

POSTHUMOUS PIECES: PART 1 - TIME

The seeker is the found,
The found is the seeker,
As soon as it is apperceived
That there is no Time

CHAPTER 1 : Taking Time by the Forelock

Nearly everyone seems to accept time as though it existed absolutely, for indeed, almost always, everything is discussed and analysed in a time-context as though that were the indisputable foundation of all that is known.

The foundation, of course, it is, but how can it be regarded as indisputable? Has anyone ever produced any scrap of evidence of its objective existence - except the fact that everything depends on its existence, which is very precisely *une petition de principe* or begging the question?

Therefore to argue about the factuality of 'things' as such, all subject to duration, without considering the validity of this 'duration' on which they all entirely depend, would seem to be a singular lacuna in the logic of any such discussion. We must surely admit that until the validity of apparent 'duration' is established the validity of whatever may depend on it cannot either be established or denied. It is the primary factor, and should have precedence over all else.

Discussing something whose existence is totally dependent on something else for whose existence no evidence has been adduced, or indeed can be adduced, apart from the supposed something under discussion that is dependent upon it, is indeed a performance of some futility! And what current religious or metaphysical discussion does not come into this category?

'Time' - and, of course, 'space' from which it is inseparable - is basic to all phenomena, for without extension in duration and in volume they cannot have any apparent existence at all.

On examination 'time' and 'space' will be found to have no objective existence otherwise than as a conceptual structure in mind, an assumed background without which no phenomenon could appear. 'Time' and 'space', therefore, must be entirely subjective. Closer examination will reveal that they represent a further dimension of measurement (or dimension), conceptually an all-inclusive super-volume constituting what is implied by the term 'subjectivity' itself.

Metaphysically expressed, we may say that I-noumenon manifest objectively what I am, in three directions of measurement, by means of a fourth or super-volume which is interpreted sensorially by divided-mind as what is known as 'space-time'.

If objectively 'space-time' does not exist as any 'thing' perceptible or cognisable, that must be because it can only be an expression of the non-objectivity which is perceiving and cognising, and that is what we are.

What then is 'space-time'? It may tentatively be defined as the super-volume from which we observe, interpreted in a tri-dimensional universe as extension, by means of the consecutive duration of that apparent three-dimensional universe.

* * *

The 'past' is a memory,

The 'future' is a supposition,

The 'present' is passed before we can apprehend it.*

The only 'present' therefore is presence and must necessarily be what we are.

Such presence, then, is inevitably outside time and must be 'intemporality'.

*the processes of perception and conception are complicated and require a lapse of time for their completion.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 2

What Space-Time Is

I

We can conceive infinity, vaguely perhaps, as unlimited space, and intemporality as unlimited time, both continuing 'forever'; but, try as we may, we are unable to conceive the absence of space and the absence of time, and we have no words for these conceptual absences.

The term 'eternity', perhaps, should denote an absence of duration which we are unable actually to conceive, but in fact whenever used it merely implies the opposite - 'time without end'. 'Outside space and time' is a vague expression, of poetical character, and 'spaceless' and 'timeless' have no significance that is capable of visualisation.

It is the absence of a concept for a condition in which neither space nor time exists that is significant, for it must necessarily imply that existence as such is dependent on the concept of space-time. It is, of course, evident that this is the case, since all phenomena must be extended spatially and appear to have duration in order to be perceived, but the absence of these terms proves that we have in fact always known it.

II

The inconceivability of the absence of space-time, the fact that it cannot be thought in the sense of visualised, has a still more profound significance, since nothing objectifiable can be inconceivable.

What, then, is non-objectifiable? Surely any 'thing', any kind of object whatsoever is imaginable? There cannot be anything at all that is not objectifiable, for any and every thing imaginable is thereby conceived in imagination.

What, then, could be inconceivable, what in fact is and must be inconceivable? Only that which is conceiving is itself inconceivable, for only what is conceiving cannot, when conceiving, conceive itself.

It might be maintained that what conceives might conceive itself as an imaginary object, like any other object, in consecutive duration, but conceiving as such, while conceiving, cannot conceive its own conceiving - any more than an eye can see its own looking. Therefore whatever is factually inconceivable can only be the conceiving itself which cannot cognise its own act of cognition.

This demonstrates the dialectic validity of the insight whereby we may apperceive that absence of space-time must necessarily be what we are who cannot conceive it.

It must be evident that what we are is 'conceiving' - for what else could be conceiving what we conceive? And, if there is a phenomenal absence which we cannot conceive, that absence must necessarily be our own absence as what is conceiving.

The phenomenal absence of space-time, being inconceivable, must therefore be our own phenomenal absence as what is conceiving, and - since we cannot conceive our own absence - we must be what space-time is, and space-time must be what noumenally we are.

And that no doubt explains why all that we are, both phenomenally and noumenally, was termed 'mind' by the great Masters of China.

Note: We may assume also that this explains why so very few people are willing to face up to the problem of space-time, why nearly all fight shy of it, decline to discuss it, and just accept it as something inevitable, whether philosophers, the religious, or those who seek 'enlightenment'. Yet surely anyone can see how vitally important it must be, that nothing can be finally understood while that remains unexplained, for it is obvious that whatever is subject to extension in space and to successional duration could not be veritable in itself. The study of space-time in physics may also be the key to the startling fact that so many of the greater physicists have found themselves on or over the borders of metaphysics, and have been brave enough to say so.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 3

Eight Words

Objective existence is mythical,
Non-objective existence is absolute.

Note

Objective existence is phenomenal - appearance only,
Non-objective existence is unaware of existing,
And it is phenomenally incognisable.

Objective existence is figuration in mind,
Non-objective existence only 'exists' in such mind,

Cognising everything except what is cognising.

Objective mind is self-elaboration in space-time,
Non-objective mind, phenomenally void, knows neither.

By whom is this being said?
By mind attempting to see itself - and not succeeding.
Why? As space-time 'it' appears as 'void',
Intemporally 'it' cannot cognise what is cognising.

* * *

'Dying' is dying to phenomenality: 'birth' is being born to phenomenality, i.e. to perceiving
and - later - to conceiving.

That is why neither exists as such.

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The Nonsense of 'Life' and 'Death'

(pub. The Mountain Path, April 1966. Posthumous Pieces (HKU Press, 1968) Part 1, Chap. 4)

What difference could there be between 'living' and 'dying'? 'Living' is only the elaboration in sequential duration of what otherwise is known as 'death'.

When What-we-are functions, extending in three apparent spatial dimensions and another interpreting them as duration, together known as 'space-time', there is what we know as 'living'. When that process ceases we are no longer extended in sequential duration, we are no longer elaborated in 'space', 'space-time' is no more and the apparent universe dis-appears.

Then we say we are 'dead'.

But as what we are we have never 'lived', and we cannot 'die'.

Where could 'we' live? When could 'we' die? How could there be such things as 'we'? 'Living' is a spatial illusion, 'dying' is a temporal illusion, 'we' are a spatio-temporal illusion based on the serial interpretation of dimensional 'stills' or 'quanta' cognised as movement. Only the concepts of infinity and intemporality can suggest intellectually a notion of what we are as the source and origin of appearance or manifestation.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 5

Karma and Rebirth - A Dialogue

Morning!

Hello! Want something?

Yes. Tonic.

Well?

All said and done, what are 'karma' and rebirth?

Little to be said and nothing to be done about it.

Very well, let's have the little.

'Karma' means 'action' and the result of it. Find me someone to act and we'll discuss his action, find me someone to be born and we'll discuss his rebirth.

So they are both hooey?

Better when spelled with a 'w' in front.

Never been a 'who?' and never will be?

Only in a conceptual space-time context.

As an appearance in mind?

Any kind of dream, dreamed by a dreamer.

Good, but in that case?

Ask someone who thinks he knows about all that.

Who does?

Any dreamed phenomenon who is being dreamed and doesn't know it. Usually have letters after their names.

All their apparent actions?

The volitional ones.

There are two kinds?

Yes and No: spontaneous, and accompanied by a will-impulse.

The volitional element creates 'karma'?

How could it not?

And that leads to rebirth?

The 're' is tautological. Appearance occurs every split-second.

Ksana in Sanscrit?

Any language you like.

I refer to Sanscrit because those boys knew about all that.

Scholars like to think so, at least.

Why do they do that?

Justify their 'karma', like the rest of us.

But, without the volitional element, what is it?

What Sages appear to do. Ask them.

Can't we do it too?

We 'can' not, but it may occur.

Nevertheless we do it?

It is not a 'deed'.

Why?

Because no one 'does' it.

Then what is it?
A do-ing.
Which is?
Functioning. You like Sanscrit: 'prajna' is that.
And 'prajna'?
'Dhyana', the principal of functioning, looking for itself.
And 'dhyana'?
Whatever says it. 'Prajna', functioning, is the saying.
And the two of them?
There aren't two.
Well the one then?
There isn't one.
Then what is it?
Whatever you are, you ass!
But that?
Not that! You tell me, for a change.
This, then?
Better, but still - no.
Nothing whatever?
No, no.
Then what?
The absence of that: 'nothing' is a negative 'something'; and you would still appear to be as an objective entity.
I must be total absence?
Since you are total presence.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 6

Space

That which is not extended in space can have no perceptual existence, for the concept of 'existing' denotes and requires spatial extension.

That is the explanation of Hui Neng's statement: 'From the beginning not a thing is', i. e. 'No "thing" has ever existed', for there has never been such a thing as 'space' other than as a concept in mind (which we are) which renders possible the notion of appearance.

Note:

It should hardly be necessary to treat of Space independently of Time, for they are not separate - Time, as we have seen, being a spatial concept interpreted as duration. Therefore what has been said regarding Time is applicable to Space and only requires the necessary verbal adjustment. It may be said that whereas treating the space-concept directly is more radical, treating it via the time-concept may be an approach more readily appreciated.

Ultimately the concept whose demolition must result in understanding is that which is known as 'Space-time'.

* * *

Nothing could be more obviously imagined than 'space' and 'time', yet people assume them to be permanent and objective realities! Basic they may be, but as the basis of an elaborate dimensional fiction.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 7

Come to Think of it ...

Huang Po on 'time': 'If there's never been a single thing - past, present, and future are meaningless ... Full understanding of this must come before they (you) can enter the Way'. (Blofeld, p. 110)*

One must be tireless in pointing out that unless we (each of us) face up to the apparent problem of what 'time' is we shall never see the way things are - other than phenomenally, nor shall we understand what we are apparently doing in this apparent universe. Taking 'time' for granted - as everyone seems determined to do - is searching blindfold for an open door. So, 'past, present, and future are meaningless' - because from the beginning 'there's never been a single thing': phenomenally indispensable, noumenally - just meaningless. And vice versa one may say 'Things are meaningless - because there's never been a past, present or future'.

Let us analyse this proposition. 'Things' are wholly dependent on 'time' (past, present, and future) for the extension that renders them perceptible as 'things', and were they not perceptible how could they be 'things'? Things, therefore, are only the perceptibility or the perceiv-ing of 'things'.

And 'time' is wholly dependent on 'things' (objects perceived) in order that it may be cognised and conceptualised as 'time', for without objects perceived, being perceived, about to be perceived, there could be no 'time' - for 'time' is only the cognition of 'things in duration'.

'Time' (duration), therefore, must be inherent in objects, inseparable from objects, an aspect of objects, as 'space' must - to which the same factors apply - so that 'time' and 'space' must both be inherent in perceiv-ing.

It follows that all phenomena are the perceiv-ing of phenomena, and that their extension and duration is inherent in the mechanism whereby perceiv-ing appears to occur, the dualist mechanism of noumenon phenomenalis-ing noumenality.

Does this not demonstrate the correctness of the metaphysical intuition common to Buddhism, Vedanta, and Sufism?

There is only perceiv-ing: all else is void of noumenality - the eye that cannot see what is looking.

* * *

The 'future' is a dream. The 'past' is recollection of a dream. The 'present' is an unlikely hypothesis.

What, then, is left? Must I say it? Why, Intemporality, of course!
It never was any 'where' or at any 'time' but Here and Now, and Here and Now it will be forever.

*'Entering a way' implies movement in duration, and Huang Po has just stated that 'past, present, and future are meaningless'! There must be a misunderstanding? When one points out that 'the Way' is the 'philological' translation of 'Tao', which that word can and does sometimes mean colloquially, but which - as is often pointed out here - it does not mean metaphysically, it will be seen that Tao is a synonym for Dharmakaya, Bhutatathata, Buddha-mind, Noumenon, so that the sentence implies 'Full understanding of this must come before you can re-become (or actualise) what-you-are'.

(Ed. note: Huang Po quotes from John Blofeld's 'The Zen Teaching of Huang Po')

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 8

'The Truth of Ch'an'

'Sudden (instantaneous) Enlightenment' is the essential teaching of the Supreme Vehicle, chiefly represented by Ch'an, and in this Intemporality is necessarily implied, since it is nowise dependent on duration. But it is not generally realised that this implication must also necessarily include the negation of the validity of the notion of 'time' as the sine qua non of phenomenal manifestation.

It follows that even Ch'an (and, of course, Zen) must make nonsense as long as the concept of 'time' is retained as the basic element of conceptualisation therein. It follows also that the implied notion of 'space', whose duration it measures, must be apperceived as being part of the mechanism of objectivisation, and rejected.

'Time' may then be re-recognised as being a further direction of measurement beyond those by which we constitute our phenomenal universe in 'space', interpreted - since our psychic apparatus is only equipped to cognise via three - as the duration of tri-dimensional volume.

The basic doctrine of Ch'an, and of Zen, being the im-mediate or timeless character of awakening to what-we-are, the comprehension of 'space-time' must necessarily be integral in its apprehension. Such instantaneity being the essential teaching, 'intemporality' must be that also - for each is an aspect of the other.

As long as we continue to remain oblivious of this essential and primordial factor, accepting it as not only actual but factual, is it reasonable to suppose that we shall awaken to what Huang Po called 'the Truth of Ch'an'?

Note: The phrase 'The Truth of Ch'an' is translated for us by John Blofeld in his profound and brilliant translation of Huang Po as 'The Truth of Zen', but poor Huang Po had not the

good fortune ever to have heard of Zen or of what his Japanese neighbours were to make of the teaching of his masters and of his own, however important and valuable that may be. Do we refer to the Old Masters of Italian painting by the name of a subsequent school in another land?

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 9

Nameless and I

Darkness is only apparent absence of light, otherwise there is no such thing: the word can only indicate that absence, for such itself has no kind of presence.

Death is only apparent absence of life, otherwise there is no such thing. The word only indicates the absence of the presence of life. To think of death as such is senseless. There can never be any such presence, for phenomenally it is only an absence.

'Life' is a concept extended in space-time, and as such it is only an image in mind.

Conceptually also it is the absence of 'death' which - as we have seen - is the absence of 'life'.

Evidently, therefore, there is no such factuality as 'life', nor any such factuality as 'death'. Nor can there be any factual entity such as a 'liv-er' of life or a 'dy-er' of death.

But there is a phenomenal manifestation called 'liv-ing' and another called 'dy-ing', both extended in a space-time concept, and these latter have a direct relation to what we are. Such relation, however, can never be evident as long as we adhere to the notion of 'life' and 'death' as factual existences.

What we are is manifested in the spatio-temporal appearance of 'liv-ing', and dis-appears in that of 'dy-ing', but in order to apperceive what this is it is necessary to discard the notions of the 'liv-ing' of a 'life' and the 'dy-ing' of a 'death' - for what-we-are neither 'lives' nor 'dies'.

We must cast both into the dustbin of futile concepts, and so leave ourselves in our presence, which cannot be subject to any kind of phenomenal extension, either spatial or temporal, or to any kind of sensorial objectivisation whatever.

What, then, does this imply? It implies the abandonment of split-mind as an instrument of apperceiving, for such abandonment leaves us inevitably in our wholeness - also 'holiness' and 'health' which are the same word - and as such we are noumenal integrality, - neither positive nor negative, immanent nor transcendent - nameless and I.

* * *

We have to split mind in order to dream,
We have to split mind in order to live and to die,
Let us stop splitting mind - and stay whole!
One might be lonely in the absence of 'other'?
Unless 'one' were 'all' there could be no 'one',
Unless 'all' were 'one' there could be no 'all'.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 10

Sequentia Fugit

I

The future should not be envisaged as some 'thing' that is awaiting us, any more than the past should be envisaged as some 'thing' that is gone-for-ever.

Neither has either come or gone, is either to-come or to-go, because neither is a 'thing' at all or has any objective existence whatever.

Both are what we call 'the present' which to us only appears to exist as an imaginary line separating two temporal states which we are obliged to experience sequentially. They are just Presence, which has for aspects 'past' and 'future' as a coin has head and tail.

II

The future is already 'now', has never been anywhen else, and will never go elsewhen. It does not exist as a 'future' at all, nor will it ever exist as a 'past'. It is entirely here now, always has been and will be 'forever' - in a time-context.

It is the 'time-context' which is imagined, according to which events are experienced in sequence. 'Sequence' appears to 'fly' and we call it 'Tempus'. Nothing else suffers any kind of displacement in Mind.

Note: 'Mind' here refers to the integrality of mind, whose division into subject and object produces relativity, 'future' and 'past' being relative concepts.

III

The centre of infinity is in all 'places',
And I am the centre of infinity.
The centre of intemporality is at all 'times',
And I am the centre of intemporality.

Therefore here-and-there, near-and-far,
Are measurements from where-I-am,

And now-and-then, passed and to-come,
Are measurements of my presence-and-absence,
From my eternal centre.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 11

The Dying-Dream

Where the so-called problem of 'death' is concerned it would seem reasonable to start by enquiring 'What is there to die?'

One obvious answer might be 'Whatever was born'. Another should perhaps be 'Only what is called "matter" can be subject to either birth or death'. Thus these answers are inseparable. 'Death' and 'birth' are inseparable also; that is to say they are only apparently separated as a consequence of the conceptual extension of the concept of 'matter' in space and duration.* But that, absolutely all that, is ideation.

Apart from ideation, what could there be to be born or to die? The living-dream and the dying-dream are not essentially different from the sleeping-dream - since all are ideation in mind. 'Waking' and 'sleeping' are a pair of relative and interdependent counterparts, inseparable and only negatively veridical - veridical in mutual negation.

* 'The cause, displaced in time and space, appears as its effect.' (The Nirvana Prakarna of the Maha Ramayana). Death, therefore, appears as a space-time effect of birth.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 12

Presence in the Present

I

'The present' only appears to exist relatively - in relation with what is past and with what is to come. It cannot have any independent existence as a 'present'.*

'Being present in the present' is a positive concept and as such must constitute bondage, whereas 'being absent from a present' is a negative concept and should constitute liberation.

Since it must be the absence of presence that perceives a 'present', to the supposedly present what is perceiving must be absent.

Therefore my 'being present in the present' is phenomenally an absence.

* A concept of a self-existing 'present' should inevitably imply noumenal intemporality, timeless non-objectivity, which could not be applicable in any phenomenal context.

II

No present moment could be perceived, since it must be in the 'past' before the complicated process of perception could be completed - therefore our notion of 'the present' could only exist in a 'past'.

But a 'future' and a 'past' only appear to exist in relation with a supposed 'present'. All three temporal concepts are mutually interdependent, so that there can be no basis for any of them.

The absence of a 'present' thereby implies total phenomenal absence - the existential absence of any universe whatsoever, whereas my phenomenal absence, perceiving itself as a presence in a phenomenal 'present', must necessarily be the noumenality of all phenomena.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 13

Analytical Observations Concerning Time

I

I do not know whether advances in the accuracy of mathematical instruments have allowed scientists to calculate the duration of the time-lag between the perception of a supposed object and its completed conception and recognition by memory as whatever such object may be said to be. Each element in that process, whether visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile, is well-known, complicated, indeed elaborate, involving chemical changes in more than one set of cells, apart from the transmission of nerve-impulses, so that the final interpretation can only be a mnemonic structure in the psyche.

However considerable it may be, the importance of such duration is not of metaphysical interest, but merely the obvious fact that it must 'exist' and must, relatively speaking, be considerable. It must therefore follow from this that if duration has objective existence whatever we psychically regard as 'present' or 'the present' must necessarily be well and truly in the past by the time we have become aware of its recognition as what we are conditioned by memory to think that it is.

What conclusions should we draw from this?

1. That what we regard as 'the present' is in fact 'the past' when we know it.
2. There is, therefore, no 'present' that we can cognise as such:
3. In fact we are actually 'living' in 'the future' which we can never know as such until it is factually in 'the past'.

Should this be difficult to envisage, and since only the general circumstance is in question, the duration of the time-lag is unimportant, so that in order to envisage it easily we have

only to imagine its duration, not as being too brief to be recognised by our senses but as lasting, let us say, for a familiar period such as ten minutes. So regarded, the situation should readily appear evident.

It seems to follow that our 'present', having passed, must be purely conceptual as a presence, in fact just a notion in mind, and can have no factual existence whatever: we can know no actual present.

It follows, also, that since in the hypothesis of objective duration we are already living in the 'future,' without being aware of it, nothing we imagine that we do in the already passed 'present' could have any effect whatever on the 'future' in which we are already living, since whatever we think we are doing in this passed 'present' must necessarily be 'done' in the unalterable past when we do it! If it be the result of conceptions themselves resulting from already past conditions, whatever we think we do volitionally can no longer affect anything.

It may now be evident that analysis reveals that the notion of an objective 'time', of duration as an existence independent of this which is conceiving it as such, makes nonsense of what we recognise as 'living'? If the perfect subjectivity of the notion of 'time' needed demonstration does not analysis readily reveal that so it must be?

Therefore is it not clear that we neither live in a 'past' nor in a 'future', and that our 'present' is an image in mind like that of the Equator? 'Time' is nothing objective to which we are subjected, but a measurement of our phenomenal extension in 'space', integrated with the sensorial experience of what ultimately we are.

II

It is by means of apparent extension in 'space' and a fourth directional measurement of that, experienced as duration, that 'we' are able to experience phenomenally what noumenally we are.

As long as we objectify our spatial and temporal measurements, regarding them as independent of ourselves, it should be evident that we could never recognise ourselves noumenally, since it is that spatio-temporal framework, supposedly external to ourselves, which - subjected to that objective servitude - psychically holds us in captivity. It is in fact to the concepts of spatial and temporal extension that what noumenally we are appears to be bound phenomenally - for it is on space-time that all phenomenality depends. This 'bondage' is conceptual, due to the objectivisation of what is subjective, thereby obscuring our noumenality.

Whether the required adjustment be difficult or easy, it must be evident that this is the essential reorientation necessary for release from what undoubtedly constitutes 'samsara' as opposed to 'nirvana', which - as we are taught - are not fundamentally either separate or different.

In what, then, does such reorientation consist, what is required in order to bring it about? The answer to this question seems to be that essentially we must cease to regard what conceptually we know as 'space' and 'time' as objective to what is conceiving them. That is to say that we are required to recognise that they are an aspect of ourselves, inseparable from whatever we are, and integral in our phenomenal manifestation. 'Space-time' must cease to be a concept of something external on which our appearance depends, and instead must be apperceived as not anything cognisable but as an aspect of what is cognising.

What is cognising? We are; nothing could there be to cognise, and what is cognising could not be a 'thing', i.e. an object of cognition. What we think of as 'space-time' is incognisable: it is a theoretical proposition, an hypothesis like the 'aether', psychically projected.

'Space-time' is a conception of what is so conceiving it in 'space-time', and as such it could not have any kind of factuality. As an element of phenomenalisation, of the elaboration of our objective universe in mind, it is what we are - phenomenalising what we are, as are all our sensorial perceptions. It is not something we perceive but an element of what is perceiving. 'Space-time' is nothing but we who are conceiving it.

III

All sensorial experience is experience of what we are, and cognition is our sixth sense. The sutras teach that sensorial experience, correctly understood, can lead directly to re-cognition of our noumenality and the Bodhisattivas Avalokitesvara and Manjusri lauded the auditory sense as the simplest way and that which they themselves had employed. The Buddha acquiesced but emphasised that all the senses are equal in that respect and that, whichever was applied, all conformed as one in anuttara samyak sambhodi. Such, therefore, was the teaching accepted as that of the Buddha by the great Masters of Ch'an at the highest period of its development.

But what experience is or could be more constant than that of space-time, and what experience could lead more directly back to its noumenal source and origin?

If we apprehend space-time as being non-objective, as a phenomenal functioning of our noumenal integrality, can it fail to dis-appear as an object in mind? In so-doing can its phenomenal disappearance leave our phenomenal identity intact? That must be forever impossible. Wherever 'it' goes 'we' go with it - for whatever 'we' are it is. Objective extinction must comport subjective extinction, for no object can subsist without a subject, nor any subject without an object. Together their presence comports our presence as phenomenality, and together their absence must comport our phenomenal absence as noumenality. The presence of space-time is called 'samsara', its absence is called 'nirvana', and these are names for the positivity and negativity whose mutual negation is the only possible relative indication of what we could be.

Release from subjection to the concept of 'time' - of duration in spatial extension - is the ultimate release, and it must be total. As such it is inevitably the most direct, for it is im-mediate. All other approaches are indirect, for they are via some medium by means of which the bonds which bind us to duration are broken, whereas phenomenal - which is temporal - experience experienced as duration, but apperceived as experience of what we are as I, must annihilate instantly all objective experience of temporality.

IV

The apparent 'present' is each moment of awareness, resulting in mnemonic activity: it occurs in mind only. By the time cognition has occurred it belongs to the state termed the 'past'.

The 'past' is mnemonic: it exists only in mind. It has passed and, temporally, is regarded as immutable although its mnemonic record varies and deteriorates.

The 'future' is the suppositious state in which events must be assumed to have occurred, if occurrence has taken place, such events being subsequently cognised as being in the 'present' although they must then necessarily have been in the 'past'.

Any movement that may have occurred can only have been mnemonic. Mind may have functioned in a manner that appears as sequence, but there has been no evidence of action exterior to the perceiving mind, or as having objective existence.

V

Therefore it would seem that no evidence can be adduced for the factual existence of the so-called 'passage of time', so that the notions of 'future', 'present', and 'past' are conceptual only, and should be recognised as a product of the process of relativity whereby the conceptual universe becomes apparent.

As such, 'time' may also be regarded as a measurement of the three dimensions of volume by means of which the appearance of form can occur extended in what is termed 'space', for without such measurement there could be no sequence in perception, and without sequential duration no object could appear to be perceived.

Perceiving is thus revealed as an apparently functional aspect of What-we-are as sentient beings. This - incidentally - is what the T'ang-dynasty Masters explained to us, using the Chinese equivalent of the Sanscrit term 'prajna'. This word represented to them an immanent or functional aspect of THIS or I, the symbol for which in Sanscrit was 'Dhyana' or 'Butatathata'. The Taoists, at the time of Guatama the Buddha, referred to these two aspects of the process of sentient manifestation as Tao and Te, and this mode of apprehension became the in-forming element of the Supreme Vehicle later represented by Ch'an.

Note: Buddhistically speaking, need it be pointed out that all experience - pain and pleasure, the famous 'suffering' (dukha) and its counterpart - could only be experienced in the sequence of duration, in the 'horizontal' sequence of a 'time'-dimension, and that without sequence, in the 'vertical' dimension which cuts the horizontal in every split-second (ksana) of the former, there could not be duration, so that equanimity alone can subsist therein intemporally?

The sequential direction of measurement must constitute samsaric or split-mind, whereas the measurement at right-angles thereto represents nirvanicor whole mind. Therefore when subjective intemporality (nirvana) replaces objective temporality (samsara) the latter having been found to have no factuality, equanimity (an end to 'suffering' and its counterpart) alone can obtain.

It may also be pointed out that, since we are demonstrably what 'Time' subjectively is, metaphysically whatever we may be must necessarily be intemporal.

* * *

All objectivisation is seeing things in a time-sequence. Every such act, therefore, is a phantasy, a composition in temporality, an image of the non-existent.

That surely is why the bound objectivise and those who objectivise are bound. That also is why those who are free do not objectivise, and why those who do not are free.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 14

'The Essential Understanding Seems to be ...'

The essential understanding seems to be that everything we can know appears to exist in 'mind' and can have no other kind of existence whatever. If that has been apperceived as

inevitable and factual, then we have to apperceive that this 'mind' does not exist independently as such either. Why is that? The answer is almost absurdly simple: it is because 'mind' is just a symbol for what we ourselves are, and therefore we cannot see it as an object independent of what is looking!

This so-called 'mind' is just what is meant by the word 'I' and, when I turn outwards and objectify, 'mind' divides into a duality of subject and its object. This means that I create as an apparent object something other than I, so that 'mind' is thereby split into 'I-subject' and 'you-object', 'self' and 'other'. But I always remain as I, objectively void or devoid of objective existence. However, 'you-object' are an apparently sentient being in 'mind', and 'you' start calling yourself 'I' also - although you are factually only an object of Subject-I. Therefore I am always I, and 'you' are always 'you', but 'you' can come back with that and say the same to 'me' - since what I am as an object is 'you' to you-as-I. Therefore we can say: ''We' are all the apparent objects of what mutually we all are, which, whoever says it, is always I.'

In order to understand this more thoroughly it is necessary to see how it works. The process of objectifying is by splitting 'mind', which as 'I' remains whole and eternal (intemporal), into Duality which demonstrates what it is as 'I' sensorially, which is relatively, by dividing its wholeness - which we can describe as 'equanimity' - into contrasting elements, positive and negative, pleasure and pain, love and hate, and all the endless pairs of contrasting concepts. In order to do this, which is the conceptuality in which the universe appears in 'mind' (now split), these images have to be extended in length, breadth, and height, which is called 'volume', and in order to be perceptible they must be further extended by duration, which we call 'time', which is a fourth direction of measurement interpreted as 'lasting' or as being 'horizontal' as opposed to 'vertical', and which cuts the measurements of volume at right-angles, thus giving the illusion or impression of duration.

This space-time element, therefore, is nothing objective to ourselves as objects, is nothing independent to which we are subjected or 'bound', but is part and parcel of our appearance, being our extension which renders us objectively perceptible to subjective perceiving. And our notion of 'bondage' is just this illusion that we are independent entities subjected to temporality.

We know that what prevents us from knowing ourselves as 'I' is this apparent temporality which enables the notion - that each of us is an independent 'I' - to endure. These supposed 'me's only appear to exist because they appear to last, to endure, and if they did not, if they were not temporal, they would be intemporal which is what I AM whoever says it. We have been taught that in order to know ourselves as 'I' we must destroy the illusion that we exist as 'me's in duration, but we cannot destroy our 'me'ness as long as we leave its duration as 'me'ness objectively behind it, for the concepts are inseparable. They are not independent or different: they are elements of one another! If we could remove the notion of 'me' for a moment, its 'lasting' in 'time' would still remain - and it would re-appear. Which it does. So 'time' (duration) must go with it. We should apperceive what 'time' is, that it is not an independent objectivisation but is an essential part of the objectivisation of our apparent 'selves'. The former, however, is insufficient as an independent operation for if the ego-concept be removed alone, the time-concept may remain, whereas if the time-as-an-object concept be removed the ego-concept which depends upon it, in which it extends as 'lasting', must go with it. If it could not have duration, if it could not 'last', it could not appear to be at all.

Therefore our problem is really only to apperceive that 'time' could not be anything objective to 'ourselves', but on the contrary must be, and clearly, demonstrably is an intrinsic element of what we are as phenomenal objects in mind.

Is not all this really very simple and obvious? As I - which is all that we could be - we are in-temporal and in-finite, for 'time' and 'space' are concepts by means of which what we are is objectivised in divided 'mind' as phenomenal individuals through whom the whole objective universe appears so-extended and made perceptible sensorially. Those of us who are not satisfied to accept this phenomenal universe at its face-value and to make the best of our supposed 'bondage' thereto, seek to apprehend what factually we are, and so to recover our intemporality which, as I, we have never lost. We make a lot of fuss about it, and let ourselves be led up the garden path by well-meaning, mostly religious, sages and prophets in the most abstruse and intricate manner conceivable, expounded in ancient metaphor and jargon of all sorts and descriptions, and all with remarkably mediocre results! Yet is it not in fact comparatively simple and obvious?

It is important also to understand that 'we' are only able to experience what we are as I, for there is rigorously nothing else to be experienced. That 'we' experience it as contrast between opposites, fundamentally positive and negative but affectively as pleasure and pain, etc., is an ineluctable effect of the duality of which 'we' are constituted as concepts in 'mind'.

'We' are conditioned to imagine that these contrasting elements can exist independently the one of the other, but such a simple-minded notion is untenable, as every student of philosophy, however elementary, must know. Unfortunately religions, impregnated with such notions from early times, tend to perpetuate this absurdity, which is an added and unnecessary obstacle to clear understanding, and one so elementary that it should not be allowed to hinder the de-conditioning which leaves open the way to clear apprehension of the truth concerning what we are.

When this inevitable concomitant of duality, called relativity, is understood it should no longer be difficult to apperceive that with the disappearance of temporality as an objective existence independent of the perceiving of it, and its recognition as an intrinsic element in that perceiving, that thus it is subjective, the perfect equanimity which is our natural condition intemporally must necessarily supervene and replace all the miseries due to our supposed bondage to temporality.

* * *

Arya Deva regards Space and Time as inferences, sensorially imperceptible (Catuh Satadam ix.5). If an object existed it could not change - change being movement in duration, the illusion of 'stills' or quanta seen successively in mind, existing only in mind - as Hui Neng pointed out in settling the argument about the movement of the wind or the flag.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 15

The Subjectivity of Time

The Maharshi (Sri Ramana) said, 'What is eternal is not recognised as such, owing to ignorance' (Teachings, p. 118). Ignorance of what is 'eternal' is due to the concept of 'time', and so ignorance of eternality is a definition of that concept, since the eternal and a time-concept are interdependent counterparts, i.e. intemporality and temporality. He continued: 'Ignorance (the concept of 'time') is the obstruction. Get rid of it and all will be well. This ignorance (the concept of 'time') is identical with the 'I' thought. Seek its source and it will vanish'.

The ''I' thought' is entirely a temporal product, depending upon and exclusively appearing to exist subject to temporal extension (duration). if you apperceive what 'time' is, it must simultaneously dis-appear as an object in mind. It is then revealed as the essential element in the constitution of an I-concept or conceptual 'I', and the I-concept as an object in split-mind must go with it, for neither what 'time' is nor what 'I' am can have any objective quality whatever.

(Note: In case there should be any misapprehension: 'What 'time' is' is what split-mind tries to conceive as 'Intemporality', just as 'What I am' is what split-mind tries to conceive as 'I', which respectively are only cognisable in relativity objectivised as 'time' and as 'me'.)

An 'I-concept' and the 'time-concept' are inseparable, neither can appear to exist without the other: they are dual aspects of what is erroneously conceived as objective, and are themselves believed to have objective existence as such. That assumed objective existence of what is a concept-of-sequence in mind is precisely the foundation of the notion of 'bondage'. Seeking to dispose of one aspect without the other is a labour of Sisyphus, for the one that is left will inevitably bring back its fellow on which it depends. As long as the concept of 'time' as an objective existence, as a continuity independent of the continuous perceiver of it, is left untouched, that object must retain its subject - and its subject, the perceiver of it, is precisely the I-concept in question.

That is why the nature of 'time' should be revealed. In the distant past an analysis of the nature of 'time' was not in accordance with current modes of thought and of general knowledge, so that no tradition of it was handed down by the Masters, who certainly understood it since they refer to it obscurely but quite often, but this is not a valid reason for us to ignore it. For us it should be readily comprehensible, and its comprehension is urgent, the more so since it will hardly be denied that many of the ancient traditional approaches to the essential problem have lost much of their force through unending repetition and the auto-hypnosis that accompanies the repetition of all kinds of popular concepts.

If the I-concept can be disposed of for a moment, and the concept of duration remains, the latter will restore the former which is extended therein and which remains with it. This, indeed, is a familiar occurrence, but its mechanism is not recognised. On the other hand, if the concept of duration is seen as invalid, as not an objective existence to which 'we' can be bound, but as an essential part of our appearance, extended therein, being our-extension, its removal must necessarily carry with it all that is extended in it. Then the supposed objective character of both lapses, and the process of objectification ceases, leaving 'us' as what intemporally we are.

As long as we continue to regard 'space-time' as objectively factual we are not merely 'bound' - we are trussed!

Note: What is termed 'an I-concept' is a symbol of the splitting of whole-mind into relative duality, which consists in conceiving 'other-than-self' as a space-time entity, whereby its interdependent counterpart 'self' becomes another. This dual, or divided, functioning

of mind (just termed 'mind' by the Maharshi) appears as the conceiver or functioning 'I', temporally extended as 'duration'. Therefore the Maharshi states 'The mind is only the thought 'I''.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 16

The Timeless Way

The only way of escape from subjugation to the concept of 'time' as an objective factuality, external to ourselves, is by identifying ourselves with it, re-becoming it, which is apperceiving that it is what we are, not objectively but subjectively.

When we recognise ourselves as temporality, we have only to apperceive what is obvious - which is that temporality and intemporality are inseparable, each being an aspect of the other, the one appearing in movement, the other static. They may be said to be twin modes of cognising what we are, temporality accompanying and making possible all phenomenal action, and intemporality remaining noumenally eternal.

As such the one may be said to be what we are as prajna, the other what we are as Dhyana. Noumenally we are intemporal, phenomenally we are 'time', the one nirvanic, the other samsaric.

But they only have conceptual existence, and neither is as any 'thing' in itself.

As 'time' we are intemporal, and as 'intemporality' we are time.

Of course as the one we appear to be singular, as the other to be plural, but our plurality is as conceptual as our singularity. We are neither - for what-we-are is not any 'thing' that could have any conceptual quality or attribute whatsoever. It is neither any 'thing' nor no 'thing', for it is void of 'thingness' - which is objective and conceptual only. We can all say 'Intemporal, I am Time: temporal, I am Eternal'.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 17

Succession, Dialectically

In order to experience 'duration' we must necessarily be what 'duration' is, or 'duration' must be an aspect of what we are, for 'duration' is not some vague entity independent of the experience of it.

What we experience - we are. Conceptualising experiences, diversely named as opposing and mutually contradictory counterparts, emotions, sensations, etc. cannot be anything apart from the cognising of them. Their conceptual objectification as 'other', as independent

entities experienced by a 'self', is an untenable relative supposition to which we have become conditioned.

Also, since we are 'duration', we cannot have been 'born' and we cannot 'die', because duration as such, or other than as a concept in mind, cannot begin or cease to endure, since duration cannot start or stop enduring, for otherwise it could not be duration at all. A conceptual object in mind may be supposed to start and to stop objectively experiencing 'duration', but non-objective duration as such cannot be 'duration' unless it endures. It follows that since 'time' is an aspect of what we are, we are temporal, and we must be intemporal also: since we endure, we can never cease to endure and we can never have begun to endure, for 'time' cannot begin to be 'time' or cease to be 'time'. 'Time', therefore, is eternity, and there cannot be any difference between temporality and intemporality. The supposed difference can only be conceptual and due to the concept of succession which creates the illusion of 'lasting'.

Therefore 'appearance and disappearance', as concepts, 'birth and death', 'creation and dissolution', must be psychic effects of the concept of 'succession'.

Time is subjective, but it is conceptualised as an object to which 'we' are apparently subservient, but which is only an image in mind. In that respect and also, it is what we are - for what-we-are is subjective and is conceptualised as an object in mind which is not I but 'me'.

In relative phenomenality 'we' are conceptual objects subservient to conceptual succession which creates the illusion of 'lasting' in temporality, but noumenally we are Intemporality, 'eternal' in the sense of transcendent to any conceptual interpretation of the notion of duration. As such, however, we are no longer plural, nor are we singular either.

* * *

Temporality is not in fact - but only in appearance - different from intemporality: each is a conceptual interpretation, positive and negative respectively, of the phenomenon of the sequential extension of objects, of their duration as opposed to their possible lack of duration. They lose all meaning in their mutual negation, which leaves the eternality which is what, ultimately, we are.

Ultimately the non-difference of all pairs of opposites lies in the absence of an experiencer of them.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 18

Walking Backwards Into the Future

I

Do we not see it the wrong way round? We think we must do something, or not do something, so that a subsequent eventuality may, or may not, result.

But may not the contrary be what is required? Should not whatever we do, or refrain from doing, be in accordance with whatever eventuality is about to occur?

Is it not with what is in process of becoming apparent in the time-sequence of manifestation that we should be in accord, rather than be concerned about the gratuitous and imaginary effect of some action we may envisage in a 'present' that will already be in the 'past' by the time that its performance has been cognised?

Do we see the essential absurdity of this conditioned notion that our apparent action could effect what is evolving in future time, which apparent action itself will already be in our 'past' when we have experienced and cognised it?

The future is awaiting us in the sequence of 'time', like a house that is being built for us, or a repast that is being prepared. The idea that we are building our house or cooking our repast - we who have no idea how to build unbuilt houses or to cook anything unforeseeable - is surely an illusion, a reversal of seriality, based on false premises - the false premises of autarchy and the recompense-or-retribution of volitional ethics, all of which looking-in-the-wrong-direction constitutes the chains of our pseudo-bondage.

II

Should we not reverse this retroactive error, abandon retrospection, and live prospectively instead, adapting our psychology to what is ahead instead of gratuitously assuming that what is ahead depends upon what has already occurred? We appear to assume that the 'past' influences the 'future', even that the 'future' is the effect of the 'past' which we are conditioned to see as its cause, but surely the contrary is at least as plausible if not altogether more evident.

Theoretically, of course, the future is neither more nor less dependent on the past than the past is dependent on the future. They are not two, they are not separate or different in nature, and the 'present' which we imagine as an essential and factual link between them as two entities, has no more veritable existence than the equator.

Does the captain of a ship travelling South imagine that his ship can bring its own weather into the Southern hemisphere, instead of preparing it for the weather which is in store for it when it crosses the 'line'?

We seem to imagine that we 'belong' to the past, because we remember it, and that the future is non-existent because our memory does not record it, but that somewhat primitive reasoning may have led to an unjustifiable conclusion. The past has 'passed' and should be left behind in our apparent temporal transit: the future approaches and it is for that we should be prepared and to which we need to adapt. We think we 'belong' to the past, but there is no valid reason to suppose that such is the case: we have had it; surely do we 'belong' to the future: which is about to have us. Such surely is our phenomenal position?

III

Noumenally no such discrimination can be in question, for there is no distinction between 'past' and 'future', and neither is either present or absent, for they represent our extension in duration, the temporal aspect of our intemporality, and their phenomenal separation is based on spatial extension in temporal sequence, in which neither 'past' nor 'future' could have any causal function in regard to the other. Rather have they - in their apparent sequence - a mutual or reciprocal relation.

Therefore what we become is as much and as little an effect or result of what we have been, as what we have been, or think that we are, is an effect of what we are becoming or shall have become when that becoming is passed. Otherwise expressed, our conceptual existence

is as much or as little dependent on what it has apparently been in the 'past' as on what it is about apparently to become in the 'future'.

What we appear to be, composed of mutual conceptions, can have no factual past or future, i. e. other than conceptual - or psychic if you prefer the image - since duration is only a sequential appearance in mind; the sequence of our appearance could be regarded, theoretically at least, in either direction, and its evolution may seem to depend causally on either what has appeared or on what has not yet appeared. Growing older may appear to depend on our having been younger, or our having been younger may appear to depend on our being about to be older.

We find it difficult to envisage this? That is only because it is inhabitual, which also is why it should help to break down conditioned thinking which gives us the illusion of bondage.

If we lay a bet and win, or lose, was not the laying of the bet as much due to our winning it, or losing it, as the winning or losing of it was due to its having been laid? Would the bet have been laid but for its winning or losing?

Why do all things eat and reproduce? In order that living things may live at all. Is not their living as much the reason for their eating and reproducing as the latter is for the former? Which comes first - the living, or the eating and reproducing, the acorn or the oak, the egg or the chicken, and which is the cause of the other? Causation is an illusion - as every notion based on 'time' as something objectively existing must necessarily be. But if we were to live as belonging to the 'future' instead of as belonging to the 'past' - should we not live more freely?

And if we were to live knowing that we 'belong' to neither, but that, being that of which we ourselves conceptually are composed, they belong to us, should we not thereby find that there is no freedom to be 'found' - since all that 'freedom' could be is precisely this which we are?

IV

So much for 'living'.

And 'dying'? Is the trouble due to regret for what we are leaving, or for what we shall not have in the future? To worry about what we are losing, or to worry about what may be coming?

Is dying to the past so tragic for us - or is it dying to the future which we shall not know? Would we care so much if it were only the former, of which we may have had enough? Would we accept it more serenely if we saw it as only the latter? If so, we are now dying to the past, as we have lived to the past, rather than to the future.

But if we lived to the future, then our dying, as our living, should be more serene. Then instead of 'my past obliges me to do this, I am acting so that the future shall be as I wish or think it ought to be', we might say 'The future requires that I shall do this, that I shall act in this manner in order that I may become what I must become and that everything may be as it is due to be.'

Would not conflict have vanished, strife have disappeared? We might be humble and more resigned? For is not humility just absence of anyone to be proud, and is not relinquishment just absence of anyone to renounce?

Note: The notion that the future is the result of the past is itself the result of deeply-rooted conditioning. It may be seen as fundamental in our thought. As has been pointed out, it is based on the evident fact that 'memory' is only retroactive. But this deep-rooted conviction need not be any the less unfounded for being deep-rooted. Deep rooted it is,

and unfounded also, for it has no sound basis whatever. It is a temporal illusion, a deviation of the psyche, and it should rapidly disappear – along with others of its kind – if we were to break through the conditioning which binds us, and see clearly, without bias, our relationship with what we know as 'time'. That should be non-objective relation and, so-looking, we should find that our future no longer depends on our past, and our past can no longer be held responsible for our future.

The situation would not then in fact be 'reversed', but such temporary 'reversal' may be needed as a measure whereby a readjustment of our inaccurate perspective may occur, for this error in our direction of living in itself may be held responsible for our apparent condition of bondage.

An attempt to apply the foregoing analysis by means of isolated volitional actions would be unlikely to effect the psychological re-orientation which is here suggested.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 19

So We Are Told

In the context of re-birth an aeon or a kalpa should be something like a minute of our duration called 'time'. Are we not re-born every ksana, 4,500 times every temporal minute, 270,000 times every temporal hour, 6,480,000 times every temporal day?

We can never be 'enlightened' in the present 'birth' – for we have no 'time' to know it; nor in the next, nor in any other – for never have we 'time' to experience it (or anything else). Perhaps that is why there is no such 'thing', why there can be no 'things' of any kind? It is what we are – unborn. Both born and unborn – and dead?

How can we be born? What we know as 'life' is a thousand million births, and as many deaths. How can we die? What we know as 'death' is a million deaths, and as many births. All that is clock-business, toys, gadgets and gimmicks – imagined stuff in an illusion of sequence. 'Meantime' (meaning 'beyond time': that odd Buddhistic meaning of 'mean') we are only what we are outside the notion of 'time', unborn, undead, and so blazing with 'light' that we are Enlightenment Itself?

Note: This is good Indian Buddhism. Tibetans claim to have trained themselves to perceive the ksana, which should correspond exactly to the 'stills' whose rapid succession in projection on to a screen – our 'mind' – produces the illusion of movement to the famous 'Observer'.

'A ksana, the shortest space of time, a moment, the 90th part of a thought, the 4,500th part of a minute, during which 90 people are born and as many die.' In view of the two figures of 90, a ksana would appear to be what we are. Enough? Or already too much?

For those of us who insist on 'being', at any price – is this not a tolerable hypothesis? Better than swallowing the literal notion hook, line, and sinker? It almost can be said to 'work'?

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 20

The Great Pearl (Hui Hai) Concerning 'Time'

'There is no single thing (dharma) which can be grasped or rejected. When you cease looking on things in their temporal aspect, as having come or gone, then in the whole universe there will be no grain of anything which is not your own treasure ... Do not search for the truth with your intellects. Do not search at all. The nature of mind is intrinsically whole. Therefore it is written in the Avatamsaka Sutra: 'All things have no beginning, and all things have no end'.'

Note: 'Your own treasure', relatively an objective concept of possession, here is used to imply something like 'the absolute value of what you are'.

In relative language his revelation could hardly be clearer. We have only to apperceive it directly.

* * *

Big Joke

As long as we go on tacitly accepting 'time and space' as veritable, anything we say or do must necessarily be nonsense metaphysically, or, more politely, just fun-and-games.

We close our eyes to them presumably because we instinctively know that their inevitable invalidity blows the whole structure of phenomenality sky-high: for nothing but 'noumenality' could survive.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 21

Intemporal Time

As 'time' we are 'intemporality', and as 'intemporality' we are 'time', for time and intemporality are not different in undivided mind.

Therefore our temporal aspect implies and requires our intemporality.

But we can also say that we are neither 'time' nor 'intemporality' for neither as such is anything but a concept in divided mind.

Conceptually, however, there can be no difference between 'intemporality' and 'total absence of time and of no-time'; the latter is a double negative abolishing no-time, i. e. that kind of time which is 'no-time; or negative time as well as positive time.

Time-less or time-full, we are still conceptually 'time', for such, conceptually, we must necessarily be.

* * *

Positivity is temporal and finite,
Negativity is timeless and infinite,
But neither exists otherwise than conceptually.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 22

Quips and Queries - I

How could anything extended in the concepts of 'space' and 'time' be other than a fabrication in mind, as a dream is?

* * *

Existence is subject to Time. How could what-we-are be dependent on sequence in duration?

* * *

Can any metaphysical statement based on a tacit acceptance of space and time be anything but balderdash?

* * *

The seeker is the found, the found is the seeker - as soon as it is apperceived that there is no time.

* * *

All 'being' can only 'be' as a continuity in duration. That is why the Diamond Sutra condemns it as a concept which has no existence as such.

* * *

Phenomena are not extended in space-time objectively, as things in themselves: it is the perceiving which extends them.

* * *

'Sudden enlightenment' means precisely the immediate apperception of all that in fact we are.

'Enlightenment' is 'sudden' only because it is not in 'time' (subject to sequential duration). It re-integration in intemporality.

* * *

Apart from the conceptual 'space-time' of relativity in which it is extended - there is nothing for 'form' to be.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : PART II

SENTIENCE

The Buddha forebode to specify:
as long as there is any 'one' to suffer - he will.

Chapter 23 : Should not this be Said? ...

Must not this be said? Can it be said with sufficient finality? How may it be stated with a force and conviction that leave no room for even a shadow of equivocation?

As long as an apparent individual thinks, as long as he is speaking, acting, or cognising, as an autonomous entity, self-identified as such psychically and somatically, can such a psycho-somatic apparatus so-acting be qualified to understand what it is?

Can a psyche-soma, presuming its factual existence to be what is sensorially apparent and intellectually cognisable, be capable of knowing, and so of saying, anything significant or accurate concerning its fundamental nature?

Otherwise expressed, can anybody who is still thinking of himself as a 'self', speaking and acting as such, be comprehending the essential error in consequence of which everything so being thought and said must of necessity be erroneous also?

More concisely, can anything of metaphysical import, that 'anyone' says, thinking and speaking as, by, and from a supposedly autonomous entity, be anything but arrant nonsense? This idea does not necessarily imply that only a fully disidentified sage can say anything pertinent; it means that anything pertinent can only be said by or via a psycho-somatic apparatus whose cognition is intuitional and immediate, based on impersonal perception, and on a clear understanding of the origin of what is then functioning.

So why 'must this be said'? In order that the essential understanding may break through, and that we may know ourselves for what we are and for what we are not.

Note: Such a statement may be not only disagreeable to read, but is likely to hurt the feelings of sensitive and well-intentioned readers who believe they know a great deal about these matters, and who indeed may 'know' a great deal, perhaps considerably more than the writer of these lines. But, if that be so, it is itself a valid reason for such a statement and, if it has not been made heretofore, the present writer must share the accusation of cowardice that may be presumed to be responsible.

General statements have indeed been made, such as 'Everything we say must necessarily be untrue' - and everyone is delighted, almost flattered, but then everyone is involved and hardly anyone takes it seriously! Such a general assessment is even more profoundly true, but does it help anybody and does it serve any immediate purpose? in order to be effective truth must penetrate like an arrow - and that is liable to hurt.

* * *

'Objective existence is only a notion',
(And surely somewhat fatuous at that?)

Why so?

All 'existing' is objective

And there is no one, and no 'thing', to exist.
Is not this the whole, the sufficient, the ultimate truth?
Can we know any other?

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 24

An Ego, A Self ...

An ego, a self, or an individuality, can only be conceived as an object extended in space-time.

When time is recognised as a spatial measurement interpreted as sequential duration, i.e. as a series of 'stills' or quanta perceived as movement, the purely conceptual nature of all possible objects becomes evident. Such is the composition and nature of all phenomena, and the sensorially perceived universe is nothing else.

As phenomenal objects we are only that, but if we were only phenomenal objects we could not know phenomena as such, for 'the perceived cannot perceive', as Huang Po stated, i.e. if we were flowing in the stream of time we could not know it was flowing. What-we-are cannot be in the temporal stream in which objects appear to us, therefore we must be intemporal, outside the stream of sequential duration within which objects appear.

An autonomous 'self' that 'lives' and 'dies' is necessarily a part of this temporal phantasy which is responsible for a see-er, thinker, actor, and things seen (or otherwise sensorially perceived), thoughts and deeds. There have never been any such entities otherwise than as figurants in the phantasy, but the function-ing implied - the doing as opposed to the do-er or the deed apparently done - is functional, that is not a conceptual interpretation of a percept but perceiving as such, which is the subjective or prajñatic aspect of immutable Dhyana or what we are.

That is why 'thinking and feeling' in their functional aspects, uninterpreted as thought and emotion, are not then subjected to the dualistic process of subject and object in a time-sequence of A thinking a thought, or B feeling an emotion; they are still impersonal, non-objective, and are not yet apparently experienced by an experiencer, but are the experienc-ing which is all that in fact 'he' can be.

(Note: In order to 'experience', to suffer any 'experience' relatively, we must necessarily be what we 'experience', for what 'experience' is must be what we are absolutely.)

They can be described as 'insee-ing' and 'infeel-ing', as long as the 'in' is not in reference to an implied see-er or experience-er looking 'within', but to the 'within' which is the source of the function-ing, which is what he is, that is not to any phenomenal object that might be supposed to be suffering experience but to the origin of all apparent manifestation including seeing and feeling. The terms should be less misleading as 'within-seeing' and 'within-feeling'.

Such thought, called 'the One Thought' by Shen Hui, or 'a thought of the Absolute (absolute thought)', and such impersonal non-objective affectivity, is not an interpretation of quanta as movement, is not, therefore, temporal: it is the arrière-fond, the immutable background of the phenomenal process of 'living'. It is Dhyana, what-we-are, in our

functioning aspect called Prajna. Subjected to sequential duration it becomes thought and emotion, concept and ratiocination, love/hate, and pleasure/pain.

* * *

The Goose

'Destroy 'the ego', hound it, beat it, snub it, tell it where it gets off?' Great fun, no doubt, but where is it? Must you not find it first? Isn't there a word about catching your goose before you can cook it?

The great difficulty here is that there isn't one.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 25

Sentience

'Living' is experiencing in duration.

Objective 'life' is subjection to experience.

But only the non-objective is what we are.

'Being sentient' is suffering 'experience' and, being the object of experience, gives the idea of individuality, of being a 'self'. What-we-are does not experience, can not experience at all. For only an object can suffer experience.

Identification with that which is suffering experience is what constitutes bondage, whereas 'being-this -experience', devoid of entity, cannot be bound.

To experience is paskein - to suffer, whether interpreted as positive or negative 'suffering'. The 'abolition of suffering' is nirvana, awakening to what-we-are, and what-we-are cannot suffer, since - not being an object - there is no 'thing' to suffer.

Suffering, therefore, is conceptual, i.e. 'experiencing' in a time-context.

Phenomenally, that experience-ing (being sentient) is what, extended in space-time, we are, whereas we imagine that we are some 'thing', an 'individual' self that has, that possesses, a body and a soul that is sentient and suffers experience. Such a pseudo-entity is a medium for suffering experience, and we are not to be identified with the objective medium whereby we are experienced.

Therefore, phenomenally, this sentience, spatially extended in duration, is our 'self-nature': only the 'being', that is imagined as subjected to suffering, is illusory. And this same 'sentience', not extended in space-time, potential, devoid of objectivity, and not being experienced, not 'suffered', is our noumenal identity, called the Absolute, Bhutatathata, Dharmakaya, Tao - or what you will.

Note: There does not seem to be, and can hardly be assumed to be, any justification for supposing that the Buddha, by appellation incarnate enlightenment, intended the word translated as 'suffering' - whatever it may have been in the language he spoke, i. e. Maghadi

- in the negative sense only, that is as applying solely to that kind of experience which we regard as disagreeable. His vision was total vision, and 'suffering' (paskein) means 'experience' - whether cognised as 'sorrowful' or 'joyous'.

The extent to which the Buddha's message may have been distorted by this sentimental and stultifying limitation, treating one element of a pair of interdependent counterparts as though it could have independent existence, has not yet - to my knowledge - been estimated. No doubt it could be maintained that Mahayana itself, particularly as represented by the Supreme Vehicle (Shresthyana), in fact represents a rectification of this somewhat ingenuous interpretation. It is clearly stated in the second section of Heart Sutra (see 'Open Secret' Part III, 42:I).

* * *

Receptivity

Yung Chia said: 'Ask a wooden puppet when it will attain Buddhahood by self-cultivation'. Was he referring to sentient-beings as 'wooden puppets',

Or was he implying that they could do what puppets cannot do?

Puppets can only react to stimuli. Sentient-beings can both react to stimuli and act directly, activated indirectly (via volition) and directly by prajna, which is their sentience - the one 'false' action (yu wei), the other true (wu wei).

Receptivity is not reacting to stimuli, but lying open to prajna, which is dhyana, whole-mind, and what-we-are.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 26

Sunshine - A Dialogue

Hui Hai, on the first page of his treatise on Sudden Enlightenment, explains it by saying that it is a means of getting rid of conceptual thinking. An instantaneous means. But how? He tells us that also; does he not add that 'enlightenment' is just the apperception that 'enlightenment' is not anything to be obtained, to be obtained or attained by anyone soever? He does, but what does he mean?

If he had wished to answer that question would he not have done so? He wished us to answer it, to insee the answer. It should be seen directly, not indirectly via a Master, not intellectually as knowledge, but by whole-mind. It is for you to see it.

We are told that it means that it cannot be attained because we have it already, that it is always ours.

Typical half-baked nonsense! What are we, phenomena, to have or possess that or anything else? That is the usual pitiful attempt of volitional consciousness to maintain its position as an entity!

Then he means to imply that 'enlightenment', 'awakening', 'liberation', or whatever term one uses, is not any 'thing', that there isn't any such thing anywhere, or nowhere, to be obtained or attained?

No doubt that is a fact, but why? What conclusion do you draw from that?
If it is not there, we cannot have it!
That is not the point. What does the absence of an object connote?
The absence of a subject.
The absence of its subject!
You mean there is neither object nor subject, which are inseparable, that there is no one to do it, neither doer nor anything done?
Never mind what I mean; is it a fact?
Yes, it must be a fact.
So what?
There is no 'us' to have or to do anything whatsoever!
Good! Is not that the point?
I suppose it is. But what, then, are 'we'?
Did not Hui Hai start by telling, actually telling, you that?
He told us that 'enlightenment' was a means of being rid of conceptual thinking.
Exactly.
You mean that 'we' are 'conceptual thinking'?
Can you suggest a better definition of what we imagine that we are?
I suppose not! So that 'enlightenment' is ridding ourselves of what we imagine that 'we' are?
Yes, and 'suddenly', once and for all 'time'.
But, then, who does it?
There is no 'who'. Nothing phenomenal, evidently, if anything is done.
But is anything done?
What could there be to 'do'?
No do-er and no-thing done. So what?
Neither subject nor object, and out of 'time'.
Yet there is some - let us say adjustment, or integration.
Adjustment or re-integration.
Even that needs doing!
A doing that is no-doing, action that is non-action.
Taoist wei wu wei?
Yes, and that implies ...?
It must be what-we-are!
Quite so. What else could it be?
So that is the whole story! Everything is therein! There is no 'us' at all, never was and never will be!
Because there is no 'time' in which to 'last' and no space in which to be 'extended', since both are just concepts in mind.
There is no 'us' either to experience 'enlightenment', to be awakened from a 'sleep', or to be freed from any kind of 'bondage'!
Go on! Why not add - and no enlightenment, no sleep, and no bondage either? And how so?
Because there could not be one without the others, nor any others without the one!
That is surely the 'doctrine that is no-doctrine' of Bodhidharma, the 'transmission outside the Scriptures', which is the definition of Ch'an, the burden of 'Ekayana' - the Supreme Vehicle.
Written and read its significance is not apparent, but suddenly apperceived it is luminous - like the sun emerging from behind the clouds!

What we are is the sun; 'we' do not dissipate the clouds in order to reach (obtain or attain to) it: it is the sun which dissipates the clouds and enlightens us without us even knowing that 'we' are there?

'Enlightenment' does not exist phenomenally at all, and 'we' cannot have it - because it is what-we-are!

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 27

What Noumenally We Are ...

I

What noumenally we are, commonly called 'Sentience', unaware of sentience, as such is necessarily insentient: what we are phenomenally, called 'sentient', is awareness of being sentient.

Also what noumenally we are, called 'Presence', unaware of being present, as such is phenomenally absent: what we are phenomenally, called 'Present', is awareness of being present.

Unconscious Sentience and Presence, therefore, are the noumenality of our phenomenal being-sentient and being-present.

Unconscious Sentience, phenomenally absent, becomes conscious of sentience only in the process of objectifying what-it-is, as sentient phenomena.

Likewise, unconscious Presence, phenomenally absent, becomes conscious of presence only in the objectifying of what-it-is, as present phenomena. Only phenomena, objects, can be sentient and present.

II

Sentient and present phenomena, manifested, conceptually extended spatially and in apparent duration, can have no autonomy whatsoever. Their only being, apparent also, lies in their noumenal Sentience and noumenal Presence, both as such phenomenally absent. Their manifested appearance is entirely in 'mind', in a conceptual universe, which itself is objectification devoid of factuality, as are all forms of psychic manifestation such as dreaming and what has been termed 'hallucination'.

Sentient and present phenomena, as what they are unmanifested, defined here in conceptual terms as Sentience and Presence (or 'Consciousness' or 'Awareness' or, Vedantically, as 'Being'), unextended in conceptual space and duration, are total phenomenal potentiality. As integers they are not at all in any sense that can be conceptualised, but their noumenal potentiality is absolute and inclusive of all conceivable manifested expression, which is expression by means of, and subject to, the duality of an apparent conceiver and what is apparently conceived.

There can be no noumenal 'existence' as such, for all forms of existence, and its absence, are the product of the dualistic mechanism of conceptuality, which is the objectivisation of the noumenal which as such has no phenomenal 'existence' whatever.

* * *

Phenomena ARE 'mind',
All that is sensorially-perceived IS 'mind',
And we are the perceiving sentience.
Sentience as such is phenomenal experience of 'mind',
And 'mind' means, and is, noumenon.
The apparent existence of phenomena
Is the apparent existence of 'mind',
But we can only be conscious of 'mind',
When we become aware of noumenal presence.
Using the word 'I' to indicate our phenomenal absence.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 28

Let Us See

I

Have you ever noticed how often the great Masters seemed unable to understand why their monks found it so difficult to apperceive, how often they said 'but look! It is just here!?' Let us try and see the meaning of this.

The teaching of all the greater Masters is simply to enable us to understand that objectivisation is what hinders us from apperceiving what in fact we are. What is translated as 'thinking' means conceptualising - fabricating objects in mind. As long as we do that we can only perceive 'that': we cannot apperceive 'This', and the apperceiving of 'This' is just awakening from the dream of an objective universe to the actuality of what is. But what-is is nothing objective and cannot be objectified in any way, which means that it cannot be conceptualised. That is not some obscure mystery, as is supposed, but an absolutely obvious and logical inevitability. As has so often been pointed out here, it is merely because what is looking cannot see 'looking'; what is conceptualising, or functioning in any manner, cannot observe 'functioning', and 'it' cannot be observed because it is not any kind of object, being the subject of all objects. There is absolutely no mystery about it. All speculations end in the so-called 'Void', but there is no such thing: it is what is not there. It is 'here', if you like, metaphorically speaking, and, being 'here', being the looking, it cannot be seen by itself. Of course 'it' has no 'self', but if you have to say that it is a 'self', phenomenally inexistent, you are not far out. Phenomenally absent, absence as such, 'it' is noumenally present, presence as such. Words, fundamentally dualistic and phenomenal, cannot take us nearer.

Most of the 'methods' advocated comprise a cessation of 'thinking', but it has been widely observed - and anybody can verify it - that this demands an effort that cannot be long sustained. The inference seems to be that if such effort could be sustained, conceptualisation should cease and what is termed 'enlightenment' (awakening to what we are) would supervene. Few things could be more unlikely, however. What is operating here

is positive, since it implies effort, and what is apparently functioning is a conceptual 'I' desperately trying to pull itself up by its own boot-straps. Awakening to what we are requires no phenomenal effort: it just happens, and all 'we' can do is to allow it to happen. Nor do we normally give it much opportunity. Why, because its opportunity is our absence as 'I'. The situation must be vacant. As long as 'we' are conceptualising, the situation is not vacant, for trying not to conceptualise is a precise and potent form of conceptualisation.

There is not, cannot be, any prescriptive method of not conceptualising: it can just - lapse. And it is more liable to lapse when 'we' have understood that conceptualising is not the only way of living and thing-we-can-do. Sitting down in a very uncomfortable position (for us), with our legs under our chin, and concentrating on not-thinking, or on some positive nonsense such as 'love' of someone or something, can only affirm our conceptual 'I'. One might, perhaps, say: the conceptual absence of what is conceived HERE - is what I am; or, the present absence which is what I am, is the absent presence of my appearance.

This may read like a cosy little chat, but it need not be regarded as such. If that is all it is, I am doing it very badly - which is by no means unlikely. But it is improbable that writing bombastically makes it any easier. All I am trying to point out is that as long as we are conceptualising we are 'out', and as soon as we cease to conceptualise we are 'in'. I suggest that it is as simple as that, and that people who say otherwise seem to be talking through their hats. The furthest we need go to meet them would be to say that the moment we cease our conditioned attitude of permanent and unremitting conceptualisation regarding all things whatsoever - we are comfortably seated in a bodhimandala, which is a metaphorical 'gazebo' or shrine in which awakening to the obvious, the so very very obvious, may supervene at any moment.

In short, our whole trouble - if trouble it seems to us - is our conditioned notion that nothing can be that is not a concept. This, of course, also happens to be true; in fact nothing whatever we regard as existing is other than as a concept in mind. But what we are is not any thing, of that kind or of any other kind, and we can never reintegrate what we are by means of our habitual conceptualising. This habit is so ingrained that we cannot normally imagine anything that is not conceptual, and we endeavour to imagine what we are in the same way, which, as has been stated, is forever impossible.

The flaw in the argument of most people is the notion that our conditioning is too great to allow us to understand anything otherwise than as an object. I am not able to believe that it is so, and go so far as to suggest that it is quite easy and that anyone can do it at any moment. Unfortunately most writers refuse to give us a chance, whereas I am writing this just to say 'try it and let it happen'. Did not Jesus Himself remark 'Knock, and it shall be opened unto you'? But there is knocking and knocking; if you knock hard the Porter may be annoyed; he may ask who is this egoistic individual, just the type we do not accept Here! In fact perhaps the 'knock' is no more than an availability to enter, which is no entry - since we are already within without knowing where we are.

Have I said it even now? Objectivisation is the only obstacle, but it does not need a substitute: a counter-force of equal strength is not what is required: we are what subsists when it is absent.

II

It is externalising instead of internalising. The phenomenal universe is perceived 'without' whereas it should be apperceived 'within' - as every sage and prophet, including Jesus, has pointed out, wherein it becomes 'the kingdom of Heaven'.

The noumenal reason is equally radical: phenomena are extended in 'space' and have duration in 'time', without which they could not be perceived, and without which there could be no perceiver: both must 'last' in order that any thing can be known at all. Such is the essential characteristic of phenomenality, whereas noumenality, having no characteristics whatever, knows no such limitations.

Concepts are extended in space-time, therefore, for they are phenomenal, and the concept of 'not-conceiving' is maintained, for as long as it can be maintained, in the degree of 'time' which clocks can measure. And it is maintained by an act of volition, which is the conceptual-I functioning; whereas only in the absence of a conceptual-I could it be possible for what-we-are to replace that concept.

Noumenality, quite evidently, cannot manifest itself directly in a time-context, since its manifestation as such is only possible subject to space-time, wherein it divides into apparent subject and object and operates via the mechanism of opposing interdependent counterparts - which operation results in the phenomenal universe. Space-time can only be phenomenal, noumenality knows it not, and nothing phenomenal can be directly noumenal for there is a solution of continuity between them. Noumenon is transcendent to phenomena, but it is immanent therein.

Thus every concept is subject to space-time, and every concept can only be true phenomenally, so that nothing 'we' can say conceptually could possibly be true noumenally: what we call 'truth' phenomenally, conceived by split-mind, must necessarily be nonsense noumenally to whole-mind. It then follows that neither conceptualising nor not-conceptualising, the positive and negative aspects of conceptuality, can open the way to noumenality. As long as 'we' tacitly accept the factors of 'space' and 'time', themselves interdependent as 'space-time', nothing we say or do can have noumenal validity. 'Space-time' it is that constitutes the 'insurmountable obstacle', and only in the absolute silence of the mind, which is conceptual absence, can 'we' cease even for an instant to seem to be what-we-are-not in order to find integration in what-we-are.

Note: Saying it simply: there is no phenomenal way out.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 29

Happiness

Happiness is dependent on duration: it can only appear to exist in the sequence of 'time'. Moreover nobody can know that he is happy - an animal doesn't, a child doesn't; a man may know it afterwards. Therefore happiness can only be an effect of memory.

You look at an animal, a child, a man, and you say 'he is happy'? It is you who see it: he doesn't. You may be right, but it is you who recognise whatever you mean by 'happiness': what you recognise exists in you, and nowhere else wherever. Moreover in you also it only appears to exist in relation to memory - memories of memories of something you never knew otherwise at all.

You say that you can train yourself to recognise it almost at once? Almost - but not quite, for even then it belongs to the 'past'. In order to know what it is you cannot any longer

be subject to the passage of 'time', which means that you can no longer be 'you', and that 'it' cannot any longer be 'happiness' - for then, what it is - you must be.

It never existed at all: it is merely your interpretation from memory of your own intemporal nature.

I am: it is you who supply the details - and they are whatever your reactions may imagine, but they belong to 'you' and not to 'me' - for there is none such, other than in your mind.

Note: When a dog is released from a rabbit-trap in which his paw has been caught, he bounces with delight? When you win a bet at long odds, or receive any unexpected satisfaction, you also bounce with delight? Quite so. That proves, if proof were necessary, that all counterparts are mutually dependent, more spectacularly revealed in cases of sudden contrast, but experienced after all departures from a norm. However long or short its duration in a time sequence, it is always a memory that you 'enjoy', never the event as it is occurring.

In myself I am nothing, exactly no thing: I am only a mirror in which others see aspects of themselves and attribute the resulting concepts to 'me'. But I am also an 'other' to my 'self'.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 30

'Suffering' in Buddhism

When the Buddha found that he was Awake during that night under the bodhi-tree it may be assumed that he observed that what hitherto he had regarded as happiness, as compared with suffering, was such no longer. His only standard henceforward was ananda or what we try to think of as bliss. Suffering he saw as the negative form of happiness, happiness as the positive form of suffering, respectively the negative and positive aspects of experience. But relative to the noumenal state which now alone he knew, both could be described by some word in Maghadi, the language he spoke, which was subsequently translated as dukkha. Dukkha is the counterpart of sukha which implied 'ease and well-being', and whatever the Maghadi word may have meant it remains evident that to the Buddha nothing phenomenal could appear to be sukha although in phenomenality it might so appear in contrast to dukkha.

This proposition is quite general and can be more readily perceived in the case of - say - humility. Humility is the negative form of pride, and pride the positive form of humility: they are not different as what they are but only in their interpretation. What we mean by true or perfect humility is not that at all: it is the absence of ego-entity to experience either pride or humility because, if humility is experienced, it rebecomes a form of its opposite - pride.

Similarly what we interpret as suffering and its opposite are just negative and positive experience, but when there is no longer a supposed ego-entity to experience either, neither can be present any longer, and what remains is sat-chit-ananda the division of which into three elements is merely a dualistic convenience. To require an accurate translation into Pali or Sanscrit of words in a lost language, long centuries before the dialectics of

Nagarjuna, Arya Deva, and Candrakirti, is unreasonable, particularly in a tradition rooted in the Positive Way which is natural to Indians: it is the inevitable burden of the Buddha's teaching which concerns us rather than the dubious terms in which it may have been put into writing several centuries after his parinirvana.

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POSTHUMOUS PIECES : 31

I Am But There Is No 'Me'

I

What is called 'experience' is the effect of reacting. It has no existence as such. It is sensually interpreted as pleasant or unpleasant, i. e. as positive or negative sensation, but it is conceptual, not factual.

What is it that experiences? Surely this is the ultimate question?

Must that not always appear as 'me'?

Whenever there is experience, cognisance, is there not also the presence of 'me'?

And vice-versa whenever there seems to be awareness of 'me', must there not be a present experience?

Can either appear without the other?

Are they not - therefore - inseparable?

II

Experience, therefore, is inseparable from 'me'; whenever it occurs a self, an object, experiences it. Always it is experienced by 'me', never by 'I' or by 'you'.

I cannot suffer experience, because only an object can appear to suffer, and I can never be anything objective - which is any thing at all.

Nor can 'you' suffer experience, for in any kind of experience suffering is suffered as 'me' and by 'me', whoever seems to have the experience.

Therefore 'experiencing' and 'me' are both objects and inseparable.

When I say 'I suffer an experience', that is nonsense - for an experience can only appear to be suffered by an objective 'me', and that experience and that 'me' are inseparable.

This fallacious identification of what-I-am, of I, with 'me', of subjectivity with objectivity, is precisely what is meant by 'bondage': it is what 'bondage' is.

For, This I am, but that 'me' is not. A 'me', like any and every object, is sunya and k'ung, existentially null and void, non-existent except as a concept in mind.

But since experience is a reaction to stimulus, the question subsists: what is it that reacts?

The answer is that what reacts is the experiencing of the experience, which is 'me'.

III

Therefore what is assumed to be the nominative 'I' regarded as an object - absurd contradiction-in-terms as that is - referred to in the genitive, dative, and ablative cases as 'me', and also in the accusative except when the verb that denotes 'being' is used, is a sensorial apparatus whereby experience is suffered psycho-somatically.

It is indeed noteworthy that in the English language the concept of 'being' should be reserved for 'I'. One may even be tempted to surmise that this abnormality might represent a deep-seated apprehension of the truth. Such phrases as 'I am I', 'You are I', 'He, she or it is I', 'We are I', are pure metaphysical expressions of the truth in so far as that could ever be stated in dualist terms. This is surely a sacred linguistic tradition if anything could be so-called!

The conclusion, both linguistically and metaphysically, is that I experience as 'me'. From this it should follow that I, objectified as 'me', as manifold 'me', am experiencing as such, and that experience is the objective functioning of what I am.

Experience is reagent, it is an interpretation of a sensorial reaction to stimulus, but however complex or simple this mechanism in a context of space and duration may appear to be, it may be apprehended as the essential manifestation of what-I-am objectified as 'me'.

IV

May we not conclude, therefore, that since every sentient being appears to live and to experience, each one as 'me', 'living' as such is experiencing as 'me', and every sentient being must therefore be an example of the objectification of I-subject, utterly in-existent phenomenally as such, but all that whatever is manifest can be assumed ultimately to be? Since, however, nothing but what is phenomenal, which is objective, can be assumed to be - for neither the word 'being' nor 'existing' can imply anything but what is cognisable - we reach the inevitable conclusion that manifestation is not the manifestation of any objective 'thing', which could only be a concept in split-mind. It must be mind as such, not in its divided aspect which produces phenomenality via subject-and-object, but its in-temporal and in-finite wholeness which can only be indicated by 'I'. Any sentient being, whose sentience it is, may say it, but none can ever know it, for wholeness could never be known since knowledge results from its division, and an object cannot know the subject which is all that it is.

I can know that I am it, for all I am is what it is, but what 'it' is I can never know - for 'it' cannot be any 'thing' that could be known - otherwise than conceptually as each and all of 'its' dualised phantomatic representatives objectivised as 'you'.

* * *

To say 'I' suffer is non-sense, for I cannot possibly suffer, since I have no objective quality that could experience any sensation whatever. But suffering, positive or negative, joy or sorrow, can be experienced by an identified 'you' called 'me'.

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I, Noumenon, Speaking

(pub. The Mountain Path, October 1966. Posthumous Pieces (HKU Press, 1968) Part II, Chap. 32)

I only am as all beings,
I only exist as all appearances.
I am only experienced as all sentience,
I am only cognised as all knowing.
Only visible as all that is seen,
Every concept is a concept of what I am.
All that seems to be is my being,
For what I am is not any thing.
Being whatever is phenomenal,
Whatever can be conceived as appearing,
I who am conceiving cannot be conceived,
Since only I conceive,
How could I conceive what is conceiving?
What I am is what I conceive;
Is that not enough for me to be?
When could I have been born,
I who am the conceiver of time itself?
Where could I live,
I who conceive the space wherein all things extend?
How could I die,
I who conceive the birth, life, and death of all things,
I who, conceiving, cannot be conceived?
I am being, unaware of being,
But my being is all being,
I neither think nor feel nor do,
But your thinking, feeling, doing, is mine only.
I am life, but it is my objects that live,
For your living is my living.
Transcending all appearance,
I am immanent therein,
For all that is - I am,
And I am no thing.

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The Positive Way

VEDANTA

Being-Aware may be said to be what noumenally I am.
All aspects of being aware are what phenomenally I am,
But these are devoid of being in themselves,

For they are manifestations of being-aware.
If awareness can be said to be cognisable at all,
Such cognising is ultimate inseeing,
And might be called 'radiant voidness', manifesting as 'Grace'.
If I am aware of radiance - that may be awareness of what I am,
For, being Awareness, I am Radiance also.
What awareness is - I am,
What awareness seems to be - I am not,
Yet I am what every object is,
For every object is I.

The Negative Way

CH'AN

What I am must necessarily seem to be Unawareness,
Unaware of being aware.
It has been objectivised as 'Voidness'.
That is why I perceive awareness as my object,
Which I do not recognise as being what I am.
It has been objectivised as 'Cognition'.
This functioning, which is known as 'cognising',
Inevitably manifests in a conceptual extension,
Which is termed 'space-time',
And this is experienced by me as 'living'.
Since I can never become aware of my unawareness,
I can never be an object,
And I alone, of which I cannot be aware, cannot be known.
But everything of which I am aware,
Must necessarily be my object,
And therefore must be what I am,
For my object and I are not two.

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The Logic of Non-Logic

The Meaning of 'Noumenon'

The phenomenal is conceptual - appearance or form, the interdependent counterpart of which is the non-phenomenal, which is also conceptual - non-appearance or formlessness.

The source of the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal ('the world of form and the formless world' as the Masters referred to them) is noumenon.

'Noumenon', therefore, is not the interdependent counterpart (or the opposite) of 'phenomenon' but the source of 'phenomena and of non-phenomena'. All this is purely conceptual.

Phenomena are both positive and negative, both appearance and non-appearance, form and non-form, both presence and absence of form or of appearance, for each is dependent on the other and can have no hypothetical existence apart from the hypothetical existence of the other.

'Noumenon' is a symbol indicating double phenomenal absence - the absence of both counterparts or, as sometimes expressed, the absence of the negative counterpart (a double absence), which is also the absence of the absence of the positive.

Even as such, philosophically speaking, 'noumenon' still appears to be dualistic; that is, to be an objective concept requiring a 'cogniser' of some 'thing cognised'. But here there is no thing cognisable, and precisely because 'it' (noumenon) is also the cogniser, and indeed all hypothetical cognisers that ever were or ever could be.

As such 'it' is unfindable, unknowable, simply because 'it' could not be as an object of anything but 'itself' and 'it' could never know 'itself' as an object, so that the symbol is just a phenomenal ruse contrived in order to indicate some 'thing' which is not such. Referring to 'it' as 'Suchness' or 'Tao', or in any other way whatever, is equally futile logically - since 'it' is the supposed cognising element, the supposedly cognised, and the apparent act of cognition.

Living Without Tears

There cannot be any such thing as 'non-volitional living'; taken as a verb it is in fact a contradiction in terms, for the act of living non-volitionally must constitute an act of volition - the volition of non-volition. Like other negatives it is a mode of its positive, as its positive is a mode of itself.

But the fact, not the act, indicates something which phenomenally can be, for it can imply 'being lived', whereby 'non-volitionally' is understood, since there is no place for volition in the process of being lived.

Since, however, there is every reason, total evidence, to suppose that we are in fact lived, entirely and absolutely lived, like all dreamed figures in every sort and degree of dream, there cannot be any such factor as volition in the serial development of our lives.

'Volition', then, is not an effective element at all in phenomenal life, but one that is imagined to be such. It is in fact an expression of an I-concept, an 'ego' appearing to function, and as such may be seen as pure clowning, a psychic activity which, by pretended interference in the chain of cause-and-effect, produces the reactions recognised as satisfaction or frustration, according to whether the attempted interference has been in accordance with what had to occur or has been opposed to that.

Volitionally inhibiting 'volition', therefore, in no way factually effects the serial evolution of our lives, in no way has any impact on events, and endeavouring to abolish 'egotic' volition can only reinforce it by such an exercise of itself. For instance, when we are told to 'lay everything down', that means abandoning volitional activity - for everything we are required to 'lay down' is a supposed effect of supposed volition, and it could only be 'done' by a voluntary act, that is by a supposed 'ego' or independent 'self'; from which it follows that such is nothing more than an act of clowning or mummery.

If, then, it can effectually be done it must be a result, an effect of cause, and that cause can only be in the chain of causation which cannot in any degree be affected by an act of

will on the part of a supposed 'ego' or I-concept. Such cause can only arise as an effect of prior causes which, in such a case as that under consideration, can only appear as a result of understanding, the development of which may be described, somewhat metaphorically, as 'our' only freedom. (It is, of course, not 'ours', and phenomena cannot have 'freedom', which anyhow is only a concept applicable conceptually to them, but perhaps the 'noumenality' which in-forms phenomena manifests directly so that understanding may arise or 'appear'.)

Therefore non-volitional living, 'laying down' everything by an abandonment of volitional activity, or 'letting ourselves be lived', can only be effected by non-action (wu-wei); i.e. as a result of understanding arrived at by identification with the noumenality of prajna; that is, as an effect of in-seeing.

No apparent volitional interference is involved, nor, if it were, could it have any bearing on the effect except in so far as its absence or latency, the non-arising of ego-activity, leaves the mind open for the direct or intuitional apprehension which is represented by the picturesque Sanscrit concept called 'prajna'.

The intuition, indeed, is direct, but the result appears to us as indirect, for, to us, what we regard as 'direct' is a supposed effect of 'volition'. That is integral in the illusion of separate individuality and the notion of an 'ego' or I-concept, just as 'volition' is the apparent expression or activity of that, whereas in fact non-volitional life or being-lived is direct living, spontaneous living, wu wei, and at the same time is living without tears.