuji’s text itself to see how he brought about this shift.

First, as Steve Bein points out in his introduction, Watsuji’s fascination with Dōgen was probably in part due to the literary quality of Dōgen’s writings. As Bein explains, Watsuji loved literature and as a youth aspired to a literary career of his own. This literary bent may also explain his early interest in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Watsuji wrote his university thesis on Schopenhauer, but only because Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), the head of Tokyo’s Philosophy Department, insisted that he submit a study on a “real philosopher,” not Nietzsche. Still, even Schopenhauer has literary qualities absent in Kant or Hegel, the primary targets of study in the early period of modern Japanese philosophy. Consequently, in *Shamon Dōgen* we find Watsuji the philosophical stylist writing about Dōgen the Zen stylist. Toward the end of the final chapter, Watsuji focuses directly on Dōgen’s theory of *expressing* the truth. For his own concerns about language and its relation to philosophical truth, Watsuji found in Dōgen a kindred spirit.

The existential connection between life and thought is another theme bridging Watsuji’s early interests in Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dōgen. For Watsuji philosophy only exists in its thinkers: human beings living in specific cultural, historical, and social contexts, struggling to create meaning in their daily lives. For Watsuji, philosophy is not about ideas, but about people with ideas. *Shamon Dōgen*’s initial chapters stress the everyday, explaining the circumstances in which both early Indian Buddhism and Dōgen’s thought took form. This discussion served Watsuji’s humanization, even demythologization, of the iconic Dōgen. The halo of religious veneration had blinded the Japanese to the personality of the concrete, fallible, finite human being who gave birth to Japanese Sōtō Zen. To make Dōgen more human, Watsuji repeatedly quotes from the text called *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, a collection of Dōgen’s sayings and deeds as presented through the reminiscences of his

devout disciple and successor, Ejō. In those snippets we find Dōgen most engaged in the daily practice of being a monk and a Zen master: answering student queries, giving practical advice, and adjusting his message to the practical needs of his followers. The practice, not the theory, of Zen is most visible there. For Watsuji's readers who had thought of Dōgen only as a sage from the distant past with an enlightenment so profound as to be beyond the grasp of ordinary people, this new account was eye-opening.

In the essays that constitute the later chapters in the book, by contrast, Watsuji becomes more reflective, analyzing Dōgen's ideas more than his way of life. Here he quotes mainly from the Zen master's major collection of philosophical essays, *Shōbōgenzō*. At one point, Watsuji compares and contrasts Dōgen's idea of compassion with that of the founder of Shin Buddhism, Shinran. Today's reader of the history of Japanese philosophy might not be surprised by such a comparison. After all, Dōgen and Shinran were contemporaries, and, although from different Buddhist traditions, they shared a time and place. Yet, before *Shamon Dōgen*, such comparisons were rare. Shinran "belonged to" Shin Buddhism and its scholars, while Dōgen "belonged to" Sōtō Zen Buddhism and its scholars. Such comparisons (except for occasional lapses into interreligious polemics) were not considered appropriate. Therefore, Watsuji's comparison was another step in freeing the two thinkers from the sectarian religious attitudes that had isolated them not only from each other but also from their supposed followers.

In his reflections developed in the book's final chapter, Steve Bein adds one further twist to this tale. He highlights the differences in Watsuji's analysis of Dōgen from the ones commonly found in English-language studies today, especially in regard to such issues as the role of faith in Dōgen's Zen. In effect, Bein uses Watsuji's interpretation to expose the assumptions and proclivities of Western Dōgen studies, perhaps trying to liberate Dōgen from his Western interpreters as Watsuji had tried to liberate Dōgen from Japanese sectarian studies. In the end, we end up with not one Dōgen, but an array, each viewed from a different time and place, from a different set of interests. This multiplication of Dōgens probably would not surprise the Zen master himself, however. In his *Shōbōgenzō* essay "Mitsugo" (Intimate [or Esoteric] Language), Dōgen writes that in their verbal encounters, the students and master "each bring their half of the intimacy" so that, as he says in the "Kattō" (Entanglements) essay, "student and master personally practice together." In this book, Dōgen, Watsuji, Bein, and we readers each bring

our part of the intimacy and all practice philosophy together. We should be grateful that Steve Bein has given us the opportunity for such an extraordinary encounter.

Thomas P. Kasulis
The Ohio State University

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the *Rinrigaku*, Watsuji suggests that our individuality is possible only because of the nurturing and support of our communities. I claim individual responsibility for any errors that appear in this book, but for its success I have a host of others to whom I am deeply indebted and whom I can repay only with my sincerest gratitude.

My deepest debt is to Dr. Yuasa Yasuo, for without his assistance this translation would not exist. As a young man Yuasa-*sensei* worked as Watsuji Tetsurō's graduate assistant, and upon graduating he followed his professor in establishing himself as one of Japan's most renowned twentieth-century philosophers. These two qualifications by themselves made him the best adviser I could have asked for, but Yuasa-*sensei* exceeded both of these by far. He took me under his wing when he did not need to, working long hours with me that he could have spent enjoying his retirement. I do not know if I can ever do anything so generous in my life as he did for me in being my mentor.

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Robert E. Carter, both of whom are exceedingly generous men. Dr. Steve Odin first piqued my interest in Watsuji and in Dōgen, and was the one who told me that if I wanted to read *Shamon Dōgen* I'd have to translate it myself.

I am grateful to Dr. Tom Kasulis for contributing the foreword to this volume, for his helpful advice in reconstructing the introductory and interpretive essays, and for his insights on nuances in the translation. Rochester Community and Technical College and the College of Arts and Sciences Advisory Council of the East-West Center provided funding for completing the translation. Patricia Crosby at the University of Hawai'i Press is a patient and diligent editor, the best kind one could ask for.

I am deeply, deeply thankful to all of these people and institutions, and most of all to Michele, whose constant support and encouragement are more precious to me than I can express.

Introductions

This book is called *Purifying Zen* because that was a goal shared by the two minds who meet in these pages. About eight hundred years ago Dōgen Kigen (1200–1253), a young monk from the Kansai region of Japan, came to the audacious conclusion that the Buddhism practiced in his homeland was hopelessly corrupt. Convinced that he could find a purer form of Buddhism across the sea, he braved a dangerous voyage to China. After his return home, he established himself as one of his country's greatest philosophers and a founding father of Sōtō Zen, still the largest Zen sect in Japan. He arguably achieved what he'd set out to do: he brought home a pure, unspoiled Zen and saw it take root.

Paradoxically, Dōgen would also slip so deep into obscurity that his work would all but vanish. For centuries the only ones to read Dōgen were Sōtō monks. Then, seven hundred years after Dōgen's Chinese pilgrimage, a young philosopher named Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960)—also from Kansai, as it happens—saw corruption in the Japanese Buddhism of his day. Watsuji was a student of history, and in Japan that meant he was a student of Buddhism. He unearthed Dōgen's writings and accused the Sōtō sect of attempting to murder its founder. Watsuji too hoped to see a purer form of Zen in his country, and the series of articles he penned on Dōgen blossomed into a little monograph entitled *Shamon Dōgen*. The book was a sensation, and because of it Watsuji is credited with catapulting Dōgen to the forefront of philosophical study.

The title *Shamon Dōgen* has been translated into English as *Dōgen the Novice* and as *Dōgen, a Monk*,¹ but the word *shamon* (沙門) has an important philosophical and religious heritage, and as such it is a good entry point to introduce Watsuji's groundbreaking book. It is not entirely clear whether Watsuji chose the word with its Sanskrit origins in mind, but they are relevant to his book as a whole.² *Shamon* finds

its roots in the Sanskrit *śramaṇa*, which itself finds its root in the verb *śram* (to exert). Literally, a *śramaṇa* is “one who exerts.” The term refers specifically to a Buddhist monk, and Dōgen Kigen can certainly be called a monk who exerted. Perhaps more than any other figure in Japanese Buddhism, Dōgen is renowned for advocating single-pointed mindfulness as the key to enlightenment. He famously professed his willingness to meditate even if it killed him, and indeed one might argue that it did: he might have found a remedy for the illness that ultimately took his life, but despite the urging of his fellow monks he was unwilling to leave the remote monastery he founded in order to seek a physician. Single-minded exertion in Buddhist practice was more important to him than life itself.

The word *śramaṇa* has an opposite—actually, more than one (as I discuss in the essay that concludes this volume), but for the present one of its opposites is most relevant: the *śrāvaka*. *Śrāvaka* is a Sanskrit term derived from the verb *śru* (to hear), the root *vaka* referring to commands and therefore connoting obeisance. In their translation of the *Shōbō-genzō*, Gudo Nishijima and Chodo Cross translate *śrāvaka* or *shōmon* (声聞, “voice-hearer”) in Japanese as “intellectual Buddhist,” and the proper connotation here is something more like “merely intellectual Buddhist.” Like the *śramaṇa*, the *śrāvaka* is a monastic, but while the *śrāvaka* listens, the *śramaṇa* exerts. The *śrāvaka* is only “one who hears and obeys,” lacking the deeper contemplative capacities of the *śramaṇa*. (*Śrāvakayāna*, “vehicle of the *śrāvaka*,” is, like Hinayāna [lesser vehicle], a derogatory appellation used to describe Abhidharma Buddhism by Mahāyāna [greater vehicle] Buddhists.) On this definition, Dōgen was no mere *śrāvaka*, but rather a *śramaṇa*. Rather than *Dōgen the Novice*, then, *Shamon Dōgen* might be translated as *Dōgen the Adept*.

The idea that Dōgen was an adept must be borne in mind because without this idea, it is hard to see why Watsuji (or anyone else, for that matter) should bother writing a book on him. Furthermore, it draws attention to a singularity in the history of Japanese religious thought: Dōgen, a master, was made so obscure that he had all but disappeared. Thus *Shamon Dōgen* is an important text if only for the fact that with it Watsuji Tetsurō performed intellectual CPR on a very important figure on the brink of philosophical extinction. Dōgen remained alive through his writings, but only within the inner circles of the Sōtō Zen sect; outside those circles his name was scarcely known, his work virtually unread for centuries. That Dōgen was reintroduced to his homeland not by his sect but by a philosopher is not at all trivial, for, as Watsuji says in the first

chapter, this only goes to show how far the sect had strayed from its roots. Neither is it trivial that a Japanese philosopher reintroduced him, for at the time Watsuji wrote *Shamon Dōgen*, there was active debate as to whether the Japanese did philosophy at all, or whether philosophy itself was a strictly Western enterprise.

In addition to being a landmark book and a book of philosophy, *Shamon Dōgen* is above all an introductory book, intended to reacquaint Japan with one of its greatest minds. To make sense of the idea that we might question whether or not the Japanese did philosophy, and to understand why Japan's reacquaintance with Dōgen was so significant, two more introductions must be made. Let us first get to know Watsuji, and then Dōgen.

The Life of Watsuji

Watsuji Tetsurō was born in Nibuno, a small town in Hyogo Prefecture, in 1889. It was a time of tumult in Japanese history, just twenty-one years after the Meiji Restoration and just thirty-six years since Japan had opened her borders to foreigners for the first time in over two hundred years. The opening was forced at gunpoint, but Japan quickly came to welcome foreign influence, or if not to welcome it then at least to absorb it voraciously. Perhaps no other generation in history has seen such cultural transformation in its lifetime. Prior to 1868, samurai wearing swords still walked the streets; by 1872 one could see telegraph poles and railways from these same streets, and by 1900 over half the national wealth came from manufacturing. In 1895 Japan defeated China in war, and in 1905 it defeated Russia—Asia's largest country and a major Western power, both bested by a tiny island chain that had been a feudal state not four decades earlier.

The motivation to transform was obvious: the Japanese had only to look around, see virtually every nation in Asia under the yoke of European colonization, and refuse such a fate for themselves. The best defense was to absorb European culture, including its technology, science, art, literature, and philosophy. Watsuji's generation was tasked with much of the absorption.

At first Watsuji studied literature. He was drawn especially to the Romantic poets, and even after entering the prestigious First Higher School of Tokyo (now Tokyo University) to study philosophy, he maintained a keen interest in Byron and the Romantics. But by his own admission, his own attempts at literature were "complete failures,"

so he ultimately settled on philosophy for his graduate work, entering Tokyo Imperial University in 1909.

In 1912, the year he was to graduate, his thesis on Nietzsche was rejected (though it was later published under the title *Nietzschean Studies*). He completed a second thesis, “Schopenhauer’s Pessimism and Theory of Salvation,” barely in time to graduate. His next publication was *Søren Kierkegaard* (1915). Furukawa Tetsushi has remarked on Watsuji’s early interest in the “poet-philosophers”³ (an interest that nearly cost him his graduation; Robert E. Carter and Yamamoto Seisaku note that “at that time, neither Nietzsche nor Kierkegaard were studied as a part of the philosophical canon in Japanese universities”).⁴ We can also see in Watsuji an early interest in stepping beyond the accepted borders of philosophy—another interest that would take him toward Dōgen.

A visitor to Tokyo today might have a hard time imagining a time when Japan was not so thoroughly Westernized. The clothing, technology, and urban architecture are familiar to residents of any major city in North America. Baseball is more popular there than it is in the United States. McDonald’s pervades. But in Watsuji’s day the difference between Japanese culture and that of the United States and Europe was stark, observable, and the subject of much thought. A major issue at the time was whether the Japanese did philosophy at all, or whether philosophy was only a Western endeavor. At the end of his life, the political philosopher Nakae Chōmin (1847–1901) wrote, “Over the ages in our country, Japan, there has been no philosophy.”⁵ The philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944) argued the opposite case, maintaining that Confucian thinkers of the Edo period were in fact philosophers in their own right.⁶ In *Shamon Dōgen* Watsuji sides with Inoue and makes the case that Japan’s philosophical tradition extends at least as far back as the Kamakura period (1185–1333) and Dōgen Kigen.⁷

Watsuji devotes his attention to Dōgen during a turning point in his own thought. Though he began his philosophical career by immersing himself in the Romanticism and individualism of European philosophy and literature, Watsuji harbored a deep interest in his own cultural heritage. This interest was piqued by a book written by one of his teachers, a book now recognized as a classic, and its author now famous for having written it: Nitobe Inazō’s *Bushidō, the Soul of Japan*. Nitobe (1862–1933) was the headmaster when Watsuji studied at the First Higher School of Tokyo, and according to James Kodera, *Bushidō* “began to awaken Tetsurō not only to the Eastern heritage but also to the study of ethics.”⁸

This sprout found further nourishment when Watsuji studied with Natsume Sōseki (1867–1916), one of Japan’s most acclaimed writers. (Watsuji was not alone in having been heavily influenced by these two mentors; that Nitobe and Sōseki appear on modern Japanese currency indicates their enduring prominence.) Though both Watsuji and Sōseki were affiliated with the First Higher School of Tokyo, they did not meet until 1913, after Watsuji’s graduation (though Watsuji confessed that he would stand outside the windows of Sōseki’s lecture halls and listen in when he had the time). Watsuji joined Sōseki’s study group, meeting regularly at the novelist’s home until Sōseki’s death three years later. The two of them were quite close—intimate enough, it has been suggested, that Sōseki modeled one of the characters in his novel *Kokoro* on Watsuji.⁹ Afterward, Watsuji would write at length about Sōseki, ultimately publishing his reminiscences in *Revival of Idols* (*Gūzō saiku*, 1918).

Sōseki’s work involved the complexities of individuals in social relationships (*ningen kankei*, 人間関係), lamenting the stark egoism and loneliness of life in an increasingly Westernized Japan.¹⁰ Watsuji would later take up the relationship of individuals to the communities in which they find themselves, but the immediate effect of Nitobe and Sōseki’s influence was to turn Watsuji away from the poet-philosophers of Europe and toward his own country. After *Revival of Idols* he published *Koji junrei* (A Pilgrimage to Ancient Shrines, 1919), followed shortly by his three-volume *Ancient Japanese Culture* (*Nihon kodai bunka*, 1920, 1926, 1934). From 1920 to 1923 he published a series of papers later collected to comprise *Shamon Dōgen* (1926). There would be a long series of other works on Japanese culture, philosophy, and history, including an edited translation of Dōgen’s *Shōbōgenzō* in 1929.¹¹ But *Shamon Dōgen* deserves special attention, because with this book Watsuji is credited with single-handedly rescuing Dōgen from obscurity.

The religious resources on Dōgen are voluminous and date back hundreds of years, but as Watsuji points out, for much of its history the Sōtō sect actively discouraged the greater public from studying these texts.¹² To this day philosophical treatments of Dōgen’s thought remain scarce (though the recent swell in Dōgen studies is certainly encouraging), and were it not for Watsuji, it is entirely possible that neither you nor I would ever have heard of Dōgen.

Thus *Shamon Dōgen* was, in the words of Hee-Jin Kim, “a bombshell.”¹³ The papers that precipitated it, as well as his other philosophical work, drew the attention of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), who is com-

monly regarded as Japan's greatest philosopher. Nishida invited Watsuji to serve as a lecturer of ethics in the philosophy department at the Imperial University of Kyoto, which today is known as Kyoto University and in those times was the center of the soon to be famous Kyoto School. Watsuji himself was never recognized as part of the Kyoto School, except perhaps at its fringes—his philosophy was never religious in nature, as was that of Nishida and the others, and Watsuji did not remain in Kyoto long enough to develop a closer association with the group—but the concept of nothingness, a topic to which the Kyoto School philosophers return time and time again, is also central to Watsuji's philosophy, and his interest in nothingness results from Nishida's influence.

Watsuji took his post at Kyoto Imperial University in 1925 and two years later was awarded a scholarship to study in Europe. He arrived in Berlin in 1927, even as Heidegger's *Being and Time* was released. One of Watsuji's best-known works, *Fūdo: Ningengakuteki kōsatsu* (Climates: An Anthropological Study), was a direct response to Heidegger. *Fūdo* is also a reflection on Watsuji's European travels, and that fact, plus the climatological determinism he seems to advocate in the book, has drawn the criticism that *Fūdo* is a philosophical lightweight. Nevertheless, it does contain some significant ideas about the nature of culture and climate (Watsuji says they mutually define each other) and about Heidegger's notion of being-there, or *Dasein* (which Watsuji argues ought to have more to do with our being ontologically grounded in space than being ontologically grounded in time, as Heidegger has it).

Though granted a three-year scholarship, Watsuji returned to Japan after only fourteen months, drawn home by the death of his father in 1928. Watsuji went back to teach at Kyoto Imperial University, where he was promoted to professor in 1931. In 1934 he took the prestigious position of professor in the faculty of literature at Tokyo Imperial University (now Tokyo University), where he would teach until his retirement in 1949.

Watsuji's reputation would see significant damage during World War II, some of it arguably deserved, much of it not. According to William LaFleur, "One cannot ignore how controversial Watsuji's ideas have been in post-war Japan. From 1945 until fairly recently he was condemned by Japan's Marxist intellectuals as 'conservative,' nothing more than a provider of ideological struts for the chrysanthemum throne."¹⁴

To preface this discussion, it should be pointed out that nationalism has been a sore point for many Japanese since World War II, for rea-

sons that the average American might find very strange indeed. The *hi no maru* flag—a red disc on a white field—is recognizable to nearly everyone, but few remember that this was not the national flag until 1999, or that in fact Japan had no national flag at all from 1945 until 1999. “Kimigayo,” now the national anthem of Japan, was similarly designated as such only in 1999, and prior to that Japan had no legally enshrined national anthem. (As it happens, I was in Japan in 1999 when the idea of a national anthem and flag were being discussed in the legislature. “Kimigayo” is sung before sumo tournaments much as “The Star-Spangled Banner” is sung before baseball games, and I remember speaking with Japanese friends who had always been under the impression that “Kimigayo” was a song about sumo wrestling.)

How different would American history have to have been for the average college student to have no idea that “The Star-Spangled Banner” was about the American flag? If it had mirrored Japanese history, there would have been a period of aggressive militarism followed by a resounding defeat and then by a long period of shame regarding expansionism, militarism, and the song and the flag that were used to lead the charge. The only symbol I can think of that holds a similar position in American history is the Confederate “stars and bars” flag, especially when displayed north of the Mason-Dixon line. Put it on your car and you make a definitive and controversial political statement, and if people scorn you for it you should not be surprised. This, more or less, was the position of the *hi no maru* for many Japanese people for the last sixty-odd years. Nationalism was a dangerous trend. The national memory knew exactly where it led, and the people and symbols associated with it were also thought to be dangerous.

The work Watsuji is best known for, his three-volume *Rinrigaku* (Ethics), was published on the brink of, during, and shortly after the war (1937, 1942, 1949), and in the third volume he is accused of defending nationalism and Japanese elitism.¹⁵ Another of his multivolume works, *Sonnō shisō to sono dentō* (The Idea of Reverence for the Emperor and the Imperial Tradition, 1943), also contributed to Watsuji’s reputation as a right-wing reactionary, and essays like “Amerika no kokuminsei” (The National Character of the Americans), which he delivered as a lecture to Japanese naval commanders in 1943, are used as evidence supporting the claim that Watsuji was a propagandist and ultranationalist.¹⁶

One might start to build a defense for Watsuji by drawing a contemporary comparison: in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, even the *New York Times* gave Capitol Hill a free pass, publishing very little about the

Patriot Act and other governmental actions that would ordinarily have drawn both investigation and criticism. Prior to World War II, Japan—and its samurai spirit—had never been so soundly defeated; in such circumstances Watsuji's reaction, like that of the *Times*, might well have been predicted to lean toward nationalism. But there is a difference: the *Times* apologized, while Watsuji remained unrepentant.

In truth Watsuji's position was more nuanced than his critics typically let on. In 1920 or so, Watsuji was encouraged by one of his friends, the folklorist Yanagita Kunio, to read the literature of Anatole France. Watsuji was taken with France's pacifism—so persuaded, in fact, that he wrote an essay disparaging Japan's imperialism in the Russo-Japanese war. Indeed, in 1925, perhaps because of that essay and Watsuji's other studies on Romantic individualism and European philosophy, Watsuji was targeted for attack by the ultranationalist Japan Principle Society as being “liberal, pro-democracy, and pro-individualism, and thus ‘dangerous’ in the eyes of the ultranationalists.”¹⁷

But attacks from the right notwithstanding, Watsuji did turn away from European philosophy and from individualism, and he did work for the Imperial government during the Second World War—during, that is, the rape of Nanking, the aggressive militarism and expansionism across Asia, and the rise of ultranationalism. Starting in 1935, Watsuji served (along with philosopher and Buddhist scholar Tanabe Hajime) on the Ministry of Education's Committee for the Renewal of Education and Scholarship. In his tenure there, Watsuji and Tanabe were the lone defenders of Nishida Kitaro's proposal that studies of “the history of Japan and things Japanese” would have to be more heavily supported if there was to be any hope of “diverting the radical infiltration of foreign ideas.”¹⁸

But Nishida, like Watsuji, was arguably neither an ultranationalist nor a reactionary, though such charges have been leveled against both of them.¹⁹ Indeed, during the war years Watsuji would defend fellow scholars against attacks from the far right, testifying in court on behalf of historian Tsuda Sōkichi, who was forced into retirement and saw his books banned (a fate many others also suffered during the war).²⁰ Not long after Watsuji's death, Robert Bellah suggested that one of Watsuji's crimes may simply have been writing in the wrong place at the wrong time: “The humane and gracious figure of Watsuji Tetsurō would not be problematic for modern Japan were it not for the fact that partly behind the cloak of just such thinking as his, a profoundly pathological social movement brought Japan near to total disaster.”²¹

Watsuji took steps to understand and avert this social pathology. In the spring of 1945, he organized a group of scholars to study the isolationist policy of the Tokugawa period (1600–1868), ultimately publishing his thoughts from their meetings in 1950 as *Sakoku: Nihon no higeki* (Closed Nation: Japan's Tragedy). According to William LaFleur, Watsuji's argument in *Sakoku* and elsewhere is that Japan's imperialism in World War II was the direct result of the Tokugawa policy that closed the nation to the outside world for over two hundred years, an argument that was quite critical of the nationalists and the militarists in their prosecution of the war given the country's limited resources.²² LaFleur even suggests that, in his 1943 lecture to Imperial Navy officers, Watsuji warned the command staff that their strategies were dangerous and that his having advised restraint may have been the reason he felt no need to apologize after the war.²³

Whatever his reasons for refusing to recant, Watsuji paid the price of his reputation. According to Yuasa Yasuo, after the war there was an "attack from the left" against the Imperial system of government, an attack Watsuji strongly opposed. Watsuji held that the Imperial government was a unifying force for the country—a rare one in those days, we might well guess—and that the people should therefore support it. Yuasa suggests, "This act is the primary reason why Watsuji came to be seen as a conservative who could not be easily reclaimed by the liberal intellectuals with whom he had been associated."²⁴

Watsuji would not see his reputation recover within his lifetime (though his stance may have earned him the emperor's favor: after the war he served as a lecturer to Crown Prince Akihito—now Emperor Akihito—on the histories of Japanese culture and Japanese thought). He died on December 26, 1960, after a long bout with illness. He left an impressive legacy, including a *zenshū* (complete works) that runs twenty-seven volumes. He is also succeeded by his students, of whom the best-known is his former graduate assistant, Yuasa Yasuo (1925–2005), who would go on to join his *sensei* as one of the most significant Japanese philosophers of the twentieth century.

And of course there is *Shamon Dōgen*, with which Watsuji single-handedly rescued Dōgen from obscurity. We might well ask, why did he choose Dōgen? Why not Kūkai or Shinran or Nichiren, or any number of other famous figures from the history of Buddhism? For that matter, why not one of the less famous ones—one of the many Zen patriarchs, for example, going all the way back to China and India?

It is hard to answer these questions definitively, but I can hazard

a guess. If Watsuji was a nationalist, then it should be obvious why he would choose a Japanese instead of a Chinese or Indian Buddhist master to write on. Even if he was not a nationalist, if he wanted to establish that Japan had a philosophical history, then in all the history of Zen and Chan and Dhyāna, only a Japanese figure would do. But we know more about Watsuji. He was a lover of literature and was enamored from the start with those not commonly accepted among the ranks of philosophers. (Recall that Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche were not included then.) And he was something of a revolutionary, likely to be sympathetic toward other revolutionary minds. Given these predilections, a better question might be, how could Watsuji *not* write a book on Dōgen? Dōgen the rebel, Dōgen the poet, Dōgen who languished in obscurity, Dōgen who showed as keen a philosophical mind as anyone could hope to engage; for one such as Watsuji, what's not to love?

The Life of Dōgen

Dōgen was born in January 1200 to aristocratic but ill-fated parents. His father was probably a well-heeled member of the Koga family,²⁵ and his mother was probably Fujiwara Motofusa. If so, then Dōgen was descended from noble stock. The Fujiwaras were a dominant power in Japan for centuries, and the Kogas were related to the Minamotos (another dominant family) and descended from Emperor Murakami.

There is general agreement that Dōgen's mother died when he was seven or eight years old.²⁶ It is said that Dōgen first grasped the impermanence of all things as he watched smoke rise from the incense at her funeral. After her death, he was adopted by an uncle, Fujiwara Moroie, who was without a son and who therefore planned to groom Dōgen to be his heir. At the age of twelve or thirteen, Dōgen was faced with a choice: he could follow his uncle's wishes, undertaking a rite of passage into manhood and joining the aristocracy of the Fujiwara clan; or he could follow his mother's dying wish, which was for him to enter a monastery.

Dōgen chose the latter, and would later be quoted as saying, "It is said that if one son leaves his home to become a monk, seven generations of parents will gain the Way."²⁷ Within a year he was officially ordained into the order of monks on Mount Hiei, adopting the name Dōgen (道元, literally "Origin of the Way"). Mount Hiei had long been the seat of power for Buddhism in Japan, but it had begun its decay into corruption

long before Dōgen was born. Indeed, corruption began to infiltrate the Buddhist hierarchy as early as 752, soon after the dedication of the Central Temple at Nara (later renamed Tōdaiji). Watsuji tells much of this tale in *Shamon Dōgen*, but to summarize, troubles began when huge tracts of land were opened to farming for the first time. During the Heian period (794–1185), the system of *shōen* (莊園), or privately held lands, gradually came to replace the previously existing system of *kōden* (公田), or public lands. Some of this land fell into the possession of Buddhist temples, which then began to know wealth. This was the beginning of the end.

It was during this time that the Tendai Buddhist Saichō (767–822) founded Mount Hiei, a monastic community in the mountains overlooking Kyoto. Hiei’s remoteness was a real asset for meditative tranquility, and also for escaping the vices of the world. Gaining the government’s blessing, Saichō was able to establish Mount Hiei as the “Chief Seat of the Buddhist Religion for Ensuring the Security of the Country,” and for centuries Hiei stood as the most powerful seat of Buddhism in Japan.²⁸ But over the years, Hiei amassed ranks of warrior-monks (*sōhei*, 僧兵), and by the eleventh century they became a small army that no longer fought only in defense. The *sōhei* went to battle to acquire land and eventually grew so powerful that they threatened the government.

The Fujiwara clan tried to control them and failed. When Minamoto no Yoritomo took control at the beginning of the Kamakura period (1185–1333), he cemented his power by converting all *kōden* to *shōen*, which he then awarded to his commanders and allies. Landholding monasteries like the ones on Mount Hiei were drawn into the fray as territorial struggles grew ever more heated, and these struggles reached a boiling point in Dōgen’s lifetime.

Two figures rose to combat the corruption. Not long before Dōgen’s birth, Hōnen (1133–1212) founded the Jōdo (Pure Land) school, soon to be succeeded by Shinran (1173–1263), who built upon Hōnen’s ideas to establish what is now called the Jōdo Shin (True Pure Land) sect. Both were met with hostility—Shinran was exiled, and both the Buddhist hierarchy and the Imperial court called for Hōnen’s execution²⁹—and neither Hōnen nor Shinran was able to correct the course of the Age of Degenerate Dharma.

Thus Dōgen entered a corrupted, decaying monastic tradition. At fourteen, the story traditionally goes, he asked the question no one on Mount Hiei could answer to his satisfaction, the question that would

ultimately drive over seas and mountains in search of an answer: “As I study both the exoteric and the esoteric schools of Buddhism, they maintain that human beings are endowed with the Dharma-nature by birth. If this is the case, why did the buddhas of all ages—undoubtedly in possession of enlightenment—find it necessary to seek enlightenment and engage in spiritual practice?”³⁰

There is some dispute about whether this question could impel a man of Dōgen’s intellect on a religious quest. Yamauchi Shunyū, for example, suggests that the question is puerile and that one who studied Japanese Tendai Buddhism in the Kamakura era would not have deemed it worth pursuing. On the other hand, Ishii Shūdō argues that a close reading of the *Hōkyōki* suggests that Dōgen took the question quite seriously, Abe Masao describes the question as “unavoidable,” and Ishii Seijun holds that Dōgen’s answer to this question is an important point of distinction between his Zen and that of the Chinese Chan master Dahui (837–909).³¹

In any case, the story goes that Kōen, the abbot of Mount Hiei at the time, sent the young Dōgen in search of Master Eisai (1141–1215?) in order to answer the question that drove him. This took Dōgen to Kenninji, where he was deeply impressed by Eisai’s legacy—as was the whole of Japan, historically speaking: Eisai is credited with introducing Zen Buddhism to Japan.³² According to Watsuji, Dōgen had such esteem for Eisai that years later he would tell his students, “Today’s disciples should also think only the thoughts of [Eisai’s] innermost heart.”³³

Another who made a lasting impression was Eisai’s successor, Myōzen (1184–1225), under whom Dōgen would study for the next nine years and with whom Dōgen would go to China at the age of twenty-three. Crossing the Sea of Japan was never easy—those are dangerous waters—but their decision was made all the more difficult by the fact that Myōzen’s master, Myōyū, was on his deathbed. Myōyū asked Myōzen and the others to delay their voyage until after his passing, and as Watsuji tells it, Myōzen put the question to the assembled monks of Kenninji this way: “I suppose my Buddhist training is good enough just as it is now. I suppose I can attain true enlightenment if things always remain just as they are.”

Only Dōgen understood the subtext of his master’s words. His response—“If that is the case, you should stay here”—is easily misunderstood. Dōgen is not advising Myōzen to stay; rather, he is questioning whether the quest for enlightenment should be delayed in order to wait beside Myōyū’s deathbed. A similar question arises later in

Dōgen's career, when a monk asks whether he should abandon his aged mother to enter the monastery. In that context Dōgen says, "You may think you can circumvent the entire problem by waiting until after your mother passes away to follow the Buddha's Way, but what if you die before she does? Your mother will have disrupted your efforts toward reaching the truth." As Myōzen and Dōgen saw it, to delay the trip to China was to besmirch the master they admired so much, and perhaps even to bring bad karma on him; because of their love and loyalty for him, they left his side and crossed the sea in search of enlightenment.

Dōgen's life in China was one of austerity, hardship, and devotion. After a nauseating voyage, he was denied enrollment in a temple and had no choice but to spend a few months aboard the ship on which he had arrived. The reasons for his rejection vary among his biographers: in the *Kenzei-ki*, his successor Kenzei suggests that Dōgen experienced discrimination because he was not Chinese, while Steven Heine notes that the cause may have been illness (as the *Zuimonki* has it) or, most probably, Dōgen's lack of proper credentials (according to the *Kenzei-ki* and *Denkōroku*, among other records).³⁴ Whatever the reason, Dōgen lived aboard his ship for a time, and traditionally he is said to have had a conversation that would change his view on the nature of Buddhist practice.

An old *tenzo* (典座)—a senior monk serving as chief cook for his monastery—visited Dōgen's ship to buy mushrooms. Dōgen invited him to chat and share a meal, but the *tenzo* insisted on returning to his kitchen straightaway. Dōgen, puzzled, asked why a monk with such seniority would bother with cooking, a task any number of monks must have been suited to do, when instead the *tenzo* could have spent his time practicing *zazen* or studying the analects of the patriarchs. He was surprised by the *tenzo*'s reply: "My good foreigner, you do not yet understand practice or know the meaning of the words of the patriarchs."

Ashamed and surprised, Dōgen said, "What are words? What is practice?"

The *tenzo* told him, "If you penetrate this question, how could you not become a person who understands?"³⁵

In his later teachings Dōgen would include this essential insight: meditation happens not just in *zazen*, not just in the meditation hall, but in everyday activities like chopping vegetables and washing rice. Anything one does can be done with single-minded focus; any activity can be made an opportunity to throw off body-mind and realize non-ego.

Shortly after meeting the *tenzo*, Dōgen was admitted into the

Jingteshi monastery on Mount Tiantong, one of the “Five Mountains” said to be the most important nuclei of Zen Buddhism in China. Eisai himself once studied at Jingteshi, and Dōgen’s experience there led to a deeper understanding of Buddhism (in part because of another meeting he had there with the same *tenzo*). But Dōgen never settled there, perhaps because he did not find a suitable match with a teacher. He left Jingteshi, and for months he wandered the Five Mountains, drifting from one monastery to the next in search of a genuine teacher.

At last, at the age of twenty-four or twenty-five, he crossed paths with Rujing (J. Nyojō, 1163–1227?), the new abbot of Tiantong and one of China’s great Zen masters. As the traditional accounts chronicle their meeting, there was an immediate rapport between the two, but more than that, Dōgen intuited that Rujing was the right teacher for him. This meeting was significant enough that Dōgen would later write, “If you do not meet a right teacher, it is better not to study Buddhism at all.”³⁶ Watsuji explains it this way: “The innermost meaning of the practice of the patriarchs is not transmitted by fixed general concepts; it is transmitted as the strength of a living personality. People accept directly through personality that which they cannot grasp with the intellect. Therefore, self-cultivators must directly study the tradition that is embodied in a teacher’s personality.”³⁷

Heine questions how Rujing taught Dōgen, and what Dōgen was taught—for one thing, Dōgen’s approach toward the dharma transmission is notably different from what Rujing’s must have been³⁸—but at least as Watsuji tells it, Rujing embodied Buddhist enlightenment for Dōgen, and it was under Rujing’s tutelage that Dōgen awakened to enlightenment himself. Rujing’s method hearkened back to the practice of Siddhartha Gautama, who realized enlightenment by just sitting under a tree—that is, doing nothing other than being there, fully present and aware of just-sitting. Dōgen called this *zazen*-only method *shikantaza* (只管打坐), and this was the path that Rujing laid out for casting off body-mind (*shinjin-datsuraku*, 身心脱落). By just-sitting and casting off body-mind, one might embrace non-ego, release oneself from attachments and cravings, and realize the impermanent and interdependent nature of all existences.

Just-sitting is an austere, strenuous practice. Rujing made a practice of sitting every day of his life (even when the practice caused sores and hemorrhoids), and Dōgen advocated just-sitting even if it meant risking death. This was not an idle supposition; his temple Eiheiji stands in a mountainous area where even today the snowdrifts routinely pile

so high as to deny the passage of plows and bulldozers. Imagine just-sitting in an unheated meditation hall walled in by snow on all sides: in such conditions, serious illness and hypothermia are not unrealistic possibilities. Nevertheless, Dōgen remained wholly committed to just-sitting day and night:

What would be the point of keeping my body perfectly healthy if I couldn't do *zazen*? Even if I thought I could avoid illness, I'll never know when death is coming for me. . . . It's quite enough for me to cultivate myself under great Chinese teachers, die doing *zazen*, and have good monks mourn my passing. If I were to die in Japan, I couldn't be mourned by the likes of such people.³⁹

It was during *zazen* practice that Dōgen had his initial experience of enlightenment. Another monk in the meditation hall had fallen asleep, and Rujing admonished him, saying, "To practice *zazen* one must cast off body and mind. How dare you indulge in sleeping?"

Hearing this, Dōgen suddenly realized enlightenment. Afterward he went to Rujing's room, burned incense, and praised the Buddha. When Rujing asked why, Dōgen said, "Body-mind is cast off!"

Rujing saw the authenticity of Dōgen's understanding and said, "Body-mind is cast off! Cast off is body-mind!"

Thus Dōgen received the dharma transmission (the exact nature of which is, as suggested earlier, still debated by leading Dōgen scholars). Dōgen and Rujing would train together for two years, until in 1227 Rujing passed away and Dōgen announced that he would return to Japan. Traditional accounts hold that he left with Rujing's blessing and with very little else: though there was a standing tradition of Japanese monks returning from China with large collections of sutras, artworks, and so on, Dōgen brought with him only the remains of his late master Myōzen, a robe transmitted to him by Rujing from antiquity, a portrait of himself, and a few other items from his master. As Kim puts it, "His sole 'souvenir' presented to his countrymen was his own body and mind, his total existence, now completely liberated and transformed."⁴⁰

Upon his homecoming Dōgen returned to Kenninji, which had decayed even further since his departure four years before. Sorely disappointed with what he found there, he wrote *Fukan-zazengi* (A Method of *Zazen* Recommended for Everyone) and did what else he could to correct Kenninji's course. But whereas Rujing had no desire whatsoever for wealth, the monks of Kenninji plastered over concealed holes in

the walls where they stored their valuables. (Dōgen’s recommendation for security was simple: don’t own anything and no one can steal from you.) In 1230 Dōgen found he could no longer live among the monks of Kenninji, so he moved into the abandoned An’yōin, a temple in the Fukakusa district of Kyoto. There he wrote *Gakudō-yōjinshū* (Points to Watch while Studying the Way) and an essay entitled “Bendōwa” (A Talk on Realizing the Way), which would eventually become the first chapter of his magnum opus, the *Shōbōgenzō* (Treasury of the True Dharma Eye).

These, coupled with *Fukan-zazengi*, were among the most important of his early works, for in them he laid out his methodology for Buddhist training and meditation. Steven Heine notes that in the Kamakura era a number of eminent monks—including Dōgen, Eisai, Hōnen, and Shinran, all of whom appear in *Shamon Dōgen*—adopted a “selectionist” (*senjaku-shugi*, 選択主義) approach in which “the respective Buddhist leaders advocated a specific form of religious practice, be it meditation, chanting, precepts, recitation of scripture, or veneration of a deity or shrine . . . to the exclusion of all other methods.”⁴¹ Heine is hardly alone in maintaining that Dōgen selected meditation as his exclusive method, but there is no consensus on this issue. Ishii Shūdō, for instance, questions whether Dōgen was in fact a selectionist, distinguishing between “meditation Buddhism” (*zazen bukkuyō*, 座禪仏教) and “wisdom Buddhism” (*chie no bukkuyō*, 知恵の仏教) and arguing that Dōgen’s voluminous writings are evidence that his Buddhism falls at least partly into the latter category.⁴² Indeed, scholars like Ishii and Hakayama Noriaki have observed that if Dōgen’s Zen is reexamined in the light of the twelve-fascicle version of the *Shōbōgenzō*, the distinctive features are not *shikantaza* and self-cultivation but rather respect for *prajñā* (wisdom) and deep faith in causality.

Rather than attempting to settle this debate here, I will make two suggestions. First, it is evident in his writing that seated meditation, respect for wisdom, and belief in causality and karmic dependency are all important to Dōgen. Second, to posit a hard and fast bifurcation between meditation Buddhism and wisdom Buddhism is arguably a violation of Buddhist nondualism, and selectionism itself is arguably guilty of the same violation, but in any case we can safely say that important works in Dōgen’s early writings—“Bendōwa,” *Gakudō-yōjinshū*, *Fukan-zazengi*—lay the foundation for a Buddhist practice in which seated meditation was indispensable.

With this foundation laid, Dōgen began to attract followers,

and in 1233 he had so many of them that he needed a larger space to accommodate them. He and his disciples moved into another temple in Fukakusa, known as Kannon-dōriin until 1236, when after refurbishing it Dōgen renamed it Kōshō-hōrinji. The new facility was sparse, in keeping with Dōgen's adamant rejection of extravagance, but his following continued to grow. He lived in this temple from 1233 to 1243, an enormously creative decade for him: he would write forty-four sections of the *Shōbōgenzō* during this period, including his best-known and most often quoted work, *Shōbōgenzō* "Genjōkōan."

By this point Dōgen's influence was already significant enough that it should strike us as odd that his work all but vanished for almost eight hundred years. Even today, there is so little Dōgen scholarship in English that Carl Bielefeldt lamented, "It may be misleading—both historically and analytically—to speak as if what we have in America represents anything so imposing as a 'field' of Dōgen studies."⁴³ The same is not true in Japan—Komazawa University has published volumes of work on Dōgen over the last twenty years, and postwar scholars like Kagamishima Genryū, Ishii Shūdō, and Ishii Seijun have founded their careers on Dōgen studies—but though the articles have been accumulating in Japanese, only a handful have been translated into English. Even after Watsuji dropped his bombshell, Dōgen scholarship outside Japan still languishes.

Why is this the case? Steven Heine suggests that the complexity of Dōgen's attitudes about training makes it difficult to sort out which texts to focus on.⁴⁴ Bielefeldt hazards a different sort of guess, positing that "it may be that Dōgen's very fame, both in America and Japan, is partly to blame for his neglect: he is, as it were, too 'big' to offer an immediately promising subject of study—at once too familiar to the American public to be academically fashionable and too imposing in the Japanese secondary literature to be easily manageable."⁴⁵ And Bielefeldt goes further, suggesting that the problem may be even larger yet: "We still have nothing approaching an adequate history of Kamakura Buddhism within which to place Dōgen, and, therefore, little sense of him."⁴⁶

We can attempt to develop a sense of that era (though, as Bielefeldt observes, the subject is much too big to address comprehensively here). According to Kagamishima and Heine, Buddhism in the Kamakura era had become something of a mongrel, Tendai mixing with Huayan mixing with Pure Land, and this mishmash had been colored by non-Buddhist influences like Confucianism and Daoism before it ever reached Japan. Hyakujō (749–814), whom Dōgen admired, established a "pure"

Chan system in China, but this became “impure” in Dōgen’s eyes even by the time of Dahui (837–909), who, according to Dōgen, totally misconstrues the doctrine of original enlightenment.⁴⁷ In the centuries to follow, Chan Buddhism degenerated in much the same way Zen Buddhism was corrupted in Kyoto: it succumbed to state sponsorship and to handsome donations by wealthy laypeople.⁴⁸ One reason Dōgen is significant, therefore, is that, like Hyakujō, he attempted to purify (or perhaps repurify) a Buddhism he saw as tainted—and according to Ishii Shūdō, he was at least partially successful: “When Buddhism was acclimatized in China, it incorporated certain non-Buddhist, indigenous Chinese ideas. Dōgen, being Japanese and not Chinese, successfully eliminated these.”⁴⁹

This, of course, is a difficult claim to verify. For one thing, even if Dōgen “purified” a Sinicized Zen Buddhism, he may have Japanized it in the process, and in that sense his Zen would be no “purer” than the Chinese version. (Indeed, Ishii Shūdō has suggested that Japanese Zen underwent another “purification” process when it reached the United States, as its American practitioners did not view the tradition through Japanese cultural preconceptions.)⁵⁰ For another (as we saw Heine and Kagamishima argue earlier), the conditions under which Dōgen received the dharma transmission were arguably not the same as for Rujing’s other disciples. Heine suggests that we may consider Dōgen’s view to be “a constructive compromise, which left him differing with both Chinese and Japanese Buddhist schools.”⁵¹ But this is another reason Dōgen is a significant figure of the Kamakura period: his Zen was unlike anyone else’s.

Moreover—and in this aspect, as we have already observed, Dōgen is not unique—Dōgen attempted to overturn a legacy of corruption whose roots had penetrated nearly every aspect of organized Buddhism. Dōgen rejected mongrelized Buddhism, politicized Buddhism, militarized Buddhism, and libertine Buddhism, and in that sense he is in the same camp as Hōnen, Shinran, and Eisai, all of whom were exiled as enemies of the state. Dōgen himself was never legally banished, but he did practice his Buddhism under stern political pressure once he returned to Japan. Even by 1230 we can see in Dōgen a figure whose revolutionary teachings drew attention—both positive and negative—from every level of society.

In 1234 he took under his wing a young monk named Koun Ejō (1198–1280), who was soon ordained as head monk of Kōshō-hōrinji and who began compiling the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* (Inquiry into

the Marrow of the *Shōbōgenzō*) shortly thereafter. Dōgen's following grew rapidly as he gained a reputation as an excellent teacher (and also as a stern taskmaster). Dōgen admitted anyone to sit *zazen* with him, without regard to social status, occupation, or gender, and this made him exceptional. This divorce from tradition, along with his temple's growing influence, drew criticism and even persecution from the conservatives of Mount Hiei. But Dōgen also received the attention of the social elite, including Hatano Yoshishige, a wealthy court justice who would later offer his own lands as the location of Dōgen's ultimate headquarters, and the Hōjō shogunate in Kamakura, from whom he received multiple invitations to come and teach.

For Dōgen, who repeatedly dissuaded his students against seeking fame and wealth, this attention must have been a bit troubling. In the summer of 1243, at the suggestion of Hatano Yoshishige, Dōgen left Kyoto. Traditional accounts have Dōgen leaving because he was frustrated by political haranguing and the interferences of city life; Heine postulates that this may be a hagiographical flourish added by later Sōtō writers and that Dōgen may have fled or been forced out of Kyoto by political forces beyond his control.⁵² Whatever the causes were, Dōgen removed himself to Echizen province (modern-day Fukui prefecture), where he settled briefly in a number of small temples in the region.

This too was a productive time for Dōgen: in the next twelve months he would write twenty-nine more fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*.⁵³ All the while, Yoshishige and other devout lay practitioners were busy constructing a huge new temple, Daibutsuji. In the summer of 1244, Yoshishige invited Dōgen to become the founder of Daibutsuji, and Dōgen accepted.

In 1246, Dōgen renamed the temple Eihei-ji, "Temple of Eternal Peace." Hee-Jin Kim observes that Eternal Peace was "the name of the era in the Later Han dynasty during which Buddhism was said to have been introduced to China. Thus, Dōgen signaled the introduction to Japan of the eternal peace of Buddhism."⁵⁴ Secluded in the mountains, far from the attentions of Kamakura and Kyoto, Eihei-ji was to be Dōgen's home for the rest of his life. In addition to his duties as abbot, he regularly conducted formal dharma talks. These were recorded in what is now entitled *Eihei-kōroku* (Public Records of Eihei-ji), an enormous repository of Dōgen's teachings and poetry. Scholars such as Kagamishima Genryū, Ito Shuken, and Steven Heine have suggested that this shift in focus from the *Shōbōgenzō* to the *Eihei-kōroku* marks a shift in focus from teaching monks and nuns to teaching more broadly to the public—the

shift, as Kagamishima puts it, from “Dōgen the philosopher” to “Dōgen the practitioner.”⁵⁵

He aspired to write one hundred fascicles for his *Shōbōgenzō*, but in 1250 he fell ill and never fully recovered. In the winter of 1252 his condition worsened, and though he had already refused them many times, at the insistence of his disciples Dōgen finally returned to Kyoto for medical treatment in the summer of 1253. Ejō and others escorted him, but their efforts were in vain, for by then Dōgen was beyond medical aid. He died on August 28, 1253, seated in *zazen* posture and in the company of good monks.

Dōgen’s legacy is considerable. He had already named Ejō as his successor at Eiheiji, and after the master’s death it was Ejō who compiled the *Shōbōgenzō*, a literary undertaking unparalleled in Japanese Buddhism. Dōgen also left behind the collected analects of Rujing (known as the *Hōkyōki*), a collection of *kōans*, and the voluminous *Eiheikōroku*. The *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, compiled by Ejō from 1235 to 1237, is another important source of insight into Dōgen’s thought (and one that drew Watsuji’s attention: he edited a version of it for Iwanami Press in 1929).

Dōgen’s influence on Japanese culture is also considerable. Eiheiji’s next generation of practitioners would include a monk named Keizan (1268–1325), who is credited with promulgating Sōtō Zen all across Japan and is recognized alongside Dōgen as a founder of Sōtō. Eiheiji remains the largest Zen monastery in Japan and a headquarters for Sōtō Zen, which is now the most widespread form of Zen Buddhism in the country. As noted earlier, there are still many areas left unexplored in Dōgen scholarship (not least being the discrepancy between Keizan’s Zen and Dōgen’s Zen), and even in the simple biographical details of Dōgen’s life, but whatever scholars might discover in such explorations, it cannot be denied that Dōgen cast a long shadow over Japanese history.

According to Robert E. Carter, “Current thought holds Dōgen to be perhaps the only other philosopher in Japan’s history who was the equal of Nishida Kitarō.”⁵⁶ Given that Dōgen predates Nishida by some six hundred years, and in the light of Tanabe Hajime’s claim that Dōgen is “the precursor of Japanese philosophy,”⁵⁷ one might suggest that this should be turned around: Nishida was perhaps the only other philosopher in Japan’s history who was the equal of Dōgen.

NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION

The standards of scholarship in American academia, according to which attributing quotations to their original authors is sacrosanct, did not apply in Taisho era Japan. Watsuji never heard of “intellectual property” and would likely have been dismayed by the very idea of it. (In a world founded on Confucian values, knowledge made public becomes a public good, to be appropriated by anyone as he or she sees fit.) Watsuji felt no need to cite the sources of many of his quoted passages, and to complicate matters, there are yet more passages that do not appear in quotation marks and yet beg citation, for Watsuji often prefers to paraphrase rather than quoting directly. The upshot is that *Shamon Dōgen* is peppered with dozens of passages, some obviously quotations and some not, without citations crediting the original authors.

To remedy this I have inserted notes throughout the text. All of these are my own, while all internal citations are Watsuji’s. This is in keeping with the original text, which is devoid of notes. In citing the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, to which Watsuji often refers, I follow the system of enumerating its passages that he devised in editing the Iwanami Press version of the work. (It is Watsuji’s edition that Masunaga Reihō translated into English as *A Primer of Sōtō Zen*.)

Readers of English may find it helpful to have Masunaga’s translation of the *Zuimonki* ready to hand in reading *Shamon Dōgen*, since Watsuji refers to it more often than any other text. If the reader would like to follow along with the other texts to which Watsuji refers, there are now excellent translations available of Dōgen’s most important works. Tanahashi Kazuaki’s *Moon in a Dewdrop* contains good translations of many of the writings to which Watsuji often refers in *Shamon Dōgen* (*Gakudō-yōjinshū*, “Kattō,” “Bendōwa”), and a selection of other important works that inform the text but to which Watsuji does not often refer (“Menju,” “Zazengi,” “Zenki,” “Busso”). Nishijima Gudo and Chodo Cross have published a four-volume English

translation of the *Shōbōgenzō*, the first two volumes of which contain the other fascicles Watsuji analyzes in *Shamon Dōgen* (“Busshō,” “Dōtoku,” and “Raihai-tokuzui”), and which, at ninety-five fascicles in length, encapsulates Dōgen’s most closely studied work in its longest form. Watsuji also makes occasional reference to Dōgen’s *Eiheikōroku*, a monumental text that has largely been ignored by Dōgen scholars ever since Watsuji (due in part, no doubt, to Watsuji himself, who devoted so little attention to it). In recent decades the *Eiheikōroku* has been attracting the attention it deserves, and at long last it is available to an English readership, translated by Taigen Dan Leighton and Shohaku Okumura under the title *Dōgen’s Extensive Record*.

Shamon Dōgen

BY

WATSUJI TETSURŌ

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Preface

Before touching on the personality and thought of Dōgen the monk,¹ first I would like to make the reader aware that I am a layman with regard to Zen, and that I express nothing but admiration for Dōgen. I can only write of *my* impressions of his admirable qualities. If by doing so I can arouse interest in some people in one of the great religious masters born to our country, and if I can clarify that the essence of our own culture cannot be properly understood without taking such religious figures into consideration, then I'll be satisfied.

But there are problems here. First, is it possible for me, a layman with regard to Zen, to understand Dōgen, who *especially emphasized zazen*? In trying to grasp the highest and deepest points of Zen, will I not accidentally end up making those points lower and shallower? And second, even if I am able to acquire a certain degree of understanding, what would be the point of trying to make this great religious master's personality and his manifestation of the truth serve our cultural and historical understanding? When a religious truth is accepted as the *foundation* of everything, what cultural and historical understanding can there be of such a view? More generally speaking, how much can I understand with my *secular* wisdom? Assuming I do grasp religious truth, then I have already reached the highest point. From such a standpoint, things such as cultural and historical understanding, which attempt to discover the ways of ancient people through their various doubts, desires, joys, hardships, and the like, no longer have any use. However, assuming my mind is still wrapped up in such things, I have not yet touched religious truth after all.

It is true that these two objections are accurate. But the fact that these objections are accurate does not immediately render my efforts meaningless. I have an answer for each of them.

If Dōgen's truth should be transmitted purely and directly, why did

he leave behind so many writings on his sermons? It goes without saying that he made so many writings because he believed he could transmit his truth through them. He stopped reading ancient accounts of the moment of self-cultivation, turning instead to single-minded *zazen*. But to take *zazen* seriously is not to exclude verbal expression. He began writing the *Shōbōgenzō* to “try to teach the true way of the buddhas” to “those who are beguiled by bad teachers.” He taught that, “even if one cannot formalize it, one should write down whatever comes to mind, and even if one lacks literary skill, one should write on entering the Dharma,”² and declared “any principle you have heard is important for the way.” If this is true, then he felt all logical expression is also possible for teachers.

If this is true, then when we read his writings on his sermons, how should we attain his truth?

According to his instructions, the ways to learn directly are to consult good teachers and to do strenuous *zazen*. What we read of him now is either his own writing or the writings of his students. In these, his strong personality appears vividly between the lines. In other words, we are able to meet him there. In this way, if we ask him about the Dharma, he will answer us from the words he left behind. But in order for us to be able to understand these words, we must do *zazen* strenuously.

Very well; we sit and meditate. Speaking from the perspective of the spirit of Dōgen, who doesn’t care where he meditates, be it in a crude hut or under a tree, we don’t have to ask whether we do *zazen* in a *zendō* or in our own reading rooms. Thus, we’re able to consult a good teacher and do strenuous *zazen* without going near our modern-day Zen temples and Zen priests—temples that were built with illicit donations and priests who obsess over building halls and pagodas, or become “teachers of convenience” for politicians and profiteers, or only make efforts to excel in academic Buddhism. Entering a Zen temple nowadays is not necessarily the only way to attain Dōgen’s truth. Or, to put it in stronger terms, these days to enter a Zen school is actually to distance oneself from Dōgen. This is because the sect that takes Dōgen as its founder is no longer solely concerned with the establishment of the kingdom of truth, but concentrates on building massive halls and pagodas and on the pursuit of the position of abbot.

I hear that a certain priest who used to be one of those abbots was a high priest of rare caliber in modern times.³ Therefore, in what should have been a very busy time for men of the cloth, if he poured his energies into such unessential matters as erecting temples and pagodas, or demanding too much in donations for simple works of calligraphy

that take no more than five minutes to paint—perhaps this wasn't his will, but if his subordinates forcefully demanded this kind of "donation" in such a merchant-like manner, he is the one who should be blamed—weren't all these things an outpouring from the truth he understood viscerally?⁴ But the truth of which he had a visceral understanding cannot be the same as the truth of Dōgen, who shunned the obsession with building temples and pagodas and rejected all craving and aversion. No matter what kind of high priest he is, in drawing closer to him we drift farther from Dōgen's truth. As long as we are concerned with attaining Dōgen's truth, we must not go anywhere near the modern temples where this sort of monk is "high priest."

But even though it is possible for us laymen to consult good teachers and do strenuous *zazen* outside of a temple, that doesn't mean we can receive Dōgen's truth immediately. Are we throwing ourselves bodily into the truth, with all the intense determination Dōgen preached? Are we doing *zazen* with the unwavering resolution he preached? Only this can determine the authenticity of our visceral understanding. The logical comprehension of Dōgen's words is not so challenging. Understanding them viscerally in proportion to Dōgen's depth is difficult. I honestly admit it: I haven't yet reached the point where I can confidently say I "get it." But this deficiency does not prove that a layman *cannot possibly follow his path*. The reason I haven't "got it" yet is because my determination is insufficient. The way to make it sufficient exists only within me, not in entering a temple.

If so, then determination is all that is needed to follow Dōgen's way—*without* entering a temple. However, the fact that this is possible is no help to me at all, because I haven't grasped his truth yet. So won't people accuse me of overstepping my bounds in trying to explain him?

I don't think so. I feel confident in my understanding of his words. In reading the commentaries on Dōgen by monks, I find points I agree with and accept as well as places where I notice a merely superficial understanding. On these points I cannot think, "I shouldn't explain it." Of course I'm not saying that everything I understand I put into practice. For example, I believe I was able to understand his motivation in saying, "Don't be concerned with food and clothing," and "By all means, be poor, for if you have lots of wealth you will lose your craving for the truth."⁵ These are the expressions of the free and brilliant state of mind of one who has attained the one and only truth, and of a heart that feels pity and sorrow for the pitiable cravings of human beings that reflect on that state of mind, a heart that still admonishes those who crave.

Dōgen's expressions are akin to these: "Sufficient for the day is its own trouble." "Go your way, sell whatever you have and give it to the poor, and you will have treasure in Heaven." "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God."⁶

I understand that pitying mind and I long for that free and brilliant state of mind. But I worry about tomorrow in order to live my ordinary life, and I strive to stockpile my few possessions. If we ought not explain anything but that which we are able to realize in our own lives, then I ought not explain those words of Dōgen. But because of my longing for that state of mind and because of the ideal not to crave, I think it is fine for me to admire his words. Moreover, because I have the right to admire those words, I do not think I am inferior to today's enlightened high priests. They stock up wealth and seek to "guarantee their way of life" more than we do. They probably understand "you should be poor" to mean "*don't get caught*." But setting aside any valuation of this understanding itself, it is unthinkable that the heart that explains "poverty" could be understood so much better because of this understanding than we can understand it ourselves.

Concerning Dōgen's truth *itself*, which I am not confident of having understood, I am not claiming that my explanation is the only explanation. However, at least I may say I opened up a new way of interpretation. Because of this, Dōgen will become not Dōgen of one sect but Dōgen of the human race, not Dōgen the founder of a sect but our Dōgen.

The reason I use such arrogant words is because I think that up until now Dōgen has been killed within the sect. Among the existing biographies of Dōgen, what appears in the *Book of Gangō Period Buddhism* and the *Book of Japan's Great Monks*⁷ is nothing but unimportant stretches of his life; the same is the case with the historical texts from the Meiji and Taishō eras.⁸ *The Record of Master Dōgen*, which was published by his sect as the only detailed biography, appears to have been written by one who could not understand Dōgen's personality. Judging by Eihei-ji's biography of Dōgen, which seems to have been based on *The Record of Master Dōgen*, and which was placed at the beginning of *The Complete Works of Dōgen* published by Eihei-ji, it would further seem that the high priests of the sect are so enlightened that they can even endure insults directed at their sect's founder.⁹

The more I appreciate Dōgen's work, the more I cannot help but feel resentment toward these senseless biographies. They ignore Dōgen's

noble lifestyle of authenticity, focusing instead on all the secular values and nonsensical miracles piled up to create an artifice of nobility for him. Of course these biographies will not cause any harm to those who are truly familiar with Dōgen's writings. But the fact that the *only* biographies of this great religious master are ones of this ilk is powerfully indicative of how insufficiently Dōgen is understood even within the sect.

The goal of people who enter the Zen sect is their own enlightenment. Things like a historical understanding of Dōgen are not their primary problem. Perhaps there are people who would object to what I have said for these reasons. But I would ask these objectors, why do they accept *him* as the founder of the sect? Why do they form groups centered around *his* personality? Using his personality as a nucleus around which to gather, and yet deliberately understanding his personality incorrectly, is not what honest people do.

For various reasons like these, I maintain that a layman's explication of Dōgen is not necessarily fruitless. This is my response to the first objection.¹⁰

As to the second objection, I first raise two questions. First, why do humanity's religions not exhibit a single form, but rather appear in various "particularized forms"? And second, why do these particularized forms in religion have "history"?

Religious truth is the root of all of these particularized forms, of all their discriminations and all their values. This cannot be apprehended by the "worldly wisdom" that deals in classification. It can only be felt through the most direct experience,¹¹ which ignores all thoughts of classification. Only when people abandon their "wisdom" of all things and return to the mind of an infant can they absorb the brilliance of the infinite world. I would not say I have witnessed this myself, but I have a hunch about it. I often get closest to it in moments of prayer to "the unknowable being." Nevertheless, it cannot be the root of solid faith for me because I still cannot abandon worldly wisdom. When the time comes that I do *try* to apprehend it, surely the "roots" of everything will be there. I think it will indeed become the foundation of everything. It is my life and the life of the universe. It is the *one* great life that makes nature and human life possible. It is the eternal now, which can be grasped in this moment. But the only thing understood in this way is not "that" which can be felt in the moment of prayer and which has a warm, inexpressible authority and intimacy. The "that" of which I speak is expressed much more fittingly in phrases like "Abba, Father, all things

are possible for You,” or “Not my will, but Thy will be done.”¹² But the god that is thrown into these sentences is not my god. In the end, “that” is the unknowable being.

I believe in the idea of *logos*. I believe in the idea that the life of the universe is constantly creating. I sometimes forget myself in the wonders of the life of the universe: for example, in the infinite beauty of a tree sprout shooting up. But experiences such as this have not caused the truth to sprout up within me. What I am seeking is the state of mind in which I will be able to say, with whole-hearted conviction, something like “Thy will be done.” This state of mind is “the unknowable being” becoming “the knowable being.” It will enable me to believe in a particular being just as Jesus believed in God. I have been looking for that being for a long time. But this is extremely troubling for me, who still clings to modern “worldly wisdom.”

It is natural for people like me to feel that this unique, absolute religious truth is the highest value they can attempt to find. For those who live *within* this truth, perhaps its value is not relative. But for those who are striving to attain it, even though it is still one value among values, it does not lose its status as a value.

We can accept with a sorrowful heart that, when we observe from the standpoint of people who seek religion as it has existed up until now, there are only *particularized expressions* of religious truth, not an existing religious truth *itself*. People have continually pursued it. They have intuited it. And then they manifested the impressions of the heart exactly according to the heart. What they intuited may have been the absolute. But so long as their hearts are particularized, the impressions of their hearts can only be particularized. Thus absolute being is always manifested in particularized forms. The reason a particularized form bears eternal value is because it is the manifestation of absolute being. But although it manifests absolute being, it is because absolute being manifests in particularized forms that we can feel the mind of those people who seek and suffer and rejoice in arduously seeking out their highest value.

Right from the outset, for us to consider one religion to be a “particularized form” will not meet with the approval of the believers of that religion. For example, for those who *have faith* in Christ, Christianity is no “particularized form” but rather absolute religion. They *have faith* that Jesus of Nazareth was the savior promised to humankind by God in the Old Testament, that he was the Son of God, that he endured many hardships for the sake of humanity, was hung on the cross, and

was resurrected after three days.¹³ (Those who don't believe in these as historical facts don't have faith in Christ. To consider Jesus simply as a great man and a religious genius, and to interpret elements like his being "the Son of God" to be pure symbolism, is a totally different point of view.)

Paul had faith in Christ. For him, Christ's cross was the absolute truth. The reason he rejected "worldly wisdom" to preach "God's wisdom" was in order to make people accept *this truth*, not one truth, nor a thoughtless belief in a simulacrum of the truth. That God is defined as a personal God; that God sent Elijah and Moses down to Jesus; that His voice commanded from the clouds, "This is My beloved Son; hear Him"; that God gave Jesus Christ "power according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead"; that God is one with Jesus Christ, who "became for us the wisdom from God—and righteousness and sanctification and redemption"¹⁴—these are the fundamental insights, the fundamental facts of his religion. For Paul, there are no other truths, and no mysteries aside from these facts.

But even when we have a pure and symbolical understanding of these facts that Paul accepted intuitively, we still feel their infinite profundity. I cannot believe the actual physical voice of God emanated from the clouds. But that the "unknowable being" is a *personal* being, that in other words it is absolute and at the same time individual, that it includes oneself while being set against oneself—I think I can understand these things. Therefore I can also believe that through the Holy Spirit of this unknowable being, a particular *human being* can be elevated to godliness, and that this elevated *person* can become our wisdom and justice and holiness and redemption. But here I think the belief that Christ was the one and only savior is clearly lost. *Christ the deity is degraded into Jesus the man*. It must be acknowledged that there are other holy men equally as important as Christ. For instance, even in the case of Shinran we can recognize one mediator who was elevated by the Holy Spirit. Although the God whose voice emanated from the clouds and Amida Buddha sitting in the Pure Land show tremendous differences in their intuited forms, according to the intuition in which god is love, both of these are very similar. Belief in Christ is not a valid basis for rejecting Shinran. Therefore we also cannot see Christianity as absolute religion.

At this point, we must accept several true religions. Because their foundations are equal—in other words, because each of them expresses the absolute being—they are all made eternal and divine. But since we

accept all of them, we cannot belong to any of them. Thus, we look for a new god. We see both Christ's God and Shinran's Buddha as symbolic expressions, then seek out a god that is revealed in each of these, but that will never be completely revealed. (For me, this is the *unknowable* being.) But for both Christ and Shinran, their God and Buddha were not the "symbols" we have in mind. They believed in the real existence of God and Buddha *in their intuitive forms*. We cannot help but see them as "particularized forms."

When I see things in this way, religious truths are revealed to me as nothing but particularized forms. All religions, by attracting countless hearts that desire absolute truth, and by adding some particular color to the era, crystallize around a particular personality that intuits this truth. Even when these intuited and desired truths are indeed the absolute, one cannot claim these crystallizations are anything other than particularized forms, so long as people's hearts are inconstant and particular to the special nature of the characteristics of any era and the personality of each religion's founder.

Seen in this way, it is easy to understand that all religions have "history." Religious truth was originally the *eternal and unchanging* "cause of all things," yet religions always appear as particularized forms and *clearly* undergo historical changes, and there is no contradiction in this. In all religions, the founders, as well as the originators of new movements, teach their truth to be the ultimate truth. Therefore, from their standpoint, ideas such as the historical development of this truth are inadmissible. But history proves that these truths only appear as particularized forms, and therefore that they keep transforming into other particularized forms as the times change. How seriously had primitive Christianity changed by the time of the Gospel of John?¹⁵ How many various sutras were created from just one sermon of the Buddha? So long as religious truth *itself* is mixed with existing religions, I suppose these things will never be understood.

Thus, having answered the questions I proposed, the second objection will be easily answered. In the end, to see established religions as particularized forms, and to accept the historical development within these religions, is to treat religions historically. Because of this, it is impossible for us to believe in just one religion. However, no matter what the religion is, we do not overlook the eternal and divine value in all of them. Naturally, we do not place the ultimate truth that is the root of everything into one cultural system. If we could accept one existing religion as having the absolute truth that is the basis of everything, then

that religion would no longer be a “particularized form” for us, and all historical development would become meaningless. However, if we accept the truth that appears in a particularized form in each of the existing religions, and seek out the “being” that does not completely appear in any of them, then we can keep hunting for that “being” through our historical understanding of religions.

We feel this kind of endless yearning and seeking as the great significance of human history. Humans have kept on living, all the while doubting, struggling, and hoping. How they have strained to put the infinite into their finite hearts! Human beings want eternity! They want the depths of eternity! Nevertheless, their desirous hearts are short-lived. The unknowable being fills their hearts with the light of something infinite. People rejoice and bathe in this light. But even this light is the reflection of finite hearts. People continually seek out a new light and go foraging for fuel for it. If all these scenes are not the gradual development of something infinite, if they are not the gradual construction of a divine country, then what meaning is there to human life as a whole?

I answer the second objection with such feelings in mind. It is a fact that I do not grasp the absolute truth. In fact, I pursue it precisely because I do not yet grasp it. In doing so, it is only natural for me to make a record of my quest. I do not intend to convey a truth I do not have. I can only write of my own impressions as my impressions. In that sense, I do not think I am exceeding my limits. As one who tries to look within human history for a path to the truth, it is no surprise that I try to use Dōgen to understand the history of human culture. As one who accepts all existing religions as particularized forms, religion is also one part of human history.

Dōgen's Period of Self-Cultivation

The monks of Kenninji once turned to their teacher Eisai and said, “These days the Kamo River is getting close to the temple buildings at Kenninji. Someday it may flood up to our doorstep.” Eisai answered, “Our temple *will* disappear someday; it’s not necessary to think about such things. Nothing but the foundation stones remain of the Jetavana monastery¹ in India anymore. The important thing is the effort made at embodying the truth, which happens in a temple.”

One time a beggar came to Kenninji and said, “My wife and children and I haven’t eaten for several days. There is nothing left for us but death by starvation. Please have mercy on us and save us.” Eisai wanted to give something, but unfortunately there was nothing in the room to give in the way of food and clothing. So he took some copper sticks that were supposed to be used as materials to gild the statue of Yakushi,² broke them, rolled them up in a bundle, and handed them to the beggar. “You should use these to buy food,” he said. The beggar was happy and left. But his disciples did not approve. “That was gilding for Yakushi. To think only of personal gain with the Buddha’s things is disgraceful.” Eisai replied, “In truth, you are right. But the Buddha cut up his own body and limbs to give alms to all living beings.³ If you think of the mind of the Buddha in this way, actually, it would be acceptable to give the Buddha’s whole body to anyone who is destined to starve to death. Even if I fell into hell because of this sin, I would still dare to commit it.”

Another time at the impoverished Kenninji, there was starvation throughout the temple. At that time, one patron invited Eisai to his home and donated a roll of silk to him. Eisai was so glad that he carried it himself, without sending for anyone else for help; he put it inside the folds of his robe, and, returning to the temple, he said to the temple deacon, “Well, this is tomorrow morning’s gruel!” Then a request came

from a certain layman, requesting a bit of the silk to help him out of some trouble. Eisai took back the silk he had just got back from the deacon, gave it to the layman, and later said to his disciples, "I suppose each one of you thinks I did something strange, but we monks should aim to follow the path of the Buddha together. It shouldn't be a big deal to fast for a day and die of starvation. There is deeper meaning in rescuing people living in the secular world from their pains" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*).⁴

This is one portion of the words and conduct of Eisai, who introduced the Zen sect to our country.⁵

In this era, the social revolution of the early years of the Kamakura period⁶ was already coming to an end. Although the Imperial court, which occupied the upper class, still preserved its former offices, ranks, ceremonies and conventions, there was nothing but a skeleton remaining of its deceased power. Earlier, the warrior class had been of the middle class or the classless, and for a long time it had resigned itself to the contempt and insults of society. However, though it maintained the slave name of the Imperial court—that is to say, the name "samurai"—the warrior class now held true power as the upper class, and was about to establish a new order for a society that would comply with its demands.

But the religious authority of Nara and Mount Hiei, which had controlled the public for centuries, was freeing itself of the old political regime at the same time that it refused to submit to the new regime, and was now displaying the might of its own independent economic and military influence. It was already making its appearance not as a religious entity but as a political power of the secular world. The monks and priests threw away religious ecstasy, threw away truth, and pursued nothing but worldly gains. The public unrest born of this social revolution, and the audible cry for religious faith coming from within this turmoil, were of no concern to the monks. At about the same time that Eisai risked his own starvation and death for the sake of the beggar who came to Kenninji, the warrior-monks of Nara often revolted and shed blood for the sake of their temple estates. The monks of Mount Hiei went down into Omi, burned the homes of the village superiors, killed people, and also went down into Kyoto to threaten the nobles of the Imperial court.⁷

On the other hand, the monks who were working in temples in Kyoto, having no connections to such political events, did nothing but perform their ceremonies in the traditional way and carry out the old customs of the now-disempowered Imperial court, just as if they were a

part of the Imperial court themselves. For them the Issaikyōe, Gohakkō, Kiu-godokkyō, Gogyakujū, Tō-kuyō, and Hōjōe were no different from festivals like the Kamo-matsuri, the Five Dragons Festival, and Daijōe.⁸

During this time, another group apart from Eisai's appeared to alleviate the suffering of the masses: the sect of Hōnen.⁹ Although their paths differed remarkably, because both groups were true religions, both of them gave strength to the people. But this phenomenon must have become the biggest threat to the old doctrinal authority, which had already lost its vitality as a religion. Thus, the monks of Mount Hiei filed a complaint against Eisai, and, feeling the same sentiment, the Imperial court issued an order to put a stop to the sects of Bodhidharma.¹⁰ The monks of Nara labeled Hōnen an enemy of the state; moreover, the Imperial court also regarded "Hōshibara of the Nembutsu sect"¹¹ as a crazy monk, beheaded his high retainers, threw his followers into prison, and sentenced Hōnen and his associates to exile. But the truth was, the strength of the declining doctrinal authority and the Imperial court could do nothing to stop the newly established strength that was already in motion. At Kenninji, which was in need of food even for its monks, the young Dōgen was already present, and in the Nembutsu sect of Hōnen, whose tomb had been exposed by the monks of Mount Hiei, Shinran¹² was already maturing.

Eisai died when Dōgen was sixteen years old. Because of his deep religious conviction, Dōgen had left Mount Hiei and had been wandering about in all directions when finally he was accepted by Eisai as a talented student in Buddhist practice. It isn't clear whether Dōgen actually observed Eisai doing all the things mentioned above, or whether some of these words and deeds were just hearsay for him.¹³ But Eisai's conduct had made a deep and lasting impression in Dōgen's mind, and looking back at how, in later years, Dōgen so reverently recounts the meaning of Eisai's actions, we can see the true influence Eisai had upon Dōgen. In a time when the pursuit of superficial prosperity such as rank and power were the normal practice of monks, one monk endured all the persecution and oppression and was absorbed in the quest for truth and the practice of compassion—and one young disciple chose the path of that monk's words and deeds.

In those days, the remarkable thing was not the sudden rise to power of a single sect, but rather the powerful emergence of eternal values. In later years Dōgen did not recount his discussions with his teacher about Buddhism, but simply recited his teacher's words and deeds, saying, "Today's disciples should also think only the thoughts of

my teacher's innermost heart." His words here were enough to destroy my own concept of Zen, conventionally and carelessly constructed concept that it was.

After Eisai died, Dōgen started studying under Myōzen of Kenninji. According to Dōgen, "Among Master Eisai's disciples, no one surpassed Master Myōzen in the way of the Buddha."

In later years, Dōgen speaks of Myōzen only in regard to his personality. He says that when Myōzen was planning a pilgrimage to China, Myōyū Ajari,¹⁴ Myōzen's master at Mount Hiei, was very sick and on the brink of death. At that time Myōyū said, "Because I am very old, my death is not far off. I want you to put off your trip to China so you can help me with my illness and pray for my happiness in the next world. It won't be too late for you to go even if you wait until after my death."

Myōzen gathered the students, practitioners, and so forth, and consulted with them. "When I was a child," he said, "I left my parents' house and this teacher raised me to grow up the way I am now. This was a truly great gift to me. It is due to my teacher that I learned the Buddhist way of thinking, that I have a small degree of fame, and that I had the desire to plan this pilgrimage to China. Now, my teacher is suffering the infirmities of old age and is on his deathbed, and his days are numbered. If I think about the difficulty of meeting him again, it is hard to disobey his last wish to delay our voyage. However, if I look back at the reasons for making a pilgrimage to China, I journey there out of compassion, for the salvation of all living beings. Are there any reasons why I should disobey my teacher's last request and go to China, for the salvation of all living beings? I'd like to hear each of your thoughts on this."

One by one they began to answer. "It would be good for you to delay your journey to China this year. The time of your teacher's death has already been determined. Even if you delay your pilgrimage for a year or half a year, that's not a big problem, is it? If you go to China next year, you can accomplish your goal and you won't have to disobey your teacher."

Then Dōgen, who was the lowest ranking among the monks, also responded. "If you believe your enlightenment at this moment dictates taking this action, then it's best if you delay your voyage to China."

Myōzen replied, "Well, I suppose my Buddhist training is good enough just as it is now. I suppose I can attain true enlightenment if things always remain just as they are."

Dōgen said, "If that is the case, you should stay here."

With that the discussion ended and Myōzen spoke. “Each of you has shared his opinion, and you say I should stay. But that isn’t my opinion. If I remain here this time, those who are fated to die will still die. Moreover, even if I nurse him, I cannot expect his suffering to stop. Even if I tell him not to die, I cannot spare him from death. It would only ease his heart, nothing more. For purposes of enlightenment, I think it would be useless.

“Moreover, because staying here would deter me from my aim of enlightenment, he may receive bad karma. However, if I realize my aim to go to China and seek enlightenment, even if I attain just a bit of enlightenment, then even if I go against one individual’s wishes, I will secure good karma for many people. If the merit in this is good, then I will be fulfilling my obligation to my teacher. Even if I should die at sea and fail to reach my goal, if I die with the aim of seeking enlightenment, I’ll be truly satisfied. Think about the voyage of Master Xuanzang.¹⁵ To waste precious time for the sake of one person is not in accordance with the Buddha’s will. Therefore I cannot change my resolve regarding our upcoming pilgrimage.” Thus, in the end Myōzen left for China.

Dōgen was struck by Myōzen’s true piety. When Dōgen retold this story in later years, a disciple named Ejō¹⁶ asked, “Wasn’t it ignoring the practice of the bodhisattvas to think only of his *own practice* and not to help his teacher with his suffering?” Dōgen replied, “In benefiting others and in benefiting oneself, the conduct of a great person, I think, is only to throw away the inferior in favor of the superior. It’s best to throw away the transient desires of this lifetime for the sake of the way” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, fifth fascicle).¹⁷

This is the true influence Myōzen imparted to Dōgen. Here we can see his genuine passion for the quest for truth and the embodiment of truth. His exceptional religious faith in the world of truth was born from this influence. In later years he says Buddhist practice—which is to say, the pursuit and embodiment of truth—is not a means to some other purpose. Seek the truth for the truth; embody the truth for the truth. In the end, the establishment of the world of truth has a purpose. One should not pursue the truth for self-confidence in one’s own self-cultivation. One should not pursue the truth for fame, wealth, happiness, prosperity, or supernatural power. Compassion for all living things is not for oneself or for other people, but is a manifestation of the truth itself. Therefore, in the practice of compassion there is no other course but to “appoint oneself as the law of the Buddha,” and “*exhaust oneself for the law of the Buddha.*” In other words, the truth itself is aimed at the

manifestation of truth (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first and fifth fascicles; *Gakudō-yōjinshū*, fourth fascicle).

In terms of this resolve, *our own practice* is not for our own sake. It is for serving the world of great values that transcend ourselves and others. Dōgen learned these things from Myōzen's personality. This seems to be one of the great advances in his life.

But why was this "Chinese pilgrimage" so important? Was it not just an obsessive fixation with foreign culture to believe that as soon as they got to China they would immediately be able to grasp the truth?

To answer these questions we must look back again at the time in which Dōgen lived. His was an age in which the priests of Nara and Mount Hiei dealt in arson and murder. It was a time in which the head monks caroused with the upper class.¹⁸ Those who sought the way of truth naturally had to turn to alternative directions to find new vitality. Dōgen said, "We should feel sorry for this remote little country where Buddhism has not yet been widely spread, where great masters still are not prominent, where teachers can only transmit phrases and recite names. If you want to study the best form of Buddhism, you must seek out the masters of distant China. If you don't have a great master to study under, it is the same as not studying at all" (*Gakudō-yōjinshū*, fifth fascicle). He did not say this only because he thought his Zen was the correct method. It was his formal rejection of the corrupted spiritual life of his era. Seen in this way, we can say the meaning of a pilgrimage to China at that time was tantamount to the quest for the path of truth.

In the world of values, the differences of the geopolitical world are not important. Where blindness to higher values is concerned, in every instance there is no escape from the ridicule of the narrow-minded. Dōgen had already rid himself of the narrow-mindedness of youth. He said, "At first, due to impermanence, I briefly awakened the desire to seek the truth, finally leaving Mount Hiei and wandering in all directions, studying the way. Since I was unable to meet with the great master of Kenninji¹⁹ in those days, and did not even have friends, I had doubts and delusion rise up within me. The lessons of my teachers in those days are partly to blame for this. They instructed me to 'study like the patriarchs and become a famous person in the world,' so I was thinking I would become as great as Kōbō Daishi.²⁰

"But then I started reading the biographies of past great monks and learned that their kind of mentality²¹ should be avoided. I thought about this. When I think of fame, rather than becoming good in the minds of secular people, I think it is better to be ashamed before the wise men of

ancient times and the virtuous people of the future. Thus, when thinking about becoming great, rather than thinking about whom to emulate in our country, it is better to think of emulating the true monks of China and India. Alternatively, you would do well to think about the greatness of a bodhisattva. When I became aware of this, I began to think of the grand masters as nothing but mud and clay, and my feelings completely changed” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, fourth fascicle).²²

This passage makes the following clear: Dōgen's world of meanings and values surpassed the boundaries of the geopolitical world, and in his world the buddhas and bodhisattvas reign as the supreme authority. The way of progress toward enlightenment is simply to go into this world.

At age twenty-four, Dōgen went to China. He tells of an incident he had along the way: “While inside the ship I got diarrhea. At the time there was a terrible wind blowing, and the clamor within the ship became deafening. As soon as the noise happened, my sickness disappeared.” Even from this experience, he gained an insight into the truth: “Mental strain can conquer physical ailment” (*ibid.*, sixth fascicle).

When he got to China, he started studying under Rujing of the Mount Tiantong monastery. Rujing was a man who believed love of fame was worse than breaking laws. (The reason is that violation of the law is only a temporary mistake, while the love of fame is a vice that lasts a lifetime.) Throughout his life he stayed away from officials and politicians, and rather than wearing a mottled priest's stole, his was stained black. And starting from the age of nineteen, for sixty-five years he never tired of the lifestyle of strenuous *zazen*, even when his hips became inflamed and sore with age. Dōgen said of him, “To see an enlightened master directly is to meet a true person”²³ (*Shōbōgenzō* “Gyōji”).²⁴

Dōgen's memoirs of the training hall of Mount Tiantong describe Rujing's method of training in detail. Rujing would do *zazen* until eleven o'clock at night, and when morning dawned he would rise again at six o'clock and do *zazen* again. The lower monks would also sit in the hall with him. He did not forgo this practice even for one night.

During this meditation time, many of the other monks would fall asleep. When they did this, Rujing walked around the hall, sometimes striking the sleeping monks with his fists, sometimes even taking off his shoes to hit the monks with them. In addition to that, when he found them sleeping, he would go into the training hall and ring bells, light candles, and call out to the monks. Then he would immediately admonish them. “What do you think you're doing, sleeping in the training hall? You'd do

better to enter the priesthood and do *zazen* than to sleep. People of the secular world suffer through manual labor. No one passes through this world in comfort. What do you think you're doing, escaping the secular world and coming into a temple to nap? It is said that life and death are very important. So never lose vigilance even for a moment. What kind of stupidity is it to doze off? This is why the world of truth is wasting away."

Once some altar boys working nearby said to Rujing, "There are monks in the temple who are sleepy or fatigued, and some who are sick as well; maybe they're losing the desire to train. This may be because of the long hours of doing *zazen*. How would it be if we shortened our meditation time?"

Rujing became terribly angry and told them, "That won't do! I suppose faithless people would sleep even if they were in a meditation hall for only a short time. For monks who have faith, the longer they're in the training hall, the happier they should become for being able to cultivate themselves. When I was young, an elder monk said to me, 'I once hit a sleeping monk so hard I thought my fist would break off, but now as I get older my strength disappears and I can't hit so hard. That's why no good monks are coming out of here anymore.' He was right when he said that" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).²⁵

But Rujing's training was based on the conviction that *zazen* was the path to truth. Therefore his censure was his compassion. Dōgen says of him, "Master Rujing was unrelenting in his scolding of monks sleeping in the training hall, but the monks admired him and were happy to be struck. Once he came into the hall and said, 'I'm already an old man. I'd like to take my leave of you, move into a hermitage and cultivate my old age. But in order to provide people with knowledge of how to conquer their doubts and reach the way, I have become a chief priest. To these ends I scold you and beat you. I think it's awful to do these things. But this is the way to manifest the Buddha and educate the masses. Monks, I want you to be compassionate and allow me to do these awful things to you.' When the monks heard this, all of them wept" (*ibid.*, first fascicle).²⁶

A compassionate heart and stern training were the two qualities of Rujing that were most deeply etched in Dōgen's heart. Again we can see here the embodiment of the fiery passion to actualize the world of truth. Setting aside the question of whether Rujing's path was the one and only path, his strong personality is worthy of admiration. Dōgen was struck by his personality, and perhaps he wept with the other monks.

The expression “To see an enlightened master directly is to meet a true person” certainly voices admiration for his strong personality.

But it wasn't only the aforementioned personality of Master Rujing that gave strength to Dōgen. The atmosphere of Mount Tiantong—the center of which was Rujing—also exerted a powerful influence on him. He says, “Although this is the Age of Degenerate Law, in the monasteries of China there are thousands upon thousands of people practicing the way. Among them, some were from distant countries and some were from around here,²⁷ but nearly all of them were poor. However, not one lamented his poverty. They simply were not satisfied with the state of their enlightenment as it was and so they did nothing but *zazen*. Everywhere from the foot of the temple to the top of it, they did *zazen* just as intensely as if they were mourning their own parents.

“Once I was with a monk from Szechwan who had used up all the things he'd brought for his long journey and was left only with two or three blocks of ink. He used them to buy some shoddy, low-quality Chinese paper, and out of the paper he made clothes to wear. Every time he moved you could hear the sound of tearing paper. But he didn't mind. When one person saw him and advised him to go home and get some proper clothes, he answered, ‘My home is a long way away. It would be a shame if I had to give up time cultivating myself to go all the way home to do that.’ And he went on like this, studying the way without fear of the cold. Many good monks came out of China because of this general feeling of diligence” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, sixth fascicle).²⁸

He says in the same vein, “Everyone known as a great monk in China is extraordinarily poor. Their clothes are torn and they own nothing. At Mount Tiantong, a scribe named Master Daoru was a child of a high-ranking noble. But because he separated himself from his family and threw away worldly luxuries, his clothing became so shoddy he was embarrassed to look at it. I once asked Master Daoru, ‘Master, you are the son of a wealthy and honored family. Why do you surround yourself only with base, vulgar things?’ The master replied, ‘Because I've become a monk.’”²⁹

Such was the environment that surrounded Dōgen. He entered this world and devoted himself to it. Once when he was reading a book of ancient analects a Szechwan monk asked him, “What are you reading the analects for?”

Dōgen replied, “I think it will help me understand how the ancients lived.”

“What for?”

“Then when I return home, I can educate people about it.”

“What for?”

“To save all living beings.”

“What do you need to do that for?”

At that point, Dōgen stopped and thought. And, foreseeably, he soon realized there was no purpose in anything. From that point onward in his single-minded pursuit of the truth, he would no longer use the lessons of the analects' *kōans*. Rather, without knowing a single written word, his understanding would gush forth from an indescribable wellspring within. The *raison d'être* of truth is “What for?” Hearing it, he stopped reading the analects and turned toward single-minded *zazen* (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).³⁰

Rujing valued *zazen* above all else. Under Rujing's direction, Dōgen sat day and night in quiet meditation, not even paying heed to extreme heat and cold. Seeing other monks temporarily give up *zazen* out of fear of illness, Dōgen thought, “Even if I get sick and die, I'll continue to cultivate myself. What would be the point of keeping my body perfectly healthy if I couldn't do *zazen*? Even if I thought I could avoid illness, I'll never know when death is coming for me. I intend to get sick and die here doing *zazen*. It's quite enough for me to cultivate myself under great Chinese teachers, die doing *zazen*, and have good monks mourn my passing. If I were to die in Japan, I couldn't be mourned by the likes of such people.” And so he kept on sitting day and night (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first fascicle).³¹

Rujing approved of this and said, “Although you aren't Chinese, you are a truly talented person” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, sixth fascicle).³²

Under Rujing, Dōgen accomplished “the most important study of his life.” But how he came to realize enlightenment is not something we should explain intellectually. If it were something that could be expressed in words, Zen, which we are supposed to actualize through our self-cultivation, would become meaningless. It certainly may have been something that only existed for the blink of an eye. However, in that instant, he leaped from one world to another. Even with his great ability it was still necessary for him to undergo long, austere training in order to make this leap and create this instant of brilliance. In this lies the most personal, most mysterious, most inexpressible moment.

Of course, we can explain in detail the austere means of self-cultivation that led Dōgen to this moment. Moreover, we can describe with rich symbolic expression the world of brilliance that arises after this moment, a world in which the self and the cosmos become one. The

only way for self-cultivation to tie us to this world of brilliance is for our own body-mind to be subsumed beneath the casting-off of body-mind.³³

However, we know that which moves people and urges them toward enlightenment is the strength of the personality that embodies the truth. This same personality will move others and push them on toward enlightenment in the same way. Dōgen says, "Because the Buddha realized the oneness of body-mind, no matter how short the words of the Buddha we all can feel radiance of the Buddha's oneness of body-mind. When the Buddha's body-mind comes, our own body-mind finds the way" (*Shōbōgenzō* "Gyōji"). Even if this innermost lesson shouldn't be explained intellectually, those whose personality can bear this lesson can manifest it clearly before us. We have seen the kind of personality that trained and disciplined Dōgen. Moreover, we have seen how much Dōgen's own personality was disciplined by this kind of personality. Here we reach the conclusion of Dōgen's period of self-cultivation.

The First Sermon

Having finished his period of self-cultivation in China, Dōgen returned to Japan at age twenty-eight. This was two years after the death of Minamoto no Yoritomo's wife, Hōjō Masako.¹

In Kyoto, Kamakura, and other cities, there were still attempts to overthrow the new government of the warrior class, but by this time they could no longer shake the ruling authority. After the Jōkyū Disturbance,² the Imperial court lost much of its revolutionary drive and began to ingratiate itself with the warrior class. The power of the Imperial court and the warriors finally blunted even the spearhead of the warrior monks, who had defended their temples with fierce tenacity.

But the Kyoto to which Dōgen returned was far from a peaceful capital. To alleviate their uneasiness, the men and women of the upper class engaged in nothing but debauchery. Some of the nobility became absorbed in gambling and associated with bands of thieves; even the children of the regents and Imperial advisers did so. In the city, there were no police at all due to the roving gangs of robbers. The guards of the warrior caste would kill anyone they captured, but even these oppressive tactics were ineffective in putting a stop to crime. There was arson, murder, and looting every night. Even the Imperial treasuries were pillaged, and in the end the Imperial palace was burned. The “Downfall of the Imperial Court” was at hand.

When Dōgen first returned to Kyoto he went to visit Kenninji, the temple of his old master. When the people there asked him about Buddhism, he didn't accuse them of being “immoral and diseased”; instead he told them only of “where the Dharma itself excels.” But the Kenninji of those days set him ill at ease. He later remarked on the talk of lust and greed he heard at Kenninji, saying the temple was setting a bad example.

He said, “Those who study the way ought to be poor. Looking

at the world one sees that the wealthy are always confronted by anger and disgrace. If you have wealth, people try to steal it, and if you try to prevent being stolen from, you will immediately grow angry. People explain the right of ownership and discuss the immorality of theft, but ultimately they resort to fighting. In the end, being stolen from brings one shame. Isn't there evidence of this right before our eyes in Kyoto?

"Ancient sages disparaged wealth, and all devas mock the rich. If you desire poverty instead, not only do you avoid anger and shame but you also please the buddhas and sages. However, stupid people hoard wealth and are diseased by it. Even monks are so afflicted. Buddhism is degenerating before our eyes.

"This is precisely the difference I see in Kenninji now as compared to when I was last there seven or eight years ago. The temple dormitories now have safes for hiding valuables; the monks there own all manner of possessions. They like fine clothes, they stock up wealth, and they absorb themselves in talk of debauchery. Because of this, their Buddhist studies are declining. It is probably the same elsewhere. Originally Buddhist monks knew of no higher treasures than robes and rice bowls. What do you intend to hide from other people in a safe? If you have to hide something, it's better not to own it. One fears thieves only because one has something to hide from them; throw away all such valuables and the fear disappears as well.

"It is not only possessions that should be treated this way; it is the same with one's body and life. Even those who kill people think 'I should not be killed,' and it is because of this that they need to be fearful and cautious. Even if someone is going to kill me, I resolve myself not to think of retribution, and burglars and murderers cease to be a problem" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, third fascicle).³

A Kyoto without police was the background for this speech. Before Dōgen's eyes were all manner of disasters, spawned by greed for wealth. Even Kenninji had been swallowed up by this whirlpool of greed. Therefore, separation from this greed became a necessary condition for entering his kingdom of truth.

He also said, "Many worldly people, whether men or women, young or old, enjoy talking about orgiastic parties. These thoughts may relieve the tedium for a short time, but for monks this should be most strictly forbidden. Even among laymen, good people don't engage in such practices in serious times; there are appropriate occasions for drunkenness and debauchery. For monks it is all the more necessary to think only of the buddha-way. This sort of vulgar thinking isn't found in

any of the temples and monasteries of China. Even in our own country, in Eisai's day it was not like this. Even after he passed away, as long as some of the disciples who trained directly under him remained pure, people did not talk about such things. Nevertheless, in the last seven or eight years things have changed, and the young monks nowadays often talk of such vulgar pastimes. This is hardly what I expected" (ibid., first fascicle).⁴

In Dōgen's day, Kyoto was steeped in this sort of lustful talk and behavior. Buddhist enlightenment was replaced by carnal passions, and Nirvana literally became the embodiment of sexual desires. The last several centuries spawned these trends, but now they took on a morbid form and prompted intense civil unrest. The effects of rotten carnal desires spoiled and destroyed the people's hearts. Even Kenninji was already enjoying the aroma of sexual craving, but separation from this lustfulness was a necessary condition for entering Dōgen's kingdom of truth.

If Dōgen had been able to bring about total reform, perhaps he would have stayed at Kenninji. But he did not stay there. Not yet thirty years old, Dōgen was not likely to be able to change Eisai's temple, which had already become thoroughly secularized. Not only that, but Eisai had also compromised with Tendai and Shingon and had not established a tradition of pure Zen. At Kenninji they did not even formally practice *zazen*. For Dōgen, who held *zazen* to be unparalleled for self-cultivation, there was no choice but to create his own path independently.

At the age of thirty, Dōgen moved into An'yōin, a deserted temple on the south side of Kyoto in the Fukakusa district. It was in this temple that he began his efforts to establish his kingdom of truth.

However, his efforts began at a time of abnormal civil unrest. In the year he returned from China, there were indications of worldwide famine in the near future, and in the following year, when he moved into his deserted temple, that famine came to pass. It was a dreadful disaster. In midsummer a cold snap hit and people layered on their warmest clothes. Snow fell even in parts of Minō and Musashi.⁵ During Urabon⁶ there was frost just as if it were winter, and in the harvest season typhoons and heavy rains still continued. Our country, which was always self-sufficient, was suddenly struck by drought, and the price of rice skyrocketed until finally a price cap was enacted. Even the Shōgun could not afford to light lamps at night, could eat only two meals a day, and could no longer hold his banquets.

This kind of famine would not end quickly, and the next year

poverty among the people grew even more terrible. Because of the chaotic weather, and because people were weakened by starvation, epidemics began to appear in force. Such dire straits made even good citizens become bandits. Among those who could not bring themselves to turn to crime, some even found that the only way to escape death by starvation was to sell their wives and children. The demands of love and devotion were overruled by the sheer will for self-preservation.

This pitiful situation was all the more appalling in the areas of Kyoto where people had to wait for their food rations. Starving people wandered around in confusion, while a stench rose from the rows of emaciated corpses that lined the roads. Naturally there were riots due to this awful state of affairs. The people formed gangs and broke into the homes of the wealthy, eating and drinking whatever they found. They would also extort money and rice, distributing the profits among themselves. One might say social communism was realized in Kyoto, albeit on a small scale.

In such trying times the people needed something to believe in, even if it was only superstition. A source of salvation came to the suffering populace in the form of the Pure Land sect. They said, “Human beings are powerless. For as long as this body lives, it is the source of all of our craving, and we can never separate ourselves from it. Where there is craving, we harm others and suffer ourselves. However, Amida Buddha, the absolute, will save us from this fate. Even if we who are powerless try to save ourselves, it will be to no avail. Just rely on great, absolute love. Just call on great, absolute power. All can be forgiven. All can be saved.”

This belief in great, absolute love was the greatest salvation for the people’s hearts, which were broken in the struggle for food. It was Amida’s acceptance of the crimes of people who were originally powerless. But at the same time it was the establishment of a great world in which the foundation of these crimes was completely destroyed. By calling out to the absolute being, we can enter the greater-than-human world of the absolute, while the relative world of human beings remains just as it is. That is, we can be delivered into the world of the absolute just as we are.

But for Dōgen this brand of salvation was “the terrible delusion of the ordinary man.” He wrote, “If the world of the absolute—the eternal manifestation of the highest value—was the greatest possible goal, why not throw away all other values immediately? If the foundation of crime is something that should be completely destroyed, why don’t you

separate yourself from it immediately? Even if human beings are weak creatures, surely some of us could have accomplished that much. We are not the only ones for whom this path is difficult. It is a difficult path from the beginning, but wasn't Buddhism itself originally the result of Śākyamuni's austerities? If it was this way at the beginning, wouldn't it naturally be difficult and austere at the end?

"The patriarchs said even for those who have great strength it is difficult to practice. Compared to the patriarchs, people today cannot achieve even the tiniest fraction of their accomplishments. Even if people today with their little resolve and limited knowledge could muster the strength to undergo such austerities, it would still be impossible for them to achieve the easiest of accomplishments of the patriarchs. How can people today, whose accomplishments are utterly insignificant, understand the profound truth of the Buddha without undergoing these austerities? If you can avoid the path because it is difficult, you are not pursuing the Buddha's truth" (*Gakudō-yōjinshū*, fourth fascicle).

Dōgen made no social efforts to aid the starving and suffering people. He simply stayed in his abandoned temple in Fukakusa, doing *zazen* or preaching on the way. He had but one comment for those who were starving and suffering all around him: "You should contemplate impermanence." For Dōgen, if one meditates on impermanence and seeks out the true nature of life, the way to the kingdom of truth opens up before one's eyes.

The first fascicle of Dōgen's magnum opus, the *Shōbōgenzō*, was written in this deserted temple in the midst of these social conditions. He begins it by saying, "I intended to return from China to spread the truth and save all sentient beings. This was like a great weight on my shoulders. Now, though, my intent is to await a good opportunity to not have to missionize anymore. In the meantime I think I will drift like a cloud or a duckweed and practice the ways of the patriarchs. However, I cannot bear the sight of today's bad teachers confusing genuine seekers of the truth. Because I have pity for these students, I am going to make a record of my experiences studying the way in China" (*Shōbōgenzō* "Bendōwa"). Thus he began his teaching of *zazen* as the gateway to Buddhism, through which the pinnacle of Buddhist truth can be attained by dropping off body-mind. In his efforts to establish the kingdom of truth, this was the first step, which he took at the age of thirty-two.

We have no way of knowing what he did during his stay in the abandoned temple in Fukakusa. However, we do know that during this time a few promising students began to gather around him. When

Dōgen was thirty-four years old, there was a nun who decided to build a new temple out of the ruins of Gorakuji, a temple in the Fukakusa district, and give it to Dōgen as a donation, so she moved there to begin construction. It is recorded that during *geango*⁷ of that year, Dōgen wrote the second fascicle of his *Shōbōgenzō*, “in order to point people toward the way.”⁸ It is also recorded that he wrote the third fascicle in autumn of the same year, for Yang Guangxiu, a lay practitioner from Kyushu. At age thirty-five he wrote *Gakudō-yōjinshū*.⁹ At about the same time, Ejō came to study under him; Ejō would later succeed Dōgen to become the second chief priest of Eihei-ji. Two years later the planned reconstruction of the temple was completed, and at the close of that year Ejō was allowed to teach students. From this point onward, students recorded Ejō’s words as well as Dōgen’s. Especially valued among these records is the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, said to have been written by Ejō three or four years after he began studying under Dōgen.

During these years the times of famine and hardship passed, but the uneasiness in the hearts of the people still had not diminished. Even among the warrior class, who supported the ruling authority, there were many who decided to throw away worldly desires and return to Buddhism. But the old educational authority still lay in the hands of the warrior monks of Mount Hiei, and their displays of military might had not stopped. Because of their protests, the newly arising Pure Land sect was, inevitably, banned. Therefore, the only religion the warrior caste could easily turn to was a new sect of Zen.

Dōgen could not have failed to notice this opportunity. However, he was still the disciple of Rujing of Mount Tiantong, who said, “Distance yourself from the Emperor and never associate with public officials.” What Dōgen aimed at was the establishment of the kingdom of truth, not the attainment of influence in *this world*. Others advised him to leave Kyoto and go to Kamakura “in order to spread Buddhism.”¹⁰ Nevertheless, he said, “No, I’m not going. If the warriors truly have the will to attain the Buddha’s truth, it’s best for them to come to me, even if they have to cross mountains, streams, rivers, and oceans to do it. The worst suffering I can imagine would be to preach the Buddha’s truth in order to acquire wealth and worldly fame” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).¹¹

In other words, Dōgen did not define the rise of Buddhism to be the spread of Buddhism throughout the secular world. From the beginning, the rise of Buddhism wasn’t found in things like grandiose statues and pagodas. The true rise of Buddhism is manifested in moments spent

doing *zazen* and considering particular phrases of the Buddha, even if these activities are done sitting under a tree or in a run-down shack rather than in a beautiful temple. For Dōgen the rise of Buddhism was not simply an increase in the number of people that came to him to practice Buddhism. If only six or seven people truly followed the path of the patriarchs, this in and of itself would be the rise of Buddhism.

Needless to say, from this point of view Dōgen would have seen no point in trying to increase the number of Buddhist believers. Just before Dōgen's thirty-eighth birthday, Ejō was invited to sit before the monks and give sermons. At that time, Dōgen said to him, "You must not lament about our lack of followers."

There were only a few who followed in Dōgen's wake. But the so-called better opportunity he was waiting for would be coming soon. When we read *Gakudō-yōjinshū* and *Zuimonki*, the establishment of the kingdom of truth is urged on within us like a fire. In this way we assuredly affirm one man—Dōgen—as a *master*.¹²

The Method and Meaning of Self-Cultivation

At the heart of Dōgen's teachings is the manifestation of eternal values. Therefore, the destruction of all worldly values must be the starting point of his project.

Dōgen expressed this destruction of worldly values through the traditional Buddhist expression "You should contemplate impermanence." He says, "The impermanence of this world is not a problem to think about, but rather a fact before our eyes. In the morning we are born and in the evening we die. The people you saw yesterday are not the people of today. We ourselves may contract a terrible illness this evening or be killed by a burglar in the night. If this precious life is the only value we possess, then our existence is truly without value" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).¹

When we consider the fact that this statement was written during a period of social unrest, we can tell it comes directly from his true feelings. But if this expression is to be accepted as the foundation of his worldview, it can no longer be mere sentiment. It must be a criticism of human bodily cravings as well as a reproach of all the thoughts, systems, and efforts built upon bodily cravings. In other words, it declares that wealth and worldly fame (both indicators of greed) and all the activities of life directed toward achieving these ends are foolish and insignificant. This is tantamount to a resolute denial of any possible value of the existing social order. From this it follows that no efforts toward gaining material welfare will arise. Quite to the contrary, people must either *seclude themselves from the world* or else *throw the whole world away*.

But this does not entail the wholesale rejection of the secular world, nor the pursuit of happiness only in the afterlife. What is rejected is only that part of life concerned with materialistic happiness and thoughts of

fame, not the super-individual life that aims at noble, humanistic values. The difference between “this shore” and “the other shore” is not the same as the difference between this world and the afterlife. Regardless of after-lives and before-births, living within the truth is life on the other shore, and living in the snares of delusion is life on this shore. Therefore, it is meaningless to say our ideal life consists in crossing over from this world to the other world. The ideal life exists as that which must be actualized here and now.

The destruction of the values of this world is nothing but a reversal of values in order to attain this ideal life right away. This reversal of worldly values gave birth to the search for the eternal value of truth. Only through this search can we bear witness to the truth.

Dōgen said the Buddha’s truth lies open before all people. The problem does not lie in things like natural ability, poverty, wealth, talent, or intelligence. Why then do they not grasp it? Because they are not trying to attain it. They are not earnestly seeking it. If you do nothing but seek the truth single-mindedly, there is no need to ask whether you lack wisdom or whether you lack moral character, no need to discuss whether or not you are intelligent or whether you are a wicked person. If you earnestly seek the Buddha’s truth, you will certainly attain it. Therefore, those who have a will to find the way must first earnestly seek it. If worldly thoughts of stealing valuables, striking out at enemies, getting women of unsurpassed beauty, and the other matters of everyday life concern you, you will obsess over realizing them. Needless to say, you cannot hope to transcend the cycle of birth and rebirth if you seek the truth half-heartedly (*ibid.*).

We already seek. We have a pure will to do it. The problem here is that there must be some method to our pursuit of the truth.

The first part of this method is “practice.”² “Practice” is the abandonment of all old views, all our current analyses, and all of our desires, in order to follow the words and deeds of the patriarchs. In other words, practice is the surrendering of all worldly values in order to become an imitator of the pure patriarchs. Even if one reads and comprehends all the sutras, if one still entertains thoughts of gaining honor, fame, or wealth as a scholar, one does not really understand the truth. The patriarchs explained the wondrous truth of the realization of past, present, and future within a single thought;³ scholars who try to explain this truth are distracted by their sole desire for fame and money, and so they do not even find a shadow of the truth. Even among those who lead a life of devoted *zazen*, if they do so while still even partly

acknowledging criticism from worldly people, one cannot say they are true disciples of Buddhism.

Dōgen says: When practitioners think, “I will not do this thing because it is bad *and people may think ill of me if I do it,*” or think, “If I do this thing, people may think of me as a good Buddhist,” and for this reason do good deeds, this is just the state of the world. But to do whatever evil things one’s heart desires in order to prove one’s lack of concern for worldly people is also simply egotistical and evil-minded. Practitioners should do nothing but single-minded self-cultivation, forgetting all the vices of the secular world (*ibid.*, second fascicle).⁴

In *secluding oneself from the world*, there is no alternative but to pay no mind to the judgments of secular people. No matter what worldly people may think, no matter how they may call you a lunatic, if you only follow the practices⁵ of the patriarchs, there is a way to be a disciple of the Buddha (*ibid.*, third fascicle).⁶

To enter the way you must throw away thoughts of good and evil as you have divided them in your own mind, forget your own conveniences, likes, and dislikes, and follow the words and practices⁷ of the patriarchs *regardless of whether they are good or evil*. If something was practiced by the patriarchs, you must also practice it, no matter how painful. If something was not practiced by the patriarchs, you must not do it even if you might like to. In so doing, a new world of truth opens up for the first time (*ibid.*, second fascicle).⁸

This “*blind obedience to the patriarchs*” is most remarkable in Dōgen’s work. From the very beginning he advocated *single-minded zazen* as the core of Buddhist practice. This is because *zazen* was the means of self-cultivation for the patriarchs themselves, as well as their way of direct transmission. For this reason “imitating the patriarchs” lies at the foundation of his method of self-cultivation. He upheld the precepts because this was a tradition of the patriarchs, and he underwent austerities because this was following the practice of the patriarchs. If one failed to uphold the precepts and avoided undergoing austerities, it could not be said that one was practicing the sort of self-cultivation that would lead to “the Buddha’s truth.”

The proper attitude of Dōgen’s self-cultivation is strictly defined in terms of self-power⁹ and enlightenment. This attitude certainly places great trust in the reality of life that *happens to be born in a human body*: because we were born into this life, we are able to grasp eternal value. But this trust is not a trust in the five *skandhas* or the *ātman*. It is a trust in *the possibility of attaining buddhahood*, which becomes clear only after

throwing away the five *skandhas* and the *ātman*. In other words, it is a trust within oneself that is “trust in a power not of oneself.” Therefore, by emptying ourselves we hope to be possessed by the patriarchs. In the moment the patriarchs possess us, that which shines forth brilliantly from us is the eternal life that was in our original selves. Even if this is true, we still would not be able to reach that eternal life with our own power. In other words, the proper attitude for self-cultivation does not include belief in “one’s own power.”

The difference between the ideas of self-power and other-power¹⁰ lies in the meaning attributed to “emptying the self.” According to faith in other-power, emptying the self is realizing the powerlessness of the self, which can never detach itself from the five *skandhas* and the *ātman* on its own. It is through this awareness of our own powerlessness that the power of the absolute can come even to us, who are afflicted by all our natural cravings.¹¹ Therefore even our own practices and our goodness are not accomplished by us; rather, the power of the absolute works within us. Contrary to this, on Dōgen’s path there is faith that we can detach ourselves from *ātman* by ourselves, and moreover, there is a drive to seek out this detachment. In other words, we are commanded to take the responsibility ourselves for seeing worldly values as meaningless, and to throw ourselves bodily into the pursuit of eternal values.

Here we can see a remarkable difference between the Buddhism of the Pure Land sect and Dōgen’s Buddhism. For instance, the former does not say that one should separate oneself from the fear of death. Although there is eternal comfort after death, people fear death all the same because of their natural cravings.¹² If a person feels like rushing to meet death without fear, that person is without natural cravings, which is simply unnatural for people. Because people are foolishly troubled by their natural instincts, Amida’s compassion embraces them all the more strongly. If we think about it in this way, then we must accept it as a very natural thing for people to seek “health for this fleshly body” and cling to Amida.

But in Dōgen’s case, attachment to the body and to life is the most forbidden of all things. To call on eternal religious values in order to preserve bodily values would be a terrible reversal of the relative importance of those values. Unless one overcomes the fear of death—namely, unless one is ready to climb to the top of a hundred-foot pole and let go, throwing down one’s body¹³—it cannot be said that one is throwing oneself bodily into the pursuit of the Buddha’s truth. Thus, in the former case clinging to Amida for the sake of the body is approved

of, while in the latter case the body must be abandoned for the sake of seeking the truth. However, we should keep in mind that the former places salvation in *life after death*, while the latter locates it in *this life* and tries to realize it. One places personal relief from suffering at the center, while the other places the manifestation of the Buddha's truth at the center. We can say that, as far as the idea of abandoning the self is concerned, Dōgen's philosophy is more complete.

We abandon all values attached to life and body, and we throw ourselves bodily into the practice that seeks out eternal values. In so doing, we empty our selves and imitate the patriarchs. This is the true method of self-cultivation that leads to the Buddha's truth. But without a good master¹⁴ we cannot properly imitate the patriarchs. Our own discernment cannot tell us what the patriarchs' practices were; we must be taught by one who has already entered the path of the patriarchs.

This involves direct moral education from one person's personality to another's. Just as Dōgen's own self-cultivation was guided in large part by a strong personality, the method of self-cultivation he teaches also relies on the strength of this personality. The innermost meaning of the practice of the patriarchs is not transmitted by fixed general concepts; it is transmitted as the strength of a living personality. People accept directly through personality that which they cannot grasp with the intellect. Therefore, self-cultivators¹⁵ must directly study the tradition that is embodied in a teacher's personality. As the name indicates, this teacher is a "master."¹⁶

A teacher's accurate or errant guidance defines the success or failure of self-cultivation. Dōgen said: "A self-cultivator's natural endowments are the clay and the master is the sculptor. If good clay does not meet with a good sculptor, the clay cannot show its good quality. But even when bad clay meets with a good sculptor, it will immediately become a thing of beauty. In this way the authenticity or inauthenticity of a self-cultivator's enlightenment depends upon the accuracy or error of his master's guidance.

"Even in our country, from ancient times there have been various teachers instructing in various systems of thought. But these were simply words. They were nothing but the recitation of names. The living truth is enmeshed in these words and names, but those who say the words and recite the names do not grasp it.¹⁷ This resulted in the spread of such errant ideas as wanting to die to go to the Pure Land. The words of the sutras are the same as good medicine. Even if you give a person good medicine, if you do not teach him the proper dosage, it becomes

poisonous. For us the most important thing is not the good medication we already have but instructions on how to take it. However, ordinary teachers do not understand how to take this medication themselves. Therefore we must take as our teachers only those who do understand how to take it—namely, those who embody the truth in their own person” (*Gakudō-yōjinshū*, fifth fascicle). When Dōgen says “good teacher,” he is referring to the many Zen teachers of China who held the truth of the direct transmission of the patriarchs in their person. Included among them is Dōgen himself.

If the master holds this degree of significance in one’s training, the self-cultivator under such a teacher must empty himself and follow his teacher’s guidance. Dōgen has this to say about it: “There are people in the world who say, ‘My teacher’s words don’t suit me.’ This line of thinking is mistaken. If the *reasoning of the sutras* that appears in your teacher’s words doesn’t suit you, you are just common and foolish. If the *teacher’s own words* don’t suit you, why did you choose that person as a teacher in the first place? Further, if you are using your own opinions to criticize your teacher, then you are caught up in an endless distraction. Once you have a teacher, you must throw away all your own views and defer to him regardless of whether or not he suits you.

“Among my friends there was one who was caught up in his own views and who went around consulting learned men. He rejected everything that differed from his own views and only listened to that which matched his views, but in the end he could not understand the Buddha’s truth. I saw this and realized I should follow the teacher, and finally I grasped the reasoning of the sutras. Later while I was reading the sutras, I saw one passage that said, ‘If you think you will study Buddhism, do not carry along the thoughts you have inherited from previous incarnations.’ When I saw this I thought, ‘That’s it.’ Throwing out all your own thoughts and views and listening to your teacher is the most important point to watch while studying the way” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, fifth fascicle).¹⁸

Clearly there is no concern at all for individuality here. Whether or not one imitates, whether or not one follows, grasping the eternal truth is the only important thing. This does not mean the disposal of individuality but rather the exultation of it. The possibility of imitating and following exists only along the path of self-cultivation; it has no relation to the realization of truth itself. Realization of the truth has its own distinctive personality. Only in the moment of realization does that individuality shine out as unique in all the universe.

The significance of imitating the patriarchs becomes clear for the first time when one realizes the point at which this kind of personal expression becomes the core of imitation. Here all Buddhist terminology is spared from being conceptually petrified. It is in this way that Buddhist disciples are separated from being conceptually locked up and encounter the living truth, which is free-flowing and without obstruction.

Still, for this kind of self-cultivation, one cannot be lacking a “group of truth-seekers,” or, in other words, a sangha. When those who intend to imitate the patriarchs stimulate, encourage, and help each other within a harmonious group, each of them can discipline his own personality and express the truth via his personality.

On the night Ejō was first invited to sit before the monks and preach to them, Dōgen turned to them and spoke: “For the first time at this temple, I pass the torch¹⁹ to the person who has been invited to sit before you today. You must not lament the fact that only a few monks are gathered here tonight. You must not look back at the fact that you are beginners. Feng-yang had only six or seven monks and Yao-shan had no more than ten.²⁰ However, because all of them practice the ways of the patriarchs, those places are said to be good Zen monasteries.

“Behold! There are those who have realized the way through the voice of bamboo, and those who have clarified their hearts with a peach blossom. It is not that there is sharpness or dullness in bamboo, nor shallowness or depth in a blossom. Moreover, it isn’t that anyone who hears the sound of bamboo or sees the color of the blossom will attain enlightenment. When one pursues the opportunity for enlightenment by means of the merits of self-cultivation, that pursuit is what enables one to be enlightened. This is not different from that which enables one to study the way. The truth is within all people. However, the only way to grasp it is to enable yourself to become a monk. Therefore monks should single-mindedly pursue the way. Through training, anybody can be a vessel of the truth. Even if you are not a vessel, do not deprecate yourself, but always be diligent in studying the way” (*Shōbōgenzō Zui-monki*, fourth fascicle).²¹

The above is the method of self-cultivation according to Dōgen. His attitude as a teacher is clearly shown here. But one thing to pay particular attention to is his resolution to the goal of self-cultivation. For him, the purpose of self-cultivation is not “salvation of the self” but “the establishment of the kingdom of truth.”²² From the beginning, the self is saved in the kingdom of truth. But it isn’t that one tries to grasp the truth in order to be saved. In the face of the truth, the self is empty. What is

valued is not the self that embodies the truth, but rather the truth that is embodied in the self. The self-cultivation that leads to the truth must, to the greatest possible extent, be *for the sake of the truth itself*.

“Buddhist self-cultivation for Buddhism.”²³ The fact that this resolution was extolled by Dōgen, a Japanese, is worthy of our admiration. Seeking the truth for its own sake was certainly not a special quality unique to ancient Greek culture. Those who recognize the truth as the highest value—in other words, those who recognize it as the greatest goal—must reach this state of mind. Dōgen reached this state of mind. For him, Buddhist self-cultivation was not a means of attaining anything else. “Having entered the buddha-way, do everything for the sake of Buddhism; you should have no wishes for personal profit.” Everything is valueless! Everything is valueless! This powerful message penetrates and resonates throughout all of his teachings. Buddhism does not exist for the sake of human life; human life exists for the sake of Buddhism. Buddhism does not exist for the sake of the country; the country exists for the sake of Buddhism.

When worldly value is overturned and the eternal truth is accepted as the one and only highest value, this resolution simply and clearly appears. Buddhist self-cultivation practiced in a worldly way has become a slave to worldly value, which should be abandoned. Dōgen uses stark words to speak to this point on more than one occasion: “In Buddhism, self-cultivation is not something to be done for other people. Yet Buddhist self-cultivators in the world today do self-cultivation even when they know it is not in keeping with the way to do so, just for the admiration of worldly people. Even when they know that something is in keeping with the way, if it is not praised by worldly people they give it up and do not cultivate themselves. This is truly placing the values of worldly people above Buddhism. They should be ashamed. They should be ashamed that divine eyes shine on them” (*Gakudō-yōjinshū*, fourth fascicle).

He also says, “Those who start out with faith and join a group of truth-seekers soon forget their intent to seek the truth and only try to get respect or money from the elders and patrons of the temple by singing their own praises. In extreme cases they slander other monks and proclaim that they themselves are the only ones who have faith. In such cases, worldly people believe them. These ones are not worth talking about; they are of the same ilk as the five evil monks.²⁴ They will certainly fall into hell” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, fifth fascicle).²⁵

Even setting aside such examples of bad ways, most of the time

what is called faith is actually aiming at worldly welfare. It is “for myself,” or “to ease my heart,” or “to save my soul,” or “to attain eternal bliss”: all of these are still rooted in selfish desire for fame and wealth. This is desire for personal gain. If eternal happiness and the salvation of the soul are the highest goal, then Buddhism is a means and not the highest value. Real Buddhist self-cultivation must abandon even this kind of desire. We must practice only that self-cultivation in which “you simply throw yourself body and mind²⁶ into Buddhism *without ever aspiring to attain enlightenment.*”

This faith in “Buddhist self-cultivation for the sake of Buddhism” is simultaneously faced with the Pure Land belief in “simply devotedly chanting the *Nembutsu* and hoping to be saved by Amida’s compassion.” Of course these two stand in significant contrast with each other. But still I wonder: as far as the kingdom of truth and the kingdom of compassion are concerned, are their internal landscapes as different as their methods of self-cultivation?

Shinran's Compassion and Dōgen's Compassion

The most remarkable part of Shinran's teaching is his explanation of boundless compassion. For Shinran, compassion is the image of the absolute being. It is the highest aspiration. Therefore, the best thing in human life must be the manifestation of compassion. But Shinran does not explain infinite compassion in phrases such as "Love thy neighbor," "Love all humankind," or "Love between people is the most meaningful thing in life." This is because he understands how feeble human love truly is, and how difficult it is for human beings to love selflessly. He distinctly separates human compassion from the Buddha's compassion. Thus he has this to say regarding the compassionate heart of human beings: The Path of Sages is one of cultivating pity and sorrow. However, as long as people live in this world, we cannot truly help others, no matter how much our hearts pity or yearn for them.¹

Shinran's great love for humanity is expressed here; we cannot help but be moved deeply by it. Indeed, how many hurting souls can we see immediately around us? And how much do we suffer because we cannot save people from their pain—or, rather, because their pain is such that they cannot be saved from it? It is not that we don't know the means to eradicate their suffering. The problem is that we can never embody these means, because our love is too meager and human ability cannot go beyond certain limits. Because of our inability, our sympathy grows all the more, and through it we suffer all the more. If we could possess the boundless strength to immediately actualize what our hearts desire, shouldn't we hurry on the way toward that power rather than simply suffering out of sympathy?

This is where Shinran explains compassion of the Buddha:² The compassion of the Pure Land is nothing other than chanting the name

of the Buddha,³ quickly attaining buddhahood, and, with that great compassionate heart, saving all sentient beings according to one's heart. It is not suffering due to unending compassion, but rather the interpenetrating compassion that is attained by chanting the Buddha's name, which we must call an all-encompassing compassionate heart. In other words, to save oneself is simultaneously to save others. To save others, one must be saved oneself. If you want to perfectly manifest the idea of "Love thy neighbor," there is no alternative but to call upon Amida Buddha. Through Amida we can *be perfectly loved* and we can *love perfectly*.

Thus, the compassion that Shinran teaches is a great love that "cannot belong to humans." His emphasis was not on the relationship of person to person but rather the relationship of people to love itself. It is in this relationship of people to love that we can see the special quality of his belief that "all is forgivable." He says, "*Of course* even good people can reach the Pure Land (i.e., enter Heaven). Evil people are even more able to reach it."⁴ Those in need of salvation are bad people, not good ones. The deeper evil becomes, the stronger the need for salvation must become. Therefore, Amida's compassion is poured all the more on those who are evil. According to this way of thinking, before the compassion of Amida there is no distinction between good and evil in human behavior. Indeed, it even seems that evil possesses more positive meaning than good.

In Shinran's world of compassion, is evil not something to be condemned? In fact, is it *necessary* for salvation? Seeing Shinran's attitude of defending even this "overconfidence in Amida's original vow,"⁵ people might come to this very conclusion. "Overconfidence in Amida's original vow" is the attitude of not fearing evil because Amida's compassion is always being poured onto evil people, but this attitude is rejected, for it takes Amida's vow of salvation for granted.⁶

Nevertheless, Shinran rejects this rejection. Still, I cannot think he condones evil by doing so. No matter how much Amida seeks to save evil people rather than casting them away, I don't see this as an approval of evil. Evil will always be evil. But Amida saves pitiable *humans* who cannot escape this evil. The reason Shinran cannot wholly reject "overconfidence in Amida's original vow" is that the sin of being overly confident in Amida's vow is a matter of *karmic origins and causality*. In order to clearly explain this point, Shinran elaborately explained "the karmic origin of good and evil": Good hearts and bad hearts all arise dependently on karmic origins. *Humans* can be led to good and evil by

karma. Therefore, all good practices and bad practices are shaped by the effects of karma, and we must only cling wholeheartedly to Amida's heart of salvation.⁷

Here there is a clear distinction between the karma that controls humans and the humans that are controlled by karma. While karma leads much of human behavior, it is possible for humans, while being moved by karma, to place their hearts on the other shore. Namely, they can chant the *Nembutsu*. Thus, as long as a man's heart is on the other shore—or, to put it another way, as long as he is chanting the name of the Buddha—no matter what evil deeds karma forces him to commit, he is not really the one responsible for them. Because of this, he is not punished for these evil deeds and can still be saved. However, if he does not entrust everything to Buddha, or in other words if he believes he can make his heart one with karma and take the responsibility for his behavior himself, his fate and his karma must now go together. In this case, he cannot be saved. The question of whether or not a person can be saved is simply a matter of the attitude he takes toward *humans* and *karma*.

But what is the meaning of responsibility if people “attribute all acts, whether good or bad, to the effects of karma”⁸ and simply *cling devotedly to Amida*? Are we to believe that one's actions do not arise out of one's personality but are rather imposed from outside? No, this is not the case. Karmic origin is the principle of making the life before you a possibility. “One cannot even say that the dust on the tips of the hairs of a rabbit or sheep are not sins resulting from karmic origins.”⁹ The evil deeds manifesting in this world are the results of past evil acts. My own life now is the ripple effect of a previous life.

But where are “was done before” and “happened before”? More generally speaking, where is the past? If we do away with spatial metaphors when we think about time, every instant signifies an eternity containing both past and future. This makes all pasts immanent in this life. But this also makes karmic origins immanent in this life. As long as we exist as living creatures, we cannot escape the impulses and instincts of living creatures. As such, these impulses and instincts are the karmic dependencies that deliver us and our innumerable ancestors into this world.

Moreover, where can the impulses and instincts of our ancestors exist except in our own impulses and instincts? In short, where else can the karmic dependency of countless ages exist except in the karmic dependency within us? Truly, we exist in this world because of karmic

dependency. Thus, as long as we live in this world, we cannot elude karmic dependency. Therefore, acts determined by karmic dependency are our own acts, not acts imposed on us from outside.

However, ours is a world that transcends karmic dependency. We possess a particular soul that never existed previously. We even have a spirit that rejects karmic dependency itself. Thus the foremost root quality¹⁰ of our personality is existence above and beyond karmic dependency. Therefore, acts dictated by karmic dependency do not arise out of *this* root quality of our personality. Even if our personality manifests itself as being wrapped up in karmic dependency, this root quality of our personality denies those deeds and seeks forgiveness for them.

If we recognize the latter as the important meaning of humanity, it is acceptable to deemphasize acts arising from karmic dependency. In order to be able to go beyond deemphasizing karmic dependency and ignore it entirely, we must reflect on our powerlessness to leave karmic dependency behind. To live in this world is to be bound by karmic dependency. No, to be *human* is itself due to karmic dependency. Therefore, as long as we lack the power to transcend the world and live as superhuman beings, we cannot leave karmic dependency behind. Any who cannot leave karmic dependency behind are led to various evil acts. However, as human beings, this is not something we can prevent. If we have the heart to say *I do not approve of this act*—that is, if we have a mind to chant to the Buddha unceasingly even from within karmic dependency—then this evil act can be forgiven immediately. When one sees the self that is plagued by karmic sins as “such a miserable existence,” then in the suffering *heart* that hates and is ashamed of that sin, there is already no obstacle that can obstruct salvation.

Based on this line of reasoning, the notion that “all is forgivable” becomes a condition subject to the *Nembutsu*. If this condition does not hold, and if all is unconditionally forgivable, there is no need to talk about the *Nembutsu*. It is also unnecessary to speak of Amida's original vow. In sum, Amida's original vow has no meaning if no one needs to be saved. Thus, the idea that salvation is necessary arises out of the recognition that evil, as it exists, cannot be alleviated.

I don't know whether my explanation matches Shinran's original intentions. However, it is clear that his ideal that even evil people can enter Nirvana does not mean that all actions are to be accepted as they are. For weak people sin is hard to avoid. However, even sinners have

a loftier heart within them. By this condition alone can the sinner be forgiven and saved.

I've clarified two points so far. First, Shinran preached about Amida's compassion *toward* human beings, not about love *between* human beings. Second, at the core of his principle that all is forgivable is the condition that evil is both fearful and shameful. Against these characteristics of Shinran I will investigate Dōgen, who advocates "seeking the truth for the truth's sake." Now I will investigate Dōgen concerning these two special points, calling on Dōgen's idea of "seeking the truth for the truth's sake." What is the basis of his teaching of compassion? On what basis does he forgive evil, or fear it?

Dōgen says body-mind must be abandoned for the sake of the Dharma. This abandonment of body-mind has extremely important meaning for "loving thy neighbor as thyself." The greatest force obstructing love is selfishness, which takes root in what Dōgen calls body-mind; this can be nothing other than attachment to self.¹¹ When one throws away all desires to preserve one's body-mind, empties the self, and lets oneself enjoy coming into contact with others, then love freely flows with the force of one's whole personality. The human compassion that Shinran despaired will become a real possibility for one who throws away body-mind. This is because Shinran must regard the selfishness in karmic origins as an inescapable fact, while Dōgen is able to throw away selfishness. Whether we have the strength ourselves to completely alleviate the sufferings of others is not the issue here. The only issue is whether or not we can throw away the motivations within ourselves that obstruct love for our neighbors. Is it possible for there to be only one motivation, the motivation of love? By this alone can the compassionate heart, which is a problem for us, be resolved.

Dōgen gives a very powerful example to address this problem: Once there was a Chan master named Zhijue, who was originally a government official. When he rose to the rank of provincial governor, he stole public funds and distributed them to the people as alms. One of the border guards reported this to the emperor. The emperor was surprised, and he and his ministers all became suspicious of Master Zhijue, but as it was a serious crime that could not be taken back, they decided to execute him.

At that time, the emperor said, "This man is a man of talent. He is a wise man. Perhaps deeper feelings motivated him to commit this crime. When it comes time to chop off his head, if he shows any sorrow, chop it off immediately. If not, do not behead him."

An imperial messenger took this message and went to the execution grounds. The criminal was waiting calmly, with a rather pleasant look on his face. He said, "In this lifetime, I give my whole life to all sentient beings."

Shocked, the messenger reported back to the emperor. The emperor said, "Ah, indeed there were deeper feelings." The prisoner was summoned to the emperor, who asked about his intentions. He answered, "I quit my job with the government, threw away my life, gave alms, realized my connectedness with all sentient beings, received Buddhism, and will never stray from the way of the Buddha."

In connection to the story, Dōgen says, "Today's monks should also attain this mind-set at least once in their lives. Without at least one instance of this mind-set, it is not possible to achieve Buddhist enlightenment" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first fascicle).¹²

This type of mind-set is "the mind-set that places no weight in this life, deepens feelings of pity for all sentient beings, and entrusts the self to the Buddhist faith." This is imitation of the patriarchs *for the sake of the Buddha-Dharma*, not for the purpose of saving people. If you do it for the Dharma, in the instant that you give your body and your life to all sentient beings, your compassionate mind-set acquires an all-encompassing understanding of your life in this world. In other words, you become compassion itself. Thus, Dōgen saw this compassion—which is emptying the self and loving one's neighbor as oneself—as a disposition no Buddhist could lack.

Of course, this was what Shinran called "Compassion of the Path of Sages." No matter how much this compassion is elevated, we cannot "completely save" all sentient beings. In one incarnation, Master Zhijue gave his whole life to all sentient beings, yet they were only helped by the public funds he distributed. If we were to ask about the effects of this compassion, they are sadly short-lived. But Dōgen does not teach compassion because of its effects. He teaches compassion because it is the path of the patriarchs. He often repeated, "The Buddha tore apart his body, flesh, arms, and legs, giving his whole body to all sentient beings."¹³ The starving tiger that greedily devoured the Buddha's body and flesh only satiated its hunger for a little while. If we consider the effects of giving one's body and flesh for the momentary appeasement of one beast's hunger, they are infinitesimal. But the Buddha's sentiment in abandoning life and body to satisfy the hunger of a wild animal is deeply and boundlessly valuable. Buddhists must study this sentiment. For the Buddhist, the problem is not the degree to which one is able to alleviate

the troubles of all sentient beings, but rather the degree to which one embodies *within oneself* the Buddha's intention to alleviate the suffering of all sentient beings.

Here the distinction between Shinran's compassion and Dōgen's compassion becomes clear. The goal of Shinran's teaching was compassion, and in order to reach that goal he stressed that one should turn one's eyes away from human love for a while and only think¹⁴ devotedly of the Buddha. The goal of Dōgen's teaching was the truth, and in order to reach that goal he stressed selfless human love. Shinran preached *the Buddha's* compassion, while Dōgen preached *human* compassion. Shinran placed emphasis on the *power* of compassion, while Dōgen placed his emphasis on the *feeling* of compassion. Shinran's love is the infinitely increasing love of a *compassionate mother*; Dōgen's love is that of a *seeker of the way*, a love attained through disciplined training.

If this is the case, how does Dōgen's compassion handle the problem of evil? In the face of Shinran's compassion, any evil can be forgiven so long as one has the heart to fear it. Can Dōgen's compassion, which is a human compassion, forgive anything and everything?

First of all, if we are addressing the question of whether evil people can become buddhas, we must keep in mind that saving people's souls is not in the nature of the compassion that Dōgen teaches. For Dōgen, the perfect act of compassion is risking one's life and body to give food to the starving. In such a case, isn't the problem whether or not an evil person receiving this food can attain enlightenment? This compassion is practiced for the sake of the Dharma; it is the practitioner's own practice and is not aimed at salvation. Second, if we are talking about the attitude we should take toward "evil people," Dōgen's compassion does not ask whether a person is good or evil. For a child of the Buddha who "receives the family traditions of the Tathāgata and must have mercy on all sentient beings as if they were his own only child," evil people are just sentient beings one "must have mercy on."

The same problem for Shinran arises for Dōgen: "Shouldn't we condemn evil?" The answer to this is that as long as we are concerned with our attitudes and not Amida's attitude, this problem does not have the great significance it had for Shinran. According to Dōgen, a person's "original heart"¹⁵ is not evil because good and evil are dictated by karma. Therefore, people must seek good karma. Accordingly, a child of the Buddha is one who seeks the highest karma. Children of the Buddha should throw away the "Hinayana approach" that divides right from wrong and separates what is from what is not, and should simply

follow the words and deeds of the patriarchs, regardless of whether they are good or evil.¹⁶ Insofar as one imitates the devout patriarchs, one will naturally reject the evil they rejected. Where the actions of other people are concerned, as long as children of the Buddha treat them with compassion, it is unnecessary to ask questions of good and evil. This is because the child of the Buddha imitates the patriarchs and acts with compassion, not because he judges evil. To put it another way, for children of the Buddha, acting with compassion is important, but judging evil is not.

Thus, in the face of the compassion that Dōgen teaches, “it is not necessary to condemn evil.”¹⁷ As proof of this, we can refer to the following story told by Dōgen. “Once there was a monk at Jimyō-in who was an assistant minister, and his treasured sword was stolen from its hiding place. The thief was one of his servants. When another servant exposed the crime, the monk said, ‘That is not my sword,’ and thrust it back. The servant who stole it became ashamed and gave it back. Because of this, the servant did not commit suicide, and went on to have many children. Even laymen have this understanding. Obviously no monk can be without it” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, fourth fascicle).¹⁸ Judging by this story, Dōgen places more importance on the struggle in the thief’s heart than on the sin of theft itself.

From the beginning this was never meant to imply that “you should approve of evil.” One should reject evil in the same way the patriarchs rejected it. But because we sometimes fall into evil due to evil karma, we must refrain from rejecting our “original heart,” which should be directed toward the good. Dōgen’s attitude that because of this “original heart” we should not condemn evil might be seen as being compatible with Shinran’s attitude that all sins can be forgiven on the condition that evil is still feared. But in Shinran, the one who forgives is Amida. In Dōgen, it is human beings.

One might suppose the compassion of the absolute not only forgives all but also never causes suffering. On the other hand, mightn’t one also suppose that when human compassion forgives all, it might be in error, and through its errors couldn’t it trod on justice? For example, might not a compassionate mother’s favoritism result in promoting evil?

If we understand compassion simply as the love inherent in humanity, there is probably no way to avoid this difficulty. However, Dōgen’s compassion is the compassion of throwing off body-mind. It is the compassion of discarding attachment to self and love of fame. It is practiced for the Buddha’s truth: to fill the world with goodness and

righteousness, not to achieve worldly gains. Therefore, in the case of forgiving evil, let us not forget that it is not forgiving evil as such, but rather having pity for humanity. If we have this resolution, no matter what help others may require of us, we will always be able to help without any hesitation whatsoever.

To illustrate, Dōgen cites the example of everyday, petty things: for instance, asking others for things, such as requesting someone to write a letter in order to press a lawsuit.¹⁹ “In this case, let us suppose you are a hermit. You could refuse the request, saying, ‘I don’t take part in pursuing benefits of this world.’ This seems compatible with a hermit’s conduct. However, to think of the blameworthiness of worldly people and to refuse them is to act out of attachment to self and love of fame. If there is a way to aid the person even a little bit, it is best to throw away personal fame and fulfill the request. After all, when the Buddha was a bodhisattva, if people asked it of him, he would have given up even his body, flesh, arms, and legs.”

Ejō asked Dōgen about this point: “Is that really so? Even in the case of a person who intends to kidnap someone’s family or hurt somebody, should we still help that person?”

Dōgen replied, “How am I supposed to know whether one side or the other is in the right? To me it is only a matter of writing the one letter I was asked for. In this case, I think it goes without saying that you should write of your hope for the correct resolution; you should not pass judgment. Even if you knew the person requesting the letter was not in the right, once you heard the request to write it, it would be best to write the letter and include in it your opinion of the best solution to the situation. ‘*Were it always like this*, no one and no thing would bear ill will. Similarly, if you meet someone and you have reached the limit of your ability to help them, if you give the situation deep, deep intellectual assessment,²⁰ in the end you will think of something. You should throw away attachment to ego and love of fame’” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first fascicle).²¹

In this way, Dōgen teaches of the possibility of a broad, all-encompassing love²² within the transparent world, from which attachment to self and love of fame are banished. If we think of the saving *power* of this love as being beyond reach, it can be seen as Amida’s compassion actualized in humanity.

Through “faith,” Shinran blindly obeyed the guidance of the patriarchs before him. “For me, Shinran, simply by doing the *Nembutsu*, I will be saved by Amida; for good people to make their wishes heard

by Amida, they need nothing in particular other than faith. Is the *Nembutsu* really for being reborn in the Pure Land, or does it earn us karma that will condemn us to hell? I know nothing about this at all. Even if I were deceived by Hōnen Shōnin and were to fall into hell because of the *Nembutsu*, I would have no regrets whatsoever.”²³

As opposed to this, Dōgen imitated the patriarchs before him through “cultivation.” He followed them for good or ill. Both Dōgen and Shinran are in agreement with regard to abandoning egoistic views and “following”; it is where the focus on “faith” and “cultivation” diverges that is the notable difference between the two. (Of course, to separate *cultivation* from *faith* is merely to recognize a difference in emphasis; it does not imply a fundamental divide. Shinran is a complete cultivator in the sense that he actualized faith in Amida throughout his life. The powerful strength of that faith shone out from that cultivation. By the same token, Dōgen was a complete person of faith in the sense that the cultivation of imitating the Buddha was founded purely upon faith in the Buddha. Thus, the profound meaning of that cultivation flowed out from that faith. Seen in this way, the two of them are fundamentally one. However, in spite of this, each of them appears with his own particular characteristics. Here we have paid attention to these particular characteristics.)

It seems to me that these similarities and differences recur again and again throughout both of their writings. Their similarities always maintain their different colors at the same time that they are one, and their differences, while having one root, remain different. This is how the *karunā* and *mettā*²⁴ preached by Śākyamuni lives in both of their teachings. This is also how the fact also appears in both of their writings that good and evil are rendered insignificant before *karunā* and *mettā*. According to Shinran, compassion belongs to Amida. Therefore, human excellence loses its significance in the face of that compassion. According to Dōgen, compassion belongs to humans. Therefore, the significance of human excellence is deepened further by compassion. Shinran only explained the relationship between human good and evil and Amida's compassion, while Dōgen delved deeply into the relationships between people.

Moreover, if by chance they both refer to the same problem of applying moral excellence,²⁵ then at the core their teachings are always the same. For instance, Shinran said the following about “filial piety”:²⁶ “As for myself, I have never chanted the *Nembutsu* for the sake of ‘discharging my filial duties to my parents.’ This is because, first, I cannot

save my mother and father through my own power. Second, all living creatures in all worlds are my parents and siblings.” In other words, for him, as a human being in this world, it is meaningless to pray for one's parents' eternal happiness.²⁷

Dōgen had this to say about “filial piety”: “It is good for laypeople to maintain the beliefs taught in works like *The Book of Filial Piety*.²⁸ But monks have thrown away social obligations and entered a state of being without obstructions.²⁹ A monk's code of conduct dictates that he cannot limit himself to merely returning a favor to the individual who grants him one; instead, the monk must treat all sentient beings everywhere as one of his parents. To give special treatment to one's parents in this lifetime by specifically giving them one's merit³⁰ cannot be the Buddha's will. You must truly know the depth of the kindness your parents gave to you, but more than this you should know that this is so with everything” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).³¹ In other words, in the face of compassion, the existence of the particular applied excellence called filial piety is not allowed.

However, we cannot count too many of these similarities. This is because Shinran has very little to say concerning applied excellence. Therefore we cannot know about the moral excellences that are supported by Amida's compassion. In contrast, we can find impassioned speeches on moral excellence by Dōgen, who preaches the compassion of humanity. Because of his “faith,” Shinran, who was in immediate contact with the people and directly influenced their lives, had little to say about the path of human beings. On the other hand, because of his idea of “cultivation,” Dōgen, who retreated into the forests and mountains solely in order to work toward realizing the truth, has great passion for the ways of human beings. This contrast is profoundly interesting.

Concerning Excellence

Obviously, concern for moral excellence is not the primary obligation in religions that aim for oneness with the absolute. In the case of Shinran, the fact that he gives little explanation regarding excellence indicates his intense passion for the absolute. But here one can also see an inevitable difference between the teaching that places Amida's Pure Land somewhere far beyond this world and the teaching that recommends trying to embody the absolute truth in this life. According to Shinran, human beings could be rescued and taken to the Pure Land, even with their "innate desires"¹ as they are. Confronted with the light of the world of the absolute, humanity's innate desires are so tiny they cast not even the slightest shadow.

But for Dōgen, dominating one's innate desires was a necessary condition for embodying the truth. Once innate desires have been conquered, even the tiny world within each of us can reveal a state of limitless freedom. Shinran allows monks to eat meat and marry and does not sharply separate clergy from the laity. On the other hand, Dōgen erects the most inflexible barrier between the two. Shinran simply preached the possibility of forgiving evil, while Dōgen emphasized strong self-discipline through the precepts. Japanese Buddhism used the idea of "innate desires as buddhahood" to create a certain harmony between everyday practices and Buddhist ideals. Dōgen pulled the original textual "one or the other" back into Japanese Buddhism.

But Dōgen does not try to assign these precepts to all people. Those who imitate the Buddha—namely, monks—are influenced by the Buddha and must obey the precepts. For the laity, however, this is not always necessary. The Buddha said, "Thou must not kill any living creature." He said, "Thou monks² must throw away all desires." But for the laity to kill birds and fish, or to lead their lives according to their passions,

is not seen as any sin at all. This fact robs the precepts of any universal meaning as “a path everyone must walk.”

If this is the case, doesn't it cause the precepts to lose their moral authority? This question arose in the hearts of monks and nuns. Once a nun asked Dōgen about it: “Even among worldly women and housewives there are those who study Buddhism. If even *they* can practice, then I don't think nuns have failed Buddhism if they commit a minor transgression. What do you think?” Dōgen replied, “A laywoman who studies Buddhism while living out her passions might still do herself some good. (This depends only on her desire. It makes no difference whether she is clergy or a laywoman.) However, if a nun doesn't have a nun's mind-set, she can never attain the absolute. In the case of those laywomen who have Buddhist intentions, no matter how much their lives fail to conform to the precepts, it is still a point in their favor. For a nun who has a laywoman's heart, however, no matter how her Buddhist intentions surpass those of laywomen, it will only be a point against her, and in fact she will be doubly in the wrong” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, third fascicle).³

In other words, because the laywoman is in a position to acknowledge her passions, her passions are not a concern for her. On the other hand, because the nun is in a position to refuse her passions, she suffers great harm because of them. The difference in their positions causes identical things to differ in significance. If so, what does this difference mean? In one position one yearns for the Buddha but cannot even dare to imitate the patriarchs. In this position the reason why passions should be refused is not fully understood. In the other position one intends to imitate the patriarchs through and through. In this position the mental state of the patriarchs, who had refused their passions, must be fully understood. If we think about those using the Buddha's truth as the standard, the nun is much higher than the laywoman. However, because she is higher, she is required to have stricter excellences.

In this sense Dōgen clearly separates the excellences of the clergy from the excellences of laypeople. We can see this in passages like the following: “In filial piety, there is a difference between laypeople and clergy. Laypeople practice the teachings of *The Book of Filial Piety* and so forth, knowing as all worldly people do that they must do so throughout life and until death. But because clergy throw away honor and enter into acting without obstructing, returning debts of honor is not limited to just one person.”⁴ All laypeople have to do is pay filial respect to their own parents. Clergy, however, must behave toward everyone

as they would toward their parents. In other words, they should not adhere to “filial piety” as an excellence that applies to particular people. For the laity, sacrificing oneself for one’s parents is an excellence among excellences. But for monks, to throw away faith for the sake of one’s parents is to be plagued by selfish feelings and to fail in one’s duty. Laypeople should not discard their parents out of selfishness. On the other hand, for monks it is even acceptable to let one’s parents starve to death for the sake of faith (*ibid.*, second fascicle).⁵

Dōgen praised Master Myōzen, who deserted his teacher even when his teacher was at the brink of death in order to pursue Buddhism. This praise caused Dōgen to reject filial piety. Originally, filial piety is the deep love between parent and child. Countless people understand filial piety to be a pure form of human affection. Now our natural tendencies dictate that a parent’s love for a child is far stronger than the child’s love for the parent. Therefore, the parent’s love for the child is not emphasized as an excellence; only the child’s love for the parent is emphasized as such. But if we assume that filial piety has a particular strength that is difficult to throw away, this is not because it is an excellence but because it is a fondness. To the layperson, this fondness is beautiful. However, for a monk, it is an obstacle.

A certain monk once consulted Dōgen, saying, “My mother is very old and as I am an only child, I have to take care of her. We love each other very much, and so I push myself to work for clothing and food for her. If I retreat from the world and confine myself to a monastery, I don’t think she could survive even one day. Because of this, I feel I cannot devote myself to Buddhism. What is the best thing for me to do? Should I desert her and follow the way?”

Dōgen replied, “This is a difficult problem. It’s not something other people can solve for you. You yourself must think on it well, and *if you truly have the will to practice Buddhism*, do whatever you can to assure your mother that you are doing the right thing, then follow the Buddha’s way. If the demand is strong, you will certainly find a solution. You may think you can circumvent the entire problem by waiting until after your mother passes away to follow the Buddha’s way, but what if you die before she does? Your mother will have disrupted your efforts toward reaching the truth. On the contrary, if you throw away this life and follow the Buddha’s way, then even if your mother starves to death, will she not show her virtuous generosity by forgiving her only son and allowing him to follow the way? In so doing, will she not give you a good chance of reaching the way?” (*ibid.*, third fascicle).⁶

When placed before the truth, the love between mother and child is mere selfishness. If a mother were able to help her child's efforts toward the truth—even if she had to sacrifice her love to do so—this would be a love greater than motherly love. These are appropriate words for Dōgen, who is the apostle of the kingdom of truth. But does this not contradict his teachings of compassion? If it is asked of him, the Buddha gives up even his entire body. Should this monk not give up his whole way of life to aid his starving mother? Indeed, he should. If asked, he should give it up. *But this is not because the person who asked was his mother.* He must surrender everything he has just as completely no matter who is asking. The problem here is the pain he feels *because she is his mother.* Therefore, once again the answer here is that he must throw away this special affection that arises *because she is his mother.* In other words, *filial piety* must be elevated to *compassion.* The “child” must be elevated to the “disciple of the Buddha.”⁷ The act of love that is realized in this way is not “for mother” but “for the truth.”

In the end, the difference appearing here between a monk's excellences and those of the laity originates in the “one or the other” Dōgen places between worldly values and Buddhism. In his words, “Buddhism is opposed to everything worldly.” *This* is the Buddhism he chose. For him, *this* Buddhism had unique and unsurpassed value. Given this, why did he accept worldly values as well? Shouldn't the worldly standpoint, which opposes Buddhism, be immediately rejected?

It is clear that on this point Dōgen lacks a complete answer. He accepts the existence of the secular world alongside the world of Buddhism. As such, he often pointed out the existence of true people⁸ even in the secular world, as a warning to monks. This dual attitude probably originates in Dōgen's acceptance of Confucianism alongside Buddhism. Concerning the realization of absolute truth, he would recognize no authority beyond Buddhism. But concerning things such as the ways of human beings and their passions for their ways, he strongly sympathized with apocryphal teachings as well. He quoted passages like the following, with all his passion for the truth: “If you hear about the way in the morning, it is all right to die at night.”⁹

This trust in Confucianism (which was probably agreement with Confucius's passion for the way) made Dōgen unintentionally accept moral principles of the world of laypeople and made him take the incomplete standpoint mentioned before. It can be thought that because of this incompleteness, he was able to reach a single ethical system that exists in Buddhism and in Confucianism, a system applicable to all

people, whether they are clergy or laypeople. Dōgen taught excellence to his monks and priests, saying, “Even laypeople are like this.” These were all Confucian excellences, but Dōgen saw them as being suitable for clergy as well. The point all these excellences share in common is that they all leave egotism and personal interest behind. “Laypeople think of trying to be in accordance with the will of the heavens, and priests try to be in accordance with the will of the Buddha.” “Forget yourself and be the way.” To act so as to leave the “I” behind and be in accordance with the will of the absolute is the moral principle Dōgen suggests all human beings have in common.

There is one more remarkable characteristic among Dōgen’s comments on moral excellence. It is the emphasis on internal meaning. He says, “Excellence appears in a person *to make him worthy*, not so that he can be praised by others. Being ashamed of evil is also being ashamed of one’s own debasement, not of the criticism of others. Deeds are noble or vulgar in and of themselves. A person’s acts should not change one iota whether he is in public or alone in a dungeon. Praise or criticism from worldly people has nothing to do with the value of acts themselves. Therefore, ‘If you have excellence and yet are slandered by others, you should not lament it. If you have no excellence and are still praised by others, you should grieve.’ ‘Do not hold anyone in esteem who does not have true internal excellence.’”¹⁰

Dōgen said these things especially to “people of this country.” “People of this country do not know of *true internal excellence*; they only praise people on the merit of their outer appearance. Therefore it is easy for faithless heretical academics to be pulled astray. For example, there are those who try to make it obvious that they are ‘throwing away the self’ by soaking themselves walking through the rain. Sadly, when worldly people see such odd behavior they immediately say, ‘What a noble person; he truly is not attached to the world.’ These academics merely pretend to be noble. It is this brand of ‘nobility’ that abounds in our country. This is nothing short of heresy. Only those who do not appear outwardly different from worldly people but who continually prepare their innermost hearts should truly be called faithful people” (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).¹¹

Dōgen reserved such language for “academics.” But this spirit of his permeated academic circles and went beyond the academics to have an even deeper influence on the spirit of the warriors of the day. In later years, he was invited to Echizen by a samurai and policeman in Kyoto named Hatano Yoshishige.¹² For Hōjō Tokiyori,¹³ who erected a Zen

temple in Kamakura, the first to be invited to become the head of the temple was Dōgen. If Dōgen's emphasis on internal excellence had some form of influence on the thought of the warrior caste, then the excellence of restraint, which is one part of the warrior ethic, should be tied to Dōgen's spirit.

Concerning Social Problems

Dōgen accepted the world of laypeople and their excellences. However, he did not try to teach that, when complete, the moral excellences of the laity are in agreement with the moral excellences of the clergy—or, in other words, that to leave personal interest behind and ascend to the will of the heavens is, in the end, to return to cutting away natural cravings and following the will of the Buddha. The reason for this is that the act of leaving personal interest behind is not necessarily the same as conquering appetites and carnal desires. The ideal world that laypeople try to realize by leaving personal interests behind and being the way¹ is a world in which all people can satisfy their appetites and carnal desires as much as they like, and yet be free of strife and unfairness. But for Dōgen the satisfaction of such cravings held no meaning whatsoever. Craving itself is a source of suffering, and the satisfaction of craving becomes a new, additional source of suffering. These are nothing but things to be conquered. The thing people actually aim at is the great value that transcends craving and satisfaction.

Because of this, Dōgen does not try to alleviate the social unrest of the secular world by means of secular excellence. After all, the root of social unrest arises from craving. The only salvation from this unrest is the way of the patriarchs, who cut away the root of this unrest. Accordingly, Dōgen only made efforts toward manifesting the way of the patriarchs. This manifestation is that which allows a disciple to embody Buddhism to the utmost, no matter how few such disciples there may be.

Having adopted this perspective, Dōgen did not try to criticize things like the disputes over land, which were frequent in his day, or the severe oppression of farmers at the hands of landowners who had just gained power. For many warriors, who realized their own strength as a result of numerous battles, it was only natural to request rewards (such as territory and property) for their efforts. It was also natural for their

limitless craving for finite lands to give rise to disputes. Perhaps this was the sad reality for the people of this period, but for Dōgen it was a phenomenon as old as humanity itself. The only thing he felt he needed to say was, “Throw away greed and do not concern yourself even with food and clothing.” However, Dōgen did not say this to laypeople. He only said it to “those who study the way,” or monastics. He did not say it in order to eliminate social unrest; his only purpose was the establishment of the *truth*.

In Dōgen’s era, monks actually represented the highest path of human beings. Anyone who sank to the deepest depths of suffering—whether noble or warrior or farmer, man or woman—turned to the monks and temples for help. They repented before the Buddha for their “ten evils and five hindrances”:² in other words, the sufferings they endured due to their desire, passion, and hatred.

There is a story of Taira no Shigehira in *The Tale of the Heike*, which was written in Dōgen’s time.³ Shigehira burned down Tōdaiji in Nara, but after he was captured, he repented to Master Hōnen, who was known as “a living buddha.” Shigehira said, “When the Heike were in power I was bound by worldly desires and felt nothing but pride. Even after the Heike were doomed to decline and the world was in chaos, I still fought over anything and ruined others to help myself. I had nothing but evil in my heart, and no good will stirred within me.”

Anyone who experienced the combative mentality of those days as Shigehira did must also have naturally come to regret it. The reason they “threw away life to make war”⁴ is, to borrow the words of Kumagai, because they “thought about the future” of their own children; in other words, they did it in order to guarantee their family’s way of life.⁵ When a person is about to take the life of a child solely from this motivation, the value of human life is thrust upon him, and he “suddenly forgets thoughts of sworn enemies and gives up warlike intentions.” Kumagai was not the only one to have done so. In the end, these painful feelings inevitably take one to Buddhism. Therefore, in Buddhism the thing that builds up a real sangha (that is, a harmonious community) is nothing other than guiding people in that which has the most essential significance. Even if the sangha converts only one person to become a true Buddhist, the sangha’s guidance will eventually establish a symbol of the solution to the problems of the people.

With this in mind, Dōgen emphasized that to be a monk is to abandon greed for wealth and live a beggar’s life. For ordinary monks who had grown accustomed to owning land and living prosperously,

this must have been a radical way of thinking. If the monastic lifestyle led to realizing the Buddha's truth, they said, then in order to realize this highest goal, was it not enough to "not be concerned about food and clothing" and practice Buddhist cultivation while still receiving their income as landowners? But for Dōgen, if one stockpiled even a minimum amount of wealth it would damage one's resolve⁶ for the way. Even keeping the donations of the wealthy in order to have food for tomorrow was amassing wealth. "Not even worrying about food and clothing" does not mean one prepares for tomorrow beforehand; it means one must completely forget about preparing for tomorrow.

Of course this must have been particularly difficult in our country, where the perpetual poverty of temples and the ritual of begging never developed.⁷ But even so, Buddhists should not think about food before it is needed. They should first become enmeshed in its necessity when it comes time to fast. "Though the patriarchs transmitted Buddhism across three countries, I have not heard of one of them dying by starvation or freezing to death."⁸ In the course of the life fate has decided for you, you may not be able to secure worldly riches such as food and clothing no matter how hard you seek for them. On the other hand, you may receive them even if you do not seek them. For Dōgen himself it took over ten years to "not own anything and not think of anything." It is natural to think of storing food, even if it is only just enough to keep yourself alive. In this short life, things will turn out one way or another regardless of how much you worry about them. "Heaven and Earth give things to us. They are there even when we don't run around asking for them." Simply give it up to destiny and do not let your heart be troubled by it. Even if you starve or freeze to death, if you die following Buddhism you will attain eternal happiness (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first and third fascicles).⁹

In this way, Dōgen tells his monks they absolutely must be penniless: "Those who study the way *must* become poor *first*. If you have wealth, you will necessarily lose your will to practice. Laypeople who pursue riches, desire homes, and seek social status always go astray from the way."¹⁰

"There was a Chinese layman named Pang who was not inferior to monks because he had the courage to throw away wealth. When he took his riches and threw them into the sea, people admonished him, saying he should have given them to the poor or to a temple. His reply was, 'I threw it all away because I knew it was harmful. Why would I give something to another person if I knew it to be harmful?' By throwing his

wealth into the sea, he became poor and had to make his living weaving bamboo baskets. This preparedness made his innermost personality deeper.”¹¹

“Even laypeople who devotedly follow the One Path don’t need things like land.”¹²

“There was a time when I myself had land. There was even a time when I was rich. When I compare my body-mind then and my poverty today, now that I have no food or clothing, I realize my heart is better off. This is my own experience” (ibid., third fascicle).¹³

For Dōgen, separation from the desire for the basic necessities of life was a necessary condition for following the way to the truth. Therefore, he strongly disapproved of orthodox Buddhism in Japan, which allowed the royalty and aristocracy to continue living their extravagant lives while still practicing Buddhism. After all, why did Śākyamuni throw away his status as crown prince and become a beggar? If he could have solved all problems by giving out wealth and dividing territory equally among rich and poor, he should have become king and done exactly that. But for a king to return to the Buddha, the first step must be to become a beggar. This was Dōgen’s way.

Criticism of Art

Given his way of thinking, Dōgen soon came to disapprove of artistic efforts. The Buddhism of the Asuka period was represented by Prince Shōtoku and Hōryūji. Buddhism of the Tempyō period is represented by Empress Kōmyō and the Great Buddha Hall of Tōdaiji.¹ Buddhism in the Fujiwara period was in harmony with the elegant lifestyle of the aristocracy.² We can see one point all these forms of Buddhism hold in common: in all these periods, religious ecstasy is clearly described to be an aesthetic ecstasy. Because of this, even today we still tend to value the religious aesthetic of this period in all its depth, purity, and mystery, rather than the religion itself. Although the arts *are* a grand *human* treasure, this is not in keeping with the teachings of the patriarchs. Although these arts differ from the patriarchs' path of self-cultivation, we can still recognize an abundant, gentle, beautiful faith in the heart of one who worships art religiously.

For Dōgen, who resurrected the original demand of “one or the other” in early Buddhism, temples and statues of the Buddha were not in any way beneficial for attaining the truth. “People today think making statues and erecting temples indicates the prosperity of Buddhism. This is not so. No matter how much one decorates huge temples with jewels and gilds statues with gold, *these acts do nothing at all for attaining enlightenment*. It is good for laypeople to give their wealth to the world of the Buddha and to do good deeds. Even though the laity feels doing small things like these brings about great results, for monks to do this sort of thing does not lead to the prosperity of Buddhism. The true prosperity of Buddhism consists in considering passages from the sutras and doing *zazen*, even if you're just sitting under a tree or in a grass shack.”³

It is *evil* to think one can gain enlightenment by revering statues and relics of the Buddha. “This will only condemn you to the land of evil demons and poisonous snakes.”⁴ Of course, since those statues are

afterimages of the Buddha, and since the relics are the remains of the Buddha, it would not do to treat them irreverently. However, one certainly should not revere them differently depending on whether they are beautiful or ugly. “You should even revere poorly made statues of mud or wood.” But this reverence has nothing to do with *Buddhist enlightenment* (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, first and second fascicles).

Dōgen clearly disdains the power of beauty. This disregard is an expression of distrust for everything sensual. This tendency appears in all countries in all eras where there is religious tension. Paul opposed the sculptors of Greece. Savonarola opposed the authority of the Medicis. If one assumes that artistic pleasure accompanies carnal pleasure, then it is natural that art is balanced against this kind of religious faith as a “one or the other” sort of decision.

Dōgen did not merely oppose Buddhist art; he also said people should “ignore any discussions” of literary arts, poetry, and the like. What purpose do honeyed words and beautiful passages of literature serve in attaining enlightenment? Those who only enjoy literature and poetry “do nothing but play with words; they will not gain enlightenment.” Even in the case of expressing one’s innermost essence, the important thing is not written words but one’s own experience. “Monks these days are fond of using flowery words when creating *ślokas*⁵ and writing sermons. This is not necessary. Even if you do not create a *śloka*, just record the thoughts in your heart, and if your writing is poor, you should still write about your entry into the Dharma.” “If you write what you think of the principle⁶ bit by bit, then even if future readers find your writing to be poor, if nothing but the principle is in it, it is still important for the way” (*ibid.*, second fascicle).⁷

Here again, except for such expressions as “entry into the Dharma” and “the principle,” Dōgen saw no value in the literary arts. Naturally, he also had little interest in the literary style of the sutras. Aside from fragmentary quotations from the sutras, he only referred to the words and conduct of the Zen monks of China, as well as that of certain honorable laymen. For him, it was enough if the principle appeared in a person’s words and deeds.

In contrast, the swelling tide of the Pure Land sect was relatively generous toward the literary arts. Of course, the stories that were found suitable for “the will to enter the Dharma” were those in which good was rewarded and evil was punished. But the assumption that the principle underlying various aspects of the Dharma is at play in poetic phrases that praise the Buddha is a thought that influenced not only

the writer of *The Ten Teachings*⁸ but also writers of military stories in general. This contrast eventually became the rivalry between two forms of expression: on the one hand, the drive to follow the influence of the art and literature of the noble court, and on the other, the drive to absolutely reject everything carnal.

Dōgen's "Truth"

All of Dōgen's ideas that I have explained so far are based on his most basic passion: the passion to cast off body-mind and realize the truth. Though I try to explain these ideas clearly, I could never get beyond even the outer boundaries of his "truth." So what is his so-called "Buddha's truth"?

Here we encounter the most important question, and also the most challenging.

In the early days of Dōgen's preaching—namely, the several-year period after he turned thirty-seven or thirty-eight, a period we have examined already—he only glosses over this question in his first three chapters of the *Shōbōgenzō*: "Bendōwa," "Maka-Hannya-Haramitsu," and "Genjōkōan."¹ His analects written in the *Public Records of Eihei-ji*² contain very little information about this period. Nevertheless, in several years following, until his forty-fifth birthday, he actually wrote over seventy more chapters of the *Shōbōgenzō* to illustrate the truth. It was precisely at this point that his thinking reached its highest peak.

During this time he was invited to preach on the way before the warriors at Rokuhara.³ At the invitation of Hatanō Yoshishige of the Council of the State, in the summer of his forty-fourth year, Dōgen moved to Koseisha in Yoshimine, in Echizen prefecture. In the seventh month of the following year, he opened the Temple of the Great Buddha (namely, Eihei-ji). From the time he moved to Koseisha until the third month of the following year, Dōgen would write thirty more fascicles to the *Shōbōgenzō* in eight months, one chapter after another. If we imagine the mental strain such prodigious writing must have caused, we see that the three-year span from the time he was forty-two until he turned forty-four had special meaning in his career.

However, it is impossible for me to lay out the whole of his thinking in the *Shōbōgenzō* in an organized manner. I will limit myself to pointing out only two or three of the problems he considers in it, since I can only give you a glimpse of these.

A. *Raihai-tokuzui*

Dōgen has a chapter in the *Shōbōgenzō* entitled "Raihai-tokuzui."⁴ I think I shall first examine the deep problems explored in this passage.

According to Dōgen, when one has the desire to realize the truth, the most important factor is one's master. If a seeker of the truth does not meet a suitable teacher, if the seeker does not "see a true person,"⁵ he or she will never be able to grasp the ideal. Of second-most importance is to obey the master, throwing away everything, and not wasting a moment in diligent pursuit of practicing the way.⁶ Those who doubt their masters and do not devote themselves to the truth cannot realize the truth in the same way. But in the case of those who cast aside doubt and confusion and realize the Buddha's essence, that which allows one to attain realization in the end is nothing other than one's self. It is the utterly sincere faith that emerges from the bottom of one's personality. "To get the marrow is to follow the Dharma, and to follow the Dharma sincerely is certainly to do it from faith."

If this is so, what is this sincere faith? It is not something that can be bestowed from without, but neither is it something that comes from within one's own heart. We cannot create sincere faith out of our own desires and exertions. "Simply make the Dharma heavy and the self light. Cast aside the world and make the way your dwelling. If you take the slightest glance back at the self, making it heavier than the Dharma, then the Dharma will not be transmitted and you will not find the way." In other words, the only chance we have at realizing the truth is to place all importance in the Dharma and none in our selves.

"It is easy to grasp body-mind. The world is like rice or flax or bamboo or bulrushes." When we make this body-mind a receptacle of the Dharma, only then is our body-mind more precious than the rice and flax and bamboo and bulrushes. If one wants to give value to one's own life, one absolutely must make one's valueless body-mind serve the Dharma as a bearer of "the Dharma that is so hard to come upon."

One sure standard of the value of things arises from this faith. That which preserves the Dharma and attains the marrow, no matter what it may be—dewdrops, garden lanterns, buddhas, foxes, spirits, men, women, people from the highest and lowest ranks of society—should be honored for the value it possesses. These things and people are not intrinsically valuable; they are precious because they are the embodiment of the Dharma. It is not these things and people that should be venerated, but the attainment of the Dharma. Therefore, even in the

case of human beings, a person has value insofar as he or she honors the Dharma. When judged by this standard of value, none of the worldly differences of high and low have any power.

"I am a senior monk; I cannot bow to a junior who has attained the Dharma.' 'I have practiced for a long time; I cannot bow to a recent student who has attained the Dharma.' 'I sign my name with the title of Master; I cannot bow to someone who is not a Master.' 'I am an Administrator of Dharma Affairs;⁷ I cannot bow to junior monks who have attained the Dharma.' 'I am a Chief Administrator of Monks;⁸ I cannot bow to laymen or laywomen who have attained the Dharma.' 'I have reached the three wise stages and the ten sacred stages;⁹ I cannot bow to nuns or other women who have attained the Dharma.' 'I am of royal blood; I cannot bow to those descended from retainers and councilors, even if they have attained the Dharma.'" This is "the sort of foolish Buddhism that does not hear."¹⁰ Worldly classes and social structures must all be capsized by the power of the Dharma.

It is from this perspective that Dōgen inflicts his crushing blow against all forms of discrimination happening in the world. The one he attacks in particular is the incredibly discriminatory treatment of women in the Buddhist community. He has a warm sympathy for women, recounting the story of Nun-Mistress Moshan in China and how she enlightened Master Zhixian.¹¹ He also relates the story of Miaoxin, a nun and disciple under Master Yangshan who so harshly scolded the seventeen monks.¹²

After explaining that nuns can attain the same degree of enlightenment as male disciples, Dōgen goes on to denounce the idea that men should repel women as the objects of lustful temptation. "If women are originally fated to be unclean, why should men not also be unclean to women? If you despise this uncleanliness, men and women will forever be your enemies. Moreover, women aren't the only people who are originally unclean. Dreams, the sun, gods, demons, and even Buddhist images all share the same fate. What fault do women have? What excellence do men have? Among evil people there are men who are evil. Among good people there are women who are good. Wanting to hear the Dharma and seeking to be liberated do not depend on whether you are a man or a woman. If you haven't yet cut away delusion, whether male or female you still haven't cut away delusion. For men and women who have cut away delusion and actualized the truth, there is not the slightest difference between them."¹³ To reject women's salvation is to throw away half of humanity. This cannot be called compassion.

With these thoughts in mind Dōgen points to dojos that forbid women to enter as "one of the laughable problems in the country of Japan." The Buddha Śākyamuni associated with many women in his lifetime. "We should not wish for a world more pure than the rituals of the world when Nyōrai comes."¹⁴ The first position of the Buddha's disciples was reserved for monks, the second for nuns, the third and fourth for male and female followers of the laity. The second position of the Buddha's disciples is more precious than the Wheel-Rolling King.¹⁵ "Needless to say, they do not stand on a level with the kings and ministers of remote regions in our little country." In those dojos where even honored nuns are not allowed to enter, yet where boors, kings, and ministers not only may enter but may even reside, the monks shamelessly commit the ten sins and violate the ten grave precepts.¹⁶ Such depravity had never been seen before as it existed in our little country.

Though this crushing attack of Dōgen's was only aimed at monks, from it we can steal a glance at his attitude toward the whole of humanity. The fact that there are nuns who have attained the way is proof that all women have "the possibility of attaining the way." The fact that there are people who once were wrongdoers but have attained the way is proof that all wrongdoing people have "the possibility of attaining the way." The mere fact that a wrongdoing person is a prostitute is no justification for stripping away her right to enter a dojo.¹⁷ All people deserve to be treated equally because all of them can take this body-mind, which is no different from rice or flax or bamboo or bulrushes, and make it a receptacle of the Dharma. Being born in this world as a human being means one has the fortunate opportunity to meet "the rare Dharma" and attain it, and no one has the right to interfere with this opportunity.

We can see two things from what has been explained to us. First is the rejection of the discrimination inherent in worldly values. Neither class nor surname, nor personal appearance, nor the high or low status of one's social rank, nor office nor rank, nor youth nor old age has any bearing on the worth of a person.¹⁸ People are equal. They are equal in the fact that they all share a body-mind no different from rice or flax or bamboo or bulrushes, and at the same time they are equal in the fact that this body-mind can be a receptacle of the Dharma.

Second, however, is that the true value of a person elevates based on how seriously they uphold the Dharma. People must prostrate themselves to the attainment of the marrow. Though we are equal as people, we are not equal in terms of how we carry the Dharma. To accept the value of the Dharma is to soon accept this inequality, and

to be forced to understand respect for those things that are valuable. There is clearly an aristocracy here. "Prostrating to the attainment of the marrow" is the motto of this spiritual aristocracy, which stands above the equality of all people.

Seen from a historical background, in Dōgen's day these ideas of equality should have been strongly advocated. Though the aristocracy of the Heian dynasty was overturned by its own foundation,¹⁹ the aristocracy still maintained the strength of its tradition. On the surface, the warrior class did not go against this tradition. However, new social sensibilities refused to accept the old authority of this tradition. We can clearly see a defiance of this tradition in Dōgen's words. "Kings and ministers of remote regions in our little country are brought below the status of nuns." "In our country, among the daughters of the emperor and the daughters of ministers there are some who are no different than concubines. On the other hand, there are empresses who have taken Buddhist names, some shaving their hair and some not shaving it.²⁰ But there are high-ranking monks who act like low-ranking monks greedy for fame and worldly goods; when people come to them, these monks always hit them over the head with their sandals. This is even worse than the relationship of master and servant."

Compared to the reverent words used in modern literature and military histories to describe the class that was the Imperial court, Dōgen's words are shockingly different. In his writing, the Imperial court were not the only human beings. The lower classes of warriors, farmers, and so on, who were treated as "savages" by the Imperial court and who received no consideration at all from the Imperial court's perspective, now insisted on all their rights as human beings. The lower ranks no longer felt shame for not understanding the Imperial court's refined tastes and complex academics. (According to Dōgen, such things were heresy when it came to striving toward the Dharma.) Thus, the culture that bore this abundant heritage in the several centuries to follow, as well as the massive social discriminations built upon that culture, had no authority whatsoever in the face of Dōgen's new spiritual creation.

But for Dōgen, this effort to overturn the classes was not only resistance against the Imperial court. The discrimination inherent in worldly values was to be denied in general, whether it applied to the warrior class or the world of Buddhism. Even the *shōgun* of the Kamakura *bakufu*, the lord of the ruling class, has no value whatsoever in Dōgen's view. Monks who were proud of office, rank, or beautiful Buddhist robes were the most despicable of all. A person's value must be

accepted even when all these outer garments are torn off and the person is stark naked. The standard of this value is something that comes out of the deep roots of one's life, penetrating the innermost core of one's personality, and regulating the direction of the will as a whole and as a unity. As long as people keep that human nature, they transcend this changing, evanescent world and long for the eternal Dharma. Therefore, without being worried by worldly discriminations, one can say one possesses precisely this valuable spirit. Even if one does not study, even if one does not uphold the precepts, one can do nothing to lessen this value of the spirit. Monks should uphold the precepts because they are the tradition of the patriarchs, but this is nothing to take pride in. Thus for Dōgen, after all worldly classes are destroyed the equality of human beings is clearly exhibited.

Based on this point, we cannot deny a possible similarity between the equality of Śākyamuni that Dōgen revitalized and the Christian concept of "all men being equal under God."²¹ But Dōgen did not stop just with this concept of equality. Rather, it was the Jōdo sect of Dōgen's day that stopped with that equality and went no further. From the bloody war between the classes, the Jōdo-shin sect, which accompanied the growing movement to break down the old class hierarchy, awakened the awareness that the classes of this world are generally meaningless. Some of the warriors, who gambled their lives to overthrow the Imperial court, threw away their newly won supremacy without hesitation for the sake of this awareness. They rejoiced in the fact that before Amida, in the face of the Buddha's original vow to save all of humankind, all the differences existing between petty, worldly people disappear without a trace.

Seen from the perspective of the Jōdo sect, we cannot even imagine gradations of value surpassing the equality of human beings in the face of Amida Buddha. When thinking of Amida's great compassion, what authority could there be in the insignificant values human beings uphold? The only question is whether or not one prays to be saved by the Buddha. All efforts toward creating value have no meaning whatsoever. We do not need to look to those among us who embody great value, and things like prostrating to the attainment of the marrow are unnecessary. People only need to pray to Amida Buddha.

But Dōgen walked a different path. For him, the relationship of *people to the Dharma* was not like the relationship of *people to Amida*. Unlike Amida, the Dharma is not a personified existence, but rather something human beings have the responsibility to uphold. It works to

manifest itself by possessing people. Śākyamuni Buddha was an example of this, but he was not the one and only Buddha. All people must follow Śākyamuni Buddha and manifest the Dharma in themselves. In other words, the authentic function of a person is to actualize the Dharma in the activities of his or her life. Salvation lies not in clinging to all things as a baby clings to its mother's bosom, but in making the self a buddha. The Dharma is something we embody in ourselves.

Seen from this perspective, there is no big difference standing between people and the Dharma like the vast disparity of the value between social classes. That which should be venerated²² is not the Buddha, who surpasses all people, but people who have become buddhas—people who attain the Dharma. Of course the object of this veneration is not *people* but the *Dharma* borne by people. However, this *Dharma* is directly transmitted from one person to another, not a metaphysical entity separate from and independent of people. Prostrating to the Dharma is inevitably prostrating to people who have attained the Dharma, and it is because they have attained the Dharma that they are prostrated to.

At this point, using the Dharma as the standard we must reestablish the gradations of the value of personality over and above those of people, who have already been made equal. Only then can the meaning of human life attain that preexisting gradation of value, when it meets "the rare Dharma." If this is so, our efforts to rise through these gradations of value, using the Dharma as the goal, must become the highest meaning in our lives.

Here is Dōgen's exceptional characteristic. No matter what he meant by "casting off body-mind,"²³ in any event he gave sufficient importance to the efforts of human beings to try to seize the ultimate ideal (the Dharma) with the entirety of their own personalities. By doing so, life on this shore will be affirmed. Unceasing diligence²⁴ gives life meaning. As opposed to the worship of Amida, which ignored diligence and considered cultural developments meaningless, Dōgen's diligence clearly restores faith in human culture. We can see "prostrating to the attainment of the marrow" as an important chance at making it possible for culture to elevate itself.

In this way, Dōgen's expression "make the Dharma heavy and the self light" approaches the idea that "in the end those who stop striving will be saved." This is forcing oneself to serve the eternal ideal in one's life. Human life can be dynamic only when driven by this spirit.

Whether or not Dōgen's "Dharma" is at once the root of human

culture as well as its goal is a separate question. We can never be without the compelling and essential need for this final meaning—namely, the part of the heart that in the end cannot be satisfied no matter what one may have or do in this world. If that heart affects the structure of society, I think it will appear as the need for the destruction of all privileges and for the equality of rights for all humans. If it affects human life, I think it will appear as the need for love and harmony. But when the Dharma has its effect through these needs, the final goals that give human life meaning must not be forgotten. Dōgen's method is to go directly toward this goal. Even if we don't have the strength to walk his path, we can still prostrate ourselves to him as one who attained the marrow, and start out on the path of *diligence* inspired by his words. We are lucky we have something to which we can prostrate ourselves; in other words, we are lucky to be able to accept the inequality that comes after equality, and to accept gradations of value. Thus, we must accept that this higher sense of aristocracy is more fundamental than economic, political, or even religious equality.

B. *Busshō*

Even when referring to the problem of "buddha-nature,"²⁵ a problem that gave birth to supremely important discussions in the history of Buddhist thought, Dōgen, who was pious toward the founder of his religion, constructed his theory primarily based on historical concerns. Specifically, he spent fourteen chapters commenting on and criticizing historically famous commentaries on buddha-nature. But what he aimed at was not whether or not the true meaning of buddha-nature was carried across by the authors of those commentaries, but rather what meaning there should be when seen from his position. Therefore, those various historical commentaries were transformed into the structure of his own thoughts. For him there was no historical truth outside of logical truth.

The first thing Dōgen is concerned with in *Shōbōgenzō* "Busshō" is these words of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* (*Shishikō-Bosatsu*, twenty-fifth volume, section 1): "issai shujō shitsu-ū busshō, nyorai jōjū mu-u hen'i."²⁶ "Issai shujō shitsu-ū busshō" is usually read as "All living beings possess buddha-nature through and through." If this reading is correct, then in the text of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* (twenty-fifth chapter), this buddha-nature is *the possibility to become Buddha*. "All the living beings should attain buddhahood in the last world; this is called buddha-nature."²⁷ Any being with heart can attain buddhahood.

Even Issendai (the most evil person)²⁸ should attain buddhahood. For this reason living beings *have* buddha-nature. If this is the case, "*issai shujō shitsu-ū busshō*" must mean "all the living beings *now being caught acting on natural inclinations* must totally have the possibility to attain enlightenment and become Buddha."

But for Dōgen the question was not how these words are explained by the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*. He treats these words of the Buddha independently of the sutras and goes digging down within them to find value. He says, "The totality of existence is buddha-nature. '*All living beings*' means *every part of the totality of existence*. This authentic, ineffable suchness²⁹ permeates all living beings within and without; that is to say, it is all existences of buddha-nature."

Here Dōgen reads a completely different meaning into "*issai shujō shitsu-ū busshō*." *Shitsu-ū* is not understood as the relationship between all living beings and buddha-nature, in terms such as "all living beings totally *have* buddha-nature" or "all living beings totally *do* buddha-nature"; rather, it is understood independently to mean "total-existence," or, in other words, "universal existence." In other words, *shitsu-ū* is *Allsein*. Therefore it includes everything. Together the living beings and the Buddha are only a part of *shitsu-ū*. If so, this *shitsu-ū* is buddha-nature.

Therefore, "total-existence buddha-nature"³⁰ must be the buddha-nature of all existences (the omnipresence of buddha-nature). In this way, Dōgen deepened the meaning of the term *shitsu-ū* in a direction unforeseen in the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*. Here, the idea that buddha-nature exists as something possibly *within living beings* can no longer hold up. On the contrary, living beings exist *within buddha-nature*. Both the internal aspect (the heart) and the external aspect (the body) of living beings are identically the buddha-nature that is total-existence, and there is nothing that stands in opposition to this buddha-nature.³¹

Here, Dōgen takes the *ū* of *shitsu-ū* to be *absolute* existence, and he places it above all relative existences. The existence of the possibility to exist or not exist, the beginning of existence, original existence, mysterious existence, and so forth are all limited as relative existences. But *shitsu-ū* is simply existence, *regardless of mental states or the nature of mind*. It is not bound by the nature of causality. It transcends time and is separate from discriminations.

"Nothing in the world has an opposite counterpart, and there is no second person below me." In other words, there is no object opposite the "I," nor a he or you opposite the "I."³² Therefore, it is totally impossible to say such things as "*I understand shitsu-ū*." Those who

interpret buddha-nature as the "I" of Brahman do not understand the aforementioned argument explaining the perception of buddha-nature. They are confusing "the mind moving like wind and fire" with the perception of buddha-nature. Buddha-nature is total-existence and is beyond perception. "You should know that in total-existence, all living beings meet both pleasure and pain. If total-existence is like this, then total-existence itself permeates the body and casts it away."

Dōgen rejected the explanation of buddha-nature as "I": "Many scholars who hear the word 'buddha-nature' heretically think of something like the 'I' of senior nuns who have strayed from the path. This is because they do not meet people, they do not meet themselves, and do not consult teachers." When he says this, we have no choice but to recognize Dōgen's deep insight into the foundational concepts of Buddhism. First of all, Buddhism starts by negating the concept of "I" and builds up from this standpoint of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nevertheless, the predominance of the notion of "I" in non-Buddhist philosophy actually caused the concept of "I" to seep into Buddhism (especially through the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*). When it came to China, this tendency became especially strong. The expression "many scholars who hear the word buddha-nature heretically think of something like 'I'" is truly an accurate description of Chinese tendencies. Though his interpretation of the sutra was his own, the fact that Dōgen understood the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* and at the same time defied it indicates how well he understood Mahāyāna philosophy.

Based on Dōgen's aforementioned explanation of the single term *shitsu-ū busshō*, one could say his unique interpretation is applicable to the whole of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*, which takes this term as its central theme. But a new understanding of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* was not his aim. He only wanted to establish his own interpretation of total-existence buddha-nature. For this reason he selected one verse from within that great sutra: "Wanting to know the meaning of buddha-nature, we should view time-causality rightly." (This, the second verse of the *shishikō* volume of the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*, refers to time-shape-color, not time-causality.³³ But there is a lengthy explanation of causality in this volume. Time-causality is the central theme of the volume.)

This being the case, Dōgen subsequently added the verse, "When time arrives, buddha-nature appears," and made this the central theme of the second section. The *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* refers to time-causality from the perspective of explaining that the possibility of becoming Buddha is *within all living beings*. To adopt the metaphor used there, *at*

the time milk is milk, it is not whey, and *at the time* whey is whey, it is not milk; nonetheless, a person who wants to make whey uses not water but milk. Even while milk is still milk, its causality is already inseparable from whey; in other words, the possibility of becoming whey (its "whey-nature") exists *within the milk*. "Just as whey is in milk, buddha-nature is in all living beings; if you want to see buddha-nature, you should simply observe time-shape-color."³⁴

The meaning of these words in the sutra is absolutely clear. But for Dōgen, it is not the case that the whey-nature exists *within* the milk, or in other words that buddha-nature exists *within* all living beings. Here he offers a new reading of "viewing time-causality rightly." Viewing rightly does not mean "you should view time-causality rightly," but rather, independently, "you should view rightly" (*Schauensollen*). That is to say, it is not experiential "viewing" such as possible viewing, present viewing, correct viewing, heretical viewing, but "viewing" as a norm, "viewing" as what should be. Therefore, in "viewing rightly" there is no discrimination between self and other. ("Not oneself viewing, not another viewing.") Moreover, it is not bound to particular conditions. This viewing is not viewing *something*. Seen in this way, the content of viewing rightly is not a particular time-causality but *jisetsu innen seki* (time-causality *itself*). It is *transcendent causality* (general causality). It is buddha-nature *itself*. Time-causality—namely, buddha-nature—is viewing rightly. To say it in other words, *if you want to know buddha-nature, you should know time-causality*.

Thus, time-causality, which the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra* refers to as a particular possibility, is changed to mean *total-existence*,³⁵ which transcends all particularities. Therefore it must not be understood to mean "Jisetsu jakushi busshō genzen," which means "When the time arrives, buddha-nature will appear." Those who expect the time of the appearance of buddha-nature to come in the future think, "In the course of practicing self-cultivation like this, one comes upon the time when buddha-nature appears naturally, and if that time does not come, even if one consults a master and asks about the Dharma, or even if one practices the way, buddha-nature does not appear." This view is utterly wrong. "Time" is total-existence; it transcends particular times. There is no point in time that is not time. "If the time comes"³⁶ means time has already come; can there be any doubt about it?" "The time when time has not come has never existed; the buddha-nature in which buddha-nature does not appear does not exist."

In this way Dōgen made the idea of a reality of many Dharmas

complete. "These mountains and rivers and earth are all an ocean of buddha-nature." Mountains, rivers, and earth are "the form of buddha-nature" just as they are. To look at mountains and rivers is to look at buddha-nature, and to look at buddha-nature is to look at a donkey's jaw or a horse's mouth.³⁷ Here the difference between phenomenon and substance is totally smashed away. There is no difference at all between worldly meaning (a term interpreted in China to mean the truth of the natural disposition) and a higher meaning or primary meaning. Existing things are nothing other than buddha-nature. No, we can't even say "existing things." There is only "buddha-nature." There is only "total-existence."³⁸

However, we should not consider this as one of the theories of epistemology. According to Dōgen, total-existence buddha-nature is the central truth of Buddhism. It is not only the truth Śākyamuni preached about. "It is simultaneously the brains and eyes of all the buddhas and all the masters and teachers. It has already been studied for 2,190 years, through just over fifty generations of successors.³⁹ For twenty-eight generations in India, successors *have dwelt in it* from one generation to the next, and for twenty-three generations in China, successors *have dwelt in it* from one generation to the next. The patriarchs in the ten directions *have dwelt in it*." In other words, total-existence buddha-nature is "what" (*Was*), which only the "descendants of the patriarchs"—who were immensely strong—inherited from generation to generation, and in which they dwelled.

No matter how specifically one tries to express logical thinking, logic cannot capture this truth. "The various sutras of Akyūma (of the Agon sect) and their teachers do not know this." Thus, the truth of total-existence buddha-nature becomes an inner secret reserved for only a few enlightened people. "The logic of buddha-nature is this: buddha-nature does not armor you before you become Buddha. It armors you after you become Buddha. Buddha-nature must always be the same as becoming Buddha. This logic is only merited after long studies, pursuit, and efforts. You should struggle and study for as long as twenty or thirty years" ("Busshō," fifth section).

Perhaps here is Zen's unique standpoint, and the possibility probably exists that the *shitsu-ū busshō* that Dōgen interpreted will *not* simply be the idea of a reality of many dharmas. The reason one sees buddha-nature in the jaw of a donkey is not because one transcends worldly meaning, in which a donkey's jaw is a donkey's jaw, and becomes situated in the primary meaning. Rather, worldly meaning, which is the

primary meaning, does not arise from taking the standpoint of a realist ontology. It arises through raising epistemology via the higher standpoint of *practice*, and doing epistemology via the power of practice. It is due to total-existence buddha-nature and having the strength to study it. In other words, it is not knowing total-existence buddha-nature and then explaining it (becoming Buddha), but explaining and then knowing total-existence buddha-nature. Dōgen places the correctness of studying the Buddha-Dharma in this point, and said, "If you do not study this way, you cannot understand Buddha-Dharma." We must understand Dōgen's explanation of total-existence buddha-nature to indicate this kind of the realization of the truth.

If total-existence buddha-nature is this sort of thing, then I wonder if it is possible to even make clear sense of the term "emptiness-buddha-nature."⁴⁰ The one who first spoke of emptiness-buddha-nature was the fourth patriarch, Dayi, and soon the path of this emptiness-buddha-nature was "seen and heard on Mount Ōbai, circulated by Zhaozhou, and prospered through Dayi."⁴¹ Dōgen commented on each of the patriarchs' interpretations of that term. As he said, "The first difficult thing to grasp and hear when seeing the Buddha and hearing the Dharma is that all living beings are emptiness-buddha-nature." However, the difficult thing to grasp and hear about this is the understanding that *issai shujō shitsu-ū busshō* is "all living beings are buddha-nature in their totality," because this has to do with "all living beings are not buddha-nature." This is due to the problem of the *existence-nonexistence*⁴² of buddha-nature, in the same sense that whey-nature *is* in the milk and *is not* in the milk.

This originates in misunderstanding the meaning of buddha-nature. If total-existence buddha-nature is understood in the way that Dōgen explains it, the question of existence-nonexistence does not arise. Total-existence, which is buddha-nature, is absolute existence that transcends existence-nonexistence. In this sense of buddha-nature, emptiness-buddha-nature is not lost. Therefore the term "emptiness-buddha-nature" must not be understood to mean "There is no buddha-nature *within* all living beings." The buddha-nature of total-existence *buddha-nature* is the buddha-nature of emptiness-*buddha-nature*. Emptiness-*buddha-nature* is emptiness-*total-existence*. *Emptiness is total-existence*. "The *existence* of total-existence is the inherited Dharma of the *emptiness* of the emptiness of emptiness (the emptiness of the fourth patriarch and the emptiness of the fifth patriarch)."⁴³ Total-existence is absolute, as is this *emptiness*, and the two are not different.

From the beginning it has been a separate question whether or not the discussions that Dōgen draws from the various patriarchs have the meaning he understands them to have. When the sixth patriarch visited Mount Ōbai, there was a discussion that can be understood in this way:

The fifth patriarch asked, "Where did you come from?"

The sixth patriarch said, "I am from south of the mountains."

The fifth patriarch asked, "What do you want?"

The sixth patriarch said, "I want to be enlightened."

The fifth patriarch asked, "People from south of the mountains are without buddha-nature (the *nature* of *enlightenment*), so how can you gain enlightenment?"

The sixth patriarch said, "Even though human beings have a difference between south and north, buddha-nature is without a difference between south and north."

Their discussion may have actually been along these lines. This is probably accurate, because if it is not understood in this way, the sixth patriarch's answer would not have come in the way that it did. But from Dōgen's perspective such an explanation was not allowable. The term "emptiness-buddha-nature" that came from the lips of his patriarchs and masters would certainly be the only meaning he would contemplate. Therefore, even in the case of Master Dayi's emptiness-buddha-nature, according to Dōgen, "Dayi did not say *lacking* buddha-nature; Dayi did not say *having* buddha-nature; Dayi *becomes* buddha-nature."

In other words, he is not questioning the existence or nonexistence of buddha-nature. Taking the perspective that one has buddha-nature only after one becomes a buddha, he introduces emptiness-buddha-nature by explaining the true meaning of buddha-nature for those who have not yet become buddhas. The sixth patriarch is asking earnestly about creating Buddha;⁴⁴ the fifth patriarch knows no other words with which to explain creating-Buddha to the sixth patriarch, and so he only says "emptiness-buddha-nature." "You should know the way you grasp and hear emptiness-buddha-nature is the direct path of creating Buddha."

Dōgen understood it in this way. Therefore the sixth patriarch's answer is insufficient. Dōgen criticized him, saying, "In this instance, if this is the sixth patriarch, this talk of emptiness-buddha-nature should be passed down. Setting aside the nonexistence of existence and nonexistence, one should only ask, what is buddha-nature? Even if people today explain buddha-nature, there is still less questioning of whether it is buddha-nature; it is just like talking about the meaning

of the existence or nonexistence of buddha-nature and so forth, and it is done hurriedly." This is probably the criticism Dōgen made, based on his own interpretation of the dialogue between the fifth and sixth patriarchs. But in it, I think his understanding of the term "emptiness-buddha-nature" appears clearly.

Even with regard to the discussion of whether or not a dog has buddha-nature, it is possible to say the same kind of thing. When he was asked, "Does a dog have buddha-nature?" Zhaozhou answered, "Mu."⁴⁵ When he was asked, "If all living beings have buddha-nature, why is a dog without it?" Zhaozhou answered, "Because it has karmic consciousness."⁴⁶

We can't necessarily say it is wrong to interpret this superficially. However, Dōgen interprets it in the following way. From the outset, Zhaozhou's interlocutor was not asking whether a dog has or does not have buddha-nature, for the existence or nonexistence of buddha-nature *within* the dog is not a question that should be asked. He is only saying, "Is Zhaozhou studying the way?"⁴⁷ In other words, using a dog as an example, he is asking whether Zhaozhou is thinking about the question of whether or not buddha-nature has a location. Since buddha-nature is total-existence, it therefore has no location; this is the reason Zhaozhou's answer is *mu*.

Based on this *mu*, Zhaozhou's interlocutor said, if all living beings are *mu*, then the dog and even buddha-nature should be *mu*; then he asked, what is the meaning of this? It means, "As for dogs, buddha-nature, and the like, if all of them are *mu*, then even if you say, 'Don't ever mention *mu*,' none of them are supposed to exist anyway."

Zhaozhou answers, "Because it has karmic consciousness." "Karmic consciousness" (relative possession) is "understanding karma," and even if one understands karma and is conscious of it, the dog and buddha-nature are *mu*.

Here the absolute *mu* that surpasses the hidden karmic consciousness of "existence and nonexistence"⁴⁸ is filled with meaning. Thus, Dōgen changed this problem to be something other than the problem of "the existence or nonexistence of buddha-nature." Another name for total-existence is *mu*. *Mu* is buddha-nature.

Seen in this way, emptiness-buddha-nature is probably nothing other than the same comprehension⁴⁹ of buddha-nature, which is concomitant with becoming-Buddha. "At just such a moment, emptiness-buddha-nature is, namely, creating Buddha."⁵⁰ The meaning of emptiness-buddha-nature can be captured only because of the ability

to attain the way of emptiness-buddha-nature. In this way, when it is captured, the one who captures it is already enlightened. This is also the truth, which should be realized through one's whole life and whole body, only by means of self-cultivation.

Originally, Dōgen did not only explain the meaning of existence-buddha-nature and emptiness-buddha-nature in the way described above.⁵¹ When he explained the position of Yanguan Qi'an⁵² (that "all living beings are buddha-nature"), and of Dayi Daoxin (that "all living beings are emptiness-buddha-nature"), he said, "In becoming a living being one therefore becomes a possessor of buddha-nature." He also said, "Because buddha-nature is this buddha-nature, living beings are these living beings. Originally living beings are not adorned with buddha-nature, and it is not something one can get for the first time by seeking to attain it. If you do not have buddha-nature naturally, you would not yet be a living being, and if you were not already a living being you would not have buddha-nature." In these passages, living beings and buddha-nature are made to exist relatively; it is now a question of the relationship between them.

This relationship is the existence or nonexistence of *existence*-buddha-nature and *emptiness*-buddha-nature, not absolute total-existence, which is emptiness. Therefore, Dōgen himself cites the words of Baizhang, and accepted that if you speak of existence-buddha-nature or emptiness-buddha-nature, you slander Buddhist monks.⁵³ Moreover, he asserts, "Even if I say this is slander, it is not that you should not grasp the way." This is because both "existence-buddha-nature" and "emptiness-buddha-nature" are words that manifest buddha-nature. If you cling to the difference between existence and nonexistence, this poisons buddha-nature. However, this poison will also become good medicine for tearing apart abstract knowledge.⁵⁴ Discussion of existence and nonexistence serves to quickly transcend existence and nonexistence. It serves to burn the distinction between phenomenon and substance to ashes.

The meaning of buddha-nature appears this way as total-existence: that is, as emptiness. However, this should not simply be a theory but the strongest form of realization, something in which one should dwell. Therefore, for those who wish to know buddha-nature while not yet having become Buddha, it is not something to be meditated on; one must see a *person* who dwells in it. Dōgen explains this matter using a legend associated with Nāgārjuna.⁵⁵ When Nāgārjuna went to southern India and preached on the Lotus Sutra, a member of the audience who believed in good karma said, "If people have good karma, there is nothing that

surpasses it, so even if you speak in vain of buddha-nature, who is able to understand it?"

Nāgārjuna said, "If you think you want to see buddha-nature, you must first eradicate permanence."

His questioner asked, "Is buddha-nature large or small?"

Nāgārjuna replied, "It is neither large nor small, neither broad nor narrow, neither fortune nor reward, neither dying nor born."

His questioner was moved by these words and converted. Nāgārjuna appeared to this person like the self-realized body of the full moon. The audience merely heard the Dharma-teachings and did not see the master's form. There in the middle of the crowd was Kānadeva,⁵⁶ who said, "The master has exhibited the form of buddha-nature and has graciously shown it to me."

Nāgārjuna asked, "How do you know?"

"Totally without form, and with a shape like the full moon, he has made the meaning of buddha-nature unclear and yet clear."

Once Kānadeva was done speaking, the circular form vanished and Nāgārjuna was sitting in his original posture. Explaining this episode, Dōgen said,

The form of the round moon shows its body
By expressing the body of the many buddhas.
That form does not preach;
It communicates without a voice.

To think that Nāgārjuna temporarily exhibited a changed body and took the round form of the moon is foolish, ignorant Buddhism. That Nāgārjuna, a human, turned into the round moon is a piece of stupidity. Nāgārjuna was only sitting patiently. He was sitting just the way people sit today. However, by doing just that, he displayed the body of many buddhas. The form of the round moon was not a sensory form but a spiritual form. *Nāgārjuna was not there*, because he eradicated permanence and became the Buddha. In other words, Nāgārjuna, who possessed a body of flesh, displayed the Buddha whose body is not flesh.

Seeing the form of this embodiment, Kānadeva grasped the way and said, "It is buddha-nature." The Buddha-Dharma was circulating everywhere at the time, but the only one who observed it was Kānadeva. All the other people thought, "Buddha-nature is not seen by the eye, heard by the ear, or known by the heart." They do not know *embodiment is buddha-nature*. Therefore, no matter how many people may call

themselves Nāgārjuna's successors, if they have not received what Kānadeva said, it would be wrong to think that their way is Nāgārjuna's way.

This interpretation of Dōgen's should be described as a completely symbolic interpretation of the legend. But Dōgen's understanding of how humans can embody buddha-nature is clearly evidenced in it. He draws on these passages from the Song of Sekitō Sōan:⁵⁷ "Even in a hermitage, a person who is not yet dead wants to know that," and, "Why surrender the crawling skin-sack of the here-and-now?" Even for those who master the body of flesh and are beyond birth and perishing, none among them (including Śākyamuni and Maitreya)⁵⁸ ever surrender this skin-sack (the body of flesh). If we see that Dōgen explains this, we are certain to see that buddha-nature is exhibited most concretely through one's personality. This is where we find the direct point of contact between the world of discrimination in which we reside and his total-existence.

The truth of total-existence buddha-nature, or emptiness-buddha-nature, is revealed only to those who are enlightened. To say it the opposite way, all who realize this truth are enlightened. According to Dōgen, the path that reaches this truth is one of nothing but devoted *zazen*. People cannot capture this lived truth by means of reflection alone. If we believe Dōgen, we must abandon the reflective pursuit of his religious truth, which lies beyond the bounds of philosophical reflection. But if, in the end, all philosophical reflection clarifies all basic and direct knowledge, then I think that in this case we can reflect on what this direct knowledge is. According to Dōgen, buddha-nature is embodied in personality. Those who embody buddha-nature are the intermediaries between buddha-nature and ourselves. In seeing a *person*, we are able to touch this truth, and in fact we must touch it.

In Dōgen's case, the truth of total-existence buddha-nature, or emptiness-buddha-nature, touches us through his personality. Dōgen, who realized this truth, appears before us as a passionate disciple who pursued the truth for the truth's sake; as a passionate believer who advocated blind obedience to the patriarchs through the way he led his life; as a guileless man of personality who practiced selfless love; as a strong self-cultivator who conquered all natural desires for the sake of establishing the kingdom of truth. We must reflect on his knowledge of total-existence *through this personality*. Only then can we have some inkling of the inner perspective of this total-existence. As I think of it, this is "freedom" in the deepest sense. Does his phrase "casting-off body-mind" not point us there?

When buddha-nature is considered to be total-existence, the emptiness of emptiness, it is natural that the idea of "heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha"⁵⁹ is interpreted in a special way.

Regarding "heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha," the idea he earnestly tried to avoid is as follows: Our hearts are the manifestation of the mysterious wisdom that is the substance of the universe, and here there is no separation between the mundane and the divine. The ten thousand forms of the world of discrimination have nothing to do with coming and going or birth and death; the true personality of mysterious wisdom is eternal and unchanging. This exists all around the ten thousand things; it is the foundation of our lives, whether you doubt it or are enlightened. Even if our flesh body should perish, the mysterious wisdom we reside in will not die. This enlightening of our true personality is, namely, the return to that which is constant, and moreover to become Buddha. Only then do we return to the truth and witness the unborn, undying, eternal life.

Dōgen rejects this sort of pantheistic speculation. Heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha, which the patriarchs preserved, does not exist anywhere in non-Buddhist philosophy. Heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha exists only in the Buddhist patriarchs and in their writings, practices, and enlightenment, which *do* mind-here-and-now-is-Buddha and exhaust it.

Here, "heart" means the wholehearted Dharma of entirety, and the entire Dharma of wholeheartedness. It is the heart that makes the entirety of the universe one. Upon comprehension of this heart, people feel as though the heavens fall and the ground erupts. It feels as though the earth is no more than a few inches thick. Because of this experience, the heart that is received by one's personality is already not the mind of ages past. It is the heart of the mountains and rivers and earth. It is the heart of the sun, moon, stars, and constellations. Furthermore, this heart of the mountains, rivers, and earth is just the mountains, rivers, and earth; there are neither waves nor tides, neither wind nor smoke. The heart of the sun, moon, stars, and constellations is just the sun, moon, stars, and constellations; there is neither fog nor haze. This heart, which is made transparent by ultimate freedom—this heart, which cannot be explained except through one's own life—*this heart itself is Buddha*.⁶⁰

This is why it is impossible to think of heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha apart from enlightenment, self-cultivation, buddhahood, and Nirvana. The faith-practice-enlightenment in the blink of an eye, the faith-practice-enlightenment that spans eternity, both of these are heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha. If one thinks that becoming Buddha through

long years of practice-enlightenment is not heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha, then one still does not see heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha and has not had a proper teacher. *Śākyamuni is heart-here-and-now-is-Buddha.*

The heart described here is, in other words, total-existence, which is the emptiness of emptiness. According to the absolute awareness of this heart, mountains and waters and earth are heart just as they are, and are also mountains and waters and earth. In this idea, I think we can find a single, profound, philosophical standpoint.

C. *Dōtoku*

In Dōgen's writings there are always two drives at work in his reflections. One is the drive to capture the general concept of the truth he tried to explain; the other is the drive to clarify whether that truth is only directly given and received between buddhas. Based on the mutual effects these two drives have on each other, he tried his best to keep his words from degenerating into the abstract and the concrete. At the same time, he tries his best to make possible the expression of a general concept of his truth. He never thought his work would be finished by means of a mere verbal expression. But the important thing he did express through language was his clarifying of the idea that "you should not craft flowery words but only write what the heart thinks; you should not create literary art, but just write down the Dharma" (*Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle).⁶¹

These words urge us to repel modern monks, who craft elegant speeches without writing Dharma-words in order to practice their literary skills, and, rather than capturing the heart with beautiful words and excellent poems, urge us to craft a direct expression of the spirit of the self. I think that if he did not believe in the possibility of expressing the truth⁶² in writing, it would be difficult to understand the passion with which he tried to write the *Shōbōgenzō* in Japanese.⁶³

The Zen sect advocates nondogmatic words and various legends from outside the sect, and especially emphasizes *zazen* and *kōans*. Dōgen also emphasized *zazen*. However, he was one who did not accept these particular characteristics of Zen. Even the name "Zen" was something he strongly rejected. Those who say the various buddhas and patriarchs were not necessarily enlightened via *dhyāna*, that *dhyāna* is nothing more than one form of practice, that *dhyāna* is not the whole point of the Buddha-Dharma, that only Zen is the name of the great path of correct transmission from buddha to buddha, such people do not know

the buddha-way.⁶⁴ None of the Buddhist patriarchs and teachers called it "Zen." "You should know Zen got its name from demons, and those who use the demons' name may be a band of demons themselves, and they are not the descendants of the patriarchs" (*Shōbōgenzō* "Butsudō").

According to Dōgen, in his day even China was lacking people who understood this idea. Any people who use the name "Zen," and even split five different sects within it, do so because they treat the Buddha-Dharma frivolously and "neglect people's practices and do not treat discourses on the way⁶⁵ respectfully." Therefore Dōgen also rejected the advocacy of various legends from outside the sect. Those who teach various legends from outside the sect insist that, in addition to teaching in a single historical period, Śākyamuni correctly transmitted the exceptional heart⁶⁶ of the *Shōbōgenzō*'s Nirvana to Mahākāśyapa, who smiled when the Buddha picked up the udumbara flower and winked.⁶⁷ They insist that the Zen sect is the one that continued this transmission from generation to generation. This teaching is nothing more than the rote repetition of a silly theory. This exceptional heart, which was a correct transmission *from outside the sect*, is itself the "truth of reason," and so it should not be discussed at the same time that one discusses the three vehicles and the twelve separate teachings.⁶⁸

Because this exceptional heart is the highest truth, it is directly-pointing-people's-hearts-to-seeing-nature-and-becoming-Buddha.⁶⁹ Dōgen did not only call it fallacious to insist on this; he said those who insist on it "have nothing to do with the Buddha-Dharma and the buddha-way," and "they do not know Buddha; they do not know the teachings; they do not know heart; they do not know within; they do not know without" (*Shōbōgenzō* "Bukkyō").

The reason for this is that they are thinking of the Buddha's *teachings* and the Buddha's *mind* as being separate. If the exceptional heart is outside the *teachings*, then those *teachings* are not *Buddhist teachings*. If *teachings* are outside *the exceptional heart*, then that *exceptional heart* is not the *exceptional heart of Nirvana* correctly transmitted by Śākyamuni. If the exceptional heart of Nirvana is one of the *various legends from outside the sect*, then those legends must be a special transmission *outside the heart*. But should we believe Śākyamuni explained teachings without the heart? The heart and the teachings are one. Śākyamuni did not explain teachings that were not the Buddha-Dharma. The exceptional heart of Nirvana is the teachings of the three vehicles and twelve sects; it is the great storehouse and the small storehouse (*Shōbōgenzō* "Bukkyō").

Even though Dōgen insisted on this kind of simple transmission between buddhas, he never rejected verbal expressions. The idea that language and writing cannot explain the exceptional heart is a fixed concept of degenerate Zen; it is no concern of Dōgen's living Buddha-Dharma.

However, neither did Dōgen allow that linguistic expression could be used independently and exclusively. The truth can be expressed in language, but it is not the real truth if it is not expressed in accordance with the face-to-face transmission between buddhas. This is not only because the expression used here is a literary one and must be intuitive rather than rational. Although Dōgen's writings are freely written expressions for practical use, in general they are logical expressions, conceptual rather than intuitive. However, even if they are logical embodiments of the truth, their meaning cannot be captured by abstract conceptual reasoning alone. There, sagely intuition is necessary to capture the living strength of this truth. In order to emphasize this transition, Dōgen explained the face-to-face transmission between buddhas (*Shōbōgenzō* "Menjū"). It is only possible to capture and appreciate the truth by *seeing a person who understands and embodies the truth directly before your eyes, and by being seen by such a person.*

Of course the "seeing" here means seeing from the bottom of the heart, not mere sensory seeing. At Vulture Peak, Śākyamuni picked up an udumbara flower and winked, and hundreds of thousands *saw* him do it, but at that time the only person who *truly saw* was Mahākāśyapa. All the others *saw but did not see*. But even though Mahākāśyapa saw from the bottom of his heart, he saw with his eyes as well. It is possible for the eyes to see the things the bottom of the heart sees. In this way, at the point when sagely intuition unites with "sensory seeing," this is probably when the true meaning of "the wisdom that is embodied in personality" is revealed. If knowledge is not embodied in personality, it does not become the wisdom learned by experience. As for this vital opportunity in which knowledge becomes wisdom, direct transmission can be received from the personality that expresses this vital opportunity. I think his words "When you see a master, you see yourself" point to this lesson. This is where the most correct meaning of the word "master" exists.

This explanation is not for the Zen sect alone. However, we can say that when Dōgen allowed for logical expression on the one hand, while on the other he emphasized sagely intuition through *seeing* a master, and granted the rich content of intuition at the same time that he defended

fixed ideas, he breathed philosophical life into such subjective facts as the heart-to-heart transmission and the master's seal of approval, which Zen held so dear. This does not lapse into abstract thought and speech; it avoids the obscured secrets of Zen's esoterism. Buddhism's truth cannot be grasped without face-to-face transmission between buddhas, but the truth transmitted face-to-face was expressed in the words of the buddhas and patriarchs and in no place outside their mysterious verses. From the very beginning, whenever Dōgen explained the words of the many buddhas and patriarchs, he always developed new content by means of his own interpretation. However, that development was not ostentatious. Therefore, no matter how many times it is developed anew, it always carries the meaning of the words of the patriarchs.

But just at this very point, we should see how Dōgen has torn apart fixed concepts. Old fixed concepts are always newly remodeled, and through them the Buddha-Dharma is *always* expressed. He did not pay attention to the "development" emerging from the Buddha-Dharma, but paid attention to the Buddha-Dharma from which all developments emerge. In this way, according to him every face-to-face transmission between buddhas, each of which is a new development, is always interpreted as *one* true expression of the Buddha-Dharma.

Of course he was not the only one to see things in this way. Generally speaking, according to the thinking at the inner threshold of the religion, especially in Oriental thought, it is an obvious fact that awareness of development is lacking. Because of this, historical knowledge has been cut off, and the proper development of knowledge has been hindered. But that notwithstanding, the strong point in Dōgen's thought is that even unconscious developments always tear apart fixed generalizations. Therefore, when he said that the truth is "always expressed in the words of the buddhas and patriarchs," he really meant this about the thoughts in his own new developments. Through the face-to-face transmission between buddhas, he saw himself within the words of the patriarchs. Better said, Dōgen changed the words of the patriarchs into his own system. The face-to-face transmission is important, but rather than rejecting rational expression, it makes rational expression possible. The Buddha-Dharma that is realized through the face-to-face transmission is, to use his term, the truth of "expressing the truth";⁷⁰ it is not a wordless, reticent, super-logical truth.

I think Dōgen's viewpoint on "expressing the truth" as described above is sufficiently clarified in his writing on the subject (*Shōbōgenzō* "Dōtoku").

Regarding the definition of expressing the truth, he gave no explanation whatsoever. But if we look at the way he uses the term, this word doubtlessly holds great sway. *Dō* (道) originally means "to speak," and therefore means "words" as well, which is to say the language that exhibits the truth, while at the same time it is the truth itself. This word is also used to translate buddhahood, which is enlightenment. It seems Dōgen uses the term bearing all of these meanings in mind. Based on this point, this word is very nearly equal to *logos*. Expressing the truth means "to be able to speak." Further, it means "to be able to speak of the way of buddhahood." It also takes the meaning of expressing the truth as acquiring the truth. Here again Dōgen bears all these meanings in mind when he uses the term.

Now, Dōgen said, "The many buddhas and patriarchs are expressions of the truth." In this case, we feel a deep interest in his not calling the patriarchs "people who express the truth" but simply "expressions of the truth." The many buddhas and patriarchs are the personality that expresses buddhahood, but Dōgen extracts that personality from the heart of that expression, which should not exist apart from that personality, allowing only the expression of buddhahood to stand independently. Then he calls this "expressing the truth."

Here I think we can see through to the special meaning he meant to express in the term "expressing the truth." It does not simply mean buddhahood or the truth of the Buddha. What it points to is the *expression* of buddhahood or of the truth, the ability to speak of it. Moreover, it is pulled apart from special personality and established as "the ability to speak in general,"⁷¹ so to speak. Therefore, when the many buddhas and patriarchs are seen from the perspective of how they usually show themselves, they are nothing other than expressions of the truth. From the beginning, the patriarchs' showing themselves was not simply done through language, but happened through all human expressions and gestures, such as winks, smiles, snaps, and strikes of the *bōkatsu*.⁷² These too are expressions of the truth, so long as they transmit meaning.

But especially with regard to the choice of the term "to speak,"⁷³ we must see the importance Dōgen placed on linguistic expression. Zhaozhou said, "If you never leave a monastery for your entire life, and never leave the way of *zazen*, sitting still for five or ten years, no one will be able to call you a mute." Commenting on this, Dōgen says, "It is wrong to think the mute cannot express the truth." Furthermore, "The mute are also expressions of the truth. Their voices should be heard. You

should listen to their words" (*Shōbōgenzō* "Dōtoku"). Even when we look at these words, the first meaning of expressing the truth is *using language to express the truth*. We must pay attention to the fact that Dōgen gave these instructions about expressing the truth.

Furthermore, expressing the truth itself is defined as its own independent activity. It is not that the self-cultivator becomes able to express the truth by following another person or by means of "my own strength." "*Within the expression of the truth*, people in the past cultivated themselves and became enlightened; now people practice strenuous *zazen* and talk about the way. When the patriarchs meditate on themselves and explain the moral excellences of the patriarchs, this expression of the truth itself becomes the meditation of three years, eight years, thirty years, and forty years, and is the greatest possible expression of the truth" (*ibid.*, "Dōtoku").

In other words, all self-cultivation operates *within expressing the truth*. Expressing the truth, as the activity of strenuous *zazen*, is the effort to express the truth. Expressing the truth itself is the self-expression of expressing the truth. For the self-cultivator (who is already one of the patriarchs, for the meaning in expressing the truth lies in self-cultivation), decades of self-cultivation are nothing other than the process of the actualization of expressing the truth itself. Here, expressing the truth is not the expression of which *a person* is able to speak,⁷⁴ but rather the possibility of expression without there being a subject expressing it. It is the self-development of *logos*.

By defining expressing the truth in the aforementioned way, the activity in which expressing the truth becomes strenuous *zazen* and then becomes an expression of the truth takes on a very logical structure. If expressing the truth takes place by means of many decades of self-cultivation and strenuous *zazen*, those decades of *zazen* are indispensable for expressing the truth, and therefore we can say this expression of the truth is a seamless continuity over the decades. The opinion arrived at halfway along the road to self-cultivation is not yet an expression of the truth, but the moment of expressing the truth is born within it. If we assume that the present expression of the truth has within it the unfinished expression of the truth, then the present expression of the truth cannot exist without this perspective. If so, the perspective of the unfinished expression of the truth already existed within the present expression of the truth. Expressing the truth, which is the point of arrival, already exists at the point of departure, so to speak; it guides all self-cultivation and all perspectives; in the end, it returns to itself.

When Dōgen says, "Expressing the truth itself is strenuous *zazen*, the most earnest effort to express the truth," or, "The *present* expression of the truth and the expressed perspective *of the past* are of the same lineage, which extends over ten thousand *ri*," surely the meaning of this is no different than that which the foregoing passage indicated. If we assume this expression of the truth functions in the same way that *idée* does, the *strenuous zazen* that exhibits this function is nothing other than the developmental process borne forth from within expressing the truth.⁷⁵

The phrase "the *zazen* of the present is *zazen* impelled by expressing the truth and expressing perspective" should be understood in this way. One perspective that has within it the expression of the truth that is to be attained is summoned by that expression of the truth and begins to emerge by means of it. But this does not yet express the truth. Therefore doubts are born of it. Because this perspective and these doubts are opposed to one another, *zazen* becomes necessary. These doubts are also summoned by the expression of the truth that exists in the aforementioned perspective, so this *zazen* must be understood as being the *zazen* done by expressing the truth and expressing perspective. Thus all strenuous *zazen* is not a matter of the discretion given to human beings, but must be understood as an inevitable development from within expressing the truth itself. Even if one doubt is resolved and a new perspective is reached, unless that new perspective is expressing the truth, this cycle never stops. New perspectives give birth to new doubts. It is possible to see this idea implied in the phrase "*zazen* impelled by expressing the truth and expressing perspective."

Finally, "the many months and years of *zazen* pile up, and the *zazen* of those years and months is casting-off." I think casting-off is equivalent to a sudden *Aufhebung*.⁷⁶ This expression of the truth is a product of that moment of seeing the truth, and all *zazen* is born within this expression of the truth. Casting-off is not an extinction; rather, it allows birth into a higher place. Here, expressing the truth appears as something that kills all opinions and all *zazen* in each moment and allows them to be born into a higher place.

This, finally, is what is realized in *being able to speak*.⁷⁷ However, as was explained previously, this is the motivating power of all strenuous *zazen*, not an effort and a goal existing of itself and independently. The effort to make the casting-off of all *zazen* "the highest treasure" is itself the manifestation of the highest treasure. Every effort made toward expressing the truth is a manifestation of the expression of the truth.

Therefore, expressing the truth is not feeling as though you have arrived at the mark in the moment you aim at it. Neither can you reach it as if suddenly entering into a strange new world. "In the moment of true casting-off, there is an expression of the truth already there; even if the mind is without power and the body is without power, expressing the truth exists by itself. Even if you express the truth, you don't have any special or mysterious feeling."

This is what is meant by the word *dōtoku*. When the true Dharma is transmitted and received through the face-to-face transmission between buddhas, the "ability to speak"⁷⁸ is attained. From the beginning, what is captured by the word *dōtoku* is not the honor of the patriarchs. Even by doing not-the-way (the inability to speak), one can still express the reality of the transmission and reception of the Dharma. However, this does not reject verbal expression, but rather simply approves of gestures apart from verbal expression. Naturally, it is also not a rejection of capturing general concepts. Even in those who can express themselves without words, the process of capturing concepts exists within that experience.

When one's own expression of the truth develops and becomes self-cultivation and strenuous *zazen*, it becomes the development of the highest and most stable seat, in which one does not speak and yet is not estranged from monastic training. In order for one to actualize oneself, *idée* appears as this highest and most stable seat, both not speaking and not estranged from monastic training. It is not that one who does not speak, sitting in the highest and most stable seat, has some obscure, mysterious intuition; it is only that he has no thoughts disturbing him. While being guided by the highest expression of the truth, with his whole heart he is constantly thinking about discriminatory thoughts, which contain expressions of the truth in them.

In this *movement of the expression of the truth*, we can see the *development of logos*, and we must recognize a logical trend in Dōgen's thought. However, by weaving the opportunity for intellectual intuition into every step of this development, his system of thought is not purely logical either. Moreover, this intellectual intuition is a presupposition of thinking with the whole body-mind—which is namely enlightenment through self-cultivation. For Dōgen, creative self-activity of absolute spirit does not simply appear as a natural consequence of dialectic, but appears as the dialectical development present in one's own life, including all its impurities, and moreover, each step of that development also appears as something driven by illogical reasons. As such, what

guides that development is the source of the development, though it is also guided by moral excellence, which is its purpose; therefore the aforementioned illogical reasons must be thought of as being inclusive of moral excellence. *Dōgen had no need to finalize a purely logical system of excellence.* For him the proof of enlightenment that could be realized through self-cultivation and strenuous *zazen* was a fact that was difficult to displace.

However, if we venture to investigate his thought philosophically, it seems this illogicality has come into the fray as an opportunity to develop immeasurable excellence. It is an opportunity that is hard to be without, but it will remain as a problem that should be raised in various ways. As long as it is an individual problem of face-to-face transmission between a self-cultivator and a master, we can eliminate the difficulty by offering a psychological explanation. But when we think of excellence as an activity that develops itself, overtaking the self-cultivator and the master, then psychological explanations are already ruled out. This is the blind spot left in Dōgen's thought. As such, it is the only reason that the points Dōgen preaches on are not philosophy but religion.

D. *Kattō*

We have recognized that "expressing the truth" explains the self-development of *logos*. Dōgen said, "Within that expression of the truth, *even in past times* they practiced self-cultivation and sought enlightenment. *Nowadays too*, we do strenuous *zazen* and practice the way.⁷⁹ *When we do the strenuous zazen of the patriarchs' patriarchs, and when we practice the way of expressing the patriarchs' truth*, this expression of the truth itself becomes the strenuous *zazen* of three years or eight years or thirty years or forty years, as well as our best effort at expressing the truth."⁸⁰

These words of his mean that the truth⁸¹ constantly manifests itself in self-cultivation and strenuous *zazen* and that the truth of the transmission between the patriarchs is the development of the expression of truth itself. However, in such a case, he only emphasized the point that any self-cultivation and strenuous *zazen* and any transmissions between the patriarchs are all one activity of expressing the truth; he did not refer to how that truth manifests itself in various different forms. It is in *Shōbōgenzō* "Kattō"⁸² that he makes this point clear.

Bodhidharma once said to his disciples, "The time has come. Why don't you tell me what you have attained?"

The disciple Daofu replied, "Not attaching to letters and not detaching from them, I do what I should for the way."

Bodhidharma said, "You have attained my skin."

The nun Zongchi replied, "It is like seeing Akṣobhya Buddha's land just once and not seeing it again."

Bodhidharma said, "You have attained my flesh."

Daoyu replied, "The four great elements are originally empty and the five *skandhas* do not exist, so as I see it there is nothing to be attained."

Bodhidharma said, "You have attained my bones."

Finally Huike bowed three times and stood where he was. Bodhidharma said, "You have attained my marrow." As expected, Bodhidharma made Huike the second patriarch and transmitted the way to him.⁸³

Recounting this story, Dōgen said the following: "Those who have not received the proper transmission think one can discriminate between the attainments of the four disciples according to closeness, so that Bodhidharma's comments distinguish between skin, flesh, bones, and marrow on the basis of shallowness or depth. That is to say that the most superficial answer was skin, the next deeper was flesh, the next deeper was bone, and the most central was marrow, so that the answer of Huike, who said nothing, attained the marrow because of his superior perspective. But is it even possible to say that when these disciples *attained* their master, this attainment in itself differed in depth or shallowness because of a difference between skin, flesh, bones, and marrow? *The master's body-mind is the master with skin, flesh, bones, and marrow. It is not that the marrow is close and the skin is distant.*"⁸⁴

To attain Bodhidharma's skin is to attain *all* of Bodhidharma. There is no difference between this and attaining all of Bodhidharma by attaining his marrow. From the beginning, perhaps there appears to be a difference between attaining the whole by attaining the skin and attaining the whole by attaining the marrow. However, *even if there is superiority and inferiority in the perspectives, to attain the way of the patriarchs is only to attain oneself.* The truth of Bodhidharma's words⁸⁵ is that *one attains oneself.* Therefore what he said to his four disciples was one and the same from the beginning.

However, the fact that Bodhidharma's evaluation of his four disciples was the same does not mean that the four disciples' perspectives were the same. The four disciples each presented different answers with different degrees of superior or inferior understanding. Those different

answers were each approved by Bodhidharma as they were, with their differing levels of superiority or inferiority. These were not the only four possible answers. There were four answers because there happened to be four disciples there. "If there are hundreds and thousands of disciples after Huike, there should be hundreds and thousands of ways to preach and write. There should be no limitations."⁸⁶ In other words, through face-to-face transmissions the possible explanations of the way are unlimited. As individuals are different, words⁸⁷ can differ.

Through this explanation of Dōgen's, I think we can certainly grasp that expressing the truth can appear in thousands or even tens of thousands of different forms. However, if the expression of the truth appears in various forms, where should we recognize the ultimate Buddha-Dharma when we encounter contradicting and conflicting words?⁸⁸ Dōgen replies that the Buddha-Dharma manifests itself just where all the differing views become mixed up in one another. The word he uses to express this thought is "entanglements."

"Entanglements" denotes the arrowroot and wisteria vines. Vines show the aspect of being so meandering and twined about that it is difficult to disentangle them. From there the word becomes an adjective that means "entangled" and "troubled," and thence "entanglements" comes to be used as "dispute." Human opinions differ for each person, and when people try to reach consensus on one opinion, disputes inevitably spring forth. In other words, reflective thinking inevitably gives birth to entanglements. Therefore a Zen sect that accepts mystic understanding rejects reflective thinking as the entanglement that it is.

However, Dōgen insisted this entanglement is the very thing to transmit the Buddha-Dharma truthfully. He said Śākyamuni's sermon on Vulture Peak is already the beginning of entanglements. Mahākāśyapa's realization at Vulture Peak is the succession of the entanglements. All that masters and disciples pass on through face-to-face transmission are entanglements. As long as we are given limited lives on earth, it is not possible for anyone to master the truth of the ultimate Buddha-Dharma without entanglements. But entanglements being entanglements, we learn the truth of the Buddha-Dharma while entanglements wrap around entanglements. "*Because the seeds of entanglements have the power of molting off the body*, there are branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits that wrap around entanglements, and because they entwine and do not entwine, the patriarchs manifest and kōan manifests."⁸⁹

Entanglements only make entanglements into seeds; entanglements themselves are the seeds that sprout limitless entanglements. Those

seeds of entanglement hold the power of enlightenment. Because of that power, there are branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits that wrap around entanglements, that are rooted in entanglements, that are produced from the entanglements, and that cause the condition of transcending entanglements. That is where the patriarchs manifest.

If we translate the meaning of entanglements that is developed here into our own language, it must be closest to the dialectical development of *idée*. It grows by way of wrapping around contradiction. Therefore it constantly calls to mind the movement of resistance and denial. Such disputes are the seeds that sprout limitless disputes. Thus those seeds of dispute hold the power of enlightenment. Because of that power, there appears the self-recurrence of *idée* in the dispute that is wrapped up in denial.

When we understand entanglement in this way, I think the reason the Buddha-Dharma exists in the form of unending entanglements becomes clear, for though each of the patriarchs attains enlightenment, each attains his own enlightenment. As such, I think it will also clarify why the expressions of truth that appear in thousands and hundreds of thousands of variations reveal the Buddha-Dharma just as it is. Therefore, avoiding entanglements is not a way to reach the way.

Dōgen also discussed this point unequivocally. He said, "Although all practitioners orient themselves toward practicing 'cutting off the root of entanglements,' they do not practice 'using entanglements to cut off entanglements' as cutting. They do not know about using entanglements to don entanglements. How much less do they know about using entanglements to continue on by way of entanglements? Those who can understand inheriting the Dharma through entanglements are rare. No one is able to listen. No one yet has been able to write of this way."⁹⁰ Here Dōgen appears to be clearly capturing the meaning of dialectical development. The Buddha-Dharma is simply the flow of thought as it develops through contradiction and opposition. It is the continuity of limitless entanglements. Therefore it is impossible to inherit the Dharma without entering into intricate logical refutation, argument, assertion, and the like.

This idea of Dōgen's warns us against thinking of Zen as an unvaryingly mystical tradition. Dōgen himself already expressed this warning to the Zen monks of his era. Moreover, more than a few of his Dharma successors repeated this warning to the Zen monks of their times. As an example I will cite a comment about entanglements from Tenkei (1648–1735), the author of *Notes on Discourse*.⁹¹ "Regarding

the tangling of entanglements, the free expression of the way is manifest; this means attaining freedom even in the midst of a thorny forest. These days both teachers and students play on the shore of living and dying, telling pointless lies about attaining great freedom in the midst of the thorny forest *practicing only with kōans, without studying written commentaries*. There should be no meaning, no taste, no letters, no phrases. These are all pointless lies from beginning to end.⁹² No wonder they never envisioned the ancient Buddha's phrase, entanglements winding around entanglements." "These days teachers and students alike dislike words, calling them entanglements; it's really bitterly laughable."

Of course those who take Dōgen as their master could never let words like these escape their mouths. In light of the slogan "practicing only with kōans, without studying written commentaries," to organize an exclusionist body akin to the groups of Esoteric Buddhism cannot be said to put into practice real knowledge of the depth of Dōgen's philosophical thought.⁹³

If we judge by Dōgen's own words, his thoughts against Zen's tendency toward illogic and mysticism seem to have been inherited from his master, Tiantong Rujing. He said, "My late master, old buddha, said, 'Gourd vines entwine gourd vines.' This teaching has *never been seen* in any direction, past or present. *Only my late master* spoke of it" ("Kattō").

Dōgen also rejected those who tried to set up "the Zen sect" as one that advocated attaining buddhahood by directly seeing into the nature of the human heart, by transmitting face-to-face without teaching and without written language, and so forth. He said, "The common folk of modern times in their stupidity do not know the old ways, and those who have not received the transmission from buddhas of the past mistakenly say that there are five sects within the Buddha-Dharma. This has become a natural deterioration, and now there is not a single person—nor even half a person—who can rectify this. My late master Tiantong, the old buddha, was the first to show sympathy for this" ("Butsudō").

In other instances as well, Dōgen repeatedly expounds upon Tiantong Rujing's independent stance. If these claims of "my master alone" and "my master was the first" are factual, then one must say Tiantong Rujing was a revolutionary in Zen. Even if these are different from historical facts, then at the very least *for Dōgen* his master alone made the correct emphasis from the first. This being the case, the fact that Dōgen was influenced by this emphasis of Rujing's must have been duplicated in his deliberate protest against the whole corpus of

Chinese Zen. For us this is a very interesting fact. Dōgen crossed over to China before the Zen tradition had been established in Japan. Of all the Japanese who became truly absorbed in Zen thinking, it would be accurate to say he was the first. Nevertheless, he jumped into the midst of the closing years of a Chinese Zen tradition that had already existed for six or seven centuries, boldly claiming that in all that history *only* Rujing was correct. In other words, rather than choosing *the Zen sect* he chose one man: Rujing.

No matter how many Zen sects were later brought over from China and introduced to Japan, it remains that the first Japanese to accomplish this—and accomplish it powerfully—was Dōgen, who at the same time rejected “the Zen sect” as a protester against that Zen. Seen from this point of view, it also becomes clear that Dōgen’s disparaging thought concerning Zen’s illogical streak was not one that imported the prevailing thought in China just as it was in those days. Here we can see why his thoughts on expressing the truth and entanglements should be regarded as particularly significant.

(Taisho 9–12 [1920–1923])

Postscript

I planned in this chapter to describe Dōgen’s philosophy, but those plans were frustrated midway, in circumstances already related in the preface. I did not expect this inexpert narrative to yield much scholarly fruit, but when I recently came upon Tanabe Hajime’s “My Philosophical Perspective on the *Shōbōgenzō*,” I felt extremely pleased when I learned that he took my book as his opportunity to approach Dōgen. The fact that Dōgen’s philosophy has been revived in this way as a living question is, I believe, a matter of great significance not only for Dōgen’s sake but also for the history of Japanese spirituality.

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Reading *Shamon Dōgen*

A Tourist's Guide

Perhaps the greatest contribution *Shamon Dōgen* can offer readers of English is a distinctively Japanese interpretation of Dōgen's life and thought. Watsuji's perspective is unmistakably different from that of most of the Dōgen scholars working in English (and in other European languages, for that matter). Watsuji has had a significant influence on these studies: it is his edition of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* that Masunaga Reihō translated into English, and he is the first of a long line of Dōgen scholars to take up the *Shōbōgenzō* at the expense of the *Eiheikōroku*. Nevertheless, the features of Dōgen's thought that receive the most attention in English scholarship on Dōgen (mind-body dualism, time and space, etc.) pass almost unnoticed in *Shamon Dōgen*. On the other hand, many of the issues Watsuji deems to be of central importance are all but invisible in studies available to an English readership.

This should hardly surprise us. Just as a European or American tourist fixates on any number of sights in downtown Tokyo, sights the locals take for granted, so too do European and American scholars pay attention to features of the landscape of Japanese philosophy that would ordinarily be taken as given by a "native." Japanese texts on Immanuel Kant are substantially different in content from English or German resources, and for the same reason: when unfamiliar with the landscape, one takes note of things to which natives pay no mind. And, just as a native guide can enhance the experience of a tourist in a foreign land, Watsuji offers those of us who approach Dōgen from outside his own cultural perspective a more intimate tour of the conceptual landmarks in his thought.

As such, while many of the themes deemed central by Dōgen scholars are not addressed explicitly in this work, they are certainly

present in the background. However, if *Shamon Dōgen* is a guided tour, it was originally a tour for a Japanese readership, and features the average Japanese would take for granted are not explicitly brought to the fore. The non-native reader must therefore delve deeper to see these ideas at work.

But Watsuji also brings out several points of Dōgen's philosophy that are rarely emphasized in Zen scholarship in general. First is the element of faith, largely overlooked in many studies of Buddhism, perhaps because the Buddhist notion of faith differs so strongly from most Western religious conceptions of that term.¹ Dōgen's own theory of the primacy of faith stands apart from many Buddhist notions thereof, as Watsuji makes clear. Second is Dōgen's emphasis on intuition and on the responsibility of the student in Zen practice. According to Watsuji, Dōgen holds that in the teacher-student relationship it is actually the pupil who wields decision-making power, for it is the student who selects the master and not vice versa. Again, this receives little attention in Dōgen studies outside Japan.

If *Shamon Dōgen* is a guided tour of Dōgen's thought, this essay is a tour of the tour. Starting with the most obvious beginning point—the title—I will move on to examine the nature of faith and the role of responsibility in Watsuji's vision of Dōgen's Zen. From there I proceed to the technical terms of Dōgen's philosophy, terms that Watsuji rarely employs directly but whose influence is significant nonetheless. Included in this analysis of terminology will be a brief study on the role in Dōgen's philosophy of written language itself, for Watsuji presents us with an apparent contradiction: Dōgen, an accomplished poet, spurns efforts at writing poetry. Finally, I will highlight important beliefs shared by Watsuji and Dōgen, with the suggestion that perhaps some of the themes in Watsuji's later philosophy first took root as he delved into Dōgen's ideas.

Faith and the *Śramaṇa*

The first point of interest in *Shamon Dōgen* is its title. As I pointed out in the introductory essay, the title has been translated into English along the lines of *Dōgen the Monk*—and, as I suggested in that essay, *Dōgen the Adept* more closely mirrors the connotations of the Japanese word *shamon* (沙門) and its Sanskrit root, *śramaṇa*. Historically the *śramaṇa* was the Buddhist and Jainist answer to the highly ritualistic, family-centered *brahmana* tradition of Hinduism. The *brahmana* were closely

connected to the caste system and were tightly bound by social ties and rites in a manner almost reminiscent of Confucianism. The *śramaṇa* evolved as a rejection of this highly ritualized position and the social stratification that defined it. Unlike the *brahmana*, the *śramaṇa* were monastics and mendicants who deliberately distanced themselves from such worldly comforts as marriage and family. The *śramaṇa* rebuked the caste system that the *brahmana* embraced, instead embracing a life of exertion toward self-cultivation and enlightenment.

The second “opposite” of the *śramaṇa* is the *śrāvaka*—“one who hears and obeys”—and this *śramaṇa/śrāvaka* distinction is especially interesting in relation to the Dōgen that Watsuji describes for us. Watsuji emphasizes the importance of faith in Zen, an element often overlooked in many analyses of the religion. As Watsuji describes it, faith for Dōgen is not the belief in the existence of higher powers but rather the absolute suspension of doubt of the Zen master. Regardless of what the student believes, the master is right. The ancient patriarchs are equally indubitable, no matter what point they might be questioned on. The practitioner’s job is not to doubt but rather to hear and obey. Every question regarding training methods is a step backward. Every attempt to push the master’s instructions into logical pigeonholes is a failure. In short, on this view the good Zen practitioner is the model *śrāvaka*. The student must have faith that no matter how cryptic the master’s advice might be, and no matter how cruel the practices of the patriarchs might appear to have been, the master and patriarchs are indubitably correct in all their actions.

This is a colossal leap of faith for the average philosopher, and this reading of Dōgen’s philosophy has been both misinterpreted and taken to task. Ishii Shūdō, for instance, observed that the Sōtō sect has long maintained a “fundamental misconception” that “Dōgen Zen accepts totalitarian-based ideology unquestionably.”² We need not read Watsuji as arguing for “totalitarian-based ideology,” and indeed I suspect Watsuji would shrink from calling Dōgen an ideologue of any description. It is equally difficult to describe Dōgen’s method as totalitarian (he did not even seek to expand the ranks of his own followers, much less force his will on *everyone*), so even if the Sōtō order has interpreted Dōgen’s Zen as totalitarian ideology (as Ishii says), we may still conclude that Watsuji maintains a more moderate stance.

Even so, the leap of faith remains. Many a religion claims its god is infallible, but to place the same trust in the human representatives of that god is, for a great many people, unthinkable. In the Abrahamic

traditions, the instinct has generally been to say that *of course* rabbis, pastors, and imams make mistakes. They're only human. Dōgen's demand of utter reliance on the judgment of the Zen master would then seem tantamount to saying the Zen master is somehow superhuman.

But that would be an irrational suggestion, and though Zen famously advocates suspension of logical thought, that does not make Zen nonsensical. Even if he is sometimes antirational, Dōgen is not irrational. Nevertheless, he does ask the practitioner to suspend faith in rationality, since it is the unwavering faith in logic and ratiocination that leads so many astray. Many things a Zen master will say are patently anti-logical, but there is a difference between the illogical and the anti-logical, and students bound by the constraints of rigidly logical thought are often incapable of seeing this distinction. The anti-logical is the super-logical, that which cannot be contained by the merely logical and which demonstrates the many shortcomings of logical analysis. Those who are mired in logic can only see the anti-logical as illogical, and for this reason it is necessary to suspend faith in logic itself.

For the logical mind, even this is too much to ask: how could logical thought escape the structure of logic? It is impossible, and Dōgen does not ask the impossible. According to Watsuji, Dōgen only asks for faith in the Zen master. The master's teachings and instructions can loosen the student's white-knuckled grip on worldly rationality, provided only that the student is willing to listen. Honest and earnest listening requires faith. It requires obeisance—not acceptance of totalitarian ideology, but obeisance—even in the face of apparent irrationality. In short, it demands that one listen and obey; it asks for the *śrāvaka*.

In this sense Dōgen excelled as a *śrāvaka*. He listened to the Dharma and he listened to his masters, even to the point of ignoring the personal wishes of a dying and beloved instructor. Watsuji tells the story in his moving account of Dōgen's departure to China with his master, Myōzen. Crossing the Sea of Japan was never easy—those are dangerous waters—but their decision was made all the more difficult by the fact that Myōzen's master, Myōyū, was on his deathbed. Myōyū asked Myōzen and the others to delay their voyage until after his passing, and as Watsuji tells it, Myōzen put the question to the assembled monks of Kenninji this way: "I suppose my Buddhist training is good enough just as it is now. I suppose I can attain true enlightenment if things always remain just as they are."

Only Dōgen understood the subtext of his master's words. His response—"If that is the case, you should stay here"—is easily mis-

understood. When Myōzen asks the gathering of monks whether or not they should go to China, his question is rhetorical, and Dōgen's response is an equally rhetorical "if." *If* monks should set aside the call for enlightenment when worldly sorrow confronts them, then staying behind until the master passes away is the best course. If, on the other hand, the Dharma is to be obeyed even when following it is painful, there is only one thing to do, a point only Dōgen and Myōzen seem to understand. Dōgen's reply seems to be directed not so much toward Myōzen as toward the other monks (who, it should be noted, were all superior to Dōgen in rank; Dōgen was only twenty-three at the time). Abiding with the old master would clearly have been a choice made from attachment, and not one a dedicated monk would consider.

A similar question arises later in Dōgen's career, when a monk asks him whether he should abandon his aged mother to enter the monastery. In that context Dōgen says, "You may think you can circumvent the entire problem by waiting until after your mother passes away to follow the Buddha's Way, but what if you die before she does? Your mother will have disrupted your efforts toward reaching the truth." As Myōzen and Dōgen saw it, to delay the trip to China was to besmirch the master they admired so much, and perhaps even to bring bad karma upon him; because of their love and loyalty for Myōyū, they left his side and crossed the sea in search of enlightenment. Such a decision might be deemed inconsiderate from a secular point of view, but Dōgen allows such considerations to take a back seat to faith.

Watsuji makes no mention of the *śrāvaka*, but we may bring the *śramaṇa/śrāvaka* distinction to the text as a heuristic device, and with it we may observe Dōgen's subtle progression from the level of *śrāvaka* to that of *śramaṇa*. In the concluding sentence of chapter 3 Watsuji says we should regard Dōgen no longer as a disciple but as a master. Up until this point Dōgen has been a student, but by 1231 his "Bendōwa" marks him not as one who simply hears and obeys, but rather as one whose exertions enable him to reflect on the Dharma. The same is evidenced in his *Gakudō-yōjinshū* (Points to Watch while Studying the Way), written in 1234, and in Ejō's *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* (1235–1237), in which Dōgen is portrayed as a leader and a teacher par excellence.

Dōgen earns the right to be called a master through his writings, for it is only the master who can read sutras as Dōgen did, engaging in liberal *yomikae* (読み変え), or "reading and changing." Like Shinran, Kūkai, and others, Dōgen frequently changed the sutras as he read them, with little concern for adhering to the literal Chinese he was reading. For

Dōgen, reading was a creative act, because expressing the truth (*dōtoku*, 道得) always necessitated personal interpretation. Thus sutras were not read correctly or incorrectly; they could only be read with a greater or lesser understanding of the truth contained within them. One who merely hears and obeys cannot engage in this sort of reflection.

Being a *śrāvaka* should not be thought of as a negative state that one must escape in order to become a *śramaṇa*. Instead, the *śrāvaka* is a stage of development. Even for a master of Dōgen's caliber, we might say the *śrāvaka* stage is a necessary phase in the process by which one ultimately becomes capable of the *śramaṇa*'s exertions toward self-cultivation and authentication. Understanding this as a phase, we might well predict that Dōgen would strongly urge faith and obedience. For many people, the idea that one should throw away all one's own opinions and accept whatever the master has to say is a frightening prospect. It sounds more like the dogma of an extremist cult than the teaching of the largest Buddhist sect in Japan. But this fear presupposes that one's own opinions and the lessons of the master encounter each other on a level playing field. Zen faith, the faith Dōgen speaks of, presumes no such equality; the master is presumed to operate in a different league.

The rugged individualism of liberal democracy doesn't make much room for this possibility, but one must admit that within the religious sphere, certain leaps of faith must be made. The fear, of course, is that when one surrenders one's opinions one simultaneously surrenders freedom, for how can a person be free without the faculty of judgment?

This is where faith comes in: it alleviates that fear. Children often suspend their own opinions and ask their parents or teachers what to do, and they can feel safe in doing so because they trust that their parents and teachers are looking out for their best interests. The Zen practitioner must make the same sacrifice of personal judgments under the same presumption of safety, the presumption that the master always looks out for the pupil's best interests: namely, the pupil's eventual enlightenment.

Progress toward enlightenment will not be comfortable. In fact, it will hurt. Its price is sore legs, frequent boredom, and years of struggle, doubt, depression, fear, and cognitive dissonance. One needs faith to believe that all these austerities will actually lead one to the goal. For Dōgen, faith in the practice cannot be separated from practicing itself. He tells us that faith and enlightenment are one and the same (*shushin-ichinyo*, 修信一如), and he also speaks of the oneness of cultivation and authentication (*shushō-ichinyo*, 修証一如). If faith and enlightenment

are one, and if practice and enlightenment are one, then faith and practice are one. The student practices as instructed, trusting that the efforts are worthwhile.

Of course the possibility remains that the master could be working against the student's interests. It might be that all the privation is for nothing or, worse still, that it somehow furthers only the master's welfare. This could be the case, just as a mother could tell her son it is safe to pick up a pot when in fact she knows the pot is blisteringly hot. Faith must exist even when—and perhaps especially when—there lies the possibility that the object of that faith is not worthy of trust at all. Granted, the leap of faith in Zen spans a wider chasm than in the case of a child and loving parent, but this is characteristic of all religious faith. Moreover, Dōgen employs a protective measure to ensure the safety of the practitioner: he invests the student with the final responsibility of choosing if, when, and how the student will enter the buddha-way.

Responsibility, Intuition, and Will

In taking up the Buddhist path, the most important factor for Dōgen is the process of selecting a master. This is a burden that falls solely on the student. It is not that the teacher is able to accept and reject the pupil, as modern universities take their pick of applicants to be admitted. Rather, the student must accept the teacher. For Dōgen, only a suitable match of teacher and student will result in enlightenment, making the selection of a master a most weighty decision. It was his search for the proper master that brought Dōgen to Eisai, then to Myōzen, then across the sea to study at the feet of Rujing. He literally abandoned his whole life in Japan to search for a “true person,” a person suitable to be his mentor. Dōgen has no sympathy for a student who complains that her teacher fails to teach her: as Watsuji puts it in chapter 4, “If *your teacher's words* don't make sense to you, why did you choose him as a teacher in the first place?”

This emphasis on the student's responsibility for her own education and guidance is, to the best of my knowledge, uniquely Dōgen's. For him the student bears the weight of this responsibility from the first day, even before entering a monastic order. Finding the correct teacher is a matter of intuition; outside help or instruction is all but useless. Indeed, finding a master might be compared to falling in love: there can be no doubting it when it's genuine, yet at the same time errors are all too easy to make. Students settle for a less-than-perfect master just as people settle for a

less-than-perfect mate when they should continue to search. For Dōgen the student is a lump of clay looking for the right sculptor, and, like clay, the student has no control over what form she will ultimately take once she places herself in the master's hands. Again, this may be difficult to accept for those steeped in the individualism of liberal democracy, but this is an intuitive matter, not a logical one.

The search for a master presupposes that one has already chosen to practice Buddhism, but the student's responsibilities precede this. The primary question is whether or not one will become a Buddhist, and for Dōgen, the weight of this decision is to be placed on the practitioner's shoulders. This is another question to be resolved not by rational thought but by the student's intuition, as we see in the case of the doubting monk who cannot decide whether to leave his aging mother. Dōgen, of course, disdains any half-heartedness in Buddhism, yet he admits he can't answer the doubting monk's questions. It is up to the monk to decide whether he has the will to follow the path of Buddhism. If he finds he has it, he must simply say goodbye to his mother and join the monastery; it can only be *are ka kore ka*, one or the other.

The story is a good one because it demonstrates how compassion and single-minded dedication coexist. Compassion demands that Dōgen give the monk no advice on the issue, because no counsel but the monk's own intuition can resolve the issue. Bad advice will lead the monk astray, possibly leading him to commit himself to a demanding path he will be unable to complete in the end. He must abandon either his mother or the monastery, but advice from others may lead him to abandon both. Only the monk's own intuitiveness, combined with a total exertion of the will, can lead him to a suitable resolution.

The will is an interesting problem for Buddhism because it is so closely associated with desire, which is exactly what one is supposed to detach from oneself in order to attain enlightenment. If enlightenment is the state of detachment from desires, it cannot be attained by desiring to attain it; but without desiring a goal, how can one ever reach it? The problem of desire is a long-standing one in Indian philosophy, dating back many hundreds of years before Dōgen's time, but the problem is not insoluble. Its solution lies in the idea that, in seeking enlightenment, detachment from the self is of the utmost importance. Once I accomplish this, it cannot be said that *I* desire enlightenment, for there is no longer an *I*. Thus there is a desire for enlightenment, but there is no one who desires it; there is Nirvana, but no one who enters it. This is the doctrine of non-ego at its pinnacle.

Watsuji devotes very little attention to this doctrine nor to other philosophical issues deemed to be of central importance in Dōgen scholarship outside Japan. Impermanence and the unity of body and mind are relegated to the background; one might even suggest that Watsuji takes them for granted. In this one would not be far from the truth. The question here is one of perspective.

Terminology and Japanese Perspective

For a Japanese scholar like Watsuji, the oneness of what Descartes referred to as body and mind is hardly a novel idea. Indeed, the unity of these two is present in basic Japanese vocabulary: the word *kokoro* (心), frequently translated as “heart,” signifies both the vital organ and the “mental” or “emotional” activity (present in such English locutions as “put your heart into it” or “it was a heartless act”). The indivisibility of the psychophysical *kokoro* is to be found in aspects of Japanese culture ranging from the tea ceremony to the martial arts. Impermanence also permeates Japanese culture, from *hanami* festivals to the aesthetic of Kurosawa films, from architectural design to the design of samurai armor. Watsuji does not take up such issues, issues that fascinate and perplex *gaijin* academics, but this should come as no surprise; these themes are remarkable only when one lacks prior exposure to Buddhism, to Japanese thought, and to Asian cultures in general.

However, to say that Watsuji does not highlight these concepts is not to say that they are absent from his analysis. Indeed, they permeate it, in a manner that is very much in keeping with Dōgen’s own system of thought. According to Dōgen, one’s every thought should be devoted to meditation on non-ego and buddha-nature. The text of *Shamon Dōgen* is saturated by the concept of non-ego in a similarly ubiquitous way, and also by the oneness of the mental and the physical, impermanence, and the oneness of practice and enlightenment. These ideas appear continuously in anecdotes about Dōgen’s life, in his conversations and instructions, and of course in Watsuji’s explicit analyses of Dōgen’s thought. I will comment briefly on each of them here, and also on the role of the written word itself in Dōgen’s philosophy.

“Body-Mind” in *Shamon Dōgen*

The term *shinjin* (心身 or 身心, in both cases also pronounceable as *shinshin*) has most commonly been translated as “body-mind,” following the dichotomy suggested by Plato and defended by Descartes.

It is an unfortunate translation, as “mind” only tangentially touches on the meaning of *shin* (心), and *shin* (身) is not “body” at all if it is separated from “mind” (心). Philosophically speaking, *shinjin* is a beautifully elegant word, for its two halves can be reversed without changing pronunciation or meaning. It therefore creates no hierarchy of the kind suggested by Plato and Descartes, as neither term comes before the other either on the page or in metaphysical priority: “mind-body” is just as good as “body-mind.” Watsuji uses both variants interchangeably, once again reflecting Dōgen’s nondualistic thinking.

The ineluctable physicality of self-cultivation is also brought forth in Watsuji’s analysis. For Dōgen, religious experience is bodily experience; *shikantaza* (只管打坐, “just-sitting”) is, to use a Heideggerian turn of phrase, “always already” enlightenment. This is the doctrine of *hongaku* (本覺, “original enlightenment”) in practice, and the reason why the lotus position is the *zanmai-ō-zanmai* (三昧王三昧), the “king of samadhis,” the activity that cannot be surpassed in human life: just-sitting in the full lotus posture is, by itself, the actualization of enlightenment. As Dōgen sees it, the problem for the practitioner is only to grasp this.

Throughout *Shamon Dōgen* we see the centrality of *zazen* in Dōgen’s vision of *buppō* (仏法), the Buddha-Dharma. Indeed, in the text Dōgen does little else but meditate, with occasional pauses to write and teach—frequently about meditation. (We’ve seen already that later studies question the primacy of meditation in Dōgen’s Zen; see Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends in Dōgen Studies,” as cited in the introductory essay to this volume.) As Watsuji portrays him, for Dōgen a life well spent was a life spent on the *zafu*, sitting day and night in the effort to cast off *shinjin*. Thus the physicality of self-cultivation is ultimately aimed at throwing away the medium of that psychophysical experience. Self-cultivation is physical insofar as it has to be, for we are embodied creatures, but one reflects on “body-mind” in order to detach from it. This is closely connected with the idea of *muga* (無我), or non-ego, a pivotal concept in Dōgen’s philosophy.

Non-ego in Shamon Dōgen

Watsuji never explicitly refers to Dōgen’s doctrine of non-ego, nor does he employ the Japanese term *muga* in the text. Nevertheless, the idea of the fundamental emptiness (*mu*, 無) of the supposedly enduring self is present throughout his treatment of Dōgen. Its presence is carried through (at least in part) in *shinjin-datsuraku* (心身脱落), “casting off *shinjin*,” another key term in Dōgen’s thought.

If Dōgen's recommendation were to cast off the *body*, we could simply interpret Sōtō Zen as another dualistic religion that scorns the material as it uplifts the noumenal. Of course, Dōgen does not adopt such a position; on the contrary, he spurns it vehemently, as we see in his fiery denouncement of the Senika heresy.³ Alternatively, Dōgen's casting off *shinjin* could be interpreted in the way the samurai understood it, not as a means to religious salvation but as a tool for self-abnegation, in order to better serve as the implement of the master's will. For the warrior, non-ego is the most expedient means of extinguishing fear; it need not hold any salvific significance beyond this fact.

There is a crucial difference between Dōgen's non-ego and non-ego as it was taken up in *bushidō*. For Dōgen, non-ego was neither an aesthetic ideal nor the means to some other end: non-ego was truth. That the samurai did not act from a properly Buddhist perspective should be obvious—those who made the sword their livelihood could not adopt the Buddhist prohibition against drawing blood—but the samurai did mimic the Zen doctrine of non-ego, and it is important to see that self-abnegation for the sake of easier self-sacrifice was never Dōgen's intent.

Rather, when Dōgen commands that one cast off mind and body, he is not implying that there is some real mind and real body to be dismissed. Dōgen's move is not the same as that of Epictetus, who says, "If you are fond of a jug, say 'I am fond of a jug!' For then when it is broken you will not be upset. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset."⁴ Epictetus recognizes the fragility of a real, reified object, and detaches himself from that object. This is all the samurai needs to do in order to be a faithful retainer. (Naturally, some samurai did come to understand the deeper meaning of Buddhism's non-ego, but the samurai only *needs* to detach himself in the manner of Epictetus.)⁵ Dōgen, on the other hand, denies the independent existence of the object and calls it empty. Casting off body-mind, then, is not simply detaching from the physical and the mental but rather denying their independent reality. Here Dōgen is not reviling attachment but is embracing *sūnyatā*, or emptiness. It is because of this that *shinjin-datsuraku* entails *muga*.

Watsuji does address the concept of *muga* tangentially in chapter 6: "The point Buddhism and Confucianism share in common is that they both leave egotism behind. . . . In the end, Dōgen suggests the moral principle all human beings share in common is to act in such a way that leaves the 'I' behind, in order to suit the will of the Absolute." Here

Watsuji weaves Dōgen's moral philosophy into the everyday morality of the Japanese people—a good idea, given that his first goal in writing this book was to reacquaint Japan with its great religious philosopher. However, it is important to note the differences between the Confucian interpretation of “leaving the ‘I’ behind” and Dōgen's understanding of the same idea. Confucianism dictates that private concerns may not trump the interests of the communal whole; we can see a similar concept arise in Watsuji's later writings, when he introduces the movement of double negation in his philosophy of *ningen* (人間).⁶ As such, leaving behind the “I” is essentially being able to put personal desires in check in cultivating relationships with others. For Dōgen, on the other hand, to leave the “I” behind is to recognize dependent co-arising. It is to realize that what I call my self is without intrinsic, independent existence. Therefore, though the ethical ramifications of leaving the empty “I” behind reach far, deep, and wide, for Dōgen it is nonetheless a soteriological necessity rather than a moral duty.

Recognizing that no “I” resides in the body or the mind helps one cast off body-mind. *Shinjin-datsuraku* is therefore both the method for understanding *muga* and the end result of understanding it. And, given insight into *muga*, one simultaneously gains insight into the concept of *mujō* (無常), or impermanence. *Mujō* is as important as *muga* in Japanese Buddhism; awakening is arguably impossible without a visceral understanding of both. Once again, Watsuji does not explicitly take up *mujō*, but once again the reader can find the concept woven into the text.

Impermanence in Shamon Dōgen

Dōgen was confronted with the reality of impermanence almost from infancy, losing his mother by the tender age of eight, and on some accounts losing his father by the age of two. He entered a monastery almost as soon as he became a teenager, and walked the monastic path from then on until his death. Impermanence was a part of his life from boyhood onward, and it was his repeated meditations on the matter that led him to develop one of the most profound philosophies in Japanese intellectual history.

No analysis of Dōgen could be called complete without a treatment of *mujō*, and *Shamon Dōgen* is no different. In fact, one could fairly say that the entire second chapter is a chapter on impermanence. *Mujō* underlies nearly every story and anecdote there and is the foundational concept of Dōgen's days of training. We see it in the chapter's opening lines, where Eisai is unperturbed by the thought of his monastery being

swept away by the river. We see it when Eisai surrenders the donated silk and dooms all the temple's monks to hunger: as he puts it, "It shouldn't be a big deal to fast for a day and die of starvation."

When Myōzen and Dōgen sailed off to China as the master lay on his deathbed, they demonstrated the highest self-cultivation. Reading the story uncharitably, one might conclude that they callously left their master, abandoning him in his greatest hour of need. A more sympathetic interpretation, and one which relies more heavily on Dōgen's philosophy, is that they left Myōyū Ajari only with great personal sorrow, knowing they would never see him again and feeling anguish because of it. They left not because they wanted to, or because they had no concern for the dying master, but because they understood the nature of *mujō*. People die; that is the way of the world. It is a monk's duty to disengage himself from the anger and anguish that accompany that fact, focusing instead on that which truly matters: *satori*. If a monk allowed himself to be distracted every time impermanence reared its head, enlightenment would only be a thing of myth. It is only through self-restraint and self-cultivation that Dōgen can acknowledge impermanence for what it is, thereby recognizing Myōyū's death as both tragic and unavoidable. It is because he understands impermanence that he can pursue enlightenment.

Watsuji relates a number of episodes from Dōgen's life in which the reader can see how wholeheartedly Dōgen embraced *mujō*. One such example is Dōgen's imperturbable resignation to risk death doing *zazen* in the dead of winter, his justification being that he would die in good company and be buried by good monks. Another poignant example is the Chinese monk who is so poor that he can only clothe himself in paper, his robes tearing with every step, yet who still continues his religious pilgrimage and daily meditation. This is a person who values every moment, as the Earl of Chesterfield did: "Know the true value of time; snatch, seize, and enjoy every moment of it. No idleness, no delay, no procrastination; never put off 'til tomorrow what you can do today."

To embrace *mujō* is not to resign oneself to desperation or hopelessness, though many first-time students of Buddhism experience both of those reactions when they hear the central message of *mujō*: you are dying. Indeed, *mujō* entails more than that: your family is dying, and so are your children and your pets and your friends, and all the world's great works of art, and everything beautiful in the universe. Modern physics tells a comparable tale: everything in the universe is made up of matter and energy, and while neither matter nor energy can be destroyed, both move inexorably toward entropy. Everything is constantly breaking

down; the only question—for the physicist and the Zen Buddhist alike—is how quickly. And for ephemeral beings like us, the question is how to react to this basic fragility of everything in existence.

In religion the question has two favored answers. One is to deny the premise, to maintain that some things are indeed permanent (gods, souls, heavens, hells, and the like), and to hold that this second stratum of reality, the realm of the permanent, is the more important one. The other approach is to embrace impermanence, to root out where and how we hypnotize ourselves into believing fleeting things are everlasting, and to free ourselves of such delusions. Dōgen clearly takes the latter approach, according to which only immortals should look on impermanence as a frightening prospect. We ephemeral beings should know better—or at least we can know better, if only we adopt the right kinds of practices.

For Dōgen, *mujō* is not a philosophical theory to adopt; it is the inevitable and ineluctable nature of everything, at once stupefying mystery and plainest truth. For him every moment is therefore the most important moment in history; in a sense, it is the only moment there is, for the present is a point thinner than a razor's edge, with an imagined future stretching out before it and a remembered past stretching out behind. The present moment is the only one that exists, and should therefore be treated with appropriate reverence.

This belief is arguably the root, or at least a root, of Dōgen's unequivocal rejection of fame, rank, political office, and wealth. To seek fame, wealth, or power was to commit the double mistake of distracting oneself from the present moment (by aiming for a goal in a nonexistent future) and of reifying the impermanent, dependently arising ego (by trying to ensure its future security and comfort). Anything that is not *zazen* did not warrant Dōgen's concern (though here too one must tread carefully, since what Dōgen thinks of as *zazen* is not just seated meditation, but rather a mindfulness permeating every activity, from walking to eating to defecating). Dōgen considered love of fame to be one of the worst sins a monk could commit, and positions of leadership tended to corrupt a person toward that love. (Dōgen's own role as a founder of the Sōtō sect in Japan might have been just such a power position if not for the fact that he never actively sought members, and proclaimed no concern for whether his sect flourished or disappeared so long as the Buddha-Dharma thrived.) As he so pointedly put it, "The worst suffering I can imagine would be to acquire wealth and worldly fame by going out to preach the Buddha's truth."⁷

Just as Dōgen regarded political leaders with disdain, he also had

no use for intellectuals or scholastic Buddhists. We might dub these the *śrāvakas* against whom he stood as a *śramaṇa*. Those who studied the sutras to the exclusion of meditative practice were simply a source of irritation for Dōgen. But here we run across a curiosity in the text: Watsuji, who was a great lover of literature, argues that Dōgen had no time for it, yet Dōgen himself was an accomplished poet. How are we to understand this apparent contradiction?

The Role of Writing in Shamon Dōgen

Dōgen made a point of teaching his students that, in their writing, they should have little concern for “flowery words” and should be more concerned with enlightenment itself. This position, in addition to Dōgen’s dismissal of scholastic monks, may have led Watsuji to his conclusion in chapter 8 that Dōgen “saw no value in the literary arts.” Such arts might well be held in contempt if it were true that any effort spent on eloquence in writing was a distraction from authentically expressing the Dharma. By the same reasoning, the sutras would also hold little interest for Dōgen, for the written word could not express the truth of Buddhism as wholly as it could be expressed by holding up a single flower.

Here we face two apparent contradictions. First of all, Dōgen himself is lauded for his poetry, a fact Watsuji could hardly have been unaware of.⁸ Second, Dōgen explicitly says it is a mistake to claim that the Buddha-Dharma cannot be expressed on paper; to say otherwise is to cast Zen as a quagmire of illogic and mysticism, a depiction Dōgen roundly rebuffs.⁹ Indeed, Watsuji himself makes Dōgen’s rejection of this position abundantly clear in his analysis of *dōtoku* (道得, “expressing the truth”). Thus it seems very difficult to take Watsuji’s account of Dōgen’s aesthetic philosophy at face value.

In considering this apparent inconsistency, the modern reader would do well to consider what Dōgen had in mind when he thought of poetry. In Kamakura period Japan, poetry was identified with the life of the court, a life of decadence and debauchery. Still worse, the poets of the court used Buddhist ideas in their writings, but only to pervert them into a *carpe diem* aesthetic that further goaded their licentiousness. Dōgen saw himself living in *mappō* (末法), the Age of Degenerate Dharma, a period in which words themselves were losing their power to convey the Dharma. When Buddhist concepts like impermanence and nonattachment were used to sell orgiastic sensuality, a usage especially prevalent in the poetry of the day, it becomes much clearer why Dōgen should show his disdain.

But this being the case, why would he then go on to write poetry himself? The Buddhist doctrine of *upāya*, or skillful means, may be of use in resolving this paradox. A mentor teaching with *upāya* tells a student only what is needed to allow the student to progress. In learning how to cook, for example, it would be pointless in the first lesson to teach everything there is to know about spices, which spices work well with each other, which ones best bring out the flavor of certain dishes, which ones can eliminate bitterness or enhance sweetness. Sometimes it is better simply to say, “This needs more pepper.” Depending on the student, different advice will be offered, and as the student progresses, later lessons may flatly contradict earlier ones.¹⁰

This is what it is to teach with *upāya*: to teach to the needs of the student. And, for most of Dōgen’s readers, the best advice he can offer is to steer away from flowery words. For certain individuals at certain times, effort can be spent well on making one’s writing more eloquent, but in general when one attempts to write beautifully one loses sight of the truth, and when one keeps one’s eye on the truth one loses the ability to write beautifully. The final chapter of the *Daodejing* says, “Truthful words are not beautiful, and beautiful words are not truthful.”¹¹ The Dōgen we see in chapter 8 of *Shamon Dōgen* may have such sentiments in mind when he disdains the literary arts: striving toward eloquence is a distraction from expressing the truth (*dōtoku*, 道得) as it is expressed in things being present just as they are (*genjō*, 現成).

Dōgen is far more concerned with *genjō* than with flourish. As such, his own poetry is better interpreted as an attempt at authentic expression of the Dharma, not as a recording of Sōtō sect canon and certainly not as a bid for literary immortality. For Dōgen, the ability to recite sutras from memory is fruitless in comparison to one minute of seated meditation in a meager thatched hut.

Both the rejection of fame and power and the spurning of “flowery words” speak to Dōgen’s unwavering drive toward self-cultivation. As Dōgen envisions the monastic life, anything that distracts is disallowed. (Hence garlic and other spices are forbidden to monks, loud noises are prohibited in the *zendō*, alcohol is taboo, and so forth; the *Eihei Shingi* abounds with such prohibitions.)¹² The dichotomy of *are ka kore ka* (either one or the other), which Watsuji draws in chapters 7 and 8, also speaks to Dōgen’s single-minded focus on Buddhist practice. Now Dōgen was thorough in extirpating dualism from his thought, and the student of Dōgen would be well advised to become wary anytime a dichotomy is posed in Dōgen’s name. However, when Watsuji offers his seemingly

dualistic *are ka kore ka*, I believe the core of the message is essentially “Don’t do it halfway.” If you are to write, write with the whole of your being; let the writing become *zazen*, as meditative a practice as the *tenzo*’s chopping vegetables. On this view, time spent thinking about writing is indeed a distraction, and no more useful than thinking about meditating during meditation. Just-sitting is exactly that; we might think of just-writing in similar fashion.

For Dōgen, Buddhist practice was its own reward. As Watsuji describes him, he did not meditate in order to attain some other goal, and those who wrote for some goal other than directly expressing their experiences aroused his suspicion. Writing eloquently in order to become famous would obviously meet with Dōgen’s disapproval. The finest writing would be, in the best Daoist sense of the word, effortless. It would not be motivated by the approval of the reader; rather, it would well up from a spring of authentic experience.

As it happens, many readers appreciate authenticity in writing, and as such Dōgen’s own poetry drew high regard. But if Watsuji is right, Dōgen’s goal would never have been to accrue a wide readership; his goal was writing as a form of self-cultivation—and, as cultivation, an experience of awakening in and of itself. For Dōgen there was no distinction to be drawn between self-cultivation and enlightenment; *zazen* was itself enlightenment, in every moment of practice.

The Oneness of Practice and Enlightenment in Shamon Dōgen

If we think of *shamon* Dōgen as Dōgen the *śramaṇa*, he stands apart from the *śrāvaka* for a number of reasons. One is that, as a merely intellectual Buddhist, the *śrāvaka* is overly concerned with eloquent and scholarly expression, which Dōgen condemns as failing to engage in total exertion toward expressing the truth. Another is that the *śrāvaka* does not practice what he preaches; he does too much thinking and not enough *zazen*. Watsuji does not make the point explicit, but one reason Dōgen ultimately rejects scholasticism is the principle that sets his Sōtō Zen apart from the rivaling schools of its day: the oneness of cultivation and enlightenment (*shushō-ichinyo*, 修証一如).

Dōgen arrives at the idea of *shushō-ichinyo* as a result of the question that first plagued him in his earliest years as a monk, the question of original enlightenment (*hongaku*, 本覺). Dōgen describes the problem as follows: “As I study both the exoteric and the esoteric schools of Buddhism, they maintain that human beings are endowed with the Dharma-nature by birth. If this is the case, why did the buddhas of all

ages—undoubtedly in possession of enlightenment—find it necessary to seek enlightenment and engage in spiritual practice?”¹³ What is the purpose of self-cultivation through *zazen* if one is already born into original enlightenment? This question plagued Dōgen from his first days at Mount Hiei, and it stayed with him throughout his studies until finally, having attained *satori* in China, he realized that there is no difference between Buddhist practice and enlightenment. The indivisibility of cultivation and enlightenment, reflected in the importance he vests in just-sitting (*shikantaza*, 只管打坐), was the key to Dōgen’s enlightenment and to his brand of Zen.

Watsuji repeatedly recounts Dōgen’s zeal for doing seated meditation, but he does not offer much comment on the reason for *zazen*’s importance. This is commonly noted as a principal difference between Dōgen’s Sōtō Zen and other schools of Zen, yet in *Shamon Dōgen* this point is not brought into the spotlight. Indeed, at one point Watsuji seems to misunderstand the role of *zazen* and *satori* in Dōgen’s Zen: “The possibility of imitating and following,” he says in chapter 4, “exists only along the path of self-cultivation; it has no relation to the realization of truth itself.” If cultivation and authentication are one and the same—in a word, *shushō-ichinyō* (修証一如)—how can there be an important part of *shugyō* that has *no* relationship to *satori*?

To answer this question, one should keep in mind that in “Genjōkōan,” where Dōgen elaborates the idea that cultivation and enlightenment are one, his audience consists of monks practicing *zazen*. Watsuji is speaking to quite another audience when he reintroduces Dōgen to laypeople who had all but forgotten him. Here Watsuji is attempting to lay out Dōgen’s philosophy in the simplest possible terms in order to reinstate him as a major figure in Japan’s intellectual history.

As such, Watsuji seems to be dividing self-cultivation from authentic enlightenment as two halves of a single, unified whole. The blind obeisance that is demanded during self-cultivation is the objective aspect of *shugyō*. Enlightenment is the subjective aspect of it. Like any dichotomization in Zen, this one is artificial, for some aspects of *shugyō* are vitally subjective, and some aspects of enlightenment appear to be objective. However, a dichotomy can be artificial and still have utility in teaching. (Indeed, this is the very essence of *upāya*.) This subjective/objective split, albeit artificial and temporary, seems to be what Watsuji is working with here to make Dōgen’s philosophy more easily understandable to those who are not Sōtō scholars.

But why continue to divide laypeople from the monastics who are

at the heart of Sōtō Zen? Dōgen makes no bones about it: *zazen* is hard. Just-sitting involves more physical and mental strain than most people are willing to endure, and though every moment of authentic *zazen* is a moment spent in enlightenment, the road from sitting to just-sitting is a long one. The Buddha spent eight trying years under the Bodhi tree before just-sitting and awakening to enlightenment. Bodhidharma spent nine years gazing at the wall of a cave to accomplish the task. Dōgen himself spent twelve years as a monk before attaining *satori*. Nothing about Sōtō Zen is easy, as Dōgen would be the first to admit.

As it turns out, latter-day Sōtō priests and monks have not trailed far behind him in disseminating this message; if anything, they have oversold *zazen*'s difficulty. In his study of Sōtō practice in Japan, Ian Reader found that the monks of Sōtō temples actually discourage the laity from doing *zazen*. According to Reader, because *zazen* has long been deemed too difficult a practice for any but monks and nuns to do, the meditative aspects of the sect have been almost entirely entrusted to the monastic order.¹⁴ Salvation is not a marketable commodity when years of *zazen* are its price, so to keep the sect alive, compromises were made. These very compromises contributed to Dōgen's gradual disappearance over the centuries. His methodological purism was deemed too difficult to popularize, and as a result, much of his philosophy was either buried or misrepresented.

Watsuji himself may have been plagued by this tension as well: his goal was to reinvigorate interest in Dōgen, not to characterize him as a puritanical extremist. He does criticize the Sōtō sect for deliberately obscuring Dōgen's work, but at the same time he suggests that the laity can practice Dōgen's Zen just as monks can. Perhaps Dōgen would dispute this point with Watsuji; he never claimed that laypeople literally cannot practice *zazen*, but he did maintain that the best life is a monastic one. Practice and enlightenment are inextricably enmeshed, and the monastic life is the only one that allows adequate time for practice.

Related to *shushō-ichinyo* is the oneness of faith and enlightenment (*shushin-ichinyo*, 修信一如), another concept to which Watsuji does not openly refer, yet one that we might guess would be attractive to him, given that faith plays such a crucial role in his investigation of Dōgen's thought. He stresses the importance of faith in Sōtō Zen time and time again, yet does not explicitly draw the connection between—or, better said, the indivisibility of—faith and self-cultivation. Cultivation and enlightenment are one; faith and enlightenment are one; faith and cultivation are one. Dōgen's philosophy is thoroughly nondualistic;

some might find it objectionable that Watsuji never brought this theme to the fore.

But here the Western reader should tread with care. As a Japanese scholar writing for a Japanese audience, Watsuji may not have regarded nondualism as a point of interest. It may have been simply assumed, much as dualism is often an unexpressed presumption in the philosophies originating out of Europe. The fact that body-mind is so easily interchangeable with mind-body in Japanese, yet so awkward an expression no matter how it is phrased in English, is indicative of the basic dichotomizing present in English that must be introduced to the Japanese thinker. Dōgen's nondualism is appealing to Zen scholars outside Japan (and indeed outside Asia), but Watsuji—and his audience—may well have taken it as self-evident.

While Watsuji devotes relatively little time to explaining Dōgen's technical terminology, perhaps this is justifiable given his overall purpose in writing *Shamon Dōgen*. At seventy pages in the original, *Shamon Dōgen* was meant to be a quick read, and from the outset it was always intended for a wide readership. When Stephen Hawking started writing *A Brief History of Time* he sought to invoke as few mathematical equations as possible, and in fact he employs only one in the whole book: $E = mc^2$. The reason, he says, is the advice he received that each equation he included would halve the number of people who bought the book.¹⁵ Perhaps Watsuji foresaw a similar problem in his own project. Dōgen's technical terminology often challenges basic Buddhist precepts at their very core in a fashion almost reminiscent of Nāgārjuna. He rejects or revises many of the tenets most Buddhists hold unquestioned, and perhaps Watsuji decided this was too much to take on if his goal was to reacquaint Japan with its long-forgotten Dōgen.

Conclusion

Though Watsuji's philosophy tends not to be religious in nature, his reflections on Dōgen's thought would resurface in Watsuji's later work. Some of their commonalities are superficial and are to be expected. Both Watsuji and Dōgen observe, for example, that a person cannot be thought of as existing wholly independently of his or her surrounding environment, but nondualism of any stripe says that no two things exist wholly independently of each other. Other commonalities arguably run deeper. One shared view regards the nature of human personality, or *jinkaku* (人格).

According to T. P. Kasulis, this word had become a technical term among Watsuji's fellow philosophers of the early twentieth century: "*Jinkaku* had a specific philosophical use in Japan: it translated the Western idea of 'person' (or sometimes 'personality'). Abe Jirō, a prominent philosopher with a large popular following, had started the Japanese 'personalist' (*jinkakushugi* 人格主義) movement. Most personalists in the West, like Abe, understood the 'person' as intrinsically linked to a fundamental religious or aesthetic ground."¹⁶ The word *jinkaku* was clearly meaningful to Watsuji, for it permeates *Shamon Dōgen*, appearing over fifty times in seventy pages, and in 1938 Watsuji would return to it in his book *Jinkaku to jinruisei* (Personality and Human Nature). In *Shamon Dōgen* Watsuji employs *jinkaku* in a variety of ways: here to describe the charismatic power of religious leaders like Dōgen and Jesus; there as the medium by which the Dharma is transmitted from master to student in the Zen tradition; elsewhere as a sort of pool one taps into when awakening to Buddhist enlightenment. But in his usage of it, we may catch a glimpse into Watsuji's philosophical future, for in *Shamon Dōgen* he makes an initial foray into the territory he comes to explore at length in the *Rinrigaku*.

In chapter 4 of *Shamon Dōgen* Watsuji writes of Dōgen's realization that he must abandon his old ways and cleave to the ways preached by his master. There Dōgen says, "Throwing out all your own thoughts and views and listening to your teacher is the most important point to watch while studying the way," and to this Watsuji adds the following commentary:

Clearly there is no concern at all for individuality here. Whether or not one imitates, whether or not one follows, grasping the eternal truth is the only important thing. This does not mean the disposal of individuality but rather the exultation of it. The possibility of imitating and following exists only along the path of self-cultivation; it has no relation to the realization of truth itself. Realization of the truth has its own distinctive personality [*jinkaku*]. Only in the moment of realization does that individuality shine out as unique in all the universe.

Watsuji seems to be working with two distinct types of individuality in this passage, both against a backdrop of Buddhist thought. One is what I shall call "egocentric individuality." This is the type of individuality most people experience, since they do not understand what Dōgen would have them understand: namely, that all beings are but manifestations of

a unified whole. In other words, this type of individuality includes the belief that one exists as a distinct entity, independent of all others.

The second type of individuality we might label “authentic individuality.” In this state of awareness the individual can see that individuality is nothing but a singular manifestation of the Buddha-Dharma, which is the universe and all that is in it. Authentic individuality is the individuality of waves in the ocean: though one can discern one wave from the others, one recognizes that no wave has a claim to existence independently of the ocean, nor indeed of any other wave.

When Watsuji writes of both disposing of individuality and exulting it, I believe he means that egocentric individuality is left behind and authentic individuality is lifted up. He speaks of the patriarchs taking hold of self-cultivators and carrying them to enlightenment. When this happens, egocentric individuality disappears and the practitioner realizes authentic individuality. All the buddhas and patriarchs participate in and are a part of this authentic individuality, the individuality that transcends the particular human form.

Those familiar with Watsuji’s *Rinrigaku* will see the parallels between his rejection of unfettered individualism there and his rejection of egocentric individuality here. In that context the rejection is philosophical; here it is both philosophical and religious. In *Shamon Dōgen*, the personality of the individual is being rejected by the personality of enlightenment itself, which is not egocentrically individual but communal. Watsuji suggests that enlightenment is not a rejection of individuality; rather, it has its own individuality, as evidenced by his statements in *Shamon Dōgen* concerning the *jinkaku* of enlightenment itself: “realization of the truth has its own distinctive personality”; “the true personality of mysterious wisdom is eternal and unchanging.”

The same is true of *ningen* (人間) in the *Rinrigaku*. Left to its own devices, a community can drain any of its constituent individuals dry. Because individuals fear being expended “for the greater good,” they rebel: *nin* (人) negates *gen* (間). But the resulting unfettered individuality leads to egoism and anarchy; thus the community reabsorbs the individual, who is now protected against abuse by a robust sense of authenticity. *Nin*, the person as against the community, is egocentrically individual. *Ningen*, the socially contextualized person, is authentically individual.

Thus in rediscovering Dōgen, Watsuji may also have performed an act of self-discovery. It is not an accident, I think, that Watsuji’s *Rinrigaku* came only after he completed his monographs on Dōgen, Confucius, and Nietzsche. The meta-ethics he develops in the *Rinrigaku*

has echoes in the personal authenticity espoused by Nietzsche, the socially constructed account of personhood found in Confucius, and the way in which Dōgen manages to blend the two. As such, in one sense Watsuji has picked up where Dōgen left off (albeit in a secular way), extending socially constructed personal authenticity into the political sphere. As Dōgen tells the student to suspend personal judgment, placing faith in the master, so too does Watsuji suggest that the individual suspend personal interests, placing the good of the collective before personal ends. But Watsuji also insists in the *Rinrigaku* that the individual ought not to be considered expendable by the social whole, much as Dōgen insists that ultimate control lies not with the master but with the acolyte.

Dōgen and Watsuji share common ground on the relationship of the individual to the whole and on the nature of personal responsibility within that relationship. Whereas Dōgen writes of this in the context of Buddhist monastic life and Buddhist enlightenment, Watsuji writes of it in the social and political domain. Dōgen, who had no interest in politics at all, voiced a position quite similar to the one Watsuji was able to express at the highest levels of government. Interestingly enough, and just as Dōgen might have predicted, this proved disastrous for Watsuji's reputation, causing repercussions in his personal and professional life. Having his voice heard by the Ministry of Education, the Imperial Naval command, and the Imperial house contributed to Watsuji's being vilified as a government loyalist. Surely it was Watsuji's words, and not those who heard them, that had the most to do with his vilification, but it is interesting to note that had Watsuji taken Dōgen's advice more seriously, he might never have concerned himself with politics. And if that had occurred, Watsuji's own name might have been as little known as Dōgen's was before *Shamon Dōgen*.

As a study of Watsuji, *Shamon Dōgen* offers a rare insight into the blossoming mind of one of modern Japan's greatest thinkers. As a study of its eponymous subject, *Shamon Dōgen* is more than a classic; it is one of the cornerstones on which modern Dōgen scholarship is built. Though that scholarship takes up themes, ideas, and terms not readily visible in *Shamon Dōgen*, and though much of that scholarship flatly rejects the basic account of Dōgen's life that Watsuji lays out, the fact remains that were it not for Watsuji's book, Dōgen's name might never have escaped obscurity. Moreover, one of *Shamon Dōgen*'s merits is that it does not include all the concepts deemed important by Western Dōgen scholars; in the end this is a Japanese book for a Japanese audience, and that in and of itself provides insights unlike any other.

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NOTES

Introductions

1. See, for example, Odin, *The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism*, 50, and Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 2.

2. Watsuji did study some Sanskrit in order to write his 1927 book, *Genshi bukkyō no jissen tetsugaku* (Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism), but he is not accounted an expert. Dōgen himself used the term in his “Bendōwa” to describe himself: “the Dharma transmitter *shamon* Dōgen who went to Sung China.”

3. Furukawa, “Watsuji Tetsurō,” 219.

4. Carter, introduction to *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku,”* 1.

5. *Nakae Chōmin shū*, 168, quoted in Abe Masao, introduction to *An Inquiry into the Good*, vii. Abe points out that to answer whether or not the Japanese did philosophy, one must first ask what is meant by “philosophy” (introduction to *An Inquiry into the Good*, viii–xi).

6. I am indebted to T. P. Kasulis for the connection between Watsuji and Inoue.

7. See chapter 4 of Watsuji Tetsurō, *Shamon Dōgen*, where Watsuji muses on Dōgen in the context of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

8. Kodera, “The Romantic Humanism of Watsuji Tetsurō,” 6.

9. See Yuasa Yasuo in correspondence with Robert Carter, in appendix to Yamamoto and Carter, *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku,”* 315.

10. Kodera, “The Romantic Humanism of Watsuji Tetsurō,” 6.

11. Others include *Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshi bukkyō no jissen tetsugaku*, 1927), *Confucius* (*Kōshi*, 1936), *National Seclusion: Japan’s Tragedy* (*Sakoku: Nihon no higeiki*, 1950), the two-volume *History of Japanese Ethical Thought* (*Nihon no rinri shisōshi*, 1952), *A Study of Japanese Arts* (*Nihon no geijutsu kenkyū*, 1955), and the work he is best known for in philosophical circles, the three-volume *Ethics* (*Rinrigaku*, 1937, 1942, 1949).

12. See chapter 1 of this volume. See also Reader, “Zazenless Zen?”
13. Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 2.
14. LaFleur, foreword to *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku,”* viii.
15. Even Watsuji’s translators have drawn criticism on this count: in reviewing Yamamoto and Carter’s translation of the *Rinrigaku*, David Gordon takes the translators to task for only translating the first two volumes. See Gordon, “Watsuji Tetsurō’s *Rinrigaku.*”
16. See, for example, Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, and for an example of a similar (though less acerbic) indictment among Japanese philosophers, see Sakabe, “Watsuji Tetsuroo—A Case of Philosophical Thinking in Modern Japan.” According to William LaFleur, “This view of things . . . is the almost universally accepted interpretation” (“Reasons for the Rubble,” 5).
17. Yusa, “Nishida and Totalitarianism,” 119–120.
18. Yusa, “Nishida and Totalitarianism,” 116.
19. I will not develop a full case for or against them here, but see Heisig and Maraldo, *Rude Awakenings*; Parkes, “The Putative Fascism of the Kyoto School and the Political Correctness of the Modern Academy”; and Bellah, “Japan’s Cultural Identity.”
20. Minamoto, “The Symposium on ‘Overcoming Modernity,’” 201.
21. Bellah, “Japan’s Cultural Identity,” 593.
22. LaFleur, “Reasons for the Rubble,” 3.
23. LaFleur, “Reasons for the Rubble,” 5–8, 10.
24. See Yuasa Yasuo in correspondence with Robert Carter, in appendix to Yamamoto and Carter, *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku,”* 313.
25. Hee-Jin Kim identifies the father as Koga Michichika, who died in 1202 (Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 16–17), while Ishii Shūdō identifies Dōgen’s father as Koga Michitomo and puts the date of death in 1227 (Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 259).
26. Kim (in *Dōgen Kigen*) puts him at seven, Ishii Shūdō (“Recent Trends,” 259) at eight.
27. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.14. See “Notes on the Translation” for more information about the edition cited in this volume: Masunaga, *A Primer of Sōtō Zen: A Translation of Dōgen’s “Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki.”*
28. Yōkoi Yūhō, “Zen Master Dōgen,” 24.
29. Watsuji relates the story in chapter 2 of this volume.
30. Ōkubo, *Dōgen zenji-den no kenkyū*, 78–80.
31. Yamauchi, *Dōgen zen no tendai hongaku hōmon*; Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends”; Abe Masao, *A Study of Dōgen*, 20; and Ishii Seijun,

“The True Transmission of Buddha Dharma and Chinese Chan in the Southern Sung Dynasty.” Yamauchi is quoted in Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 257.

32. To be specific, Eisai introduced Rinzai Zen to Japan. Dōgen is regarded as the second monk to introduce Zen to Japan, his being Sōtō Zen, though Dōgen himself made no effort to establish a sect as such.

33. See chapter 2 of this volume.

34. Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 101–102. As Heine notes, Kagamishima Genryū found the question of Dōgen’s credentials to be the most pressing. See Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 106; Kagamishima, “Zenkai no seiritsu to endonkai,” 273, 278–279; and Kagamishima, *Tendō Nyojō zenji no kenkyū*.

35. *Shōbōgenzō* “Tenzo Kyōkun” (Instructions for the *Tenzo*).

36. *Gakudō yōjinshū*.

37. See chapter 4 of this volume.

38. See Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 104–106.

39. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.14.

40. Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 36.

41. Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 10.

42. Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 260–262. (In this article Welter translates *chie no bukkūyō* as “intelligence-Buddhism.”)

43. Bielefeldt, “Dōgen Studies in America,” 212.

44. Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 6.

45. Bielefeldt, “Dōgen Studies in America,” 204.

46. Bielefeldt, “Dōgen Studies in America,” 204.

47. See Ishii Seijun, “True Transmission.”

48. See Kagamishima, *Dōgen zenji to sono monryū*, 71, and Kagamishima, “Dōgen zenji to hyakujō shingi,” 181–192. See also Foulk, “Ritual in Japanese Zen Buddhism,” 26–30.

49. Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 263.

50. Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 263.

51. Heine, *Did Dōgen Go to China?*, 106.

52. Heine, “Is Dōgen’s Eihei Temple ‘Mt. T’ien-t’ung East?’,” 152.

53. Ishii Seijun observes that one reason Dōgen was able to be so prolific during this time was that he had no temple to preside over as abbot, and Funaoka Makoto suggests that Dōgen may have been so productive because he wanted to bring clarity to his thought in an unstable period of his life. See Funaoka, *Dōgen to Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, and Ishii Seijun, “The Eihei-ji Monastery System in Dōgen’s Time.”

54. Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*.
55. Kagamishima, “Kaidai Eiheikōroku,” in *Dōgen zenji zenshū*, 4:314.
56. Carter, introduction to *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku,”* 4.
57. Takeuchi et al., *Tanabe Hajime zenshū*, 5:445.

Preface

1. *Shamon Dōgen* (沙門道元).
2. *Hōmon* (法門).
3. It is not clear to whom Watsuji is referring in this context.
4. *Taitoku* (体得).
5. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 6.3, 3.11. In the *Zuimonki* Dōgen often reiterates his admonition to be poor: see *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.16, 2.2, 5.5, 5.22, and 6.4 for other instances.
6. The preceding three passages are Matthew 6:34, Mark 10:21, and Mark 10:25, respectively.
7. The *Book of Gangō Period Buddhism (Gangōshakusho)* is a thirty-volume set collected by the Buddhist monk Kugen Shiren (1278–1346). Gangō is another name for the Kamakura period in which Dōgen lived. The *Biography of Japan’s Great Monks (Honchōkōsōden)* is a seventy-five-volume collection assembled by Shiban, another Buddhist monk, in 1702.
8. Respectively, 1868–1912 and 1912–1926.
9. Eiheiji is the temple Dōgen founded in 1244, situated in modern-day Fukui prefecture.
10. Namely, whether it is possible for a layman to fully understand Dōgen, given that Dōgen especially emphasized *zazen* and the monastic life. (The second objection is whether acquiring a purely cultural and historical understanding of Dōgen has any value. See below.)
11. *Taiken* (体験).
12. Mark 14:36.
13. Watsuji is working with a dichotomy here, one that he later laid out explicitly in his 1926 article “The Significance of Primitive Christianity in the History of World Culture.” There Watsuji discusses how the historical Jesus of Nazareth became Jesus Christ, the mythic figure and religious savior. In the text here, when Watsuji uses the name “Jesus,” he is referring to the historical Jesus of Nazareth. “Christ” and “Jesus Christ” are names for Jesus Christ as a religious figure.
14. The three preceding quotations are, respectively, Mark 9:7, Romans 1:4, and 1 Corinthians 1:30.
15. The exact dates of the writings of the four gospels are not known pre-

cisely, but the first three (synoptic) gospels are thought to have been written somewhere between 50 and 70 C.E., and scholars have traditionally placed John at 85 C.E. or later.

Dōgen's Period of Self-Cultivation

1. A monastery in India where the Buddha once preached.
2. The buddha of healing.
3. *Shujō* (衆生).
4. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 6.15.
5. Eisai is credited with bringing Rinzai Zen to Japan.
6. 1185–1333.
7. Ōmi was the name of the region between Mount Hiei and Lake Biwa, on the opposite side of the mountain from Kyoto.
8. The first six festivals and holidays are all Buddhist celebrations. Issai-kyōe is a religious holiday in honor of the complete Buddhist scriptures. Parishioners pray before the sutras, which are posted for the holiday (on billboards at a temple, for instance). Gohakkō was probably a Lotus Sutra festival. Kiu-godokkyō is a ceremony in which participants pray for rain by chanting sutras. Gogyakujū is the practice of one's own funeral rites (performed before one's death, of course). Tō-kuyō is a ceremony in which a parishioner prays before a *stupa* or pagoda. Hōjōe is a Buddhist holiday in which animals that are usually caught for food are released, following the Buddhist tradition (not always strictly followed) that Buddhists are not to take the life of any animal for their food. The last three festivals are all Shintō holidays. Kamo-matsuri is a festival in a region named Kamo (*matsuri* simply means "festival"). The Kamo shrine there is rather well known in Japan, and Kenninji temple, at which Dōgen underwent his initial training, sat near the banks of the Kamo River. Daijōsai is a "Great Thanksgiving Festival," traditionally held following the enthronement of a new emperor.
9. Hōnen, also known as Hōnenbōgenkū or simply Genkū (the name Watsuji uses), was the founder of the Jōdo sect.
10. That is, the Zen sects.
11. Namely, Hōnen. The name "Hōshibara" means "monastic founder."
12. Founder of the Jōdo-shin sect.
13. Ishii Shūdō suggests that they must have been hearsay, since Eisai passed away in 1215 and Dōgen left Mount Hiei to study under Myōzen in 1217.
14. *Ajari* is the highest title a priest can receive in Esoteric Buddhism. In the Kamakura period, Esoteric Buddhism included both the Tendai (Taimitsu) and Shingon (Tōmitsu) sects.

15. Xuanzang (J. Genjō, 602–664) was a Chinese monk who journeyed throughout India for twenty years to collect the contents of the *Tripitaka*.

16. Ejō would become Dōgen’s chief disciple. He compiled the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, and after Dōgen’s death he completed the compilation of the *Shōbōgenzō* and took over as the head abbot of Eiheiji.

17. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.12.

18. The “head monks” (*kansō*) mentioned here were the leaders of powerfully influential monasteries. The “upper class” (*jōsō kaikyū*, 上層階級) here refers to the upper class of the Imperial court (*kuge*, 公家), discussed earlier in the chapter.

19. Namely, Eisai.

20. Kōbō Daishi, also called Kūkai, founded the Shingon sect of Esoteric Buddhism.

21. *Kokoro* (心).

22. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 4.8.

23. *Shinjin* (真人).

24. *Gyōji* (行持) is “Creative Activities.”

25. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.25.

26. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.7.

27. That is, from the area around Mount Tiantong.

28. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 6.4.

29. From *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.2.

30. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.9.

31. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.14.

32. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 6.1.

33. *Shinjin-datsuraku* (身心脱落).

The First Sermon

1. Minamoto no Yoritomo was a warlord known for his ruthlessness. He set up the first *bakufu*, a significant step toward unifying the country. He died in 1199, leaving no able heirs to inherit his power (his two sons were very young, and in the process of rising to power Yoritomo slew all other rivals in the family, including his own brother). Power therefore passed to his wife, Hōjō Masako. The Hōjō family was among the most powerful military clans after the Minamoto clan and would go on to rule for the remainder of the Kamakura period.

2. The Jōkyū Disturbance of 1221 was an attempt at revolution by the deposed emperor Go-toba. His bid to take power from the newly established Hōjō shogunate failed within a month and the Go-toba was exiled, along with two other former emperors.

3. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.4.
4. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.17.
5. Minō is near Nagoya, and Musashi is near Tokyo; both are relatively close to the coast, where summer snow would be most unusual.
6. Urabon (Skt. Vrabana) is a weeklong holiday in early August commemorating the Buddha's death.
7. A temple retreat for three months of *sesshin* (extended periods of *zazen*), traditionally held during the hottest days of summer. Exact dates for *geango* vary by region, but Dōgen is said to have observed *geango* from mid-April to mid-July.
8. The fascicle in question is *Shōbōgenzō* “Maka-Hannya-Haramitsu.”
9. “Points to Watch while Studying the Way.”
10. In Dōgen's day Japan had two centers of political power: Kyoto, the capital city of the emperor and the Imperial court; and Kamakura, where the *bakufu* and the warrior caste maintained their center of government.
11. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.7.
12. “Master” here is *shi* (師), which appears in the most common title attached to Dōgen's name, that of *Zenji* (禪師), translatable as “Zen Master.”

The Method and Meaning of Self-Cultivation

1. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.14.
2. Gyō (行).
3. *Ichinen sanzen* (一念三千).
4. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.12. See also 2.4 and 2.10.
5. Gyōri (行履).
6. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.13.
7. *Gengō-gyōri* (言語行履).
8. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.4.
9. *Jiriki* (自力).
10. *Jiriki* (自力) and *tariki* (他力).
11. The Japanese term *bonnō* (煩惱) is a translation of the Sanskrit *klēsa*, meaning “instinct” or “natural craving.”
12. *Bonnō* (煩惱).
13. See also *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.1: “An old Master has said, ‘You've climbed to the top of a hundred-foot pole. Now keep on going.’”
14. *Dōshi* (導師).
15. *Shugyōsha* (修行者).
16. Again, *dōshi* (導師).
17. Here Watsuji seems to be referring to the recitation of the *Nembutsu* by adherents of Pure Land Buddhism.

18. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.13.

19. The Japanese is not literally “torch” but *hinpotsu*, a ceremonial scepter with a mane of white hair, traditionally held by Zen abbots while lecturing.

20. Fengyang Shanchao (947–1024) was a Chan monk still celebrated for his poetry. Yaoshan Weiyen (751–834) was the ninth Chinese patriarch (the thirty-sixth counting from the days of Śākyamuni).

21. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 4.5.

22. In this sentence and the sentences to follow, “self” is *jiko* (自己).

23. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.18. Dōgen reiterates this point in *Zuimonki* 5.2 and 6.2 and in *Gakudō-yōjinshū* 4. English translations of *Gakudō-yōjinshū* are available in Tanahashi, *Moon in a Dewdrop*, pp. 31–43; Kennett, *Zen Is Eternal Life*, pp. 123–138; and Yokoi, *Zen Master Dōgen*, pp. 48–57.

24. This is a reference to five monks from Buddhist lore. In a footnote to his translation of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, Reihō Masunaga provides a footnote describing the monks’ wrongdoing: “[They] were too lazy to read the sutras and, as a result, [they] received no offerings. They made a show, however, of practicing meditation. . . . They were reborn as imperfect beings, such as stone women” (p. 118).

25. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 5.20.

26. *Shinjin* (身心).

Shinran’s Compassion and Dōgen’s Compassion

1. See Bandō Shōjun and Harold Stewart, trans., *Tannishō: Passages Deploring Deviations of Faith* (hereafter cited as *Tannishō*) IV, XII.

2. *Butsu no mono de aru jibi* (仏の物である慈悲) can also be translated as “the compassion that *is* the Buddha.” Thus the original Japanese can represent either or both of two Sanskrit translations: *amītabha* (the embodied Buddha, who *has* compassion) or *amītayus* (an all-permeating light that *is* compassion).

3. The verb is *nenji* (念じ), which means both “to chant” and “to have in mind” or “to think of.” Thus to chant the name of the Buddha is to meditate on the Buddha.

4. See *Tannishō* III. This is known as Shinran’s *akunin shōsei kisetsu* (悪人消正機説), “the paradox that evil can be saved more than good can be.”

5. *Hongan hokori* (本願ほこり).

6. See *Tannishō* XIII.

7. See *Tannishō* XIII.

8. See *Tannishō* XIII.

9. See *Tannishō* XIII.

10. *Honshitsu* (本質), a term without any connotations of permanence. Originally *honshitsu* refers to *pratītyasamutpāda*, dependent co-arising.
11. *Gasshū* (我執); literally, “clinging to *ātman*.”
12. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.12.
13. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.19, 2.2.
14. Or chant (*nenzuru*, 念ずる).
15. *Honshin* (本心).
16. Dōgen refers to the “Hinayana approach” in *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.4.
17. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 4.16.
18. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 4.16.
19. In the legal system of the Kamakura era, these letters served a function similar to the character letters of modern American law.
20. *Shiryō* (思量).
21. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.19. See also *Shōbōgenzō* “Keisei-sanshiki.”
22. *Issai ni korenaru hiroi ai* (一切に是なる広い愛). This can be understood in two ways: as a love that is *extended toward* all things, or as a love that *constitutes* all things.
23. See *Tannishō* II.
24. Sanskrit terms denoting compassion: *karunā* is sharing in suffering, while *mettā* is sharing in joy.
25. “Excellence” and “applying excellence” are two separate terms, translating Watsuji’s *dōtoku* (道徳) and *toku* (徳), respectively. *Dōtoku* is excellence in its broadly construed form. *Toku* is excellence as it is applied in concrete situations, the “focus” to *dōtoku*’s “field.” (I follow Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall in the usage of William James’s terms “focus” and “field” here; see Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar*, especially pp. 5–8.)
26. *Kō* (孝), one of the cardinal excellences of Confucianism.
27. See *Tannishō* V.
28. *Xiaojing* (孝経), a Confucian classic.
29. Japanese *mui* (無為), from the Chinese *wuwei*, “action without obstruction.”
30. *Ekō* (廻向). This is a Shin Buddhist term, signifying the merit one accumulates through one’s own cultivation, which is good for one’s own salvation and for the salvation of all people.
31. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.19.

Concerning Excellence

1. Japanese *bonnō* (煩惱).

2. *Shamon* (沙門).
3. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.2.
4. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.19. “Acting without obstructing” is *mui* (無為).
5. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.19.
6. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.14.
7. The Japanese for “child,” *ko* (子), appears in the Japanese for “disciple of the Buddha,” *butsudesshi* (仏弟子).
8. *Shinjin* (真人).
9. *Analects* 4.8. Dōgen cites it in *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.16.
10. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.3.
11. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.10.
12. Hatano Yoshishige would go on to build Eihei-ji for Dōgen in Echizen.
13. A famous regent of the Hōjō clan, the ruling power of Japan in Dōgen’s day.

Concerning Social Problems

1. *Michi o sonzuru* (道を存ずる).
2. The ten evils are greed, hatred, delusion, conceit, false views, lack of trust, sloth, distraction, shamelessness, and recklessness. The five hindrances are sensual desire, anger, sloth, worry, and lack of trust.
3. Shigehara was a warlord of the Taira clan who was captured after a defeat at the hands of the Genji clan. Both families’ stories came into print in *The Tale of the Heike* and *The Tale of Genji*.
4. A reference to *The Tale of the Heike*.
5. Kumagai Naozane was a samurai known for killing Taira Atsumori when Atsumori was only a teenager, because he knew already that Atsumori was far too powerful to be allowed to become a mature enemy. Kumagai later gave up his samurai status to become a monk under Hōnen.
6. *Kokoro* (心).
7. This is a comparison to Chinese and Indian cultures, in which Buddhist monks and temples were to remain in a state of perpetual poverty. In China and India, the laity were allowed to improve their own karma through acts of charity by leaving daily offerings for the monastics.
8. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.16.
9. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.16, 3.12.
10. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.11.
11. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.11.
12. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.11. The word for “land” here is *den’en* (田).

園), specifically a “field” or “garden” that was part of the *shōen* system (see Dōgen’s biography in this volume).

13. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 3.7.

Criticism of Art

1. The Asuka period, alternatively called the Suiko period, was 593–710 C.E. The Tempyō period was 729–749 C.E. Hōryūji and Tōdaiji are famous temples of these eras. According to the *Nihon Shoki*, Shōtoku was the nephew of Empress Suiko and the first crown prince of Japan; Suiko was overthrown by the Soga clan in 645. Hōryūji was built by Shōtoku in Nara, where he also built Shitennō-in. Tōdaiji was built not by the Empress Kōmyō but by her husband, Shōmu. The *Kojiki*, another record of this early period in Japanese history, differs from *Nihon Shoki*, and modern scholars of Japanese history disagree on the accuracy and authenticity of both sources.

2. The Fujiwara period is the last three centuries of the Heian period (794–1185).

3. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.6.

4. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 1.1.

5. The *śloka* (Japanese *shō*, 頌) is a form of poem intended to reflect the experience of self-cultivation and enlightenment.

6. *Ri* (理).

7. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.8, 2.11.

8. The author of *The Ten Teachings* is, according to Watsuji, “an old man wishing for the lotus leaf in the clouds of the western land” (“the western land” presumably being the Pure Land). *The Ten Teachings* is a work from the early part of the Kamakura period. I have been unable to discover anything more about it or its author.

Dōgen’s “Truth”

1. These three fascicles are among the most important in the whole of the *Shōbōgenzō*. “Bendōwa” (弁道話) is “A Talk about Pursuing the Truth.” “Maka-Hannya-Haramitsu” (摩訶般若波羅密) is the Japanese transliteration of the Sanskrit *Maha-prajñā-paramita*, which is “Accomplishing Great Real Wisdom.” According to Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, *genjōkōan* (現成公案) is a term to which it is “impossible to give adequate English translation” (*The Heart of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō*, 130); “Manifest Absolute Reality” is their translation. However its title is translated, this fascicle is generally regarded as the most important in the *Shōbōgenzō*.

2. *Eiheikōroku* (永平広録).

3. The headquarters of the Heike clan.

4. 礼拝得髓, “Prostrating before the Attainment of the Marrow.”

5. *Shinjin* (真人).

6. *Bendō* (弁道).

7. *Hōmushi* (法務司). I borrow this translation from Nishijima and Cross, who have this to say about the position: “[This] title is no longer in use, and the exact nature of the position is unclear. 司 (shi) means ‘government official.’ A monk holding this position would also have been an official in the government” (*Master Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō*, 1:71 fn. 17).

8. *Sōjōshi* (僧正司). Again I borrow the translation of this title from Nishijima and Cross (*Master Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō*, 1:71 fn. 18). They note that this is another title that has gone out of use since Dōgen’s day. Again, the character *shi* (司) seems to indicate that this was some sort of governmental position as well as a religious one.

9. The footnotes of Nishijima and Cross are instructive once again with regard to these stages. “A bodhisattva is said to pass through fifty-two stages on the road to buddhahood. The first group of these is the ten stages of belief. The next three groups of ten stages are the three clever stages [“wise stages” in my translation]. The fifth group of ten stages is the ten sacred stages” (*Master Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō*, 1:74 fn. 43).

10. *Shōbōgenzō* “Raihai-tokuzui.”

11. Zhixian (J. Shikan, d. 895) was the successor of Linji (J. Rinzai, d. 866), founder of the Rinzai sect. Zhixian placed Moshan (J. Matsuzan, 800–900) on par with Linji, calling the two of them his mother and father in Buddhism. (Dōgen recounts the whole story of Matsuzan and Shikan in *Shōbōgenzō* “Raihai-tokuzui.”)

12. Zen Master Yangshan (J. Kyōzan, 807–883) employed the nun Miaoxin (J. Myōshin, 840–895) in the business office of his monastery. Once a party of seventeen monks at the monastery discussed their interpretations of a *kōan*, and Miaoxin called them all “blind donkeys” for their lack of understanding. All seventeen prostrated themselves to her in recognition of her superior grasp of the Dharma.

13. *Shōbōgenzō* “Raihai-tokuzui.”

14. In this case Nyōrai is the name given to Miroku, the buddha of the future.

15. *Tenrin Seiō* (転輪聖王). A wheel-rolling king is a worldly king bound up in the cycle of *samsara*, but the Wheel-Rolling King is the name given to King Cakravatri, father of Siddhartha Gautama.

16. In *The Mind of Clover* Robert Aitken interprets the ten grave precepts as follows: not killing, not stealing, not misusing sex, not lying, not giving or taking drugs, not discussing faults of others, not praising yourself while abusing others, not sparing the Dharma assets, not indulging in anger, and not defaming the three treasures. In most cases there is a direct correspondence between the ten grave precepts and the ten sins: e.g., if the precept is not killing, the sin is killing.

17. There is a Buddhist parable in which a prostitute dons a Buddhist robe as a joke; her pretended piety becomes a moment of sudden awakening for her, and she goes on to become a nun.

18. In feudal Japan a person's surname immediately revealed a person's caste: only samurai were allowed to have surnames, and farmers, peasants, and the like had only one name. In this sentence "social rank" refers not to caste but to one's rank within the caste.

19. Namely, the warrior caste.

20. To take a Buddhist name (*ingō*, 院号) is to enter the world of Buddhism, or, in other words, to give up the luxuries of the secular domain and (in this case) to become a nun. Those who shaved their heads became full-fledged nuns; those who did not became practicing laywomen but did not formally enter a convent.

21. Romans 2:11.

22. *Raihai* (礼拝).

23. *Datsuraku shinjin* (脱落身心).

24. *Shōjin* (精進), "diligence" or "devotion," is a word of religious significance. The Japanese term for vegetarian cooking is *shōjin ryōri*, literally meaning "diligent food," since historically only monks (diligent practitioners) were strictly vegetarian.

25. *Busshō* (仏性).

26. Watsuji leaves this phrase entirely in ancient Japanese.

27. The source of this quote is presumably the *Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra*.

28. *Issendai* is the Japanese transliteration of the Sanskrit *Icchantika*, a hedonist who holds only secular cravings and who therefore has virtually no chance of attaining enlightenment.

29. *Immo* (憊麼), also the colloquial Chinese for "it" or "that." "Immo" is the title of one of the fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*.

30. *Shitsu-ū busshō* (悉有仏性).

31. "The internal aspect" here is *kokoro* (心), and "the external aspect" is *nikutai* (肉体).

32. "I" is *ware* (我), which is also the character used to translate the Sanskrit *ātman*.

33. Time-causality is *jisetsu inmen* (時節因緣). Time-shape-color is *jisetsu-keishiki* (時節形色).

34. See *Shōbōgenzō* “Genjōkōan,” where Dōgen writes of the Milky Way turning into whey.

35. *Shitsu-ū* (悉有).

36. *Jisetsu jakushi* (時節若至).

37. See *Shōbōgenzō* “Busshō.”

38. *Shitsu-ū* (悉有).

39. This passage was written in 1241; hence if the same idea were to be communicated today, the figure would not be 2,190 years; it would be closer to 3,000.

40. *Mubusshō* (無仏性).

41. Zhaozhou (J. Jōshū, 778–897) is one of the great patriarchs of Chinese Zen. Dayi Daoxin is the thirty-first patriarch, counting from the death of Śākyamuni, or the fourth when counting from the days of Bodhidharma.

42. *Ūmu* (有無).

43. The fifth patriarch by this counting was Daman Hongren, Dayi Daoxin’s successor and the thirty-second patriarch counting from the death of Śākyamuni. He and Dayi are two of the so-called Six Patriarchs of Zen.

44. *Sakubutsu* (作仏), as opposed to the “becoming Buddha” (*jōbutsu*, 成佛) seen in the previous sentence.

45. In conventional language, *mu* (無) means “nonexistence” and operates as a negative prefix meaning “without” or “not a matter of.” In Buddhism, *mu* is Japanese for the Sanskrit *śūnyatā*, meaning “emptiness.” Thus the reply from Zhaozhou (who was famous for his inventive answers) is not a “no.” His answer escapes the dualism inherent in the yes-or-no question he has been asked.

46. *Shōbōgenzō* “Busshō.” I follow Nishijima and Cross’s translation of *goshiki* (業識) as “karmic consciousness” (*Master Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō*, 2:28–29).

47. Here Watsuji uses the name “Tekkan” (Iron Man); this is Zhaozhou’s posthumous name.

48. *Ūmu* (有無).

49. *Dōri* (道理).

50. The original source is unclear, but may be *Shōbōgenzō* “Immo.”

51. “Existence-buddha-nature” and “emptiness-buddha-nature” are, respectively, *ūbusshō* (有仏性) and *mubusshō* (無仏性).

52. Yanguan Qi’an (J. Enkan Seian, 750–842) was one of Zhaozhou’s Zen masters.

53. Baizhang Huaihai (J. Hyakujō Ekai, 749–814), a Zen master best known for the kōan known in Japanese Zen as “Hyakujō’s Fox.”

54. The “good medicine” reference here is an allusion to Dōgen’s maxim that Buddhist teaching is like good medicine: it can save you if administered correctly, but without proper instruction it can be deadly.

55. Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250) is the fourteenth patriarch counting from the days of Śākyamuni.

56. Kānadeva, also called Aryadeva, was Nāgārjuna’s successor and the fifteenth patriarch. As I read it, Watsuji refers to Kānadeva only as Nāgārjuna’s questioner or interlocutor because until the flash of enlightenment strikes him, Kānadeva is not yet Kānadeva. As a monk and eventual patriarch, Kānadeva is suddenly born in the middle of the crowd.

57. This may be a reference to the song “Thatched Roof Hut” (*Sōan no gin*) by Sekitō Kisen.

58. Maitreya is the buddha of the future.

59. “Sokushin zebutsu” (即心是仏). This is the title of the sixth fascicle of the ninety-five-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*.

60. *Sono shin koso sunawachi butsu de aru* (その心こそすなわち仏である). *Sunawachi* is written here in *kana*, but in *kanji* it would be the same *soku* (即) of *sokushin zebutsu* (即心是仏).

61. *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* 2.8.

62. *Dōtoku* (道得).

63. In Dōgen’s day it would have required special effort to write Buddhist texts in Japanese (as opposed to the Chinese or Sanskrit in which existing Buddhist texts were written). The easier path was for Dōgen to write the *Shōbōgenzō* in Chinese, as he was fluent in it already, and as that language already contained a robust Buddhist vocabulary.

64. The Sanskrit *dhyāna* begat the Chinese *Chan-na*, which begat the Japanese *Zen’na*, which was shortened to *Zen*.

65. *Bendō* (弁道).

66. *Myōshin* (妙心).

67. This is paraphrased from *Shōbōgenzō* “Butsudō,” where Dōgen recounts the Buddha’s sermon on Vulture Peak. The Buddha picks up the udumbara flower and winks, and of all the people in attendance, only Mahākāśyapa understands. Dōgen says that in this moment Śākyamuni transmitted “the exceptional heart of *Shōbōgenzō* Nirvana” (正法眼藏涅槃妙心) to Mahākāśyapa.

68. The three vehicles are *Daijō*, *Shōjō*, and *Mikkyō*: Abhidharma, Mahāyāna, and Esoteric Buddhism. The twelve teachings comprise a method for attaining enlightenment, beginning with self-purification, progressing

through intense work with a master, and culminating with enlightenment in life, death, and the afterlife. Today the twelve teachings are more closely associated with Dzogchen (Tibetan) Buddhism than with Sōtō Zen.

69. *Chokusa-jinshin-kensei-jōbutsu* (直指人心見性成仏).

70. *Dōtoku* (道得).

71. *Iieru koto ippan* (道い得る一般). N.B.: the verb used for “to speak” is not *iu* (言う) but *iu* (道う).

72. A *bōkatsu* is a stick used for slapping monks who grow drowsy or fall asleep during *zazen*.

73. *Iu* (道う).

74. *Iieru* (道い得る).

75. Watsuji seems to have Hegel in mind when referring to *idée*.

76. Watsuji uses the German, which depending on its context can mean “to lift up” or “to cancel, to annul.” In Hegel’s philosophy it is often translated as “to sublimate,” and refers to simultaneous preservation and cancellation.

77. *Iieru* (道い得る).

78. *Iieru* (道い得る).

79. *Bendō* (弁道).

80. *Shōbōgenzō* “Dōtoku.”

81. In this case, *michi* or *dō* (道), as in *dōtoku* (道得).

82. *Kattō* (葛藤), “entanglements,” literally denotes the arrowroot (*katsu*, 葛) and the wisteria (*tō*, 藤), both climbing vines.

83. Huike (J. Eka, 487–593) is the second Chinese patriarch, or the twenty-ninth in the Indian reckoning.

84. *Shōbōgenzō* “Kattō.”

85. Here Watsuji specifically reads the character 道 as *kotoba*, “words.”

86. *Shōbōgenzō* “Kattō.”

87. *Kotoba* (道).

88. Again, *kotoba* (道).

89. *Shōbōgenzō* “Kattō.” “Manifest” here is *genjō suru* (現成する), a reference to *genjōkōan*. As Kasulis observes, “manifest” should not be misunderstood to imply “that something previously transcendent becomes immanent” (*Zen Action/Zen Person*, 83).

90. *Shōbōgenzō* “Kattō.”

91. Tenkei Denson was a master of the Sōtō school and a commentator on the *Blue Cliff Record*. *Notes on Discourse* is his commentary on the *Shōbōgenzō*.

92. This translation is rather more polite than the original from Tenkei.

It would mirror the original more closely to say, “These are all pointless lies they pull out of their asses.”

93. Here Watsuji appears to refer, as he does in chapter 1, to the later history of Sōtō Zen, which became increasingly cloistered and secretive in the centuries after Dōgen’s death.

Reading Shamon Dōgen

1. Of course it is not true that *nobody* has devoted attention to the topic of Zen faith. For a discussion of Buddhist faith, see Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, 8–12, and for a study of Buddhist faith in Bodhidharma’s tradition, see Sung Bae Park’s *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*. See Hee-Jin Kim’s *Dōgen Kigen*, 62–63, regarding faith and enlightenment in Dōgen’s Zen. But consider also that the term “faith” appears so seldom in scholarly works on Dōgen that Kim’s index is one of the few in which one can find it.

2. Ishii Shūdō, “Recent Trends,” 234.

3. See Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 97, 113–116, 159–160.

4. Epictetus, *The Handbook of Epictetus*, 12.

5. The *Hagakure*’s Yamamoto Tsunetomo, for instance, retired from the samurai caste to join a Buddhist monastery. Suzuki Shōsan was also devoutly Buddhist, and arguably understood Buddhism’s non-ego, not just *bushidō*’s interpretation of it. See Yamamoto Tsunetomo, *Hagakure*, and King, *Death Was His Kōan*.

6. See the first chapter of Watsuji’s *Rinrigaku* (e.g., Yamamoto and Carter, *Watsuji Tetsurō’s “Rinrigaku”*).

7. Watsuji cites this as coming from *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki*, second fascicle, but the passage is absent from the English translation of the *Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* by Reiho Masunaga.

8. Dōgen’s kōan repertoire can be found in Steven Heine’s *Zen Poetry of Dōgen*.

9. See Kasulis, “The Incomparable Philosopher,” 88–89.

10. In his *Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion*, John Schroeder argues that *upāya* is (as the subtitle of his book suggests) vitally important to cultivating Buddhist compassion. Kasulis’s discussion of *upāya* in the introduction to Schroeder’s book is most helpful.

11. Lao-Tzu, *Tao Te Ching*, trans. D. C. Lau.

12. See Leighton and Shohaku, *Dōgen’s Pure Standards for the Zen Community*.

13. Kim, *Dōgen Kigen*, 20. Taken from Ōkubo Dōshū, *Dōgen zenji-den no kenkyū*, 78–80.

14. Reader, “Zazenless Zen?” According to Reader, the problem goes beyond simply discouraging laypeople from practicing their faith; most monks today openly profess their dislike for meditation, and most do *zazen* only during their training years, never sitting again once they become ordained as monks. The Sōtō Zen that Dōgen founded has virtually disappeared from the modern Japanese landscape, replaced by a less strenuous version that, while popular, fails to meet the pure standards set up by the sect’s founder.

That said, I have witnessed genuine Sōtō Zen in Japan, most memorably in the convent of Aoyama Shundō Sensei in Nagoya. Sōtō’s influence is arguably waning in modern Japanese society, as is the case with many other aspects of that country’s traditional religious heritage, but there are isolated pockets—Aoyama-sensei’s convent being one of them—that stun a visitor with their vitality and unmistakable authenticity.

15. Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, vi–vii.

16. Kasulis, personal correspondence, September 2008.

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