In April of 1944, facing the destruction and death around them, Hisamatsu Shin’ichi (1889–1990) and several of his students at Kyoto University founded the Association for Self-Awakening. Hisamatsu guided his students through intensive practice and study of Zen as they searched for answers to the existential and moral questions that were pressing upon them. By the time he died thirty-six years later, he had achieved renown as a charismatic lay master. With his exposition of Zen in relation to Western thought, reformulation of Zen practice, and skill at calligraphy and the tea ceremony, he occupies an important place in modern Zen history.

As a Zen philosopher, Hisamatsu reflected at length on the “ultimate antinomy” to which Zen responded and sketched how the Zen view of elements in that antinomy—sin and death, value and existence—diverges from Western perspectives. He also wrote on the chief characteristics of “Oriental Nothingness” and gave talks on an array of Buddhist texts. His legacy is evident in the distinguished careers of those who studied and practiced Zen under him, including Abe Masao (1915–2006), Zen thinker and representative of Zen in interfaith dialogue; Yanagida Seizan (1926–2006), a scholar of Zen texts; and Tokiwa Gishin (1926–), a Buddhologist at Hanazono University.

Hisamatsu was not, however, a typical apologist. Though he trained under a traditional Zen master and lived much of his adult life in Myōshinji, a prominent Rinzai Zen head temple in Kyoto,
he criticized Zen for its focus on awakening (satori) at the expense of due consideration of social and political issues. This criticism informed the orientation of the Association for Self-Awakening, which in 1958 evolved into the F.A.S. Society.² The abbreviation F.A.S. encapsulates Hisamatsu’s vision of a reformed, true Zen:

Awakening to the Formless Self,
the dimension of depth, the Self as the ground of human existence;
Standing on the standpoint of All Humankind,
the dimension of width, human being in its entirety;
Creating history Suprahistorically,
the dimension of length, awakened human history.³

This three-dimensional standpoint finds further expression in the Society’s “Vow of Humankind”:

Keeping calm and composed, let us awaken to our True Self, become fully compassionate humans, make full use of our gifts according to our respective missions in life, discern the agony both individual and social and its source, recognize the right direction in which history should proceed, and join hands without distinctions of race, nation, or class. Let us, with compassion, vow to bring to realization humankind’s deep desire for Self-emancipation and construct a world in which everyone can truly and fully live.⁴

As the dynamic leader of the society, Hisamatsu drew from established Zen practice in emphasizing the importance of zazen, rigorous Zen retreats, and the cultivation of the “Great Doubt Block,” yet he also crafted new forms of practice, foremost of which were his “fundamental kōan” in lieu of the roughly 1,700 cases in the traditional kōan curriculum and his notion of “mutual inquiry” (sōgo-sankyū) instead of formal kōan interviews (sanzen) with a Zen master.

In this chapter I will explore Hisamatsu’s stature as a Zen master along the lines of F, A, and S, beginning with his analysis of the basic human problem, Awakening as the solution to that problem, Nothingness as that to which one awakens, and the forms of practice he formulated as a path to Awakening. I will then turn to his arguments about “all humankind,” “creating history suprahistorically,” and the “postmodern” world. In passing, I will touch upon Hisamatsu’s artistic legacy, and then close by highlighting several issues in his standpoint.
Awakening to the Formless Self

Growing up in Gifu Prefecture in a Shin Buddhist family, Hisamatsu was a “steadfast young believer,” with what he later called “a ‘leave-it-up-to-the-Almighty’ type of faith that avoided all doubts.” In middle school, while studying science, he started questioning his faith, until his “doubts only became deeper and more complex.” As Hisamatsu relates in the third person, “He reached an impasse, and his indestructible iron faith, of which he had been so proud, eventually crumbled at his feet.” He “underwent a conversion from the naïve, medieval form of religious life that avoids rational doubt, to the critical attitude of modern people that is based on autonomous rational judgment and empirical proof.” At the same time, “his rational awareness of sin further deepened and the desire to be rid of it became acute.”

Matriculating at Kyoto University in 1912 as a philosophy major did not help, for despite intensive studies over his first few years there, he “came to despair of the powerlessness of philosophy to solve his fundamental problem. He lost all interest in graduating from the University, though he had not yet defended the graduation thesis he had submitted. He spent days up in his room, lost in silent thought. His behavior at the time was so bizarre that an older student in the Department of Medicine from his hometown, assuming that he had developed some psychological abnormality, proceeded to telegraph his father.”

In the midst of this crisis, at the suggestion of one of his professors, renowned philosopher Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Hisamatsu turned to Zen. After learning how to sit zazen in the autumn of 1915, he went on his first Zen retreat, the grueling rōhatsu sesshin over the first seven days of December, under Ikegami Shōzan Rōshi at Myōshinji in Kyoto. “Deeply disillusioned with both theistic religion and rationalistic philosophy,” Masao Abe writes, “he threw himself into that first sesshin with all the energy he could command to resolve the crisis occurring within him.” By the third day he had become “a single Great Doubt Block, in which the doubter and the doubted were one. This one block constituted his entire being. Like a mouse entering a bamboo tube only to find itself trapped there by a snake, or like being at the top of a hundred-foot pole and unable to go forward or backward, he had reached a total impasse and could no longer move.” He did not remain in that state, however: “Right at that moment . . . the Great Doubt Block crumbled apart and melted like ice from within. That imposing wall, Shōzan, also crumbled away without a trace, leaving not a hair’s breadth between the student and the rōshi. Awakened to his formless, True Self, he gazed upon Shōzan’s True Face for the first time.”

Hisamatsu expressed this experience in a poem:
With the breaking up
Of rain and cloud,
Even clearer,
The moon in the great sky.
The intimacy:
The sound of a waterfall
After the downpour
Breaking the quiet night.\textsuperscript{15}

In following his path, Hisamatsu had “cast off the religion of medieval belief, turned to philosophy grounded in modern reason, broke through the extreme limit of rational philosophy based on objective knowledge, and awakened to the free and unhindered True Self.”\textsuperscript{16} In this way he grasped the crux of Zen, which, to him, was “to awaken to the Formless Self of True Emptiness by virtue of great wisdom, to manifest all wondrous being by virtue of great compassion, and to give rise to great functioning spatially for all humankind and temporally for the history of all humankind.”\textsuperscript{17} And through the resolution of his moral and existential quandary, he also laid a foundation for his own religious standpoint: “It is the living experience of self-realization that constitutes the concrete base of my own religion and philosophy.”\textsuperscript{18}

Using philosophical language distinctive in the history of Zen, Hisamatsu later detailed what, exactly, happened to him on that December day: “With the awakening to the True Self, the rational self is cast off in negation. This results in autonomy of a deeper dimension, which has broken beyond and completely shaken off the limitations of rational autonomy. It is fundamental, absolute autonomy free of the fatalistic, absolute antinomy that characterizes rational autonomy.”\textsuperscript{19} Hisamatsu’s critique of the “rational self” with its autonomy and antinomy derives from his view of the ordinary structure of human existence. In one of his most important essays, “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection,” he asks, “Where in people does one find the ‘moment’ whereby they need religion?”\textsuperscript{20} As I have briefly outlined elsewhere,\textsuperscript{21} Hisamatsu argues that the fundamental religious problems are sin and death, the two insurmountable facets of human existence. In making this argument, he expands the scope of “sin”: “Even if we could get rid of sin in a moral sense, we could not be free from the contrast between ugliness and beauty in the world of art, or opposition between falsity and truth in the world of science.”\textsuperscript{22} From this perspective, sin comes down to the inseparability of the poles in these three dyads in the arenas of the will, feeling, and intellect.

Hisamatsu also argues that “sin ought to be extended to include the problem of reason per se.”\textsuperscript{23} That is to say, “The opposition of rational and irrational
is basic to the structure of reason, so that to remove what is irrational and leave
behind only what is rational is, one must say, impossible."24 This inseparability
characterizes death as well, for death cannot be separated from life, and “at the
bottom of life there exists the antinomy of life-and-death.”25 Our core existen-
tial problem is thus not our mortality but “our sharing in the nature of life-and-
death. . . . Therefore, the meaning of death ought to be deepened to the extent
that not mere death but life-and-death is death.”26 Hisamatsu develops this
thesis by further construing sin as the opposition of value and antivalue, and
death as the opposition of existence and nonexistence (sonzai-hisonzai). And, ultima-
tely, these dilemmas converge:

In both value and existence the human harbors insolvable
contradictions at the starting point or basis of life. And in the
concrete human being, the two contradictions are found to exist in
an indistinguishable, inseparable way. In that sense, they are nondual
contradictions, an absolute, ultimate contradiction. That is to say,
they are ultimate worries, the “moment” in humans that requires
ultimate deliverance.27

Simply put, Hisamatsu construes sin not as the problem of evil but as the
paradoxical inseparability of good and evil, or of value and antivalue, and death
not as physical death but as the inseparability of life and death, or of existence
and nonexistence. With this character, sin and death constitute the axiological
and ontological dimensions of what Hisamatsu terms the “ultimate antinomy”
at the core of human existence. In this respect, they are the reason humans
turn to religion. As Hisamatsu puts it, “This ultimate antinomy’s pressing
upon us is the true moment of religion. Any death or sin that one can look at is
an abstract one, a mere object of thought. We are confronted by ultimate death,
ultimate sin. This ultimate antinomy is the very self-awareness in which exist-
ence and value are one; it is not anything to be known objectively. It is original
to people; it is at once my way of being and that of all humans.”28

In its most profound form, this “self-awareness” is the Great Doubt Block,
which is “something total, in which emotional anguish and volitional dilem-
as, as well as intellectual doubting, are one fundamental subject.”29 Reason,
or the discriminating, dualistic ego, is unable to manage this predicament. Self-
power (jiriki) is of no avail. There is only one way to solve it: “We must have
every fetter cut off. We must die a Great Death and be born again.”30 That is to
say, “The only way to break through it [the Doubt Block] is to be awakened to
the True Self, the Self in which the Doubt Block is resolved. This entails a leap.
The self caught in the ultimate antinomy cannot with continuity become the
True Self. Only when that self breaks up does the Self or Oneness awaken to
itself."\textsuperscript{31} Expressed from another angle, “By our awakening to this Formless Self, we overcome the ultimately antinomic self and come to be saved from the ultimate antimony. This is achieved not by the ultimately antinomic self overcoming that antimony. Rather, from the bottom of ultimate antimony, the Self by which the antimony is overcome awakens.”\textsuperscript{32} Upon this awakening, we overcome the dilemmas, anguish, and contradictions of the will, emotion, and intellect, and we extricate ourselves from the antinomies of good-and-evil and life-and-death.\textsuperscript{33}

This True, Formless Self that awakens through our pursuing a “thorough inquiry into life-and-death”\textsuperscript{34} is not “some thing” that is objectifiable, nor a mere static ground or void apart from actuality. In more standard Buddhist terminology, “By the seeing of one’s nature we do not mean any objective contemplation, objective awareness, or objective cognition of Self-Nature or Buddha-Nature; we mean the Awakening of the Self-Nature itself. Since there is no Buddha apart from this awakening, to ‘become Buddha’ means to come to the true Self-Awakening.”\textsuperscript{35} As this buddha or awakened one, “the True Self or the Formless Self is beyond the opposition of self and world, within and without. . . . The True Self, without having in itself the structure of being and non-being, at the same time forms the ground of being and non-being.”\textsuperscript{36} In this way, the True Formless Self “does not negate the world of birth and death, but transcends birth and death, being free from the bonds of birth and death. It is not in space and time, and yet, transcending space and time, embraces them within itself.”\textsuperscript{37} It is unconditionally free. Beyond all forms, or, better yet, prior to all forms, the True Self can function without getting caught by the assumed form or the functioning. It is this liberated, unhindered activity that Hisamatsu refers to as the Formless Self. Only this Self realizes absolute autonomy beyond theonomy and ego-based autonomy. It is the Self that dwells nowhere—in neither life nor death, good nor evil, male nor female, east nor west—but can function freely in all of these forms.

Hisamatsu elaborates on the True Self in terms of the Buddhist construct of Nothingness. He writes that “if one awakens to the True Self, one realizes that the True Self is Nothingness, and only when we know the Self as Nothingness are we able to truly live and truly function freely.”\textsuperscript{38} In a 1939 essay, “The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness,” Hisamatsu argues that Nothingness is “the active contemplating Mind, . . . Subject-Nothingness in which active and passive are one, and in which the duality of mind and object is left behind.”\textsuperscript{39} And he expounds on the True Self as Nothingness in terms of six positive characteristics of Nothingness.

First, in terms of the “Not a Single Thing” characteristic, Hisamatsu argues that Nothingness is the “Nothingness-state of myself, that is, it is no other than
myself being Nothingness.” The self here is the Formless Self, which is free from all definition and limitation. More exactly put, it is not that there is “an entity” called the Self that has no form, but rather that not having any form whatsoever, not standing as “something” opposed to other things, is precisely the dynamic way of being called the Formless Self. Hisamatsu argues along these lines that the normal self always stands in opposition to things: “It may be said that there is almost no time when one is not entertaining some internal or external object. The ordinary ‘I,’ therefore, is an ‘I’ that is always connected with an object. This is the reason that consciousness is said to have the character of noema-noesis.”

The True Self, however, does not stand opposed to objects, for it is their unobjectifiable ground (an Ungrund ground, as it were): “The ‘I’ that does not have an object, the ‘I’ that does not have a single thing, is the ‘I’ that is no longer dependent upon or attached to anything. It is the ‘I’ that is not of the nature of noema-noesis.”

Second, concerning the “Like Empty Space” characteristic, Hisamatsu writes that the True Self as Nothingness is Non-Abiding Subjectivity, which “neither abides in something nor abides in no-thing.” This Self is beyond all delimitation, including being and nonbeing. Since it is without beginning or end, it is unborn and undying (fushō-fushi) and hence neither becomes nor decays. It clings neither to things nor to itself, and for this reason it is “completely without anything ‘obtained.’”

With regard to the “Mind-in-Itself” facet of Nothingness, Hisamatsu argues that “The True Buddha (True Self) is not without mind, but possesses Mind that is ‘without mind and without thought’; and it is not without self-awareness, but possesses Awareness that is ‘without awareness.’ An egoless ego is not without life, but possesses life that is ungenerated and unperishing.” In contrast to our usual mind, which is obstructed and attached, this Mind is beyond birth and death, beyond obstructions, limitation, form, defilement, and attachments. It is free from all of the divisions and barriers erected by ego-centered thought.

In discussing the “Self” aspect of Nothingness, Hisamatsu writes that the True Self is a “pure, absolute subject.” It is an active seeing, not a “mind” that is seen. That is to say, the True Self as “Mind does not obtain as object, but obtains as subject.” And describing the fifth characteristic, freedom, Hisamatsu maintains that “Oriental Nothingness as the subjective subject is, further, the completely free subject.” What is entailed here is neither the sen- suous freedom of children nor the mature rational freedom of which Kant speaks. By transcending reason and attaining liberation from sin as the inseparability of good and evil and death as life-and-death, one realizes true religious freedom. Of course, such a transrational, transmoral realm is also opened up
in Christianity with its notions of grace and unconditional love. But Hisamatsu sees Zen as going beyond the dichotomy of human and God or human and Buddha and opening up “the truly free state that is neither bound nor obstructed by either humans or Buddha.”\(^{49}\) Again, this freedom is attained by ridding oneself of the ego-self and awakening to the True Self, by seeing into one’s True Nature beyond the antinomic polarity at the heart of human existence. This “‘seeing into one’s True Nature,’ not being anything, is every-thing, and being everything, is not anything. It is in this sense that the true meaning of ‘absolute negation is none other than absolute affirmation; and absolute affirmation is none other than negation’ (J. zettai hitei soku zettai kōtei, zettai kōtei soku zettai hitei) is to be understood.”\(^{50}\) Here, the True Self as No-thingness, being absolutely no-thing, permeates everything, and being nowhere, is everywhere.

Sixth, Hisamatsu sketches the creative aspect of Nothingness. He takes the True Self as creative along the lines of Scotus Erigena, arguing that “only in and as that which creates but is not created can creativity be said to be primary and absolute.”\(^{51}\) This creative Mind differs from Kant’s “consciousness in general,” for whereas the objects of consciousness in general come from the outside, “in Buddhism, on the contrary, that which is reflected in the mirror [Mind] is not something that comes from outside the mirror, but something that is produced from within the mirror.”\(^{52}\) Hisamatsu elaborates on this with a metaphor:

The creative nature of Oriental Nothingness is to be illustrated by the relation between the water and the wave, in which the water is forever and in every way the subject. If one were to make a subject of the wave, which is produced and disappears, this would be the ordinary human self. It is in such an ordinary subject’s reverting back from wave to water—that is, returning to its source—and reemerging as the True Subject or True Self that the characteristics of Oriental Nothingness must be sought and are to be found.\(^{53}\)

Along these lines, Hisamatsu writes in another essay, “The satori of Zen is like the phenomenal waves returning from waves to water, recognizing water as their original feature, that is, as their noumenon. It is the return of the phenomenal waves to noumenal water.”\(^{54}\) This return to the noumenal water is nothing passive. The water is not a negative nothingness, but creative, active Nothingness, functioning in and among the rising and falling waves.

Masao Abe argues in an essay on Hisamatsu’s philosophy that by experiencing at a young age the crumbling of his own “naive religious belief that avoids rational doubt,”\(^{55}\) and then despairing of reason’s ability to solve his most pressing existential problem, Hisamatsu himself passed through medi eval theocentric faith and modern, anthropocentric, rational autonomy.\(^{56}\) He
realized the contradiction of rationality and irrationality inherent in the structure of reason, and sought a standpoint beyond modern anthropocentrism, a standpoint that would not be a facile turning back to medieval theocentrism. By penetrating absolute sin and absolute death, Hisamatsu awakened to the Formless Self as the basis of absolute autonomy beyond theocentrism and anthropocentrism. He thereby established “a standpoint of absolute autonomy, which, though atheistic, is deeply religious, and though religious, is never contradictory to rational autonomy.” This standpoint is not mere transcendence as in theocentrism, nor immanence as in anthropocentrism, but rather a transcendent immanence in which ultimacy as the True Self, the “Way of Subjectivity” (shutaidō) is realized through the death of the ego-self.

Though it was Zen that reportedly solved the core existential questions with which he had been grappling, Hisamatsu did not accept the tradition in the form he had inherited. From his perspective, Zen historically has given Mahayana compassion that ostensibly animates it too narrow of a focus:

If, as has been the case with Zen, activity starts and ends only with the so-called practice of compassion involved in helping others to awaken, such activity will remain unrelated to the formation of the world or creation of history, isolated from the world and history, and in the end turn Zen into a forest Buddhism, temple Buddhism, at best, a Zen-monastery Buddhism. Ultimately this becomes “Zen within a ghostly cave.”

Hisamatsu admits that “Rinzai Zen decries stopping at the standpoint of emptiness and becoming entangled in oneness, describing this in such ways as ‘Zen person in a demonic cave,’ ‘attached, degenerating in a dark cave,’ and ‘the evil Zen of silent illumination (mokushō Zen).’” But he claims that this stopping is, in fact, what Zen has done, and “if Zen ends in mere self-awakening and the awakening of others (jikaku-kakuta), it is not perfect awakened functioning.” Zen in all of its forms in modern Japan needs to reflect on and respond to problems facing humanity, even though there are “people who feel that not having an interest in such problems is a condition for true Zen practice.”

Hisamatsu’s criticism of Zen extends beyond its overemphasis on satori to practice itself. He claims that Zen monastics typically engage kōans “quantitatively” as they work on and pass kōans one by one in what he terms “ladder” (hashigo) Zen, gradually transforming themselves but not realizing a complete and decisive Awakening. Deploying the metaphor of a polygon and a circle, he sees such practitioners as adding sides to a polygon to make it increasingly resemble a circle but never reaching true circularity. To attain the circle, what is needed is a negation, a qualitative disjunction.
Cognizant of this “ladder” pitfall in traditional kōan practice, Hisamatsu advances what he calls the “fundamental kōan” (kihonteki kōan), which subsumes all other kōans and purportedly brings the practitioner to a total realization. He proclaims, “I would like to establish a method for ‘Cornered, one passes through, passing through, one changes,’ in the simple form, ‘Right now, if nothing you do is of any avail, what will you do?’ (Dō shitemo ikenai to sureba, dō suru ka). If all our ways of being and all our actions are of no avail, what do we do? The expression, ‘all our actions,’ refers to our total actuality, but the situation where nothing will do is an absolute predicament, the last extremity.” In effect asking, “When you can neither do nor be anything whatsoever, what do you do?,” this kōan includes all other traditional kōans, and its resolution is none other than complete, immediate Awakening (tongo).

Hisamatsu also questions the need to work with a certified Zen master. In the F.A.S. approach, one does not go to a particular master and present one’s understanding of the kōan. Rather, one engages in “mutual inquiry” (sōgo sankyū) with other committed practitioners, on the assumption that one is ultimately meeting and engaging with the True Self. The context of this mutual inquiry has been the retreats of the F.A.S. Society three times a year at Reiuin’in, a Myōshinji subtemple, and more recently at other sites in and around Kyoto, including Shōkokuji. Hisamatsu termed the retreats betsuji-gakudō, “special time for studying the Way,” and like traditional Zen sesshin, they lasted for seven days with rigorous zazen, walking meditation, three-bowl oryōki meals, physical labor, and chanting (gongyō) of such texts as the Heart Sutra (Hannya shingyō), “Daitō Kokushi’s Admonition” (Daitō kokushi yuikai), and the “Vow of Humankind.” At the retreats, Hisamatsu offered sermons on classical Zen texts, sutras, and Buddhist treatises, although he called his talks teikō rather than using the customary Zen term, teishō, which he thought was a less dynamic approach to Zen discourse.

In recent years, the retreats of the F.A.S. Society have become less frequent, but members do continue meeting on most Saturday evenings, primarily at Rinkō’in, a subtemple at Shōkokuji. These gatherings, termed heijō dōjō, “ordinary place for [practicing] the Way,” begin with jikkyū, several thirty-minute periods of zazen with some walking meditation in between, followed by the serving of tea and about an hour of ronkyū, or discussion of Hisamatsu’s talks or writings. Although monks and nuns have participated in F.A.S. gatherings, the primary focus has been on the laity. In fact, Hisamatsu believed that one did not need to become a monk to awaken to the True Self. If one had Great Faith, Great Resolution, and a Great Doubting Spirit, one could wake up, regardless of whether one was living in a monastery. Hisamatsu thus rejected the Zen of a small coterie of monastics and in its stead advocated a “Zen for the masses” (taishū Zen).
While forging his novel approach to practice, Hisamatsu was well aware of the pitfalls of an overemphasis on practice, just as he criticized those who overemphasized Zen scholarship at the expense of practice. Cognizant of these possible shortcomings, he advocated the “unity of study and practice” (gakugyō-ichinyo). Since practice without study is blind and study without practice is powerless, one must negotiate the Way while pursuing both religious practice and academic study. Hisamatsu thus advocated that the Zen path go beyond narrow monastic discipline—zazen, kōans, physical work (samu)—and include study of social, political, and economic dimensions of history. He criticized scholars of Buddhism, claiming that “modern Buddhology, while taking in new Western ways of study, has tended to follow in the footsteps of traditional Chinese methods emphasizing the doctrinal study of the different schools. Practice has become an object of research. Living practice has been all but ignored.” For this reason, Buddhologists “have become strangers to practice, and because of that, to satori itself.” In this respect, “It is not the objective and impartial study of ethical, philosophical, or religious phenomena, but gaining knowledge of how to ‘live’ morality, philosophy, or religion, that must be the essential concern.” That is to say, our concern “must be that fundamental human subjectivity should come to be the totally and ultimately unified self.”

One fact that must be kept in mind in surveying his critique of Zen is that Hisamatsu did not speak from the detached standpoint of an external observer. Kitahara Ryūtarō, one of his senior students, once commented that “Hisamatsu made his criticism only after having gone through all the kōans at Myōshinji,” and “a criticism of traditional Zen coming from the mouth of someone who doesn’t know anything about it is likely to be an erroneous one.”

As we have seen, Hisamatsu concurs with Zen masters before him that Awakening is the crux of his tradition, but from his perspective that realization alone is not sufficient, for one must then, as what he calls the True or Formless Self, take the standpoint of all humankind and create history anew:

The Formless Self, which is no-birth-and-death freed from birth-and-death, must function and give rise to all things in actuality. This is the True Self (F), which constitutes the source of A and S. It is Self-Awakening. In that it is spatially boundless (formless), it is the basis of All Humankind, and in that it transcends the three periods of past, present, and future, it is the basis of Suprahistorical history. Since this Self is no-thought (mu-nen), no-mind (mu-shin), and the true reality of no-boundary, one can stand in the standpoint of all humankind and create history while transcending history.
Let us now turn to these second and third dimensions of Hisamatsu’s schema of F, A, and S.

Standing in the Standpoint of All Humankind

Having experienced the carnage of the Second World War, Hisamatsu recognizes the danger of the modern nation-state. He writes, “The second point (A) lies in transcending the fatally deadlocked egoistic structure of the nation-state, and in creating a universal and unified sovereignty for all mankind.”\(^74\) In a “Postmodernist Manifesto,” he declares that “we can no longer trust absolute sovereignty to nation states. . . . Because of egoism, in the realm of politics, world peace is impossible, in the realm of economics, the free circulation of material and spiritual wealth is obstructed, and in the realm of ethics, universality for all humans is lost.”\(^75\) To replace nation-states, he calls for “a world system, in which all of the world is one, not a state system or a nation system.”\(^76\) The first requisite for that system is for the Formless Self to take the stance of “all humankind.”

Hisamatsu views the dimension of humankind in Mahāyāna fashion, for he construes the Awakening of one person as simultaneously the Awakening of all people, while recognizing that most people do not realize that they are originally or fundamentally awakened. For this reason, the compassion that wells up from the depths of Awakening—rather than from Amida or God—directs itself to helping people confirm that they are fundamentally awake. In this respect, “True religious life lies not in our receiving compassion but in our turning over that approach and practicing compassion ourselves.”\(^77\) Hisamatsu construes this compassion as “Objectless Great Compassion”:

In one’s original condition . . . there is no salvation. That is to say, in one’s original place there is no saving and no being saved. Saving and being saved, seen from the standpoint distinguishing Expedient Dharma and True Dharma, are Expedient Dharma. Clearly realizing that one is originally saved, that saving and being saved are originally nonexistent, and then saving those who do not realize this fact—this amounts to Objectless Great Compassion. Therefore, if one is unawakened to the True Self, one cannot understand this point and in ignorance is convinced one must be saved.\(^78\)

This can also be termed Bodhisattva Functioning (bosatsu-gyō), in which the actor is no ordinary ego but a “transcendent Person or transcendent humanity,”\(^79\) operating on the basis of “the whole of mankind as width and such
transcendent humanity as depth.” And as indicated by the “Vow of Humankind,” Hisamatsu argues that humans must transcend their differences and work together to solve not only the fundamental religious problems of sin and death, value and existence, but also the various other forms of suffering in the world.

Creating History Suprahistorically

Like the spatial dimension of all humankind, the temporal dimension of creating history suprahistorically derives from the depth dimension of Awakening:

The casting off and self-dissolution of the ultimately contradictory subject of history, and its freeing of itself with the emergence of the unhindered, self-abiding, fundamental subject is not achieved in the movement of history, that is, through the historical dialectic. It is accomplished at the root-source of history, which is prior to the birth of history. In living in history itself there is an ultimate contradiction, and this ultimate contradiction cannot be resolved by means of living in history. It can only be resolved through the self-dissolution of history itself. Therefore, though the term “the casting off and self-dissolution of history” has been used, this means that history “casts itself off,” and returns to what is prior to its own birth.

In short, we must break beyond not only the inherent contradictions of human existence but also the contradictions at the base of history, and in the resultant awakening, Hisamatsu claims, the True Self, the true world, and true history converge.

From Hisamatsu’s Buddhist perspective, time is beginningless and endless. In Awakening, the past and future “roll back” into the Eternal Now, the nunc stans that contains past, present, and future. In Awakening to the Absolute Present, one grasps the eschaton, the end of history, right now, not in the future. Of course, although history is cast off and one awakens to Absolute Present, there still remains an aspect of “not yet,” in the sense that work still needs to be done to awaken others and create a historical world in which all people can live peacefully in fulfillment. Hisamatsu construes this activity as a “creating without parting from Awakening,” with the True Self transcending history while working within it. The True, Formless Self retains its freedom—as the Zen expression puts it, is “solitarily emancipated and non-dependent” (dokudatsu-mue)—and “it is only when we are free from our very action of creation that we can really create history.” In this respect, Hisamatsu claims, only the True Self can create history “suprahistorically.”
Operating in tandem with the nation-state as an obstruction to taking the stance of all humankind and creating a different kind of history is modernity:

The modern age collapsed as a consequence of excessive “multiplication.” Accordingly, the method for the resurrection of the modern world lies neither in a restoration of the medieval world, which is lacking in multiplicity, nor in a further intensification of the approach of the modern world, which is completely devoid of “unity.” Rather, it must be realized in the thoroughgoing actualization of existence itself as the non-dualistic oneness of unity and multiplicity in which multiplicity is realized in unity and unity in multiplicity. Herein, unity is the root-source to which multiplicity must return, while multiplicity is the expression of unity. Thus unity and multiplicity do not consist of a mere static relation, but rather a dynamic and creative one.\(^8^4\)

To “resurrect” the modern world in this way, Hisamatsu argues for the creation of a “postmodern world.” This new world does not, however, lie on a line of extension from antiquity, the middle ages, and modernity, for there needs to be a fundamental break between the modern and postmodern ages, paralleling the break between the antinomic ego-self and the True Self. “The postmodern world does not signify something merely coming after modern humanity in the temporal sense, but rather, in an ontological sense, the creative realization of being itself in human history, whereby the two indispensable conditions for existence [unity and multiplicity] will be equally . . . fulfilled.”\(^8^5\) As Abe Masao puts it, “By postmodern, he did not refer to some future time in a chronological sense, but to a time in which the ultimate basis of the modern age and all past time as well is fundamentally overcome and in which Self, world, and history are completely fulfilled.”\(^8^6\)

In his criticism of modernity, Hisamatsu rejects the “idealistic humanism” through which modern humans apply their rationality to solve the myriad problems confronting them. With its faith in the rational ego, idealistic humanism cannot penetrate to the deepest source of problems. However successful it may be at solving certain problems and ameliorating certain forms of human suffering in history, it does not resolve the basic human problem that causes those problems in the first place, nor does it resolve the antinomy at the base of history itself. As Hisamatsu writes, “the solution of the branch problems alone will not bring about the solution of the root problem.”\(^8^7\) Lacking this resolution of the fundamental problem in the structure of the ego and history, “idealistic humanism is a false endlessness. Attached to existence, it never overcomes the issue of the inseparability of existence and nonexistence. It tries to take only the
existence side of existence-nonexistence . . . This is the standpoint of the
delusion that it can reach an eternally unreachable goal." As Hisamatsu elab-
orates, “From what standpoint are we to approach actual problems, as the
unsettled wave or the formless water?” We must, as another of Hisamatsu’s
metaphors would have it, function like a spider, which never gets stuck in its
web, not like a silkworm, which gets bound by its creation.

Hisamatsu’s insight found expression not only in his standpoint of F.A.S.
but also in his poetry, unorthodox calligraphy, and accomplished performance
of the tea ceremony. During his many years of teaching at universities in Kyoto and living in Hōseki-an, part of the Shunkō’in subtemple of Myōshinji,
Hisamatsu devoted himself to the practice of these Japanese arts. “Calligraphy,
painting, and poetry,” as Abe relates, “all became vehicles of awakened self-
expression. Hisamatsu was especially fond of the tea ceremony, which for him
was also an expression of the same Awakening, transcending all tea schools
and ceremonial forms.” Abe further comments, “He looked with disfavor on
the modern tea ceremony, in the forms into which it has fallen in modern
times. In departing from the true spirit of Zen, he felt it had developed strong
tendencies to mannerism. His role as a reformer can be seen in the time and
effort he devoted to the Shincha-kai (Mind-Tea Society), which he organized in
1941 in an effort to infuse the tea ceremony with new meaning based on the
spirit of Zen.” Hisamatsu also wrote on Zen aesthetics, and his most impor-
tant work in that area, *Zen to bijutsu*, was translated by Tokiwa Gishin in 1971 as
*Zen and the Fine Arts*.

Critical Assessment

At a time when bookstores abound with “Zen and the Art of” titles and many
people are content to practice Zen simply as a way to cultivate self-discipline,
mindfulness, or concentration, Hisamatsu’s sustained focus on fundamental
issues in human existence merits attention. His ongoing concern was the com-
mitted engagement with existential predicaments that many traditional Zen
Buddhists would claim makes Zen a path of liberation, of salvation, if you will,
rather than simply a hip hobby or a self-help technique. The trade-off here is
that in focusing so much on fundamental existential issues, the impasse of the
Great Doubt Block, and Zen awakening, Hisamatsu says little about possible
interim fruits of Zen practice, the partial transformation of the vast majority of
practitioners, who have not experienced the Great Death and Great Awakening
of which Hisamatsu speaks. Though Hisamatsu is to be applauded for not
dwelling on relative concerns and attainments, his focus on Great Death and
Great Awakening runs the risk of rendering his path distant to most of “all humankind,” if not elitist.

Along these lines, Hisamatsu seems to be arguing that the standpoint of F, A, and S can be understood and actualized only by those who are awakened to the True Self. Indeed, about our ability to understand the aesthetic side of Zen he once wrote, “In order . . . to determine which calligraphic style or which style of painting or which music expresses a Zen style, one must have a thoroughly vivid Zen realization. If one lacks this realization, one probably will not be able to understand why a certain calligraphic style . . . expresses Zen meaning.”

Needless to say, his overwhelming emphasis on full awakening impacts his institutional legacy insofar as no members of F.A.S. have emerged with the stature and charisma of Hisamatsu as an “awakened True Self.”

Another issue that emerges in Hisamatsu’s standpoint is his claim that Zen awakening lifts us above divisions of nationality, race, class, and gender and equips us with the ability to function in the midst of such distinctions without getting caught up in them. The historical record indicates that supposedly awakened Zen masters have been far from enlightened on issues surrounding those distinctions, as evidenced by “Imperial-Way Zen” during the Second World War and recent sex scandals in Zen centers. In fact, traditional blind spots in the areas of nationality, race, class, and gender have led some modern Zen thinkers to deny that awakening has any significant impact on one’s social and political savvy. After the Second World War, D. T. Suzuki argued that “by itself satori is unable to judge the right and wrong of war.” Zen master Bernie Glassman has suggested that “even while possessing great realization, we still have our conditioning, our own particular characteristics, our own particular paths. Little of that changes overnight.”

Hisamatsu’s focus on what he sees as the basic predicament and its resolution, though more penetrating than much of what goes by the name of Zen these days, also tends to imply that other religious paths are shallow, that is, are insufficient as resolutions of sin and death. His discourse implies that only those who experience the Great Death and awaken to the True Self are truly qualified to address social and political problems. Of course, most people working to transform the world would accept his diagnosis of how contemporary problems and suffering derive in large part from the nature of the human ego (or more proximately from the institutions and practices it generates), but partial solutions—as opposed to Hisamatsu’s apparently “all or nothing” approach—are possible in an ego-based way of functioning, even if it harbors the “false endlessness” of which he spoke. And especially outside the monastery walls, in the lay world where Hisamatsu chose to build the F.A.S. Society, most people are compelled to respond to problems of actuality in whatever way
they can and do not have the luxury of waiting until they can do so as the Formless Self.

Moreover, Jews, Christians, and Muslims committed to social justice would surely question whether what Hisamatsu terms the “postmodern world” can be established only by means of an absolute discontinuity, the absolute death of the antinomic ego and history itself. A Christian, for example, might argue that an experience of grace frees one from narrow, selfish concerns and prepares and motivates one to respond to the problems of the world and history just as much as a Zen-style death of the ego does. Even nonreligious people have made major contributions to overcoming the suffering caused by nationalism and modernity, the main objects of Hisamatsu’s concern. In fact, in the 1920s and 1930s, while ostensibly awakened Zen masters were jumping on the imperialist bandwagon, fully entangled in history and seemingly unable to see it clearly much less transcend it or create it “suprahistorically,” it was the Marxists who were criticizing the nation-state. Perhaps Hisamatsu would argue that those nationalist Zen masters were not fully awakened to the True Self, but one wonders why Hisamatsu, with all of his concern about self-interested nation-states and human entanglement in them, did not more explicitly address the issue of Zen war responsibility in the decades following 1945.

Even if we allow for the sake of the argument that Hisamatsu’s approach is not elitist and that a large number of people could awaken to the Formless Self, we are still left with the question of what, exactly, the “dropping off” of history might entail. At the moment of his awakening in 1915, how was World War One affected? How did his teaching and other actions in the three decades after that affect the historical process that led to Hitler, Tōjō, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

We also confront the question of the exact forms the suprahistorical creation of history might take. Hisamatsu rejects the modern nation-state and advocates going beyond it to a world system of all humankind, but what exact steps are necessary to get us there? Hisamatsu offered no specific, concrete proposals. And on what other areas might the creation of history focus? Economic injustice? Environmental degradation? And what features of Hisamatsu’s approach, if put into action, would distinguish it from the actions being taken by non-Zen actors committed to social justice? Hisamatsu might argue that I am setting up a false dichotomy between transforming oneself and transforming history, for he argues that the death of egoism, the turning over of the ego in the One Great Death, is nothing other than the turning over and transformation of history. But Hisamatsu never elaborated on the creation of history with any degree of detail. Nor did he take public stances or protest while alive, even though many Japanese with similar criticisms of nationalism were highly active in opposing state
support of the Yasukuni Shrine, the security treaty with the United States, the Vietnam War, and other developments that were directly related to the problem of the nation-state, ostensibly Hisamatsu’s main ethical concern. This lack of specificity about concrete issues and actions leaves Hisamatsu’s standpoint vulnerable to such criticisms as Bernard Faure’s characterization of F.A.S. as “an idealistic and rather grandiloquent lay movement.”

Steven Antinoff, who practiced Zen ardently with the F.A.S. Society in the 1970s, has addressed the pitfall of Hisamatsu’s dominant focus on how the ego taints history and how humans must transcend the nation-state and stand in the standpoint of all humankind. In his Ph.D. dissertation on Hisamatsu, Antinoff writes, “The setting forth of the trans-national ideal, taken in conjunction with the total repudiation of the efficacy of less ‘exalted’ forms of international social organization and cooperation, reveals a perfectionistic utopianism of the most sentimental type.” He further argues:

The perfectionistic and sentimental nature of his concrete proposal to transfer sovereignty to all humankind, the utter neglect of the question of what means are permissible in seeking to gain his objective or retain it against the onslaught of a determined opposition, and the absence of any basis or strategy for discerning and supporting the relatively better policy or cause in a struggle between admittedly egoistic forces where the actualization of his program is not an immediate issue, all show his advance over traditional Zen to be far from adequate.

Antinoff turns to theologian Reinhold Niebuhr’s “Christian realism” to explore how Hisamatsu’s standpoint might be augmented to allow for serious consideration of injustice and proximate steps that egos in history might take to ameliorate human suffering, all the while recognizing that such actions and their positive fruits are partial and need to be scrutinized in light of the transnational ideal Hisamatsu lifts up. Antinoff also makes a proposal: “What is mandatory . . . is a dual perspective which realistically seeks to do justice to both ultimate and relative dilemmas in human existence, that is, a perspective in which the religious criticism of both polarities of any duality not only does not entail the suppression of the moral (or socio-political) imperative for the actualization of the positive pole, but is sensitive to the ambiguous and tragic aspects of any meaningful attempt to effect that actualization.”

Despite the questions I raise here about his approach, Hisamatsu will in all likelihood continue to be recognized as an important modern Zen master. His path to Zen and his treatment of the tradition were both informed by his particular historical situation, and as Abe has argued, “The originality of his
standpoint lies in the fact that he awakened . . . by overcoming both theistic religious belief and rational humanistic philosophy, grasping the Nothingness of the Zen tradition.”

If, like his teacher Nishida Kitarō, Hisamatsu’s religious thought is, as I have in effect argued here, more sophisticated than his political and historical analysis, Hisamatsu’s legacy will rest less on his exposition of “A” and “S” than on his exposition of “F.” Like other important masters across the history of Zen, Hisamatsu offered a distinctive representation of the core religious teaching of Zen, and it remains to be seen whether his exposition of what he sees as the problem in human existence and his F.A.S. version of the Zen path will in future decades continue to attract the interest of scholars and those who might pour themselves into practice with the commitment that he and his immediate followers exhibited sixty-five years ago in the middle of war.

NOTES

1. The Japanese name is Gakudō Dōjō, and though the group translated it into English as the Association for Self-Awakening and Abe Masao rendered it “The Seat of Awakening,” the expression literally means “place for studying the Way.”


4. The Vow of Humankind was crafted in 1951.


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


33. As Hisamatsu argued in his conversation with Jung, “The cure in psychoanalysis is to . . . treat isolated diseases individually. But, in Zen, as indicated by the expressions do-issai-kuyaku (save everything from suffering) and kyūkyō gedatsu (ultimate extrication), it is to be awakened to the ‘Self’ not enmeshed by things, and to get rid of all diseases at once.” Hisamatsu and Jung, “Unconsciousness and No Mind,” p. 87.


37. Ibid.


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42. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
64. The F.A.S. term for walking meditation is gyōdō, “going along the Way,” rather than the traditional expression, kinhin.
65. With Tokiwa, I have also translated and published a number of Hisamatsu’s teikō on the “Vow of Humankind” in the F.A.S. Society Journal.
66. With Tokiwa Gishin, I have translated and published Hisamatsu’s talks on The Record of Linji (Ch. Linji lu, J. Rinzairoku) in Critical Sermons of the Zen Tradition: Hisamatsu’s Talks on Linji (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002).
72. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
82. This expression appears in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra.
83. Association for Self-Awakening, Nothingness, p. 16.
84. “For the Postmodernist,” p. 4.
85. Ibid.
89. Hisamatsu taught at Rinzai Gakushūin (later renamed Hanazono University) and Ryūkoku University from 1919 until 1932, then at Kyoto University (1932–1949), and finally at Kyoto Municipal University of the Fine Arts (1952–1963).
90. Hisamatsu’s Zen name was Hōseki, “stone embracing,” and the character an means “hermitage.”
93. For expediency’s sake, I am bracketing the issue of how scholars might critique Hisamatsu’s portrayal of satori and claims about what constitutes the crux of Zen.
95. As Ichikawa Hakugen, Brian Victoria, and I have outlined, ostensibly enlightened Zen masters were often eager supporters of Japanese imperialism over the first half of the twentieth century. See Ichikawa Hakugen, Bukkyō no sensō-sekinin (Buddhism’s Responsibility for the War), vol. 3 of Ichikawa Hakugen chosaku-shū (The Collected Works of Ichikawa Hakugen) (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993); Brian Victoria, Zen at War, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); and Christopher Ives, Imperial-Way Zen: Ichikawa Hakugen’s Critique and Lingering Questions for Buddhist Ethics (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2009).
96. “Sasshin” (Renewal of the Zen World), in Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū 28, p. 413; quoted in Brian Victoria, Zen at War, p. 148.