LECTURES AND DISCUSSION

Discussion II

Masa’aki Honda, Presiding

PART 1

CHAIRMAN: First, we ask Professor Yagi to comment on the lectures.

YAGI: I think Professor Takizawa explained clearly what the primary and the secondary contacts are. The distinction he made between them is very important to us. Also important is his view that the primary contact is the fact which is present at the ground of every man quite unconditionally. If it is true, it follows that the first contact itself was not established by Jesus Christ, that Jesus was a person in whom the secondary contact arose completely. Based on the primary contact, the secondary contact can take place also in Buddhists. So far, my own studies affirm Takizawa’s view. There is an ultimate ground, then, common to both Buddhism and Christianity, the ground which makes the dialogue between Buddhists and Christians possible. Not only can Christians learn from Buddhists the depth and pureness of their faith and their methods of meditation; Buddhists and Christians can also examine matters of common concern in authentic dialogue. Takizawa’s theory of the first and second contacts has essentially to do with the problem of the absoluteness of Christianity, that is to say, the question of what is the ground of our salvation.

Second, Professor Takizawa maintains that between God and man there is the relation of inseparability, unidentifiability and irreversibility. He says that the relation between the archedecision of God and self-decision of the man is the relation between the archetype and its reflection. This last statement sounds fairly Platonic. According to Professor Taki-
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zawa, Hisamatsu talks as if the individual self were transformed into the formless Self. But Professor Takizawa, on his side, talks as if God were an objective being facing man; as if the will of heteronomous God determined the will of man; as if, against his own disclaimer, God and man exist apart from each other originally. But, if the Original Vow of Amida-Buddha is the primary contact and the settlement of faith the secondary, then though man is distinguished from Amida, Amida and the man is really one, insofar as the human act of believing is at the same time the act of Amida-Buddha. Paul says, "It is no longer I who lives. Christ lives in me." The activity of Christ constitutes the very subjectivity of man. There is oneness here; not contact across a gap, but real oneness. Contact without a gap would seem to offer a choice between my ultimate subjectivity ("Christ in me") and my "ego." Though Professor Takizawa asserts inseparability, I wonder if he can maintain real oneness.

Third, Professor Takizawa claims that Hisamatsu went a step further than Nishida, as Hisamatsu did not posit anything like an individual self which could stand apart from the activity of the formless Self. He is right. Yet, Professor Takizawa criticizes Hisamatsu for his failure to distinguish clearly between individual self and the Formless when he speaks as if the individual self were transformed into the formless Self. I would like to hear comments of those who know Hisamatsu well. As far as I know, Hisamatsu did in fact hold a view similar to Professor Takizawa's. Indeed, he asserted oneness; but at the same time he saw very clearly the distinction between the Formless and the authentic individual self which is realized in the activity of the Formless, the base and the based.

Further, Professor Takizawa said that we could not find the conceptions of primary and secondary contacts in Hisamatsu. This seems to me improbable since, as Takizawa himself notes, these conceptions correspond to hongaku and shikaku, notions that a Zen philosopher would not be likely to reject. But because Hisamatsu spoke strictly from the standpoint of the Formless which is the real and ultimate subject of man, his utterances sometimes sound as if he regarded the individual self as absolute. I do not believe, however, that he intended his words to be taken in that way.

Fourth, Professor Takizawa says that there is a method of cognition common to religion, natural sciences, and social sciences. Since I have written on this problem, I can affirm what
he says. On the other hand, I think he should clarify the difference between the ways of cognition in religious awakening as self-understanding and the scientific cognition of objective beings. I would like to ask him to clarify also the difference between the matters which these different ways of cognition bring to light. For instance, I cannot approve when he speaks as if capitalists did not have their eyes open to the primary contact, whereas for socialists the secondary contact has taken place in the right way. Neither the former nor the latter, I think, have awakened to the primary contact of man with God.

Fifth, insofar as Karl Barth never posits anything apart from the archefact that God is with us, Professor Takizawa says he is at one with Hisamatsu. There are problems in understanding Barth. To the best of my knowledge, Barth rejects any revelation, any knowledge of God, which is not based on "Jesus Christ, to whom the Bible bears witness." To Karl Barth this is the only revelation. All other cognitions, apart from this, be it scientific, philosophical, or religious, are not accepted as revelation of God. With regard to this point, Emil Brunner was of the opinion that man could not accept the word of God as the word of God, if he did not know God apart from, or prior to, his faith in Christ. I cannot approve Brunner at all, and I think Takizawa would reject him also, insofar as Brunner saw the contact point with God in the rationality of the man. But in the sense of the prior contact of God with the man, I think Brunner stands nearer to Takizawa than to Barth, for Barth rejected any possibility of the knowledge of God apart from the revelation of God in Christ Jesus, and therefore, apart from faith in Him. If so, there is a grave difference between Barth and Hisamatsu. Hisamatsu rejected any dependence on the external form of the Savior, any external authorities or sources. He rejected such "heteronomous" knowledge as depends on the Bible very strictly. And whereas for Barth, God was objective, Hisamatsu never admitted an objectified deity.

Sixth, according to Professor Takizawa, Hisamatsu does not distinguish between sin itself and its forms, i.e., between ignorance of the primary contact and the forms which arise out of this ignorance, so that such forms of sin as the "absolute contradictions of being human" are mistaken for sin itself. But, for instance, Shinran says that the Light of Amida Buddha shines above the clouds of ignorance though the
heart of the man is clouded. I do not think that Shinran took
sin as something substantial that exists by itself. To Buddhists
sin is ignorance of Light. I believe this to be the case also with
Hisamatsu. I would like to hear the comments of Jodo Bud-
 dhists.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for the comments, Professor Yagi. Now
I would like to request participants to ask their questions.

NISHIMURA: I should like to put a question to Professor Yagi. You distin-
guish between "awakening" and "awareness of awakening." Now,
seen from the viewpoint of Professor Takizawa who
made the distinction between the primary and the secondary
contacts, is your first "awakening" the primary contact or the
secondary?

YAGI: Because this question bears upon the positions of both Profes-
sor Takizawa and Dr. Hisamatsu, please let me answer to it.
Now Hisamatsu was a well-known atheist. Generally speak-
ing, atheism is the assertion that there exists no God, though
there exist the man and the world. But, as I thought that
Hisamatsu's atheism was not of the ordinary sort, I visited
him and, questioning him closely, made sure of what he
meant by his "atheism." Whereas he denied the existence of
God, he denied also the existence of the "self" in the ordi-
nary sense of the word. I raised the distinction between
"awakening in its pure immediacy" and "awareness of awak-
ening in reflection," affirming on my side that there was no
God and no human self in the indiscriminateness of "awak-
ening in its pure immediacy." Then I said to Hisamatsu that,
where we are aware of our awakening in reflection, we must
see also the relation and distinction between the Transcen-
dent and the man, that therefore there must be God and
the man.

This Hisamatsu affirmed quite openly. Afterwards I found
a saying of Daisetsu Suzuki to the same effect: "Not only
Europeans, but men generally, stand at the point where real-
ity has been discriminated. There is a Zen saying, 'Where
immovable tathata is at work, there appear, necessarily, two
poles.' Now most people want to begin from the standpoint
where these poles have appeared. But I grasp where there are
not yet poles and I would like to say that this is the (ground
of) man. As regards to the union of God with man, we should
gasp where there is not yet God nor man to be united. In this
I differ very much from other men." (Zen no Sekai, Risō-sha,
1981, ed. by S. Ueda, p. 4.) "Self-awakening is something
that is named afterwards. Intuition itself is not to be defined
in any way. Reflected intuition we call self-awareness. Jodo Shinshū speaks of Other Power, but there must be a human self which is aware of the Absolute Power. Then it manifests itself and works actually.' (Ibid., p. 13) "I call it consciousness. In the beginning there is the act (in its pure immediacy). Reflecting on it, we cognize it and speak of 'self-awareness'." (Ibid., p. 12) When I say that in "indiscriminateness" there is neither God nor man, Professor Takizawa rejects it and says that nothing stable can come out of such ambiguous and transitory psychology, and that we must start from the clear cognition of the contact and the boundary between God and man. But the indiscriminateness of intuition is the starting point not only of Suzuki but also of Hisamatsu and Professor Nishitani Keiji. We must grasp both the indiscriminateness of pure immediacy and the awareness of awakening in reflection. Otherwise our cognition would not be free from discriminating intellect. Now my conceptions of "awakening in its pure immediacy" and "awareness of awakening in reflection" correspond to Suzuki's conceptions of "intuition" and "self-awareness." Professor Takizawa's objection, that Hisamatsu did not distinguish sufficiently between the Formless and the human self is, at least to some extent, based on Takizawa's rejection of the two standpoints of intuition and awakening as Suzuki described them.

NISHIMURA: Awakening is not an ontological principle but an epistemological one, isn't it? Now Professor Yagi, the intuition prior to the awakening, that which is "not to be defined in any way," is this intuition the primary contact or the secondary contact in the schema of Professor Takizawa?

YAGI: In Professor Takizawa's schema it is the secondary contact for awakening is a human act. I think you are concerned with the question of what should be understood as primary reality in Buddhism and Christianity.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, awakening is the secondary contact, for the awakening which occurs unexpectedly to a man at some time and in some place is a form of the self-determination of the man.

NISHIMURA: Even the intuition which is not to be defined in any way?

TAKIZAWA: Yes. But maybe the awakening which I understand through Hisamatsu is not the same as that which Mr. Yagi understands. I do not accept that awakening is something which cannot be defined at all. There is the contact point, the boundary between God and man, and awakening is just becoming aware of this point. I believe it is evident.

NISHIMURA: Is your religious ground, after all, an ontological principle or...
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an epistemological one, Professor Takizawa? Is it God or intuition?

TAKIZAWA: The primary contact is at the same time an ontological and an epistemological ground.

DOI: I agree that there is primary contact. But it is hidden from man. We can become aware of it only when we encounter Jesus Christ through the Bible, or when we encounter God in the same way.

TAKIZAWA: The ground of human being is also the ground which makes possible our cognition. Both are the same ground. I affirm that a Christian comes to know the reality of the ground of his salvation through the encounter with Christ. But it is impossible that the cognition is prior to the existence of the ground.

DOI: Not so. I mean that the secondary contact enables us to cognize the primary.

TAKIZAWA: We cannot say that the occurrence of the secondary contact permits us the cognition of the primary contact. The secondary contact means just the awakening to the primary contact. The sayings and deeds of Jesus, his fleshly figure, aid us in awakening. But the awakening comes directly from the primary contact. The secondary contact is not the base on which the cognition of the primary takes place.

DOI: But you recognize that there are many men who are not aware of the primary contact in spite of the existence of the primary contact.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, the awakening is very rare.

DOI: The awakening to the primary contact is an event which concerns me here and now. But it can take place only in the tradition of Christianity and the Christian church. You seem to ignore the meaning of the religious tradition and to affirm a sudden occurrence of the awakening to someone apart from the tradition.

TAKIZAWA: The tradition is continuous through discontinuity. It aids us to have an awakening, but the awakening itself comes out of the ground of the self; it is not caused by the tradition. This ignorance comes from vain efforts to seek one's ultimate ground in the relative, visible forms in this world. I deny that we cannot become aware of the ultimate ground because of the Original Sin of Adam. On the contrary, there is the wonderful fact that the Israelites were aware of the relation of man to what is invisible and beyond his grasp. But no one can say that it is possible only for Israelites. We can confirm this historically.

HONDA: If so, Jesus Christ is not the ground of our salvation, but
merely one of the various aids, perhaps the arche-aid, to the salvation of man.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, the fleshly figure of Jesus is an aid to us.

HONDA: Then Jesus as a historical person is to Christians just what the historical Gautama Buddha is to Buddhists.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, he is.

HONDA: Why, then, is Jesus only the arche-aid to Christians?

TAKIZAWA: There is a basic and irreversible relation between God and man, and when this relation expresses itself in our human world, there arises the relation of the center and the periphery which cannot be easily reversed. We cannot say in advance what plays the role of the center. We must see the historical fact. Christians assert that there is only one arche-aid, that is to say, Jesus, and that there are no other aids. But one need not say this.

HONDA: Then the arche-aid is not limited to Jesus alone.

TAKIZAWA: No. You said "arche-aid." But there is no reason why there must be an arche-aid.

HONDA: You mean, then, that there may be any number of aids. You say that the secondary contact means awakening to the primary contact. Does it mean also that the awakened man begins to exist in a new way?

TAKIZAWA: Yes, yes, it does. To add just a few words to the previous topics, the fleshly figure of Jesus is very important. Jesus himself stood on the rock of Life and taught us that we are also based on the same rock of Life, that we can live as he did. The most important thing for us Christians is to see that we are based on the rock of Life. If we really see it, it becomes clear to us that we should not cling to Jesus. When Peter tried to keep Jesus back, Jesus said to him, "Away with you, Satan!" I think Jesus died in order to show that we are based on the rock of Life, even after the fleshly figure of Jesus has disappeared.

NISHIMURA: Often you speak of the determinateness of man. If the content of the primary contact is absolute determinateness of man by God, what is our freedom or responsibility?

TAKIZAWA: Without absolute determinateness there would be no freedom and no subjectivity of man. Because man is absolutely determined, it follows that we should not do anything in ignorance of this fact.

TAKEDA: Professor Yagi said that he found Professor Takizawa's way of expression problematical. Professor Takizawa, does the primary contact mean, if we may translate it into Buddhistic terms, śūnyatā, tathatā, or dharmakāya? If we may un-
stand it so, I think you are not quite right from the viewpoint of Jōdo Shinshū. I find such conceptions as contact or arch-decision problematic. When you say "the formless Subject," is the Formless synonymous with śūnyatā?

TAKIZAWA: Yes, it is.

TAKEDA: In Jōdo Shinshū, too, dharmakāya is the Formless. Now, in your theory, does contact refer to the contact of God with man?

TAKIZAWA: Yes, it does.

TAKEDA: The Formless is reality prior to the distinction between God and man, that is to say, reality in which no such limitation as God or man is possible, in which there is nothing that we could call "contact between God and the man." When you speak of the Formless, you use nevertheless the term "contact." This expression presupposes the relation between God and man. But, from the viewpoint of Jōdo Shinshū, dharmakāya precedes the relation between Amida and man; it is the reality which makes the relation possible. Therefore, it is nothing but śūnyatā. Do you understand the Formless as such a field?

TAKIZAWA: What I mean with my term "primary contact" is, transposed into the terms of Jōdo Shinshū, Amida the One Buddha, the Vow of Amida Buddha, while the secondary contact is the settlement of the unshakable faith.

TAKEDA: The Vow of Amida is also comprehended in the secondary contact, isn’t it? For the Vow of Amida is not dharmakāya itself.

TAKIZAWA: Amida Buddha is found in the dharmakāya. He is at the same time Amida (as Light which nothing can hinder). Therefore, He is identical with the dharmakāya. And it is through the Vow of Amida that human beings can speak of dharmakāya. Dharmakāya is not visible except in the Vow of Amida. That is to say, dharmakāya is not visible except at the contact point of God with man, i.e., at the boundary between them. Here Amida, the One Buddha as he is, is dharmakāya. We cannot say that there is dharmakāya apart from Amida the One Buddha.

TAKEDA: As Shinran said clearly, Amida is the image of the Formless that has neither figure nor color. As bodhisattva Hozo, He made the Vow and became Amida Buddha. If the Vow of Amida is the primary contact, what then is tathātā itself, the image of which is Amida? The Vow of Amida is not absolutely formless.
TAKIZAWA: Nevertheless, it is not the product of the self-limitation of something finite, something with form. As tathāgata it is present in every finite being. At the same time it is identical with the dharmakāya. It is in this sense that the Vow of Amida is the primary contact.

YAGI: From the theory of Professor Takizawa it must follow that the relation between dharmakāya and Amida is the relation of inseparability, unidentifiability and irreversibility. Is there no unidentifiability and irreversibility between them?

TAKIZAWA: Yes, there is, in a way. The relation between Father and Son is irreversible.

TAKEDA: I affirm this irreversibility. Then there must be irreversibility between the dharmakāya and Amida Buddha.

TAKIZAWA: If so, then Hisamatsu’s criticism of Jōdo Shinshū is right: Jōdo Shinshū makes a finite Buddha, with a certain form, absolute. In Christianity, Father and Son are quite identical, though the relation between them is irreversible. The relation between Amida the One Buddha and bodhisattva Hōzō seems to me analogous to the relation between the Eternal Son and Jesus of Nazareth.

TAKEDA: We distinguish between the Eternal Amida and the Amida of ten kalpas. The latter is called generally hōbenbutsu (an expedient Buddha form which the Formless takes for the sake of the man).

TAKIZAWA: If the hōbenbutsu with a certain form is the ground, the indispensable condition, of our salvation, then Hisamatsu’s criticism of Jōdo Shinshū is right.

TAKEDA: We believers who call the name of Amida see great significance in the fact that the Formless took form as Amida, the image of the Formless. We could even say that the Formless took form for the sake of salvation, because there are beings to be saved. But we are not therefore compelled to assert that the Formless is something quite separate from the infinite-with-form. The Formless acts in the finite itself, so that the finite is the manifestation of the Ultimate. If we do not understand the matter in this way, we misunderstand the sense of hōben, namely Buddha-kaya for the sake of beings.

TAKIZAWA: If the existence of beings to be saved caused Amida to appear, here is a problem: Where were the men-to-be-saved before Amida appeared? Has there ever been a man who was not found in Amida?

TAKEDA: It is a large question. There is no priority or posteriority, but simultaneity. For the sake of the men who are lost, who are
not awakened to the dharmakāya, dharmakāya took the figure of hōbenbossin and appeared as Amida Buddha. But if we discuss the relation between the Formless and the Buddha-with-form in disregard of the deeds of bodhisattva Hōzō, his vow and praxis, there is the risk of falling into abstract theory.

TAKIZAWA: If Jōdo Shinshū maintains that lost beings ever existed entirely separated from the dharmakāya, and that Amida appeared in order to unite them, it exhibits the same flaw as traditional Christianity. (The assumed separation is in reality quite impossible. And the concept of the Savior takes on the character of an ultimate, an absolute.)

YAGI: Do the men lost have no Buddha-nature according to Jōdo Shinshū? The separation from dharmakāya would mean this.

TAKEDA: In Jōdo Shinshū the theory of Buddha-nature is very complicated. Some people maintain that faith is Buddha-nature, others that the non-substantiality is Buddha-nature. There is a view also that, if all sentient beings had Buddha-nature, salvation by Amida would be unnecessary. But according to Shinran evidently faith is Buddha-nature. The Vow is one with faith. The Vow realizes itself as the Vow through human faith. Therefore, faith is Buddha-mind and the Buddha-mind is the Vow. This is the structure of salvation.

TAKIZAWA: If Jodo Shinshu insists upon salvation solely by Amida whereas Christianity persists in saying that salvation is solely through Jesus Christ, then dialogue between them would be impossible.

TAKEDA: Professor Takizawa would appear to be saying, on the contrary, that Christians could be believers in Amida and believers in Amida could be Christian.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, I approve such relative interchangeability.

TAKEDA: Is it in fact possible for Christians who see their salvation absolutely in Jesus to find in Amida Buddha the object of their faith? Could the corresponding interchange of the object of faith happen to believers in Amida? It seems to me quite impossible. The dialogue between Christians and believers in Amida consists in the mutual translation of their religious experience, in such a way that the adherents of each religion learn from each other the way of faith and deepen their own position.

TAKIZAWA: German theologians criticize me and say that religions are leveled to abstract generality in my position. But I think, on the contrary, that concrete reality is lost through the absolutification of historical events and experiences.
TAKEDA: You do, after all, take the course from Savior to dharmakāya, the road to the absolutely general.

TAKIZAWA: No, I stand on the Savior. This is the primary contact and no human being exists in separation from this.

TAKEDA: You do not think, then, that dharmakāya is primary reality whereas the Savior is secondary.

TAKIZAWA: I do not think so because Amida the One Buddha is identical with the dharmakāya.

TAKEDA: No, it is not.

TAKIZAWA: The relation between dharmakāya and Amida is, translated into Christian terms, the relation between the members of the trinity. It corresponds to the relation between Father and Son in the trinity, whereas my conceptions of the primary and secondary contacts concern the relation between God and man, the second contact being an awakening to the primary contact.

TAKEDA: The relation between God and the man cannot be separated from the relation between dharmakāya and Amida. Because beings have been lost, the Savior appears out of dharmakāya and saves them. It is in speaking of the relation between dharmakāya and Amida, therefore, that the Savior is secondary.

FUJIYOSHI: You said, Professor Takeda, that there was irreversibility between dharmakāya and Amida Buddha. But in Buddhism there is no irreversibility between them. The one comprehends the other, so that Buddhism does not speak of irreversibility between them. It is difficult for me to understand what you maintain.

TAKEDA: Nevertheless, I hold that the relation between them is in a sense irreversible.

FUJIYOSHI: This position of Jōdo Shinshū does not hold true for Zen. I feel the difference poignantly.

TAKEDA: Salvation implies irreversibility necessarily.

FUJIYOSHI: To that extent it is true. But in Jōdo Shinshū the believer equals Maitreya or even Amida.

TAKEDA: As far as faith is concerned, yes.

FUJIYOSHI: Jōdo Shinshū has not only doctrine, praxis and faith, but also enlightenment. Insofar as it is Buddhism, it must speak of enlightenment and the enlightened man equals Buddha. In the final analysis the relation between buddha-kāyas, and also the relation between Buddha and man, are reversible.

TAKEDA: As long as you say, "in the last analysis," I can go along with you.

YAGI: We are typing different problems together. We should dis-
tinguish the relation between buddha-kāyas from the relation between the primary and the secondary contacts, as Professor Takizawa mentioned before. The problem or the relation between dharmakāya and Amida corresponds, on the side of Christianity, to the problem of the trinity; the relation between Eternal Amida and bodhisattva Hōzō corresponds to Christology. Further, the problem of the primary and the secondary contacts in the sense of Professor Takizawa should be distinguished from problems of priority of transcendental realities, namely, what is primary reality, God or Savior; whether they are one or two; and whether the relation between them is reversible or not. The conceptions of the primary and secondary contacts concern rather soteriology and pneumatology, because “secondary contact” signifies the awakening to the archerelation of God with man, i.e., salvation. In terms of traditional Christianity, it means that man receives the Spirit. This corresponds to awakening or the settlement of unshakable faith in Jōdo Buddhism. Professor Takeda seems to be asking what is primary, ultimate reality and what is secondary; or, what is the ultimate standpoint of man, whether it is dharmakāya or the Savior.

TAKEDA: But the problem of trinity cannot be separated from that of soteriology.

YAGI: True, because the second person in the trinity, the Son, is also the Savior. The doctrine of trinity is rooted in the structure of salvation and in the structure of revelation. But as the secondary contact in the sense of Professor Takizawa is the realization of salvation, we had better distinguish it from the problems of the trinity or Christology; and in Buddhist terms, from the theory of buddha-kāyas.

TAKIZAWA: I distinguish between them. I should have clarified at the beginning that the meaning of “primary” and “secondary” in the analysis of the contacts of God with man is different from the meaning of “primary” and “secondary” in the question about ultimate reality.

YAGI: I have the impression that the “contact of God with man” according to Professor Takizawa is somehow different from tathāta or the primary reality in Buddhism.

TAKEDA: That is my feeling, too.

FUJIYOSHI: I agree.
We would like to discuss the Zen philosophy of Hisamatsu. Hisamatsu went a step further than Nishida, said Professor Takizawa. Though this could have various senses, I feel so, too. Hisamatsu as a pupil obeyed his teacher Nishida faithfully. In his later years Hisamatsu, commenting on his teacher's philosophy, at times said that Nishida had not seen certain points that Hisamatsu saw.

Takizawa: Hisamatsu did not lay undue stress on the finite self whereas Nishida's philosophy was not free from this fault. One should not give Nihil, or Satan, a place in one's philosophical system. In this regard Hisamatsu saw the matter much more clearly. Hisamatsu could see history more accurately. Laying stress on the Formless one can make positive research into history very well. Nishida, on the contrary, was not quite free from speculative constructions of history.

Fujiyoshi: Buddhists hold that Gautama Buddha had not only religious enlightenment but also wisdom to understand the matters of the secular world. Yuishiki (Vijnanavada) expounds the conception of secular wisdom obtained after awakening and teaches that religious enlightenment must be followed by secular wisdom to criticize the matters of the world. I think Hisamatsu had religious enlightenment. Now we can ask today how those who have acquired religious wisdom see history. In fact Hisamatsu had a clear view of history and his own way of seeing the world. It was said before that because Hisamatsu did not distinguish between the Formless and the forms it takes, between sin itself and its forms, his eye to see history critically was somewhat clouded. Yet he asked very sincerely how to reform actual realities and how to create history. He was of the opinion that we had to consult authorities about this matter. So he appealed to the professors of Kyoto University and asked them to draw up a plan to create history. But to our regret, few could offer concrete ideas. Thus, the problems of culture, nature, economy, international relations, and poverty were matters of personal concern to him, and led to his founding the FAS association. (FAS: Formless self, All mankind, Super-historical history.)

Religion recognizes not only enlightenment, but also secular wisdom. There is actually a fundamental religious orientation to the secular world. But when we need concrete ideas we must consult those who have deep knowledge of complex social situations. Generally speaking, religious men are
scarcely interested in such problems as how to create history, so that they estrange themselves from social life. Hisamatsu rejected this attitude as wrong and broadcast his views very actively.

TAKIZAWA: As regards to principles versus actualities, capitalism in our time has become increasingly collective, whereas socialistic countries are unable to dispense with capital. It has therefore become fashionable to say that the one is today not very different from the other. But this opinion overlooks an important distinction. Capitalistic society came about through the generalization of a commercialism based on the needs of private persons, in disregard of the fact that man is born in the world of nature and is intimately related to it. We must bear in mind that man's relation to the natural world does not depend on his own will. Recalling this limitation, and seeing the defect of capitalism, we understand the necessity of a transition from capitalism to socialism, a metamorphosis from negative to positive. In this way we arrive at principles. But in order to decide on concrete policy, scientific research independent of principles must be done in each situation. It is impossible to determine concrete policy on the basis of religious enlightenment alone.

FUJIYOSHI: Hisamatsu was a man who could view the world radically from the standpoint of a Buddha. After the Second World War he advocated trans-national politics for all mankind, since he saw in the state the root of all evil. When he heard that many people were dying of starvation in Africa, he wanted, quite seriously, to help them. He felt the pain of people in distant lands as his own pain.

TAKIZAWA: We should not judge the state apart from its actualities. When men produce and reproduce material goods, there arises necessarily a center which controls such activities, and so the state comes into being. The concrete activities of the state, just as those of man, are full of evil. But I wonder if it follows that we should therefore annihilate it. One could claim, against the general view, that the secular state is the Kingdom of God. This may seem to imply approval of the state. But in fact, when we perceive the state in this way, criticism inevitably follows. Then we see, from principles, how the actual forms of the state must be changed, what the processes of formation of the world-state are; and, perhaps, how various religious traditions could be preserved in such a state. The United Nations ought to make a thorough investigation of such problems.
Professor Yagi, you knew Hisamatsu in his later years, and I believe you too take issue with certain aspects of his philosophy.

Rather, I wonder if Professor Takizawa's criticism of Hisamatsu is well founded. Professor Takizawa says that Hisamatsu spoke as if the individual human self were transformed into the Formless. To my knowledge Hisamatsu asserts only that the ego dies and is built anew by the activity of the Formless.

Surely Hisamatsu made a clear distinction between the Formless and the individual self. During a lecture at Kyushu University he drew waves on the blackboard, then added a line under the waves and said that the waves correspond to individual men, the water beneath the line to the Formless Self, and the line to the distinction between them. But at the same time he affirms that man has the nature of, and the potentiality to become, Buddha. I do not think we are justified in saying that the activity or self-expression of the Formless does not become real until man is awakened. In spite of our sinfulness, the activity of the Formless is present. What awakening brings is not the activity of the Formless which comes to pass through it, but the authentic answer of man to the Formless. But as Hisamatsu does not set forth this difference distinctly, his words suggest that the activity of the Formless comes to pass only after man has awakened. Yet the presence of the activity of the Formless transcending time and place is dimensionally different from the awakening of man based upon it.

Professor Takizawa says that the Formless should be distinguished from historical reality, that the Formless is always active regardless of whether human historical reality answers, or does not answer, to its activity. Surely Hisamatsu did not talk in this way. But there is reason why he—

In the sphere of religion as in the sciences (though not in the same sense), there are objects entirely independent of human consciousness. That is why science is possible.

I am not a scientist, but I believe that scientists are now saying that the results given by observation are not objective, that the measured value varies according to the way in which a particular measurement is made. They seem to be of the opinion that the notion of an object altogether independent of human consciousness or human behavior is a fiction.

Even if we take human activities into account, it is still possible to cognize what is independent of human behavior. Field theory which encompasses human behavior is, I think, possible.
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YAGI: I believe that modern scientists hold that the measured value is a function of the method of measurement. In any conceivable dynamics which takes into account human behavior, absolute objectivity would be impossible.

TAKIZAWA: Even so, it cannot properly be called a correlation between subject and object. Cognition means, in any case, that the cognizing subject reflects what is independent of it.

YAGI: I think it is impossible that the archdecision is entirely independent of human subjectivity, because human thinking and acting themselves come to pass in the arche-relation. Professor Takizawa, you have maintained all along that circumstances are quite independent of us though we can speak of events insofar as they become manifest to us.

TAKIZAWA: I cannot refrain from saying that circumstances are not our consciousness because they are not. It is a serious flaw of the modern age that nothing can be thought about except in relation to human consciousness. If one cannot overcome this way of thinking, one cannot overcome the modern age.

YAGI: I think the idea of objectivity entirely independent of human consciousness is, not to say fiction, but a working hypothesis of the modern age. How is it possible to cognize what has nothing to do with human cognition?

TAKIZAWA: Well, cognition is possible precisely because the cognized has nothing to do with the cognizing at all. In the case of religious cognition, Jesus called God his "father;" God did not become his father because Jesus called Him "father."

YAGI: Yes, Jesus’ calling is also of significance. If the son refuses to call his father "father," the relation between father and son is not normal. This has bearing on the significance of awakening. Our problem arises when we encounter the reality of the Formless. Now the secondary contact in your sense corresponds, in the New Testament, to the conception of receiving the Spirit. When man has received the Spirit, it becomes possible for him to "walk after the Spirit." There are also the expressions, "Christ lives in me," and "Christ became manifest in me." All these expressions point to the content of what you call the secondary contact. Now, in the Fourth Gospel, Logos shone even before its incarnation. But before the incarnation the activity of Logos was not real in the historical actualities of man. It became real (in that sense) only after the incarnation of the Logos. Till that time the world remained in "darkness." In other words, the activity of God in historical actuality is real when it works in such a way that man is aware of it, so that man can answer to it, that is to say,
in such a way that it becomes manifest to the mind of man. In the saying of Suzuki quoted before it is said that the "Other Power" can work only through the person who is aware of It. If we call the activity of the Formless "real" when it works in such a way that a person becomes aware of it, we can say that it remains in possibility till that time, as Hisamatsu maintains. But if one makes such an assertion, you object, Professor Takizawa, that it [is an error which] confuses the human forms answering to the Formless with the Formless itself, lays improper stress on consciousness as a form of human activity. This is the basis of your criticism of Hisamatsu in your book. I entirely agree that the self is set in the field of activity of the Formless quite independent of, and prior to, the thinking and acting of man. Nevertheless, one has sufficient grounds for saying that the activity of the Formless is real in historical actuality only when it works in such a way that the eye of the man is opened to it, so that he becomes aware of it and can answer to it. One could even say that through the secondary contact the primary contact becomes alive to the man. Herein lies the meaning of Jesus as Savior: the primary contact became completely alive in Jesus for the first time in history, at least in Hebrew tradition. In this sense, I find your thesis problematic, but also significant as an antidote to the possible error of absolutizing the relative.

TAKIZAWA: That is not why I insist there is something absolutely prior to consciousness. If there were nothing absolutely prior to it, it would not become manifest to me. To give priority to the consciousness is only a modernist fashion.

YAGI: I am not positing consciousness which stands by itself, but rather a manifestation of the Formless in the human mind. For instance, because it is manifest we can say, "Thy will be done." This does not mean that the will of God depends on human will. On the contrary, the prayer means that the will of God can deny human will.

TAKIZAWA: Yes, the will of God is absolutely independent of human will.

YAGI: I cannot approve of the word "absolutely."

TAKIZAWA: I did not expect that you would approve of it. That is the difference between us.

YAGI: Be it "Christ in me" or be it "Transference of the Power of Amida's Vow to man," it constitutes my very subjectivity. In this point Christ is one with the man. But at this very point you speak of "absolute independence" or "irreversibility" or "the reflection of the arche-decision." Therefore, I wonder if
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you can really speak of inseparability. Oneness, in my understanding, is not the contact-without-gap.

TAKIZAWA: The primary contact is the ground both of being and of cognition. It means that there is the ground whether man knows it or not. It is simply a fact with the second contact that the existence of the ground becomes clear, and also the realization that it exists even if we do not know it at all. So, we cannot say that there would be no ground if we were ignorant of it, or that the existence of the ground would be then meaningless.

YAGI: The activity of the Formless is real when it takes place in such a way that man is aware of it. Religious life and cognition are realized in this way. But you lay so much stress on the objective reality of God apart from its manifestation in man that I am afraid it will lead to a confusion of God's reality in itself and its manifestation in man.

TAKIZAWA: The secondary contact means that man cognizes this [God's] independence. If you cannot approve, it shows that you do not see it.

YAGI: That there is independence, I affirm. But that it is absolutely independent, or that man comes to see the existence of the ground quite regardless of his cognitive disposition, I cannot entirely approve. You, too, speak of cognition, of knowing that which exists independent of human cognition; therefore, you too lay stress on cognition, don't you? I do not insist that we should at first posit consciousness by itself and then reason out the way to the existence of God from an analysis of the consciousness as Descartes did; much less do I hold that religious consciousness of man is the ground of the existence of God. I hold that normal consciousness itself is realized based on the activity of the Formless. I think the undistorted activity of the Formless is realized in historical reality when man is aware of it. When I say so, you feel that I make the Formless depend on the man. But the activity of the Formless is, I believe, distorted and hindered until man becomes aware of it in the "secondary contact." Jesus said, "How much longer must I endure you?" and Paul, "God had overlooked the sins of the past in his forbearance," and "Anger of God is revealed from heaven against all the impiety and injustice of men who suppress the truth in their injustice." The activity of God can be expressed in personalistic terms as anger, forbearance, or pain when man ignores it, when people in total ignorance of it, have not attained "secondary contact" with God. It is not exactly the case that there is the unchangeable
activity of the Formless entirely apart from human thinking and willing and that man, when his eyes are opened to it, begins to reflect it as it was and is. We can say that peace is realized between God and man when the ego of man is destroyed and established anew in the activity of the Formless and when man begins to live aware of it; that is to say, when the activity of the Formless is realized in historical reality through the awakened man answering to it correctly. What God is concretely depends on what we are in this sense. He is not absolutely independent. He acts against our sin. His act premises what we actually are. We can cognize what God is when reconciliation with God, or salvation of man, is realized, i.e., when the activity of God expresses itself through the person who is aware of it, though at the same time it is independent of the man. You criticize Hisamatsu because he lays stress more on the human moment of awakening than on the primary contact itself. But I think it is because the Formless acts through and as the awakened man that he lays stress on awakening.

TAKIZAWA: No. God insofar as he manifests himself to man belongs to the consciousness of the man. It is not God as he is. It may seem dogmatic to insist that God is entirely independent of human consciousness. I do it because if we do not bear this dogma in mind, our discussion will lose its base. In that case we will not be able to distinguish between the absolutely formless Self and the human figures based on it. Karl Barth did not make this distinction concerning Jesus, Hisamatsu did not do it concerning the awakened. It is important that the base of the human being has been decided quite one-sidedly, entirely regardless of human condition or ignorance. This is absolutely prior to my consciousness.

YAGI: To me, the normal consciousness of man is realized only in normal relationship to God. If so, we can hardly say that God is absolutely independent of it. Because you over emphasize the moment of irreversibility, I wonder if you can convincingly advocate your "inseparability."

TAKIZAWA: I affirm "oneness of the many."

YAGI: There are many meanings of "oneness."

NISHIMURA: I think Hisamatsu would say here, "The willow is green, the flower is red." Now, Professor Takizawa, does the secondary contact decide the way in which man lives?

TAKIZAWA: Yes, it is the fork in the road of his life.

NISHIMURA: Would you say that the secondary contact is the base of authentic human existence?
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TAKIZAWA: No, I would not.
NISHIMURA: That is what I have been taught. Would you say that man cannot stand on the ground of his life until he finds it?
TAKIZAWA: I would say rather that he finds that he has lived always based on that ground. Every man stands on it, is sufficiently based on it. Only because he had an erroneous view, it seems as if he had no ground at all before he found it.
NISHIMURA: To comment on it in terms of Zen, your position is not that of Rinzai-Zen, but that of Soto-Zen, which does not lay stress on awakening.
TAKIZAWA: Does not Rinzai-Zen also hold that there is a ground of human being quite regardless of whether the man is awakened or not?
NISHIMURA: Rinzai-Zen begins from the standpoint of man and moves in the direction of the Formless.
YAGI: Professor Takizawa, you say that man reflects the archedecision of God. But you do not mean that man reflects it undistortedly in whatever way he may live?
TAKIZAWA: No, because it is man who creates history.
YAGI: The very structure of "reflection" is our problem.
CHAIRMAN: The time has come to close the second discussion. Many thanks to all the participants.