

## Nishitani after Nietzsche: From the Death of God to the Great Death of the Will

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### The Death of God and the Birth of Dialogue

#### CRISIS AS OPPORTUNITY

For many, Nietzsche's proclamation of the "death of God"<sup>1</sup> marks a rupture in the history of the West; or at least it exposes a fracture in the ground of Western culture that had been steadily widening since the dawn of modernity. The "God" whose "death" Nietzsche announced is not only the Christian God of revelation, the creator and judge that had stood at the center of Western civilization for one and a half millennia, but also the "God of philosophy," the rational ground of metaphysical truth and ethical goodness. Many of the central debates in post-Nietzschean European philosophy have accordingly concerned the "overcoming of metaphysics," the "deconstruction" of the Western tradition of "ontotheology," and various attempts at radically questioning and/or rethinking our philosophical, religious, and cultural foundations.

In short, post-Nietzschean Western philosophy is characterized by a crisis of self-critique. Yet "crisis" (Gr. *krisis*) can also imply opportunity, a watershed or a turning point, as in a fever on the verge of breaking. It is indeed one of Nietzsche's insights that sickness can be a path to greater health.<sup>2</sup> As Heidegger suggests, a meditation on the "end of philosophy" as metaphysics or ontotheology may in fact enable a return to a more elemental "task of thinking."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, a deconstruction of the Western tradition of philosophy could be seen as a step on the way to what he calls at one point "planetary thinking,"<sup>4</sup> and specifically to what he refers to elsewhere as the "inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world."<sup>5</sup>

The crisis of Western philosophy may thus also be understood as an opportunity for opening up a dialogue with non-Western traditions. A loss of confidence in the ideology that equates modernization with Westernization with progress—an ideology that has always been much easier to calculate in terms of science and technology than in terms of philosophy and religion—may open a door through which we may “step back” into a realm of radical dialogical thinking, that is, into bilateral conversation between the roots of the Western and Eastern traditions, as well as between their modern and postmodern branches.

In fact, upon opening this door to dialogue with the East, what we find is that the Kyoto School of Japanese philosophy has, for several generations now, been passing through it from the other side.

#### THE PROBLEM OF THE WILL IN OVERCOMING NIHILISM

Nishitani Keiji, the central member of the second generation of the Kyoto School, has responded to the “death of God” and to the increasingly global problem of nihilism by developing a philosophy of Zen Buddhism.<sup>6</sup> In this essay I take up a central aspect of Nishitani’s contribution to what he calls the task of “overcoming nihilism by way of passing through nihilism” (NKC 20: 192),<sup>7</sup> namely, his deeply sympathetic and yet ultimately critical interpretation of Nietzsche. Rather than pursuing an exploration of Nishitani’s profound affinities with Nietzsche’s thought,<sup>8</sup> I shall focus here more on unfolding a confrontation (Gn. *Auseinandersetzung*) with Nietzsche’s central notion of “the will to power” (*der Wille zur Macht*) on Nishitani’s behalf. In the process I shall also be concerned to show how Nishitani’s thought develops certain philosophical implications of Zen Buddhism in a manner that resonates with significant post-Nietzschean responses to the crisis of nihilism in the West, that of Heidegger in particular.

A pivotal issue for post-Nietzschean philosophers is the relation between nihilism and the will. This issue can be expressed as a series of questions: Can the nihilism of the death of God be overcome only by accepting Nietzsche’s hypothesis that the world and we ourselves are “the will to power—and nothing besides”?<sup>9</sup> Does the death of the “Will of God” leave us with the untrammelled will of man? Does it leave us with the goal of the “overman” understood as a figure of maximum will to power? Can nihilism be “willfully overcome” or, as Heidegger has argued, is the “will to overcome” itself a central component of nihilism?<sup>10</sup> Could a “recovery” (*Verwindung*) from nihilism perhaps come about only by way of a “step back” from willing into a composed re-

leasement of letting-be (*Gelassenheit*)? Could there be a *radical* negation of the entire domain of the will that leads, *not* to what Nietzsche criticizes as a convoluted “will to nothingness,” but rather to an affirmative and active “non-willing” manner of being-in-the-world?<sup>11</sup>

In the context of these questions, Nishitani’s philosophy of Zen is significant for two reasons: First, in contrast to Heidegger’s criticism of what he calls Nietzsche’s “metaphysics of the will to power,” by emphasizing the idea of *amor fati* (love of fate) Nishitani is able to give a more nuanced and sympathetic interpretation of the depth and reach of Nietzsche’s thought. The second and most significant contribution of Nishitani’s thought in this context lies in his development of a Zen Buddhist critique of all forms of will and intimation of a non-willing way of being: a radical reaffirmation of life made possible by first passing through a “great death” (*daishi*) of self-will.

Before turning to Nishitani’s philosophy of Zen and his both sympathetic and critical interpretation of Nietzsche, let us first consider the debate between Nietzsche and his critics over the relation between nihilism and the will to power.

### **Nihilism and the Will: Nietzsche’s Critique and Critique of Nietzsche**

#### **NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE: NIHILISM AS NEGATION OF WILL**

According to Nietzsche, nihilism is “the devaluation of the highest values.”<sup>12</sup> Life as such is a matter of willfully positing values. By positing values humans impose interpretations on the world; and, insofar as “interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something,”<sup>13</sup> this interpretive positing of values is an expression of will to power. Nihilism is then understood to result from a weakness of will to power, from a lack of strength to impose an interpretive schema of values on the world. The “death of God” is the pronouncement of an inability to sustain the projection of a transcendent foundation for values—although it could also be said that, for Nietzsche, the history of nihilism begins already with the *birth* of God, since a transference of positive value to heaven implies a devaluation of life on earth, and since a deference to divine Will signifies a degeneration of human will.

According to Nietzsche, nihilism, which arises as the will to affirm life and impart meaning to the world wanes, is found in two forms: a Christian *ressentiment* and a Buddhist renunciation. “Among the nihilistic religions,” he writes, “one may always clearly distinguish the Christian from the Buddhist.” Buddhism is said to be “a religion for the end and the weariness of civiliza-

tion,” “the expression of a fine evening,” a “hedonism of the weary” without bitterness, disillusionment, and rancor. Christianity, on the other hand, is said to be “a degeneracy movement . . . founded on a rancor against everything well-constituted and dominant,” a revengeful movement which learned to use “barbaric concepts and values to become master over barbarians.”<sup>14</sup>

Nietzsche’s fundamental hypothesis, that the world and the self are nothing but the incessant fluctuations of the will to power, underlies his critique of both Christianity and Buddhism. The Western tradition of metaphysics and theology are said to have been built on denying this ineluctable character of all existence, often by way of positing an otherworldly hinterland (*Hinterwelt*) that transcends the willful egoism of this fallen world of becoming. This positing of a *Hinterwelt* is necessarily at the same time a devaluation of this world; it entails a rejection of the earth, even a hatred of life. The history of this devaluation is the history of Western nihilism. However, Nietzsche argues, the rejection of this world is in reality feigned; it is in fact a hypocritical assertion of will to power in disguise. Christianity is characterized as a religion of *ressentiment*, a “slave morality” that denounces the will to power of the strong in a revengeful attempt to posit a “kingdom of God” wherein “the meek shall inherit the earth.” The will to power is not in fact transcended, but only disguised, sublimated, and covertly asserted. The “ascetic priest” gains power over others by feigning the negation of his will, and by purporting to serve and represent a higher will; the projected “Will of God” is thus in reality “the condition for the preservation of priestly power.”<sup>15</sup>

The “Buddhist negation of the will,”<sup>16</sup> on the other hand, is in Nietzsche’s view a more honest form of nihilism; it is a forthright attempt to renounce life as the will to power and the suffering it causes. A Buddhist “yearning for nothingness” (*Sehnsucht in’s Nichts*)<sup>17</sup> is a direct confession of a weariness of life; it wills only an end to all willing, which, for Nietzsche, could only mean an end to life as such. Nirvana, as “the extinction of craving,” would be the nothingness of sheer non-existence pronounced holy.

Nietzsche nevertheless praises Buddhism for its candid expression of a “passive nihilism.”<sup>18</sup> He even asserts that it may be necessary to pass through a “European form of Buddhism” on the way to an “active nihilism” that would clear the ground for a complete overcoming of nihilism by means of a revaluation of all values.<sup>19</sup> A descent into a Buddhist passive nihilism, as a pessimism that acknowledges yet renounces life as the will to power, would prepare us for a radical volte-face to a revaluation that affirms life as the will to power and nothing besides. Nietzsche viewed his own mission in terms of a “self-

overcoming of nihilism,”<sup>20</sup> that is, as a descent into the depths of passive nihilism in order to bring about a revitalization that would pass through active nihilism and ultimately leave nihilism as such behind. In this sense Nietzsche claims that he could be “the European Buddha” who is at the same time a “counter-image of the Indian Buddha.”<sup>21</sup>

#### CRITIQUE OF NIETZSCHE: NIHILISM AS ASSERTION OF WILL

The force of Nietzsche’s critical interpretation of both Christianity and Buddhism cannot be denied. And yet, it may be the case that Nietzsche’s critique—for all its effectiveness in revealing existing hypocrisies and degenerate forms within these traditions—fails to take account of their most radical message. In particular, it fails to follow their indications of a radical step back from (or “trans-descendence” of) “the life of will to power,” a path that would lead, not to a hypocritical “covert will” or to a pessimistic “renunciation of the will to live,” but rather to a genuinely alternative way of life, a way of being in this world that is *other than willful or will-less*. Nietzsche’s critique may, in fact, ironically serve to help us rediscover and develop the possibilities of a “non-willing” reaffirmation of life as intimated through these traditions.

As we shall see, for example, Nietzsche’s critical interpretation of the Buddhist doctrines of “suffering” and the goal of “extinction of craving” as signs of pessimism or passive nihilism would be countered by the reaffirmation of a non-egoistic life of spontaneous activity intimated in such expressions as “dharmic naturalness” (Jp. *jinen-hōni*) and “the action of non-action” (Ch. *wei-wuwei*; Jp. *mu-i no i*).<sup>22</sup> Such intimations of the possibility of reaffirming a life of “non-willing” by way of a radical negation of the life of will would, of course, undermine Nietzsche’s basic hypothesis that life is the will to power and nothing besides. And insofar as life could not be exclusively defined in terms of the will to power, the very meaning of “nihilism” would need to be rethought. One might even go so far as to redefine nihilism as the inability to see life as consisting of any possible way of being other than the willing of power.

In fact, Nietzsche’s thought of the devaluation and revaluation of life as will to power is neither the first nor the last Western understanding of “nihilism” and its “overcoming.” According to Heidegger, thinking in terms of “values” is itself a symptom of nihilism, insofar as it centers the world on the perspective of the subject and his evaluating will. Heidegger writes that “Nietzsche’s metaphysics is nihilistic insofar as it is value thinking, and insofar as the latter is grounded in will to power as the principle of all valuation.”<sup>23</sup> In

conclusion to his prolonged *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche's thought, Heidegger goes so far as to claim that "Nietzsche's metaphysics is not an overcoming of nihilism. It is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism."<sup>24</sup> According to Heidegger's own thought of the "history of being," the will to power is the penultimate expression of nihilism, the ultimate stage of which is reached in the cybernetic "will to will" (*der Wille zum Willen*) that pervades the contemporary technological "Europeanization of the earth."

This linking of nihilism to a hubristic assertion of human will is not unique to Heidegger. In fact, Heidegger's post-Nietzschean interpretation of nihilism echoes in some respects a pre-Nietzschean critique. The first philosophical critique of nihilism is generally ascribed to Friedrich Jacobi, who in a famous letter criticized Fichte's idealism of the "absolute ego" as falling into nihilism insofar as it denies the transcendence of God over human reason and will.<sup>25</sup> In a recent study, *Nihilism before Nietzsche*, Michael Allen Gillespie traces the roots of modern nihilism back to the late-medieval reinterpretation of God as absolute and irrational Will. He argues that this inflation of God's absolute power over humans triggered a reactive assertion of human power in modern philosophy from Descartes to Fichte, which paved the way for the late-modern transference of this originally divine character of absolute, irrational will back onto human beings themselves. Gillespie concludes that Nietzsche's proposed "solution to nihilism," in the image of the overman as a figure of maximum will to power, is in fact a "turn to exactly that notion that previously was conceived to be the essence of nihilism."<sup>26</sup> Like Heidegger, Gillespie suggests that what is called for today is neither a regress to a submission to the Will of God, nor a progress toward an inflated human will to mastery of the earth, but rather a step forward beyond nihilism by way of a radical "step back from willing" as such.<sup>27</sup> In order to step back out of nihilism, what is necessary is not a revival of the God of Will, but rather a releasement from the reactive assertion of human will.

### **Nishitani and the Buddhist Critique of the Will**

Nishitani also comes to see nihilism as essentially connected with the problem of the will. In this regard the significance of his contribution to the discussion on how to "overcome" or rather "step back through" nihilism is twofold. On the one hand, Nishitani sympathetically illuminates the path of a "self-overcoming of nihilism" in Nietzsche's thought itself. He finds this self-overcoming at work particularly in the idea of *amor fati*, which he sees as expressing

the profoundest moment of affirmation in Nietzsche's thought,<sup>28</sup> and which he interprets in terms of a synthesis or "contradictory identity" of passivity (acceptance of necessity or fate) and activity (love of contingency and the "play" of the will) (see NKC 8: 77; SN 49). On the other hand, Nishitani goes beyond Nietzsche to develop the radical critique of the will which lies at the heart of the Buddhist tradition. In what follows, Nishitani's development of the Buddhist critique of the will, and then his sympathetic as well as his critical interpretations of Nietzsche's thought, will be discussed.

#### KARMA AND CRAVING: INCLUDING THE DRIVE TO EXPAND THE EGO

According to the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism, the primary cause of suffering in the world is "thirst" or "craving" (Pali *tanhā*). Craving can be understood to be a "voluntaristic metaphor" that "attempts to capture the most pervasive affective characteristic of samsaric existence."<sup>29</sup> It is thus both a passion and a volition. In fact, craving is one of several such affective/voluntaristic concepts in Buddhist thought, another of which is *karma*. *Karma* originally meant "action" or "doing" in general, but in the *Upanishads* as well as in Buddhism it comes to take on the specific meaning of "volitional action" that stems from craving, that is, action that centers on and supports the persistence of the ego. "According to the Buddha's analysis," writes Walpola Rahula, "all the troubles and strife in the world, from little personal quarrels in families to great wars between nations and countries, arise out of this selfish 'thirst.'"<sup>30</sup>

Is Nietzsche's notion of the will to power subject to the Buddhist critique of craving? Nietzsche, to be sure, explicitly denies that his notion of the will to power could be understood as a mere "lust" (*Begierde*) or "drive" (*Trieb*).<sup>31</sup> The will, proclaims Nietzsche's Zarathustra, is not the mere will to exist, or the will to live, but the will to power—"the will to be master."<sup>32</sup> And yet, such a will to mastery and preservation and expansion of power is in fact implied in the Buddhist critique. Rahula explains that "the terms 'thirst,' 'volition,' 'mental volition' and 'karma' all denote the same thing: they denote the desire, the will to be, to exist, to re-exist, to become more and more, to grow more and more, to accumulate more and more."<sup>33</sup> A standard Buddhist dictionary in Japan accordingly defines *bhava-tanhā* not merely as the will to exist, but as "the will to expand the ego."<sup>34</sup>

It is true that, like Buddhism, Nietzsche denies the existence of a *substantial* ego or will.<sup>35</sup> Yet in stark contrast to Buddhism, he does affirm the will as a *process of constructing* the ego and expanding its realm of power. "The 'ego'

subdues and kills,” writes Nietzsche; “it operates like an organic cell: it is a robber and is violent.” The “noble soul,” he tells us, “accepts this fact of egoism without any question mark.” Life, for Nietzsche, “*essentially* is appropriation, injury, overpowering what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildness, exploitation. . . . [Life] simply *is* will to power.”<sup>36</sup> If such an attempt to radically affirm life as exploitative egoism and will to power is the starting point of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the crucial first step on the path of Buddhism is rather the commitment to a path of radical negation of craving as the will to preserve and expand the domain of the fabricated ego.

#### INFINITE DRIVE AND MECHANIZATION:

##### A DOUBLE LOSS OF AUTONOMY

Nishitani in fact rarely dwells on Nietzsche’s cruder formulations of the will to power; indeed he is often more interested in its life-affirming character, and in general in pursuing—up to a certain critical point—the proximity of Nietzsche’s thought to Zen.

Before turning to Nishitani’s sympathetic and critical engagement with Nietzsche’s thought, however, let us first examine how Nishitani interprets and develops the Buddhist critique of the will. He does so in terms of what he calls the “infinite drive” of “self-will” that manifests itself in an exacerbated form in the nihilism of secular modernity. Nishitani too traces the modern problem of the will in part back to the monotheistic attempt to overcome the problem of egoistic human will by positing a transcendent Will of God. He argues—in a manner not unrelated to Nietzsche’s critique of the hypocrisies of the ascetic priest’s feigned deference of will—that here “self-centeredness appears once again, only this time on a higher plane: as the will of self backed up by the Will of God” (NKC 10: 223; RN 203).

Yet the “death of God” at the hands of modern secularism leaves us in an ambivalent situation. On the one hand, freedom from religious teleology (that is, from time structured according to the Will of God) allows humans to recover their autonomy, to become “autotelic.” On the other hand, the self-centered autonomy of the egoistic will is not yet a true autonomy, since the self ultimately finds itself subject to an aimless “infinite drive” from below. In an age of secularism, writes Nishitani, “every function of life, as something that is autotelic and therefore aimless, is given over to the unrestricted pursuit of itself. Is it here that the infinite drive, or what may be termed ‘self-will,’ is to be seen” (NKC 10: 259; RN 236). The volitional “autonomy” of the



ego is only apparent insofar as it remains driven by passions and cravings. Here we find that, just as the apparent “passivity” of a purported submission to the Will of God can conceal a sublated self-will, the apparent “autonomy” of secularism may conceal a tendency toward a reversion to heteronomous “animality.”

Moreover, this usurpation of autonomy from within is compounded from without by an increasing mechanization of (human) nature. In modern industrialized societies we find ourselves subjected to a peculiar inversion whereby “the controller becomes the controlled.” While science and technology are developed under the auspices of increasing human freedom and power over nature, at “the extreme of the freedom of the self in controlling the laws of nature, man shows the countertendency to forfeit his human nature and to mechanize it” (NKC 10: 95; RN 84). As Heidegger points out, the problem of technology is not just that of human agents reducing nature to “natural resources”; humans themselves are increasingly being reduced to “human resources” for the increasingly cybernetic capitalistic machinery of production and consumption.<sup>37</sup>

In short, we are confronted with *a double loss of autonomy* in an age of extreme secularism. Human self-assertion over against God and nature leads to a situation where “the emergence of the mechanization of human life and the transformation of man into a completely non-rational subject in pursuit of his desires are fundamentally bound up with one another” (NKC 10: 98; RN 87). In this sense, Nishitani understands the modern crisis of nihilism in terms of a *failed* assertion of human autonomy that paradoxically succumbs to the dual heteronomies of exterior technological mechanization and the interior infinite drive of self-will.

Nishitani interprets this paradoxical symbiosis of assertion and loss of will in terms of a “demythologized” notion of *karma* (NKC 10: 260; RN 237).<sup>38</sup> Behind the scientific rationality and technological will of modern human being, he writes, lurks the same “infinite drive” that the ancient Buddhist doctrine of *karma* sought to expose (NKC 11: 168). In the great yet ultimately ambivalent secular revolution, “at the bottom of the elevation of human reason to independence, we find hidden an important event: the ‘being’ of human being becomes a matter of will” (NKC 10: 258; RN 235; translation modified). Yet the standpoint of secular humanism still conceals the problematic heteronomous character of this will as an infinite drive. Here the notion of *karma* can help, Nishitani suggests, since it “implies this self-awareness.”

**CUTTING THE ROOT:****THE POSSIBILITY OF RADICAL FREEDOM FROM SELF-WILL**

Nihilism can be understood, according to Nishitani, as the “great ball of doubt” (*daigidan*) of the modern age. Paralleling its role in Zen practice, this great doubt has the positive potential to lead us to a deeper “investigation of the self” (*kojikyūmei*). This investigation reveals first of all that we are accustomed to living on what Nishitani calls the “field of [subjective] consciousness” (*ishiki no ba*), which is also the “field of possession/being” (*u no ba*). Drawing on the dual meaning of the character for “being” (Ch. *you*; Jp. *u*), which can mean both “existing” and “having” or “possessing,” Nishitani depicts life on this field in the following manner: “By ‘having’ something outside the self, one seeks to secure one’s ‘being’; one is held by what one holds, in other words, ‘possession’ and ‘existence’ are bound together in a primordial will [*konpon-iyoku*] as a basic state of mind.” In the crisis of nihilism one finds this existence of possessing and being possessed by beings slipping away, and the abyss of the “field of nihility” (*kyomu no ba*) opens up around one. Here arises the final temptation of the will, namely, that of the nihilist who attaches himself to this experience of nihility and to acts of annihilation. Still here a “deep trace of the primordial will” can be found. It is only by “cutting the root” of this primordial will altogether, writes Nishitani, that one could step back through the field of nihility and hence beyond nihilism (NKC 11: 190–91).

For Nishitani, nihilism is a crisis (*kiki*) both in the sense of the greatest danger (*kiken*)—the reduction of human being to the infinite drive of self-will—and in the sense of a great opportunity (*kikai*); for here the roots of the “primordial will” lie exposed. By cutting these roots a conversion to “the standpoint of *śūnyatā*” is possible, for “the standpoint of *śūnyatā* is first established at a bottomless place that exceeds by way of absolute negation all standpoints of any kind related to will” (NKC 10: 276; RN 251; translation modified).

**THROUGH NEGATION TO REAFFIRMATION:****PLAYFUL SAMĀDHI AND THE ACTION OF NON-ACTION**

We can speculate that Nietzsche would have mistaken this “great death” or “absolute negation of the will” for a renunciation of life itself. Like many Western interpreters of Buddhism in the nineteenth century, he misunderstood *nirvāna* in terms of a doctrine of annihilationism.<sup>39</sup> Insofar as Nietzsche considered the will to power to be the essence of life as such, the “right effort” to

attain *nirvāna* could only appear to him as a “will to nothingness.” But from the beginning Buddhist teachings clearly and consistently rejected both the doctrine of “annihilationism” (Pali *ucchedavāda*) and the “craving for non-existence” (Pali *vibhava-tanhā*). The rejection of these nihilistic doctrines suggests that *nirvāna* is not mere “extinction”: The negation of craving opens the door to a higher affirmation. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, and Zen in particular, it is clear that the great negation of the will leads not to an annihilation of life, but rather to a great affirmation of a non-ego-centered life of non-attachment, that is, to an active yet “non-willing” way of being-in-this-world.

According to Nishitani, the “great negation” entailed in the experience of emptiness or *śūnyatā* does not put an end to all activity, but rather clears the ground for a radically different kind of ceaseless activity, one no longer centered on the ego and producing karmic debt. On the ultimate field of the non-duality of *samsāra* and *nirvāna*, “constant doing is constant non-doing,” and “all being-at-doing . . . takes the shape of non-doing.” Now “all our work takes on the character of play,” for here “working and playing become manifest fundamentally and at bottom as sheer, elemental doing,” or what Zen calls “playful *samādhi*” (*yuge-zammai*) (NKC 10: 277–79; RN 252–53). Nishitani uses the image of the “child” to depict the “dharmic naturalness” (*jinen-hōni*) of innocent activity that is at once play and elemental earnestness; “for the child is never more earnest than when engaged in play” (NKC 10: 281; RN 255). The earnest play of the child serves as an analogy for the “radical spontaneity” that characterizes life after the great death of self-will.

## Nishitani on (the Limits of) Nietzsche’s Self-Overcoming of Nihilism

### AMOR FATI: NIETZSCHE’S CHILD AT PLAY

Yet does not Zen’s “playful *samādhi*” and Nishitani’s child at “earnest play” remind us of Nietzsche’s own metaphoric imagery?<sup>40</sup> And indeed, does not Nietzsche’s “child,” who appears as the third metamorphosis of the spirit in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, represent “a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘Yes’?”<sup>41</sup> In his 1949 book, *Nihilism* (translated as *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*), Nishitani develops one of the most insightful interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought, and of its proximity to Zen, by focusing on Nietzsche’s ideas of eternal recurrence, *amor fati*, and play. It is in this context that Nishitani writes: “Ironically, it was not in his nihilistic view of Buddhism but in such ideas as *amor fati* and the Dionysian as the overcoming of nihilism that Nietzsche came closest to Buddhism, and especially to Mahāyāna” (NKC 8: 185; SN 180).

The experience of the eternal recurrence of the same, Nishitani points out, threatens to crush the will with the weight of fatalistic necessity. Only if the will is strong enough to affirm life—all of life—unconditionally can it withstand the test of this greatest weight; only then can it undergo a “turn of need” (*Wende der Not*) whereby necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) becomes one with freedom. Here the will turns into a love of fate, and fate is united with the self. Nishitani interprets Nietzsche’s phrase *ego fatum* to imply that “the world moves at one with the self, and the self moves at one with the world.” “This idea,” he goes on to say, “could be thought of as close to the Buddhist idea of ‘karma’; however, Nietzsche’s standpoint is a fundamentally creative one” (NKC 8: 78; SN 50; translation modified). This “creativity” would mark a decisive difference, for *amor fati* would not be a matter of suffering an external compulsion, but would mean that the “world appears as the ‘playful’ activity of will to power and at the same time as fate” (NKC 8: 75; SN 148).

Commenting on Nietzsche’s lines, “Fate, says the grumbler, the fool calls it—play,” Nishitani writes: “To immerse oneself in the ‘play’ of the samsaric world and its groundless activity, and to live it to the utmost, is the ‘pantheistic’ life” of Nietzsche’s new Dionysian “religion.” *Amor fati* would be a matter of joyful participation in the “divine play” (*göttliches Spiel*) of the “worlding of the world.” Here concepts of “necessity” and “will” would both be eliminated, suggests Nietzsche at one point,<sup>42</sup> and Nishitani interprets this to imply that “complete fate comes to be, just as it is, complete freedom,” and “effort remains effort and yet becomes effortless” (NKC 8: 95; SN 62; translation modified). Nishitani concludes that this conversion to *amor fati* marks the point where one finds “the self-overcoming of nihilism itself in Nietzsche” (NKC 8: 103; SN 68). Here, after the destructive will of the lion has done its work, a new child of laughter is born.<sup>43</sup>

The child’s innocent affirmation would thus lie beyond the negating “I will” of the lion. And yet, would the child’s play then no longer be driven by the will to power? Nietzsche’s answer, at least the answer we find in the text at this point, is No. The sacred Yes of the new game of creation, we are told, would inaugurate yet another will to power: “the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.”<sup>44</sup>

#### REMAINING TETHERED TO A STANDPOINT OF WILL

Nishitani began writing on Nietzsche by comparing his thought to that of Meister Eckhart in a remarkable essay written in 1938, titled “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and Meister Eckhart” (NKC 1: 5–32). In this essay Nishitani sought to

reveal the dynamic of a self-overcoming of nihilism at the heart of both this late-modern philosopher, who announced the death of God, and this late-medieval mystic-thinker, who spoke of breaking through the persona of God to a oneness with the divine Nothingness of the Godhead. Nishitani found a “dialectic of life”—a reaffirmation of human existence made possible only by way of its thorough self-negation—at work both in Nietzsche’s radical atheism and in Eckhart’s radical theism. He then pursued this interpretation of each thinker further in the two central works of his middle period, *God and Absolute Nothingness* (NKC 7) and *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*.

However, by the time of his magnum opus, *What is Religion?* (translated as *Religion and Nothingness*), Nishitani credits Eckhart with having pursued the path of negation-*sive*-affirmation further than did Nietzsche. According to Nishitani, “Nietzsche does not seem to have attained Eckhart’s standpoint of an absolute nothingness that takes its stand on the immediacy of everyday life,” and this is said to reflect “the difference between a nihility proclaiming that ‘God is dead’ and an absolute nothingness reaching a point beyond even ‘God’; or between life forcing its way through nihility to gush forth and life as absolute death-*sive*-life.” While Eckhart more nearly approaches the Zen Buddhist standpoint of *śūnyatā* or absolute nothingness, “the nihility of Nietzsche’s nihilism should be called a standpoint of *relative absolute nothingness*” (NKC 10: 75; RN 66).

If Eckhart was able to pursue this path of “self-overcoming” in his trans-mystical theism more radically than Nietzsche could do so with his trans-nihilistic atheism, for Nishitani this was possible only because Eckhart clearly speaks of breaking through and standing emptied of *both* self-will *and* the Will of God (NKC 10: 73; RN 64).<sup>45</sup> For Nishitani, only by letting go of *both* assertion of self-will *and* subservience to a higher Will can we step back through nihilism to “the field of emptiness” as a groundless ground of earnest play. While Nietzsche’s notion of the *Unschuld des Werdens* approaches this “pure activity beyond the measure of any teleological gauge,” in the end it remains still tethered to a “standpoint of will” (NKC 10: 285, 292; RN 258, 265).

Nishitani explicitly criticizes the doctrine of the will to power from the standpoint of emptiness (Sk. *śūnyatā*; Jp. *kū*) as well as from the standpoint of non-ego (Sk. *anātman*; Jp. *muga*). Insofar as the will to power ultimately remains “something conceived of in the third person as an ‘it,’ it has yet to shed the character of ‘being something,’ that is, of being a *Seiendes*” (NKC 10: 237; RN 216; translation modified). Graham Parkes rightly points out that this criticism is invalid if it implies that Nietzsche reified the will to pow-

er; for “Nietzsche characterizes will to power as a force (*Kraft*) rather than a ‘thing.’”<sup>46</sup> Yet I think Nishitani’s main concern here is heteronomy rather than reification. As long as the will to power does not “completely lose its connotation of being an other for us” (NKC 10: 257; RN 234), we remain bound to a desire, determined by a drive which remains outside the indeterminable freedom and abyssal openness of what Nishitani calls the “radical subjectivity of non-ego [*muga*]” as a “subjective Nothingness” (*shutai-teki mu*) (NKC 1: 88). Nietzsche, as a matter of fact, writes that even those who command must obey the will to power, as even the greatest soul cannot help but “risk life for the sake of power.”<sup>47</sup> The freedom of the self is thus for Nietzsche limited by its inability to step back beneath and beyond the purportedly fundamental drive of the will to power.

Nishitani, to be sure, never succumbed to the temptation to reduce the subtleties of Nietzsche’s thought of the will to power to a simple affirmation of a biological drive or a brute “lust for authoritative power” (*kenryoku-yoku*).<sup>48</sup> In fact, Nishitani never lost his appreciation for a positive sense of the will to power as a creative life-force that wells up after a great negation (NKC 1: 26; 15: 338). In *Religion and Nothingness*, Nishitani still affirms that “for Nietzsche, it was the will to power that appeared in the conversion from a great death to a great life” (NKC 10: 254; RN 232; translation modified). In the end, however, the radicality of both Nietzsche’s negation and his reaffirmation of life are said to remain limited insofar as the “standpoint of will” is not cast off. A “cutting the roots of the will” is what ultimately distinguishes Nishitani’s “standpoint of Zen” from Nietzsche’s philosophy of will to power.

Only by way of a great death of the will to power could Nietzsche’s *amor fati* and the innocence of becoming, twisting free of self-will no less than the Will of God, reach the standpoint indicated by Zen expressions such as playful *samādhi* and the doing of non-doing. Such expressions are said to articulate a “true freedom that is not simply a matter of the freedom of the will” (NKC 10: 314; RN 285). This is the standpoint of Mahāyāna Buddhism that Nishitani had claimed “cannot yet be reached even by a nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though the latter may reach in that direction” (NKC 8: 185; SN 180; translation modified).

### **Conclusion: Overcoming Nietzsche by Way of Passing through Nietzsche**

Nietzsche’s provocative thought, and in particular his critical exposure of the will to power that hypocritically operates beneath the surface of many tra-

ditional doctrines and practices, has helped to expose the roots of modern Western—and increasingly, global—nihilism. After Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God, traditional answers to ultimate questions often appear much less convincing. Submissive obedience to the Will of God, for example, no longer simply appears as an innocent and viable answer to the problem of egoistic self-will. Indeed, in an age that is threatened by a regressive tendency to religious wars, appeals to the Will of God often appear to be desperate and hostile expressions of communal self-will.

Nietzsche forcefully uncovered a pervasiveness of the will to power in our lives. Yet we may accept Nietzsche’s critique without simply accepting either his affirmation of the will to power as the ultimate fact of the world and ourselves, or his embrace of an active nihilism that would prepare for the overman as a figure of maximal will to power.

The dynamic subtleties of Nietzsche’s thought, to be sure, are multifaceted and many-layered; and certain provocations such as “master morality” have often been misunderstood and interpretively abused, by his enthusiasts no less than his critics. Moreover, as Nishitani helps reveal, the ultimate message of Nietzsche’s thought lies not in his “no-saying” polemics against the past and present, but in his future-oriented intimations of a profound “yes-saying”: for example, Zarathustra’s teaching of a “gift-giving virtue” that forces “all things to and into yourself that they may flow back out of your well as the gifts of your love.”<sup>49</sup> The ultimate figure of this yes-saying is not the infamous “blond beast” of violent destruction and egoistic revelry, but rather “the over-hero” (*der Über-Held*) who, at the end of an arduous path of *self-overcoming*, “unlearns even his heroic will” and is thereby elevated as “the will-less one” (*der Willenlose*).<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, it must be said that such intimations of what I would call a “self-overcoming of the will to power” in Nietzsche’s *Denkweg* remain at least underdeveloped, and perhaps irredeemably ambivalent.<sup>51</sup> To the end, Nietzsche’s thought remains torn between a resolute affirmation and a self-overcoming of egoistic will to power.<sup>52</sup>

Nishitani’s deeply sympathetic yet ultimately critical interpretation of Nietzsche from the standpoint of Zen Buddhism makes a significant contribution to thinking through nihilism and the problem of the will. Nishitani’s style of thought in general can be characterized as an “overcoming by way of passing through.” A major avenue on his path of “overcoming nihilism by way of passing through nihilism” is his interpretation of Nietzsche, which could indeed be characterized as an overcoming of Nietzsche by way of passing

through Nietzsche. Nishitani takes seriously not only the critical impact of the doctrine of the will to power, but also its “reaffirmative” aspect, that is, its expression of a great affirmation by way of a great negation. And yet, in the end, Nietzsche’s reaffirmation is found to remain limited insofar as residues of heteronomy as well as of egocentricity inevitably remain in a philosophy of will to power. It is necessary not only to unblinkingly accept the death of the transcendent God of Will, but also to undergo the “great death” of human will to power. Only by thoroughly cutting off the roots of self-will could *amor fati* truly intimate a conversion to a spontaneous love of life and life of love. Only then would the great affirmation of life entail a dharmic naturalness or an action of non-action freed from the cycle of karmic debt, together with a compassionate gift-giving that springs, not from a guilty conscience, but from a realization that the true self is the non-ego of the “self that is not a self,” the self that ek-statically exists in the world with others.

Nishitani’s philosophy of Zen entails an unflinching acceptance of the death of the transcendent God of Will and also the modern pervasiveness of the will to power—without giving these or other forms of nihilism the last word. It suggests a way toward being in the world in a manner “other than” either regressive submission to God’s Will or reactive assertion of human self-will, a way that passes through a radical negation to a radical reaffirmation of life beyond both deference and assertion of will.

## NOTES

An earlier version of this essay was written and published in Japanese as “Kami no shi kara ishi no daishi e: posuto-Niiche no tetsugakusha toshite no Nishitani Keiji” [From the death of God to the great death of the will: Nishitani Keiji as a post-Nietzschean philosopher], in Fujita Masakatsu and Bret W. Davis, eds., *Sekai no naka no Nihon no tetsugaku* [Japanese philosophy in the world] (Kyoto: Shōwadō, 2005), and the present English version is printed here with permission of the publisher. Material has also been incorporated from my more encompassing article on this topic, “Zen after Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will in the Confrontation between Nietzsche and Buddhism,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 28 (2004): 89–138, and is reprinted here with permission of the publisher.

1. *Nietzsche Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967ff.), div. 5, 2: 145, 159, 255; *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §§108, 125, 343. In general, references to Nietzsche’s works will hereafter be given according to title followed by part and section numbers. I have in all cases consulted the original German text in the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* and in *Der Wille zur Macht: Versuch einer Umwertung aller Werte* (Stuttgart:



Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1996). With occasional modifications, I have generally adopted the translations by Walter Kaufman in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982) and *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1968), and by Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale in *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967).

2. See Nietzsche, *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Epilogue, §§1–2.

3. Martin Heidegger, “Das Ende der Philosophy und die Aufgabe des Denkens,” in *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 3rd edition (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1988); “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1993).

4. Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken (Gesamtausgabe 9)* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985), 424; *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 321.

5. Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 7th edition (Pfullingen: Neske, 1994), 43; *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 158.

6. For an introduction to Nishitani’s philosophy of Zen and his treatment of nihilism, see Bret W. Davis, “The Step Back Through Nihilism: The Radical Orientation of Nishitani Keiji’s Philosophy of Zen,” *Synthesis Philosophica* 37 (2004): 139–59.

7. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Japanese are my own.

8. In this regard see the pioneering works by Graham Parkes: “Nishitani on the Self Through Time,” *The Eastern Buddhist* 17, no. 2 (1984): 55–74; the translator’s introduction to Nishitani Keiji, *The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism*, trans. Graham Parkes with Setsuko Aihara (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); “Nietzsche and Nishitani on the Self-Overcoming of Nihilism,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 25, no. 2 (1993): 51–60; and “Nietzsche and East Asian Thought: Influences, Impacts, and Resonances,” in Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). While Parkes reports that Nishitani admitted in conversation that “the parallels between Nietzsche’s thinking and his own run farther than he was prepared to allow in *Religion and Nothingness*” (“Nietzsche and East Asian Thought,” 381), Parkes nevertheless concludes elsewhere: “While I remain confident that Nietzsche’s ideas come closer to certain types of Zen thinking than Japanese philosophers are willing to admit, I still believe that Nishitani’s mature thought . . . may indeed comprehend and in some respects go beyond what Nietzsche has wrought” (“Nietzsche and Nishitani on the Self-Overcoming of Nihilism,” 59).

9. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §1067; also see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, §12, and *Beyond Good and Evil*, §38.

10. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 5th edition (Pfullingen: Neske, 1989), 2: 389; *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 243.

11. Heidegger’s later thought is characterized by a radical critique of the will and a search for a “non-willing” way of being that would lie beyond the traditional dichotomy of activity and passivity. See Bret W. Davis, *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007).

12. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §132.

13. *Ibid.*, §643.

14. *Ibid.*, §§154–55; and *The Antichrist*, §22. It should be born in mind that Nietzsche claimed that Christ himself had transcended the spirit of revenge: “there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross” (*The Antichrist*, §39).

15. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, §26. Also see *The Genealogy of Morals*, I, §7.
16. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §7.
17. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §1.
18. In *The Will to Power*, §§22–23, Nietzsche writes that “nihilism” is ambiguous; “active nihilism” refers to an “increased power of the spirit,” whereas “passive nihilism,” which he equates with Buddhism, is a “sign of weariness” and a “decline and recession of the power of the spirit.”
19. *Ibid.*, §132.
20. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Grossoktavausgabe*, ed. Nietzsche Archive (Leipzig: Kröner, 1894–1912), 16: 422. Nishitani refers to this note in NKC 8: 98; SN 64.
21. Nietzsche, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, div. 7, 1: 111.
22. Nietzsche’s knowledge and critique of Buddhism is evidently restricted to the so-called Hinayāna schools, such as Theravāda. For two studies that respond to Nietzsche’s critique from a Theravada perspective, pointing out the “ironic affinities” between Nietzsche’s thought and Buddhism, see Freney Mistry, *Nietzsche and Buddhism: Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1981); and Robert Morrison, *Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Ironic Affinities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). However, it must be said that the Buddhist reaffirmation of life is generally more explicit and indeed more radical in Mahāyāna, and in schools such as Zen in particular.
23. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 2: 342; *Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism*, 204.
24. *Ibid.*, 340; 203.
25. *Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis Werke*, ed. J. F. Köppen and C. J. F. Roth (Leipzig: Gerhard Fleischer, 1816), 3: 49; repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968. For Jacobi, a reassertion of faith in the absolute transcendence of God over man is the answer to the nihilism of an absolutization of the human ego. Nietzsche in effect turns the tables on Jacobi by claiming that it is in fact the absolute transcendence of God that nihilistically negates the immanent value of this world. Nishitani’s thought suggests, however, that a Buddhist dialectic of “absolute negation-*sive*-absolute affirmation” offers a radical “middle path” beyond *both* versions of nihilism.
26. Michael Allen Gillespie, *Nihilism before Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), xx.
27. Gillespie criticizes Heidegger for not having investigated the origins of nihilism in late-medieval theological voluntarism, and even claims that Heidegger falls back into the same trap of attempting to overcome human will by hypostatizing a “will of Being” (xxii). However, this critique does not take account of the fact that Heidegger explicitly distinguishes his notion of *Gelassenheit* from a “letting self-will go in favor of divine will,” and in general his attempt to think the relation between humans and being outside “the domain of activity and passivity.” See Martin Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, trans. Bret W. Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 70; and Davis, *Heidegger and the Will*, chaps. 5 and 8.
28. Nishitani Keiji and Abe Masao, “Taidan: Sekai-aku to nihirizumu” [Conversation on world-evil and nihilism], in Abe Masao, *Kyōgi to kyōmu* [Falsity and nihility] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 2000), 193.
29. See Morrison, *Nietzsche and Buddhism*, 138–39.
30. Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, rev. edition (Bedford: Gordon Fraser, 1967), 29–30.
31. See Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §84.
32. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, §12.

33. Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, 31.
34. *Iwanami Bukkyōjiten* [Iwanami dictionary of Buddhism] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1989), 53.
35. See Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §§16–17; and *The Will to Power*, §715.
36. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §768; *Beyond Good and Evil*, §§259, 265.
37. See Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 7th edition (Pfullingen: Neske, 1994), 21; *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1993), 323.
38. Nishitani is more concerned with the doctrine of *karma* as an account of our existential manner of being in the world than as a cosmological doctrine of rebirth.
39. See Roger-Pol Droit, *Le Culte du néant: Les Philosophes et le Bouddha* (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1997); *The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha*, trans. David Streight and Pamela Vohnson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
40. See Ueda Shizuteru's interpretation of Nietzsche's "child" in Ueda Shizuteru and Yanagida Seizan, *Jūgyūzu: Jiko no genshōgaku* [The ten ox pictures: the phenomenology of self] (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1992), 146–49. According to Ueda, on the one hand Nietzsche's image of the child expresses a "forgetting" or "dropping off" (*datsuraku*) of the will to power for the sake of a more originary natural playfulness. On the other hand, the innocence of the child is said to fall short of the "old man" found in the final stage of Zen's *Ten Ox Pictures*, who has not only "forgotten power" but who compassionately reaches out to help others.
41. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, §1.
42. See Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, §1060.
43. And yet, does Nietzsche's Zarathustra himself ever learn to laugh this radiant, over-human laughter? Nietzsche writes rather that a "thirst" and "yearning [*Sehnsucht*] for this laughter" gnaws on Zarathustra (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, III, §2). Could perhaps the future laughter that Zarathustra yearned for be found echoing from the distant past of the East? See Ōhashi Ryōsuke, "'Hi' to 'kōshō': *Tsuaratosutora wa kaku katatta to Zen*" ["Compassion" and "laughter": *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and Zen], in Ōhashi Ryōsuke, *Hi no genshōron josetsu: Nihontetsugaku no roku teeze yori* [Prolegomenon to a phenomenology of compassion: from six theses of Japanese philosophy] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1998), 161–77.
44. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, §1.
45. See Meister Eckhart: *Deutsche Predigten und Traktate*, ed. and trans. J. Quint (Munich: Hanser, 1963), 308.
46. Parkes, "Nietzsche and Nishitani on the Self-Overcoming of Nihilism," 58. Parkes refers here to *Beyond Good and Evil*, §36.
47. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, II, §12.
48. See Nishitani's comments in a 1949 dialogue with Watsuji Tetsurō and others, reprinted in NKC 15: 348.
49. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, I, §22.
50. *Ibid.*, II, §13.
51. For a more extensive and nuanced treatment of the ambivalence of Nietzsche's "self-overcoming of the will to power," and of the problem of the will in Buddhism, see my "Zen after Zarathustra."
52. A number of noteworthy Nietzsche interpretations have reached similar conclusions. See for example Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Con-*

*traditions and the Contradictions of his Philosophy*, trans. David J. Parent (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Karl Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 6: *Nietzsche* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche, 1987), 426; Ōkōchi Ryōgi, *Niiche to Bukkyō: Kongenteki Nihirizumu no Mondai* [Nietzsche and Buddhism: the problem of radical nihilism] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1983), 207–208, 214; and Ryōgi Ōkōchi, “Nietzsches amor fati im Lichte von Karma des Buddhismus,” *Nietzsche-Studien* I (1972): 86, 88.