THE ZEN OF HUBERT BENOIT

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Despite a deluge of translations and popularizations, the basic philosophy and practice of Zen Buddhism have not been assimilated in the West. This is not to say that Zen is unknown. First the beatniks and then the hippies brought new upsurges of popular interest to Zen ideas. But these waves of popularity washed ashore, mostly on Pacific beaches, and then receded—leaving little behind except a few Zen stories, a few koans (about one hand clapping, and such), and a few Haiku pieces of driftwood. The essence of Zen did not remain. Like salt in seawater, Zen is easily tasted, but only a subtle distillation can make its essence visible and assimilable.

At present we are experiencing another wave of interest in Zen which may bring something more substantial to our psychological understanding than did the previous ones. Already a number of Zen centers have been established where competent meditation instruction is available for serious students. This article draws from the writings of Hubert Benoit to consider some of the psychological questions posed and answered by Zen. Special emphasis is placed upon the preconditions for Satori realization. These preconditions are easily overlooked unless Zen is intellectually comprehended. Very few people would undertake Trappist, Loyolan or Vedantist meditation without first trying to understand the traditions and spirit and rationale guiding these forms of realization, but for Zen such preparation is sometimes considered unnecessary. Every form of meditation has a content and a context, even the forms which go beyond specific beliefs and principles; unless these are fully understood, meditation will be mind numbing rather than mind freeing.

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Of course Zen is not, primarily, an intellectual system. Its appeal and force reside in transcendence of intellect. But this is not, as is sometimes believed, anti-intellectualism. Zen is too wise a system to be merely against anything. The phenomenon of transcendence does not negate the usefulness of genuine intellectual understanding as a first step toward transcendence. This is particularly true for the Western intellectual; to learn to go beyond analysis he must be convinced of the limits of analysis.

The French psychoanalyst Hubert Benoit does undertake the difficult task of constructing a Zen intellectual system that leads the intellect beyond intellection. His analyses are presented in three books: *The Many Faces of Love* (1955), *The Supreme Doctrine* (1955), and *Let Go!* (1962). The latter two books are the most complete and mature of his analyses and will be quoted frequently in this essay, but it is *The Many Faces of Love* that directly reveals, both in its form and content, Benoit's affinities with Plato. (The book is a conversation between a philosopher, a young man, and a young woman, about love.) Benoit is one of the very few contemporary psychological thinkers who is more influenced by the Platonic tradition of intuition and idealism than by the Aristotelian tradition of observation and naturalism.

This Platonism helps account for some of the difficulty and much of the value of Benoit's thought. He writes from a compound tradition of Western metaphysics and Eastern mysticism. On the one side, he affirms the metaphysical and metapsychic tradition of Plato, on the other, the intuitive practical mysticism of Zen. For the modern psychologist even the Western side of the tradition is likely to seem unfamiliar. Aristotle is sometimes given grandfather status in histories of psychology but Plato is, at best, little more than a peculiar forgotten cousin. When psychology became an experimental science all the armchairs of the metaphysical tradition were discarded, along with their occupants. Benoit reaffirms and works within this speculative tradition: "... I can reconstruct the intellectual forms that I perceive by means of scientific or philosophic creations (which are not two different creations because *philosophy is the science of the psyche of man*) [1962, p. 145, italics mine]."

However, Benoit is also very practical; he wants speculations put to work. He seeks to bring about a basic change in the way man experiences life. To do this it is necessary to be
precise about the difference between abstract and practical understanding, and about their interdependence. Abstract understanding can convince us of a possibility before we are able to experience it, but it is practical understanding that converts the known into the experienced. Practical understanding is within experience and it changes experience. Abstract understanding is solely intellectual, it has no transforming force by itself. There are, therefore, two corresponding kinds of insight: intellectual insight (knowing) and practical insight (becoming.)

A person who reads philosophical or religious or psychological books in an effort to understand his life will directly experience this sometimes painful difference between knowing and becoming. With the reading of each book a miniature drama is re-enacted. At the beginning there is anticipation; the reader hopes that here at last a system will be found that brings significance to his life. If the book is of worth, the anticipation changes to pensive satisfaction. The reader finds himself agreeing with the author, even jumping ahead of him; he finds his "own thoughts put into words." Yet, as the end of the book approaches, misgivings arise. These are not intellectual misgivings; they are feelings. A profound disappointment is felt, a melancholy-the residue of unfulfilled expectations. The hoped-for transformation did not transpire. He must now seek another book. And then, once again, without end, this little melodrama of anticipation, hope, and disappointment will be replayed. The book will never be found.

Benoit affirms the value of knowing and the necessity of becoming. He is an intellectual and practical mystic. Enlightenment, the supreme becoming, is the core concern of his writings.

THE BASIC HYPOTHESIS

. . . let him (the reader) not adopt the attitude of resignation according to which the ultimate reality of things must always

of developing Satori realization, he does not say "try it and see for yourself," in evocative metapsychics if you understand you will then do what is necessary. This attitude is the opposite of the laissez faire empiricism that prevails today; a certain refinement of understanding must precede practice. Metapsychics either awakens the reader to Ideas within himself or it doesn't. No attempt is made by Benoit to document his thoughts or teach historical Zen. He is not a monk or a spokesman for Zen religion. His own writings are reflections on the recorded teachings of two of the earliest Zen masters: Huang Po, C. A.D. 840 (1958), and Hui Neng, A.D. 637-713 (1967). Because Benoit is inspired by these very early sources, his ideas have a generality of application that is missing from discussions of later forms of Zen, which were specialized to meet the particular needs of monasticism in Japanese culture.
escape him, and let him accept, as a hypothesis, the possibility of that which Zen call Satori; that is to say the possibility of a modification of the internal functioning of Man which will secure him at last the enjoyment of his absolute essence [Benoit, 1955, p. xii].

Even as a theoretical hypothesis Satori is given little credence in Western thought. As a practical hypothesis, testable within every man's experience, it is almost unknown. Not even Plato in his parable of the cave tells us how one man escaped, nor if the rest of us might also find the light. Contemporary philosophy, in the main, either rejects metaphysics and ultimates outright, as not the proper concerns of philosophy, or, as in phenomenology and existentialism, looks upon the range of man's possible realizations as much more limited than enjoyment of his "absolute essence." The same is true in psychology. Behaviorists don't bother their heads about such unworldly trifles as Satori. Most humanistic psychologists are apt to believe that Satori, if possible at all, is too rare an experience to be of practical value.

Indeed, we have moved so far away from seriously considering the possibility of a fundamental, transforming realization that questions of self-realization have become incorrectly intertwined with questions of adjustment and psychopathology.

When, through some happenstance, a person does begin to take the hypothesis of Satori seriously, this wrongheaded knotting together of psychopathology, normality, and health is sure to send him running off in the wrong direction. He will think that becoming fully realized is similar to becoming fully healthy. He then sets about finding the right exercises and the right diet; he will end up trying first one and then another, but none does the job. For this is the first difficulty—it is not at all obvious what is to be done to attain realization and it is possible to do too much. What is required is an understanding of the human situation, followed by a subtle transmutation of that understanding into readiness for the Satori experience. Only in this way can misdirected commitments to absorbing but eventually unfulfilling regimens of meditation, or to other programs of "self-development," be avoided. Meditation can be useful in relation to Satori but only the right kind, done at the right time, in the right way. Benoit states the problem this way:

All religions, all Yogas, resort to convergence, to concentration. Do not the words "Religion" and "Yoga" signify to "tie
together”? . . . These methods can give very interesting results in the direction of a relative harmonization; they give them when the essence of the subject is found to resonate in a consonant way to the given images. The end result can be so satisfying that, at first glance, it resembles Satori; the inner world of the subject can be made positive to a degree that dualism appears to be abolished from it; anguish has become quite improbable; death, or the loss of whatever might be, has ceased to inspire the least fear; "supernatural powers" can be acquired. . . . But extreme positivity of the dualist world, achieved by progressive concentration around an adored image, apart from the fact that it is not given to all men, since it depends upon an individual affinity, continues to reside in dualism . . . it is not absolute bliss. The convergent harmonization of the inner world can give us the "saint" or the "wise man," but not the man completely developed [Benoit, 1962, pp. 258 and 259].

Most of us revere, perhaps a little suspiciously, saints and wise men, and would enjoy possessing a few supernatural powers, but the Zen ideal is higher. It is, to become completely, wholly natural. For this, certain preconditions must be met.

RELATIVEHARMONIZATION

Benoit specifies three conditions that must be present in a man's life before evolution toward Satori is possible. The first he terms "relative harmonization"—a satisfying adaptation to life. The second is an understanding, a felt understanding, that this harmonization is relative and can never be fully satisfying. The third is a theoretical understanding of what absolute harmonization—Satori—is, and what is necessary in order to realize it. Of these preconditions, relative harmonization is the most difficult to achieve; it is the task of the entire first half of life.

Harmonization is attained by becoming aware of one's essential character inclinations and establishing relations with the world, "compensations," that suit them. The man who does this is able to love something other than himself. He does not doubt his own existence and can allow his inner world to be centered around something other than himself. The man who cannot do this is prevented from loving by the constant need to affirm his own existence.

Benoit describes two writers, one who has achieved relative harmonization through his work and one who has not. The
unsatisfactorily compensated writer writes to succeed; he cares most, not about the writing itself but about the product, as a means to prove his worth. The other writer, although not reluctant to gain recognition for his work, does not think of this outcome when he writes. For him the writing itself is satisfying. It interests him; he can be at ease with his work and take the time to perfect it. The man for whom writing is an illusory compensation cannot stop to immerse himself in the activity of writing. For him, the act of writing is nothing but a delay, it comes between him and his real goal, which is recognition and self-affirmation. Consequently, the work itself cannot be satisfying because it delays what he wants; it postpones his sought-for proof of himself; his work becomes an obstacle or a weight.

This man, who has an illusory compensation, will feel unrooted in the world. He does not feel an inner stability since he has no stable center. He will feel uninvolved in life, as though everything were a game in which he is not an active participant. He holds back; he feels a distance between himself and the world. This is not detachment, it is a failure of attachment, a partial attachment. He is not detached in the positive sense of accepting and knowing all that comes to him. Instead he knows nothing, because he dwells in the past or the future, never "the present. His emotionality fluctuates between elation and moodiness. Temporary successes, triumphs, elate but the elation cannot last since it does not derive from a valued, repeatable activity, it is only a transient result. Results can be maintained only in memories and fantasies. The man who is unsatisfactorily compensated will show a peculiar reticence in his work; he will desire great success but will hesitate to undertake a project commensurate with his ambitions. He cannot risk the failure of a genuine effort and must confine himself to do the "real work" next, someday, or soon. Or, he may actually undertake a major work but will not fully commit his energies. He holds back just when the task requires his all.

It is necessary for a man who has not achieved real compensations to awaken to the futility of his past and begin to establish new compensations. This takes courage, effort, insight and, usually, help from a teacher. It is not a lesser task than the effort towards Satori but it is different. The man who has not established a relative harmonization of his life should not prematurely seek Satori. The reason is, such work entails a growth of detachment and the man who has never attached himself to anything cannot begin a process of
detachment. He will still retain a hope that some activity, some person, some thing, can fully redeem him. He will not be willing, or able, to detach himself because he unconsciously continues his search for the perfect attachment.

A man must succeed in some vital activity, and experience the failure of his success, before he can be ready for Satori. This "success" is not the recognition sought by the success-driven writer. It is, rather, devoted participation in a most-valued activity, an activity suited to one's essential character. If a person has experienced this successful participation, and its failure to meaningfully fill his life, he will not seek other, better attachments. The man who has loved one woman will not believe that another woman exists who could be loved more. It is only the unattached Don Juan who is compelled to seek unendingly and impotently for the woman of his fantasies.

Our stereotype of writers and other creative artists as people who must have a loving commitment to their work is psychologically correct. An artist, for his own sake and the good of his work, must dwell in it, love it, devote himself to it. Most of all he must live with the work during the time of its organic growth, as it comes to form. A wish for immediate results aborts or mis-shapes the creation. We speak of some artists as "sell-outs," an apt phrase because they have sold, for dollars or acclaim, their inner time and inner hold on their work. They are out when they should be in.

Unfortunately, stereotypes lead us astray for other types of work. We think of artists as "special." Instead they should be regarded as exemplifications of what is necessary in any work, in life at large. This is the meaning of "vocation." Any job done with caring involvement is made into a vocation. Actually, relative harmonization may not be effected through a job at all; it may be developed in an avocation, or through a complete relationship with another person, as with a mother and her children, or a husband and wife. Relative harmonization can be achieved in any real work—the work of a businessman, a housewife, a craftsman, a laborer, a farmer—if the person is suited to the work and if he has the ability and the freedom to make the work full enough to care about.

Failure of relative harmonization occurs when there is a mismatch between an individual's attachments and his character or when he is unable to form genuine attachments. The
failure can be severe, as in neuroses, where the compensations give very little satisfaction and compensating symptoms develop, or mild, as manifest in a recurring sense of meaninglessness. The latter kind of dis-ease or existential anxiety, about which so much is written and said today, is frequently misunderstood. For some people it is a desirable, positive sign of their readiness to move from relative harmonization to the search for integration and Satori. For others a different direction of movement is indicated; the anxiety is a message about their failure to achieve an adequate relative harmonization. Judgments about what is "adequate" and what isn't are hard to make; this adds to the confusion. The role of the guru or roshi in traditional Eastern societies included both treatment to remove the dis-ease of faulty relative harmonization (as do contemporary psychotherapists and counselors) and guidance in sustaining the dis-ease that must precede death and rebirth. No such guidance is provided in our society. There are no Doctors of Shamanism with professional knowledge about how to help us let go.

Full analysis of relative harmonization would entail a description of character types, an explanation of the inability to form attachments, and guidance as to how real attachments can be substituted for illusory ones. Benoit is concerned with what can follow relative harmonization and does not discuss these problems further other than to stress the difficulty of relative harmonization, its complexity, and its necessity as a precondition for the work of Satori.

The image of "succeeding spiritually" can be used as a false compensation, and in some rare cases, adoration of a spiritual image, such as Jesus or Buddha, can function as a real compensation. These spiritual relative harmonizations, though rare, are mentioned because they are frequently mistaken for the whole of self-realization. Actually, only a few people have the character type for this harmonization, and they possess no special advantage in the later work of detachment.

The main concern of personality analysis, psychotherapy, and counseling, as they are now conceived, is directed to the forms and means of relative harmonization. In earlier age, absolute harmonization was the domain of religion but for our secular age what can follow relative harmonization must also become a part of the human sciences. For arguments about this move toward applied psychotheology see "Beyond psychotherapy" (Hart. 1970).
leading to Satori, It is just as easy to be addicted to devotional ecstasy, ritual, and spiritual pride as to the worldly triad of acclaim, power, and money.

But what is this detachment? It is not the simple-minded giving up of external possessions. Rich men's wealth does not burden them with the humps of a camel; it is the humps that make a burden of wealth. What are the humps? To understand detachment, what it is and why it is the way to Satori, we must look at it from another angle. Rather than viewing relative harmonization from the obtuse perspective of life adaptations, for which there are as many adaptations as there are circumstances and types of people, we can examine it from the acute angle of cognitive processes, of which there are, in Benoit's analysis, just two. That is, we can look at relative harmonization from the inside rather than the outside.

THE MAGIC PICTURE SHOW

What we find on the inside, according to Benoit, is not a picture of reality, but an "imaginative film." For all men, other than the man of Satori, this imaginative film is life. Since we can experience nothing but our interior films, it is difficult to doubt that they are less than real. At most we take the word "imaginative" to mean that emotions influence what we perceive and think. However, Benoit's concept of the "imaginative film" is much more inclusive than the psychodynamic one. He means, literally, that all of our experiences are imaginary. Our cognitive mechanisms function to systematically exclude us from reality. Like flying fish too skilled at flying-we cannot find the ocean.

Among the curious facts that repose here and there in psychological research journals is one that gives some inkling of the pervasive everydayness of the imaginative film. When an eye is paralyzed, so that the ocular muscles permit no voluntary movement, the intention to move the eye to the right produces a perceived shift in the visual field to the right (Whitteridge, 1960). The person with the paralyzed eye seems to see another part of the visual field, even though his eye cannot receive the visual energies from that part. The effect is momentary, nothing more than a visual jump is perceived, but it definitely, and surprisingly, happens. Applying Benoit's analysis to this psychological curiosity, he would say that the subject sees a new frame of his imaginative visual film; the film continues to operate in coordination with in-

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tentions even when it is artificially out of coordination with impinging visual stimuli. The imaginative film dominates the sensory input, and there is no need for co-influences from conscious or unconscious motives to effect this dominance. Benoit mentions, as an analogy, a volume and its cross sections to illustrate the difference between our imaginative films and reality; to take one for the other is to mistake two dimensions for three.

The imaginative film develops because the two basic cognitive processes that operate at all levels of our experiencing (in memory, perception, and ideation) do not function properly. One process, “convergence,” functions almost continuously while the other process, “divergence,” seldom functions at all. Convergence can be generally defined as structuring for meaning. In almost every moment of our mental life (except deep sleep), in dreaming, day-dreaming, perceiving, and thinking, our experience is dominated by the process of structuring for meaning. Divergence goes away from meaning. It is the process that yields the meaningless. Divergence is not the same as restructuring; as in the unrealistic logic of a dream sequence, divergence moves experience toward chaos, toward the random. Divergence is the psychic counterpart of physical entropy.

It is easy enough to understand the inevitability of convergence dominance. At the simple animal level, divergence is threatening to life while convergence is protective. Yet this is the problem: the protection becomes a fixative. As convergent structuring becomes more and more effective, as it develops from the structuring of behaving and perceiving and thinking to the structuring of self-concepts, the person becomes less open to new experiences, and, at the level of the ego, divergence is felt as threatening. Man seeks an ego convergence that will be as stable as his other convergences. He seeks to abolish divergence entirely. But this is impossible because in no way can a person assure the enduring stability of his own ego.

Perhaps it is now clearer why relative harmonization must be established before the work of detachment can begin. This work is not a doing, a new kind of ultimate structuring; it is instead a relaxation, a letting-up to relax the cramp of convergence. This nondoing allows the natural process of divergence to operate within oneself. Of course, at the atomic and cellular and other nonexperienced levels of one's existence, it operates anyway, but these operations are unconscious. Consciousness of divergence is required for Satori.
The person who has not achieved a satisfactory ego adaptation will be unable to maintain the task of consciously allowing divergence to operate. The difficulty for such a person is this: he tries to converge around a proof of his own existence, which he doubts, but there is no affirmation that will affirm his existence as an ego because in fact the ego does not exist. Ego is memory. It is therefore fundamentally illusory to seek a compensatory convergence around an ego affirmation. A person can, even with the distortion induced by his imaginative film, develop a harmonious compensation around something outside himself, because it will really exist, but to attempt a compensation around the ego is to build a sand house in a never-ending sandstorm. Only the person unparalyzed by doubts of his own existence (some doubt is always present), who develops a satisfying compensation and then experiences its incompleteness, can eventually tolerate the threat of divergence to his illusory ego convergences. And his tolerance is possible because he has lost the belief in the efficacy of his own efforts. To relax one must stop doing.

It is sometimes believed, especially by those behavioral scientists who like to consider themselves tough-minded, that mystics espouse a loose belief in free will, without comprehending the fixities of man's behavior. Benoit wastes little time with this superficial attitude:

When man studies himself with honest impartiality, he observes that he is not the conscious artisan either of his feelings or of his thoughts, and that his feelings and his thoughts are only phenomena which happen to him. . . . I can deal with the subject with which my thought is concerned but not with my thoughts themselves which I have to take as they come to me. Since I am not the voluntary artisan of my feelings nor of my thoughts, I ought to recognize that I cannot be the voluntary artisan of my actions either; that is to say, I can do nothing of my free will [Benoit, 1955, p. 29].

Benoit is definitely at odds with the kinds of humanism and mysticism that simply urge men to act free, to be good, and to create and enjoy the beautiful. Such admonitions do not recognize the reality of our conditioned and innate determinisms, nor do they take account of the inevitability and the consequences of our one-sided partiality for convergence. Instead, one-sidedness is extended. At best such doctrines lead men to assume an attitude of freedom which, temporarily, makes them feel better—but is not a substitute for freedom itself. At worst they promote long programs of self-
allowing
divergence to
equal convergence

Now, if man is not free to direct his own actions, how can he achieve Satori? And how can Satori be described as liberation? These questions bring us back to an earlier question, which can now be answered: our camel humps are the repositories for convergence-dominated imaginative films. Our problem is that we have become dromedaries, each with one hump for convergence, when we should be bactrians. Here is the zoological miracle! When we acquire two humps rather than one, by allowing divergence to build up to the level of convergence, a biological transformation occurs. In a single moment we detach ourselves from the need to be beasts of burden. In this moment of Satori man realizes his freedom and in an instant he can fly through the eye of the needle, unburdened by wealth, poverty, or any other attachment.

Although we can do nothing, it is possible to think about the ideas that come to us. Man can arrive at an understanding of his predicament; he can come to know that he cannot do and realize the impossibility of an absolute harmonization through convergence. Having arrived at this understanding, it is also possible to not-do, i.e., to allow divergence to operate.

The intellect, the psychomotive system, which allows man to function at the level of ideas, does not appear at once fully developed. Its development is progressive, from childhood to early adulthood. By the time a child has developed the intellectual capacity to conceive general ideas of life and death, success and failure, achievement and loss, he is already attached to convergence. With the consequence that he regards his life, his successes, and his achievements as good, and his death, failures, and losses as bad-absolutely good and absolutely bad, which of course they are not. If this were not so, if, instead, the intellect appeared prior to convergent attachment, then the child could accept intellectually the divergences in his life as readily as the convergences and with this full acceptance he would know directly the superior principles of nature and the absolute. Benoit comments,

He would realize the immanence, in all phenomena, of this transcendent reality. He would perceive general integration and general disintegration, life and death, as equal and complementary since they would be conciliated in the becoming which dynamically manifests immovable being.... He would
fulfill the natural "will to live," but without attachment, by accepting its inevitable cessation. While willing, in his animal essence, his life and not his death, he would will, in his human essence, all that happens [1962, p, 192].

Such children do not live among us. So man must "become as a child" not by destroying his convergences, but by developing the underdeveloped part of his being, his divergent intellect.

To understand what divergence is, how it is possible, and to then comprehend what not-doing is, we must extend this examination of the processes of convergence and divergence.

We must surely suppose that the superior nervous system, this system which surmounts and controls the lower system is itself surmounted and controlled by another system which we call the "psychomotive system," a system which has no material support visible to the microscope. When one envisages a single muscular fibre controlled by a single medullary cell, which is itself controlled by a single cortical cell, this cortical cell seems to be sufficient explanation for voluntary contraction; it brings about this contraction by ceasing to be active. But as soon as one envisages a gesture during which a great number of muscular fibres contract while others remain at rest, it becomes evident that the non-activity of the numerous corresponding cortical cells demands an explanation. It becomes evident that this nonactivity depends on a superior control acting on it also by way of inhibitor [1962, pp. 174-175].

The psychomotive system exists at the level of ideas. A gesture is manifest as a pattern of muscular contractions and decontractions but it is not itself a response; it is an intention or image, i.e., it exists, unlike a response, at the level of ideas. A gesture must be located at the psychomotive level to explain the patterning of inhibitions imposed on the cortex. Here we can see that this analysis, although it deals with organismic functions, departs from strictly materialistic systems which attempt to explain behavior at the level of behavior or at the level of physiological mediators of behavior.

Phenomenology confirms this metapsychic analysis:

The action of the psychomotive system expresses itself in imagining the gesture to be made. It belongs to the subtle manifestation, to the psyche. . . . I cannot directly command
the contraction of my muscles; I can only command gesture and it is only by the command of gestures that I obtain, indirectly and without knowing how, the contraction of the necessary muscular fibres [Benoit, 1962, pp. 176 and 177].

Our psychomotive system is

our individual will to live; it is the individual thinking that carries out in us the general or natural will to live and which conceives the corresponding gestures. Nature is general thinking which conceives the general will to live and commands the particular execution of it by our psychosomatic system [Benoit, 1962, p. 178].

It would be possible to extend the hierarchy of levels below the muscular level; this extension to the cellular, protein, molecular, atomic, and subatomic levels would also involve inhibitor-releaser, executive-legislative relationships between the successive systems. And it would also terminate in nature and the absolute principle, which are at the top and the bottom of the hierarchy. The absolute principle, as the source and reconciler of the dual yin-yang initiative, is actually present throughout the hierarchy—it is the immanent, supra-ordinate, and ultimate principle.

These are mind-blathering terms, too abstract to have much meaning. It is understandable that psychologists and other scientists have balked at the metaphysical doorstep of such questions as "Where do ideas come from?" or "What is energy?" The metaphysical ideas developed from attempts to answer such questions cannot be observationally validated. The meaning of metaphysical ideas, such as the "absolute" which is "immanent" and "ultimate," can only be found through direct experience of this immanence (Satori) or in the intuitive intellectual understanding of its metaphysical necessity. Neither direct experience nor intuitive understanding are publicly verifiable. A metaphysical truth is verifiable only at the personal level; every man has access to this test and no man has access to another man's proof. The dark side of the moon is in each of us, not in the sky. It cannot be photographed; the man who sees it glow (it is not really dark) cannot bring back glimmerings for others.

Joseph Campbell, commenting on the Buddha myth and the Buddha's reluctance to teach, writes, "The point is that Buddhahood, Enlightenment, cannot be communicated, but only the way to Enlightenment. This doctrine of the incommunicability of the Truth which is beyond names and forms is basic to the great oriental, as well as to the Platonic, traditions. Whereas the truths of science are communicable, being demonstrable hypotheses rationally founded on observable facts, ritual, mythology, and metaphysics are but guides to the brink of a transcendent Illumination, the final step to which must be taken by each in his
The psychomotive system as it operates in us at present does not execute the whole of the possibilities of the absolute principle. As explained in our discussion of imaginative films, development is polarized and arrested due to the almost exclusive attachment toward convergence: "... man incarnates in himself the integrating and disintegrating aspects of Yang, the creative-cosmic thought, but only realizes, in his normal development, the integrating aspect of this thought [Benoit, 1962, p. 186]." This partial disruption of the hierarchy cuts us off from full responsiveness to nature and to the absolute.

Benoit's use of the term "nature" requires several additional comments because "nature philosophers" are commonly misunderstood in a way that makes them appear preposterous. By "nature" Benoit is speaking of a metaphysical order at a level superior to the psychomotive level, a level of "ideas" superior to personal ideas. He does not mean "nature" in the sense of everything natural, of everything that exists in the universe. When "nature philosophers" are misunderstood they are called pantheistic and if we attempt to understand a misunderstanding, we are forced into grotesque efforts to imagine how rocks might feel pain and think; we begin to imagine the inanimate as animate and, inevitably, we anthropomorphize. Nature as a metaphysical principle, however, is supraordinate to man, and to rocks. The difference is, rocks cannot understand this principle and men can. Through some temporary easing of convergence attachments, a person might actually experience rocks and water and air and fire as conscious, but this "consciousness" is the person's and the rock's sharing of the immanent absolute; it is not at all the kind of ordinary human consciousness that feels specific pains, sees specific objects, and thinks pantheistic thoughts.

This line of thought began with an effort to explain a simple gesture. It was necessary to postulate a system above the higher nervous system which could originate the inhibitive patterns, as ideas or intentions, to be passed on to the cortex. Above this psychomotive system is nature, and above nature, the absolute. Through his intellect, man can participate in the realm of ideas. If he realizes the fullness of his essence by accepting the divergences within himself, he can be open to integration, disintegration, and nonin-
liberty or freedom as "total determinism"

SATORI AND FREEDOM

We began this excursion into metaphysics and metapsychics with a query about how freedom and Satori could be possible if man is not able to consciously direct his actions. We can now offer Benoit's Zen answer to this ancient question—liberty or freedom is "total determinism."

This answer may be a bit disappointing. The word freedom connotes independence, an ability to do whatever we want, without restrictions. But even a second thought is enough to make us question this alluring connotation. For, after all, where do our desires and intentions come from?

In Benoit's psychomotive hierarchy, it is made clear that ideas do not originate with the human being. We receive ideas as our muscles receive patterns of contraction and relaxation. The difference is that we can center on certain ideas and let others pass. But this is not to our advantage; we are like people so dominated by right-handedness that the left hand begins to atrophy, it does nothing. The left hand is still capable of acting but all actions are performed by the dominant hand. Any natural action calling for the use of the left hand is experienced as discomfitting.

But this analogy, although conveying the feeling well enough, misleads because it suggests that the way to liberation is to teach the left hand to do. That is not so. The left hand of intellect is divergence and it does not need to be taught a new proficiency, all that is necessary is to let it be and receive the full message, which comes to us constantly from nature.

Liberation is both a creative state and a state of complete determination. This is possible because the absolute, to which the man of Satori totally responds, is an abstract yet directly felt imperative to harmonious action. Noumena must be brought into life creatively before they become phenomena. Thus a man of Satori is at every moment creative in life, just as an artist who does what is needed is creative in art—each fulfills. Misunderstanding about the relationship between creativity and determinism arises because we think of the guiding idea or absolute imperative at our own level of thought, i.e., too concretely.

The word that can be written is not the Word that was, and is, in the beginning. At best our words emerge from that
ever, creative Word; at second best our words are true or just or beautiful. What is above our psychomotive system must be more abstract than our personal ideas and desires. To think otherwise is to be left with the notion of a replica or superself above every self who thinks the thoughts and guides the actions of each individual. We would then need to ask who guides each superself and begin an infinite regress.

It is sometimes believed that liberation or Satori creates a superman who can do anything in any circumstance, but, as Benoit says,

This is radically contrary to a true understanding, for the man liberated by satori can only perform one single action in a given circumstance. He can no longer do anything but the action that is totally adequate to the circumstances; and it is in the immediate, spontaneous elaboration of this unique adequate action that the enjoyment of the perfect liberty of this man lies. The natural egotistical man, activated by partial determinism, elaborates in a mediate manner one of the innumerable inadequate reactions to the given circumstance; the man who has attained Realization, activated by total determinism, elaborates with absolute rigor the unique action that is adequate [Benoit, 1955, pp. 65 and 66, italics mine].

PSYCHEDELICS AND SATORI

Many users of psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin report mystical, ecstatic experiences. There is little doubt that these and other features of the Satori state occur when drugs are used with proper preparation. If the very considerable historical and contemporary documentation about drug experiences does not convince, then recent controlled research studies should (see, for example, Pahnke's (1963) report of his experiment on psilocybin and religious ecstasy).

However, reports also show that the experience of liberation is not sustained. Significant and valuable insights may result from mystical experience induced by a drug, and changes in behavior (both desirable and undesirable) can be brought about. But the total determinism of liberation is not maintained; Satori, which is a permanent and total realization, cannot be achieved through drugs.

"In the concluding chapter of their book about psychedelic experiences Houston and Masters (1966) say, "One of the most important questions raised by the psychedelic drugs is Whether authentic religious and mystical experiences occur among the drug subjects. To this question the answer must be Yes . . . [po 247]."
The reason psychedelic drugs do not yield Satan is that they act by decreasing the dominance of our convergent automatisms. When this convergence suppression is tolerated by the person taking the drug and when he can also tolerate the perhaps frightening experiences of his divergent functioning, a temporary liberation takes place. It happens at the moment divergent and convergent tendencies are in balance.

Coming down from a drug trip is often experienced as a whirling, frantic, pressed-together succession of structuring, destructuring, and restructuring. One convergent structure after another is constructed and disintegrated. This goes on and on until a re-stabilization of convergence dominance is attained-usually around the old egocentric structures but sometimes around new ones. The cognitive wobbling that occurs in this stabilization process can be extremely unpleasant-it is intellectual vertigo, a departure from one's familiar ego balance. Because of this unpleasantness, many trippers sometimes use sedatives to drift into sleep as an easy way back from the psychedelic voyage.

Another feature of some psychedelic trips is the "white light of the void." This experience occurs only after ego disintegration is complete, when convergence around egocentric structures is nulled. At this null point the person cannot move, talk, or hear. There is equality between his convergence and divergence processes—nonconvergence is now dominant and the structureless void is experienced. This experience is profound, awesome, and truly spiritual. The person enters a realm usually closed to him by his convergent attachments. But this experience is not the height of mysticism. It is in no way subjectively comparable to Satori, in which multiple convergence structures are maintained in consciousness while balanced by the conscious counter-structures of divergence and infused with the absolute. The mistake modern psychedelic mystics make about the experience of the void is the same mistake made for ages by other mystics—mistaking ecstatic null consciousness for ecstatic full consciousness.

From Benoit's analysis it is clear that psychedelic transcendence must be temporary because the drug action does nothing to develop an individual's divergent automatisms, and it is only when divergence is made equal to convergence that Satori is realized. In this limitation, psychedelic drugs are no better and no worse than the many different kinds of meditation that yield results through practice in the suspension of convergent automatisms. One of these methods will
be considered in the section following the presentation of Benoit's technique for the development of divergent automatisms.

DIVERGENT COUNTER-WORK

In *The Supreme Doctrine* (1955) Benoit had not yet arrived at a technique for the exercise of divergence. In the preface of *Let Go!* (1962) he comments, "I did not know then if such a technique were possible or if intuitive understanding would be sufficient. Since then, I have come to the conclusion that a special 'exercise' must intervene in order to actualize our understanding." This exercise, "divergent writing," is very simple to describe but extremely difficult to do.

The technique of divergent writing consists of nothing more than composing meaningless sentences. In doing this, we maintain the ordinary syntactical structure of language but avoid meaningful associations. Also, sound associations, environmental descriptions, and word or phrase repetitions are avoided. Here is an example of divergent writing, from Benoit (1962): The polyglot, decorated by influential fountains, burst through collections of blond chamois. Besides though robbers rise up because of the shock of the opossum converted the countryside with sad and preconceived manners. The gestation of the vaporous icepicks comes back toward Sorrento while needing firm during the armfuls of anemones priding themselves on the thousand frolics without success.

Notice that the example given, although cited as from Benoit, was not quoted in the normal way. Did this seem peculiar? Probably not. Rather, it seems odd to see a phrase such as "The polyglot decorated by influential fountains . . ." within quotation marks. We do not ascribe ownership to nonsense nor artistic merit to doodles (at least not usually). The reason is: we do not feel that divergent productions are ours, or anyone's, they simply come. They exist like grains of sand, unclaimed and unnoticed.

The fact that ownership or authorship is not attributed to divergent writing gives a clue as to why divergence is usually inhibited. We are attached to meaning, to convergent language, because it is *ours*, it affirms our separateness, our independence. This affirmation is, of course, illusory because the psychomotive intellect is not autonomous. Yet, even if illusory, the attraction of meaning binds us and prevents our realization.
The inner counter-work-e-rhacquisition of intellectual divergence-is not accomplished in opposition to life, but alongside of it. It is not a question of struggling to destroy our actual attachment—which is essentially attachment to intellectual convergence—but of developing a counter attachment which, with attachment, will realize the non-attachment of liberty [Benoit, 1962, pp. 212 and 213].

Divergent writing is a wedge with which we introduce divergence into consciousness. By itself this technique, like all techniques, has no important influence. Only when divergence begins to be experienced throughout one's life—in one's desires, preferences, perceptions, and actions—only then does the divergence-convergence relationship begin to bring life into balance.

It might be possible to use activities other than language for the exercise of divergence—all perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral processes are convergence-dominated. But it is language that leads to the nearly complete dominance of convergence in our lives, and it is language that provides the most general and effective beginning for counterwork:

The acceptance of integration and the refusal of disintegration are found in the world of speech to which man gains access when universal consciousness begins to manifest in him. This world is quite new, quite different from that in which the baby lives who is still incapable of speaking. While the baby, like the animal, is his individual thinking, the child in whom intellect has appeared possesses this thinking. Universal consciousness in him sees the phenomena of his individual consciousness [Benoit, 1962, p. 16].

The child is enabled to possess concepts in the same way that an animal has objects, which can be reacted to, remembered, and, in higher animals, rearranged. Ownership resides in language. Language is both the vehicle that permits us to function knowingly in the realm of nature (ideas), thereby gaining potential access to full awareness, and it is the cause of our separation from full awareness.

If convergent language dominance is the basis of attachment and the source of possessiveness, then non-convergent language is the only real asceticism. It realizes non-attachment at the primordial level at which our already realized attachments lie, at the level of the elaboration of our subjective world. True non-attachment does not consist in separating oneself from one's possessions, but to possess as if one did not possess. It is not a question of separating ourselves from our verbal power, but of possessing it as if we did not possess.
it, of bringing it into play in such a way that it brings us no effective affirmations (Benoit, 1962, p. 247).

Here Benoit refers to "non-convergent language" rather than "divergent language" because the effort of divergent writing, insofar as it succeeds in suspending the attachment to meaning, results in nonconvergent language.

Another way to conceptualize the processes of convergence and divergence is to think of positive space and negative space. In spatial arts such as architecture, sculpture, and flower arrangement, students are taught to become aware of the negative space surrounding every object. Without this negative space no form could exist. We ordinarily fail to see that form inheres just as much in the empty space around an object as in the positive space filled by the object. Similarly, we usually fail to see that every convergent meaning exists in a network of nonmeanings; indeed, the disintegration of a meaning through divergence is necessary before we can proceed to a subsequent meaning. Without disintegration, we would think one word forever. Nonevergence, then, is the void from which all manifest forms arise and the absolute is the all which contains and reconciles all possible forms.

**BENOIT AND WHQRF**

We can recognize now that our imaginative films are word strips. We see the world through our language. This assertion is exceedingly difficult to accept, and it is almost impossible to imagine what the world could be without a language filter. (Mind-manifesting drugs have value in giving glimpses of the world when the convergent filter no longer dominates experience.) Benoit states our predicament this way:

Our illusion of having dealings with the real outer world is so strong. Each of us believes so firmly that he perceives things as they are themselves. To be sure, the opportunity is incessantly offered to us to ascertain that our inner states, our moods, are in charge of our view of things. But in spite of this evidence, we live persuaded that our problems are situated in the real world and not in a world representation, a verbal world. Words seem to us to be simply tools to designate things. We believe that we "verbalize" during the course of our activities.

The Tao Te Ching says, "Clay is molded into a vessel but the ultimate use of the vessel depends on the part where nothing exists. Doors and windows are cut out of the walls of a house but the ultimate use of the house depends upon the parvis where nothing exists (Lao Tse, 1962, p. 42)."
of our real contact with the outer world and we do not see that our language creates the world in which our life unfolds. Thus it is necessary to insist on the fact that our individual world is a verbal world and that the whole question of the painful dualism in which we struggle is summed up in the structural dualism of our language, in the functional dualism of the mind which creates our individual world [Benoit, p. 207, 1962, italics mine].

The italicized sentence states a hypothesis identical to the Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity (Carroll, 1956). Benjamin Lee Whorf based his hypothesis upon extensive studies of comparative linguistics; from these he concluded that people perceive their language, not their surroundings. People of different cultures must, said Wharf, see the world differently because their languages are so radically different. Whorf’s hypothesis has continued to fascinate psycholinguists; a weaker form of the hypothesis, viz. that language influences perception, has received some experimental verification (Brown and Lenneberg, 1954).

Regrettably, the entire thrust of Wharf’s thought has not yet influenced psychology. The hypothesis paraphrased above should actually be known as the first Whorfian hypothesis; there is a second. In this second hypothesis, Wharf’s linguistic studies connect directly to Benoit’s metapsychic analysis of language. The second Whorfian hypothesis (Whorf, 1956) suggests that it is possible to realize the commonalities and relativities of individual languages and, through this realization, arrive at freedom from the partial determinism of a single language. The second Whorfian hypothesis is one of translinguistic receptivity, of Satori.

In our usual intellectual functioning, we are a spectacle without a spectator; in our divergent intellectual functioning, we are a spectator without a spectacle. When the spectator without a spectacle is as completely developed as the spectacle without spectator, they will then be at the same time and suddenly, the spectator and the spectacle [Benoit, 1962, p. 254].

Of course Benoit does not claim that divergent writing is the only effective technique for the realization of Satori. It is a technique within reach of the man who does not renounce his life in order to seek Satori, a technique compatible with ordinary living rather than monastic life. And, it is more suited to the life style of the Westerner than is the Koan method used in some sects of Japanese Zen. What Benoit does insist upon is that all effective techniques prepare
for Satori by developing divergent automatisms. This emphasis is important because there are innumerable methods of meditation that do not do this. These methods can yield results, beneficial results, but they belong to the adaptations of relative harmonization rather than to the absolute harmonization of Satori. Benoit does not want to do away with such methods insofar as they are useful. He merely tries to make very clear the difference between methods of convergence and methods of divergence.

In some instances, it is difficult to distinguish exercises that yield new convergences, or suppress old convergences, from exercises that develop divergent automatisms. The discrimination is made especially difficult because the claims made for a technique do not always represent what it actually does.

AN EXAMPLE OF PSEUDO-SATOR!

The system of Transcendental Meditation," which is now very popular among students, is described as a method that leads to "transcendence." This claim is not altogether unfounded; the regular practice of Transcendental Meditation can lead to beneficial experiences, even to a kind of "transcendence." The technique of Transcendental Meditation, despite the promotional ballyhoo that surrounds the movement and its flamboyant founder, is a subtle and effective device for convergence suppression. By doing this, definite experiences of pseudo-Satori can be evoked. The experiences are sometimes much the same as those obtained from psychedelic drugs—with the important difference that they take longer to develop and are much more within the meditator's control and tolerance.

The technique works this way: at a formal initiation, each new meditator is given a mantra, a meaningless Sanskrit sound, which he then repeats to himself at the level of thought until it fades away. This fading away is called "transcendence." Transcendental meditators do this exercise, regularly, for about twenty to thirty minutes in the morning and evening. To avoid effort and tension, the meditator is told to not exclude other thoughts. The system recognizes that such efforts are harmful and, usually, not possible. Instead, the meditator is instructed to simply and easily let whatever thoughts come that come, and, when he does

'See, for a longer account of the methods and philosophy of Transcendental Meditation, Maharishi Mebesh Yogi's Commentary on the Bhagavad Gita (1967).
notice that he is not thinking the mantra, to merely start it again. This process of starting the mantra, getting another thought, and then re-starting the mantra goes on and on throughout every meditation. With practice it becomes much easier but is usually pleasant and restful from the beginning; also, with practice, transcendence is reached more often.

Semantic satiation (Amster, 1964; Creelman, 1966), a diminution of meaning, occurs when any word is repeated again and again for a prolonged time. This can be conceptualized as an extinction process or, within Benoit's theory, it would be called an inhibition of convergent automatisms. When a person begins with a meaningless sound (the mantra) rather than a word, a sound that he always uses, this inhibition generalizes. If convergent automatisms are suppressed long enough a balance will be reached between the new low-functioning level of convergence and background divergence. At this point receptivity to nonconvergence is temporarily instituted and this is "transcendence." It must be temporary because the convergent automatisms are not permanently suppressed and, consequently, the first thought will upset the balance.

It is true that this experience of the nonconvergent can be very pleasurable, even blissful, in contrast to the tensions of life in the domain of convergence. In the void, the person will feel much bigger than his puny ego, he will float in infinity. Yet it is apparent that two serious drawbacks flaw the method: (a) necessary convergences may be dulled through repeated exposure to suppression (this is not very likely, considering the sound advice meditators are given not to meditate more than one hour a day) and, most importantly, (b) Satori is not possible through this practice. This must be so, according to Benoit's analysis, because nothing is done in Transcendental Meditation to develop divergent automatisms.

We have devoted several paragraphs to an analysis of this technique's limitations because it is a well-known contemporary example and because it is a technique that does produce a subtle convergence-divergence balance, and, consequently, a pseudo-Satori. It is only a pseudo-Satori because it cannot be sustained in action, in life. In this limitation it resembles those systems that attempt to develop spiritual convergence centered around some devout image. Both techniques, convergence centering and convergence suppression, have their uses but they do not lead to liberation. Transcendental Meditation and other forms of mantra meditation
do come close to the correct direction of practice, but end up working on the wrong side of the desired convergence-divergence balance—they chop off one end of the teeter-totter of intellect. When what we require is more weight on the other.

CONCLUSION

Humanistic and transpersonal psychologists are attempting to fashion a philosophy of science that can help them understand themselves and their friends as well as those people called "subjects" and "patients." This new philosophy of science tries to blend empiricism and speculation, introspection and observation, experimentation and sensitivity, practicality and wisdom. Benoit's thinking contributes to this effort by giving us a detailed analysis of an intriguing and fundamental region of experience. It is important to stress again, in ending this essay, that practical insight is quite different from the discussion of insights. The ideas summarized here, which can be read in an hour, might require a lifetime to realize. A cow is not milk and neither is Benoit's philosophy Zen. To really milk a cow, the milker must get the hang of it and the same is true for the realization of insights.

REFERENCES


"Benoit’s philosophy is much more detailed than this limited presentation of his system, which is condensed and selective. I have not, for example, discussed Benoit’s ideas about affect and moods, nor have I tried to include his careful analysis of perception. If, because of these and other omissions, the ideas appear to too abruptly jump between one level of discourse and another, it is my fault and not Benoit’s. Perusal of Benoit’s writings will provide the elaboration the problems require."

I have stressed in this paper the significance for the transpersonal psychologist, of Zen as a system of thought. Consequently the analysis of Zen practices and ideas is emphasized rather than the experimental and practical side of Zen meditation. For reports on the practice of Zen by Westerners I recommend Harding (1967), Huber (1967), Kapleau (1966), and Wlenpahl (1970). Wlenpahl’s book, Zen Diary, is especially useful in showing how Zen meditation involves an interplay between intellectual and experiential insights. The book Har+ by Durckheim (1962) closely parallels Benoit’s metapsychic hierarchy and also brings out the significance of “body earthling” in Satori realization. A very different kind of book is The Primal Scream by Janov (1970), but Janov’s primal therapy relates significantly to Benoit since it is the only psychotherapy that attempts absolute harmonization.


