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The Relation between Chinese Buddhist History and Soteriology

YOSHIZU YOSHIHIDE

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY PAUL GRONER

Introduction

My recent research has focused on the development of Fa-tsang’s (643–712) doctrinal thought, especially his view of soteriology and its relation to one of the key doctrinal categories he posited, the Distinct Teaching of the One-vehicle. Fa-tsang’s views have been compared with those of his teacher Chih-yen (602–668) and the Korean monk Úisang (625–702), who also studied under Chih-yen. Here I would like to discuss a different theme, namely, my view of the overall development of Chinese Buddhism, although I will return to Hua-yen and Fa-tsang later in this chapter. I have chosen this topic because from the time of Gautama Buddha’s enlightenment until the present day, any group that called itself Buddhist has focused its soteriology on explaining the realization of buddhahood. Their explanations, however, have varied in form, content, and metaphors used.

For example, in India, the Abhidharma tradition and early Perfection of Wisdom literature clearly exhibit different soteriological stances. Abhidharma thought stressed the four noble truths; of the four, the path (mārga-satya) was especially important because of its soteriological significance. The first two truths, suffering and the cause of suffering, concern conditioned (samskṛta) and tainted (āsraiva) existence, but the third noble truth, nirvāṇa, concerns the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and untainted (anāsraiva). Thus the world we live in and the ideal were separated. The fourth truth, which is both conditioned and untainted, serves as a bridge between the two by specifying religious practices. The eightfold noble path was generally considered to be the content of the fourth truth, but it was often interpreted so that all the various practices found in the threefold studies (morality, meditation, wisdom) could be included.

Because the path (mārga) specified in the fourth truth served as the
basis for Abhidharma soteriology, this form of Buddhism may be called “mārga-Buddhism.” Many people embraced it; its vitality is amply demonstrated by the survival of Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. However, mārga-Buddhism was not without problems. Although Śākyamuni Buddha had advised people to depend on both the Dharma and themselves as a lamp or guide, people were willing to sacrifice themselves in order to protect the Dharma. Thus while their actions could serve as examples of using the Dharma as a lamp, they did not remember the Buddha’s admonition also to rely on themselves. Perhaps the Buddha’s emphasis on no-self contributed to this situation. Many practitioners did not stop with simply eliminating their selves, but also refused to pay much attention to society, perhaps believing that they had done enough by receiving alms from lay believers.

Early Mahāyāna, especially Perfection of Wisdom, arose partly as the result of criticisms of mārga-Buddhism. Although the earliest occurrence of the term “Mahāyāna” (great vehicle) in extant texts is found in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines), the Mahāyāna movement started even earlier. Because so much of early Perfection of Wisdom thought was expressed in terms of “vehicles” (yāna), early Mahāyāna could also be called a “vehicle movement.” For example, when Mahāyānist (those of the great vehicle) called the Abhidarma tradition “Hīnayāna” (small or inferior vehicle), they were using the term to criticize their opponents and exalt themselves.

The great vehicle was defined by using the teaching of nonsubstantiality or emptiness to criticize and evaluate various concepts. Thus Perfection of Wisdom sūtras directed bodhisattvas to practice the six perfections and advance through the ten grounds one by one, starting from the three realms and progressing to omniscience. Yet at the same time, all these concepts were empty. The bodhisattva who practiced even as he realized the emptiness of dharmas exemplified the revival of relying on oneself as a guide, a teaching that had been lost in the minutiae of Abhidharma. By basing his practice on the emptiness of dharmas, the bodhisattva obtained a freedom that allowed him to carry his teachings anywhere. That freedom, the essence of the yāna movement, was revolutionary when contrasted to the standardized and fixed elements of the Abhidarma systems. Although the use of such terms as “mārga” and “yāna” to characterize these trends in Buddhist soteriology is clearly a broad overgeneralization, their usefulness should become evident through the following survey of Chinese Buddhist history and soteriology.

In most textbooks on Chinese Buddhism, Ch’an, Pure Land, T’ien-t’ai, and Hua-yen are singled out as representative traditions of Chinese Buddhism. Ch’an and Pure Land are said to emphasize practice while T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen stress theory. But this type of generaliza-
tion is so broad that it tells us little or nothing. When T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen are compared, T’ien-t’ai is said to have included practice while Hua-yen did not. Although this may seem reasonable at first, nothing is stated about whose version of T’ien-t’ai included practices and whose version of Hua-yen did not.

Before such broad generalizations are made, we must clarify the positions held by the various figures in a lineage. For example, in the Hua-yen lineage, enough common elements can be found among the Tu Shun (557–640), Chih-yen, Fa-tsong, Hui-yüan (n.d.), and Ch’eng-kuan (738–839) to justify calling it a lineage. However, if the individual figures are studied, major doctrinal differences clearly exist between teachers and their students. The researcher soon learns that the argument that Hua-yen had no tradition of practice is clearly unjustified. Some Hua-yen masters emphasized practice and others did not.

Rather than relying on such generalizations, we should grasp the general “movement” or “course” (nagare) of Chinese Buddhist history, the broad outline of how it develops over time. Although I already have written about the importance of understanding the “movements” of Buddhist history, I develop this topic in the next section. Chinese Buddhist history can be divided into three major movements or ways of understanding Buddhism: teachings (chiao), personal standpoint (Ch. tsung, J. jibun no tachiba), and teachings and personal standpoints conjoined (tsung-chiao).

The historical period from the introduction of Buddhism to China until the early T’ang can be characterized as emphasizing chiao. Monks devoted themselves to defending Buddhism against Confucian criticisms, arguing that their tradition was a chiao, the “teaching of the Buddha,” and that it was comparable to Confucianism, “the teaching of the scholars” (ju-chiao). Eventually, the Buddhist position was officially recognized. The lineages that appeared from the Northern and Southern dynasties through the early T’ang—Pure Land, San-lun, the Sect of the Three Stages, T’ien-t’ai, the Lü (Vinaya) school, Hua-yen, and Hsūan-tsang’s Yogācāra (Fa-hsiang) tradition—all shared an interest in systematic “teachings.”

The Ch’an tradition criticized the emphasis these traditions placed on the systematic exposition of doctrine by proclaiming that Ch’an was “a special transmission outside of the teachings (chiao) that did not rely on words.” Ch’an monks thus criticized the overemphasis on words that they perceived in establishment Buddhism. Later, Tsung-mi (780–841) would conjoin teachings, especially the Hua-yen tradition, with the personal emphasis (tsung) of Ch’an. In doing so, he established his own tradition of Hua-yen Ch’an and opened the way for those who argued that the three teachings (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) had the same purport.

Before T’ien-t’ai, Hua-yen, Ch’an, and Pure Land are compared,
and before the individual representatives of a tradition such as Hua-yen are contrasted, the doctrinal and soteriological stances of the three major movements mentioned above must be explained. In doing so, the importance of this approach will become more evident. For example, Ch’an and Pure Land, the two traditions usually grouped together as “practical,” can be differentiated because Ch’an emphasized personal standpoints (tsung) whereas the Pure Land tradition interpreted Buddhism as a teaching (chiao). Hua-yen and T’ien-t’ai, often contrasted according to whether or not they have a practical aspect, can both be considered teachings. After the major movements of Chinese Buddhism are understood, the student can better comprehend the relationships and comparisons of the traditions of Chinese Buddhism. If comparisons are attempted ignoring the characteristics of these three movements, then Chinese Buddhism (which has a weak tradition of sectarianism) may well be interpreted in the light of the sectarian characteristics of Japanese Buddhist tradition.

In considering the development of Buddhism in China, Korea, and Japan, we must remember that Buddhism always began as an imported tradition. In doing so, two paradoxical problems emerge. First, Indian and Central Asian forms of Buddhism were transmitted to China. Later, distinctive Chinese forms of Buddhism were promulgated in Korea. Finally, Buddhist traditions characteristic of China and Korea were brought to Japan. In analyzing the spread of Buddhism, students are prone to think of the dissemination of a pure form of Buddhism, but this has never been the case. An understanding of the broad development of Buddhism helps to clarify this problem.

The second problem concerns the manner of transmission of Buddhism. Frequently, Buddhism was promulgated in a fortuitous, almost random manner, rather than as part of a systematic effort to spread the tradition. For example, T’ien-t’ai was established before Hua-yen in China; Hua-yen was thus influenced by T’ien-t’ai. At about the time Hua-yen was established, Ch’an was emerging as an important tradition in China. But when these traditions were transmitted to Japan, Hua-yen was brought over first. T’ien-t’ai was transmitted a number of decades later, and Ch’an was not established until several centuries later, during the time of Eisai (1141–1215). In India, Mahāyāna Buddhism arose approximately five hundred years after the death of the Buddha. It immediately had to compete with the established Abhidharma tradition. Thus in India the chronological relation of the appearance of Abhidharma and Mahāyāna was clear, but in China the two traditions were transmitted in an almost random manner, without any regard to the way they had arisen in India. When Buddhism, an exotic foreign tradition, was introduced in China, even as it maintained much of its original character, it was adopted with hiatuses because of the cir-
cumstances of its transmission. The story of Chinese Buddhism is replete with both important continuities and discontinuities.

In the remaining sections of this chapter, the transmission of Indian Buddhism to China is examined first. As Indian Buddhism was being transmitted to China, major differences with Indian Buddhism became evident. These differences contributed to the formation of distinctive forms of Chinese Buddhism that can be characterized as the three major movements mentioned above. I conclude with a consideration of the transmission of Chinese and Korean Buddhism to Japan and the emergence of unique forms of Japanese Buddhism.

The Course of Chinese Buddhism and Its Soteriology

The Establishment of Buddhism as a Teaching:
Kumarajiva and Hui-yüan of Mt. Lu

Chinese Buddhism was affected by both the mārga and yāna movements of Indian Buddhism. Although these movements developed in a chronological sequence in India, they were introduced to China at virtually the same time. During the reign of King Huan (146–167) of the Later Han, An Shih-kao (n.d.) translated Abhidarma texts in China. A few years later, during the reign of Emperor Ling (167–189), Chih Lou-chia-ch'an (Lokakṣema?) translated Mahāyāna works such as the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras. Thus An Shih-kao introduced mārga-Buddhism at about the same time that Chih Lou-chia-ch'an was translating texts presenting yāna-Buddhism.

Even though the texts they translated were from opposing traditions, Chinese Buddhists respected both movements as the preaching of the Buddha. For example, Tao-an (312–385) studied Perfection of Wisdom texts but was also interested in An Shih-kao's translations of Abhidarma works. His student Hui-yüan (338–416) adopted the same attitude; until he corresponded with Kumarajiva (344–413 or 350–409) late in his life, Hui-yüan had not decided whether Hinayāna or Mahāyāna was superior.

Kumarajiva's arrival in China had a major effect on the development of Chinese Buddhism. As a youth, Kumarajīva had gone to Kashmir to study Sarvāstivādin doctrine, but on his way home had spent time in Kashgar, where he was converted to Mahāyāna by Sūryasoma. From that time on, he advocated Mādhyamika as espoused by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. As soon as he arrived in Ch'ang-an, he began translating Mahāyāna works such as the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras and Lotus Sūtra. He also translated Mādhyamika texts by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, including the Madhyamakakārikā (Verses on the Middle Way), Ta-chih-tu lun (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra; Commentary on the Greater Per-
Hui-yuan soon began to write letters to Kumārajīva asking about a variety of issues, including discrepancies between the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna positions. Like his teacher, Hui-yuan regarded both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna as the word of the Buddha; but he also recognized that the two traditions contradicted each other on a number of points. Kumārajīva carefully answered each of Hui-yuan's questions, repeatedly pointing out that Hinayāna and Mahāyāna were fundamentally different. He explained that, as their names implied, Mahāyāna (great vehicle) was superior to Hinayāna (inferior vehicle). Their correspondence was eventually collected into a text entitled the *Ta-sheng ta-i chang* (Essay on the Great Meaning of Mahāyāna).  

Kumārajīva's translations and his correspondence with Hui-yuan convinced Chinese monks of the superiority of Mahāyāna. However, the contents of such texts as the *Ta-chih-tu lun* and Kumārajīva's letters strengthened the conviction of the Chinese that both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna were the word of the Buddha.  

**Tao-sheng and Hui-kuan**

Two thousand monks are said to have come to Ch'ang-an to study under Kumārajīva. Because they adopted Kumārajīva's doctrinal position, Mahāyāna became the major Buddhist tradition in China. However, Mahāyāna texts contained many contradictions and discrepancies. To explain how the Buddha could have preached all these texts without contradiction, Chinese monks developed their own systems of classification of doctrine (*chiao-p' an*). Their early classifications are known through the presentation and criticism of "the three systems of the South and the seven of the North" made by the de facto founder of the T'ien-t'ai school, Chih-i (538–597). The systems of categorization proposed by Tao-sheng (355–434) and Hui-kuan (n.d.) are discussed below.

Tao-sheng is famous for advancing a theory of sudden enlightenment. His classification of doctrines is presented at the beginning of the *Fa-hua i su* (Commentary on the Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra) as "the four turnings of the wheel of dharma":

1. The dharma wheel of goodness and purity
2. The dharma wheel of expedient means
3. The dharma wheel of truth
4. The dharma wheel without residue

These probably corresponded to (1) teachings that enable a person to be reborn as a human being or a god and Hinayāna, (2) the three vehicles, (3) the One-vehicle of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and (4) the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*.

Tao-sheng's views were criticized by an exponent of gradual enlight-
enment, Hui-kuan. His classification system, known as “the two teachings and five periods,” is presented below:\(^\text{10}\)

1. Sudden teaching (*Avatamsakasūtra*)
2. Gradual teachings
   a. The distinct teaching of the three vehicles (*Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*)
   b. The pervasive teaching of the three vehicles (*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Brahmaviśeṣacintīparipṛčchā*)
   c. The restraining and praising teaching (*Perfection of Wisdom*)
   d. The identical-goal teaching (*Lotus Sūtra*)
   e. The teaching of eternal abiding (*Nirvāṇa Sūtra*)

In the classification systems of both Tao-sheng and Hui-kuan, the dissimilar teachings of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna have been arranged so that they fit within Śākyamuni’s biography without any apparent contradiction.

The first major purpose of such systems was to determine which of the many Buddhist texts was the ultimate teaching of the Buddha. Kumārajīva had convincingly argued that Mahāyāna was superior to Hīnayāna; but when additional Mahāyāna texts were translated after his death, Chinese monks argued about which Mahāyāna teachings should be considered the Buddha’s ultimate teaching.

The second major purpose of these classification systems was to respond to criticisms of Buddhism by outsiders, especially by Confucians and Taoists. These criticisms attacked Buddhism as a foreign religion from a variety of positions. For example, the Southern Ch’i Taoist Ku Huan (420–483) wrote a text entitled *I-hsia lun* (Treatise on the Barbarians and Chinese). In it, he argued that although Buddhism might be of value to barbarians, it certainly would not benefit the Chinese. Moreover, when Buddhists were ordained, they rejected filial piety because they chose to be celibate and did not have children. Their practice of honoring only the Buddha and refusing to pay obeisance to the emperor violated Confucian dictums on loyalty. Their doctrines of no-self and emptiness led to the teaching that the soul perished, a position that contradicted their views on karma. Mahāyāna Buddhist texts were filled with nonsensical talk that should not be trusted. Such attacks on Buddhism were a concerted effort to discredit the Indian tradition from a broad array of perspectives. These criticisms focused on whether Buddhism was to be considered a “teaching.”

The term “teaching” (*chiao*) occupied a special position within Confucian ethics. According to one view, a teaching had to have the following three characteristics.\(^\text{11}\) First, the founder of a teaching had to be an exceptional human being, a sage or superior man (such as Confucius). Second, a teaching’s contents had to be worthy of belief and trust, of being included in a “classic” (*ching*). Third, a teaching had to benefit
society in important ways. This last point was often used against Bud-
dhist in China, most recently during the Cultural Revolution. Bud-
hist monks were said to be unproductive members of society; they did
not work, pay taxes, or serve in the military. Moreover, the upkeep of
their temples consumed large amounts of resources.

From the Northern and Southern dynasties through the early T’ang
period, Chinese monks repeatedly argued that their founder was worthy
of being called a sage, that the contents of Buddhism were correct, and
that it benefited society. Their claims are found in commentarial and
apologetic literature as well as in records of face-to-face debates. Classi-
fication of doctrines must also be considered in terms of the Buddha’s
biography. If all the various sūtras were the Buddha’s words, then
despite their apparent contradictions, monks had to claim that all the
Buddha’s teachings could be arranged within a biographical framework
so that any discrepancies were resolved. If the Buddha’s teachings were
not consistent, then he could not be viewed as a sage. Far from being
seen as classics (ching), Buddhist scriptures would then be exposed as
containing falsehoods, and Buddhism would be revealed as undeserving
of the trust given to a “teaching” that could benefit society. Thus classi-
fications of doctrine should not be seen only as the product of debates
within Buddhism; they also were directed toward Confucian and Taoist
critics of Buddhism.

The Significance of Criticisms of Classifications of Doctrine

Criticisms of these early classification systems began to appear in Bud-
dhist writings during the Sui and early T’ang periods. Examples of
these critiques can be found in Ching-ying ssu Hui-yüan’s (523–592)
Tā-sheng i-chang (Essays on Mahāyāna Doctrines), Chih-i’s Miao-fa lien-
hua ching hsüan-i (Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra), and Chi-
tsad’s (549–623) Fa-hua hsüan-lun (Profound Discussion of the Lotus
Sūtra) and San-lun hsüan-i (Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises).
Slightly later examples are Hsüan-tsang’s disciple Chi’s (632–682) Tā-
sheng fa-yüan i-lin chang (Essays on the Mahāyāna Garden of Dharmas
and Grove of Doctrines), Wönch’ü’s (613–696) Chieh-shen-mi ching su
(Commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra), Fa-tsang’s Hua-yen wu-
chiao chang (Essays on the Five Teachings According to the Hua-yen
Tradition) and Hua-yen-ching t’an-hsüan chi (Record of Investigations
into the Mysteries of the Avatarṣakasūtra), Fa-tsang’s disciple Hui-
yüan’s (n.d.) Hua-yen-ching k’an-ting chi (Record of Corrections of [Inter-
pretations of] the Avatarṣaka), and Ch’eng-kuan’s Hua-yen-ching su
(Commentary on the Avatarṣaka).12

The purpose of these criticisms of classification schemes was not to
deny the validity of such systems but to make them more inclusive and
convincing, to strengthen the conceptual basis of Buddhism as a “teach-
ing.” As the systems suggested by Tao-sheng and Hui-kuan reveal,
texts with a wide variety of teachings were arranged to demonstrate how
the Buddha had appealed to beings with diverse capacities. The Bud­
dha's teachings were arranged so that they seemed to fit into his lifetime
without any contradictions. However, when these classification systems
were examined carefully many problems arose, seriously reducing their
value for Buddhists. As a result, monks felt compelled to criticize the
old classification systems and develop new, more convincing ones.

The self-confidence of the monks who devised these new systems is
amply displayed in Chih-i's discussion of the canonical sources for his
classification system of the four types of teaching. In the Ta-pen ssu-chiao
i (Doctrines of the Four Teachings), after he explained the Hīnayāna,
Pervasive, Distinct, and Perfect teachings, Chih-i discussed the canoni­
cal sources for his system in the following question and answer.

Question: If clear passages from sūtras and śāstras cannot be found
supporting the classification into four teachings, how can we accept
such a system?
Answer: Were the lectures of the masters of the past all based on pas­sages from the sūtras and śāstras? K'ai-shan [Chih-tsang, 458–522]
and Kuang-tse [Fa-yün, 467–529] used a system of five periods to
clarify the teachings. Chuang-yen [Seng-min] classified teachings
according to four periods. [Among the current classification sys­
tems are] the Ti-lun [tradition's] use of four, five, or six tenets.
[Other examples are from the San-lun tradition, such as] She­
shan's [Seng-ch'üan, n.d.] classification [of the Buddha's teach­
ings] according to whether they are simple or multiple and middle
or provisional. [His disciple] Hsing-huang [Fa-lang, 507–581] cat­
ergizes [the Buddha's teachings] according to four aspects of pro­
nonsense [truth]. None of these is based on clearly stated scrip­tural passages; all of them were established in accordance with the
feelings [and opinions of the author] in order to help and support
the Buddha in teaching and converting [sentient beings]. Any who
had karmic affinity with a teaching were to practice, believe, and
propagate it.13

In this passage, Chih-i rhetorically asked whether clear scriptural sup­
port was required for people to accept his classification system. He
replied by asking whether the major teachers of the past had scriptural
authority to support their systems, and noted that they did not. Instead,
they taught in accordance with people's thoughts and feelings in order
to benefit Buddhism. But Chih-i's attitude differed from that of earlier
scholars, who had supplied as much scriptural support as possible to
justify their classification systems so that they could withstand criti­
cisms. Chih-i demonstrated his self-confidence by announcing that aid­
ing the Buddha's transforming work was more important than carefully
eliminating any contradictions in his system and amassing scriptural passages to support his claims.

Behind this shift in attitude lay the persecution of Buddhism under Emperor Wu (r. 560–578) of the Northern Chou. After witnessing debates between Confucians, Taoists, and Buddhists, Emperor Wu decided that Buddhism was not a “teaching” and persecuted it. To respond to such events, Chih-i decided that rigorously sticking to the formalistic requirements of doctrinal analysis would not work; instead, Buddhists must put the contents of those teachings into effect.

**Fa-tsang’s Matching of Vehicle and Teaching**

Once classification systems had been established and refined, even rulers recognized Buddhism as a “teaching.” Emperor Wen (r. 581–604) of the Sui dynasty used it as an ideology for ruling the country. Both he and Emperor T’ai-tsung (r. 626–649) of the T’ang praised Buddhism as a “great teaching.” The latter even issued a proclamation with the title “Preface to the Sagely Teaching of the Tripiṭaka,” in which Buddhism was referred to as both a great teaching and, as the title indicated, a sagely one.

Hsüan-tsang’s translations called the attention of the Chinese back to the significance of Indian Buddhism. Hsüan-tsang argued that many of the previous translations had been done incorrectly. With his massive translation project, he strove to revolutionize Chinese Buddhism. Although the Fa-hsiang (Tz’u-en) school based on Hsüan-tsang’s translations survived for several generations, Hsüan-tsang’s translations were not as influential as he had hoped. Instead, the teachings he propagated were sternly criticized almost from their inception. In contrast to the One-vehicle Buddhism that had become popular in China, Hsüan-tsang propagated a form of Buddhism that may be called “Buddhism of the three vehicles.” Although many of the texts he translated included the term “Mahāyāna” in their titles, Hsüan-tsang also translated a large amount of Hīnayāna Abhidarma material, partly to demonstrate the superiority of Mahāyāna. Hsüan-tsang’s Buddhism was typical of the Indian Buddhist emphasis on categories such as mārga and yāna.

Ever since Kumārajiva had come to China, Chinese Buddhists had generally recognized Mahāyāna as being superior and had based their classifications of doctrine on that premise. However, Hsüan-tsang had called many of their presuppositions into question, especially the emphasis on the One-vehicle and the universality of buddha-nature. Instead, Hsüan-tsang argued for the three vehicles, five separate types of religious potential for humans, and the position that some people could never realize buddhahood. As a result, disputes over the interpretation of buddha-nature continued for a long period.

One of the major reasons that Hsüan-tsang’s translations did not have more impact on Chinese Buddhism is that Buddhism had already
been accepted as a “teaching” by the Chinese on the basis of previously translated texts. Hsüan-tsang pressed for the importance of interpreting Buddhism in terms of vehicles (yāna) by retranslating the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (Sūtra Explaining the Profundities [of Doctrine]). On the basis of that text’s classification of the Buddha’s teachings into three periods, he argued for the reality of the three vehicles. However, as Chih-i’s writings demonstrate, Chinese Buddhism already had a five-hundred-year history of establishing Buddhism as a “teaching.” Even Hsüan-tsang’s massive translation project, which included many texts of major doctrinal importance, had little effect on that tradition. As a result, Hsüan-tsang’s interpretation of Buddhism had relatively little lasting impact on Chinese Buddhism.

After Hsüan-tsang had promulgated his view that Buddhism should be interpreted as a system of vehicles, many scholars criticized it and defended the tradition of interpreting Buddhism a “teaching.” An example of this trend is found in Fa-tsang’s *Hua-yen wu-chiao chang,* particularly in the fifth chapter (“Matching the Vehicles and Teachings”). The *Hua-yen wu-chiao chang* is composed of ten chapters. The first, “Establishing the Vehicles,” is an examination of such Indian Buddhist terms as Hinayana, One-vehicle, and three vehicles from a Hua-yen perspective. Even though Fa-tsang eventually argued for the superiority of the Distinct teaching of the One-vehicle found in the *Avatamsaka,* he did not reveal his conclusion in the first chapter. However, in the second chapter, “The Benefits of the Teaching and Its Objective,” he argued that the *Avatamsaka*’s Distinct teaching of the One-vehicle was superior to the *Lotus Sūtra’s* Pervasive teaching of the One-vehicle. Thus the teachings of the *Avatamsaka* must be much better than Hsüan-tsang’s three-vehicle system.

In the third chapter, “Doctrines Expounded in the Past and Present,” Fa-tsang considered ten classification systems; of the ten, he praised nine of them, including Chih-i’s classification. Only Hsüan-tsang’s system of the three turnings of the teachings was criticized. For Fa-tsang, the *Avatamsaka*’s authority rested at least partly on the claim that it was the first teaching expounded by the Buddha immediately after his enlightenment. In contrast, according to Hsüan-tsang’s system, the Hinayāna teachings expounded at Deer Park were the first teachings, a direct contradiction of Fa-tsang’s system. Although Hsüan-tsang’s position is closer to that revealed by modern historical scholarship, Fa-tsang’s faith was more important to him than textual evidence. As Chih-i had stated, “helping and supporting the Buddha in teaching and converting [sentient beings]” was more important than scriptural evidence.

In the fourth chapter, “Analyzing the Teachings and Explaining the Tenets,” Fa-tsang explained his system of five teachings and ten tenets for the first time. The superiority of the *Avatamsaka*’s doctrines was
emphasized by calling them Perfect teachings or the teachings of the Distinct One-vehicle. The fifth chapter, "Matching the Vehicles and Teachings," is particularly relevant to our theme here. In it, Fa-tsang took the summary of Indian Buddhism he had elaborated in the first chapter, "Establishing the Vehicles," and explained how it is matched up with the five teachings. In doing so, he recapitulated the process by which the Chinese had progressed from the Indian emphasis on vehicles to stressing teachings, and concluded with his own system of five teachings. His analysis had three parts. In the first, "Matching the Teachings," he explained how the five teachings could be derived through the five steps illustrated below.

In the second part of the chapter, Fa-tsang demonstrated how the One-vehicle, three vehicles, and Hīnayāna were encompassed by the five teachings.¹⁷

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³²° Yoshizu

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Fa-tsang’s explanation of the One-vehicle, three vehicles, and Hīnayāna in terms of the five teachings is diagrammed in the above charts. In the third section of the chapter, the relations among the five teachings are analyzed. Fa-tsang did not hesitate to criticize both Hsüan-tsang’s interpretation of Buddhism as a system of vehicles and various theories of the One-vehicle in terms of his own five teachings. The following chapters of the Wu-chiao chang (from the sixth, “The Sequence of the Teachings,” onward) are primarily devoted to an explanation of the five teachings. Fa-tsang’s discussion of Hsüan-tsang’s interpretation of Buddhism as vehicles was intended only to supplement the analysis into five teachings.

Hsüan-tsang’s campaign to emphasize the importance of the concept of vehicles did not have a major influence on Chinese Buddhism. Fa-tsang’s criticisms once again established the concept of the “teachings” as the major idea for categorizing Buddhism. The appearance of the term “chiao” (teachings) in the titles of Chih-i’s Ta-pen ssu-chiao i (Doctrine of the Four Teachings) and Fa-tsang’s Wu-chiao chang (Essays on the Five Teachings) epitomizes the recognition of Buddhism as a teaching by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The Characteristics of the Soteriological Stance of Buddhism as a Teaching

Buddhism gradually came to be accepted as “the teaching of the Buddha” (fo-chiao) by many Chinese. This was due not only to the efforts of monks such as Chih-i and Fa-tsang; the Three Stages movement, Tao-hsüan’s (596–667) Lü (Vinaya) school, and the Pure Land movement, led by such figures as T’an-luan (476–542), Tao-ch’o (562–645), and Shan-tao (613–681), also played a role. Eventually some Chinese came to regard Buddhism as a teaching that was superior even to Confucianism.

The monks who maintained that Buddhism was a “teaching” held various soteriological positions; however, a common theme can be recognized in their writings in their use of the term “kuan.” If a person followed, upheld, investigated, mastered, and preached the teachings of the sage called the Buddha, his personal expression of the teaching might be called his “view” or kuan. In addition, kuan is often used to refer to insight meditation (vipaśyanā) in contrast to calm abiding (samaṭha or chih). Later, however, with the exception of T’ien-t’ai, most Chinese Buddhists came to regard meditation and wisdom as essentially identical; as a result, kuan was thought to include both calm abiding and insight meditation. In the following discussion, it is interpreted as including both.

T’ien-t’ai thought includes a convincing and thorough analysis of the relation between teaching (chiao) and meditation (kuan). Although Chih-i’s Mo-ho chih-kuan ([Treatise on] Great Calm Abiding and Insight Med-
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The teaching of the Buddhas and patriarchs lies only in teaching and meditation (kuan). If meditation is not in teaching, it is incorrect; if teaching is not in meditation, it is not transmitted. Teaching without meditation is obscure; meditation without teaching is not trustworthy. 18

Similar sentiments are found in the writings of other monks. In the encyclopedic Tā-sheng i-chang (Essays on Mahāyāna Doctrines) by Hui-yuān (523–592) of Ching-ying ssu, the doctrinal focus is found in the chapter on the eight consciousnesses. That chapter is divided into ten sections (men); the seventh concerns discarding delusion and cultivating enlightenment. In that section, three meditations are established for each of the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses. 19 The heart of Hui-yuān’s doctrine, his discussion of the true and deluded, is thus not merely a discussion of epistemological issues but a soteriological treatment with meditations on the true and deluded states of mind.

Chi-tsang of the San-lun school also recognized the importance of kuan. He chose to call the most important text in his school, the Madhya-makakārikā, the Chung-kuan lun or Cheng-kuan lun (Treatise on the Middle [or Correct] View), instead of the more common title, Chung lun (Treatise on the Middle). In the San-lun hsüan-i (Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises), his summary of the San-lun position, he described his reasons for choosing to call it the Chung-kuan lun:

Question: Why have you used these three characters to refer to the text?
Answer: Through the middle (chung), meditation (kuan) emerges. Through meditation, the treatise is narrated. When these three elements are present, the meaning [of the text] is perfect and replete. 20

Chi-tsang developed his theme of correct views (sheng-kuan) by analyzing each of the three characters in the title Chung-kuan lun in terms of their subjective and objective aspects. He then explained how correct views saved sentient beings.

Tao-hsüan, the systematizer of the Ssu-fen lü (Vinaya) school, also was interested in kuan, as is evident in the title of his text, the Ching-hsin chieh-kuan fa (The Procedures for Purifying the Mind through Following the Precepts and Meditation), 21 in which he examined some of the elements of monastic discipline and meditation maintained in common by both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.
In the Pure Land tradition, the character “kuan” is found in the title of Shan-tao’s Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching su (Commentary on the Sūtra on the Contemplation of the Buddha of Immeasurable Life), a text that concerns meditation on the Pure Land. As Shan-tao declared in summarizing the essentials of the scripture, “This Contemplation Sūtra (Kuan-ching) has the concentration of discerning the Buddha (kuan-fo san-mei) as its essence (tsung); it also has the concentration based on recitation of the Buddha’s name (nien-fo san-mei) as its essence.” Thus even Shan-tao, who was noted for encouraging people to recite the Buddha’s name, considered meditation with recitation to be his basic practice.

Although Hsūan-tsang’s disciple Chi strove to develop the Yogācāra tradition in China, he was not fully satisfied with Hsūan-tsang’s emphasis on “vehicles.” In the Tā-sheng fa-yūan i-lin chang (Essays on the Mahāyāna Garden of Dharmas and Grove of Doctrines), he enumerated the various vehicles mentioned in Indian Buddhism but then continued by noting that “When the innate nature (t’i-hsing) [of vehicles] is explained, teachings (chiao), principle (li), practice (hsing), and the effect of practice (kuo) are discussed. These we collectively call vehicle.” Like Fa-tsang, Chi turned away from the concept of “vehicle” toward that of “teaching.”

In the beginning of his “Chapter on Ideation-Only,” Chi stated,

There are two aspects to examining the essence (t’i): (1) the essence of the object discerned, and (2) the essence of the subject that discerns. The essence of the object discerned in ideation-only is all dharmas. The practitioner performs a fivefold discernment on their existence and nonexistence in order to ascertain that they are ideation-only.

Chi continued by explaining that the subjective aspect was the mental concomitant, wisdom. Since the objective aspect, all dharmas, had varying degrees in which they seemed to exist, a fivefold discernment had to be devised. However, this discernment was not based directly on Indian texts, but rather was devised by Chi on the basis of the three natures and the four aspects of consciousness.

In the Hua-yen tradition, Tu Shun’s (557–640) Fa-chieh kuan-men (Contemplation of the Dharmadhātu) deserves special attention. His disciple Chih-yen is the purported author of another meditation (kuan-men) text, the Hua-yen i-sheng shih-hsüan men (The Ten Profundities of the One-Vehicle of the Avatāmsaka), but the authenticity of this text has been questioned. However, since the ten profundities are emphasized in Chih-yen’s Hua-yen sou-hsüan chi (Record of Seeking the Profound in Hua-yen), they are clearly a vital part of his teachings. One of the most common terms in Hua-yen texts is “distinguishing between teachings and meaning” (chiao-i fen-ch’i). The term “meaning” (i or i-li) refers to the basis of the teachings, that which the teachings point toward. Mean-
ing thus constitutes the contents of the meditations or discernments. In works such as the *Wu-shih yao-wen-ta* (Fifty Essential Questions and Answers) and *K'ung-mu chang* (Essays on Articles within the Hua-yen ching), Chih-yen considers the doctrinal aspects of some of the most important passages of the *Avatamsaka*, but at the same time that he discusses classification of teachings, he also considers meditations and discernments of the meaning elucidated in those passages.

Fa-tsang was more interested in the classification of doctrine than in meditation, but did not completely ignore meditation. The *Wang-chin huan-yüan kuan* (Contemplation of the Exhaustion of Defilements and the Return to Origins) is usually cited as a text representative of Fa-tsong's concern with practice; however, its authenticity has recently been questioned. Among his other extant works, the *Yu-hsin fa-chieh chi* (Record of the Mind's Play amongst the Dharma-Realms) is noteworthy as a text on practice. The rough draft of this work seems to have been circulated as Tu Shun's *Wu-chiao chih-kuan* (Calm Abidings and Discernments of the Five Teachings), a text that is primarily a discussion of meditation in terms of the five teachings. However, because Fa-tsang generally suggested that people rely on Chih-i's *Hsiao chih-kuan* (Short Treatise on Calm Abiding and Insight Meditation) in their practice, he was clearly more interested in doctrinal issues than in practice.

Subsequent Hua-yen adherents reacted to Fa-tsang's emphasis on classification of doctrine by stressing the role of meditation. In doing so, they were both reacting to and resisting the increasing influence of Ch'an. The *Wang-chin huan-yüan kuan* attributed to Fa-tsong can be considered as part of this movement. Fa-tsong's disciple Hui-yüan (n.d.) was particularly concerned with the "discernment of the nature of dhammas" (*fa-hsing kuan*); unfortunately, none of his works on meditation is extant. Another disciple, Wen-ch'ao (n.d.), enumerated ten gates of meditation in his *Tzujang i-wang chi* (Compilation on Guarding against Forgetfulness). Among the disciples of Hui-yüan's student Fa-hsien (718-778) were Ch'eng-kuan and Hui-chi Shen-hsiu (n.d.). The latter was the author of a work on meditation entitled *Miao-li yüan-ch'eng kuan* (Contemplation of the Wondrous Principle and the Perfectly Accomplished).

Ch'eng-kuan's teachings were based on the four *dharma dhātus* (dharma realms), but were actually a synthesis of Tu Shun's *Fa-chieh kuan-men* and Fa-tsong's ten profundities. The *dharma dhātu* of the interpenetration of phenomena was, in fact, a meditation. Ch'eng-kuan practiced under a number of Ch'an teachers. At times he was critical of Ch'an teachings, indicating that he was very much aware of that tradition. Yet he wrote a number of texts on meditation, such as the *San-sheng yüan-jung kuan-men* (Contemplation of the Perfect Interfusion of the Three Sages), *Shih-erh yin-yüan kuan-men* (Contemplation of the Twelve Links of
Dependent Origination), and *Wu-yün kuan* (Contemplation of the Five Aggregates). The first was influenced by the writings of the lay Hua-yen scholar Li T’ung-hsüan (646–740), whose meditation on the Buddha’s light influenced a number of later Buddhist practitioners.31

Many of the monks who interpreted Buddhism as a teaching also emphasized meditation. Even though this tendency varied among monks, those who stressed the importance of teaching would often meditate on the teaching to gain a personal understanding of it, realize enlightenment, and then urge others to follow their example. In many ways, their approach was similar to the soteriological stance of those followers of Indian mārga-Buddhism who emphasized Abhidarma. The element “abhi” in the term “Abhidarma” can be interpreted as meaning “facing” or “discerning” the Dharma.32 This interpretation closely resembles the relation between teaching (*chiao*) and meditation (*kuan*).

**Establishment of the Ch’ an School**

*The Personal Aspect of the Term “tsung”*

Ch’ an arose in part as a protest against the systems of teachings discussed in the previous sections. Ch’ an monks objected to the political implications of the concept of “teaching” as a tradition founded by a sage whose teachings had been edited into classics and were of benefit to the state. Buddhism in China had so thoroughly adopted these criteria that it was sometimes regarded as more of a teaching than Confucianism. Buddhism’s acceptance as a teaching required that the opinions and views of those above be conveyed to those below. This model applied to both the political realm, in which the emperor’s commands were conveyed to the masses, and to the religious realm, in which the beliefs of the teacher were studied by his pupils.

Although this system often had much to recommend it in both the political and religious spheres, it did violate the dying Śākyamuni’s instructions to his students that they both be a lamp unto themselves and take the Dharma as a lamp. Although the practitioner could rely on both the self and the Dharma, he could also choose to rely on only one of them. For example, just as self-reliance was lost in the mārga-Buddhism of Abhidarma, so it was lost in many of the Chinese traditions that emphasized “the teaching.” By relying on the authority of the Buddha and his scriptures, Chinese monks gained the self-confidence to promulgate their teaching to the people; but because of their respect for their founder and his teaching, they tended to forget the Buddha’s dictum that the practitioner should rely on himself.

Those people who wished to revive the Buddhist tradition of self-reliance were critical of the use of Buddhism to indoctrinate people. Their
dissatisfaction is expressed in the following verses, sometimes said to epitomize the Ch’an position:

A transmission outside the teachings,
Not relying on words and characters,
Directly pointing at man’s mind,
Seeing one’s nature and realizing buddhahood.

The first two lines are typical of Ch’an’s critical attitude toward Buddhism as a teaching.33 Those who advocated the teachings proclaimed their contents through the use of characters. (When the characters were written on large signs they seemed to carry more authority; in recent years in mainland China, signs to instruct the people were erected on mountaintops.) Ch’an practitioners, however, wished to rely on something other than teachings and thus claimed that they did not rely on words.

In fact, Ch’an practitioners had to rely on words to reveal their personal standpoints (tsung), but those personal standpoints were based on their own minds rather than on external authorities such as systems of teachings. In an inscription commemorating the ordination and tonsure of Hui-neng, later known as the sixth patriarch, the author Fa-ts’ai describes Hui-neng’s teaching as “the personal and profound principle of the simple transmission” (tan-ch’uan tsung-chih).34 The direct and simple mind-to-mind transmission of Ch’an differed radically from the indirect transmission based on hierarchical distinctions between teachers and students or the emphasis on scripture found among those who interpreted Buddhism as teachings. The basic attitude of the Ch’an movement is expressed through its use of the character tsung (personal standpoint) in the compound tsung-chih (profound principle). When scholars read the term “Ch’an tsung,” they may well think of the Ch’an school. The term certainly did have a sectarian nuance when it was employed by figures such as Shen-hui (684–758), who attacked Northern-school Ch’an in favor of his own Southern school. Tsung-mi (780–841) also used the term in a sectarian manner when he advocated the Ho-tse school (of Shen-hui). Later on, the term was used to refer to the “five houses and seven schools” (wu-chia ch’i-tsung).

In Japanese Buddhism, once tsung (J. shū) had been used to refer to the six Nara schools (Nanto rokushū), the sectarian nuances of the term were inescapable. However, Dōgen disliked the sectarian sense of “Zen school” (Zenshū) and refused to call his own tradition the Sōtō school. He referred to the words of the various patriarchs and teachers as “profound principles” (J. shūshi, Ch. tsung-chih), the same term used to refer to Hui-neng’s teachings.35

I believe that we can detect a new movement in Chinese Buddhism
through the way in which Chinese monks regarded doctrines, and that
this movement can be characterized by the term “tsung.” Suzuki
Daisetsu translated this term into English as “principle.” Suzuki's
explanation is easily confused with Tsung-mi’s emphasis on terms such
as “nature” (hsing) or “principle” (li), leading to a loss of the sense of

tsong as a personal interpretation of Buddhism which reflects the Bud-
dha’s dictum that practitioners should be a lamp unto themselves.
Translating tsung as “personal or subjective standpoint” indicates how
certain terms came to characterize the position of individual Ch’an
masters. For example, in comparing Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng, Suzuki
noted that Shen-hsiu was scholarly, whereas Hui-neng seemed to have a
personal sense of his religious mission that was expressed in the fre-
cuency with which tzu (self) appeared in the Platform Siitra. Similarly,
jen (human) appears frequently in the Record of Lin-chi, in expressions
such as “the true man of no rank” (wu-wei chen-jen). The use of these
terms to characterize the individual perspectives of the protagonists of
these texts reflects the sense of tsung as personal standpoint.

The Ch’an protest against the emphasis on teachings can be
expressed through the tension between the statements, “Take the
Dharma as your lamp” and “Be a lamp unto yourselves.” Ch’an
monks respected the Dharma by honoring the buddhas and patriarchs,
but at the same time they sought to develop their own individual under-
standing of Buddhism. As a result, they often used seemingly rough or
coarse expressions in Chinese instead of Buddhist technical terms that
had originated in India. Everyday events were often taken as the subject
of their discourse. The meetings and clashes between the individual
standpoints (tsung) of various Ch’an masters appear repeatedly in the
genre of literature known as “records of the sayings [of masters]”
(yü-lu).

Ch’an Soteriology

The soteriological stance of those who advocated Buddhism as a “teach-
ing” was characterized by the term “kuan.” In contrast, Ch’an sote-
riology can be summarized through the words “mind” (hsin) and
“transmission” (ch’uan). The term “mind” is found in the last two of
the four lines quoted above (“Directly pointing at man’s mind (hsin),
Seeing one’s nature (hsing) and realizing buddhahood”). These verses
are often used to epitomize the Ch’an view of liberation. The term
“transmission” has also been introduced above, in Fa-ts’ai’s descrip-
tion of Hui-neng’s teaching as “the personal and profound principle of
the simple transmission” (tan-ch’uan tsung-chih).

The term “mind” is often misinterpreted as referring only to one’s
own mind. The phrase “seeing [or realizing] the nature (hsing) [of one’s
mind]” in the second line just cited has contributed to this explanation.
Instead, “mind” should be understood in accordance with the definition in the Ta-sheng ch‘i-hsin lun (Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna), which equates the principle (fa) of Mahāyāna with the minds of sentient beings. Thus early Ch‘an practitioners saw the locus of practice as including all sentient beings. Rather than being concerned with the authority of words and scriptures, they strove to open their own minds in order to speak directly to and about the minds of other people. Hence “realizing the nature of mind” could be interpreted as meaning “directly pointing to society.”

Practice directed toward sentient beings was expressed as “seeing the nature and realizing buddhahood.” Although this phrase eventually was interpreted to mean that enlightenment was identical to seeing one’s own nature, it was originally an exhortation to bodhisattva practices. When figures such as Shen-hui used the phrase, they did so with the sense of “seeing the buddha-nature” (chien fo-hsing), a phrase that was interpreted through texts such as the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, according to which a ninth-ground bodhisattva could hear about the buddha-nature and practice (wen-chien fo-hsing), but only a tenth-ground bodhisattva or a buddha could actually see the buddha-nature (yen-chien fo-hsing). Thus the term “buddha-nature” could be interpreted as referring to the activities of bodhisattvas and buddhas. “Seeing the nature” (chien-hsing) indicated the practices of bodhisattvas and buddhas as they saw the buddha-nature of all sentient beings. Understanding the phrase “seeing the nature” as suggesting that the individual thoroughly saw his own nature was clearly a later interpretation.

The self-confidence evident in the Ch‘an soteriological position is expressed through their frequent use of the term “transmission.” Among the phrases already mentioned, “a special transmission outside of the teachings” and “the profound principle of the simple transmission” clearly indicate the importance of this term. In addition, the phrase “not dependent on words and phrases” is often associated with the expression “a transmission from mind to mind.” Ch‘an monks claimed that they transmitted the Buddha’s teachings directly, without recourse to scriptures, because they were confident that their actions could serve as transmissions. In this sense, their use of the word “transmission” suggests the freedom in their actions and interpretations of Buddhism, much as the earlier use of “vehicle” in India had indicated the independent views of early Mahāyānists.

The term “transmission” was used in the titles of many texts. Beginning with early texts such as the Ch‘uan fa-pao chi (Annals of the Transmission of the Treasure of the Dharma), this tendency continued with works such as the Ch‘uan-hsin fa yao (Essentials of the Transmission of the Dharma That Can Only Be Passed from Mind to Mind), Ching-te ch‘uan-teng lu (Records of the Transmission of the Lamp Compiled dur-
ing the Ching-te Period), and the *Ch’üan-fa cheng-tsung lun* (Treatise on the Transmission of the Dharma and the True Essence). The transmission of specific pieces of clothing, such as robes, or the composition of verses concerning the transmission of the dharma were also emphasized. However, when the transmission of a robe came to be seen as proof of some sort of enlightenment, the original significance of the term was weakened. Similarly, when Ch’an traditions boasted of the length of correct transmission, the original meaning of the term was diluted. The initial emphasis on transmission had nothing to do with length of time or the conferral of an object; rather, it arose naturally out of the Ch’an focus on relying on the self rather than on external authorities.

Although the heart of Ch’an soteriology lies in the bodhisattva practices directed toward sentient beings and in the transmission of the lamp of enlightenment, another important aspect of Ch’an soteriology must also be mentioned: the use of all aspects of everyday life, even farming, as religious practice. This approach would have been unthinkable in the Indian Buddhist tradition. In Ch’an, however, leaving home to become a monk was not seen as a necessity for practice. Ch’an attitudes developed in part as an answer to Chinese criticisms that Buddhism was not productive and was immoral (especially when considered in the light of Confucianism’s emphasis on filial piety). Thus Ch’an offered salvation to lay believers through everyday activities.

**Hua-yen Ch’an: The Third Movement**

*The Identification of Personal Standpoint (tsung) and Teaching (chiao)*

The differences between monks who stressed teaching and practitioners who emphasized their personal standpoints has been described above. Each of these choices had certain soteriological consequences. Tsung-mi’s efforts to reconcile these two movements constitutes the third movement in Chinese Buddhism. Some of the reasons behind his efforts can be found in a summary of his biography. In his youth Tsung-mi was a Confucian, but then was ordained as a Buddhist monk, practiced Ch’an meditation, read the *Yüan-chüeh ching* (Sutra of Consummate Enlightenment), and was instructed in Hua-yen by Ch’eng-kuan. In his *Ch’an-yüan chu-ch’üan-chi tu-hsu* (Preface to the Collected Writings on the Source of Ch’an), Tsung-mi contrasted Ch’an and the teachings in a variety of ways and then proceeded to bridge the gap between the two. He argued that the origins of Ch’an were to be found in the teachings, and that the essence (*t’i*) of the teachings was Ch’an.

Although earlier scholars have usually described Tsung-mi’s position as “the convergence of Ch’an and the teachings” (J. *kyözen itchi*), I
believe that it may be more accurately called "Hua-yen Ch’an."

This term reflects the way Tsung-mi combined the Ch’an of Ho-tse Shen-hui with Hua-yen doctrine (as it had developed up to the time of Ch’eng-kuan) to formulate his position on the realization of innate buddhahood (pen-lai ch’eng-fo). The earlier description of Tsung-mi’s position as “the convergence of the teachings and Ch’an” suggests that he had simply combined Ch’an and the teachings. Although this is one aspect of Tsung-mi’s thought, his interest in developing the theme of the convergence of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism must also be noted. This latter aspect of his thought might be described as “neither the teachings nor Ch’an.” As a result, I have created the new term “Hua-yen Ch’an” to describe Tsung-mi’s position.

Tsung-mi’s thought can be traced by arranging his works in the order in which he composed them: his commentaries on the Yūan-chüeh ching; the Ch’an-yüan chu-ch’uan-ch’i tu-hsū (Preface on the Source of Ch’an); the P’ei Hsiu shih-i wen (P’ei Hsiu’s Questions); and the Yūan-jen lun (Essay on the Origins of Man). In his commentaries on the Yūan-chüeh ching, Tsung-mi examined the idea of “realization of innate buddhahood,” a term mentioned only in passing in the Yūan-chüeh ching itself. In explaining it, Tsung-mi cited Ch’eng-kuan’s views on the relationship of the realization of buddhahood to the discernment of the dharma-realm of unhindered interpenetration of phenomena (shih-shih wu-ai fa-chieh). The term “realization of innate buddhahood” came to refer to the realization of an innate nature that transcended any consideration of whether or not buddhahood had actually been attained. In developing his argument, Tsung-mi shifted the interpretation of the phrase “realization of innate buddhahood” from focusing on the term “realization” (ch’eng) to emphasizing “innate” (pen-lai). His interest in this problem is reflected in the use of “origins” (yuan), a term similar to “innate,” in the titles of two of his major works, the “Preface to the Origins of Ch’an” and the “Essay on the Origins of Man.” For Tsung-mi, recognizing these origins was sudden enlightenment, but even if the practitioner did not recognize his origins, he would not lose them.

In the “Preface on the Origins of Ch’an,” Tsung-mi demonstrated how the teachings and Ch’an were identical in purport. Ho-tse Shen-hui’s Ch’an was called “the personal standpoint (tsung) that directly reveals the nature of mind” (chih-hsien hsin-hsing tsung). The teachings found in the Hua-yen ching, Yūan-chüeh ching, and tathāgatagarbha literature were all called “teachings that reveal the true mind is the nature [of all]” (hsien-shih chen-hsin chi-hsing chiao). The similarities of both positions were disclosed through terms such as “nature of the mind” and “origins.”

Two aspects of Tsung-mi’s thought can be characterized as “neither the teachings nor Ch’an.” First, although advocates of both the teach-
ings and Ch’an might sometimes be concerned with the innate nature of things, Tsung-mi’s emphasis on the innate nature seemed to deviate from both these traditions. Advocates of Buddhism as a system of teachings would have found little room for a discussion of the innate nature of things in the elaborate edifice of the Buddha’s teachings they constructed. Ch’an practitioners, with their practices based on concrete behavior, would not have been interested in Tsung-mi’s discussions of innate nature. Tsung-mi’s position thus represented a third movement in Chinese Buddhism.

Tsung-mi’s advocacy of the convergence of the three teachings (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) is illustrative of a second aspect of his views that can be called “neither the teachings nor Ch’an.” Of course, many Ch’an advocates as well as scholars who considered Buddhism to be a system of teachings had been attracted by either Confucianism or Taoism. Although some of them had argued that Buddhism or Ch’an was essentially identical with Confucianism or Taoism, they had ended up rejecting Buddhism or Ch’an. Tsung-mi advanced beyond them by positively avowing the convergence of the three teachings.

Tsung-mi argued forcefully for his position in the Yüan-jen lun (Essay on the Origins of Man), in which he developed his case in two phases. First, he demonstrated the superiority of the “One-vehicle teaching that reveals the nature” over all other teachings. Thus Confucianism and Taoism were rejected as superstitious views concerned only with life in this world. The four Buddhist traditions of lay teachings, Hinayana, and Mahayana Fa-hsiang and San-lun were rejected as one-sided and shallow. Thus only the “One-vehicle teaching that reveals the nature” was accepted as the supreme correct teaching.

In the second phase of his argument, in a section called “Reconciling (hui-t’ung) the Roots and Branches,” Tsung-mi revealed that Confucianism and Taoism were incorporated into and encompassed by the “One-vehicle teaching that reveals the nature.” When the original nature of all was thoroughly understood, all previously rejected teachings were seen to be encompassed by the teaching that reveals the nature. Only then could the virtues of each teaching be appreciated. Thus Confucianism and Taoism were ultimately in agreement with Buddhism, and the three traditions converged.

This aspect of Tsung-mi’s thought, described above as “neither the teachings nor Ch’an,” does not directly contradict his insistence on combining Ch’an and the teachings. The combination of Ch’an and the teachings eventually contributed to the theories that led to Ch’an’s cultural influences on art and literature. Tsung-mi’s insistence on the ultimate agreement of Buddhism with Confucianism and Taoism enabled adherents of the latter two traditions to associate more easily with
Buddhists. At the same time, Tsung-mi did not subordinate Ch’an or Buddhist systems of teachings to Confucianism or Taoism. Although the interaction and mutual criticisms of these traditions led to Ch’an’s influence on culture, abuses resulted when the various traditions did not interact in a positive manner and keep each other’s excesses in check.

Thus Chinese Buddhism eventually developed into a confused mix of various traditions without much vitality, in part through later developments of Tsung-mi’s innovations. In particular, neither those who interpreted Buddhism as a system of teachings nor Ch’an adherents were critical enough of the tendency toward indiscriminate syncretism. Because they failed to check the confused mingling of religious traditions, they must bear the responsibility for the current state of Chinese Buddhism.

Soteriology in Hua-yen Ch’an

Tsung-mi is known for combining the systematic presentation of Buddhism as a teaching (chiao) with Ch’an’s emphasis on personal standpoint (tsung); his soteriological stance is often summed up with the phrase “sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation” (tun-wu chien-hsiu). The details of his view of practice and ritual are found in a text called the Yüan-chüeh-ching tao-ch’ang hsiu-cheng i (Rituals for Practice and Realization at the Place of Practice According to the Sutra of Consummate Enlightenment). Since research on this text has already been done by earlier scholars, I will limit myself to summarizing its main points. Although the phrase “sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation” implies that Tsung-mi’s views might be summarized by referring to terms such as “enlightenment” (wu), “practice” (hsiü), or “realization” (cheng), the character “reveal” (hsiên), found in phrases such as the “teaching that reveals [innate] nature” (hsiên-hsing chiao), is more central to his thought. In addition, the character i (ritual), found in the title of the text mentioned above, played a key role in his views. For Tsung-mi, gradual cultivation required the daily practice of worshiping the Buddha, confessing wrongdoing, and meditation (tso-ch’an). As the practitioner continued to perform these rituals, his innate Buddhahood would gradually be revealed.

The influence of Chih-i’s Hsiao chih-kuan (Short Text on Meditation) can be found in Tsung-mi’s Yüan-chüeh-ching tao-ch’ang hsiu-cheng i. However, important differences between the two texts also exist. Through rituals, Chih-i argued that the practitioner could discern the three thousand realms in his everyday, polluted mind; in contrast, Tsung-mi used ritual to reveal the true nature of everything. T’ien-t’ai meditation is directed toward the deluded mind, whereas Tsung-mi is interested in revealing the true nature of mind. The differences between the two tra-
ditions are found in the two characters they employ repeatedly: “discern” or “meditation” (kuan) for T’ien-t’ai, and “reveal” (hsien) for Tsung-mi.

Differences existed between Tsung-mi’s version of sitting meditation (tsö-ch'an) and that advocated by many Ch’an masters. One view of sitting meditation within Ch’an circles is exemplified in the famous dialogue between Nan-yüeh Huai-jang and Ma-tsu Tao-i about polishing a tile to make a mirror. The point of this story is that sitting meditation is ultimately nothing more than sitting and meditating, and is not to be used with the intention of becoming a buddha. Although meditation was certainly a valid practice, by itself it would not lead to buddhahood; the other practices of a bodhisattva were also needed. For Tsung-mi, the various bodhisattvas and gods were to be invited to the practice hall where meditation was performed; only then could the practitioner’s true nature be revealed through sitting meditation. At the very least, Tsung-mi’s attitude was markedly different from that of practitioners like Nan-yüeh and Ma-tsu.

Conclusion

Soteriology in Chinese Buddhism shifted through the ages as monks used different concepts to provide a framework for their views. However, even as they developed new positions, they also adopted themes from many of the movements that had occurred in Indian Buddhism. Of these themes, that of the tension between external authority and self-reliance was particularly important.

This approach can be extended to other cultures. If Japanese Buddhism were considered, the same tension between external authority and self-reliance that is important in Indian and Chinese Buddhism would be seen in the emergence of the Kamakura schools. The Japanese emphasized soteriological elements that were not as important in Indian and Chinese Buddhism. For example, the Japanese insistence on sectarianism (shū, Ch. tsung), the rapid realization of buddhahood, the worship of the founders of the schools, and the emphasis on a single practice were all major influences on Japanese Buddhist soteriology. However, these are themes for another paper.

Notes

1. In recent years, many scholars argued that Mahāyāna arose from the Mahāsāṅghika school. However, Hirakawa Akira has demonstrated that many peculiarly Mahāyāna characteristics arose around Buddhist stūpas (Shoki Daijō Bukkyō no kenkyū [Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1965]). Shizutani Masao (Shoki Daijō Bukkyō no seiritsu katei [Kyoto: Hyakkaaen, 1975]) has developed Hirakawa’s research further by discussing “primitive Mahāyāna” Buddhist orders.

3. For a discussion of these lines, said to epitomize the Ch’an position, see Yanagida Seizan, *Shoki Zenshū shishō no kenkyū* (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967), 471-484.


7. For example, in the *Ta-chih-tu lun* 100 (T 25.756b14-16), Mahākāśyapa is said to have compiled the Hinayāna canon while Māñjuśrī and Maitreya entrusted Ananda with the compilation of the Mahāyāna canon. The text also notes that both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna are the “word of the Buddha” (T 25.756b22).


10. Hui-kuan’s views are described in Chi-tsang’s *San-lun hsüan-i* (T 45.5b4). In Ching-ying ssu Hui-yuán’s *Ta-sheng i-chang* (T 44.465a), a similar classification system is attributed to Liu Ch’iu (438-495). Hui-yuán’s statement was probably based on Liu Ch’iu’s *Wu-liang-i-ching hsü* (Introduction to the Sūtra of Innumerable Meanings), included in the *Ch’u san-tsang chi chi* (T 55.68a). Liu Ch’iu’s classification system was presumably based on that of Hui-kuan.


12. *Ta-sheng i-chang* 1, T 44.465a; Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i 10a, T 33.801a; Fa-hua hsüan-lun 3, T 34.382b; San-lun hsüan-i, T 45.5b4; Ta-sheng fa-yüan i-lin chang 1, T 45.245a; Chieh-shen-mi-ching su 1, HTC 34.298b; Hua-yen wu-chiao chang 1, T 45.480b; Hua-yen t’an-hsüan chi 1, T 35.110c; Hua-yen ching k’an-ting chi 1, HTC 5.8b; Hua-yen-ching su 1, 35.508a.


17. In Hua-yen wu-chiao chang 1 (T 45.482a23), Fa-tsang does not define both the Distinct and Pervasive teachings of the One-vehicle as the Perfect teaching. However, in following Chih-yen, he seems to relate the Pervasive teaching of the One-vehicle to the Perfect teaching. The Distinct and Pervasive One-vehicle are not equal, though; the Distinct One-vehicle teaching is identified with the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, while the Pervasive One-vehicle teaching is identified with the *Lotus Sūtra*. Thus even though the Pervasive One-vehicle teaching is not specifically defined as the Perfect teaching, the identification is implied in Fa-tsang’s complex classification system.
18. T 46.936c.
19. Ta-sheng i-chang 3b, T 44.536b10.
21. T 45.819b.
23. Ta-sheng fa-yüan i-lin chang 1, T 45.264c17.
28. Yuki Reimon has argued that the Hua-yen wu-chiao chih-kuan (T 1867), usually said to have been based on Tu Shen's talks, was in fact not by Tu Shen at all. Instead Yuki claimed that it was a draft of Fa-tsang's Hua-yen yu-hsin fa-chieh chi (T 1877). See Yuki Reimon, "Kegon gokyo shikan senjussha ronko: Gokyo shikan no Tojun senjutsu setsu wo hitei shi, Hōzōen Yushin hakkaiki no sokō nari to suitei su," Shūkyō kenkyū new 7.2 (1930).
29. Fa-tsang, Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun i-chi 3b, T 44.283b4, 284b16.
33. For a discussion of the compilation of these lines, see Yanagida Seizan, Shoki Zenshū shisō no kenkyū (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967), 470–476.
34. For the inscription, known as the Kuang-hsiao-ssu i-fa t'a-chi, see Yanagida, Shoki Zenshū shoshi no kenkyū, pp. 535–538.
39. John McRae has argued that the "encounter dialogues" between Ch'an practitioners may be considered their soteriology. In these exchanges, each participant had his own point of view, but their confrontation sometimes resulted in a more profound understanding on the part of at least one of the participants. I agree with McRae's analysis, but note that the later tendency to base practice on Ch'an problems (kung-an) probably represents a return to a stance in which "teachings" are emphasized.
41. Ta-pan-nieh-p'an ching 27, T 12.527c29.
42. See Yoshizu Yoshihide, Kegon Zen, pp. 269-336.

43. This text is often called the Chung-hua ch'uan-hsin-ti ch' an-men shih-tzu ch' eng-hsi t'u (Lineage Chart of the Masters and Students of Ch'an in the Transmission of the Mind Ground in China). However, Ishii Shūdō has argued that the phrase "ch' eng-hsi t'u" (lineage chart) is used only for diagrams of dharma lineages and has suggested that the title P'i Hsiu shih-i wen is more appropriate ("Shinpukuji bunko shozō no Haikyū shūmon no honkoku," Hanazono daigaku Zengaku kenkyū 60 [1981]).

44. For a discussion of these developments during the Sung dynasty, see Robert Gimello’s chapter on Wen-tzu Ch'an in this volume.

45. For more on Tsung-mi, see Kamata Shigeo, Shiimitsu kyogaku no shisōshi-teki kenkyū (Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1975). Peter Gregory has written a number of thorough articles on Tsung-mi; see especially his excellent study, “Sudden Enlightenment Followed by Gradual Cultivation: Tsung-mi’s Analysis of Mind,” in idem, ed., Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

46. Chung-te ch’uan-teng lu 5, T 51.240c.

Glossary

An Shih-kao 安世高
Ch’ an 禪
Ch’ an tsung 禪宗
Ch’ an-yüan chu-ch’ ian-chi tu-hsü 禪源諸詮集部序
ch’ eng 秋
ch’ eng-hsi t’u 承襲図
Ch’ eng-kuan 澄観
Ch’ eng-kuan lun 正観論
Chi 基
Chi-tsang 吉藏
chiao 教
chiao-i fen-ch’ i 教義分齋
Chiao-kuan kang-tsung 教観綱宗
chiao-p’ an 教判
Chieh-shen-mi ching su 解深密經疏
chien fo-hsing 見仏性
chien-hsing 見性
chih 止
chih-hsien hsin-hsing tsung 直頷心性宗
Chih-hsü 智旭
Chih-i 智顕
Chih Lou-chia-ch’ an 支婆迦葉
Chih-yen 智薀
ching 経
Ching-hsin chieh-kuan fa 淨心經觀門
Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu 景徳伝燈録
ch’ uan 伝
Ch’ uan fa-pao chi 伝法寶記
Ch’ uan-fa cheng-tsung lun 伝法正宗論
Ch’ uan-hsin fa yao 伝心法要
Chuang-yen Seng-min 華嚴僧旻
Chung-hua ch’uan-hsin-ti ch’ an-men shih-tzu ch’ eng-hsi t’u 中華仏地禅門師承襲図
Chung-kuan lun 中観論
Chung lun 中論
Ch’ u san-tsong chi chi 出三蔵記集
Dōgen 道元
Fa-chieh kuan-men 法界觀門
Fa-hsiang 法相
Fa-hsien 法鏡
fa-hsing kuan 法性観
Fa-hua hsüan-lun 法華玄論
Fa-hua i su 法華義疏
Fa-ts’ai 法才
Fa-tsang 法藏
fo-chiao 仏教
Hirakawa Akira 平川彰
Ho-tse Shen-hui 荷沢神会
Hsiao chib-kuan 小止観
hsien 頭
hsien-hsing chiao 類性教
hsien-shih chen-hsin chi-hsing chiao 類性真性即教
hsin 心
hsing (practice) 行
hsing (nature) 性
Hsing-huang Fa-lang 興皇法朗
Hsüan-tsang 玄奘
Huan 桓
Hua-yen-ching k’ an-ting chi 華嚴經刊定記
Hua-yen-ching su 華嚴經疏
Chinese Buddhist History and Soteriology

Hua-yen-ching t'an-hsüan chi 華嚴經探玄記
Hua-yen i-sheng shih-hsüan men 華嚴五教章
Hui-chi Shen-hsiu 會稽神秀
Hui-kuan 慧觀
Hui-neng 慧能
Hui-t'ung 会通
Hui-yüan (of Ching-ying-ssu) 慧遠(淨影寺)
Hui-yüan (Fa-tsang’s disciple) 慧苑 (法藏之弟子)
Hui-yüan (of Lu-shan) 慧遠(廬山)
I-hsia lun 夷夏論
i-li 義理
Ishih Shùdō 石井德道
jen 人
ju-chiao 僅教
K'ai-shan Chih-tsang 京善智藏
Kegan Bukkō zammaikan hihōzō 華嚴宗教義二三略
Kuan 観
Kuan-ching 観經
Kuan-fo san-mei 観仏三昧
Kuang-hsiao-ssu i-fa t'a-chi 光孝寺廬胎塔記
Kuang-tse Fa-yün 光宅法雲
Kuan-men 観門
Kuan wu-liang-shou-fo ching su 観無量壽仏經疏
 Ku Huan 頋懐
Kung-an 公案
K'ung-mu chang 孔目章
Kuo 果
Kyōzen itchi 教禅一致
Kyunyō 均如
Li 理
Lin-chi 臨濟
Li T'ung-hsüan 李通玄
Liu Ch'iü 劉克
Lü 律
Ma-tsü Tao-i 馬祖道一
Men 門
Miao-lian-hua ching hsüan-i 妙法蓮華經玄義
Miao-li yii-an-ch'eng kuan 妙理印成觀
Mo-ho chih-kuan 摩訶止觀
Myōe Shōnin Köben 明惠上人高弁
Nanto rokushū 南都六宗
Nan-yüeh Huai-jang 南嶽懷讓
Nien-fo san-mei 聞仏三昧
P'ei Hsiu shih-i wen 萧休拾遺問
pen-lai ch'eng-fo 本來成仏
San-lun 三論
San-lun hsüan-i 三論玄義
San-sheng yüan-jung kuan-men 三聖門融觀門
Shan-tao 善導
Shen-hsiu 神秀
Shen-hui 神会
She-shan Seng-ch'üan 摩山僧詔
Shih-erh yin-yüan kuan-men 十二因緣觀門
shih-shih wu-ai fa-chieh 事事無礙法界
Shizutani Masao 靜谷正雄
Ssu-fen lü 四分律
Suzuki Daisetsu 鈴木大拙
Ta-chih-lun 大智度論
tan-ch'üan tsung-chih 單伝宗旨
T'ân-luan 帝罷
Tao-an 道安
Tao-ch'o 道绰
Tao-hsüan 道宣
Tao-sheng 道生
Ta-pen su-shiao i 大本四教義
Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun 大乘起信論
Ta-sheng fa-yüan i-lin chang 大乘法華義林章
Ta-sheng ta-i chang 大乘大義章
T'ieh-t'ai 天台
T'i-hsing 体性
Ti-lun 地論
tso-ch' anz 坐禅
tsong 宗
tsong-chiao 宗教
tsong-chih 宗旨
Tsung-mi 宗密
tun-wu chien-hsiu 頓悟漸修
Tu Shun 杜順
Tu 自
Tz'u-en 慈恩
Tzu-fang i-wang chi 自防遺忘集
Üisang 義湘
Wang-ch'in huan-yüan kuan 妄盡還源觀
Wen-ch'ao 文超
wen-chien fo-hsing 開見仏性
Wen-tzu Ch'an 文字禪
Wönoch'ük 円測
wu-chia ch'i-tsung 五家七宗
Wu-chiao chang 五教章
Wu-chiao chih-kuan 五教止觀
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Encounter Dialogue and the Transformation of the Spiritual Path in Chinese Ch'an

John R. McRae

Introduction

The Rejection of the Path in Chinese Buddhism

Instead of discussing some variant of the Buddhist notion of the mārga or spiritual path, I will consider a case involving the rejection, or at the very least a radical reworking, of the concept of mārga itself. The emergence in medieval China of the Ch'an school, with its distinctive style of spontaneous “encounter dialogue” between masters and students, represents just such a situation: the appearance of Ch’an and its development into a major school signals a major transformation in Chinese Buddhism—one that appears to have been based in part on a shift away from a primarily mārga-based perspective. Indeed, the practice of encounter dialogue derived much of its creative energy from the iconoclastic rejection of traditional Buddhist formulations of the spiritual path, and the incredible popularity of the Ch’an methodology meant, at least in part, a rejection of the concept of mārga itself.

The originally Indian concept of mārga was never completely uprooted from Chinese soil, and it is not my intent to argue that Chinese Buddhism underwent some sudden and total revolution in consciousness, some Foucauldian epistemological shift, at one particular point in time. Rather, the emergence of Ch’an implies a gradual metamorphosis in the Chinese religious and intellectual consciousness, and the mārga and encounter models of spiritual training, if I may use those terms, were reciprocally engaged in a mutually interactive evolution over a period of several centuries.

There are still many unresolved historical issues pertaining to the emergence of the classical style of Ch’an practice, which as much as possible will be relegated to some later forum. The texts of Ch’an
encounter dialogue, as they exist today, are not journalistic accounts of actual events, although centuries of Chinese readers and practitioners have assumed that they are. Rather, they are literary re-creations of how the enlightened masters of the past must have spoken and acted. Although the narrative realism of many of the accounts about Ma-tsu, Pai-chang, and other famous masters should not be taken as evidence of historical accuracy, it is my current hypothesis that the style of dialogue represented in woodblock text was created in imitation of actual practice, and that the popularity of the printed texts eventually informed actual oral practice.

At present, the use of Ch’ an stories within the context of monastic training during the T’ang is not well understood. Are we to believe that the T’ang masters actually functioned according to the style of spontaneous creativity depicted in the records? Or should we read the stories as firmly bounded by the precisely defined ritual contexts of the Sung, when the spontaneity and intuitive acumen of Ma-tsu and his associates and successors was a firmly accepted myth? My current feeling is that the “golden age” of the T’ang existed only in the mythic consciousness of later times, but this does not in any way eliminate the power of the images involved. Because of the very nature of time in the Chinese cultural context, the act of retrospective attribution was more than a powerful force within the Ch’ an tradition; the process of re-creation and communion with the sages of the past was absolutely fundamental to the process of Ch’ an spiritual endeavor.

I am not concerned here with the evolution of this oral practice or with its progressive creation (and re-creation) in written texts. Instead, I would like to focus on the theoretical implications of the bimodality between the encounter and mārga models in Chinese Buddhism. This discussion will have important implications for understanding the social, intellectual, and religious changes that mark what we now tend to call the “T’ang-Sung transition,” that is, the period from roughly 750 to 1350 C.E. It may also complement the other discussions in this volume by showing some of the potential ramifications of themes deriving from the mārga concept, as well as the possibilities for approaches to Buddhism created in counterpoint, if not outright opposition, to the idea of the spiritual path itself.

“Encounter dialogue”1 refers to the spontaneous repartee that is said to take place between master and student in the process of Ch’ an training. This type of communication includes both verbal and physical exchanges that are often posed in the form of sincere but misguided questions from Ch’ an trainees and perplexing, even enigmatic, responses from the masters. Instead of students, the questioners are sometimes monks with high monastic positions, specialists in Buddhist academics, or devotees of particular forms of religious devotion, all of
whom are gleefully lampooned and often depicted as eventually giving up their mistaken preoccupations with the trappings of Buddhism in favor of true spiritual endeavor. And instead of the usual sort of master—that is, the seasoned religieux who administers a training center for young trainees—we often find exotic characters of unorthodox behavior who engage more traditional masters as equals and, more often than not, tweak the tendencies of the latter toward stuffiness and formulaic responses.

This is by no means a complete description of encounter dialogue, but it should suffice as a working definition. The general understanding of modern scholarship is that this form of practice came to the fore with the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu Tao-i (709-788). Certainly, Ma-tsu's school does represent a new form of Ch'an developing in a newly expanding area of the provincial South, and the extent to which his first- and second-generation successors blanketed what was then Chiang-hsi nan-tao (roughly, modern Kiangsi) is truly remarkable. However, as I have shown elsewhere, the antecedents of encounter dialogue are apparent earlier in the Ch'an tradition. In addition, my more recent research into the documents surrounding Ma-tsu and the Hung-chou school has yielded the preliminary suspicion that encounter-dialogue material may not have appeared as a genre of Ch'an literature until sometime during the tenth century. For the present purposes I will place only the broadest of limits on the emergence of this important style of Ch'an practice.

Locating an Important Development

Yanagida Seizan's landmark study of the historical works of early Ch'an Buddhism, which was published just over twenty years ago, opens with the description of his research agenda as aimed at filling in a gap between the Hsü kao-seng chuan (Continued Lives of Eminent Monks; hereafter HKSC), written by Tao-hsüan in 645 and augmented until his death in 667, and the Sung kao-seng chuan (Lives of Eminent Monks [Compiled during the] Sung; hereafter SKSC), completed by Tsan-ning in 988. The first of these texts contains biographical entries on Bodhidharma, Hui-k'o, and Tao-hsin as well as other scattered information, all of which is crucial for our understanding of the early phases of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism, but which does not in any sense dominate Tao-hsüan's text as a whole. By the time the SKSC was written, however, the Ch'an school had become perhaps the single most important force in Chinese Buddhism, so that the number of Ch'an masters introduced in this text far exceeds that of any other category of monk. Clearly, a major sea change had taken place in Chinese Buddhism, one that Professor Yanagida navigated with stunning expertise in his 1967 magnum opus. But since our purpose here is slightly different from Pro-
Professor Yanagida's, a set of texts taken from the Chinese Buddhist meditation tradition itself will better serve as comparative reference points for the emergence of the classical Ch'an approach to religious training.

The first of these reference points is actually a set of texts: the prodigious output on the subject by the great T'ien-t'ai Chih-i (538-597) and his amanuensis Kuan-ting. The *Tz'u-ti ch'an-men* (Graduated Teaching of Meditation), *Mo-ho chih-kuan* (Great Concentration and Insight), and other shorter works by Chih-i constitute an encyclopedic repository of practical instructions and analyses regarding meditation. Although the T'ien-t'ai school suffered a temporary eclipse after the fall of Chih-i's patron Sui dynasty, his works in many ways represent both the font of knowledge and the springboard for the formation of Ch'an, both the wellspring from which Ch'an drew its sustenance and the template against which it rebelled. 7

The complementary bracket to Chih-i's works is the *Tsu-t'ang chi* (Anthology of the Patriarchal Hall; hereafter TTC), the oldest of the mature and comprehensive "transmission of the lamp" texts to survive in complete form. Compiled in 952 by two obscure figures during the Five Dynasties period in what is now Fukien, the TTC survives only in a crude xylograph edition prepared as a supplement to the Korean canon. Organized according to the religious genealogy of Ch'an, the TTC traces the transmission of Ch'an from the Seven Buddhas of the past through a series of Indian and Chinese patriarchs and their successors, right down to earlier contemporaries of the compilers.

In contrast to the entries in the HKSC and SKSC, only rarely does the TTC attempt to create complete hagiographical portraits of its subjects. This is especially true for the more recent masters, for whom the legacy of earlier works is absent and about whom the editorial perspective of the compilers is most obvious; as in literary anthologies, only the most rudimentary of background information is given. The Ch'an masters included in the TTC are introduced primarily—it is almost fair to say solely—on the basis of their participation in memorable encounter-dialogue exchanges. In an editorial decision that was probably quite natural but extremely significant, it is left to the reader to visualize the contexts of those exchanges. 8

Chih-i's works were in many ways the culmination of a long tradition of textual erudition and practical training. His synthesis is unique but could not have been accomplished without long years of study in the *Ta chih-tu lun* (Great Treatise on the Perfection of Wisdom; *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*) and training under the meditation master Hui-ssu. The TTC, in contrast, was but one of a long series of Ch'an "transmission of the lamp" texts, a genre that begins with two products of the Northern school in the second decade of the eighth century, climaxes with the appearance of the *Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu* (Records of the Transmission of
the Lamp [Compiled during the] Ching-te [Period]; hereafter CTL) in 1004, and continues with a succession of works written during the Sung, Yüan, and Ming dynasties. The TTC is the oldest such text still extant to be so intensely devoted to the transcription of encounter dialogue.

The extreme contrast between the reference texts—namely, Chih-i’s writings (chiefly the Tz’u-it ch’an-men and the Mo-ho chih-kuan) and the TTC—is intentional; they have been chosen for heuristic purposes. My first task will be to summarize the salient characteristics of the approaches to spiritual training and of the path to liberation implicit in these texts, that is, the Chinese marga paradigm implicit in Chih-i’s writings and the encounter-dialogue model revealed in the TTC. For some aspects of encounter-dialogue practice I will refer to a seminal Ch’an text known as the Pao-lin chuan (Transmission from Pao-lin [ssu]; hereafter PLC), written in 801 C.E., which is the earliest extant product of the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu. I will conclude with some general remarks on the historical and theoretical implications of the emergence of encounter dialogue, both in terms of the Buddhist tradition as a whole and for the role of Ch’an in the transformation of medieval Chinese society.

The Conception of the Path in the Meditation Manuals of Chih-i

Progressive and Hierarchical

The traditional paradigm implicitly predicated by the Ch’an school to pre- or non-Ch’an schools of traditional Chinese Buddhism was based on the Indian Mahayana conception of the marga or spiritual path. This path is traversed by each sentient being from the initial moment of inspiration to achieve enlightenment on behalf of all other sentient beings (bodhicitta), through potentially countless lives of spiritual discipline and compassionate service, to a theoretical culmination in the attainment of buddhahood. Indian texts—and their Chinese translations—define explicit stages along this path with great precision and detail; meditation practices are defined and assigned according to specific dispositional problems that occur at different stages, with the appropriate remedies assigned by a teacher who has progressed farther along the path than the student. The temporal extent of this paradigm can only be described as monumental and grandiose.

The first and most basic achievement of Chih-i and his master Hui-ssu in the field of meditation theory was the organization of the extensive variety of Buddhist meditation techniques into a rationalized system. Chih-i’s basic formulation of the “graduated meditation”
(chien-tz’u chih-kuan) occurs in the Tzu’u-ti ch’an-men, which was transcribed from lectures probably given around 571 at Wa-kuan ssu in Chin-ling.\(^{10}\) Here occurs Chih-i’s first formulation of what came to be called the twenty-five expedient means (erh-shih-wu fang-pien), which define the prerequisites of meditation practice. Even more important, this work contains the sequential explanation of the following list of techniques:

Four dhyānas (ssu-ch’an)
Four unlimited states of mind (ssu wu-liang hsin) or pure abodes (Skt. brahma-vihāra)
Four formless dhyānas (ssu wu-se ting)
Six wondrous teachings (liu miao-men)
Sixteen excellent dharmas (shih-liu t’e-sheng fa)
Three penetrative illuminations (san t’ung-ming)
Nine contemplations (chiu hsiang) of physical impurity
Eight remembrances (pa nien) of the Buddha, Dharma, Sangha, breathing, etc.
Ten contemplations (shih hsiang) of impermanence, suffering, the lack of a self, etc.
Eight renunciations (pa pei-she), more often known as the eight emancipations (pa chieh-t’o)
Eight excellences (pa sheng-ch’u) or distinctions in the treatment of craving by contemplating various aspects of form in this world
Ten totality-spheres (shih i-ch’ieh ch’u) of earth, water, fire, wind, etc.
Nine successive dhyānas (chiu tz’u-ti ting), the ability to pass through each stage of dhyāna without any extraneous intervening thoughts
Samādhi of the lion’s charge (shih-tzu fen-hsun san-mei), which allows one to enter rapidly into an uninterrupted state of concentration
Samādhi of transcendence (chao-yüeh san-mei), the ability to proceed directly from normal consciousness to nirodha-samāpatti and back again without any intervening stages\(^{11}\)

The order of the practices listed in the Tzu’u-ti ch’an-men is derived in part from passages in the Ta chih-tu lun and, ultimately, the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, but the overall achievement is Chih-i’s. The comprehensive approach taken by Chih-i in this work goes beyond a simple ranking of individual techniques, however. As Andō Toshio writes:

[The Tzu’u-ti ch’an-men] took a variety of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna meditation techniques that had been given nothing more than a sequential ranking ever since the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra and distinguished them on the basis of their being tainted or untainted, worldly in purpose or conducive to emancipation, and whether they emphasized phenomena or absolute principles, etc. [Chih-i] grasped the essential character of each prac-
Encounter Dialogue and Transformation in Ch’an

The practice and validated the existence of every variety of meditation technique on the basis of research into a great number of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna scriptures. On the basis of this, Hinayāna meditation techniques were positively correlated with the Mahāyāna techniques. . . . Such a systematic classification of the graduated practice was truly unprecedented.\(^\text{12}\)

Of course, the scope of Chih-i’s work is such that no one practitioner could hope to master all the methods described. The important point is that Chih-i achieved a new synthesis of the Buddhist spiritual path, a schematization which suggests that any single meditation practice is part of a larger spiritual quest. This prioritization of meditation technique is similar in some ways to the “doctrinal taxonomies” (p’an-chiao) created by Chih-i and others. Although other masters might quibble over the details, Chih-i thus established the basic template of the Chinese mārga paradigm.

As defined by Chih-i, the spiritual path is inherently hierarchical, even cartographic, in its conception. Although not a pyramidal structure, it is highly segmented and articulated vertically, a detailed map of the pathway to emancipation. Paralleling the Indian understanding of this world as a realm of samsāra, this Chinese explication of the path explicitly categorizes the ranks of sentient beings, their innate abilities, their dispositional tendencies or problems, and the meditation techniques appropriate to their situations. Because one is always inferior to some others on the path, spiritual practice means following the guidance of one’s superiors; and because these dispositional problems frequently, if not always, involve some function of ignorance, great importance is given to the teacher’s instructions.\(^\text{13}\)

Like the Indian conception of the path from which it is derived, Chih-i’s formulation is based on a grandiose and abstract conception of time—grandiose, in that it assumes extraordinarily long periods of time for the cultivation of positive spiritual virtues, and abstract, in that this vast temporal span is not linked to any historical framework and its truths are applicable universally. Chih-i’s path is necessarily progressive and intrinsically gradualistic. Students move gradually up a ladder of stages, a progressive structure that goes back to the stages of dhyāna in the primitive and sectarian periods of Indian Buddhism. Chih-i’s meditation manuals discuss real developments, even if in the abstract, and assume the Buddhist notion of samsāra, the endless round of rebirth. Against this background the individual practitioner also becomes an abstract, almost hypothetical, agent.

**Unipolar and Radial**

Chih-i’s greatest work on meditation, the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*, was recorded from lectures given at Yü-ch’üan ssu in Ching-chou in 594, just two and a half years before his death. Whereas the *Tz’u-ti ch’an-men* may be
thought of as a self-study project undertaken after departing from Hui­s­su’s side, the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* is much more intimately based on Chih­i’s own religious experience—or at the very least on his later intellectual and spiritual development.

Chih-i’s approach in the *Mo-ho chih-kuan* differs from that of the *Tzu-ti ch’an-men* in significant ways, although the same attention to com­prehensive structure obtains. Practice of the “perfect and sudden medita­tion” (*yüan-tun chih-kuan*) explained within this work is organized into three stages:

1. The twenty-five expedient means, preparatory moral and proce­dural considerations drawn almost entirely from the *Tz’u-ti ch’an-men*;
2. The four types of samādhi, from which the practitioner selects the one most appropriate to his/her own needs and interests, as a more advanced but still preliminary stage;
3. The ten realms (*shih ching*) and ten modes of contemplation (*shih-sheng kuan-fa*), which alone constitute true contemplation.\(^{14}\)

Even granting this overall structure, the most significant aspect of the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*’s system of perfect and sudden meditation is the allow­ance made for spontaneous, even instantaneous, freedom in the appli­cation of different meditation techniques.

Although in the *Tz’u-ti ch’an-men* Chih-i did not insist that practition­ers master each of the listed techniques in serial order, the emphasis of that text was unmistakably on the overall contour of the spiritual agenda. In a text written slightly later, the *Liu miao-men* (Six Wondrous Teachings), Chih-i defines what is generally called the “indeterminate meditation” (*pu-ting chih-kuan*).\(^ {15}\) According to Chih-i, the practitioner can choose any technique at any given moment on the basis of individual needs and circumstances. Traditional meditation theory posited that certain techniques were appropriate responses to different problems, but never before, as far as I am aware, were the techniques to be chosen and applied in such an immediate, short-term framework. In addition, traditional meditation theory required that the student perform tech­niques chosen for him by an accomplished master, whereas in Chih-i’s system this responsibility was shifted to the student.

In the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*’s explication of the perfect and sudden medita­tion, this allowance for momentary, instantaneous spontaneity in the application of different meditation techniques is incorporated into the very heart of the system. The beginning point of that system is contempl­ation of the first of the ten realms, the realm of cognitive reality or, more literally, the realm of the skandhas, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus* (*yin-ju-chieh ching*). This is nothing less than one’s complete personal system of
physical form, sensory capabilities, mental activities, and realms of sen­
sory perception. This realm is present during every moment of contem­
plation—indeed, during every moment of sentient existence. Although
the entire human cognitive apparatus is included in this category,
Chih-i indicates that one’s meditation should begin with concentration
on the mind itself: “If you wish to practice contemplative investigation
[of reality] you must cut off the source [of your illusions], just as in mox-
abustion therapy you must find the [appropriate physical] point.”16 The
goal of this inspection of the mind is the comprehension of the first
mode of contemplation, the contemplation of the inconceivable realm
(kuan pu-k’o-ssu-i ching).

Chih-i’s elaborate explanation of the inconceivable realm is summa-
rized by Leon Hurvitz; there is no need to expand on that summary
here. What is significant at present is not Chih-i’s description of the
ultimate realization, but the substantial allowances he makes for those
who do not achieve that realization immediately. Although the first of
the ten realms is present in every moment of consciousness, the others
occur adventitiously, based on the karmic propensities of the individual.
In other words, the very effort of intense contemplation may agitate the
kleśas (afflictions or illusions), generating various feelings and desires
that would not occur during normal consciousness. Such agitation may
lead to physical illness or to awareness of former events’ karmic implica-
tions, both of which occurred during Hui-ssu’s course of practice, or
even to apparitions, both fearful and enticing, tempting the practitioner
away from his practice, as supposedly happened to Chih-i.17 Due to the
practice of different states of dhyāna in previous lives, the practitioner
may now experience any number of the concomitants of those states.

In other words, the latter nine realms are all manifestations of the
impediments associated with meditation. They may occur in any order
or combination and continue for any length of time. As they occur they
are to be made objects of contemplation. Their nonarising would indi-
cate the relative aptitude of the practitioner for the ultimate goal.

The ten modes of contemplation, in contrast, are a preconceived
sequence of practices aimed at ensuring achievement of ultimate
enlightenment. The goal of the entire system is success in the first
mode, that of the contemplation of the inconceivable realm, but failing
this at the outset, the practitioner is to avail himself of each successive
mode until he achieves success. Thus he renews his dedication to the
bodhisattva ideal, reposes his mind in the dharmatā, frees himself of
attachments, distinguishes between that which hinders and that which
aids his progress, and so on (these are a few of the ten modes), to the
extent necessary and in the appropriate order.

The fundamental stance of the practitioner in this type of endeavor is
one of autonomy and spontaneity: fixing his aspirations firmly on the
highest goal, he draws from his broad knowledge of meditation tech­
niques whatever means are appropriate to bring him nearer to success. 
As Kuan-ting writes in his introduction to the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*:

In the Perfect and Sudden [Meditation], from the first one focuses (yiian) on the True Characteristic, the realms [all being] the Middle, there being nothing that is not True. One fixes one's focus on the dharmadhātu; one is completely mindful of the dharmadhātu. Of all the forms and fragrances (i.e., all reality) there is not a single bit that is not the Middle Path. One's own realm, the realms of the Buddhas, and the realms of sentient beings are also similarly [the Middle Path]. The skandhas and āyatanas are all "such-like" and without suffering that can be rejected. The illusions of ignorance are enlightenment and without any accumulation that can be eradicated. . . . Samsāra is nirvāna, with no extinction that can be real­
ized. . . . The serenity of the dharmatā (fa-hsing) is called concentration (chih, śamatha). Serene yet permanently reflecting is called insight (kuan, vipāyanā). Although the terms "beginning" and "later" are used there are no dualities, no distinctions. This is called the Perfect and Sudden Medita­
tion (yiian-tun chih-kuan).

There is an undeniably gradualistic cast to the design of the perfect and sudden meditation, in the self-evident sense that achievement of the goal requires the expenditure of effort in a prescribed set of contempla­
tions. Nevertheless, the distinction between this and manifestly grad­
ualistic systems such as that of the Tz’u-ti ch’an-men is clear: here one is not eradicating attachments, illusions, and the like in order to gain greater and greater individual perfection, but seeking for the one moment of realization that will obviate the entire framework of one’s conceptualized ignorance. Hallucinations, recurrent swells of feeling, mental agitation, and so on are obstacles to success, but not in the sense that they must be eliminated or forcibly suppressed. Since one’s illu­sions are fundamentally no different from enlightenment, they become objects of one’s contemplation; one seeks to understand and not be unduly moved by them rather than to annihilate them.

What additional inferences can we now make about Chih-i’s formula­
tion of the path? First, there is a fundamental contradiction inherent in the concept of the gradual path: even though the overall process may be described as a progressive development, actual performance of the many exercises involved requires that the practitioner focus exclusively on the moment, the immediate present. This contradiction is, I believe, inherent in the earliest Indian formulations of the spiritual path, in which the stages of dhyāna are perceived as a vertical progression prep­aratory to but not sufficient for a lateral leap into a moment of prajñā. Of course, many Chinese were skeptical of the implicit requirement to continue spiritual training for lifetime after lifetime, and this awareness
may have abetted Chih-i’s description of the highest form of meditation as instantaneously malleable.

In addition, Chih-i’s formulation of the path may harbor within its most basic structure an admission of its own inadequacy and a prescription for the articulation of an alternate paradigm. The wider implication of these qualifications is that, although the elaboration of the encounter model of spiritual training was a unique innovation of Chinese Ch’an, the very construction of earlier Buddhist models of the path virtually necessitated that some such dialectically superior paradigm be enunciated. Thus it is not merely adventitious that the sudden/gradual distinction arose in the Ch’an school, nor that that distinction embodied value-laden and polemic judgments similar to the Mahāyāna/Hinayāna dichotomy. Such distinctions were inherent to the Buddhist conception of the path, at least as received in China, from its earliest stages.

Second, Chih-i’s description of the perfect and sudden meditation highlights the peculiar role of the individual practitioner in his system. The focus of Chih-i’s system was on spiritually gifted individuals. It was individual human beings, whether trainees, bhikṣus, bodhisattvas, or buddhas, who performed the practices necessary to propel them upward along the path.

I find it significant that these individual people are unnamed. The practitioner who navigates Chih-i’s path is anonymous, and we never hear examples drawn from Chih-i’s experience as a meditation instructor. The practitioner is a piece on the playing board, so to speak, who must make his or her own decisions on the basis of universal rules, rather than on inferences drawn from specific cases (as in the Indian literature) or through the contemplation of anecdotes intended not simply to instruct but to propel the listener or reader past the current obstacle (as in later Ch’an literature). Indeed, in Chih-i’s system the present moment on which the practitioner is to concentrate is an abstraction constructed out of psychological categories and metaphysical principles. Judging in part from a draft paper by Daniel Stevenson, Chih-i’s criticisms of contemporary meditation masters were largely based on their identification with individual approaches to meditation—that is, on their refusal to adopt a systematic approach to Buddhist meditation. He may also have resented them because they refused to subordinate their identities to the path as a whole, and thus become anonymous.

Perhaps it is only a result of the “dark age” that the T’ien-t’ai school entered after the fall of the Sui, but I get the impression that all the practitioners surrounding Chih-i were dressed in the invisible black of No stage assistants, like supporting characters attendant to the grand theater of his lectures. Indeed, his disciples are known chiefly for their service to him. Even the biography of the scribe Kuan-ting, who must have played a large role in the compilation and editing of Chih-i’s writ-
ings, is largely unknown. The same situation prevails in Chih-i’s theore-
tical descriptions of the path: the theoretician is glorified and the
actual practitioner is reduced to a virtual cipher.

Third, implicit in the hierarchical structure and the focus on gifted if
anonymous individual practitioners is the exaltation of the teacher or
guru. In traditional meditation texts, the master is specifically given the
responsibility for intuiting the student’s dispositional tendencies and
assigning the appropriate meditation technique or sequence of tech-
niques. Indian texts set out rules and guidelines for the master’s input
that make his role as instructor to students seem somewhat mechanical
and automatic. Perhaps this is the source of Chih-i’s tendency to deal
with students’ problems in the abstract: in traditional meditation the-
ory, students have the autonomy to seek different teachers, but they
themselves play only a secondary role in the cultural expression of the
religion. To put it differently, practitioners are virtually invisible within
the system until they achieve the status of master or teacher.

Of course, the master’s training gives him special insight into Bud-
dhist doctrine, and it is this facet of the Buddhist monk’s identity that
was most highly valued in the Chinese tradition. In China the teacher is
often perceived as the great expounder, the theoretician, either deliver-
ing the authoritative interpretation of the text or generating brilliant
theories for the consumption of lay and ordained followers. These
great teachers were, in effect, independent entities due to their per-
ceived status as figures who towered over the rest of the religious com-
community (this was, at least, a favored descriptive). Like lesser buddhas,
they radiated their teachings outward and downward to their spiritual
inferiors. There was competition among teachers for this role of ascen-
dency and cooperation among those who recognized themselves to be at
similar spiritual levels (usually considered out of humility to be uni-
formly low relative to the buddhas), but the radial and unipolar model
held even in these situations.

Chih-i was, of course, the ultimate example of such an exalted
teacher: his brilliance was transcribed in roll after roll of abstruse trea-
tises and commentaries, he lectured to large audiences of monks and
laypeople, and he ministered to princes and courtiers. Although his
instructions on meditation are magnificent, it is simply not known how
he taught his own students. Whereas traditional meditation texts place
great emphasis on the role of the instructor in analyzing the student’s
temperament and assigning techniques to him, the role of the teacher is
recognized but not emphasized so explicitly by Chih-i.

**Mechanistic, Artisanal, and Elitist**

I suspect that meditation practice in China prior to the advent of the
Ch’an school was based primarily on the paradigm of Chih-i’s gradu-
ated system. This is not to say that all meditators used his texts, nor that they restricted themselves to the techniques he described or the way he described them. Although his work was very influential, we have no means of tabulating the statistics that would be implied by such assertions. Rather, Chih-i’s work was the dominant example of the kind of religious paradigm presupposed and superseded by the Ch’an school (according to its own perspective) in its creation of a “transmission outside the teachings.”

In the most positive sense, meditation practice according to Chih-i’s writings was the most subtle of crafts, a spiritual trade learned through self-effort by gifted students practicing predetermined techniques. But the mārga paradigm was so well elaborated in Indian texts that it often seemed to the Chinese to be mechanistic in its application and not a little overwhelming in its requirements. Authority was granted to the meditation instructor, but the relationship between instructor and trainee was mechanistic in that the master used preestablished rules to select among known meditation techniques on the basis of the student’s dispositional problems. In Chinese biographies, however, individual masters appear devoted to a certain style or interpretation of religious practice. In cases where their training is described, the identities of their teachers is often unclear. And in accord with the invisibility of practitioners who are not (yet) teachers, in many cases their training is hardly mentioned and never described in any depth or detail. (In this the meditation master Seng-ch’ou [480–560] of the Northern Ch’i is much more representative than Chih-i.)

As a spiritual craft, the practice of meditation as conceived by Chih-i was intrinsically elitist, being limited solely to the spiritually advanced. Essentially, it was open only to monks and others who had given up all family ties. This was in part due to the great dedication of time and energy involved, but it was also presumed that those with great moral impediments, such as a large store of negative karma from past lives, simply could not participate in the process described. Hence monks and the occasional layperson with the capacity for dedication to a long-term process of self-transformation were the intended audience of Chih-i’s meditation texts.

**The Encounter Paradigm as Manifested in the *Tsu-t’ang chi***

*A Comprehensive, Reiterative Genealogical Structure*

The *Tsu-t’ang chi* (*TTC*) was compiled in 952 by two students of Ching-hsiu Wen-t’eng, who provided a preface for the work. Although the two students are otherwise unknown, Wen-t’eng himself was the author of a series of verses for each of the Indian and Chinese patriarchs from
Kāśyapa to Hui-neng, and for a few other major figures up to Shih-t’ou and Ma-tsu. In addition to being incorporated into the TTC, Wen-t’eng’s verses were discovered as a separate text among the finds from Tun-huang. The TTC itself, though, does not occur at Tun-huang, nor was it widely circulated in China, where it seems to have merited only a reference or two in the annotation of Ch’an scholiasts. Fortunately, woodblocks for the text were carved in 1245 as a supplement to the Korean canon; since the text itself was not printed along with the canon, presumably due to its supplementary status, it was only in the twentieth century that the existence of the TTC became known.

Although the TTC is markedly different in character from the writings of T’ien-t’ai Chih-i, its high degree of structural integrity as a single text is at least as striking as the drive toward conceptual systematization apparent in Chih-i’s writings. The TTC traces the “transmission of the lamp” of Buddhist enlightenment from the Seven Buddhas of the past through a series of Indian and Chinese patriarchs, thus connecting the historical present (i.e., tenth-century southeastern China) with its spiritual roots in a most comprehensive and compelling fashion. More specifically, the structure of the TTC is as follows:

1. The Seven Buddhas of the past: each buddha is identified by very brief name and family information, followed by a transmission verse for each (written by Wen-t’eng).
2. The historical Buddha: Śākyamuni receives a long entry, probably summarized from an earlier Ch’an text, the Pao-lin chuan (Transmission from Pao-lin [ssu], or PLC), but deriving from various canonical sources. The customary verse is included.
3. The twenty-eight Indian patriarchs from Kāśyapa to Bodhidharma: these sections are also drawn from the PLC, although they are abbreviated somewhat. Transmission verses are included.
4. The six Chinese patriarchs from Bodhidharma to Hui-neng: the verses for these patriarchs first appeared in the Platform Sūtra. (Bodhidharma receives only one TTC entry, of course.)
5. Eight generations of successors of Ch’ing-yüan Hsing-ssu through Shih-t’ou Hsi-ch’ien (700–790): this line of succession devolves to Hsüeh-feng I-ts’un and after him to Ching-hsiu Wen-t’eng; hence it is the lineage of the compilers of the TTC.
6. Seven generations of successors of Nan-yüeh Huai-jang through Ma-tsu Tao-i (709–788): this line of succession includes Lin-chi I-hsüan. The TTC adds transmission verses for several figures (in both this and the previous category) not included in Wen-t’eng’s separate text.

As indicated by the references to the PLC—an extremely important work that will come up again later—the TTC was not the first text to
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utilize this comprehensive genealogical structure. Nor was the TTC’s version of the tradition history of Ch’an destined to become orthodox; this status was accorded the presentation found in the CTL, a text submitted to the imperial Sung court in 1004. The TTC is used here because it represents the earliest extant version of this comprehensive vision.

Whereas Chih-i’s system involves a graduated set of practices set in a grandiose cosmological context, the structured nature of the TTC derives from a sequence of biographies, or at least biographical vignettes. This text was not written for practitioners who are conceived of as game pieces moving across a playing board and performing consciously selected sequences of spiritual exercises. In fact, the TTC may not have been written for living practitioners at all, for it describes a community of spiritual masters of the near and distant past. It was no doubt written for living aspirants to use as a guide to spiritual cultivation, but in form, at least—and this is an important qualification—the TTC is dedicated to the past. Here is a conception of time that is fundamentally different from that of the Indianesque framework of Chih-i’s writings.

Yet it would not be fair to say that the TTC looks backward to the past. Rather, like many other works of Chinese literature, it acknowledges the supreme greatness of figures of antiquity. The Seven Buddhas of the past are concessions to the infinite regression of human history; the real beginning of this text (as, perhaps, of all Buddhist scriptures) is the historical Buddha Śākyamuni. The biography of Śākyamuni is the most complete hagiographical portrait in the TTC, and in many ways it is the root metaphor of the enlightened sage.

Although the Ch’an biography of the Buddha is an intriguing subject, Śākyamuni represents only the beginning node of an interconnected chain of sages. By virtue of the transmission or certification of enlightenment that each patriarch bestows on his successor, each one of the subsequent Indian and Chinese sages is Śākyamuni’s spiritual equal. This is a purportedly historical list, yet its impact is distinctly ahistorical: the transmission is perfect, each successor is the spiritual equivalent of his predecessor, and the distinctions of synchronic time are eliminated. Time is flattened into a single continuous, participatory moment—not a present moment, but a continuous expression of a golden moment of the past, whether from the hoary ancient age or from the poignant memory of one’s recently departed master.

The primary feature of this temporal continuity is its participatory nature: to receive certification of enlightenment from a Ch’an master is to join the succession of patriarchs and enter into dynamic communion with the sages of ancient times. The primary goal of this training is not an exalted state of spiritual attainment but reenactment of the archetypal drama that takes place between each patriarch and his successor.
The "transmission of the mind with the mind" described in the anecdotes involving Hung-jen and Hui-neng, Bodhidharma and Hui-k'o, and eventually the historical Buddha and Mahākāśyapa, are scripts of the primal event in the Ch' an religious sensibility. This pristine moment of ancestral time was intended for repetition, over and over, within each teacher-and-student combination throughout the extended genealogy of Ch' an.

It was through the reenactment of this primal script that Ch' an derived its emphasis on sudden personal transformation: with the cast limited to teacher and student, there could be no in-between category of "almost-enlightened" or "rather like a master." One either belonged within the lineage of enlightened masters or one did not, and the religious transformation from one status to the other could only take place suddenly.

**Bipolar and Collaborative**

In encounter dialogue, the locus of spiritual practice shifted from the individual realm of yogic meditation exercises to the interpersonal interaction between master and student. Teachers sometimes wrote essays, poems, and gave sermons, but their primary source of identification lay in their interaction with students. It was impossible to express the truth in words radiated outward from a high seat in the lecture hall; rather, truth could be alluded to only in the spontaneous and natural activities of daily life. This critical importance of a teacher's ability to interact with students is a direct continuation of the emphasis on expedient means or salvific technique (*fang-pien*, Skt. *upāya*) in early Ch' an.

The cast of characters in the encounter-dialogue texts is essentially limited to master and students, and there is a remarkable degree of near-parity between these two statuses. I find it extremely significant that in this literature both masters and students are defined almost entirely through their mutual interaction. For example, although Matsu is known for a few basic positions—"this mind is the Buddha" and "the ordinary mind is enlightenment"—the major emphasis is on the fact that he taught in the context of intimate interpersonal interaction.

The very number of students, both named and anonymous, that appear in this literature, and the emphasis placed on the master's interaction with them, indicates a remarkable shift in Chinese Buddhist literature. In the theoretical works of previous centuries, a master's students were mentioned rarely, if at all, and then only as incipient exegetes, gifted translators, or future teachers whose presence proved the master's ability to attract followers.

In classical Ch' an texts, however, the gifted exegete or great theoretician is no longer the universal cynosure. Although it is still the master who is "on stage," he is depicted in terms not of doctrinal soliloquy but
of his varied and creative responses—his mastery of upāya—in relation to a number of students. (A graphic example of this is the painting discussed by Robert Gimello in this volume, in which the Ch’an master Fa-hsiu appears with an anonymous lay student.) In other words, in Ch’an texts masters attain individual identity only through their group identity, that is, through their interaction with students and the rest of the Ch’an community.24

Unstructured and Creative

Encounter-dialogue anecdotes are presented as having been unrehearsed, and such exchanges are taken as the very nexus of spiritual cultivation. In the TTC, encounter-dialogue exchanges are sometimes preceded by a sermon or pronouncement of the master’s; in many cases the student’s inquiries are standardized. Nevertheless, and even though we can now posit rules to explain the master’s strategic jumps, the dialogue itself proceeds in a spontaneous and unique fashion. There are no explicit rules that the student can follow.25 Indeed, if the master detects any predication of logical structure (e.g., rules, preconceptions, or projections) on the part of the student, rejection is sure to follow. Any attempt by the student to impose logical structure on the dialogue is exploded by the master in a superior verbal parry or nonverbal thrust. Obviously, the most common type of logical structure students applied in their questions was that derived from the traditional conception of the Buddhist mārga.

It bears repeating that the locus of religious endeavor defined in these texts is not seated meditation practice, of whatever style, but engagement in encounter dialogue itself: it is in such exchanges that religious truth is to be found. The student is not allowed to rely on any explicit method or technique, including any form of meditation practice. The antiritualism of Ch’an toward traditional Buddhist activities is well known, but the most significant aspect of this was the school’s iconoclasm toward meditative and contemplative exercises. It is virtually certain that such exercises continued to have wide currency, but they were removed from center stage. The impression given in the text—although it is an impression that probably would not have occurred to the actual participants in ninth- and tenth-century Ch’an training regimens, as opposed to the literary constructs who appear in the TTC itself—is that the locus of spiritual self-cultivation has shifted from the realm of private yogic endeavor to a more public realm of informal, interpersonal linguistic exchange.

Finally, the goal of spiritual endeavor had changed, perhaps irreversibly. Entering the confraternity of masters may have required a total and instantaneous transformation, but it did not require the laborious cleansing away of unwanted defilements. The prelude to the moment of
transformation was a process not of self-improvement but of self-discovery: namely, recognition of one’s own identity as a buddha or patriarch. This is graphically demonstrated by the internal structure of the PLC, in which each patriarchal successor is discovered by his predecessor but undergoes no training prior to his accession to the status of patriarch. In fact, the text does not contain a single description of the enlightenment experience of any of the Indian patriarchs.

The first patriarch whose enlightenment is described in the PLC is Hui-k’o, but even here the treatment is unusual. Before meeting his teacher Bodhidharma, Hui-k’o underwent an inner transformation that is depicted in amusingly physical terms: he experiences what is literally an exchange of skeletons prior to his encounter with Bodhidharma. Thus to become a patriarch he had to be totally transformed. The suddenness of the encounter paradigm implies a transformation of self, awareness, or one’s total being into a different mode of existence. As Robert Gimello has noted, sudden enlightenment was perceived as a transformation into a world totally different and absolutely separate from, but at the same time identical with, ordinary reality, yet immediately at hand. This was a leap similar to that of prajñā, a lateral jump off the vertical ladder of the stages of dhyāna. In other words, the encounter model of Buddhist practice is intrinsically subitist. In addition, it makes no claims regarding the validity of samsāra as a description of sentient existence.

### Conclusion

*The Implications of Chronology*

In this chapter I have described the T’ien-t’ai and Ch’an approaches to spiritual practice with a variety of terms, such as paradigms, models, and templates. Since this is a preliminary statement of findings that will change as my research continues, the reader is justified in considering the multiplicity of terms a function of the experimental nature of this paper. However, there is another more profound reason for the avoidance of a rigid terminology—namely, that the emergence of Ch’an was a complex process that should not be treated by the social and intellectual historian with artificially precise theoretical categories.

To explain this dictum, let me briefly address the issue of the historical emergence of encounter dialogue itself. Earlier writers, including Professor Yanagida, have treated the existence of this unique form of spontaneous Ch’an dialogue as a given, with the explicit assertion that it emerged in conjunction with the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu in the last part of the eighth century in south-central China. It would seem, in fact, that singleminded devotion to encounter dialogue distinguishes
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the “classical Ch’an” of Ma-tsu from the “early Ch’an” of the Northern, early Southern, and Oxhead schools, the last of which was almost contemporaneous with the Hung-chou school. Indeed, the distinction between early and classical Ch’an, which I posed in an earlier article as the primary discontinuity in the development of Chinese Ch’an, was based on this identification of encounter dialogue with Ma-tsu’s community.30

Although Robert Buswell recently made the very cogent suggestion that we identify early, middle, classical, and postclassical phases of Chinese Ch’an, the precise delineation of these stages is still subject to further consideration.31 More important is the question of whether we can actually use the occurrence of encounter dialogue as a distinguishing characteristic of a specific chronological period. When did it emerge as the central style of Ch’an practice? Was there ever a period in which the primary activity of Ch’an students and masters was spontaneous religious dialogue, or is the image of such a period only an enabling myth generated by later generations of Ch’an devotees?

The orthodox texts of Ch’an would clearly have us believe that such a period did exist, and that it existed during the careers of Ma-tsu and his immediate students and successors. But examination of these sources indicates that none of the stories involved can be traced back earlier than the TTC. While some of the anecdotes seem quite obviously to be artificial reconstructions—for example, Huai-jang’s mimicking the young Ma-tsu in meditation by trying to polish a piece of tile into a mirror—others carry a sense of vivid realism that makes us want to believe they really happened. However, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by this impression of credibility, which is an essential function of fictional writing.

Examination of the contemporary sources for Ma-tsu’s Hung-chou school, which include a number of epitaphs and texts such as the PLC, supposedly from 801, and the Ch’ian-hsin fa-yao (Essential Teaching of the Transmission of Mind), from around 850, has led me to believe that the school did have a significant emphasis on oral practice, or at least oral instruction. But was the type of oral encounter emphasized the same as that evoked by the classical Ch’an encounter dialogue that appears in the TTC and later texts? At this point, I am uncertain. I suspect that all the famous stories we have about Ma-tsu and his students are later reconstructions rather than edited transcriptions of contemporary, first-person observer accounts. This is not to say that spontaneous dialogue did not occur, but that the examples we have of it are less journalistic reports than creative imitations.32

To support the assertion that encounter dialogue arose only with the Hung-chou school, it has usually been said that the absence of such material among the Ch’an literature discovered at Tun-huang shows a
basic lack of conformity with early Ch‘an. But although there was no
encounter-dialogue material at Tun-huang, there were several Hung-
chou school and later texts of the “classical” or “middle” periods. Sig-
ificantly, the latest of these consists of Wen-t’eng’s verses, which
formed the backbone of the TTC, as mentioned earlier.33

Although further research is needed, the implication is clear: encoun-
ter dialogue was published for the first time in Chinese history with the
TTC. No doubt there were private transcriptions circulating within the
monastic community, but we know of nothing prior to this text, which
was compiled more than 150 years after the death of Ma-tsu. Given this
passage of time, the accounts that we have of Ma-tsu and his early gen-
erations of students must be edited reconstructions at the very least,
rather than first-person accounts.

In the present context, we need not specify exactly when encounter
dialogue came to dominate Chinese Ch‘an. But notice that the question
is not solely one of chronological obscurity. A larger issue is involved:
the appearance of encounter-dialogue material in the TTC must be con-
sidered as a phenomenon of literary genre. We should think not only
about masters and students of the late eighth and early ninth centuries
engaging in spontaneous dialogue, but about their successors during
the middle of the tenth century pondering the implications of the anec-
dotes of spiritual parry and riposte handed down from generations
before.

The TTC was compiled during the relatively peaceful southeastern
regime of Wu-Yüeh, and its very creation implies that its editors were
on a mission to preserve a tradition that had become tenuous due to the
difficult military and social conditions of the Five Dynasties period. If
the urge to compose the text was essentially conservative, in the pri-
mary meaning of the term, then the attitude of the editors and their
cohorts toward the patriarchs of earlier years was inherently retrospec-
tive. Whatever the facts of the eighth and ninth centuries, it was at the
hands of these editors that the “golden age” of the T‘ang Ch‘an masters
was created; it was from their text, and later ones like it, that students of
Ch‘an reenvisioned the wondrously enlightened actions of Bodhidhar-
ma, Hui-neng, and Ma-tsu. And it was in this process of creative
visualization that the genealogical structure of the TTC is of absolutely
fundamental significance.

The Attractions of Living in Ancestral Time

The masters and students of the postclassical Ch‘an of the Five Dynas-
ties and Sung periods read, pondered, discussed, and sermonized about
the anecdotes contained in the TTC, and in so doing they defined both
their own religious identities and the contour of their own spiritual
endeavors. Meditating on the hua-t‘ou or “critical phrase” wu (J. mu)
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according to the instructions of Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089-1163) was not merely a psychological device, it was a method for visualizing oneself as a full-fledged member of the numinous world of the ancient patriarchs, a way of entering into dialogue with the patriarchs on their own terms, of entering a particular moment in ancestral time.

Why did Ch'an become so popular within Chinese Buddhism? No doubt there are many answers to this question, including the identity of the school as a movement of spiritual revitalization within Chinese Buddhism. However, I suggest that at least part of the reason is that its mode of practice and its entire self-understanding were inherently and intrinsically genealogical, in a way that echoed the extended family social structure and that mirrored some of the dominant concerns of post-T'ang Chinese society. This is not to say that the genealogical structure of Ch'an is intrinsically Chinese; as I have pointed out elsewhere, the nucleus of the transmission theory, whereby the true teachings of Buddhism are handed down from Sakyamuni Buddha through a succession of patriarchs, was brought into China by the Kashmiri masters who established the foundation of the meditation tradition in China.

Roughly contemporaneous with the efflorescence of Ch'an was another movement in the Chinese intellectual world: the reclamation of the native civil tradition by a movement that began with the search for ku-wen (ancient texts)—a movement that later came to be called tao-hsüeh (study of the Way) or li-hsüeh (study of principle), and that is known in modern English writings as Neo-Confucianism. The de facto originator of this movement is thought to have been Han Yu (768-824), a scholar-official known both for his brilliant literary style and for his famous memorial attacking the worship of a relic of the Buddha. Han Yu's contemporaries did not share his xenophobic interest in reviving the Confucian tradition to the exclusion of Buddhism, but he became a cultural hero to Chinese literati during the Sung.

Although the group of thinkers now identified as Neo-Confucian did not go unchallenged during their own lifetimes, the dominant move during the Sung was to look back through Han Yu to the sages of the Chou dynasty and create a Confucian tao-t'ung (succession of the Way). This mirrored the Ch'an perspective, which looked back through the patriarchs of the T'ang to Sakyamuni. In addition, most Sung literati held that the Way should be recovered by seeking within the ancient classics of the Chinese tradition to understand the principles known to the sages. Although it was generally recognized that the contemporary world was too complex to witness the perfect re-creation of ancient institutions, the golden age of the past and the wisdom of the ancient sages were to be used as models in reforming the present.

If the Neo-Confucians and other Sung dynasty intellectuals were
seeking to redress China's contemporary problems by returning to the rediscovered ideals of its past, postclassical Ch'an represents a more radical version of the same move. By meditating on famous anecdotes from Ch'an literature, Ch'an trainees were, in effect, visualizing the golden age of the T'ang, thus re-creating in their own minds the enlightened actions of the ancient sages and affecting the same style of intuitive repartee in their responses to their own living masters. What is more, masters such as Yüan-wu K'o-ch'in (1063-1135) and Ta-hui Tsung-kao effectively entered into dialogue with the ancient sages in their commentaries and sermons on Ch'an "public cases" (kung-an, J. kōan). The status of Ch'an master allowed one to communicate on an equal footing with the buddhas and patriarchs, so that time was flattened along the family tree of Ch'an in practice as well as in the organizational structure of the Ch'an legitimizing myth. Both Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism were innovatively conservative movements, in that they introduced new features to Chinese culture under the guise of recreating a golden age of the past. Both monk and scholar idealized their respective forebears, but each wished to emulate rather than merely study them.

Elaboration of these very brief comments on the relationship between Ch'an and Neo-Confucianism will have to await another occasion; what is significant at present is that, for the Ch'an school, the imaginative re-creation of and communion with the past were not mere literary tropes but fundamental characteristics of Ch'an religious practice. It is thus no accident that Chinese texts do not talk openly about techniques of mental concentration, processes of spiritual growth, or dynamics of the experience of enlightenment. These subjects had already been covered in detail in the writings of Chih-i and others, and perhaps did not need repeating; there were also taboos against describing individual religious experience in ways that could be construed as self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, I am convinced that if the members of the Ch'an movement had been more interested in exploring these areas they could have found ways to improve or expand on Chih-i and to avoid breaking the taboos.

Mārga and Encounter as Creative Bimodality

The very different proclivity of Ch'an—to the reproduction of almost endless quantities of encounter dialogue—suggests that the Chinese were intensely interested in exploring the new encounter paradigm, in deliberating over its famous cases in the meditation hall, and in emulating the style of untrammeled activity and discourse implicit in its famous exemplars. Does this mean that the mārga paradigm was completely discarded? I think not. The vitality of the originally Indian version of the spiritual path may have been mitigated through its reformu-
lation by Chih-i and thoroughly undercut by Ch’an, but in the latter case the very dynamism of Ch’an spiritual practice depended on the contrast between the dualistic formulations of the student and the perfect spontaneity of the master. If there was a decline in the dynamism of Chinese Buddhism after the Sung, it may have occurred in part because the nature and quantity of new Buddhist translations completed during the Sung allowed the creative tension between the marga and encounter paradigms to be lost.

It would be foolish to suggest, however, that the marga approach to Buddhist spiritual practice disappeared from the Chinese world. It may be true that the impact of Indian Buddhism declined gradually from the mid-T’ang onward, but I suspect that Indian Buddhist conceptions were far more vital than has generally been thought to have been the case within the Chinese religious and intellectual life of the late T’ang, Five Dynasties, and Sung, and probably even later in Chinese history as well. Our task as historians of religion is to remain sensitive to the interplay between the two models. We may be inspired by Bernard Faure’s very suggestive interpretation of Bodhidharma as only one element within a binominal religious and literary motif, and we may take a cue from David Pollack’s luminous if sometimes controversial work, The Fracture of Meaning. In a fashion similar to the interplay between foreign and native themes in Japanese culture, where China represented the richly complex versus the innocent simplicity of indigenous sensibilities, the marga paradigm represented a logically ordered set of abstract priorities that was juxtaposed to the nondualistic illuminations of encounter dialogue.38 That the former came to seem contrived and the latter natural is an indication of the dominant structure of later Chinese cosmology.

What are the ramifications of this development for our understanding of Buddhist soteriology in general? Grace Burford’s discussion of the Aṭṭhakavagga implies that there may be very deep continuities between the Chinese case and the earliest Buddhist tradition. She describes two distinct approaches to Buddhism present in the Aṭṭhakavagga—one that encouraged the adoption of correct views (diṭṭhi), and another that suggested that only the absence of views was correct. When we consider the possible relationship between this set of approaches and the distinction between the marga and encounter models in Ch’an, two separate questions arise.

First, is the Ch’an polarity of marga/encounter a distant echo of the contradiction between right views and no views found in the Aṭṭhakavagga? Although the fully elaborated spiritual path is considerably more complex philosophically than the simple views discussed in the Pāli text, and although the encounter model of spiritual practice is considerably richer than the basic insight that one should be without views,
the parallelism is there: to cultivate correct views is to engage in self-improvement, whereas to eliminate views is the sudden achievement of wisdom. In this sense, the congruence between Ch’an and the Indian tradition goes back not only to the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, but to the two traditions discussed by Alan Sponberg—the ecstatic, visionary perspective of the Upaniṣads and the enstatic, purificatory approach of the śrāmaṇa groups.39

In the Buddhist context, of course, these two traditions percolate out as the śamatha (concentration) and vipāśyanā (insight) branches of meditative endeavor. Even though the Indian conception of the path embraced both gradual and sudden, śamatha and vipāśyanā, in Ch’an the path is redefined as entirely gradualistic, entirely śamatha. Any gradual progress was but the cultivation of positive qualities, which, as shown in Collett Cox’s chapter, was the preferred choice in the *Mahāvibhāṣa* system. It is thus possible to line up the different subtraditions of Buddhism according to how they treat the basic polarity between views or no views, śamatha or vipāśyanā, mārga or encounter; the delineation of precisely how these variants resemble, relate to, and differ from each other is an important task of future research. Second, we might take a hint from the Chinese material and suggest that, no matter what set of alternatives is being considered, the relationship between the two is probably not so much one of absolute opposition as one of creative tension or mutual interrelation. For instance, is it possible that the two views apparent in the *Aṭṭhakavagga* were not independent viewpoints but different poles of a single continuum, or at least alternatives that constituted an interdependent pair? There does not seem to be any direct evidence of this in the text, and it would be difficult to find explicit, incontrovertible evidence that differing approaches to spiritual practice, when offered roughly simultaneously, necessarily represent pairs of alternatives operating as a single system. Nevertheless, this is an attractive interpretive perspective to which we must remain sensitive.

Within the Ch’an tradition, I am reminded of the introductory manual attributed to Hung-jen, the *Hsiu-hsin yao lun* (Treatise on the Essentials of Cultivating the Mind), which displays a palpable sensitivity in its simultaneous exhortations to vigorous practice and cautions against predicating enlightenment as a goal to be desired and achieved.40 This same delicate touch is apparent in the Japanese *Zazen ron*, discussed in this volume by Carl Bielefeldt, which displays a delicate balance between zazen as a goal-oriented technique and as an expression of inherent buddhahood. Since the *Zazen ron* draws heavily on early Ch’an ideas, it is not surprising that it also records interest in two separate models of the religious life—one that suggests working to attain enlightenment, and another that advocates simply manifesting the enlightenment already inherent within.
In a similar fashion, Chinese texts from the late seventh and early eighth centuries seem to espouse two separate models of spiritual practice and enlightenment—one based on the doctrine of the buddha-nature obscured by ignorance (likened to the sun obscured by clouds), and the other based on the image of the mind of the sage reacting perfectly to the needs of sentient beings (depicted by the perfectly reflecting mirror). As Gimello and Buswell suggest in their introduction to this volume, these are manifestations of Buddhism’s maintenance of a vital balance between the apophatic thrust of the doctrine of śūnyatā and the theoretical implications of mārga. By restraining the urge to reify or routinize practice, the doctrine of śūnyatā mitigated spiritual enervation and the decay of mārga.

Thus for Chinese Buddhism to have sustained two different models of spiritual practice is consonant with the Buddhist tradition as a whole. Of course, the specific nature of that pair of models, not merely the paradigm of encounter dialogue but the antinomy between the mārga and encounter models, evolved within the context of the Chinese historical and cultural situation. Hence it is entirely valid to consider the parallels between the mārga/encounter opposition and themes native to Chinese culture, such as the different views of human nature in Chou dynasty Confucianism, the contrast between Taoist naturalism and Confucian moral training, and the differing approaches to self-cultivation in Sung and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucianism.

However, in at least two respects the mārga/encounter polarity seems unique. First, the encounter paradigm is based on an iconoclastic rejection of the very notion of mārga itself. Although such antinomian tendencies may be latent in other subtraditions of Buddhism, one suspects that the Ch’an example is the most pronounced. Second, the encounter paradigm involves an image of human interaction that derives jointly from Indian and Chinese sources. Not only did the genealogical model of the “transmission of the lamp” theory grow out of a coincidence of Indian and Chinese ideas, but the dialogic style of discourse used in Ch’an literature derived from a combination of Indian logical dilemmas and stylistic tendencies going back as far as the Chinese classics.

Notes
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1. The term “encounter dialogue” is used to render kien mondō, as in “The Development of the ‘Recorded Sayings’ Texts of the Chinese Ch’ân School,”
trans. from Yanagida Seizan, "Zenshū goroku no keisei," in Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster, eds., Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, Berkeley Buddhist Studies, no. 5 (Berkeley, Calif.: Lancaster-Miller Press, 1983), 185-205. The basic components of the corresponding Chinese, chi-yuăn wen-ta, are attested, but the phrase is not widespread. The term "wen-ta" ("questions and answers," or simply "dialogues"), is quite general and may refer to any text with a question-and-answer structure.

2. Other than virtually any of the works of D. T. Suzuki, the most convenient source for examples of encounter dialogue is probably Chung-yuan Chang, The Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism: Selected from the Transmission of the Lamp (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1982).


6. There was a steady increase in the percentage of meditation specialists in successive "Biographies of Eminent Monks" texts, i.e., the Kao-seng chuan of 518, the HKSC of 645/667, and the SKSC of 967. As compiled by Mizuno Kōgen, only 16+ percent of the subjects were listed as meditators or thaumaturges (the power for whose feats came through meditation) in the first of these texts, whereas successive versions had 45+ and 36+ percent. The last figure may actually be adjusted to some 60-70 percent due to the suffusion of meditation specialists throughout the other categories. Mizuno suggests that the ultimate prevalence of meditation in Chinese Buddhism resembled that in primitive Indian Buddhism, where only certain monks were listed as especially proficient in meditation but all were well versed in it. See Mizuno Kōgen, "Zenshū seiritsu izen no Shina no zenjō shisōshi josetsu," Komazawa Daigaku kenkyūkiyo 15 (March 1957): 17-18. I would note that the increased number of figures bearing the title "Ch'an master" and identified within Ch'an genealogies does not immediately imply an increased devotion to the practice of meditation per se, but rather the greater currency of Ch'an as an ideology of religious identity.

7. The discussion of Chih-i's writings here is distantly based on work included in my doctoral dissertation, The Northern School of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism (Yale, 1983), 51-76.

8. The TTC is a quintessentially "hot" medium, as the term is defined in the dialogue surrounding the classic work by Herbert Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Massage (New York: Random House, 1967). That is, it provides only the bare narrative thread, forcing the reader to imagine the background information. This is in contrast to "cool" media (such as television), which supply enough information to supplant the process of creative imagination.

9. Hui-ssu's own curriculum of training seems to have paralleled a later T'ien-t'ai scheme of four types of meditation, and it is probable that he also initiated the process of rationalization that culminated in Chih-i's system of the graduated meditation (chien-tz'u chih-kuan). This inference is based on Chih-i's heavy dependence on the Ta chih-tu lun in explicating this graduated meditation, this being a text he studied under Hui-ssu. Unfortunately, there is very little direct evidence with which to gauge the extent of Hui-ssu's contribution, so for the purposes of this discussion I consider only the most relevant themes of T'ien-t'ai meditation theory, which become manifest in Chih-i's writings.
The Tz'u-ti ch'an-men is Chih-i's most important early work; there are a number of abstracts or commentaries based on it compiled by Chih-i and/or Kuan-ting. I have used an abbreviated title for this work, which occurs at T.46.475a-548c. For an analysis of its background and importance, including its relationship to other T'ien-t'ai texts, see Satō Tetsuei, Tendat daishi no kenkyū—Chigi no chosaku ni kansuru kisoteki kenkyū—(Kyoto: Hyakkaon, 1961), 103-127. For a discussion of the origins and date of this text, see Takahashi Shūei, “Dai ikkai Kinryō dentō jidai ni okeru Tendai daishi no kōsetsu ni tsuite—toku ni Shidai zemmon o chūshin to shite—, Komazawa Daigaku Daigakuten Bukkyōgaku kenkyūkai nempō 5 (June 1971): 125-126. Chanjan's date for the compilation of this work is given in Ono Gemmyo, Bussho kaisetsu daijiten, 13 vols. (Tokyo: Daitō shuppan sha, 1933), 5:21a.

The four dhyanas, the four unlimited states of mind, and the four formless dhyanas are discussed at length in Paravahera Vajirāṇā Mahāthera, Buddhist Meditation in Theory and Practice: A General Exposition According to the Pāli Canon of the Theravāda School (Colombo, Sri Lanka: M. D. Gunasena, 1962), 35-42, 263-317, 332-340. For a shorter explanation, see Stephen Beyer, “The Doctrine of Meditation in the Hinayāna,” in Charles Prebish, ed., Buddhism: A Modern Perspective (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 138-139, 142-144. The six wondrous teachings refer to stages in the practice of meditation on breathing. The three penetrative illuminations refer to the four dhyanas, four formless dhyanas, and the attainment of extinction (nirodha-samāpatti), so named because they lead to the three illuminations (ming) into past, future, and the exhaustion of the defilements, as well as the six penetrations or supernatural powers (t'ung or shen-t'ung, Skt. abhijna). See Nakamura Hajime, Bukkyōgō daijiten, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyō shoseki, 1975), 2:972d. For the nine contemplations, eight remembrances, ten contemplations, eight renunciations, and eight excellences, see Mochizuki Shinkō, Mochizuki Bukkyō daijiten, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, 1933-1936), 1:678b-79a, 5:4223a-c, 3:2284c-85b, 5:4206b-207b, 5:4213c-14b. For the nine successive dhyanas, samādhi of the lion’s charge, and the samādhi of transcendence, see ibid., 1:664c-65a, 2:1788a-c, and Nakamura, Bukkyōgō, 2:965c.

Andō Toshio, Tendaigaku—kompon shisō to sono tenkai—(Kyoto: Heikaruiji shoten, 1968), 430.

12. Exceptions are lives of solitary practice or singleminded dedication to an ideal, such as the forbearance of suffering, that a practitioner may choose to emphasize for a particular lifetime. Such lifetimes are conceived of as individual steps along the path. A somewhat related exception must be made for the case of Mahāyāna texts that posit a single key to the entire panoply of Buddhist practices, such as the perfection of wisdom or the sūraṅgamasaṃmādhi.


15. This text occurs at T.46.549a-55c under the title Liu mioa-fa men. (The three-character title is apparently older.) See Satō, Tendai daishi, pp. 151-172; Andō, Tendaigaku, pp. 438-462; and Mochizuki, Mochizuki, 6:5077b-58a. Andō, Tendaigaku, pp. 434-436, discusses the status of this work as a forerunner to the Mo-ho chih-kuan.

16. T.46.52a-b, as quoted in Andō, Tendaigaku, p. 219.

17. See T.50.563a for the events cited for Hui-ssu.

18. T.46.1c-2a, quoted in Mochizuki, Mochizuki, 1:311c-12a. The “accumulation” of illusions and its eradication refers to the four noble truths.
19. This paradigm was described in detail in Chinese texts derived from the Kashmiri meditation tradition, e.g., Kumārājīva's Tso-ch' an san-mei ching (Scripture of Seated Meditation and Samādhi).

20. The theories proposed by these theoreticians are often very long on abstraction, categorization, and hierarchical evaluation, as is shown by the popularity of the p' an-chiao tradition of classifying Buddhist doctrines according to a systematic ranking of theoretical and heuristic principles.

21. See McRae, Northern School of Chinese Ch' an, pp. 31-50.

22. This is the Ch' uan-chou Ch'en-fo hsìn-chu chu tsu-shih sung (i-chuan), Stein 1635 or T'58.1320c-1322c.

23. My analysis of Śākyamuni's biography in the TTC is still not complete, but suffice it to say that the text explicitly cites a large number of early Chinese sources here. Presumably, this is drawn from the PLC, although the TTC does omit the Sūtra in Forty-two Sections, used in the PLC as the Buddha's "recorded sayings." See Yanagida Seizan, "Zen no Butsuden" (The Ch' an Biography of the Buddha) IBK 13, no. 1 (25; January 1965): 124-128.

24. Eventually, of course, the proliferation of Ch' an led to a very hierarchical arrangement of encounter-dialogue material according to generations and lineages. This may be viewed as a natural function of the institutionalization of the original charisma of early Ch' an, although hierarchy may also be inherent to the act of textual re-creation.

25. Encounter-dialogue exchanges may be analyzable into more or less regular patterns that were internalized by their participants, but the lack of explicit rules remains a relative distinction made in comparison with other forms of Buddhist spiritual endeavor. I refer to the notable efforts by William Frederick Powell, The Record of Tung-Shan: An Analysis of Pedagogic Style in Ch' an Buddhism (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1983), and Alan Sponberg, "Puttin' the Jump on the Master: Nāgārjuna and the Tactics of Emptiness in Ch' an Encounter Dialogue" (unpub. draft, 1987).


28. In addition to Robert Gimello's lament, made in his role as respondent to an earlier reading of this paper, that the Kuhnian terminology of "paradigm shift" has been used ad nauseum and with insufficient discrimination in the humanities and social sciences, my criticism of the oversimplifications and distortions implicit in Hu Shih's work on Ch' an has rendered me more sensitive to the problems implicit in gross periodization schemata. Hu Shih's dichotomy between gradual/Indian/complex and subitist/Chinese/simple resembles that between the mārga and encounter paradigms, and the problems inherent in the former may thus apply to the latter. Although I believe the latter comparison to be more sophisticated and of greater analytical utility, the potential for error remains.


32. It is clear from Northern school texts that Chinese meditation masters had long emphasized spontaneous interaction as a means of both understanding and teaching their students. Hung-jen (600–674), remembered posthumously as the fifth patriarch of Ch’an, seems to have been adept at this, and his important but soon-forgotten student Fa-ju (638–689) certainly was. Northern school texts include quite a few “questions about things” (chih-shih wen-i) that masters posed to students, although the responses are not given, and there are other citations in eighth-century texts suggesting that Ch’an involved a unique and recognized form of teaching. See McRae, Northern School and Formation, 91–97.

33. See note 22 above.

34. See the conclusion to John R. McRae, “The Legend of Hui-neng and the Mandate of Heaven,” Fo Kuang Shan Report of International Conference on Ch’an Buddhism (Kao-hsiung, Taiwan: Fo Kuang Publisher, 1990), 69–82. For the passage on which the comments in the article just cited are based, see idem, Northern School and Formation, 80–82.

35. Actually, the term “tao-t’ung” was used by Han Yü. Charles Hartman, Han Yü and the T’ang Search for Unity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 160, notes that “although there can be no doubt that the idea of transmission lineages in the Chinese scholarly tradition dates from at least the Han Dynasty and probably before, Ch’en Yin-k’o has suggested that Han Yü derived his concept of the tao-t’ung from the more immediate example of the Ch’an practice of the ‘transmission of the dharma’ (ch’iian-fa).” Hartman is citing an article by Ch’en called “Lun Han Yü” (1954), 105–106; the article is reprinted in Ch’en Yin-k’o hsien-sheng lun-wen chi 2:589–600. A recent and as yet unpublished manuscript by Peter Bol of Harvard University suggests that the concept of the tao-t’ung is also indebted to that of political succession (cheng-t’ung).

36. This summary is necessarily brief and overly general. In fact, the intellectual world of the Northern and Southern Sung, not to mention the Chin (which was contemporaneous with the latter), was complex and multivalent. To cite only the broadest of major currents, Sung dynasty intellectuals disagreed on whether the Way was real and universal, being transparently expressed by the sages through language and ritual (this was Ou-yang Hsiu’s position), or whether it was an understanding or interpretation by the sages of the patterns of human affairs (Chu Hsi’s position). They also disagreed on whether one could achieve wisdom by exploring the world on one’s own and relying on the natural ability of the mind (the position taken by Ch’eng I), or whether one had to probe the ancient classics of the Chinese tradition to understand the principles known to the sages (Chu Hsi’s interpretation). The latter, more absolutist position is that taken by Neo-Confucianism; the former, more epistemological one is that of Ou-yang Hsiu and others. Although still highly speculative at this point, it is possible to correlate the two major streams of Sung dynasty Ch’an practice with these differing currents within the civil Chinese tradition. Ch’eng
McRae’s reliance on the natural ability of the mind resembles the “silent illumination” (mo-chao) approach to Ch’an meditation, while Chu Hsi’s access to the Way through the mediation of the Confucian classics parallels the “observing the critical phrase” (k’an-hua) style of Ch’an. In this summary I am paraphrasing the formulation of Peter Bol, as expressed in several private conversations and stated during the Chinese religions workshop at Harvard, April 1988. In addition, I have referred to Bol’s presentation at the Harvard Buddhist Studies Forum of February 1988, “Ch’eng Yi was not a Confucian”; I responded to these remarks with “And so the Ch’an monks weren’t Buddhists?”


39. This discussion occurred in a paper Alan Sponberg presented at the Buddhist soteriology conference held at UCLA in June 1988 but not submitted for inclusion in this volume.

40. See McRae, Northern School and Formation, 136–138.

41. Ibid., 132–136, and 144–147, where I discuss these two models as complementary but separate “conceptual matrixes” of early Ch’an thought.

Glossary

Andō Toshio 安藤俊雄
chaoyüeh san-mei 超越三昧
chêng-t'ung 政統
Chiang-hsi nan-tao 江西南道
chien-tz'u chih-kuan 漸次止觀
chih 止
Chih-i (see T'ien-t''ai Chih-i)
chih-shih wen-i 指事問義
Ching-chou 荊州
Ching-hsü Wen-t'eng 淨修文偉
Ch'ing-te ch'uan-t'eng lu 景徳伝灯録
Ch'ing-yüan Hsing-ssu 青原行思
chiu hsiang 九想
chiu tz'u-ti ting 九次第定
chi-yüan wen-ta 機緣問答
Ch'üan-chou Ch'ien-fo hsin-chu chu tsu-shih sung i-chuan 泉州千仏新著諸祖師頌一首卷
ch'uan-fa 伝法
Ch'uan-hsin fa-yao 伝心法要
erh-shih-wu fang-pien 二十五方便
fa-hsing 法性
fang-pien 方便
Han Yü 韓愈
Hsü hsin yao lun 修心要論
Hsü k'ao-seng chuan 統高僧伝
Huai-jang 懷讓
hua-t'ou 話頭
Hui-k'o 慧可
Hui-neng 慧能
Hui-ssu 慧思
Hung-chou 洪州
Hung-jen 弘忍
k'an-hua 看話
kien mondo (see chi-yüan wen-ta)
kōan (see kung-an)
kuan 觀
kuan pu-k'o-ssu-i ching 觀不可思議境
Kuan-ting 潼頂
kung-an 公案
ku-wen 古文
li-hsüeh 理學
Lin-chi I-hsüan 臨濟義玄
Liu miao-fa men 六妙法門
Encounter Dialogue and Transformation in Ch'\an

Liu miao-men 六妙門
Ma-tsu Tao-i 马祖道一
ming 明
mo-chao 默照
Mo-ho chih-kuan 摩訶止觀
mu (see wu)
pa chieh-t'o 八解脫
Pai-chang 百丈
p'an-chiao 判教
pa nien 八念
Pao-lin chuan 宝林伝
pa pei-shé 八背捨
pa sheng-ch'ü 八勝處
pu-ting chih-kuan 不定止觀
san t'ung-ming 三通明
Seng-ch'ou 僧稠
shen-t'ung 神通
shih ching 十境
shih hsiau 十想
shih i-ch'ieh ch'ü 十一切处
shih-liu t'e-sheng fa 十六特勝法
shih-sheng kuan-fa 十乘観法
Shih-t'ou Hsi-ch'ien 石頭希遷
shih-tzu fen-hsun san-mei 狮子奮迅三昧
ssu-ch'\an 四禅
ssu wu-liang hsin 四無量心
ssu wu-se ting 四無色定
Sung kao-seng chuan 宋高僧伝
Ta chih-tu lun 大智度論
Ta-hui Tsung-kao 大慧宗杲
Tao-hsin 道信
Tao-hsüan 道宣
tao-hsüeh 道学
tao-t'ung 道統
T'ien-t'ai Chih-i 天台智顕
Tsan-ning 奮寧
Tso-ch'an san-mei ching 坐禅三昧經
Ts-u-t'ang chi 祖堂集
t'ung 通
Tz'u-ti ch'an-men 次第禪門
wen-ta 問答
Wen-t'eng (see Ching-hsiu Wen-t'eng)
wu 無
Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山
yin-ju-chieh ching 陰入界境
yüan 緣
yüan-tun chih-kuan 圓頓止觀
Yüan-wu K'o-ch'in 圓悟克勤
Yü-ch'üan ssu 玉泉寺
Zazen ron 坐禅論
Introduction: Mārga and History

The concept of "the path," and any soteriology consisting principally in designs of the path, would seem to be inherently and by definition systematic. All paths, in at least an elementary sense, have "steps," and where there are steps there must also be direction, sequence, coherence, continuity, priority, posteriority, and so on. Now Buddhism is, par excellence, a religion of "the path." It is surely not the only such, but it may well be the one among the world's major religions of which consistent and pervasive concern with "the path" can be said to be most characteristic. And more often than not Buddhism has treated its notions of the path—the topic of mārga—in a decidedly systematic manner. Thus, as several of the other chapters in this volume demonstrate, Buddhists have tended to focus on the necessary rather than the contingent properties of mārga, on its inner structure, on the complex relations among its many parts, on its intrinsic efficacies—in short, on its systematicity. It is therefore neither surprising nor inappropriate that most modern scholarship on the Buddhist concept of mārga should focus on these same features.

However, we must remember that the topic of mārga also has important historical dimensions. No matter what may be learned from careful study of the ideal and normative descriptions of the path to liberation that Buddhists have so variously and intricately constructed, and regardless of how profitable investigation of the inner logic of such descriptions may be, if we cannot also learn something of the actual implementation of the schemes so described—if we have no access to their manifestations in particular times and places or to their real employment in the lives of particular men and women in specific cul-
tures, and especially if we can know nothing of their relationships to other ranges and patterns of human action—then we may lose sight of the fact that mārga is not only a convenient frame for posing interesting theoretical problems but also, and most importantly, a prescription for life. There are questions, in other words, that we might too easily neglect if we were to ignore the issue of how mārga actually was, so as to be able more singlemindedly to consider the issue of how it should or must be.

Among such questions—more often implied than asked outright, and then in tones suggesting suspicion or incredulity—are these: Were the exquisitely complex and meticulously sequential regimens of spiritual practice that are so characteristic of Buddhism ever actually followed, and were they based on real experimentation, or were they only creations of an imagination working assiduously to deny, conceal, or tame the relentlessly refractory and finally unchartable territory of religious experience? And if they were ever actually employed, did they work? And if they did work (i.e., if they did really effect certain kinds of experiential change in those who followed them), were they simply self-fulfilling prophecies, predictable mechanisms which induced just those experiential consequences that their own inner structures and operations prefigured, or did they somehow engender genuinely unconditioned change of the kind Buddhism finally promises?

Of course, consideration of mārga in history does not guarantee answers to such basic questions. One must even acknowledge that at the purely theoretical level it cannot do so; it is the philosophical, not the historical, perspective that holds ultimate judgmental authority in such matters. Nevertheless, attention to the historicity of mārga—to mārga as parole rather than langue, as performance rather than competence—may lend urgency and specificity to such questions. Moreover, it is usually history, rather than the normative structures of prescriptive texts, that prompts the asking of such questions. This it does by sowing seeds of curiosity or suspicion. I have especially in mind certain of those frequent episodes in the history of Buddhism when practitioners themselves noted sharp disparities between the texts they read and the times in which they lived, between the apparent orderliness or implied predictability of the formal procedures of religious life they strove to follow and the all too common disorder, frustration, or doubt they actually experienced in the effort.

On such occasions, Buddhist history often reveals, the practitioner finds that one must deliberately relinquish any mārga that is understood as normative or prescriptive, must cease to depend on such presumptively efficacious instrumentation, and must surrender to the immediacy and unpredictability of contingent experience, or to the power of
“other,” perhaps transcendent factors beyond his or her deliberate control. To be sure, the theoretical literature on mārga itself tells us that disengagement from mārga as formal and artificial procedure is in the end a paradoxical requirement of mārga, but the point of that paradox is lost, or becomes innocuous, if one accepts it too quickly. To grasp the full measure of its consequence, we must move from the realm of assured efficacy, normative theory, and systematic praxis into the realm of contingency. Such a move takes us inevitably into history (the proper domain of the contingent), and it is there that we find the Buddhist tradition itself calling mārga into question in ways that are sure to sharpen our efforts to assess the theoretical claims made for mārga’s efficacy and relevance to real life.

What follows, then, is an exercise in the historical study of Buddhist mārga and Buddhism’s mārga-based soteriology—an approach distinct from the textual, systematic, or philosophical investigation of the same. By “history” we mean not only a diachronic tracing of the internal evolution of Buddhist ideas and practices but also (and chiefly) a sustained investigation of the synchronic, multivalent, and densely circumstantial connections between Buddhism and the other values and events that comprise the full life experiences of particular Buddhists. Focusing on a particular period in the history of Chinese Buddhism, we shall consider a particular constellation of controversies carried on among certain Buddhists who displayed rather high levels of historical consciousness and who were explicitly concerned more with the historical ramifications of the issues involved (i.e., their relevance to the immediate historical situation) than with their purely theoretical or systematic implications.

The central questions under discussion were two, and yet inseparable. First, which (if any) of the components of the larger Buddhist tradition are to be classified as mārga, in the sense of being deemed necessary and sufficient unto liberation, and which may be regarded as extraneous, dispensable, or even deleterious? Second, how (if at all) may mārga be integrated into the general structures of value and action that make up a society; or to what extent (if at all) may mārga be understood to encompass the larger patterns of private and public practice that comprise a whole culture? These questions, I believe, are telling. The importunate way in which they were posed and answered by particular persons in particular historical situations reveals something more about mārga than is disclosed in any prescriptive statement thereof—this despite, or perhaps because of, the way in which the untidy particularity and unruly contingency of history and biography always resist neat, balanced, and rigorously consistent exposition as absolutely as they resist final closure.
Ch’an Buddhism and the Question of the Value of Tradition: The Pertinacity of Marga

Perhaps there is no feature of Ch’an Buddhism better known, or more commonly regarded as definitive, than its claim to be “a special transmission outside of the theoretical teachings, which does not establish or depend upon words and letters” (chiao-wai pieh-ch’uan/pu-li wen-tzu). Not so well appreciated, however, are the many different interpretations to which this self-characterization has been subjected over the course of Ch’an history. Nor are we sufficiently aware of how frequently it has incited serious controversy within Ch’an as well as between Ch’an and other traditions, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist.

One implication of this customary self-definition, according to at least one strain of interpretation, bears directly on the general subject of this volume: namely, the notion that Ch’an simply rejects traditional Buddhist notions of marga. If Ch’an eschews all verbal and conceptual formulations of truth in favor of direct, unmediated experience, and if it thereby stands apart from the rich textual and doctrinal heritage of the rest of Buddhism, claiming not to need it, then the elaborate formulations of the path that fill the libraries of Buddhism—including both the diverse and intricate “technologies” of cultivation accumulated over centuries and the theoretical implications thereof codified in subtle systems of doctrine—are all to be denied or at least devalued. They are at best distractions or burdens, and at worst actual barriers or traps. This implies that Buddhism is really not a matter of path, direction, sequential progress, and so forth—really not, therefore, a matter of marga at all. It suggests that the true Buddhist soterion is simply not amenable to “soteriology.”

Clearly, this is an extreme interpretation of the character of Ch’an—a radical reading of its self-characterization. Nevertheless, it is one that has been taken literally and radically several times in the course of Ch’an history, and we should not render it insipid by hasty and ana­dyne judgments that its intention was merely rhetorical. On those occasions when it was, or was seen to be, literally promulgated, this interpretation usually prompted conservative reaction in the form of pleas for moderation and balance, praise for the abundance of spiritual resources preserved in the broader Buddhist heritage, and warnings that heedlessness of that heritage was both foolish and dangerous for practitioners of Ch’an. The danger lay, it was said, in failure to understand just how difficult it is to find—and, once one has found it, how difficult it is to face—the terrible “truth of things as they really are” without the canny guidance and wise support of tradition. The folly consisted in not realizing how very easy it is, without such guidance and support, to become disoriented and so to stumble into bogus forms of
spirituality like quietism or antinomianism. This conservative reaction led either to an outright rejection of the idea that Ch’an was singular and autonomous, or to the more moderate argument that Ch’an’s apparently subversive posture is actually an attack not on tradition itself but only on the ossification of tradition that comes from slavish dependence on it. In contrast, those practitioners of Ch’an who persisted in asserting its singularity and autonomy were wont to retort that the scriptural and doctrinal tradition of Buddhism, like its vast repertoire of profound symbols and subtle techniques, is more likely to prove an affliction than a guide or a support; that its very richness and diversity can stultify; and that it is too susceptible to abuse as a false surrogate for true self-discovery or as a refuge from the rigors of genuine and immediate religious experience.

When the proponents of a radical and anti-mārga Ch’an felt it necessary (oddly enough) to offer theoretical justification for their position, they usually had recourse to the deep resonance of the doctrine of emptiness that is audible in any form of Buddhism if one but listens for it. The original Buddhist discovery of the emptiness of all things was a kind of doctrinal “Big Bang,” the cognitive “radiation” from which has always been and still is coursing through the Buddhist universe like a low-frequency basal pulse. The more radical Ch’an Buddhists were therefore always able to cite the anomic implications of emptiness—the way emptiness dissolves the world of orderly progression and reveals it to be “like a mirage”—as a compelling reason to call the path into question. Thus they could hark back, for example, to Ch’an’s “Urtext,” the Er-ju ssu-hsing lun (Treatise on the Two Entrances and the Four Practices), and note that, according to that virtually scriptural authority, those who were capable of the superior “entrance of principle” (li-ju) thereby transcended all duality, even that of effort and goal or cause and effect, to realize that there is nothing to be attained, no difference between worldly and sage, no distinction between progress and non-progression, and thus no reason for an effortful path. Their more conservative opponents, in turn, could draw on the various “non-emptiness” (aśīnyatā) strains of Mahāyāna (e.g., the manifold Tathāgatagarbha tradition, or Hua-yen, or T’ien-t’ai) to justify their position that there is indeed an efficacious path that can be relied on to lead to the goal of liberating realization, and that this path is effectively salvific precisely because it is empowered by the prior presence of buddhahood even in the imperfect realm of effort and practice.

The argument, of course, was old even when Ch’an was young, and it would persist. Its persistence requires that we take it seriously. Although there were sincerity and goodwill to be found on each side, there was also, often enough, an absence of both. In any case, it does not suffice to say, as many have, that each side had a portion of the
truth, that each argued against a mere caricature of the other’s position, that one side spoke from an absolute perspective while the other adopted a relative point of view, or that in the end Ch’an surmounted the controversy by finding a sane and sensible middle way between the two extremes. The issues were too urgent and deep for such facile resolution, and the tension between conflicting views of those issues was never really relaxed, but kept reappearing in various guises and in ever-narrowing frames of dispute. Thus, even among Ch’an traditions that were more or less in agreement on the question of Ch’an’s “separateness” from the rest of Buddhism (scholastic doctrine, scripture, etc.), conflicts repeatedly erupted between two kinds of Ch’an. On the one hand, there were those who seemed to retain confidence in the margalike utility of particular devices—uniquely Ch’an devices like k’an-hua (inspecting the hua-t’ou [caption] or kung-an [precedent, J. kōan])—employed in a deliberately dynamic practice. Ch’an practitioners of this sort believed that such techniques helped precipitate a distinct and unconditioned liberating experience (wu, satori) essential to final liberation. On the other hand, there were those who criticized all reliance on external, makeshift devices. They believed that such contrivances necessarily implied duality, and insofar as they felt it essential to deny all dualistic distinctions—including those between soteriological means and soteriological end—they declared null any notion of a distinct liberating experience to which any formulae of practice could lead.

This latter tack led to the claim that liberation does not follow from, but simply consists in, a life of assiduous practice understood as its own end. But those who made this claim were accused by their opponents of having sunk into mere routine, doltish passivity, or sheer inertia of spirit. Further, even among advocates of k’an-hua Ch’an, and thus in still narrower polemical contexts, the same tension could reemerge in the form of distinctions between the proper use of kung-an as “living words” (huo-chū) and their abuse as “dead words” (ssu-chū), or between those whose kung-an practice was still at the reputedly elementary stage of “investigating the intention” (ts’an-i) of the hua-t’ou and those who had gone beyond such meditative conceptualizing to the purportedly metaconceptual “investigation of the word” (ts’an-chū) itself. Perhaps the best known of these intramural arguments among various radical and moderate versions of Ch’an are the many changes rung on the difference between subitism and gradualism, a distinction which could further ramify in such a way that, among subitists (and everyone considered himself a subitist), there could be those who spoke only of sudden enlightenment, followed or preceded by gradual practice, and those who spoke of practice itself as sudden.

Finally, this tension could appear in the most narrow and specific polemical contexts of all, that is to say, in the context of ambivalence or
vacillation in the life of a particular individual. Thus we have the famous story (perhaps only a legend) about Ta-hui, foremost advocate of k'un-hua Ch'an, who is said to have grown concerned late in life that the kung-an, created originally as dynamic alternatives to routinized marga schemes, were themselves succumbing to routinization and becoming mere literary distractions from true practice. This concern took the dramatic form of his burning the printing blocks of his revered teacher's famous kung-an collection. So it goes. The tension between Ch'an as an utterly singular (tan) spirituality quite divorced from conventional Buddhist notions of the path and Ch'an as a vehicle for that path's concentration, amplification, and perfection—between, as it were, the revolutionary and conservative, or the "Protestant" and "Catholic" impulses in Ch'an—was irressible. In whatever guise and at whichever level it operated, it continued to enliven the Ch'an tradition and propel it through history.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that today we know one side of this story, one vector of this tension, far better than we know the other. The romanticized vision of Ch'an as a renegade school of Buddhism—that is, its common depiction as a subversion of marga, as an abrogation of doctrine and theory, and as a renunciation of Buddhist learning—is quite familiar to us. But Ch'an as the conscientious husbander of a commodious Buddhist orthodoxy, as the reverent guardian of learned tradition, and as the generous sponsor of ever more expansive and accommodating designs of the path—this we find strange and tend to doubt. Yet this side of the story is available for the telling, particularly when we venture beyond later (often Japanese) reconstructions of earlier Ch'an history, and when we are willing to draw not only on the Buddhist historiographical tradition but also on secular literary, historical, and philosophical sources, thus placing Ch'an in its "Chinese" as well as its "Buddhist" contexts.

Throughout Ch'an history there have been periods in which committed Ch'an practitioners—some recoiling from real or perceived spasms of Ch'an antinomianism, others moved by impatience with the recurrent stagnation of Ch'an quietism, still others distressed by attacks on Ch'an from non-Buddhist quarters—have reasserted the claim that Ch'an, for all its singularity, is nonetheless Buddhist. Thus, it was said, Ch'an practitioners need not feel or cultivate any alienation from their Buddhist heritage but rather should fully avail themselves of it, for what is genuinely distinctive about Ch'an is not its simple rejection of traditional Buddhist text, doctrine, and path but its intensification, enhancement, and experiential fulfillment of the orthodoxy conveyed therein.

The Northern Sung was one such period. I would argue that the strains of Ch'an predominant during the eleventh and early twelfth centuries in one way or another rejected extreme or literalist interpretations
of the standard Ch’ an self-image as “a special transmission outside the theoretical teachings”; instead, they vigorously advocated the systematic integration of traditional or orthodox Buddhist doctrine and practice into a mature, self-confident Ch’ an. This advocacy included frequent and eloquent reiteration of the older calls to “unify Ch’ an and the teachings” (Ch’ an-chiao ho-i) or to “practice Ch’ an upon the foundation of the teachings” (chieh-chiao hsi-Ch’ an). But it did not simply repeat such recommendations; it also proceeded in new directions. It led, for example, to a renaissance of scriptural study in Ch’ an circles, a development not unrelated to the appearance of printed editions of the canon and to the general explosion of education and erudition throughout Sung culture. It coincided with a period of growth and vitality in Ch’ an’s institutional life, reflected in the many large, populous monasteries of Northern Sung China and in the apparent rigor of their conformity to traditional monastic codes. It also fostered a keen and prolific interest in the history of Buddhism. This last was most evident in the publication of numerous chronicles, hagiographical compendia, and so on, but it was also manifest in the careful attention paid to the hundreds of “old cases” (ku-tse—that is, the kung-an) drawn from the relatively new historical genre of “discourse records” (yü-lu) and made to comprise the even newer genre of kung-an anthologies. Perhaps most significantly, what I would call the conservative impulse in Ch’ an generated a deep concern with continuity of lineage, i.e., with a sense of master-disciple descent by which contemporary Ch’ an practitioners could assure themselves of access to, and continuing connection with, Buddhism’s nourishing past.

All this was done, I would suggest, in the unspoken name of just those values which we conventionally associate with mārga. It was done for the purpose of ensuring coherence, tenor, and efficacious order in the spiritual lives of individuals and communities. Moreover, although none of the traditional schemes of Buddhist mārga (like those developed on foundations of Abhidharma, Yogācāra, T’ien-t’ai, etc.) was preserved intact in Sung Ch’ an, new mārga strategies and techniques were created, most notably those based on kung-an meditation. These, as we will see, are no less forms of mārga for being unconventional, oblique, elusive, or less than obviously systematic. They may, in fact, be essentially the old versions of mārga in new, creatively “vernacular” modes of expression—novel forms that reflect not obliviousness of the old Ch’ an problematic of mārga, but only a tendency ceaselessly to renew it.

The conservative impulse in Ch’ an, which I hope to show was notably strong during the Northern Sung, thus deserves more attention than it has been given either traditionally or of late. But that attention ought not to be restricted to a rehearsal of all the old Buddhist formulas of
argument. The Sung expression of this little-known mode of Ch'an was as much a phenomenon of Sung cultural history as it was a reflex of themes internal to Buddhism. It occurred not only within the walls of Ch'an monasteries, nor only in the course of intimate conversations between Ch'an master and Ch'an student, nor only in the arcane pages of exclusively Buddhist literature. The Northern Sung was a period when Buddhism, true to the implications of Mahayana's distinctive acceptance of the secular world, and emboldened by its previous accomplishment of considerable feats of sinicization, could venture outside the monastery and take its public place in the larger world. The era's major monasteries were not forbidden cloisters but grand and open public institutions. The leading Ch'an figures of the day enjoyed eminence not only within clerical circles but also at court and among the secular elite generally. Both Buddhist images and Buddhist concepts and values abounded as never before in Sung art and literature. And much of the teaching of Buddhist monks was directed toward the laity rather than toward fellow monastics alone. As Ch'an monks during the Northern Sung pondered questions of Ch'an's continuity or discontinuity with the rest of Buddhism, and as they weighed the corollary questions of marga and soteriology, they did so not only under the influence of earlier Ch'an and Buddhist reflection on these topics but also with attention to the concerns of the wider secular culture of which they were now an integral part. This proved to be a very consequential broadening of perspective. It meant that controversial issues like those sketched above could no longer be adjudicated according to exclusively contemplative or clerical criteria. Because Ch'an had chosen to speak to laymen as well as to monks, it had to speak to the problems that concerned laymen—problems of education, aesthetics, literary theory, public morality, politics, civil service examinations, bureaucracy, economics, even foreign relations. Having entered so wide an arena, Ch'an monks had to attend to the traditions of discourse that were customary there. Confucianism, for example, could no longer be kept at arm's length as mere wai-hsueh (extrinsic, worldly learning); nor was it likely to be, as more Ch'an monks came to number among their closest friends and dearest students scholars and bureaucrats steeped in the revived and once again vigorous Confucian heritage. Thus we find Confucian terms and concepts occurring more and more frequently in Ch'an discourse and, by the same token, Ch'an discourse focused more often on traditional Confucian issues. In other words, the things that the literati took seriously Ch'an teachers also were required, and indeed inclined, to take seriously. Of course, this does not mean that Ch'an simply sloughed off its Buddhist identity and capitulated to secular culture; rather, it brought to its lively engagement with that culture the uncompromising and often crit-
ical values of Buddhism. In the frequent conversation or correspondence between eminent monks and eminent statesmen, for example, the role of the Ch’an interlocutor was usually to remind the layman of the transience of the world in which he lived and of the insubstantiality of the goals for which he strove. Drawing on the resources of Buddhist psychology, the monk might alert the layman to the subtle ways in which the latter’s passions and false discriminations could vitiate even his most well-intentioned efforts to fulfill his worldly responsibilities. In a more philosophical vein, he could draw attention to how even those things which might seem entirely objective and material are actually inextricable from one’s own mind. Most important, he often urged his lay associate to consider that there must be some purpose or meaning to life beyond anything the world itself could offer. There is ample literary evidence that the Ch’an masters’ teachings on such matters were effective and that many of the most prominent literati of the time were moved to serious reflection on Buddhist themes—not a few were, in one sense or another, actually converted to the Buddhist worldview.  

Nevertheless, the dialogue with the laity and with secular culture proceeded in both directions. Although Ch’an did not forfeit its character as a Buddhist tradition and continued to bring to bear on worldly matters the otherworldly or transcendental (ch’u-shih-chien, lokottara) perspective of Buddhism, the Ch’an teacher could no longer address questions of religious moment without at least tacitly considering their secular implications, their relevance to the experience of living men and women both in and out of the monastery, and their bearing on analogous issues raised in non-Buddhist intellectual and religious traditions. This inevitably affected (as, indeed, Buddhist principles of accommodation would allow it to affect) the answers Ch’an teachers could give to religious questions.

What I wish most to argue here is that questions of mārga and soteriology were prominent among the issues affected by Ch’an’s participation in secular culture, and that the overriding consequence was the stimulation or support that participation gave to the conservative impulse in Ch’an. Ch’an’s newfound worldly responsibilities and affinities served, I believe, to impede or abate its old centrifugal and radically anti-mārga tendencies. They strengthened, instead, its ties to its own larger heritage—to the codes of orderly religious and moral practice that made up the mārga portion of that heritage, and to a “broad church” vision of a Buddhism that was not restricted to small, elite groups of monastic illuminati but could accommodate persons of all capacities from all walks of life. They induced, one might say, a kind of Ch’an sobriety and moderation.

There is a term used in some traditions of Northern Sung Ch’an which I believe captures the character of this sober Ch’an conservatism
better than any other, even though it was a focus of controversy in its own day and acquired over the centuries largely negative connotations. That term is “Wen-tzu Ch’an.” Although this is often translated as “literary Ch’an,” and so conveys the derogatory sense in which it was used by critics, I prefer the implicitly more affirmative translation, “lettered Ch’an.” The latter is truer to the intention of those who employed, and perhaps coined, the term to distinguish their Ch’an, which encouraged the combination of spiritual discipline with literacy and learning, from the illiterate or anti-intellectual Ch’an that they despised as mere posturing.17 “Wen-tzu Ch’an,” therefore, was an inherently polemical term. Like the contemporary and similarly controversial phrase “Tao-hsüeh,” it was used by some to disparage, by others to praise and inspire.18

During the Sung, the phrase “Wen-tzu Ch’an” had at least two orders of reference. First, it was a purely Buddhist shibboleth. In the immediate context of Ch’an’s internal polemic, it stood in deliberate contrast to the older phrase “pu-li wen-tzu.” For those who advocated “lettered Ch’an” (and I repeat that it was they who coined the term), it announced rather boldly, almost as if issuing a challenge, the decision to annul or at least seriously to qualify the conventional divorce of Ch’an from scriptural and doctrinal Buddhism. For the opponents of “lettered Ch’an,” the same phrase had chiefly derogatory connotations and labeled an ersatz, merely “literary” Ch’an whose practitioners had allowed themselves to become entangled in the web of words.

But internal Buddhist polemic was not the only context in which the phrase “Wen-tzu Ch’an” had special significance. It also spoke to, and resonated with, certain dominant themes in the broader secular culture of the Northern Sung. In addition to its Buddhist associations, it had non-Buddhist implications that no Sung intellectual could have missed. Outside of Buddhism per se, but not at too great a distance therefrom, the Northern Sung witnessed a vigorous debate between two factions of the Confucian revival that was then in full spate. On the one hand, there were the advocates of “Tao-hsüeh” (study of the Way), those whom we in the modern West know best under the imperfect label, “Neo-Confucians.” The Ch’eng brothers (especially Ch’eng I), their teachers (men like Chang Tsai and Chou Tun-i), their disciples (men like Hsieh Liang-tso and Yang Shih), and an appreciable but still relatively small number of their contemporaries were convinced that the Tao could be truly apprehended only directly, immediately, and introspectively. Only by concentrating on the innately available Tao—that is, only by attending to the fixed and universal moral principles (li) that were believed naturally to inhere in one’s nature and mind as the very immanence of Tao—could one hope to achieve individual and communal realization of Heaven’s Way. The goal was not just to study the liter-
ary and other artifacts created long ago by "the sages" of the past, but to become a sage oneself, here and now.

It is not surprising that these men, though they were all eminently learned and accomplished authors, should have been deeply suspicious of cumulative learning, and especially of literary pursuits. They believed that such undertakings were too likely to trivialize the intellectual life, to deflect from experiential "study" of the Way and from the all-important concentration on ethical endeavor, and to lead to mere polymathy and literary refinement for their own sakes. They also felt that literary pursuits could too easily become obsessive or self-serving preoccupations that would sap and waste one's moral and intellectual strength. Such fears, they believed, had already been borne out—for example, by the past and present literary corruption of the civil-service examination system, the consequences of which affected the whole nation. To be sure, the proponents of Tao-hsiieh made no Ch'an-like disavowal of all learning, nor were they inclined, after their unhappy experience with radical reform, to overhaul the examination system. Rather, they resorted to a retrenchment of the legitimate field of learning, which they strove to restrict to the classics and a few approved commentaries thereon. The other and vaster territories of traditional learning, together with literary creativity as something valuable in itself, they declared illegitimate. 19

Ranged against the advocates of direct access to the Tao were the proponents of "Wen-hsiieh" (cultural or literary learning), a phrase quite different from "Tao-hsiieh" in connotation as well as denotation. These culturally more conservative literati were led by men like Su Shih and his disciples, who gloriied in the abundance of culture afforded them by the Sung renaissance and who believed that access to the Tao is possible only through the diverse and cumulative mediation of culture. For them it was "only" by way of poetry, prose, calligraphy, painting, music, antiquarianism—together with appreciation and cultivation of the mysterious capacity for personal creativity and aesthetic sensibility from which such things flow—that the Tao might be perceived and realized. What they required was sustained and reverent attention to the diverse particularity of history and literary tradition as preserved in books and other cultural media, along with nurture of that intuitive creativity by which one might participate in the further growth of culture. Direct apprehension of the universal principles of the Tao, without the mediation of culture, was seen as a chimera.

Significantly, Wen-hsiieh advocates of such a cultural and especially literary path to realization of the Tao held that theirs was a responsible and realistic "gradual" approach. Advocates of Tao-hsiieh, they averred, were both irresponsible and mistaken in proposing a "sudden" or immediate apprehension of Tao. It is ironic that Su-shih, despite his
generally favorable attitude toward Buddhism, could seize upon this alleged subitism of the harshly anti-Buddhist Tao-hsüeh partisans and use it as a cudgel against them, claiming that the "new learning" of Tao-hsüeh was to be avoided because, in its distrust and dismissal of culture and claim of direct access to the Tao, it was too much like Buddhism and Taoism!\(^20\)

We are, of course, tempted by the question of whether the Ch'an problematic of Wen-tzu Ch'an versus Ch'an as pu-li wen-tzu engendered or was engendered by the Confucian problematic of Wen-hsiieh versus Tao-hsüeh. Especially tempting is the prospect of arguing that the former was the case. However, as neither hypothesis is amenable to proof or disproof, we will simply note the indisputable fact that the two controversies influenced each other. They were carried out at the same time and obviously within earshot of each other, and there is a rhetorical similarity between them—an overlap of usage, rationale, and polemical strategy—that cannot be discounted as mere coincidence.\(^21\) Thus, for every warning from a Ch'eng I that "literary endeavors" (ts'o-wen) can "harm the Tao" (hai-tao) if they consist only in "working away at chapter and verse (chilan-wu chang-chii) to delight the eyes and ears of others,"\(^22\) one can cite an analogous warning from a Ch'an monk. Ta-hui, for example, said:

Mental cultivation [lit., "mind craft"] is the root (hsin-shu shih pen), whereas literary composition and learning are the branches (wen-chang hsüeh-wn shih mo); yet contemporary scholars often discard the root to pursue the branch as they "search out passages and pick phrases," vying with each other in the study of flowery words and clever remarks.\(^23\)

Just as Ta-hui often warned his lay students against wasting their minds in secular literary pursuits, so he frequently warned his fellow monks that they must "escape the dark caverns of vehicles and doctrines," cease "groping about in the vacuousness" of texts, and understand that words and letters are at best "like fingers pointing at the moon."\(^24\)

Apropos of Ch'an in particular, Ta-hui was quick to condemn the specious profundity of a certain kind of pretentiously discursive Ch'an, which he was distressed to believe was common in his day and in which he found true Ch'an practice replaced by mere rote intonation of deep-sounding Buddhist catchphrases. This he attacked as "mystagoguery" (t'an-hsiian shuo-miao).\(^25\) But all this is relatively well known; what of the other side of each of these mutually analogous arguments?

It appears that the Ch'an monasteries of the Northern Sung, as well as the era's Confucian academies, harbored both "foxes" and "hedgehogs."\(^26\) The "foxes" knew, and believed it necessary to know, "many things." They were concerned to exploit all the resources bequeathed to them by their respective traditions, despite their variety, and were
loathe to reduce those traditions to single, unitary principles. The “hedgehogs,” in contrast, knew, and felt it necessary to know, only “one great thing.” Accordingly, they were little interested in, and often quite contemptuous of, anything other than that “one thing” which they held to be the key to all. It has been the “hedgehogs” of both traditions who have gotten the lion’s share of attention throughout later history. Thus we know much more today about the singleminded monism of Tao-hsiieh than we know about the ample pluralism of Wen-hsiueh, and more about the exclusivist, univocal Ch’an that rejects “words and phrases” than about the polyphonic, accommodating tradition known as “lettered Ch’an.” This has had the general effect of constricting our vision of Sung intellectual and religious history, and the particular effect of skewing our understanding of the relationship between Ch’an and mārga.

A Picture of Ambivalence: Fa-hsiu and the Place of Ch’an in the Religious and Secular Culture of Northern Sung China

Reproduced in Figure 1 is a hanging scroll dubiously attributed to the great Yuan dynasty painter Chao Meng-fu (1254–1322) and entitled Hsi-yüan ya-chi t’u (Elegant Gathering in the Western Garden). This is said to be Chao’s pastiche—one of many done over the course of centuries by a variety of painters, both famous and anonymous—of an earlier work by the same title. The original, which seems not to have survived, was credited to the greatest of Northern Sung figure painters, Li Kung-lin (1049–1106), and was believed to have been done, as were most later renditions of the scene, in Li’s characteristic “literati” (wen-jen) manner, a deliberately archaic and rather austere monochrome outline style known as pai-miao (lit., “plain sketch”). Scholars today doubt that Li Kung-lin painted the original version of this scene. Rather, they postulate an anonymous painter of the early Southern Sung as its inaugural creator, and assume that either that painter or his literary contemporaries found it useful to attribute the work to the great Northern Sung master, perhaps as an act of homage.

Whatever its prototype may actually have been, the purported Chao Meng-fu “copy,” like the many later renditions of the same classic scene, has long been held to depict a gathering of sixteen eminent men of letters, artists, and statesmen of the Northern Sung. Their garden party is believed to have occurred in 1087, in Kaifeng, on the grounds of the estate of Prince Wang Shen (b. 1036, d. after 1089). Wang was a well-known painter in his own right, as well as a poet and patron related by marriage to the imperial family; he was son-in-law to Ying-tsung (r. 1063–1067), and thus also brother-in-law to Shen-tsung (r. 1067–1085)
and an uncle of sorts to the young Che-tsung (r. 1085–1100). According to a famous description of the scene questionably attributed to the artist and critic Mi Fu (1051–1107), the guests were as follows: Shown in the lower foreground, seated at a table and absorbed in poetic composition and/or calligraphy, is the most distinguished member of the group, Su Shih (1037–1101). At the same table are his host, Wang Shen, and two of his students, Ts’ai Chao and Li Chih-i. In the middle ground is Li Kung-lin himself, shown in the act of painting his famous illustration of T’ao Yüan-ming’s Kuei-ch’ü-lai tzu (Homecoming). Among those clustered about Li, watching him, are Su Shih’s brother Su Ch’è (1039–1112) and the poet Huang T’ing-chien. Above and behind them are two other groups. To the left is Mi Fu himself, the alleged author of the description we are now using, in the act of inscribing one of his beloved fantastic rocks, while the academician and official Wang Ch’in-ch’en and an unnamed companion look on. To the right is the Taoist calligrapher Ch’en Ching-yüan, portrayed playing a p’i-p’a while a student of Su Shih named Ch’in Kuan (1049–1100) listens. Also present are a friend of Su Shih named Cheng Ching-lao and two other Su followers, Ch’ao Pu-chih (1053–1110) and Chang Lei (1054–1114), all in the group around Li Kung-lin. Elsewhere are two groupings of what may be ancient bronze vessels. These are unattended at the moment of the painting but had perhaps been assembled for the antiquarian delectation of Wang Shen’s guests, most of whom, like many literati of the day, were probably collectors and connoisseurs of antiques.

These distinguished personages and their manifold activities are all fascinating, but for our purposes it is most important to note another, relatively unobtrusive element in the painting. At some remove from the rest of the party—in the uppermost sector, and in the shaded seclusion of a thick bamboo grove separated from the main garden by a stream—sits an aged Buddhist monk reading a text with an attentive lay student. The description of the painting ascribed to Mi Fu identifies the layman as a minor poet and painter of the period named Liu Ching (1047–1100). It also says that the subject of the teaching he is receiving from the old monk is “the theory of (or the essay on) nonarising” (wu-sheng lun), i.e., the teaching of emptiness. It is the monk himself to whom I want to draw special attention. He is identified as the Ch’an master Fa-hsiu (1027–1090), an eminent cleric nearing the end of his days and perhaps better known to the Chinese tradition by the honorific Yüan-t’ung Ch’an-shih, a title bestowed upon him in 1084 by an admiring Emperor Shen-tsung.

Much of the interest that this painting has elicited from later Chinese commentators focuses on the traditional identification of the famous literati represented in it. It was thought to provide a rare and precious
glimpse into the daily lives of some of the most famous figures of a famous age. However, the same interest has not extended to the one Buddhist monk included in the scene. To my knowledge, no traditional or modern scholar who has dealt with the painting has pursued the question of just who the Reverend Fa-hsiu was, why a Buddhist monk was included in the scene, or why this monk rather than another was deemed worthy company for the literary and artistic luminaries who fill the rest of the painting. It is not as though Buddhism was a negligible ingredient in Northern Sung culture, nor was Fa-hsiu a particularly inaccessible or obscure figure. Buddhism was never far from the center of the Northern Sung literary scene, and we know quite a bit about this particular cleric and the specific variety of Ch’an Buddhism he represented. We know, for example, that Fa-hsiu was well regarded in the highest secular and monastic circles both for his religious accomplishments as a Ch’an master and for his broad learning, cultivated tastes, and lambent wit. These facets of his fame are themselves of general significance, reminding us that Ch’an during the Northern Sung was hardly the rude, renegade, and anti-intellectual tradition of both earlier and recent Ch’an lore.

In more specific terms, we know that Fa-hsiu was a Ch’an monk in the sixth generation of the Yün-men lineage, a paramount house of Ch’an during the early Sung that was especially well known for its literary and ecumenical accomplishments.49 His immediate predecessor in that line, the even better known T’ien-i I-huai (993–1064),50 had been the student and chief successor of Hsiieh-tou Ch’ung-hsien (980–1052), who is—and was throughout the Sung—famous as the author of an influential early kung-an and poetry collection, the Hsíeh-tou po-tse sung-ku. This later became the core of the most famous of all kung-an anthologies, the Pi-yen lu (The Record of the Blue Grotto or, as it is most commonly known in the West, “The Blue Cliff Record”), compiled by the Lin-chi Ch’an monk Yüan-wu K’o-ch’in (1063–1135). Moreover, there is abundant independent evidence that Fa-hsiu was as famous outside the Samgha as he was within it. It can be demonstrated that he was well known—as teacher, friend, and colleague—to many of the other famous secular figures represented in the Western Garden painting. Thus the unobtrusive old monk, half hidden in a far corner of Wang Shen’s garden, was not simply a stock type but a particular historical person as consequential in his own right as nearly all his companions in the painting were in theirs. He was an eminent cleric in what was then an especially influential lineage of Ch’an Buddhism, while at the same time he enjoyed the patronage and admiration of the leading figures in the secular culture of his day. The fact that he lived among both fellow monks and literati, together with the equally well-established fact of his emi-
nence in both milieux, warrants our particular attention to whatever biographical and other information about him the tradition has preserved.

Born into the Hsin family of Lung-ch’eng, Ch’in-chou (mod. T’ien-shui, Kansu), Fa-hsiu is said to have been conceived after his mother awoke from a dream in which she was visited by a wizened, bald old bonze who told her that he was from Mai-chi shan (Corn-rick Mountain). The story has it that just prior to this auspicious dream an elderly monk, whose name had been forgotten but whose practice was said to be the daily chanting of the Lotus Sūtra, sought permission to take up residence, as a visiting itinerant monk, at the Ying-chien ssu, Mai-chi shan’s chief monastery. The abbot of the place, a certain Master Lu, dismissed the old vagabond somewhat rudely, and as the monk left he said, “Someday soon I will place my bamboo pallet before these slopes, beneath the iron-bound range” (i.e., beneath this “Mt. Sumeru”). Later, Master Lu heard reports of the unusually premature birth of a baby boy nearby, and when he went to see him the infant (presumably the “old monk” redivivus) greeted the abbot with a smile. At the tender age of two the boy indicated a strong desire to follow Master Lu, who then adopted him into the monastery, thus fulfilling the old monk’s prophecy.

Taking full ordination at age eighteen and finding himself possessed of exceptional natural abilities as well as an impressively stern and stately demeanor (Hui-hung describes it, appropriately enough, as the august bearing of a figure in a painting), Fa-hsiu first set his extraordinary talents on the course of Buddhist learning and exegetics. His acuity in analyzing scriptures and treatises—including works of Buddhist logic (yin-ming), Yogācāra (Wei-shih) texts, the Diamond (Chin-kang) Sūtra, the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment (Yüan-chüeh), and the Flower Garland (Hua-yen) Sūtra—soon earned him a reputation for erudition said to have reached as far as the capital. Nevertheless, it seems that the young prodigy was troubled early on by a problem that affected many Buddhists of those and other days: the problem of an alleged incompatibility between doctrinal or theoretical Buddhism—the so-called teachings (chiao)—and the practical or experiential Buddhism of Ch’an. We are told, for example, that at first Fa-hsiu was especially indebted to Tsung-mi’s commentaries, particularly those on the Hua-yen and Yüan-chüeh scriptures, but that he grew dissatisfied with Tsung-mi’s “studied Ch’an” (hsüeh-ch’an). Also, although he had once had special respect for a certain Yüan Hua-yen (actually Lao Hua-yen, a.k.a. Huai-tung) of Pei-ching, he is said to have grown disappointed in “Old Hua-yen’s” criticism of exegetics (fei-chiang). His eventual judgment of both of these esteemed teachers of a former age was expressed as follows:
If it be the case that doctrine (chiao) exhausts the Buddha’s intent, then it is not fitting to criticize the doctrinal teachings as Master Yüan [i.e., Huaitung] does. And if it be true that Ch’an contradicts the teachings, then one ought not to “study” Ch’an in the manner of Tsung-mi. But I do not believe that in what was transmitted to Mahākāśyapa there was anything apart from the Buddha’s teachings.

In one version of his biography it is reported that Fa-hsiu arrived at the same conclusion by noting an essential equivalence between Sudhana’s pilgrimage, as a symbol of the path conceived in theoretical (Hua-yen) terms, and the travels from the West and the South, respectively, of Bodhidharma and Hui-neng, the latter two taken as symbolic of the path as it was charted in Ch’an. Why then, he asked himself, should he confine himself only to “the schools of nature and of characteristics”?

In reaching this conclusion Fa-hsiu demonstrated a remarkable independence of mind. The conventional, doctrinaire options available in his day were basically two: either to emphasize the difference between Ch’an and doctrinal Buddhism, and then to choose one to the virtual exclusion of the other, or to espouse a reasonable and balanced, but perhaps also jejune, synthesis of both. Fa-hsiu, however, solved the problem of the relationship between experiential and theoretical Buddhism by determining that the very distinction between the two is invalid—that is, by insisting that what is written in the scriptures and treatises is just what is transmitted by the patriarchs, and vice versa. This judgment appears to have been a kind of personal spiritual breakthrough. It allowed Fa-hsiu, the biographies tell us, to give up “lecturing” or the career of a professional specialist in exegetics, without thereby abandoning the valued heritage of doctrine and scripture.

To mark this turning point in his spiritual and intellectual development, Fa-hsiu decided to set off on a kind of “Ch’an pilgrimage,” in his case an extended journey to the South, during which he would test his newfound understanding. He is said to have announced to fellow students, with a bravado born of strong and confident commitment, and in the vigorous rhetoric typical of Ch’an, that he intended to “explore all the ‘caves and caverns’ [i.e., all the Ch’an monasteries or practice centers], to drag out the various sorts [of teachers residing therein], and to repay the Buddha’s mercy by absolutely annihilating them.” One of the Ch’an sites he visited early in his travels was the Hu-kuo Monastery in Sui-chou (mod. Sui-hsien, Hupei), where he came upon a stele that had been erected in memory of the late T’ang or Five Dynasties Ts’a-o-tung Ch’an master, Ching-kuo. Inscribed thereon was the following pair of recorded exchanges: “A monk once asked Pao-tz’u about buddha-nature. Tz’u replied, ‘Who lacks it?’ Later, when another monk put this same question to Ching-kuo, he answered, ‘Who has it?’ and the questioning monk was thereby enlightened.” Fa-hsiu was much amused.
by this and said, as he tried to catch his breath from laughing, "How could one dare to say that the buddha-nature is something one could 'have' or 'lack,' much less suggest that one could be enlightened by such statements!"

Eventually he arrived at the T’ieh-Fo Monastery in Wu-wei chün (mod. Wu-wei hsien, Anhui), where he presented himself to the renowned Ch’an master I-huai.58 He is said to have found I-huai seated in formal posture and displaying a forbidding demeanor, but with tears streaming down his face and soaking his robes. Fa-hsiu, however, simply ignored this strange spectacle. I-huai then restrained his tears and asked, "What scripture is it, Reverend Sir, which you expound?" When Fa-hsiu replied that he specialized in the Hua-yen ching, I-huai asked him what the essential purport (tsung) of that text was. Fa-hsiu said that its cardinal meaning was mind (hsin). I-huai then asked if there were an essential purport to the doctrine of mind. To this Fa-hsiu could give no reply, and so I-huai said, "In even the smallest discrepancy yawns the distance separating (hsıan-ke) heaven from earth. Look to yourself and you will surely understand."

Thus did I-huai manage to transform a Hua-yen metaphysical abstraction—the doctrine of the mind as the ground on which the vast and the minute encompass each other—into an urgent Ch’an reminder of the necessity of close attention to the immediacies of one’s own experience. At this, Fa-hsiu was taken aback and lost his composure. He trembled and made obeisance to I-huai, vowing to spend night and day learning the dharma from him. Fa-hsiu remained with I-huai for several years before achieving his own enlightenment. This is said to have occurred when the master posed to his students the "old case" in which Po-ch’ao asked Pao-tz’u, 59 "What is the time before the emotions arise?" and Pao-tz’u replied, "Separation" (ke).60 I-huai then confirmed Fa-hsiu’s attainment by announcing, "You are truly a vessel of the dharma; in the future my message will proceed with you."

Following his time with I-huai, Fa-hsiu spent approximately ten years wandering from temple to temple in the Anhui region. We are told that he led a very austere life during this period, and was impervious to the cold and hunger that were the lot of an itinerant monk. What did trouble him, however, and grievously so, were the sorry spiritual conditions in which he found the monasteries he visited, conditions in which "the Way of the patriarchs was not flourishing," and for which he harbored a strong sense of personal responsibility. From Anhui he went further south to Kiangsi and settled on Mt. Lu, residing for nearly twenty years at that mountain’s Hsi-hsien Temple.61 There his reputation as a strict and enlightened teacher grew steadily. It was on Mt. Lu that he met another teacher, Yun-chu Hsiao-shun (d. between 1064 and 1067), who served for a time as abbot of Hsi-hsien ssu. Hsiao-shun, like
Fa-hsiu's teacher I-huai, was a fifth-generation Yün-men master, but his particular line of descent was different from I-huai's. Fa-hsiu is said to have had several bouts of dharma combat with Hsiao-shun, provoked by the latter's criticism of I-huai's (and presumably also of Fa-hsiu's) particular style of Ch'an. These encounters, in which Fa-hsiu did quite well, no doubt strengthened his reputation.

By the 1070's he must have been very well known indeed, for it was toward the end of that decade that Wang An-shih (1021-1086), then recently retired from his position as prime minister and newly appointed as lord of Shu (Shu Wang), invited Fa-hsiu to Kiangsu and offered him the abbacy of the Chiang-shan ssu (a.k.a. Chung-shan ssu), a position vacated by the recent death of a certain Master Yüan. Fa-hsiu either did not accept that position or, did not retain it long, but he did remain in the Kiangsu region for several years, residing for a time at the nearby Ch'ung-fu Ch' an-yüan, a major Ch'an center of the day located in Ch'ang-lu (mod. Liu-ho). It was there that he acquired the nickname "Iron-Face Hsiu," which was meant, it seems, to suggest both the oft-noted severity of his personality and demeanor and the famed rigor of the style of Ch'an life which he exemplified and taught.

It seems to have been during his years on Mt. Lu and in the Kiangsu region that Fa-hsiu's high repute among his fellow Ch'an monks was secured. He may at that time have come to the attention of the famous senior Yün-men monk Ch'i-sung (1007-1072). Later, as the Ta-hui P'u-chüeh Ch'an-shih tsung-men wu-k'u (Ta-hui's Arsenal of the Ch'an School) records, the redoubtable Ta-hui would recount several anecdotes drawn from this middle period in Fa-hsiu's life, all stories that established Fa-hsiu as a true exemplar of Ch'an and thus testified to the lasting strength of his reputation among Ch'an monks of all lineages.

The crowning phase of Fa-hsiu's public career began in 1084, when he was invited by Emperor Shen-tsung to come to the capital of Kaifeng and assume the office of inaugural (k'ai-shan) abbot of the newly established Fa-yün Monastery. High-ranking court officers were deputed to witness the investiture, and they came bearing gifts of incense and robes. Although the emperor himself did not attend the ceremony, his symbolic presence was indicated by a rescript in his own hand which he had delivered by the Imperial Uncle Wang Shen, the very prince who hosted Li Kung-lin's "elegant gathering." The rescript Wang brought was probably the document that conferred upon Fa-hsiu the honorary title "Yüan-t'ung" (Perfectly Penetrating). Su Shih, though not present at the event, did refer to it two years later in the preface to an inscription he composed to mark the 1086 installation of the Fa-yün Monastery's great bell.

Recipient of these highest of honors, Fa-hsiu quickly became a cynosure. As the biographies say, "literati (shih-ta-fu) visited him day and
night with questions about the Tao," and he even preached at court. He is said to have met Ssu-ma Kuang (1019-1086), whose lack of appreciation for Buddhism he lamented, and as already noted, he also came to know and be admired by Su Shih. Su had apparently learned of Fa-hsiu earlier, either while he was still in exile in Huang-chou or as he was making his way from there to the capital. The two men seem to have corresponded with each other during the early 1080's, perhaps even before Fa-hsiu reached Kaifeng, and four short letters from the great poet to the venerable monk survive today. No doubt the two men came to know each other even better after Su Shih returned to Kaifeng in 1086. Sometime after the monk's death in 1091, Su Shih made it known that he believed Fa-hsiu to have been, along with his dharma brother Hui-lin Tsung-pen (1020-1099), one of two persons most responsible for the great efflorescence of Ch'uan in the Sung capital.

We have already seen that Fa-hsiu also knew Li Kung-lin and Huang T'ing-chien. In fact, he was apparently on quite familiar terms with both, as is indicated by several oft-repeated anecdotes. For example, he is said once to have teasingly reproved the great painter by telling him that his paintings of horses were so realistic as to engender concern that Li might be reborn as a horse (lit., "enter a horse's belly"). Fa-hsiu's remark seems to have been made in a half-humorous vein, yet the story goes that Li took the caution seriously and put aside his brush until Fa-hsiu encouraged him to take it up again, this time to paint images of Buddhist figures like Kuan-yin, Vimalakirti, the arhats, and so on. Likewise, Fa-hsiu is said to have chided Huang T'ing-chien about the sensual or voluptuous diction (yen-yü) of the latter's poetry, which he noted was so popular that men vied with one another to transmit and emulate it. When Huang laughed and asked if this would put him, too, "in the belly of a horse," Fa-hsiu responded that karmic retribution for using seductive words to excite the concupiscent minds of people throughout the world would not stop at mere equine rebirth. Huang, he said, should rather fear rebirth in hell itself.

Fa-hsiu may have had a reputation for severity, but he seems also to have had an excellent sense of humor. Such bantering strictures against art and literature were no doubt made with tongue at least partly in cheek, although with an undertone of caution and serious reserve as well. In any case, that the impression Fa-hsiu made on Huang was serious and lasting is proved by several reverential references to him in Huang's surviving writings. Among these is an encomium (tsan) in which the poet confesses his grateful admiration of the eminent monk's renowned severity, taking it to be a manifestation of compassion especially well suited to the spiritually decadent times in which he believed they lived.

As to Fa-hsiu's monastic following, the records indicate that he had
One of the most famous was Fo-kuo Wei-po (d.u.), who succeeded him as a prominent resident and, later, abbot of the Fa-yün ssu. Wei-po is best known as the author of the third of the great "transmission of the lamp" compendia, the Chien-chung Ching-kuo hsü-teng-lu, a text published in the summer of 1101 and accorded the signal honors of a preface composed by Emperor Huitsung (r. 1100–1125) and immediate inclusion in the canon. This thirty-fascicle Ch'an history is itself enough to establish Wei-po's credentials as a monk for whom Ch' an piety and scholarship were not incompatible. That he went so far as to hold that scriptural and doctrinal study were necessary complements to Ch'an was confirmed in 1104, when he published another scholarly work, a systematic catalogue of the Sung Buddhist canon entitled Ta-tsong-ching kang-mu chih-yao lu. In the concluding section of this work, Wei-po pleaded for rapprochement between doctrinal Buddhism and Ch'an, asserting that practice of Ch'an without study of scripture and reflection on doctrine would result in a constricted and dangerously one-sided caricature of true Buddhism.

It is significant that Wei-po presented the complementary relationship between Ch'an and the four major doctrinal or scripturally based schools by means of an analogy drawn from the world of art, viz., the modeling of a figure of the Buddha in clay. In the terms of this metaphor, Yogacāra Buddhism (Tzu-en chiao) is like the under-layer of clay applied to the skeletal framework of the Buddha figure to form its musculature; the Vinaya school (Nan-shan chiao) is like the external layer of fine plaster with which the clay of the statue is covered; T’ien-t’ai is like the set of five vital organs placed within the body of the statue; Huayen (Hsien-shou chiao) is like the gloss of golden color applied to the plaster surface of the figure; and Ch'an (Ch’an-men tsung) is like the brilliant light emanating from the jewel-pupils of the figure's eyes. To be sure, this elaborate p’an-chiao (doctrinal classification) trope grants pride of place to Ch’an, implying that is a kind of quintessence of Buddhism. However, the point Wei-po says he is most concerned to make is that, just as a statue of the Buddha cannot be complete without all five of these stages in its fabrication, so Buddhism remains incomplete unless all five of its major component schools are given their due.

The principle of harmony between Ch’an and learned Buddhism, and the disposition to demonstrate that principle by means of artistic expression, is further exemplified in the only other of Wei-po’s works to have survived, the Wen-shu chih-nan t'u-tsan (Illustrated Encomia [Recounting Sudhana’s Journey to] the South as Directed by Mañjuśrī), a set of illustrated verses summarizing the final chapter of the Hua-yen Sūtra. This text, illustrations to the better editions of which are vaguely reminiscent of the style of Li Kung-lin’s paintings, is a prime instance
of the sort of combination of Ch’àn, doctrinal Buddhism (Hua-yan), poetry, and pictorial art that Fa-hsiu’s example could foster. There was also a significant connection between Fa-hsiu and the well-known Ch’ang-lu Tsung-tse (d.u.), a Ch’àn scholar-monk and one of the Sung era’s leading advocates of the union of Ch’àn and Pure Land. Although this monk went on to study with Fa-hsiu’s dharma brother Ch’ang-lu Ying-fu (d.u.), in whose lineage he is usually placed, it was Fa-hsiu who ordained him and served as his first teacher. Tsung-tse is especially famous in Ch’àn history for having compiled in 1103 the earliest surviving Ch’àn monastic code, the ten-fascicle Ch’àn-yüan ch’ing-kuei (Pure Regulations for Ch’àn Precincts). This work of normative ecclesiological scholarship—together with the breadth of a Buddhism that could combine Pure Land, Ch’àn, and even a strong advocacy of filial piety—exemplifies an attitude toward Buddhist traditions harmonious with, and perhaps shaped by, the catholicity of Fa-hsiu’s own piety.

The Ch’àn-yüan ch’ing-kuei, at least in certain of its later editions, includes an early—perhaps the earliest surviving—manual of Ch’àn meditation practice, a work that may well have been written by Tsung-tse himself. This brief handbook, the Tso-ch’àn i (Liturgy of Seated Meditation), presents a fairly orthodox, even conservative picture of Ch’àn meditation. The summary of Ch’àn practice found therein is no radical departure from standard forms of Mahāyāna contemplative discipline, no transcendence of deliberate and meticulous effort, but a straightforward and sober digest of some of the most basic themes of traditional Chinese Mahāyāna meditation. Redolent even of other mainstream contemplative regimens like those of T’ien-t’ai and early “East Mountain” Ch’àn, it resonates with the marga-affirming implications of classical tathāgatagarbha doctrine. For certain later Ch’àn or Zen figures, such as Dōgen (especially in his later years), this text represented a merely conventional Buddhism, a gradualist and instrumentalist understanding of meditation that was oblivious of the “understanding beyond words” that marks the true Zen of “sudden practice.” But Dōgen’s denigration of Tsung-tse’s view of meditation may itself be seen as a variously motivated reversion to just that kind of radical, antimārga, and potentially antinomian Ch’àn which Tsung-tse, Fa-hsiu, and so many other Northern Sung Ch’àn monks were seeking to restrain and reform.

Knowing, as we now do, at least the general lineaments of Fa-hsiu’s life and teachings, let us return to the Hsi-yüan ya-chi t’u and resume our use of it as a visual allegory. What does the painting, taken together with the story of its eminent monk, suggest about the relationship between Ch’àn Buddhism and the life of learning and letters during the Sung? Modern scholarly opinion, most thoroughly argued by art histo-
rian Ellen Johnston Laing, holds that the “Western Garden Gathering” is a fictitious event, that the original version of the painting was not painted by Li Kung-lin, and that the scene was probably first rendered (admittedly in Li’s style) by an unknown artist of the early Southern Sung. Laing argues convincingly that the painting may well have been first conceived and executed in the early Southern Sung, as an exercise in nostalgic admiration for the “men of the Yüan-yu period (1086–1093)” — namely, for the party of conservative literati who dominated Chinese culture and politics in the era following Wang An-shih’s experiments in reform. During the decades that immediately followed Yüan-yu, these men were condemned by the then-resurgent reform party, but their reputations were redeemed and they became heroes shortly after the 1126 fall of the North, which was then blamed on Wang’s epigones, their enemies.

Although the painting may be only an imaginative and elegiac recreation du temps perdu, it is happily suggestive of certain aspects of Sung Ch’ an that bear directly on our underlying theme. Note first that Fa-hsiu’s presence is somewhat remote and aloof, even though he is a significant part of the composition, holding his own in the idyllic scene along with a distinguished and select company of far more famous cultural luminaries. One might even go so far as to say that, at least in the version of the scene attributed to Chao Meng-fu (Figure 1), Fa-hsiu does more than hold his own: he may actually be the culmination of the overall visual narrative of the painting. The eye of the viewer seems to be drawn first to the Su Shih cluster in the lower left part of the painting. From there it is led, along an ascending “S” curve, to the decreasingly congested Li Kung-lin and Mi Fu clusters, finally coming to rest on the tranquil pair of monk and attentive lay student. Apropos of this arrangement, one may again follow Ellen Johnston Laing who, in her article on this painting, quotes part of a colophon by the poet Tseng Chi (1084–1166), found on an unpublished and unnamed handscroll version of the scene: “At the end of the scroll an old Ch’an master and a scholar sit in silence opposite each other on rush mats amidst a bamboo grove, a stream, and rocks. Can this be without significance (ch’i wu i yeh)?”

Significance there must surely be, and it may lie precisely in the fact that Fa-hsiu’s location in the scene places him in contrapuntal relationship to all the painting’s other figures. It is as though we are meant to take special note of his difference from (particularly his apparent indifference to) the fascinating activities that preoccupy Wang Shen’s other eminent guests. There is a visible and marked contrast between the contemplative stillness embodied in the figure of the monk and the more active scenes of literary and artistic creativity that seem to lead the viewer’s eye toward him. Is it too much to suggest an analogy to the larger
FIGURE 1. *Hsi-yüan ya-chi t'ü* attributed to Chao Meng-fu; original in the collection of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (Catalogue no. YV.117)
Figure 2. Detail from an anonymous *Hsi-yiian ya-chi t'u*, now in the Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (Catalogue no. 11.523), entitled "Personages in a garden," sixteenth century. (Courtesy of the Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.)
FIGURE 3. Detail from an anonymous, purportedly Sung version of the Hsi-yüan ya-chi t’u; original in the collection of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (Catalogue no. SH.133.m)
Figure 4. Detail from *Hsi-yüan ya-ch'i t'u* attributed to Liu Sung-nien (ca. 1150–after 1225); original in the collection of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (Catalogue no. SH.109.e)
An anonymous, purportedly Ming version of the 《Hsi-yüan ya-chi-t'ü》 original in the collection of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (Catalogue no. MV.670)
FIGURE 6. *Hsi-yüan ya-ch'ı t'u* attributed to Ch'iu Ying (1495–1552); original in the collection of the National Palace Museum, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China (Catalogue no. MV.441)
contrast between the contemplative spirituality of Buddhism and the profuse animation of secular literati culture? Could it not be that the placement of Fa-hsiu in the painting is actually the projection of a subtle and implicit caution, a reiteration of the qualification of cultural values that Buddhism has traditionally been concerned to assert? It seems not unreasonable to “read” Fa-hsiu’s presence in the painting, in light of what we know about the monk himself, as a reminder of transcendental Buddhist values—as a caution against forgetting that even such great achievements in arts and letters as those that distinguished the Sung generally, and this group of Yüan-yü literati in particular, were in the end “empty,” “transient,” and “unarisen” (wu-sheng). As the description of the painting attributed to Mi Fu says, just after its author has evoked the beautiful natural setting in which Fa-hsiu is seated, “There is in the world of men no joy of purity and serenity surpassing this. Alas, how difficult of achievement this is for those who are swept up in the pursuit of fame and profit and do not know enough to retreat from it.”

To support this interpretation, we can return to the realm of Ch’an discourse and cite first the most famous of the several anecdotes about Fa-hsiu retold approvingly by Ta-hui and later Ch’an figures:

The Teacher [Ta-hui] said, “Once, upon the occasion of a snowfall, Ch’an Master Yüan-t’ung Hsiu observed that whenever it snows one can see that there are three kinds of monks. The best sort remain in the monks’ hall in seated meditation. The middling sort grind ink and trim their brushes so they may write snow poems. The worst sort huddle about the brazier talking of food. In the ting-wei year [1127], when I [Ta-hui] was staying at Huch’iu, I saw all three kinds of monks, and I could not help but laugh to realize that the words of our predecessor were not empty.”

In this wry epigram we hear an echo of Fa-hsiu’s half-jocular (but half-serious) remarks to Li Kung-lin and Huang T’ing-chien, cited above. Poetry, and by implication the other arts as well, can too easily be made into an ersatz religion, can too readily become the elegant but shallow diversion of those whom later Japanese Zen monks would call “shaven-headed laymen.” Fa-hsiu is shown here, clearly, to be skeptical about the place of poetry in Ch’an.

The same point is made in another anecdote, this one offering actual examples of good and bad Ch’an usage rather than mere comment on them. Ta-hui tells us that Yün-chu Hsiao-shun (a.k.a. Shun Lao-fu) once asked Fa-hsiu whether or not he had known T’ien-i I-huai. When Fa-hsiu replied that he had, Hsiao-shun asked for an example of I-huai’s discourse. Fa-hsiu offered the following epigram: “One, two, three, four, five, six, seven. Before the lofty peaks I stand alone. I snatch the pearl from the black dragon’s jaws. With a single word I
expose Vimalakīrti.” Hsiao-shun’s response to this was terse but scathing. “Not good,” he said, “what else have you got?” Fa-hsiu then related that once, when an old monk had come for an interview with I-huai, the master raised his wisk and asked, “Do you understand?” The old monk replied, “I don’t understand.” I-huai then said, “The earlobes, two pieces of skin; the teeth, all bone.” Shun Lao found this anecdote much more to his liking and praised I-huai as a true spiritual guide (chen shan-chih-shih) whose latter remark should never be forgotten.92

Consider the contrast between these two examples of I-huai’s Ch’ an wordcraft offered by his student Fa-hsiu. The first is somewhat prolix, extravagantly figurative, even bombastic, marked by a self-consciously poetic or tropic quality. The second is extremely terse, deliberately flat and prosaic, actually rough and vernacular. Such contrast, and the explicit approval of the entzauberte mode of the latter example, seem to be yet another illustration of Fa-hsiu’s (as well as Shun Lao’s and Ta-hui’s) distrust of poetic discourse or artful diction. They had their doubts about such elegant things because they saw them as too susceptible to use as mere counterfeits of true Ch’ an experience. Of course, the style of expression they did favor, or something very much like it, was itself recognized as a literary value at the time. Many of the leading poets and critics of the Northern Sung expressly favored what was called an “even and bland” (p’ing-tan) style. This is a poetic diction that is sparse, direct, understated, and astringent—a style that was said sometimes to verge on the rough and vulgar. Mei Yao-ch’en (1002–1060) is perhaps the most famous exemplar of this style, but it was championed by others as well, like Ou-yang Hsiu and Su Shih.93 Su Shih, in fact, once borrowed a similar term, “tan-p’o” (bland and tranquil), from the T’ ang literatus and scourge of Buddhism, Han Yü, and used it to draw an analogy between the kind of poetry Su himself favored and the sort of insight and discourse he believed Ch’ an required. Han Yü had once cited the “blandness and tranquility” of the Buddhists as proof of their lack of “heroic valor” (hao-meng). Su Shih turned that criticism into praise, affirming blandness and tranquility as positive virtues in both literature and religious life, and likening them to Buddhist notions of emptiness and quiescence. In a letter of farewell to a Ch’ an poet-monk, he wrote (in Richard Lynn’s translation):

Your Eminence has studied the bitterness and illusory nature of things—
Hundreds of reflections whose ashes have long become cold. . .
So why ever try to contend with one’s contemporaries
To see whose writing will be most magnificent!
A new poem should be like the most white of snows,
Its articulation at once so pure it's startling. . .
T'ui-chih [Han Yü] criticized cursive calligraphy thus. . . .
"I am rather astonished at the way the Buddhists
Regard the self as if it were a dried up hilltop well—
Submissively, they give voice to their blandness and placidity.
But who provides for the expression of heroism and valor?"
After careful consideration, I [Su Shih] don't think this is true.
Genuine skill is not just a matter of illusions and shadows.
If you want to make the language of your poetry marvelous (miao),
Don't ever reject emptiness (k'ung) and quietude (ching). . .
Since poetry and the dharma can do no harm to one another,
I must again ask your opinion about what I have said here.94

Fa-hsiu, of course, was not a literary critic. Nor do we know whether
or not he wrote much poetry, although he surely wrote some.95 Nevertheless, we do find in his recorded religious discourse both approval and
several examples of a kind of religious "plain speech" that seems at least
analogous to the "bland and even" style of so much Sung poetry. The
image he deliberately projected later in his career was that of "the sim­
ple monk," the "dharma rube" or unsophisticated religious rustic
whose spiritual life was wholesome and unadorned by the trappings of
higher secular or sacred culture. Thus we are told that he once
addressed his disciples from the lecture platform, saying,

I am but a plain mountain monk, incapable of subtle discourse; I just
respond to the moment. I can offer you food to eat and tea to drink,96 but I
have no "profound judgments of a master or patriarch" to render. This is
how we Ch'an men are—artless. "If you try to walk on a balance beam,
you will be stiff as iron" (t'a-cho ch'eng-ch'u ying su t'ieh).97

Of course, such cultivated "rusticity"—expressed, for example, in
learned allusions to old texts that are no less subtle for being colloquial
and folksy in their imagery—can actually be the most refined form of
sophistication, and so it often was in both the sacred and the secular tra­
ditions of Northern Sung culture. One could even say of Fa-hsiu and
many of his Ch'an contemporaries what was later said of his friend
Huang T'ing-chien—that "he took the vulgar and made it elegant"
(i su wei ya).98

Such claims of monkish simplicity, and such disavowals of the "pro­
found judgments of masters and patriarchs," suggest that Fa-hsiu's dis­
trust of secular arts and letters, seen as too susceptible to use as surro­
gates for genuine spirituality, was related to his equally serious distrust
of purely religious learning if it, too, were severed from immediate
experiences of the sort available in, say, meditation. The religious
equivalent of "writing snow poems" was the composition of learned
and abstruse phrasings of the dharma, the spinning of doctrine as a substitute for experience, and we have already seen something of Fa-hsiu’s withering views of that. Even as a young man, when he weighed the quite learned Ch’an of a Tsung-mi and the radically quotidian Ch’an of a Huai-tung, he found neither alternative satisfying. Nevertheless, he was adamant in rejecting doctrinal reflection whenever it was divorced from Ch’an experience and Ch’an practice—a theme that reverberates throughout his latter life as well. Thus, in still another exchange with Hsiao-shun, again about Fa-hsiu’s teacher I-huai, we encounter one of the earliest instances of a largely pejorative label that came traditionally to be given to the sort of inferior, discursive Ch’an which Fa-hsiu had rejected and which he criticized in the anecdotes recounted above. Hsiao-shun, Ta-hui tells us, was in the habit of criticizing I-huai for preaching what Hsiao-shun called “Kudzu Ch’an” (k’o-teng Ch’an).99

One day, Hsiao-shun heard that Ch’an Master T’ien-i’Huai had died. He entered the dharma hall with palms joined in the gesture of reverence, and said, “How delightful that this old vine-pole has collapsed.” Hsiu Yiian-t’ung was at that time serving as Rector (Wei-na, Karmadāna) in Hsiao-shun’s congregation and was constantly being subjected to such abuse. He then said to his fellow monks, “I must reach some sort of understanding with this old fellow.” That night, during the evening colloquy with the Master, he was again reviled as before. Fa-hsiu then stepped forth from the assembly and said, in a harsh voice, “How is it that you never manifest the middle way of the Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment?”100 Hsiao-shun replied, “I have kept you all standing here for too long; I bid you good-bye,” and then he returned to the abbot’s quarters. Fa-hsiu said, “This old fellow’s ‘whole body is an eye.’101 Well may he revile Master Huai.”102

Hsiao-shun’s wont to taunt Fa-hsiu by criticizing his teacher’s Ch’an style, and Hsiao-shun’s specific retort to Fa-hsiu’s angry response, may seem a bit less puzzling once it is understood that Hsiao-shun’s phrasing is probably an allusion to a passage in the Lin-chi lu (Record of Lin-chi). The sixth discourse (shang-t’ang) in that work concludes when Lin-chi dismisses his audience with the phrase “I have kept you here too long; good-bye” (chiu li chen-chung; lit., “You’ve been standing a long time; take care of yourselves”). The intent of Hsiao-shun’s allusion may have been to bring to Fa-hsiu’s mind the message of that sixth discourse, in which Lin-chi claims, in accordance with a longstanding pedagogical principle of Buddhism, always to be able to fit his teaching precisely to the individual needs and circumstance of each of his students. Lin-chi says of himself,

I always know exactly where each person is coming from (tsung-shih i lai-ch’u). When a student presents himself just as he is, it is as if he had lost himself. And when he doesn’t present himself just as he is, then he is as though bound without rope. Never make precipitous judgments. “Under-
standing” and “not understanding” are both mistakes. I declare this openly. Let the world criticize me as it will.103

As an implicit justification for his criticism of I-huai, Hsiao-shun’s use of this allusion suggests that he was intent on destroying any attachment Fa-hsiu might have had to the relatively discursive Ch’ an style of his former teacher. The point is not that “Kudzu Ch’an” is mistaken and some other kind of Ch’an is correct. Remember that Hsiao-shun professes his “delight” at I-huai’s death while making the gesture of respect with his hands, thus projecting a double meaning that Fa-hsiu seems at first to have missed. Rather, Hsiao-shun’s point is that Fa-hsiu, having been bred to one particular sort of Ch’an, needed to be reminded that it had no absolute authority and could easily cease to be a vital discipline, becoming instead a mere habit. Moreover, Hsiao-shun was implying that Fa-hsiu should no more mind criticism of his teacher (and, by implication, of himself) than Lin-chi would have minded being criticized by the whole world.

The patterns of attitude and pronouncement seen in these anecdotes suggest that Fa-hsiu’s placement in the Elegant Gathering in the Western Garden is symbolically appropriate—perhaps intentionally so. They corroborate the apparent significance of his pictured separation from, and evident indifference to, the activities depicted elsewhere in Wang Shen’s garden. Fa-hsiu was clearly something of an alien amongst these painters, poets, calligraphers, musicians, antiquarians, and statesmen, just as he would have been amongst monks whose Buddhism consisted only of erudition and rehearsal of deep-sounding doctrinal formulae.

Yet there is more to Fa-hsiu’s presence in the scene. That he is present at all is significant, as is the fact that a monk so renowned for his severity and his reservations about both “cultured” Ch’an and secular culture should so often have kept company with famous poets and artists. “Iron-Face Hsiu” may have been, as tradition holds, a very stern monk, but he was no fierce anchorite, no Buddhist St. Anthony of the Desert. Nor was he, like some Chinese Savonarola, an implacable and fanatical foe of all worldly culture. If Western analogies may be deemed useful in such characterizations, he was more like his near contemporary, the Cistercian monk Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153). Bernard was an advocate of spiritual simplicity and a strong opponent of the debasement of ascetic piety into mere worldly aestheticism, but he was also a very learned man and a superb stylist in his own right. Although his most powerfully held conviction about literary learning and the monastic life was expressed in the epigram, “Christ is my grammar” (Mea grammatica Christus est), Bernard could also speak appreciatively of literature as “an ornament of the soul” (scientia litterarum quae ornat animam).104
I suspect that, *mutatis mutandis*, Fa-hsiu would have concurred in such views. If Fa-hsiu can be seen as representing, in both life and art, the Buddhist ideal of the *vita contemplativa*, then surely his association, in both the painting and history, with Su Shih, Huang T’ing-chien, and the like has some positive bearing on our general question of the relationship between Ch’an and higher Sung culture. It must tell us something about the compatibility of the two—about the degree to which cultural pursuits could legitimately be incorporated into the Buddhist religious life, and about the extent to which Buddhism could be, and was, incorporated into the secular culture of the Sung.

Again, an anecdote may shed light on the problem. Several versions of Fa-hsiu’s biography tell us that when a certain monk once asked him to explain the principles of “achieving nirvāṇa without leaving samsāra and entering the Buddha’s domain without leaving the realm of Māra,” he replied, with the concision of metaphor typical of Ch’an, “the cow’s milk is but an infusion of red earth” (i.e., barren clay). It is difficult to be confident of one’s interpretations of such enigmatic Ch’an remarks, particularly if they come to us bereft of commentary and cannot be identified as allusions to better known texts. Nevertheless, I would hazard that Fa-hsiu’s point is roughly this: The world (i.e., samsāra or the realm of Māra) may seem base and sterile, like red clay, but just as it is from such seemingly barren material that cow’s fodder grows, so one may distill from such lowly material the richest spiritual nourishment, the very “milk” of nirvāṇa and buddhahood. If this interpretation be correct, the epigram may well justify a monk’s reserved and disciplined participation in the mundane pursuits of arts and letters. It may even serve as a warrant for his attendance at literary garden parties, particularly if, once there, he reminds the other guests of the ephemeral character of all such things.

Fa-hsiu’s remark suggests that he did not hold Buddhism to be a spirituality that utterly shuns the world. Nor did he see it as requiring literal, fastidious, and complete avoidance of secular activities. For Fa-hsiu, what must be shunned is not the world itself but attachment to the world, and participation in worldly activities is to be avoided only to the extent that they entail abandonment or relaxation of religious discipline.

Such a view of the world of arts and letters is consonant with, and may actually derive from, Fa-hsiu’s views on the religious equivalent of arts and letters—namely, the “studied Ch’an” or “Ch’an of words and letters” that had preoccupied him in his youth. Again note that he did not reject such learned Buddhism outright; rather, he incorporated it into the living discipline of Ch’an, recognizing that Ch’an presupposed all that was valuable in doctrine and scripture. Once this conclusion was reached, Buddhist learning and literature ceased to be the snare or tan-
gle that it once seemed to be. What Fa-hsiu never ceased to reject, of course, were learning and letters pursued as mere surrogates for religious experience. But these he condemned no less than he condemned their opposite extreme—namely, the sort of "ignoramus Ch’an" that simply divorces itself from scripture and doctrine. If our severe and simple "mountain monk" could be both Ch’an master and master of Buddhist learning, it should not be surprising that he was also the abbot of a metropolitan monastery and a friend to renowned poets and painters. Nor is it incongruous that his most famous disciple, Wei-po, continued such affiliations while becoming both an eminent Ch’an teacher and a scholar-poet in his own right.

It would seem, therefore, that when we contemplate the old monk in the painting we have as much reason to focus on his presence in the scene as we have to note his distance from its foreground. Both the famous painting itself and the outline we have sketched of Fa-hsiu’s life and teachings support the hypothesis that Ch’an Buddhism, for all its austerity, had reached in the Sung a kind of détente with the wider world of higher Chinese culture. This was not accomplished at the expense of Buddhism’s autonomy and orthodoxy, nor did it result in a loss of the religion’s traditional tension with the secular world, or in a relaxation of its essentially critical attitude toward all the world’s constructs, sacred or profane. But it did allow Buddhism, precisely in its unflagging role as a critical tradition, to leave the cloister, so to speak, and take its place in the more public arena of civilized Chinese discourse.

This amounts, I believe, to a kind of fulfillment of the earlier promise of Chinese Buddhism, a culmination of its gradual process of sinicization, by which Buddhism wove itself into the fabric of Chinese civilization while simultaneously altering the basic pattern of that fabric. The theoretical foundations of that change had been laid during the T’ang, in the creation of new schools of Chinese thought, such as Hua-yen. Its practical foundations were laid, also during the T’ang, especially with the creation of Ch’an Buddhism. But it was not until the Sung that Buddhism emerged from its own exclusively religious confines to become an integral part of the public order of concept, value, and action that China’s intellectuals and men of letters then called Wen and Tao, “Culture and the Way.”

The problem of how precisely to define and illustrate the role that Ch’an Buddhism played in this wider culture remains, but Fa-hsiu and the Western Garden painting suggest a beginning for that effort. The themes of ambivalence and ambiguity seem apposite to our consideration of both the monk and the painting. The Buddhist perspective, symbolized by both the historical and the pictorial Fa-hsiu, is ambivalent, in that accoutrements of both secular and sacred culture are treated as proper objects of some suspicion or caution for Buddhists,
just as they always had been. Yet they are also recognized, more readily than ever before in China, as legitimate components of the Buddhist Way, provided they serve rather than replace the higher disciplines of religious experience. The perspective of Sung literati culture, represented best by the leaders of the Wen-hsiieh movement, is also ambivalent. On the one hand, the literati seemed favorably disposed to include Buddhism within the range of their culture’s constitutive ideas and values. There was genuine and deep interest in Buddhism, not mere idle curiosity, on the part of many influential literati. On the other hand, the literati appeared to reserve Buddhism for use only in extremis or on the margins of cultural life, as a kind of hovering eschatological presence. They tended to place Buddhism mostly in the background of culture as a kind of memento mori, a constant reminder of such Buddhist “final things” as the transient insubstantiality of words and the transcendence of nirvana.

Given the mutual ambivalence of both parties to this historical relationship, it is not surprising that the picture of the relationship presented to the modern scholar is, in its turn, inherently ambiguous. Contrary to long-held assumptions of its decline, we find Ch’an Buddhism during the Sung to be very much alive, actually flourishing as never before, and in the highest strata of society. We also find it (somewhat surprisingly perhaps) to be a tradition deeply rooted in literature, in the production and use of new genres of written religious discourse. Moreover, these new forms of Ch’an literature, which are what best distinguish Sung Ch’an from earlier phases of the tradition, are “classicist” in a sense that Chinese humanists or men of letters outside the Samgha could readily appreciate: they were texts employed in the common enterprise of fu-ku, the restoration and vital preservation of the sacred past. In matters of literary style, too, Ch’an and the secular belles lettres of the day often coincided and influenced each other.

On all these grounds, and more, the modern scholar could well build the argument that Ch’an became accepted as an important and integral component of Sung culture, and that Ch’an Buddhists cultivated a greater appreciation of both secular and sacred tradition by abandoning their isolation from the secular world and from the rest of Buddhism as well, and by participating more readily in public cultural life. Yet such a characterization of the relationship between Ch’an Buddhism and Sung literati culture does not tell the whole story. There remained considerable differences between the two, and despite their greater mutual involvement they did not entirely coalesce. Buddhism remained in appreciable degree aloof from the world, and Ch’an’s participation in secular culture was still conducted with considerable reserve. Ch’an Buddhists were more literary in their religious orientations than they ever had been before, but they never ceased to worry about the still-ac-
knowledged limitations of words and letters. Likewise, the secular literati of the day, pious Buddhists though they may have been in certain areas and periods of their lives, nonetheless confined their Buddhism to matters of relatively private religious and intellectual concern, remaining wholeheartedly Confucian, for example, in their civil and political lives. Nor can we ignore the steadily growing tradition of Tao-hsüeh, which was far less accommodating of Buddhism and which would eventually transform itself from an extremist minority movement into a dominant orthodoxy.

Such unsettled ambivalence and ambiguity, perhaps better understood as a continuing vital tension, was never finally overcome or relaxed. However, Fa-hsiu lived relatively early in the course of Buddhism’s dialogue with secular literati culture. In succeeding generations other Ch’an Buddhists, like Hui-hung and Ta-hui, carried the dialogue further. Wen-tzu Ch’an, for example, would not come fully into its own, and the issues implicit in Fa-hsiu’s life and teaching would not be made fully explicit, until the first several generations following his death. The inseparable questions of Ch’an’s relation to literati culture and the role of literature and learning in Ch’an practice must be pursued into this later period if they are to be dealt with fully. To this our discussions of Fa-hsiu and the *Elegant Gathering in the Western Garden* are only a prelude.

**Abbreviations and Conventions**


*CLSPC*: *Ch’an-lin seng-pao chuan* (Chronicles of the Ch’an Order), 30 *chüan*. By Hui-hung (1071–1128); completed in 1123. *HTC* 137:439–565.


*CTPTL*: *Chia-t’ai p’u-teng-lu* (The Inclusive Lamp Record Published in the Chia-t’ai Era), 30 *chüan*. By Cheng-shou (1146–1208); completed in 1204. *HTC* 137:40–438.

*CYL*: *Chih-yileh lu* (The Record of “Pointing at the Moon”), 32 *chüan*. By Ch’ü Ju-chi; completed in 1595. *HTC* 143:1–743.


HTC: Hsū tsang-ching (Tripitaka Supplement), 150 vols. Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng Ch’u-pan-she, 1977. Originally published as Dainihon zokuzōkyō, 750 vols. Kyoto: Zōkyō Shoin, 1905-1912. [Note: Citations of works in this series include the original chüan number of the particular work cited, but give the HTC volume and page numbers rather than those of the original Japanese edition.]

JAOS: Journal of the American Oriental Society

LCL: Lin-chien lu (Anecdotes from the “Groves” of Ch’an), 2 chüan. By Chüeh-fan Hui-hung; completed in 1107. HTC 148:585-647.


PEW: Philosophy East and West

SJCSY: Sung-jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin (Index of Materials for the Biographies of Sung Figures), 6 vols. Revised and expanded edition. Edited by Wang Te-i et al. Taipei: Ting-wen Shu-chü, 1977. [Note: References to this work include both the volume and, following a colon, the page numbers.]
chow, Kiangsu, which was based in turn on a 1597 blockprint edition done at the Ching-shan ssu, Chekiang. Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng, 1973. [Note: Compare with the photolithic reprint of the same 1597 edition, found in SPTK, ch’u-pien, Lo no. 208.]

SPTK: Ssu-pu ts’ung-k’an (Collected Facsimiles of Works in the Four Categories). Three series (pien), each divided into four categories (pu); 465 titles, in 3,122 fascicles (ts’e). Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1919–1937. [Note: Works in this collection are cited by series (ch’u, hsü, san) and by serial number, as given in Karl Lo, A Guide to the Ssu pu ts’ung k’an (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Libraries, 1965).]


T: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (The Tripitaka Newly Compiled during the Taishō Era), 100 vols. Edited by Takakusu Junjirō, Watanabe Kaigyoku, and Ono Gemmyō. Tokyo: Daizō shuppansha, 1924–1932. [Note: Citations of works in this collection provide the original chüan number of the particular work cited when that is appropriate, followed by the T volume, page, and register numbers, sometimes with the line numbers as well.]


TMWK: Ta-hui P‘u-chüeh Ch’an-shih tsung-men wu-k‘u (Ch’an Master Ta-hui P‘u-chüeh’s Arsenal for the Ch’an Lineage), 1 chüan. Compiled by Tao-chien (d.u.); completed in 1186. T 47:943b–957c.

WTHY: Wu-teng hui-yüan (The Collated Essentials of the Five Lamps), 20 chüan. By P‘u-chi (1179–1253); completed in 1252. Modern critical edition, punctuated and collated by Su Yüan-lei. Chung-kuo Fo-chiao tien-chi hsüan-k‘an. Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1984. [Note: Citations of this work provide the volume and page numbers of the Peking edition, but also include the original chüan number so that references can be located in other editions, like HTC 138: 1–831.]

Notes

1. I am particularly indebted to Bernard Faure and Lee Yearly—the respondents in the conference at which the first version of this paper was presented—for their acuity in posing these and other crucial questions. Thanks are also due to Paul Griffiths for his helpful comments on these issues. Note, too, the relevance of Anne Klein’s chapter in this volume to the last of the questions mentioned, i.e., whether the path—which must be, in at least some sense, a kind of conditioning—can be said to generate or facilitate an attainment that is somehow unconditioned.

2. These two clauses are most familiar as the opening half of a four-part formula which goes on to assert that Ch’an is also “a direct pointing at the human mind by which buddhahood is achieved in the seeing of one’s own nature” (chih-chih jen-hsien/chien-hsien ch’eng-jo). The locus classicus of the whole formula is a rather late text, Mu-an Shan-ch’ing’s gloss on the term “singular transmission” (tan-ch’uan) in his Tsu-t’ing shih-yuan (Chrestomathy from the Patriarchs’ Halls, HTC 113.132a), a work that was not compiled until 1108. However, the individual components of the formula, and the general claims they make, date back much earlier, perhaps to Bodhidharma himself. Even Yanagida Seizan, who has done so much to distinguish the legends of early Ch’an from its true history, accepts these traditional claims as definitive of classical Ch’an (see the concluding chapter, on “the fundamental essence” [honshitsu] of Zen, in his classic Shoki Zenshū shisho no kenkyū [Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967], 472). For an excellent discussion of Yanagida’s and others’ critical acceptance of traditional self-definitions of Ch’an, see the fifth chapter of Theodore Griffith Foulk’s University of Michigan Ph.D. dissertation, The “Ch’an School” and Its Place in the Buddhist Monastic Tradition (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1987), 164–255. This view of the fundamental character of Ch’an has led to the widespread, but I think very dubious, view that Ch’an is essentially antinomian. Thus, for example, Ioan Petru Culianu, in the article on “Sacrilege” in the new Encyclopedia of Religion, defines antinomianism as “subversion of a religious or moral code” and goes on to say, “There are other religions in which antinomianism is fully accepted as the characteristic of a special school, such as Ch’an Buddhism in China or Zen Buddhism in Japan” (ER 12:557–558).

3. My thanks to Theodore Griffith Foulk for reminding me in private communication that even in the locus classicus of the “pu-li wen-tzu...” topos, i.e., in Mu-an’s Tsu-t’ing shih-yuan (HTC 113.132a11–16), it is said that those Ch’anists who take the phrase literally, and thus understand Ch’an to be the actual abandonment of words and letters for a practice of “silent sitting” (motsu), are like “dumb sheep” (ya-yang) who display their doltish dependence on words and letters precisely by their literalist interpretation of the phrase “do not depend on words and letters.”

4. See the remarks on this topic in the Introduction to this volume.

5. This text is traditionally attributed to Bodhidharma himself and, although some contemporary scholars are willing to accept that attribution, most are comfortable only with the more cautious view that it is a composite work formed during the period extending from the late sixth into the early eighth century. In any case, its crucial opening sections may date back to Bodhidharma and his immediate followers, and there are two important points about the text which are indisputable—that it is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, of all Ch’an texts, and that it has exerted great influence throughout Ch’an history. For an expert treatment of the text and its content, along with a precise and
complete English translation, see John R. McRae, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism*, Studies in East Asian Buddhism 3 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 101-117. See also Bernard Faure’s more popularly oriented but expert and thoughtful French translation with commentary, *Le traité de Bodhidharma* (Paris: Le Mait, 1986). Note that in this early Ch’an text the “entrance of practice,” which might be taken to counterbalance the “entrance of principle,” is not so taken. Rather it is presented, in McRae’s terms, as little more than “a didactic conceit, useful in the correct orientation of new students” (*Northern School*, p. 109). Note, too, Faure’s observation that the tension between extremist and moderate Ch’an may be found in the earliest phases of Ch’an history (*Bodhidharma*, pp. 48–49).

6. On medieval Chinese uses of tathāgatagarbha doctrine for such purposes, see Robert M. Gimello’s Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, *Chih-yan and the Foundations of Hua-yen Buddhism* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1976), 212-337. Note, too, Robert Buswell’s argument that the apocryphal *Vajrasamādhi Sūtra* (Chin-kang san-mei ching, T 9.365c–374b) was composed precisely for the purpose of providing earliest Ch’an (i.e., the sort of Ch’an found in the Erh-ju ssu-hsing) with the kind of encouraging doctrinal support that was afforded by the Tathāgatagarbha Buddhism of works like the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* and the Ta-sheng ch’i-hsin lun; see Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *The Formation of Ch’an Ideology in China and Korea: The Vajrasamādhi-Sūtra, a Buddhist Apocryphon* (Prince-ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. 74–122, 179–181.

7. This particular irenic gambit I have always found especially irritating and incoherent, as I have never been able to get past the contradiction obvious in any such juxtaposition of the terms “absolute” and “perspective.”

8. The example par excellence of this polemic is found in the writings of Ta-hui Tsung-kao (1089–1163), a Lin-chi Ch’an monk whose life bridged the transition from Northern to Southern Sung. For thorough treatments of his championing of k’an-hua Ch’an, see Miriam Levering’s 1978 Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, “Ch’an Enlightenment for Laymen: Ta-hui and the New Religious Culture of the Sung,” and Robert E. Buswell, Jr., “The ‘Short-cut’ Approach of K’an-hua Meditation: The Evolution of a Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch’an Buddhism,” in Peter N. Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*, Studies in East Asian Buddhism 5 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 321–377. Levering makes it clear that the targets of Ta-hui’s strictures against “the Ch’an of silent illumination” (mo-chiao Ch’an), though long assumed to be the contemporary Ts’ao-tung master Hung-chih Cheng-chüeh (1091–1157) and his congeners, are really unknown (“Enlightenment for Laymen,” pp. 261–274). The arguments against Ta-hui’s position on such matters are best known in the form that the Japanese Sōtō master Dōgen Kigen (1200–1253) would later give them. Ignorant as we are about so much of Sung Ch’an, we cannot be sure that Dōgen’s position had close antecedents in the China of Ta-hui’s time, but it is certainly possible that it did.


10. This usage is apparently novel with the great Korean Ch’an patriarch Chinul (1158–1210), and I owe my acquaintance with it to Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *The Korean Approach to Zen: The Collected Works of Chinul* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 252–253, 260, and idem, “Chinul’s Systematiza-

11. See the various articles in Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual. Note that the curious combination “sudden realization and sudden cultivation” (tun-wu tun-hsiu) enjoys pride of place in the later Lin-chi tradition as the category into which kung-an practice is thought to fall. According to Tsung-mi, and later according to Chinul, the term “sudden cultivation” refers not to a practice that proceeds more quickly than gradual cultivation, nor even to one that is “all at once” rather than “by stages.” Rather, it implies a practice in which the practitioner applies him or herself, perhaps repeatedly or for long periods of time, to a single meditative undertaking (like work on a kung-an) rather than to a progressive series of different undertakings. See Robert E. Buswell, Jr., “Chinul’s Ambivalent Critique of Radical Subitism,” in Pojo Sasang (Chinul’s Thought), vol. 2 (Songgwang-sa: Pojo Sasang Yŏn’gwon, 1989). Of course, in other Zen traditions the same term can imply something quite different. One thinks, for example, of Dōgen, for whom “sudden practice” implied the identity of enlightenment with the bodily practice of zazen. On this see Carl Bielefeldt, Dōgen’s Manuals of Zen Meditation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), and note particularly his concluding discussion of what he calls the “recognition model” and the “enactment model” of meditation practice.


13. See Foulk, Monastic Tradition, esp. pp. 62–99. Note particularly what he says about Dōgen’s discovery of strict monastic orthodoxy in early Southern Sung “Ch’an” monasteries (i.e., monasteries over which Ch’an masters presided), a condition which no doubt prevailed during the Northern Sung as well, perhaps to an even greater degree.

14. For one intriguing suggestion as to how we might uncover the hidden cunning of kung-an practice as a “technique,” the subtle “method” of its seeming “madness,” see Chūn-fang Yū, “Ta-hui Tsung-kao and Kung-an Ch’an,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6 (1979): 222–2, in which the author draws on the methods of phenomenological sociologists and ethnmethodologists to propose that kung-an are sophisticated dialogical contrivances designed to disconcert the practitioner and thus to separate him or her from the accustomed “common-sense world”—as, for example, one would be disconcerted if someone else were to reply to the innocuous question, “How are you?” by actually explaining how he or she is, or by asking what the question meant. For an analogous suggestion that kung-an practice and its connection with poetry exploit the subtle but still systematic resources of literature (metaphor, metonymy, and other tropes) to prompt estrangement from linguistically habituated attitudes, see Robert M. Gimello, “Poetry and the Kung-an in Ch’an Practice,” Ten Directions 7 (Spring/Summer 1986): 9–10.

15. Here is not the place for the detailed argument that the point requires, but it must be noted that students of Sung Buddhism were operating under the handicap of a longstanding misconception, according to which Buddhism had already passed its “golden age” and was in a state of decline. In fact, Buddhism flourished during the Northern Sung, in both religious and worldly terms, and may well have exerted more influence on Chinese culture than ever before, even during its so-called heyday of the T’ang. For a brief discussion of the glimpses of Buddhism’s institutional strength in the Northern Sung, as found in the travel diaries of visiting Japanese monks and in other contemporary sources, see Robert M. Gimello, “Imperial Patronage of Buddhism during the
Northern Sung," in *Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Church and State in China* (Taipei: Tamkang University Press, 1987), 71–85. Even the rise of Tao-hsüeh ("Neo-Confucianism"), its strong attack on Buddhism notwithstanding, bears this out. Although the anti-Buddhist strains of the Confucian revival are commonly cited in support of the claim that Buddhism was then declining, they actually testify, both in what they owe to Buddhism and in the frequent vehemence of their attack, to Buddhism's continuing strength. Moreover, the anti-Buddhist strains of this revival, though triumphant later, were in the minority during the Northern Sung itself. Every notice taken of an Ou-yang Hsiu's or a Ch'eng I's criticisms of Buddhism ought to be balanced against consideration of a Ch'ao Chiung's, a Yang I's, a Su Shih's, or a Huang T'ing-chien's admiration for it, especially as the latter was probably the more common, and in its own day the more influential, view. In this connection see Robert M. Gimello, "Li P'ing-shan, Hsing-hsiu, and the Place of Buddhism in Chin Culture," forthcoming.

16. No less a figure than Su Shih is only one of many possible examples. Consider what George C. Hatch, in his excellent biography of Su Shih, has to say about that great man's relationship to Buddhism, especially after his 1071 posting to the Hang-chou region. But like many other students of Sung life and letters who adhere to the old sinological tradition of disinterest in Buddhism, Hatch apparently finds it difficult to take Su Shih's Buddhism seriously. Indeed, in some of his phrasings Hatch seems to suggest that for Su Shih Buddhism was little more than an aesthetic reverie, an idle poetic and intellectual diversion. See Herbert Franke, ed., *Sung Biographies*, Münchener Ostasiatische Studien 16 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1976) 3:900–968, esp. 939–953. For a more extensive treatment of Su Shih's interest in Buddhism, see Beata Grant's 1987 Stanford Ph.D. dissertation, "Buddhism and Taoism in the Poetry of Su Shih (1036–1101)."

17. The term "Wen-tzu Ch'an" is especially associated with the life and thought of the late Northern Sung Lin-chi Ch'an monk Hui-hung, who used it to characterize his own combination of Ch'an practice, Buddhist learning, and secular belles lettres. It may have been he who first coined the term. If this could be proved, it would mean that the conventional use of "Wen-tzu Ch'an" as a pejorative designating a merely literary imitation of true Ch'an—a use that seems to have first appeared shortly after Hui-hung's demise, in the teaching of Ta-hui—was actually a somewhat later use and a deliberate distortion of its original intent. For more on Hui-hung's possibly inaugural use of the term see Robert M. Gimello, "Ch'an Buddhism, Learning, and Letters during the Northern Sung: The Case of Chüeh-fan Hui-hung (1071–1128)," forthcoming.


19. On the conflicted attitudes of Tao-hsüeh scholars toward learning and the civil service examinations, see Liu, "Neo-Confucian School," p. 496.

20. I am drawing here especially on Peter Kees Bol's excellent Princeton Ph.D. dissertation, *Culture and the Way in Eleventh Century China* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1982), a study of the thought of Su Shih and his foremost disciples. This, along with Bol's more recent but not yet published
research on the subject, is the best work available on Wen-hsiieh as a tradition of intellectual, and not only aesthetic, significance. See pp. 208–209 of the dissertation for Bol’s summary of Su Shih’s sudden-gradual distinction. Although Bol does not mention the possibility, it seems inconceivable that Su Shih was not here exploiting (and, of course, inverting) the old Ch’an distinction between the sudden and the gradual.

21. Such similarities have gone unnoticed, I believe, largely because too few of those who study the Sung Confucian revival also read the texts of Sung Buddhism (the latter being usually perceived as only the detritus of a supposedly “declining” tradition). Likewise, too few specialists in later Chinese Buddhism have been able to shake off the parochialism of their scholarly tradition so as to attend also to developments in the realms of wai-hsiieh. One can only hope for more exceptions to this sorry rule, more scholars of broad and interdisciplinary competence like, say, Araki Kengo.

22. See Ho-nan Ch’eng-shih i-shu 18, in Erh-Ch’eng chi, Li-hsiieh ts’ung-shu (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 1981), 1:239. I owe my acquaintance with this passage, and numerous Ch’eng I passages of similar import, to an as yet unpublished essay by Peter Bol entitled “Ch’eng Yi and the Cultural Tradition,” part of which was presented to the Columbia University Seminar on Neo-Confucian Studies in February 1988.

23. From instructions to the otherwise unknown lay disciple Lo Chih-hsien found in the Ta-hui P’u-chiieh Ch’an-shih yü-lu 20 (T 47.898a–b). See also the discussion in Levering, “Enlightenment for Laymen,” pp. 82–102.

24. See Ta-hui’s letter to a certain exegete (chiang-chu) named Tao-ming, in Ta-hui yü-lu 25 (T 47.916c23–917b6). Of course, Ta-hui is a figure of such subtlety and so many dimensions that he cannot be confined to any one category. His views on the relationship between learning and meditation are quite complex and resistant to easy definition. Thus, although he was severe in his castigation of overly discursive Ch’an, he was best known for his criticism of the Ch’an of silent illumination (mo-chiao).

25. See Ta-hui’s reply to a letter from Li Lang-chung, in Ta-hui yü-lu 29 (T 47.935a22–b22). There he characterizes such mystagogy as mere “flapping of the lips.” See also Levering, “Enlightenment for Laymen,” pp. 277–278.


27. Chou Tun-i (1017–1073), a leading Tao-hsiieh “hedgehog,” was once asked if sagehood were the sort of thing that could be “studied” or achieved through “learning” (sheng k’o hsüeh hu). His reply was in the affirmative, but it was also disingenuous. He knew that his anonymous questioner probably understood by “hsüeh” something highly literate and cumulative like “ample learning” (po-hsiieh), but he himself had in mind a drastic redefinition of the word “hsüeh” such that it meant something more like “spiritual cultivation” than “study.” Thus, when the questioner probed further to ask if there were an “essential principle” (yao) to such “sagehood-through-hsiieh,” he replied that indeed there was, and that it consisted in “singleness” or “concentration on one thing” (i), viz., “the absence of desire” (wu-yü). This “singleness” is what I mean by Tao-hsiieh’s “monism.” It was “the one great thing” on which Chou Tun-i and other proponents of Tao-hsiieh believed they could rely, and on the basis of which they felt they could retrench the enterprise of letters and learning. See the opening passage of Chin-ssu lu 4; Wing-tsit Ch’an, trans., Reflections
28. As far as modern Japanese and Western scholarship is concerned, the unsavory reputation of Wen-tzu Ch‘an was confirmed by medieval and later Japanese judgments concerning the Gozan or “Five Mountains” Zen of Muromachi times. Gozan Bungaku and related art forms, which were cultivated by Zen monks in conscious emulation of Sung art and letters, were seen as factors in the corruption or weakening of medieval Zen. Such traditional judgments even now carry normative authority and exert considerable influence on contemporary assumptions of what Zen is or should be. Thus Philip Yampolsky, in an uncharacteristic expression of personal evaluation, was moved to write of Muromachi Zen that “it might not be an exaggeration to say that when Zen flourishes as a teaching it has little to do with the arts and that when the teaching is in decline its association with the arts increases.” See Philip B. Yampolsky, trans., The Zen Master Hakuin: Selected Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 9. One must not mistake artistic sensibility, however much it may exploit the imagery of Zen, for true Zen spirituality, but a general declaration that the two are mutually inimical flies in the face of universally available evidence for the often mutually enriching relationship between art and religion. For a thoughtful and learned discussion of this issue, particularly as it relates to the life of the great Muromachi Zen master Musō Soseki (1275-1351), see David Pollack, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan’s Synthesis of China from the Eighth through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 111-133; and idem, Zen Poems of the Five Mountains, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion 37 (New York and Decatur: The Crossroad Publishing Co. and Scholars Press, 1985), which contains many well-translated examples of the sort of Chinese poetry, written by Japanese Zen monks, that comprises Gozan Bungaku.

29. Li Kung-lin (tzu: Po-shih, hao: Lung-mien), a major figure in the literati culture of his day, was particularly celebrated for his renderings of famous Buddhist subjects—e.g., scenes from the Hua-yen ching (misidentified by Basil Gray as Taoist scenes; see below), an oft-imitated portrait of Vimalakirti, an evocation of Hui-yūn’s Lien-she (Lotus Society), several paintings of arhats (lo-han), depictions of Pu-tai, icons of Śākyamuni and Kuan-yin, etc. But he was also esteemed for his illustrations of classical Confucian and literary texts—e.g., the Hsiao-ching (Classic of Filial Piety), T‘ao Ch‘ien’s Kuei-ch‘ü-lai tz‘u (Homecoming), and the Chiu Ko (Nine Songs)—and for his paintings of Taoist immortals and horses. Although most celebrated as a figure painter, his landscapes were admired, too. As was common among literati painters of the period—and among poets and Ch‘an teachers as well—Li was a careful student of the work of earlier masters and was given to working consciously in their styles. In his paintings of horses, for example, Li is said to have imitated Han Kan; as a landscape painter he is believed to have imitated Wang Wei; Wu Tao-tzu is said to have been his model for paintings of Buddhist figures; in his renderings of secular figures he is said to have followed Ku K‘ai-chih; and the Hsi-yūn ya-chi t‘u itself is said have been done in the style of another T‘ang master, Li Ta-chao. For more on the theme of fu-ku (restoring the past) and neo-classicism in Chinese art and culture of the Sung and later periods, see Wen Fong, “Archaism as a ‘Primitive Style,’ ” and Frederick W. Mote, “The Past in Chinese Cultural History,” both in Christian F. Murck, ed., Artists and Traditions: Uses of the Past in Chinese Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89-109 and 3-8, respectively. For general information concerning Li Kung-lin, see:


Idem, *Scholars and Sages: A Study in Chinese Figure Painting*, University of Michigan Ph.D. diss. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1968).


*SJCSY* 2:959-961.


31. Concerning Mi Fu (*tzu*: Yüan-chang), see *SJCSY* 1:541-544; also Nicole Vandier-Nicolas, *Art et sagesse en Chine: Mi Fou* (1051-1107), (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1963). The description of the painting is found in an undated supplement to the surviving portions of Mi Fu's collected works, the *Pao-chin ying-kuang chi*, and is reprinted in Ch’en Kao-hua, *Hua-chia shih-liao*, pp. 472-473. For an exhaustive discussion of its authenticity, and the authenticity of the painting itself, see Laing, "Real or Ideal."


34. *Tzu*: Tuan-shu; *SJCSY* 2:947.


40. An obscure figure known to us only as the recipient of four brief and uninformative extant letters from Su Shih. See K’ung Fan-li, ed., *Su Shih wen-chi*, Chung-kuo ku-tien wen-hsüeh chi-pen ts’ung-shu (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chu, 1986), 4:1674-1676. Cheng Ching-lao’s obscurity no doubt has something to do with the fact that certain later descriptions of the scene do not find him there at all but suggest other identifications; see Laing, "Real or Ideal," pp. 421-422.

41. *Tzu*: Wu-chiu; *SJCSY* 3:1953-1954. Ch’ao Pu-chih was the scion of a distinguished literati family long known for its Buddhist piety and learning. His great grandfather’s elder brother was Ch’ao Chiung (951-1034), the author of several important but neglected collections of Buddhist reflections, including the *Fa-tsang chin-sui lu* (*SKCSCP*, tenth series, vols. 1-4), which provide a valuable insight into the importance of Buddhist learning in early Northern Sung Wen-hsüeh.

42. *Tzu*: Wen-ch’ien; *SJCSY* 3:2232-2233.

43. Huang T’ing-chien, Ch’ao Pu-chih, Ch’in Kuan, and Chang Lei are known collectively as “the Four Scholars” and comprise the group of Su Shih’s foremost acknowledged disciples. For a thorough study of this group, and the “literary learning” or “cultural learning” (Wen-hsüeh) tradition they represented during the late eleventh and the early twelfth centuries, see Bol, *Culture and the Way*. That they were recognized as a group and admired as such, not only in secular literary circles but also in the Wen-tzu Ch’an movement of Sung Buddhism, is indicated by a collective tribute to them penned by Hui-hung, the leader of the lettered Ch’an movement. See *SMWTC* 27:23a.

44. Although they are not the focus of attention at the moment depicted, the presence in the painting of a number of bronze vessels indicates, as one might have expected of a gathering of Sung literati, that antiquarian connoisseurship had its place—along with literary composition, calligraphy, painting, and music—among the day’s edifying delights. Wang Ch’in-ch’en (see note 10) was especially well known as a collector of antiques, as was Li kung-lin himself. In other words, the full complement of Sung wen-shih avocations is represented in the “Western Garden” scene.


46. *Wu-sheng* (lit., “unborn”) is the Chinese rendering of the concept first expressed in Sanskrit as *anutpāda* or *anutpattika*, as in the compound *anutpattika-dharma* (unarisen dharmas, *wu-sheng fa*). It refers to the ancient Buddhist doctrine that all things, being devoid of own-being or substantive self-nature, cannot be said ever to “come into existence” or “arise” as separate entities. It is not the Taoist “original nonbeing” (*pen-wu*) that some have taken it to be, but
rather the Buddhist “emptiness” (śūnyatā, k'un), i.e., the intrinsic transience, indeterminacy, and consequent ineffability of things rather than their supposed derivation from some eternal meonic substratum.

47. The piece ascribed to Mi Fu, and several other literary sources describing this painting, refer to the monk by name, but in some later texts his name is forgotten or ignored and he is identified simply as “a certain monk,” even though the names of all the other figures are carefully preserved. Not only his name but even the monk himself disappeared from certain later versions of the painting, e.g., the anonymous late Ming rendering owned by New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art and reproduced in Lin Yutang’s The Gay Genius, following p. 16. Such neglect, I think, is a token of the declining interest in Buddhism that characterizes many later traditions of Chinese learning, and of their eventual ignorance of the place of Buddhism in Sung culture. In this connection we should note that Ellen Johnston Laing was worried by certain inconsistencies in the record regarding the monk’s name. In those sources in which he is named, Fa-hsiu is not always referred to in precisely the same way. Sometimes he is called Yuan-t'ung Ta-shih; other times Yuan-t'ung Lao-shih; still other times simply Hsiu-lao, Hsiu Ch'an-shih, or Seng Yuan-t'ung. This should not be cause, as it was for Laing, to doubt the tradition that identifies the monk as Fa-hsiu, for the use of such variant epithets is quite common in later Chinese Buddhism. The one instance Laing cites of a truly different name (T'an-hsiu), found in a colophon on one anonymous version of the painting, is most likely an error. Moreover, in the biographies of Fa-hsiu and other contemporary sources there is ample evidence, some of which is presented below, that he was well known to many of the other figures depicted in the painting, including Li Kung-lin himself. This evidence renders the identification of the monk as Fa-hsiu no less certain than, say, the identification of the calligrapher-painter in the foreground of the painting as Su Shih.

48. In the summary of Fa-hsiu’s career that follows, I rely especially on the biographies contained in two early works: first, the CCHTL (HTC 136.155a-158b), because it is the earliest (1101) and one of the most extensive, but also because it was written by Fa-hsiu’s chief disciple Wei-po; and second, Hui-hung’s CLSPC (HTC 137.543b-545b), which was written only thirty-three years after Fa-hsiu’s death by someone who was not just a recorder of relevant events but a leading actor in the Wen-tzu Ch’an story we are concerned to tell. I have also compared Wei-po’s and Hui-hung’s accounts with those found in Hsiao-ying’s 1155 Yun-wo chi-t’an (HTC 148.55b-56a), Wu-ming’s 1183 LTHY (HTC 136.915a-916b), Tao-yung’s 1197 Ts’ung-lin shih-sheng (HTC 148.55b-56a), P’u-chi’s 1252 WTHY (2:1037-1039), Nien-ch’ang’s 1341 FTLTTT (T 49.673c1-674a14), Chüeh-an’s 1354 SSCKL (T 49.875b20-876a10), and Ch’ü Ju-chi’s 1595 CYL (HTC 143.578a-579a). P’u-chi’s work has become a favored source of information on the lives and teachings of the Ch’an monks whose biographies and selected sayings it contains, due to the care its compiler took in collating earlier sources. This work has been available since 1984 in a fine three-volume critical edition, punctuated and collated by Su Yüan-lei and published in Peking by Chung-hua Shu-chü in their Chung-kuo Fo-chiao tien-chi hsüan-kan series. I would recommend that henceforth this Peking edition be used at least together with, if not instead of, the HTC and other editions. It is this edition that I cite throughout the present chapter.

49. In early Sung, Yin-men was in close competition with Lin-chi for the status of most influential Ch’an lineage. Its importance has been traditionally overlooked since then, perhaps because it did not last long (Yin-men was even-
tually absorbed or supplanted by Lin-chi), but also perhaps because of bias against it, or ignorance of it, on the part of certain major chroniclers of Sung Buddhism. Tsan-ning (919–1001), for example, deliberately chose to exclude the very founder of the lineage from his Sung kao-seng chuan; see Ishii Shûdô, Sôdai Zenshûshi no kenkyû (Tokyo: Daitô shuppansha, 1987), 48, and Abe Chôichi, Chûgoku Zenshûshi no kenkyû, revised and expanded ed. (Tokyo: Kyûbun shuppansha, 1986), 467–488. Three major figures of the Northern Sung—Hui-hung (1071–1128), a member of the Huang-lung branch of Lin-chi but sympathetic to Yiin-men, and Ch'i-sung (1007–1072) and Wei-po (fl. 1100), both of the Yün-men lineage itself—tried to rectify this situation in the several chronicles and biographical-anecdotal collections they wrote, but apparently their effect on the later tradition was limited, particularly in Japan, where the Yün-men never developed as a separate lineage. On Ch'i-sung’s efforts to establish Yün-men, and on the influence of Yün-men monks during the early Northern Sung, see Huang Chi-chiang’s University of Arizona dissertation, Experiment in Syncretism: Ch'i-sung (1007–1072) and Eleventh-Century Chinese Buddhism (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1986), esp. 115–140, 177–219. For more on the general subject of Ch’an in the Sung histories of Buddhism, see Jan Yün-hua, “Buddhist Historiography in Sung China,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 114 (1964): 360–381, and Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer, Die Identität der Buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in China: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der Sung-Zeit (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982).

50. The standard sources of hagiographical information on this monk, most of which include brief excerpts from his recorded sayings, are as follows: CCHTL 5 (HTC 136.88a–89a), CLSPC 11 (HTC 137.489a–b), LTHY 28 (HTC 136.908a–912a), CTPTL 2 (HTC 137.58a–59b), FTLTTT 18 (T 49.b16–c6), and SSCKL (T 49.870b18–27). Extensive quotations from three nonextant collections of his sayings comprise chüan 5 of Mu-an Shan-ch’ing’s 1108 compilation, the Tsu-t’ing shih-yüan (Chrestomathy from the Patriarchs’ Halls, HTC 113.126a–151a). In the early twelfth century, Sung Hui-tsung conferred upon him the posthumous title Chen-tsung Ta-shih.

51. This is the famous sheer-faced rock that juts dramatically out of low rolling hills about 30 miles southeast of T’ien-shui in Kansu. Since at least the early fifth century it has been a sacred Buddhist site, and its scores of natural and manmade caves contain great treasures of Buddhist sculpture and painting. It had long been regarded as a representation, or local counterpart, of the great axial mountain of Buddhist cosmology, Mt. Sumeru. Historical records indicate that, although it waxed and waned through history, during the Northern Sung it was the site of flourishing Buddhist institutions. See Michael Sullivan, et al. The Cave Temples of Maichishan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). For a novel treatment of Mai-chi shan as a Buddhist monastic center compared with monasteries of the Christian and other traditions, see Peter Levi, The Frontiers of Paradise: A Study of Monks and Monasteries (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1988), 163–166.

52. I take “hsüeh” here as an adjective rather than a verb and thus understand hsüeh-Ch’an as having the pejorative connotation of “pedantic” or “bookish” Ch’an.

53. The question of this monk’s identity is difficult and requires some extended discussion. The earliest of the Fa-hsiu biographies to mention him is that found in Hui-hung’s CLSPC, and all others in which he later appears (e.g., FTLTTT) seem to derive from Hui-hung’s reference. Most of these sources
leave his identity a mystery by calling him simply “Yüan Hua-yen,” a name otherwise unattested except for an independent reference to him in another of Hui-hung’s works, the _LCL (HTC 148.586a–b)._ Another reference, in Chinul’s _Chinsim chiksöl,_ seems to be simply a quotation of the opening lines of the _LCL_ passage; see Buswell, _The Korean Approach to Zen,_ pp. 175, 187–188. Whereas the references in the Fa-hsiu biographies identify Yüan as from Pei-ching, the _LCL_ and Chinul references identify him as from Wei-fu, but these are just two Sung dynasty names for the district now known as Ta-ming in southeastern Hopei.

However, the matter does not end here. Apparently the issue of Yüan Hua-yen’s identity was recognized as problematic early on, for apart from the indecisive texts already mentioned, there are several other sources that offer two conflicting identifications. One of the latest of the standard biographies of Fa-hsiu—the one in Chueh-an’s 1354 _SSCKL (T 49.875b23–25)—offers the opinion that our Yüan Hua-yen is actually Fa-hsiu’s elder dharma brother, a monk named Chung-yüan who died 1063. The _SSCKL_ refers to the anti-exegetical monk in question as “Ch’an Master T’ien-po Yüan of Pei-ching” and adds the crucial comment that his style (hao) was Hua-yen. Now, there was a T’ien-po Yüan Ch’an-shih whose standard monastic name was Yüan-chung and whose honorary title was Wen-hui Ch’an-shih. He was a Yün-men monk who had been, like Fa-hsiu himself, a disciple of T’ien-i I-huai, having studied with him probably some years before Fa-hsiu did. He is a relatively well-known figure and information on his life, along with excerpts traditionally thought to be from his recorded sayings, is available in several of the standard sources: _CCHTL 10 (HTC 136.160a–161b), CTPTL 3 (HTC 137.77b–78a), WTHY 16 (3:1041–1042), FFTC (T 49.473b25–28), FTLTTT (T 49.667c18–22), and SSCKL (T 49.872b3–c3)._ All these sources note that Chung-yüan, like the presumptive Yüan Hua-yen, resided in the T’ien-po ssu in Pei-ching (a.k.a. Wei-fu, mod. Ta-ming). Given the fact that both the putative Yüan Hua-yen and the historical Chung-yüan were associated with the same city and temple, and considering Chung-yüan’s close relationship with Fa-hsiu, it was not entirely unreasonable of Chueh-an to assume, as he apparently did in his _SSCKL, that the Yüan Hua-yen to whom earlier Fa-hsiu biographies and other texts had referred was actually Chung-yüan.

However, there is also good reason to doubt this identification. Chung-yüan and Fa-hsiu were near contemporaries, and Fa-hsiu would probably have come to know of his senior dharma brother only after he had himself become a disciple of I-huai. But the reference to Yüan Hua-yen in Fa-hsiu’s biographies pertains to an earlier phase of Fa-hsiu’s career, before he had become I-huai’s disciple. Could Fa-hsiu have known of Chung-yüan that early, and would Chung-yüan’s views have already become so well known as to have acquired the status in Fa-hsiu’s mind of a model for one of the standard attitudes toward the relationship between Ch’an and doctrinal Buddhism? Neither seems likely. Also, Fa-hsiu’s reference to Yüan Hua-yen contrasts him to Tsung-mi, but if Yüan Hua-yen is to be identified with Chung-yüan, one is faced with the troubling and dubious anachronism of a contrast between an eminent ninth-century figure and a not nearly so eminent figure of the eleventh century. Then, too, there is nothing in the recorded sayings of Chung-yüan, at least not in those we can judge to be authentic, to indicate that he was a particularly outspoken critic of learned or exegetical Buddhism. Finally, none of the biographies of Chung-yüan say that his hao was Hua-yen; this seems to have been pure surmise on Chueh-an’s part.
For all these reasons it seems improbable, despite the testimony of the SSCKL, that Chung-yüan could be our man. However, as early as the mid-twelfth century, an alternative identification had been adduced that must have been missed by Chüeh-an and those who accepted his suggestion. In 1155, a disciple of Ta-hui Tsung-kao named Hsiao-ying, in his Yin-wo chi-t’an (Anecdotes from the Lodge Reclining on Clouds; HTC 148.28a-b), identified our Yüan Hua-yen with a certain Huai-tung, also known as Lao Hua-yen. No independent biographical record of this monk is known, at least none in which he is so named, but he and his teachings are mentioned in Ta-hui’s recorded sayings (Ta-hui yü-ku 26; T 47.923c8-12), and it was probably through Ta-hui that Hsiao-ying learned of him. In any case, Hsiao-ying tells us that Huai-tung, alias Lao Hua-yen, was also a resident of Pei-ching or Wei-fu (modern Ta-ming) and was also called T’ien-po after the local monastery of that name.

Most significantly, Huai-tung is best known as one who had repudiated an earlier attachment to learned Hua-yen in favor of an exclusive commitment to that “separate transmission outside the teachings,” i.e. Ch’an. He is said thereafter to have advocated a very down-to-earth and quotidian Buddhism in which the dharma consisted not of labored and exclusively religious undertakings like study or exegetics but of quite ordinary activities like “walking, standing, sitting, lying down, eating, drinking, and conversing.” This certainly seems to be the sort of teaching about which Fa-hsiu’s biographies say he was so ambivalent. Moreover, Huai-tung is a much earlier figure than Chung-yüan. His exact dates are forgotten, but it is known that he flourished in the ninth century and that he was a minor disciple of classical Ch’an Master Hsing-hua T’s’un-chiang (830–838). The latter is well known as the foremost heir of none other than Lin-chi I-hsüan (d. 866), progenitor of the Lin-chi line.

Hsiao-ying argued that it is really this monk to whom Fa-hsiu’s biographies and the other sources we have mentioned refer, and that it was Hui-hung’s misreading or a misprint of “Yüan Hua-yen” for “Lao Hua-yen” which led him and then others, like Chüeh-an, into error. Although Hsiao-ying’s identification of Huai-tung as the man in question cannot be independently verified, it does seem much more likely than the alternative identification of Chung-yüan, particularly in view of the fact that Huai-tung serves better—both chronologically and substantively—as a focus of contrast with Tsung-mi. Note, too, that this identification was accepted as correct in 1715 by the Obaku Zen scholar Kōhō Jitsuge (pronunciation uncertain) in his very useful Zenrin kaijutsu konmei shū (Compendium of Confused Ch’an Names; Kokuyaku Zenshū sōsho 2:5 or Zen-hsueh ta-ch’eng [Taipei: Chun-hua Fo-chiao wen-hua k’uan, 1969], 5:23–24). Also, marginal collation notes in the HTC edition of the LCL (HTC 148.586a-b) mention that “another edition of the LCL reads ‘Tung-lao’ rather than ‘Yüan-kung.’ ”

There is also a curious appendix to chūan 30 of the CTCTL (T 51.466b–467a) entitled “Address to the Assembly by Wei-fu Hua-yen Ch’ang-lao.” This appendix appears only in certain editions of the CTCTL, not in all of them, and according to the T collation note, was added to Tao-yüan’s 1004 compendium only in its 1601 Ming Tripitaka edition (but then, the CTCTL is a work known to have had a very complicated textual history, marred by repeated scribal and other errors; see Shiina Koyii and Suzuki Tetsuo, “So-Gen-han Keitoku dentō roku no shoshiteki kōsatsu,” Aichi Gakuin Zen Kenkyūjo Kiyo [1973], 3:261–280). Some later scholars, following Hui-hung’s and Chüeh-an’s mistake, have attributed this longish passage to Chung-yüan, but it would seem to follow from what we have shown that it is really a document of ninth-century rather than
eleventh-century Ch’an, and that it is most likely a remnant (perhaps the only one extant) of Huai-tung’s recorded sayings. Later, of course—and again because of Hui-hung’s original error—certain of Huai-tung’s teachings were ascribed to Chung-yüan and even inserted into his biographies, thus further compounding the confusion.

Lest this long argument seem otiose, I would point out that the correct identification of the person in question is not only valuable in its own right, as the solution to a longstanding puzzle in Ch’an history; it also serves the underlying purposes of this study insofar as it reminds us that the extreme anti-exegetical Ch’an position that Fa-hsiu rejected was, in this instance, an inheritance from an earlier phase in Ch’an’s history and not the opinion of a contemporary Sung figure. This is a further reminder of the evolution toward moderation and breadth which we argue Ch’an underwent during the transition from the late T’ang to the Sung.

54. This subtly worded remark seems susceptible to several slightly different interpretations. I take it to indicate first that Fa-hsiu held Ch’an and learned Buddhism to be compatible. He was certainly not choosing one to the exclusion of the other. However, I also take it to mean that he did not give the two equal recognition for, after acknowledging the compatibility between Ch’an and exegetical Buddhism, he implied that such compatibility warranted his confident and relatively singleminded commitment to Ch’an. Convinced that in accepting the transmission through Mahākāśyapa he would get just what is to be found in “the teachings” and not anything other or less than that, he did not need to treat Ch’an as something apart and different from the rest of Buddhism. By the same token, he could rely on Ch’an as in itself a genuine and sufficient transmission of the Buddha’s truth. Having claimed the compatibility of Ch’an and exegetics, he could, as the text goes on to say, immediately thereafter put aside exegetics as a separate vocation and devote himself entirely to Ch’an, which he had now come to understand as subsuming exegetics.

55. *LTHY (HTC 136.915a6–9)*. This use of the term “schools (or ‘principles’) of nature and characteristics” is a bit unusual. “School of nature” usually refers to the Hua-yen and associated traditions, whereas “school of characteristics” most commonly refers to allegedly lesser forms of elementary Mahāyāna Buddhism, like the *wei-shih* (representation-only) teaching of the Fa-hsiang school. Here such distinctions among various theoretically oriented traditions pale by comparison with the difference between all of them, on the one hand, and the practical or experiential orientation of Ch’an, on the other. Again, the point is not that Fa-hsiu rejected theoretical Buddhism, but that he chose to incorporate it into a Ch’an framework, just as Bodhidharma and Hui-neng had exemplified in their own lives the symbolic significance of Sudhana’s mythic pilgrimage.

56. Also known as Shou-ch’eng Ch’an-shih (d.u.); see *WTHY 13*, 2:833. Shou-ch’eng was the founder of the Hu-kuo monastery where the stele was located.

57. Ch’an Master Hui-lang of the Pao-tz’u Yüan in Fu-chou (mod. Fukien) was a late T’ang or Five Dynasties Ch’an monk in the lineage of Hsiéh-tou I-ts’un (822–908). See *WTHY 8*, 2:463. He also appears in case forty-eight of the *Pi-yen lu*.

58. T’ien-i I-huai was, as noted above, a Yün-men Ch’an monk of the fourth generation after that line’s founder, Yün-men Wen-yen (864–949). As a direct heir of Hsiéh-tou Ch’ung-hsien, he participated in the latter’s temporary revival of Yün-men, which made that house preponderant during the mid-elev-
enth century and until the ascendancy of the Lin-chi line that would eventually absorb it. He was a very popular teacher; Fa-hsiu is but one of fifty-four of his disciples whose names have been preserved in Ch’an records (see ZGDJT, Kei-fu 10).

59. Po-ch’ao Chih-yüan was a little-known monk of the early Sung who belonged either to the lineage of Hsüeh-feng I-ts’un (822–908) or to that of I-ts’un’s dharma brother, Kan-t’an Tzu-kuo. See WTHY 7, 2:386. Regarding Pao-tz’u, see note 57.

60. I have not been able to find this obscure exchange in any source other than Fa-hsiu’s biographies, nor am I confident that I have translated Pao-tz’u’s reply correctly. This is regrettable because the question may be that relatively rare thing, a Buddhist allusion to a Confucian classic. The opening lines of the Chung-yung (Doctrine of the Mean) speak of the state before the feelings or emotions are aroused. The word “separation” (ke) is the same term that appears in the phrase “hsüan-ke” (distant separation) which I-huai used earlier in the dialogue with Fa-hsiu quoted above.

61. An old monastery, first established during the Southern Ch’i (479–501), rebuilt during the T’ang, and given its name (“Sage’s Roost”) because a famous Ch’ an layman named Li Po (772–831), a student of the Ma-tsu disciple Kuei-tsung Chih-ch’ang, once used it as a retreat. It was one of several Ch’ an establishments on Mt. Lu during the Sung.

62. Yün-chu Hsiao-shun was, along with the famous Ch’i-sung, a disciple of Tung-shan Hsiao-ts’ung (d.u.). He thus traced his lineage back to the Yün-men founder, Yün-men Wen-yen (864–949), through Wen-yen’s direct disciple Te-shan Yuan-mi (d.u). Fa-hsiu’s teacher T’ien-i I-huai, in contrast, traced his and his teacher Hsüeh-tou Ch’ung-hsien’s lineage back to Wen-yen through another of Wen-yen’s direct disciples, Hsiang-lin Ch’eng-yüan (908–987). Criticism of the teaching of other Ch’ an masters, carried out in the spirit of dharma combat, was not uncommon, even among different branches of the same Ch’ an house. For standard versions of Hsiao-shun’s biography and representative samples of his teaching, see CCHTL 5 (HTC 136.99); LTHY 28 (HTC 136.906); CTPTL 2 (HTC 137.60); and WTHY 15, 3:1003–1004. See below for more on Fa-hsiu’s debates with Hsiao-shun concerning I-huai’s Ch’ an.

63. This may be Chiang-shan Tsan-yüan, a.k.a. Chüeh-hai Ch’ an-shih, another Lin-chi monk who enjoyed the admiration and support of Wang An-shih. If so, however, there is a dating problem to be resolved because there are records indicating that this particular “Master Yüan” did not die until 1086. See WTHY 12, 2:730–731. Chüeh-hai Ch’ an-shih was located just a few miles northeast of Sung-era Nanking and came to be called Chin-ling-shan in Ming, Ch’ing, and modern times (in the nineteenth century, it was the site of Yang Wen-hui’s famous Buddhist printing center). During the Sung it was the site of several important Buddhist establishments and happened also to be Wang An-shih’s residence for much of the time following his 1076 retirement, Wang having been throughout his life a very pious Buddhist layman. For an excellent treatment of Wang An-shih’s life that is more sensitive than most to his Buddhist interests, see Jonathan Pease’s 1986 Stanford Ph.D. dissertation, “From the Wellsweep to the Shallow Skiff: Life and Poetry of Wang An-shih (1021–1086).”

64. Hui-hung tells an anecdote (CLSPC 26 [HTC 137.544b]) according to which Fa-hsiu did not accept, or did not long retain, the office of abbot that was offered to him because, when Wang An-shih called on him shortly after his arrival at the monastery, Fa-hsiu was preoccupied with clerical duties and kept
the distinguished lord waiting. Wang was insulted and the result was Fa-hsiu’s departure. No doubt this story endeared Fa-hsiu to Wang An-shih’s critics, several of the most famous of whom later befriended the monk. It may have been this encounter that was recorded in another Li Kung-lin painting in which Fa-hsiu is said to have appeared, this one unfortunately lost. The anti-reform statesman Lu Tien (1042–1102, SJCSY 3:2648–2649; Franke, Sung Biographies, 2:687–691), in fascicle 11 of his collected writings entitled T’ao-shan chi, records that Li visited him in Kaifeng in 1089 and painted for him a work called Wang Ch’ing-kung’s Visit to Chung-shan, in which the eminent monk was depicted standing beneath a pine tree. The Lu Tien passage is quoted in Ch’en Kaohua, Hua-chia shih-liao, 475.

65. The story goes (CLSPC 26 [HTC 137.544b]) that a certain Ch’üan-chiao Ch’ang-lao, to whom I can find no other reference, once came to lecture to the monks of the Ch’ung-fu monastery but was greeted only by the ridicule of most of the audience, none of whom would rise to question him. Fa-hsiu, however, hastened to ask, “What is the self of Fa-hsiu?” Ch’üan-chiao laughed and said, “Iron-faced Hsiu doesn’t even recognize himself.” Fa-hsiu then said, “These clerics here are all deluded; I at least will acknowledge your fidelity to the dharma.”

66. Among Ch’i-sung’s preserved writings are three brief, undated letters addressed to a Yuan-t’ung Ch’an-shih, who was then residing on Mt. Lu (see T’an-chin wen-chi 10, T 52.702a). If the recipient of these letters had been our Fa-hsiu, then it is notable that the younger monk, who was 20 years junior to Ch’i-sung and thus only 45 at the time of Ch’i-sung’s death, should have caught the favorable attention of one of the foremost Ch’an monks of the day. However, it is more likely that the Yuan-t’ung Ch’an-shih in question is actually Ch’i-sung’s contemporary and dharma brother, Chu-na (1010–1071), who presided for a time over a Lu-shan temple named Yuan-t’ung and who was also, therefore, known as Yuan-t’ung Ch’an-shih. Chu-na and Ch’i-sung had both studied for a while with Tung-shan Hsiao-ts’ung (d. 1030). Concerning Chu-na, see CCHTL 5 (HTC 136.97b–98a); CLSPC 26 (HTC 137.542a–b); WTHY 16, 3:1020–1021; FTLLTT 19 (T 49.668b14–c2), and SSCKL 4 (T 864b19–c2).

67. TMWK, T 47.943c, 944c, 949c, 955a, 956a, and 957b. This work was compiled in 1186 by Ta-hui’s disciple Mi-an Tao-ch’ien (d.u.). Unlike other collections of Ta-hui’s remarks, the Ch’an Arsenal seems to have been designed especially for an audience of monks. Its purpose was apparently polemical and hortatory—to provide inspirational models of appropriate monastic conduct, thus highlighting just those particular styles of Ch’an, among the many available during his day, that Ta-hui found most worthy of emulation. Fa-hsiu, it seems, was one of Ta-hui’s heroes.

68. This seems not to have been a major establishment—nothing on the order of, say, the Ta-hsiang-kuo ssu, the T’ai-p’ing Hsing-kuo ssu, or the K’ai-pao ssu which dominated the city. The only standard description of Northern Sung Kaifeng in which I have found any reference to the Fa-yün ssu is rather late and not very informative, viz., Li Lien’s Pien-ching i-chi chih (Record of the Antiquities of Kaifeng), compiled in 1546 (SKCSCP, Series 10, vol. 96). Without citing his sources, Li Lien tells us (ibid., 10:15b) that there was a “Fa-yün ssu” located to the west of the Yün-chi bridge, outside the Nan-hsün Gate, and that it was razed by soldiers at the end of the Yuan (the Nan-hsün gate was the main southern gate of the city; I have not been able to locate the bridge on any map). Li also mentions (ibid., 10:25a) a “Fa-yün yün” that had been erected.
in 1010 by the northwestern wall of the city, at a bend of the Chin-sui river near the Kuo-tzu gate, and that was destroyed by the Chin armies in 1126, but it is probably with the former of these two establishments, the Fa-yün ssu, that Fa-hsiu was associated.

We also learn from the FTLTTT that a Fa-yün ssu was “rebuilt” in 1082, somewhere on the southern outskirts of the city, at the behest of a grandee by the name of Chang Tun-li (fl. 1068-1102). Chang was very much like, and was indirectly related to, our noble host Wang Shen. Like Wang, he was a prominent painter and patron, and like Wang, he was married to one of Emperor Ying-tsung’s daughters. It is not an unreasonable conjecture that the Fa-yün ssu had earlier been a kind of private chapel located on Chang’s estate in the southern suburbs of the capital, and that he had reconstructed and expanded it to attract to the capital an eminent cleric like Fa-hsiu. For more on Chang Tun-li, see SJCSY 3:2410-2411; also Bush and Shih, Early Chinese Texts, 294.

69. Su Shih wen-chi 19, 2:561-562. This inscription makes effective use of references to the sound of a bell found in the Shou-teng-yen ching (Śūraṅgama Sūtra), with which Su Shih was clearly quite familiar. Su Shih apparently maintained some continuous connection with the Fa-yün temple; his collected writings include a short, undated composition commemorating the reconstruction of its bathhouse (Su Shih wen-chi 62, 5:1906-1907).

70. Su Shih wen-chi 61, 5:1885-1886. These are more like polite notes than letters, and they inform us of little other than the depth of Su Shih’s commitment to Buddhism, born in part from his worldly disappointments, and of his great respect for Fa-hsiu. Internal evidence (e.g., reference to Su Shih’s exile, etc.) indicates that the notes were written prior to Su’s 1086 return to Kaifeng, perhaps during his slow progress back from the exile in Huang-chou, which had ended in the spring of 1084. During that period Su Shih visited several of the locales in which Fa-hsiu had recently been living, including Chung-shan, and this may be how he came to know of Fa-hsiu. However, in one of the missives Su Shih acknowledges that he owed his knowledge of Fa-hsiu to letters he had received from Huang T’ing-chien. From this we can deduce that Huang T’ing-chien had known Fa-hsiu either before the monk’s 1084 arrival in the capital or immediately thereafter. Thus Huang may have introduced Fa-hsiu into the literati society of the capital. Both Huang and Su, of course, had close relations with other Ch’an monks as well, and Fa-hsiu, although he was revered by both, seems not to have been the chief Buddhist influence on either of the two great poets. For good, albeit brief, discussions of Su-shih’s relationship to Buddhism, see Yoshikawa Kōjirō, “So Tō-pa no bunagaku to Bukkyō,” Tsukamoto Hakushi shōju kinen: Bukkyōshi ronshū (Kyoto: 1961), 939-950; Chikusa Masaaki, “So Shoku to Bukkyō,” Tōhō Gakuhō, 36 (1964): 457-480; and Beata Grant, “Buddhism and Taoism in the Poetry of Su Shih” (Stanford Ph.D. diss., 1987). For a treatment of this topic as refracted by the lense of medieval Japanese Zen, see Asakura Hisashi, Zenrin no bungaku (Osaka: Seibundō, 1985), 457-499. I have not yet found comparable studies of Huang T’ing-chien’s Buddhism, although this, too, is a topic that deserves extensive treatment in its own right.

71. Also known as Fa-k’ung and later as Yüan-chao Ch’an-shih, Tsung-pen was perhaps the most eminent of I-huai’s many disciples. In 1082, after decades of prominence in Suchow and Hangchow, he was invited to the capital by Emperor Shen-tsung to preside over the Hui-lin Ch’an-yüan, an institution that was established in 1080 as one of the Ch’an components of the great Ta-hsiang-kuo temple complex and that quickly became one of the major centers of
Ch’an in Northern Sung Kaifeng. He eventually became chief abbot of the whole Ta-hsiang-kuo ssu compound, and served as host to Úich’on (1055-1101) when that royal Korean monk visited the Hsiang-kuo temple in 1085. See CCHTL 9 (HTC 136.142b-145b); CLSPC 14 (HTC 137.500a-502b); LTHY 28 (HTC 136.916a); CTPTL 3 (HTC 137.76a-77b); FTTTC 27 (T 49.278c); FTLTTT 19 (T49.677b-c); and SSCKL 4 (T49.875a, 876b).

72. Su Shih expressed this view in a letter inviting an otherwise unknown Ch’an monk named Ching-tz’u Fa-yung to come to the capital. He notes that at the time the invitation was extended, Fa-hsiu had already died and Tsung­pen had left the city. See Su Shih wen-chi 62, 5:1908.

73. The earliest version of this oft-told tale appears to be that found in Chüeh-fan Hui-hung’s works—either the longer version found in his LCYH (8, 905b), which was composed between 1111 and 1128, or the shorter version found in his CLSPC (26; HTC 137.545a), which dates from 1123.

74. Not only does this exchange appear in Buddhist sources concerning Fa­hsiui (e.g., CLSPC 26 [HTC 137.545a]), it is also mentioned in Huang T’ing­chien’s own writings. In his preface to a work entitled the Hsiao-shan chi, Huang confesses his dissolute youthful ways as a tippler and a composer of Yuéh-fu, and acknowledges his debt to Fa-hsiu as the only person ever to have called him properly to account for such behavior. He even specifies that the particular hell into which Fa-hsiu had said he was liable to be reborn was, appropriately enough, the “Hell of Slit Tongues.” See Yu-chang Huang hsien-sheng wen-chi 16 (SPTK ed.), 163b; also Sung-shih chi-shih 92 (4/2223-4).

75. Yu-chang Huang hsien-sheng wen-chi 14, 137b-138a. In the same work one may also find two inscriptions (ming) written for the Fa-yün temple in which Fa­hsiui is mentioned; ibid. 13, 122b. For a brief discussion of Huang’s relationship with Fa-hsiu (and one of the few pieces of modern scholarship that mentions the monk), see Chang Ping-ch’üan, Huang Shan-ku te chiao-yu chi tso-p’in (Hong Kong: Chung-wen Ta-hsüeh, 1978), 101-103. Of course, Huang T’ing-chien was well acquainted with a number of other Ch’an monks as well. For a discussion of the general question of Ch’an influence on Huang’s poetry, see Richard John Lynn, “The Sudden and the Gradual in Chinese Poetry Criticism: An Examination of the Ch’an-Poetry Analogy,” in Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual, pp. 381-427.

76. The most complete listing is in the lineage charts found in the ZGDJT (Keifu 10), which are based on an exhaustive survey of all the pertinent Ch’an histories. Note that Fa-hsiu’s particular lineage of Yün-men Ch’an continues in the records for only three generations after him. This is probably due in part to the disruption caused by the Chin conquest of northern China. Note, too, that in addition to the forty-eight students listed as formal disciples, he had many other important students who went on to study with other teachers and were formally identified as their descendants—e.g., Fa-yün Shen-pen (1037-1109), who is listed as an heir of Hui-lin Tsung-pen. Nevertheless, Shan-pen’s association with Fa-hsiu persisted, as we see in the fact that he was invited to serve as abbot of the Fa-yün ssu after Fa-hsiu’s death.

77. See CTTPL 5 (HTC 137.100b-101a); WTHY 16, 3:1065-1066; FTLTTT 19 (T49.678c-679a); and SSCKL 4 (T49.880a-c). Eventually Weipo left Kaifeng, perhaps to flee the Jurchen invaders, and he ended his days at the great T’ien-tung monastery, one of the largest Ch’an centers in the veritable forest of Ch’an temples located in the vicinity of Hangchow.

78. This thirteen-fascicle catalogue was apparently lost in China, but it was preserved in Japan. Sung printed editions of the work had been brought to
Japan in the fourteenth century and served as the basis of several later Japanese printings. One such, done in 1661, was the basis for the only modern edition of the work, viz., that found as item no. 37 in the second volume of the Shōwa hōbō sōmakuroku (T99. 571-772). Wei-po tells us in his postface (ibid., 771a) that in the summer of 1103, while proceeding on a pilgrimage to Mt. T'ien-t'ai, he stopped at the Chih-che Ch'an Monastery near Chin-hua shan in Wu-chou (mod. Chin-hua hsien, Chekiang). There he found a copy of the Tripitaka that he decided to catalogue. The task kept him at Chih-che ssu through the winter, and the catalogue was not finished until the spring of 1104. The particular canon he used seems to have been a copy of the K'ai-pao edition, with some additions and some texts missing. According to Wei-po's numbering system, it contained 1,048 titles. See Ts'ai Yun-ch'en, Erh-shih-wu-chung tsang-ching mu-lu tui-chao k'ao-shih (Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng, 1983), 563-576. The last few pages of Wei-po's catalogue contain a brief summary of Ch'an history and a very interesting set of Ch'an justifications for such learned undertakings as the collection and study of scripture, both of which echo Fa-hsiu's arguments that Ch'an and doctrinal Buddhism cannot be divorced from each other.


80. The Chinese practice of placing models of the five viscera in statues of the Buddha is well documented. Perhaps the best known example of this practice (significantly, a Sung example) is the famous sandalwood statue of Sakyamuni that the Japanese pilgrim-monk Chōnen (938-1016) brought back from China in 986 and had installed in the Seiryōji, a temple in the Saga district of Kyoto. This statue had been carved and sealed in 985, at the Kai-yüan ssu in Tai-chou. When the hollow cavity of the statue was opened nearly a thousand years later (in 1954), scholars found among the several fascinating articles contained therein a cloth replica of the five viscera which had been sewn by a group of Ta'i-chou nuns. See Gregory Henderson and Leon Hurvitz, "The Buddha of Seiryōji," Artibus Asiae 19 (1956): 5-55.

81. The most readily available edition of this text (but not the most interesting from an aesthetic point of view) is the one found in standard modern Japanese editions of the Tripitaka (T 45.793-806 and HTC 103.910-936). The work was first published around 1101. It was apparently lost in China by the early Yuan, but not before versions of it had been brought to Japan in the thirteenth or early fourteenth century. A Southern Sung Hangchow printing of the text, at least three copies of which survive in Japan, was the basis for several later Japanese editions, one of which was included in the T and HTC. See Jan Fontein, The Pilgrimage of Sudhana: A Study of the Gandavyūha Illustrations in China, Japan, and Java (Mouton: The Hague and Paris, 1967), 24-40; also Lokesh Chandra, Sudhana's Way to Enlightenment, Śata-pitaka Series, No. 224 (New Delhi: Smt. Sharada Rani, 1975), 7-63. Neither Fontein nor any other scholar hazards an explicit comment as to whether or not Wei-po drew the illustrations of the text in addition to composing its encomia. The version in the T and HTC, however, includes as its final panel a portrait of Wei-po together with an encomium about him, and this, I should think, would count against the hypothesis that he was himself the artist. Perhaps the illustrations were done by his patron, the painter Chang Tun-li. The brief preface to Fo-kuo's work found in all extant editions was written by yet another Buddhist layman and literatus of the day, the former Prime Minister Chang Shang-ying (1043-1122), who was an associate of Huang T'ing-chien, Ta-hui, Yu-an-wu K'o-ch'in, and several others whom we have had occasion to mention. As a particular friend of Hui-hung, Chang should be counted as an active participant in Wen-tzu Ch'an movement. See

82. For biographical sketches of this monk, who is also known as Tz’u-chüeh Ch’an-shih, and for samples of his discourse, see CCHTL 18 (HTC 136.266a-267a), CTPTL 5 (HTC 137.101b-102a), WTHY 16, 3:1071-1072, Tsung-hsiao’s (1151-1214) Lo-pang wen-lei 3 (T 47.193c), and P’u-tu’s (1199-1290) Lushan lien-tsong pao-chien 4 (T 47.324c-325a). See also Yanagida Seizan’s “Kaisetsu,” in Kajitani Sōnin, et al., eds., Shinjin-meifūdo·kajiigyu-zu Zazen- gi, Zen no Goroku 16 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1974), 231-233.

83. Tsung-tse figures prominently in the literature of Sung dynasty Pure Land Buddhism, and several of his shorter pieces on Pure Land themes have been preserved in important Sung and Yüan Pure Land compendia. See his Kuan Wu-liang-shou Fo ching hsü (Preface to the Amitāyurdhyāna Sūtra), his Ch’üan nien-Fo sung (Verses Promoting Devotional Meditation on the Person of the Buddha Amtabha), and his Hsi-fang ching-t’u sung (Verses in Praise of the Pure Land of the West)—all in Tsung-hsiao’s Lo-pang wen-lei (Assorted Texts on the Happy Land), T47.167a-b, 177b-178b, 219b-220a.


85. Tsung-tse is said to have authored a collection of 120 pieces entitled Writings in Promotion of Filial Piety (Ch’üan-hsiao wen). This work does not survive in its entirety but is mentioned in other Sung and Yüan Pure Land anthologies, one of which quotes a very short excerpt from it. See Tsung-hsiao’s (1151-1214) Lo-pang i-k’ao 2 (T 47.249a4-20) and Wang Jih-hsiu’s (d. 1173) Lung-shu tseng-kuang ching-t’u wen (T 47.271a22-b4).


87. Again, I am grateful to Professor Ellen Johnston Laing for providing me with a photocopy of this colophon.

88. Ch’en Kao-hua, Hua-chia shih-liao, p. 473.

89. This is the mountain located a few miles northwest of the seat of Wuhsien in Kiangsu. In 1126, Ta-hui had accompanied his teacher Yüan-wu K’o-ch’in on a flight south to escape the Chin invaders. For a time they stayed together at Chin-shan in southeastern Kiangsu, but in 1127, Ta-hui left Yüan-wu and traveled about 40 miles northwest to take up residence on Hu-ch’iu shan, where several monasteries were located. He stayed for about a year, residing at the Yün-yen ssu, a Ch’an institution that had been founded some decades earlier by Ch’i-sung. Beginning with the abbacy of Hu-ch’iu Shao-
lung (1077-1136), another disciple of Yüan-wu, the Yün-yen ssu became a flourishing center of the Yang-ch'i branch of Lin-ch'i Ch' an, one of the "tenfields" (shih-ch'a) of the Southern Sung Ch'an ecclesiastical establishment and a major point of origin for several of the Rinzai lineages of Japan.

90. *TMWK*, T 47.956b9-12. This anecdote would later catch the attention of Japanese Zen monks during the Muromachi and subsequent periods. The development of Gozan literary culture at that time raised again the question of the relationship between Zen and poetry, and Muso Soseki (1275-1351), among others, found occasion to employ Fa-hsiu's and Ta-hui's quip as a warning against the danger of allowing literary pursuits to become distractions from true Zen practice (see Pollack, *Fracture of Meaning*, 129-130). Of course, Muso was himself an ardent and accomplished poet. Later still, Ikkyü (1394-1481) would compose two poems on the theme of this anecdote—poems 140 and 141 of the *Kyounshii* (Crazy Cloud Anthology)—in which he would work an ironic Zen subversion of Fa-hsiu's original intent, suggesting that if Ta-hui had been truly compassionate he would not have ridiculed the monks who spoke of food but would have served them a supernal gourmet meal of the sort that Vimalakirti had served his assembly of bodhisattvas. See Sonja Arntzen, *Ikkyü and the Crazy Cloud Anthology: A Zen Poet of Medieval Japan* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986), 116-117.

91. See note 60.
92. *TMWK*, T 47.949c11-17.
93. The best available treatment of this topic is in Jonathan Chaves, *Mei Yao-ch'en and the Development of Early Sung Poetry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), esp. 114-132. Note Chaves' observation that "even and bland" style is associated with "rough diction" and need not imply only an etiolated or insipid quality. Note, too, the references Chaves has found to the "even and bland" as a style that "sticks in the mouth" and that is bitter and hard in taste, like olives. It was a label, he says, originally pejorative in connotation, which was later endowed with implications of praise and used to name positive literary values. All this is very reminiscent of Ch'an, and I suspect that further efforts to sort out the varieties of Sung Ch'an discourse according to the categories of Sung literary criticism would prove quite illuminating. The first of I-huai's two epigrams, the one that Shun Lao rejects, might profitably be compared, for example, to the diction of Hsi-k'un style poetry, to which the advocacy of p'ing-tan diction was a reaction (see ibid., pp. 64-68, 124, 131). Of course, this is simply the converse of the procedure followed by Yen Yü (ca. 1195 to ca. 1245) and others, who used Ch'an categories to classify and evaluate poetry (see Lynn, "Sudden and Gradual in Chinese Poetry Criticism," in Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual*).

94. Lynn, "Sudden and Gradual in Chinese Poetry Criticism," in Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual*, p. 385. The poem itself may be found, together with helpful annotation, in Wang Shui-chao, ed., *Su Shih hsüan-chi* (Shanghai: Shang-hai Ku-chieh Ch'u-p'an-she, 1984), 115-118. The monk to whom the poem was written was Tao-ch'ien, a.k.a. Ts'an-liao-tzu (1043 to ca. 1116). He was, like Fa-hsiu, a member of the Yün-men Ch'an lineage, having been a disciple of the little-known Ta-chüeh Huai-lien (1009-1090). A close friend of Su Shih, with whose career his became unfortunately entangled, Ts'an-liao-tzu was in his own day better known and respected as a poet than as a monk, and a collection of his works in twelve fascicles—the *Ts'an-liao-tzu shih*—survives today (*TPTK*, san-pien: chi; Lo no. 443). For more about Ts'an-liao-tzu see
Gimello

FTTC (T 49. 210c–211a), FTLT TT (T 49.665c), SS CKL 4 (T 49.877c, 879a), and S JCSY 5:4458–4459; also Li E, Sung-shih chi-shih 91 (Shanghai Ku-chieh Ch’u-p’an-she ed., 1983), 4:2196–2199.

95. See, for example, the six brief verses which Wei-po included in fascicle 39 of the CCHTL (HTC 136.392b).

96. Note here (e.g., WTHY 16, 3:1038) the possible allusion to characteristic early Ch’an teachings about the identity of Ch’an and the ordinary activities of daily life, teachings like those of Huai-tung (a.k.a. Lao Hua-yen), for which Fa-hsiu is said to have harbored a markedly ambivalent admiration in his youth (see note 54).

97. CCHTL 10 (HTC 136.157b18–158a2). The last enigmatic statement in this passage (my translation of which is tentative and free) is taken from Hsüeh-tou Ch’ung-hsien’s “note” or “capping phrase” (cho-yü) on one line in a famous kung-an about Chao-chou’s paradoxical inability to explain the oft-quoted Ch’an saying, “The ultimate Tao is without difficulty.” The note may now be found attached to this kung-an as it appears as case number 58 of the Pi- yen lu. A general theme of this case, and of Fa-hsiu’s use of his forebear’s phrasing, is the profound simplicity and spontaneity of Ch’an, qualities that are bound to be lost in any stiff or labored effort at profundity. But, of course, this itself is only the most artful sort of artlessness. In comparison with it, intentionally “profound” Ch’an, which is always an awkward and forced performance like “walking on a balance beam,” is actually downright easy—better yet, facile. Fa-hsiu used this figure of speech more than once. We see another occurrence of it in another of the dialogues of Fa-hsiu recorded by his disciple Wei-po, CCHTL 10 (HTC 136.157b2).

98. This characterization of Huang’s poetic talents is found in the writings of the Chin dynasty literatus and lay Buddhist, Li Ch’un-fu (hao: P’ing-shan, 1175–1234), who went on to say that Huang’s poesy—in its odd combination of polished vulgarity, close attention to past models, and meticulous craftsmanship—is like the practice of Ch’an (ts’an-ch’an). See Ch’uan Hsiian-tsung, Huang T’ing-chien ho Chiang-hsi shih-p’ai chüan, Ku-tien wen-hsieh yen-chiu tzu-liao hui-pien (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chi, 1978), 1:181. For more on Li P’ing-shan’s views of Ch’an and its relationship to literary culture, see Robert M. Gimello, “Hsing-hsiu, Li P’ing-shan,” forthcoming.

99. K’o-teng refers to a creeping, vinelike plant the tendrils of which grow in dense tangles. In modern Chinese botanical usage it refers to the Kudzu plant proper, i.e., Pueraria Thunbergiana, and that is probably what it most commonly meant in earlier colloquial usage as well, although there is some indication that the same compound sometimes served as the designation for wisteria. In Ch’an usage, which seems to derive ultimately from a phrase in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (latā-vidāna-pada = the kleśas as verbal superimpositions; see Paul Demiéville, trans., Entretiens de Lin-tsi, Documents Spirituels 6 [Paris: Fayard, 1972], 29), it was a synonym for “lettered” or “literary” (wen-tzu) Ch’an. Clearly, the term’s primary use was as a pejorative, suggesting that “words and letters” are an impenetrable thicket in which one can too easily become entangled. However, the word also has positive connotations in certain contexts, as when it is used to label the sort of beneficent verbal communication that links or intertwines master and disciple. Ta-hui himself often began letters to students by characterizing them as k’o-teng (“word-tendrils,” perhaps). This is in part simply a routine and rhetorical nod to the typical Ch’an distrust of words, but it is not only that; it also suggests the spiritual benefit that may accrue to a teacher’s use of discourse for compassionate, salvific purposes. Thus when Dōgen
later used the term (J. kattô) as the title and theme of one chapter of the Shōbō-genzō, he stressed that the image of intertwining vines symbolizes Zen transmission as well as the tangle of verbalization. In this he claimed to be following the teachings of his Chinese master, T’ien-t’ung Ju-ching (1163–1228). Kattô as word-tangles, Dōgen says, can be cut only with other kattô, in the sense of links in the mind-to-mind transmission of Zen. For a graceful translation of Dōgen’s “Kattô” chapter, see Kazuaki Tanahashi, ed., Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master Dōgen (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1985), 168–174. For a useful general summary of the various Ch’an uses of the term “k’o-teng,” based in part on the earlier work of great Tokugawa Zen scholar Mujaku Dōchū, see Yanaga­ida Seizan, trans., Rinzairoku, Butten kōza 30 (Tokyo: Daizō shuppansha, 1972), 47.

100. The Yüan-chüeh ching (T 17.913–920) is an eighth-century Chinese apocryphon that combines themes from the Hua-yen and Tathāgatagarbha traditions. It attracted the special interest of the Hua-yen and Ch’ an patriarch Tsung-mi (780–841), who wrote several influential commentaries on it, and it proved to be a major inspiration for many of his distinctive teachings, including his characteristic advocacy of the unification of Ch’ an and doctrinal Buddhism. The text became quite influential during the late T’ang and the Sung, and seems to have been taken, along with the Show-leng-yen ching (*Śūramgama Sūtra), as the expression of a kind of Buddhist gnosticism, i.e., a view that Buddhists have commonly called “the Śrenika heresy.” Its central argument seems to be an assertion of utter difference between the realm of ordinary illusory experience and the immaculate and transcendent absolute that is thought to be embodied in the perfect and natural purity of the mind. Although frequently cited by Sung Ch’an teachers, its message was in fundamental respects contradictory to the Ch’an conviction that the absolute and the relative are mutually inextricable. Thus it was a controversial text and appears to have been condemned or questioned as often as it was praised. Exactly what aspect of the text’s teaching Fa-hsiu had in mind when he used it to rebuke Hsiao-shun we simply cannot say. Perhaps it was intended to stand for a kind of inert or placid Ch’an, devoid of the sort of vital tension that Hsiao-shun’s relentlessly critical attitude seeks to sustain. An unsatisfactory translation of the Yüan-chüeh ching, together with the comments of the Ming Buddhist Han-shan Tè-ch’ing (1546–1623), is available; see Lu K’uan-yû (Charles Luk), trans., Ch’ an and Zen Teaching, Series 3 (London: Rider & Co., 1962), 148–278.

101. This phrase, too, is an allusion. Hsuêh-tou Ch’ung-hsien, in the verse he composed to accompany the eighteenth of his “hundred old cases”—which verse is now found in the eighteenth case of the Pi-yen lu—uses the same trope. Yüan-wu K’o-ch’in would later use it again in his introduction to the eighty-ninth case of the same kung-an anthology. There are probably other early examples of its use to which Fa-hsiu might have been alluding, but I have not yet found them. I confess, too, that although the image of “a whole body being an eye” was probably meant to convey more than generic praise, its precise meaning eludes me.

102. TMWK (T 47.943c13–20).


104. I take these quotations from a very erudite and wise book about literary learning and the Christian monastic life that even students of Ch’an Buddhist

105. *CCHTL* 10 (*HTC* 136.157b3–4) and *WTHY* 3:1038, to cite just two of its occurrences.

**Glossary**

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</tbody>
</table>
Fo-tsu t'ung-chi 佛祖統記
Fu-chou 福州
fu-ku 復古
Gozan 五山
Gozan Bungaku 五山文學
hai-tao 客道
Hakuin 白隠
Han Kan 韓幹
Han-shan Te-ch'ing 虚山德清
Han Yu 韓愈
hao-meng 豪孟
Ho-nan Ch'eng-shih i-shu 河南程氏遺書
honshitsu 本質
Hsi-fang ching-t'u sung 西方靜土頌
Hsi-hsien ssu 擇賢寺
Hsi-yan ya-chi t'u 西園雅集
Hsiang-lin-Ch'eng-yüan 香林澄遠
Hsiao-ching 孝經
Hsiao-shan chi 小山集
Hsiao-shun 晩舜
Hsiao-yang 晚肇
Hsieh Liang-tso 謝良佐
Hsien-shou chiao 賢首教
Hsin 心
hsin-shu shih pen 心術是本
Hsing-hsiao 行秀
Hsing-hua Ts'un-chiang 興化堂
Hsiu Yüan-t'ung 秀園通
hsüan-ke 懷隴
hsüeh 學
hsüeh-ch' an 學禪
Hsüeh-feng 1-t's un 雪峰義存
Hsüeh-tou Ch'ung-hsien 雪竇震軒
Hsüeh-tou po-tse sung-ku 雪竇百則頌古
Hu-ch' iu 虎丘
Hu-ch'iu Shao-lung 虎丘紹隆
Hu-kuo ssu 護國寺
hua-t'ou 話頭
Hua-yen 華嚴
Huatung 懷洞
Huang-chou 黃州
Huang-lung 黃龍
Huang T'ing-chien 黃庭堅
Hui-chung 惠洪
Hui-lang 惠朗
Hui-lin Ch' an-yüan 惠林禪院
Hui-lin Tsung-pen 惠林宗本
Hui-neng 惠能
Hui-tsung 徽宗
Hung-chih Cheng-chüeh 宏智正覺
huo-chü 活句
I-huai 義懷
Ikkü 一休
i su wei ya 以素為雅
I-t's un 義存
Kaifeng 開封
K'ai-pao ssu 開寶寺
k'ai-shan 開山
K'ai-yüan ssu 開元寺
Kan-t'an Tzu-kuo 感譚資國
k'an-hua 拷話
kattō 葛藤
ke 隔
ko-t' eng 葛藤
ko-t' eng Ch' an 葛藤禪
kōan 公案
Kōhō Jitsuge 格峰實外
ku-t'ung 空
ku-tse 古則
Kuan Wu-liang-shou Fo ching hsü 觀無量壽佛經序
Kuan-yin 觀音
Kuei-chü-lai tsu 歸去來辭
Kuei-tsung Chih-ch' ang 歸宗智常
kung-an 公案
Kuo-tzu men 圓子門
Kyōunshū 狂雲集
Lao Hua-yan 老華嚴
Leng-ch'ai yeh-hua 冷齋夜話
Leng-yen ching ho lun 楞嚴經合論
li 理
Li Chao-tao 李昭道
Li Chih-i 李之儀
Li Ch'un-fu 李純甫
Li E 厲鴻
Li Kung-lin 李公麟
Li Lang-chung 李郎中
Li Lien 李濬
Li P'ing-shan 李屏山
Li Po 李渤
li-ju 理入
Lien-hua sheng-hui lu-wen 蓮華勝會錄文
Lien-she 聯社
Lien-teng hui-yao 聯燈會要
Lin-chi 臨濟
Lin-ch'i lu 臨濟錄
Lin-chi tsung-chih 臨濟宗旨
Lin-chien lu 林問錄
Liu Ching 劉澄
Liu-ho 六合
Lo Chih-hsien 羅知隸
Lo-han 羅漢
Lo-pang i-k'ao 樂邦遺稿
Shortening the Path: Early Tendai Interpretations of the Realization of Buddhahood with This Very Body (Sokushin Jōbutsu)

Paul Groner

Introduction

One of the major characteristics of Japanese Buddhism has been a tendency to describe the ultimate goal of practice as being attainable either within a person’s lifetime or soon after death. Discussions of how such attainments might be possible can be traced back to the early Heian period—as soon as Japanese monks such as Saichō (767-822) and Kūkai (774-835), the founders of the Tendai and Shingon schools, began developing their own views of the path.

A number of aspects of a shorter path to enlightenment could be enumerated, but three are particularly relevant to the discussion of the path in early Japanese Buddhism. First, Tendai and Shingon monks were relatively uninterested in the detailed presentations of rebirth and karma that had captured the attention of the Hossō (Ch. Fa-hsiang) monks that had dominated Nara-period (710-784) Buddhism. Although karma and rebirth are recurring themes both in popular literature concerning morality and in classical literature, they did not receive nearly as much attention from Tendai and Shingon monks interested in doctrinal issues. Second, although Japanese Buddhists were certainly attracted to celestial buddhas and bodhisattvas in their devotional worship and doctrinal discussions, they also brought the concept of buddhahood “down to earth,” often insisting that it was attainable by ordinary people “with this very body” (sokushin). Historical figures were called “bodhisattvas” (bosatsu), sometimes during their lifetimes.¹ Monks advanced arguments which claimed that a person could manifest enlightenment even as he was beset by defilements. Third, discussions of the path were often based on two types of criterion: the enumeration of defilements to be eliminated and the manifestation of untainted wis-
dom. The two were often combined, but Japanese Buddhism gradually tended to place increasing emphasis on the problem of how the innately enlightened mind could be made manifest. At times, any semblance of balance between the two types was lost as scholars argued that the enlightened mind could be manifest even without eliminating defilements.

Early Japanese Tendai discussions of the concept of the realization of buddhahood with this very body (sokushin jōbutsu) offer an opportunity to investigate the arguments that led to these positions as Japanese thinkers both compared their positions with those found in Chinese T’ien-t’ai and defended them against Hossō criticisms.

This chapter consists of four major sections. In the first the historical background of the discussion is sketched, while the last three sections concern doctrinal issues. The second and third sections are based on issues raised in the Tendai scholar Annen’s (841-889?) two-part definition of sokushin jōbutsu as realization of buddhahood while a worldling (bonbu) and within a single lifetime (isshō jōbutsu). Arguments for the realization of buddhahood by worldlings typify efforts by Heian-period Tendai thinkers to explain how buddhahood might be made accessible to ordinary people during their current lifetimes, rather than remaining a goal solely for advanced practitioners. In arguing for the realization of buddhahood within a single lifetime, some Tendai thinkers gradually inflated their claims about the efficacy of their practices. In doing so, they discussed whether sokushin jōbutsu entailed full or partial realization of enlightenment, and whether a practitioner could leap past some stages or had to go through each stage in order.

The fourth section concerns Tendai efforts to reconcile differences between Chinese T’ien-t’ai and Esoteric Buddhist (mikkyō) claims about the efficacy of their practices. According to authoritative Esoteric scriptures, as well as Kūkai’s Shingon school, Esoteric practices were superior to those from the exoteric tradition. However, such a position violated Saichō’s dictum that the Perfect teaching and Esoteric Buddhism had the same purport. Tendai monks thus devoted considerable energy to discussing the relationship of the two traditions. In terms of the path, monks asked whether the two types of practices were simply alternate paths that led to the same goal or whether they were to be combined in a hierarchical fashion. Finally, in the conclusion, some of the factors that led Japanese monks to insist on realization of buddhahood with this very body are investigated and the practical import of these claims for Tendai monks is explored.

**Historical Background**

One year before his death, Saichō, the founder of the Japanese Tendai school, introduced a new term to Tendai discourse, “the realization of
buddhahood with this very body” (sokushin jōbutsu). Developing his argument in a line-by-line commentary on the *Lotus Sūtra* story of the realization of buddhahood by an eight-year-old Nāga girl, Saichō argued that sentient beings could quickly realize advanced stages on the path to buddhahood through the power of the *Lotus*. Like several other terms adopted by Saichō, *sokushin jōbutsu* had rarely been used in China and was not particularly well defined. In addition, the absence of a developed set of commentarial positions on the story freed Saichō and his successors to develop their own views on the story and its implications for the path without constantly having to refer to Indian and Chinese views.

Saichō used the concept of *sokushin jōbutsu* primarily to bolster his claims for the superiority of Tendai practice and doctrine over those of the Hossō school. However, he died before he could develop his views in any detail, leaving a number of basic issues for his disciples to puzzle over. Among these were the practices that resulted in *sokushin jōbutsu*, the implications of emphasizing the physical aspects (*sokushin*) of realization, and whether the entire path could be traversed with only one lifetime of practice. Once Saichō had died the term could have simply been ignored, as were many other expressions introduced by Saichō, but several factors led to its becoming important in Tendai thought.

First, the term was intrinsically fascinating to Tendai monks. Realization with this very body suggested that buddhahood or high levels of the path were attainable in the immediate future. The second major factor that led Tendai monks to become interested in the term concerned events in the rival Shingon school. At approximately the same time that Saichō introduced *sokushin jōbutsu* to Tendai discourse, Kūkai, founder of the Shingon school, also became interested in the term, eventually writing an impressive tract on it entitled *Sokushinjobutsugi* (*T* 2428). As a result, *sokushin jōbutsu* came to have a central place in Japanese Esoteric doctrine and practice.

Kūkai’s treatment of the term relied on different sources and doctrines than Saichō’s discussion. In addition, Kūkai criticized Tendai doctrines in some of his other works, ranking Tendai below both the Shingon and the exoteric Kegon traditions. Tendai monks could not ignore Shingon teachings because the Shingon school’s mastery of Esoteric Buddhism made it a major rival in recruiting able monks and procuring patronage from the Japanese nobility. As a result, Tendai monks were forced to refine their concept of *sokushin jōbutsu* in their own way, developing the implications of the story of the Nāga girl and incorporating some aspects of Esoteric Buddhism into their discussions. In the process, they raised a number of significant questions about the nature and length of the path to buddhahood.

A brief survey of some of the writings on *sokushin jōbutsu* by authors after Saichō will help orient the reader to some of the later development
in the arguments. Approximately one or two decades after Saichō's death, Tendai leaders such as Gishin (781-833), Kōjō (779-858), Enchō (771-837), and Tokuen (b. 787) began compiling lists of questions concerning Tendai doctrine and practice and sending them to their Chinese counterparts. This literature, called the *Toketsu* (Décisions from China [on Doctrinal Issues]), provides one of the major sources for this study. It is particularly important because early Tendai monks expressed their interests in an open and uncomplicated manner. Many of their questions ask their Chinese counterparts for help in defining *sokushin jöbutsu* and the practices necessary for quick enlightenment. The answers by Chinese monks often demonstrate that they did not fully appreciate or sympathize with Japanese interests in a quicker and easier way to enlightenment.

Several years later, Ennin (794-864) played a particularly important role in the development of theories of *sokushin jöbutsu* after his return from China in 847. Although the term is mentioned only occasionally in his extant writing, several of Ennin's disciples—Anne (795-868), Rinshō (fl. late ninth century), and Annen (841-889?)—wrote on the subject. Texts entirely devoted to *sokushin jöbutsu* by Rinshō and Annen focused on exoteric sources for the teaching, particularly the story of the Naga girl. Their writings include some of the most detailed discussions of the implications of the story of the Naga girl for the path to enlightenment; but their analyses of the term are limited to theoretical considerations, often focusing on the reconciliation of seeming discrepancies between texts.

The term "shiki" (private record) in the title of the texts by Annen and Rinshō reflects the question-and-answer format of the text and suggests that they were probably used in debates. As a result, the texts should not be interpreted as describing a position with which all Tendai monks would have agreed. Although Shingon monks could treat Kūkai's *Sokushin jöbutsugi* as an authoritative text on *sokushin jöbutsu*, Tendai monks never had a single text that all could agree was the ultimate authority on the term. The Tendai school was divided into a number of factions that were usually based as much on personal and institutional alliances as on doctrinal positions. As a result, individual monks employed a variety of practices. Thus positions on issues such as the ease of realizing buddhahood might differ considerably within a faction. Even though monks often claimed to adopt the position of their teacher, they did not always actually do so, as the example of Ennin and Annen illustrates.

Annen's interpretation of *sokushin jöbutsu* is further complicated by texts in which he interpreted it through Esoteric Buddhist thought and practice. Tendai interests in Esoteric Buddhism probably led monks to inflate claims for the efficacy of *sokushin jöbutsu*, arguing that it was much more effective than it had appeared to be in Saichō's brief discus-
sion of it. Discussions of the practices that led to quick enlightenment appear often in Tendai texts on Esoteric Buddhism.

The views of Annen and his contemporaries can be contrasted with those of Hōjibō Shōshin (1136–1220 or 1131–1215), a Tendai monk who represented a conservative branch of Tendai interpretation. Shōshin, the author of authoritative commentaries on Chih-i’s (538–597) writings, was not optimistic about the possibility of realizing buddhahood in a single lifetime. As a result, he was sharply critical of many of the theories concerning rapid realization of enlightenment. However, since these teachings had been maintained by highly respected Tendai scholars, Shōshin could not directly contradict them; instead, he had to explain away teachings such as sokushin jōbutsu as being theoretically possible but not especially practical.

In contrast, Tendai monks who stressed Esoteric Buddhist practices often felt that a high stage on the path to buddhahood, or buddhahood itself, could be attained. Thus the ninth-century Tendai Esoteric masters Ennin and Annen gave sokushin jōbutsu a more prominent place in their writings than did Shōshin. The diversity of Tendai monks’ views on sokushin jōbutsu was not lost on their opponents. The Shingon monk Jippan (d. 1144) criticized Tendai teachings on the subject and concluded that the Kegon teaching on the realization of buddhahood within three lifetimes was superior because it was more consistent. Some of the doctrinal arguments that led to the diversity of opinion among Tendai monks are discussed below.

The Ordinary Person and the Realization of Buddhahood

When Saichō argued that sokushin jōbutsu was a teaching that described some of those who had attained the stage of partial realization (bunshō soku), the fifth of the six degrees of identity, he noted that such an accomplishment was for skilled practitioners with advanced religious faculties. Indeed, he probably felt that relatively few individuals could hope to realize buddhahood during their current lifetimes, and that even those with advanced faculties might require three lifetimes. Saichō’s attitude was in keeping with the Chinese patriarchs of the school who had not claimed very high spiritual attainments. For example, shortly before his death, Chih-i stated that he considered himself to be within the five ranks of disciples, a stage corresponding to the third of the six degrees of identity. Even in later sources, such as the thirteenth-century history, the Fo-tsu t’ung-chi (Record of the Lineage of the Buddha and Patriarchs), Hui-wen (fl. first half of the sixth century) is said to have realized the first abode (equivalent to the fifth degree of identity) and Hui-ssu (515–577) to have entered the ten degrees of faith (equivalent to the fourth degree of identity).

Thus claims to have realized the fifth or sixth degrees of identity
were rare in Chinese T’ien-t’ai. Consequently, although Saicho had stressed the possibility of realizing buddhahood with one’s current body, few of his Chinese predecessors or Japanese Tendai contemporaries seem to have hoped for such a realization during their own lifetime. However, within a few decades after Saicho’s death, attempts were made to demonstrate that sokushin jōbutsu was relevant to greater numbers of people. If it could be shown to occur at the lower stages within the six degrees of identity, then it would become directly relevant to the practice of many ordinary monks.

One of the earliest efforts to apply sokushin jōbutsu to lower stages can be seen in Kōjō’s questions to the Chinese T’ien-t’ai master Tsung-ying:

Does the teaching of sokushin jōbutsu apply to those at the first abode [the fifth degree of identity] or does it also apply to those in [the fourth degree of identity, resemblance (sōji soku)], and onward? If we say that it applies to those of the first abode, then [the transition] from a lifespan and body determined by karmic cause (bunt/an) to a body and lifespan that are chosen (hennyaku) would certainly entail death and subsequent rebirth. How could this be called “the realization of buddhahood with this very body” (sokushin jōbutsu)? If the term “sokushin jōbutsu” applies to those from the stage of identity of resemblance onward, in which sūtras and śāstras is this teaching explained? If Hui-ssu and Chih-i preached this teaching, where are the relevant passages found?

Tsung-ying replied that sokushin jōbutsu could be applied to the fourth of the six degrees of identity because “at the last state of mind within the identity of resemblance any obstacles to the first abode must be eliminated. . . . If ignorance is not eliminated at identity of resemblance, then how can one attain the first abode?” Although Tsung-ying’s reply may seem to bring the stage at which sokushin jōbutsu can occur down only an instant, it nevertheless bridges the gap between the attainments open to the worldling (bonbu) with his defiled mind and those accessible to the sage (shō) who has begun to experience untainted wisdom, traversing the gulf between worldly beings whose bodies and lifespans are karmically determined (bundan) and sages who can choose their bodies and lifespans. Thus his answer seems to allow for the possibility that worldly beings who still have some of the coarser defilements might experience sokushin jōbutsu.

Once the gap between worldly beings and sages had been crossed, subsequent Tendai monks extended sokushin jōbutsu to lower levels of the six degrees of identity. Tsung-ying’s willingness to agree to Kōjō’s suggestion may have been due to his interest in both T’ien-t’ai and Esoteric Buddhist teachings and practice. In several cases, he was more willing to accept Japanese suggestions for a freer interpretation of doctrine than some of the other T’ien-t’ai monks who answered the Toketsu.
Tsung-ying also advanced Kōjō's arguments by supplying several phrases from the *Lotus Śūtra*, the *Wu-liang-i ching* (Śūtra of Innumerable Meanings), and the writings of Chih-i and Hui-ssu which supported the argument that realization of high stages on the path could be completed within a single lifetime. These were all short passages that did not describe practices in any detail. For example, among the citations were "acquiescence to the unborn nature of phenomena with this body" from the *Wu-liang-i ching*, and "[A follower of] the Perfect teaching can leap (*chōtō*) to the tenth stage in a single lifetime with a body of flesh (*nikushin*)" from Chih-i's *Fa-hua hsüan-i* (Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra).13

Tsung-ying also argued that both Hui-ssu and Chih-i had achieved the state of sages (*shō*), which meant attaining at least the fifth degree of identity. The troublesome passages in which Chih-i claimed to have reached only the third of the six degrees of identity on the path were dismissed as being due to Chih-i hiding his virtues out of modesty. According to Tsung-ying,

Fa-tsang said that the virtuous practices of Hui-ssu and Chih-i are difficult to fathom. Did they realize virtual enlightenment (*togaku*) or supreme enlightenment (*myōkaku*)? Many of the learned monks in China believe that Hui-ssu must have been a sage on this earth. If this were not so, then how could he have abandoned the life that he had expediently assumed in China in order to become ruler of Japan and accomplish so much for Buddhism?14

By arguing that Hui-ssu, Chih-i, and others had actually attained high stages on the path, Tsung-ying suggested that the Japanese interest in rapid realization was justified.

If the stage at which a monk could realize *sokushin jōbutsu* were lowered, at least some of the time-consuming and difficult practices of the path could be eliminated. Kōjō suggested this when he asked about the significance of the Tendai teaching that each of the ten states of existence (or dharma realms) contains the other nine states. Thus a human being could be reborn in a state as miserable as a denizen of hell or attain a state as exalted as Buddha. To Kōjō, this teaching suggested the possibility of rapid realization of Buddhahood. Kōjō also noted that the threefold truth of nonsubstantiality, provisional existence, and the middle is embodied in each of the realms, a teaching which implies that enlightenment must not be very distant.15 Kōjō consequently asked whether a worldling who understood this teaching could enter the ranks of the buddhas with his current body, whether he would be able to master the *Lotus* meditation (*Hokke-zanmai*), and whether he could travel to different realms. Finally, he inquired whether "a person could naturally enter the ranks of the sages by simply knowing [the ultimate teaching]
and not practicing religious austerities? If so, what stage would he realize?"

Tsung-ying warned against confusing the discussions of the practitioner's unchanging basic nature (shōtoku) which enabled him to realize enlightenment with discussions of religious practice. Although in principle (ni) "there is no difference between the gradual and sudden realization [of enlightenment]," when practice is considered, "the speed of realization depends on how hard a person strives. If you consider these factors, you will know whether a person will attain [his goal] in this lifetime or a future lifetime." Finally, Tsung-ying rejected Kōjō's suggestion that knowledge alone might be sufficient for the attainment of a higher stage on the path, saying, "[What you suggest] is like looking at a road but not traveling it. One cannot expect to finally arrive [at his destination]." 16

Kōjō's question reflects the tension between defining the path as the manifestation of the innate nature of the mind (a theme brought out in such schemes as the six levels of identity) and defining it through the elimination of defilements (a theme emphasized in such lists as the fifty-two stages). Chinese T'ien-t'ai thinkers generally balanced these two schemes by equating the fifty-two stages with the six degrees of identity, whereas Kōjō's question clearly emphasized the manifestation of an enlightened mind over consideration of the defilements. As part of his effort to determine whether ordinary people could realize enlightenment, Kōjō asked whether buddhahood could be realized by someone who had not eliminated his defilements. In effect, he was asking whether major segments of the path might be eliminated or skipped by the practitioner, or whether a person could realize the mind of a buddha while he still had all or most of the defilements of a worldling. 17

Question: Can buddhahood be realized without cutting off the defilements, or not? If we say that the defilements must be cut off, then [we adopt the] same teachings as those who teach the three vehicles. If we say that a person realizes buddhahood while he still has defilements, then how can he realize buddhahood while he still has defilements which are [normally considered to be] obstacles [to enlightenment]? . . .

Answer: In regard to your question . . . , the defilements are essentially identical to [the three truths of] nonsubstantiality, provisional existence, and the middle. If the defilements are eliminated, then the three truths are eliminated. 18

Tsung-ying followed traditional Tendai lines when he continued by noting that the Buddha remains "within the great sea of defilements" in order to help sentient beings, but does not cling to either the concept of
eliminating the defilements or the concept of not eliminating them: “He preaches both cutting off defilements and not cutting them off in accordance with the religious faculties of his audiences.” Tsung-ying cautioned Kōjō that the bodhisattva who practiced in accordance with the Perfect teaching should not despise the Hinayana teaching that the defilements must be eliminated; belittling such a teaching would hinder his resolve to save all beings. Descriptions of the Buddha’s relationship to the defilements did not necessarily apply to practitioners at earlier stages in their training, since they could lead to misunderstandings. Tsung-ying continued:

If we discuss practice and realization (shutoku), then [we must note that] whether our vision of the principle is clear or obscured depends on the strength of our defilements. If our faculties are advanced and our defilements weak, then we can obtain realization in one lifetime. But if our faculties are dull and our obstacles heavy, then it will require at least two and perhaps many lifetimes to attain sagehood.19

Thus, although Tsung-ying was willing to agree with Kōjō that the term “sokushin jōbutsu” might be applied to monks late in the fourth degree of identity, he firmly argued that those in the early stages needed to practice assiduously and be concerned with the elimination of their defilements.

Several decades later, a number of Tendai monks were suggesting that sokushin jōbutsu might be applied to all six degrees of identity except the first, as the following passage from Ennin’s disciple Rinshō suggests.

Question: Is it the case that the teaching of the realization of buddhahood with this body applies only to the higher levels [of practitioners] and not to the remaining [lower] levels?
Answer: According to one theory, the teaching applies to [the second degree,] verbal identity (myōji soku) and above, not just to the attainment of the first abode. . . .

Question: Why does the doctrine [of sokushin jōbutsu] not apply to the [first level,] identity in principle (ri soku)?

Answer: Identity in principle applies only to a person’s innate (shōtoku) buddhahood. The issue of the realization of buddhahood is not relevant. Doctrines concerning the realization of buddhahood apply only to cases where practice results in realization.20

Rinshō’s views were influenced by Esoteric teachings brought back from China by Ennin. On the basis of teachings and practices from a Chinese master of Esoteric Buddhism, Yūan-cheng, Ennin argued that the attainment of buddhahood could be classified into two major types:
(1) realization by worldlings (bon’i jöbutsu), and (2) realization by sages (shōi jöbutsu). In realization by worldlings, the practitioner had still not eliminated all defilements but had obtained the wisdom of a buddha. Such achievements were possible through the empowerment of and response to (kaji) the Buddha manifested through the three mysteries (sanmitsu), the basis of Japanese Esoteric practices.21

Because of such teachings, by the end of the ninth century buddhahood seemed to be much more accessible to Japanese Tendai monks than it had at the beginning of the century. A unique Japanese Tendai view of the path, based on a mixture of Tendai and Esoteric teachings, had begun to emerge.

The Realization of Supreme Enlightenment in a Single Lifetime

Saichō’s discussion of realizing buddhahood within three lifetimes suggests that the term “sokushin jöbutsu” referred to partial realization of buddhahood within three lifetimes (sanshō jöbutsu). In part, this was because the transition between a life and body determined by karmic causes (bundan shōji) and a life determined by one’s wishes (hennyaku shōji) seemed to require rebirth. However, Saichō’s position seemed to contradict his use of the phrase “realization of buddhahood with this very body,” since if death intervened between stages, buddhahood could hardly have been realized with the practitioner’s current body (genshin). Moreover, waiting several lifetimes, although more promising than the Hossō school’s timespan of three incalculable aeons, still placed buddhahood farther away than many Tendai monks wished. After Saichō’s death, Tendai monks began to ask exactly how far a person can progress toward buddhahood with the religious practices of a single lifetime. Here, three aspects of this problem are discussed: (1) whether sokushin jöbutsu refers to realization within three lifetimes or during the practitioner’s current lifetime; (2) whether partial or full realization can be gained within the practitioner’s current lifetime; and (3) whether certain stages can be skipped.

Three Lifetimes versus the Current Lifetime

After Saichō’s death, Tendai monks were more interested in how far one could progress in a single lifetime than in the realization of buddhahood within three lifetimes. Although brief discussions of the latter can be found in the texts by Rinshō and Annen, Tendai authors’ main interest lay in determining whether the ultimate goal of buddhahood, or a stage close to it, could be realized within the practitioner’s current lifetime.22

The trend toward deemphasizing the possibility of enlightenment in the next several lifetimes as an element of sokushin jöbutsu became evi-
dent soon after Saicho’s death. In the Min’yu benwakushō (Essays Compassionately Explaining Delusions), Anne cited the Kuan P’u-hsien p’u-sa hsing-fa ching (Sutra on the Meditation on the Bodhisattva Universal Virtue) passage that Saicho had quoted in order to support the view that followers of the Lotus Sutra would realize buddhahood within three lifetimes. However, Anne quoted only the first part of the passage, which mentions realization in one lifetime. By omitting the last part of the passage, which says that realization might require two or three lifetimes, Anne clearly indicated that he was primarily interested in the realization of supreme enlightenment in this current lifetime.23

By Annen’s time, the realization of enlightenment in a single lifetime had become an integral part of many presentations of sokushin jōbutsu, which Annen defined as having two major components: realization of buddhahood within a single lifetime (isshō jōbutsu), and realization of buddhahood while a worldling (bonbu).24 The issue of realization within three lifetimes was not mentioned as an element of sokushin jōbutsu.

Partial versus Full Realization

Gishin (781–833), who accompanied Saicho to China and served as the second head (zasu) of the Tendai school, briefly discussed whether a person could become a buddha in a single lifetime in the Tendai Hokkeshū gishū (Collection of Tendai Lotus School Doctrines), as part of his treatment of the Perfect teaching:

Question: According to this teaching, how much time is required to become a buddha?
Answer: In a single lifetime, one can enter the abode (jū) in which the enlightened mind appears. . . .

Question: Does “becoming a buddha in a single lifetime” (isshō jōbutsu) refer to partial realization (bunshōka) or to full realization (kukyōka)?
Answer: [It refers to] partial realization, not full realization.

Question: Should we not call such a person a bodhisattva rather than a buddha?
Answer: If such a person is considered from above, he should be called a bodhisattva; but if he is considered from below, he is called a buddha.

Question: According to the Perfect teaching, what is a fully realized buddha?
Answer: The Tathāgata Birushana [Vairocana] in his self-oriented aspect.25

Gishin’s position was close to that of Saichō; both equated sokushin jōbutsu with the partial realization of enlightenment, the fifth of the six degrees of identity (roku soku).
Gishin’s discussion clarified a number of important points. First, he noted that the term “realization of buddhahood” (jobutsu) might not refer to the ultimate goal of the practitioner. Rather, when an ordinary person viewed an advanced practitioner, the ordinary person might consider the advanced practitioner to be a buddha, even though that practitioner had not yet realized the ultimate goal. Second, he argued that “the realization of buddhahood in a single lifetime” referred only to partial realization, not supreme realization. Like the Chinese T’ien-t’ai thinkers whom he cited in the Tendai Hokkeshū gishū, Gishin believed that the full realization of supreme enlightenment was an exalted state that could not be readily attained in a short period of time.

Enchō, Gishin’s successor as head of the Tendai school, questioned whether the Nāga girl could really have made so much progress on the path to enlightenment in just one lifetime. In effect, he was asking whether sokushin jobutsu was an ultimate teaching or merely an expedient one.

Question: In an explanation of the stages of practice, there is a passage stating that a person can practice and attain the stages from the first degree [of the disciple (shobon)] to the first abode during a single lifetime. . . . Now my question is: If this is so, then are there any examples of people who have performed such a feat? If the Nāga girl is cited as an example, she must have attained this stage because of her practices during previous lifetimes. She therefore cannot be an example of what can be realized within a single lifetime. . . . If no example [of such an achievement exists,] then how can the teaching be valid?

In addition, according to the [Ta-sheng] ch’i-hsin lun (The Awakening of Faith According to the Mahāyāna), “For the sake of weak-willed men, bodhisattvas sometimes demonstrate how to quickly attain Perfect enlightenment by leaping over stages. Other times, for the sake of those who are indolent, bodhisattvas state that men attain enlightenment at the end of countless aeons. Thus they can demonstrate innumerable expedient means and wondrous feats. But in reality all these bodhisattvas are the same, in that they are alike in their lineage, their capacity, their aspiration, and their realization; therefore there is no such thing as leaping over the stages, for all bodhisattvas must pass through the three terms of innumerable aeons [before they attain enlightenment].” If rapid realization is merely an expedient teaching, then why do texts state that it is possible to practice for a single lifetime and realize [enlightenment] in that lifetime?

In his question, Enchō asked about two vital issues. The first was whether it was possible to name anyone who had made remarkable
practice in a single lifetime. The answer by the Chinese T’ien-t’ai monk Wei-chüan showed little appreciation of the urgency of Japanese concerns. Enchō and others wanted concrete proof of the practicality of Tendai teachings through an example of someone who had made such rapid progress. The story of the Nāga girl was so remarkable that she was not a satisfactory model for practicing monks. Wei-chüan avoided answering the question by noting that when the buddha-nature of all existence is considered, expedient and ultimate are not to be distinguished.

The second issue was how to reconcile Tendai claims for the rapid realization of enlightenment with passages indicating that such claims were merely expedient teachings. In other words, how could statements that rapid realization was an expedient teaching devised to encourage “weak-willed men” be reconciled with Tendai claims that sokushin jōbutsu was the highest teaching? Wei-chüan answered by citing Hua-yen doctrines that “many aeons can be illuminated in a single instant.” Such academic answers, although doctrinally correct, must have been frustrating for the practical Japanese monks, who wanted a straightforward answer about the amount of time buddhahood might require.

A major component of the discussion over the efficacy of sokushin jōbutsu concerned how far the practitioner could progress in a lifetime of practice. Was it actually possible for an ordinary person to attain supreme enlightenment, the very highest stage, in a single lifetime? Or, as Saichō and Gishin seem to have indicated, was the goal of sokushin jōbutsu the attainment of partial realization?

In the Min’yu benwakushō, Anne compiled a number of scriptural citations supporting sokushin jōbutsu, many of which indicated that a stage higher than the first abode could be realized. Included were passages which suggested that the first, seventh, or tenth grounds, or even supreme enlightenment, could be attained. Anne’s search for other sources shows that Tendai monks did not always find the answer they wanted in the story of the Nāga girl. For example, although Annen stated that the Nāga girl had attained the fifth degree of the six identities (i.e., partial realization), he also argued that a practitioner could actually attain the sixth degree (ultimate identity or complete realization) through sokushin jōbutsu.

Subsequent Tendai scholars generally agreed with Annen that the Nāga girl had achieved partial realization, even if they believed that sokushin jōbutsu could result in higher attainments. During the fourteenth century, a slightly different approach was suggested, when monks such as Ninkū (1309–1388) maintained that if a person with the highest religious faculties could attain the first abode, he would advance to supreme enlightenment without further practice because of his superior faculties.

Late in the twelfth century, Hōjibō Shōshin, the author of commenta-
ries on Chih-i’s three major works, discussed the problem of the rapid realization of buddhahood. By Shōshin’s time, Japanese Tendai views on original enlightenment (hongaku) and on the rapid realization of enlightenment through Esoteric practices were well developed. Shōshin opposed these Japanese innovations and generally followed the views of Chih-i and Chan-jan (711–782). Because he was reacting against positions characteristic of Japanese Tendai, his criticism of certain aspects of rapid realization is more clearly stated than that of his Chinese predecessors. Shōshin presented his case in the Hokke gengi shiki (Personal Record on [Chih-i’s] “Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra”), his commentary on the Fa-hua hsüan-i:

Question: Ignorance is difficult to eradicate and the Middle Way is difficult to realize. How can a person cut off so many [defilements] and suddenly attain the tenth ground in a single lifetime?

Answer: . . . Rapid realization is for those with superior religious faculties. [However, even] the man with superior faculties must have previously practiced the various provisional teachings. Thus although we refer to sudden realization within the Perfect teaching, many aeons are required to go from the beginning to the end of the process.\(^{33}\)

For Shōshin, the rapid attainment of the higher stages on the path was possible only when a person had practiced provisional teachings in earlier lifetimes, thereby maturing his religious faculties to a point from which he could make rapid progress in the Perfect teaching. Consequently, Shōshin saw the Nāga girl as someone who had practiced expedient teachings for aeons. Since she told Wisdom Accumulation Bodhisattva that she could attain buddhahood quickly through practicing the Lotus Sūtra, her claim of rapid realization must be accepted, but Shōshin argued that it applied only to her practice of the Perfect teaching in her current life, not to her previous practice of expedient teachings.\(^{34}\)

Shōshin recognized that the realization of supreme enlightenment in a single lifetime could be justified by citing Tendai teachings and various sūtras, but argued that this possibility was theoretical only. When a search was conducted for examples of those who had realized supreme enlightenment in a single lifetime, although such legendary figures as the Nāga girl could be said to have done so, no examples of historical figures were to be found. Moreover, performing the many practices that benefited others—a major component of Mahāyāna paths—required long periods of time. Thus even if a person had directly received the Perfect teaching without first practicing the lower teachings, he would still need more than one lifetime of practice to complete the path.\(^{35}\)
Skipping Stages versus Passing through Each One

A subsidiary question was whether a person who rapidly attained buddhahood could leap over (chō) some of the stages on the path and directly enter buddhahood or an advanced stage on the path, or whether he had to pass through each stage in the prescribed order. Sources from several texts played a role in this debate. According to a passage from the Ta-jih ching (Mahāvairocanaśūtra), by reciting dhāraṇīs, "one could go through the stages in order (shidai) from the arising of the aspiration to enlightenment to the tenth ground." Read literally, this passage seemed to support the position that one had to go through each stage but could do so rapidly. Moreover, since it came from one of the most authoritative Esoteric texts, it seemed to call into question the efficacy of Esoteric practices in promoting rapid realization. In contrast, excerpts from other texts indicated that the practitioner could leap over many stages and directly attain supreme enlightenment. For example, according to the Lotus Sūtra, "When this man preaches Dharma with joy, anyone who hears it for a moment shall straightaway achieve ultimate anuttarasamyakāsambodhi [enlightenment]." In the Fa-hua hsüan-i, Chih-i mentioned the possibility of "leaping over" (chōtō) stages and going to the tenth stage in a single lifetime with a body of flesh (nikushin).

Japanese Tendai teachers took a variety of positions on skipping stages. For example, Rinshō reflected Ennin's views when he claimed that "a person with the highest faculties does not pass through the earlier stages, leaping over them and entering the tenth stage." Annen argued that the Ta-jih ching passage about going through the stages in the proper order should not be interpreted literally; rather, it referred to the stages presented in the Separate teaching in order to elucidate how Esoteric Buddhism allowed a person to leap over stages. Shōshin once again took a conservative position. Because he could not deny that Tendai texts mentioned leaping over stages, he argued that these passages had to be understood correctly. Although a practitioner might be able to leap past stages when practicing for his own benefit, his compassion and vows to strive to benefit others required that he not skip any stages. Moreover, statements in texts about leaping over stages to buddhahood did not apply to actually skipping stages, but either to transcending the aeons which lesser teachings would have required or to making the transition from worldling to sage in one lifetime. Shōshin's views are summarized in the following passage:

Question: According to the sixth fascicle of the Mo-ho chih-kuan (Great Calm Abiding and Insight Meditation [by Chih-i]), in the Perfect teaching aspects of both leaping [over stages] and not leaping [can
be found). Because [the practitioner] suddenly realizes supreme enlightenment, he leaps [over stages]. Because his compassion and vows are so profound, he does not leap [over stages]. Now when we speak of leaping (chōtō) in the passage [in the Fa-hua hsuan-i], how is it different?

Answer: In regard to realization of the ultimate goal, he does not leap. But in terms of the causal stages [leading to that ultimate goal], two types of leaping occur. First, when the practitioner quickly enters the ten grounds in a single lifetime, he leaps past many aeons [of practice]. Thus this can be called leaping. But this is not leaping over the grounds (chii). . . . Thus according to the Ta-jih ching, “The practitioner can go through the stages in order (shidai) from the arising of the aspiration to enlightenment to the tenth ground. . . .” Second, if a practitioner leaps to the tenth stage in an instant, this is only an expedient, like the Naga girl realizing buddhahood with her current body (sokushin jōbutsu). Although it is called “leaping,” it is not actually leaping [over stages].

The difference between the positions held by Shōshin (who usually adopted a stance close to the traditional Chinese T'ien-t'ai view) and Annen is dramatic. Much of their disagreement arose because of differences in their evaluation of Esoteric Buddhism, the next subject considered.

The Application of Esoteric Practices to Sokushin Jōbutsu

The positions presented above have been based primarily on sources that approached sokushin jōbutsu from the perspective of the story of the Naga girl in the Lotus Sūtra and Saichō's analysis of it in the Hokke shūku (Elegant Words of the Lotus Sūtra); little consideration is given to Esoteric teachings in most of these sources. For example, Esoteric teachings are barely mentioned in either Rinshō’s Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugi (Doctrine of Realization of Buddhahood with This Very Body in the Tendai Lotus School) or Annen’s Sokushin jōbutsugi shiki (Private Record concerning the Realization of Buddhahood with This Very Body), perhaps because both were written in response to debates that often focused on the Lotus Sūtra. Even though Rinshō criticized the Hossō school, he did not refer to Kūkai and the Shingon school in either positive or negative terms. However, the rise of Shingon interpretations of sokushin jōbutsu played a major if often unspecified role in pushing thinkers such as Ennin and Annen to adopt more liberal interpretations of the term.

For example, during Ennin’s lifetime Tendai monks interested in Esoteric Buddhism argued that full realization could be attained, whereas those who favored traditional T’ien-t’ai practices often argued
for partial realization. The following passage relates part of a debate between Ennin and Tendai monks who followed the Mo-ho chih-kuan (and hence were known as shikansō) over the proper interpretation of a passage from I-hsing’s commentary on the Ta-jih ching that mentioned “leaping (chōshō) to buddhahood (Butsuji)”.

Now the advocates of the Mo-ho chih-kuan criticized this passage, saying, “The phrase ‘leaping to the stage of buddhahood’ (Butsuji) refers to entering the stage [i.e., the first abode] where the enlightened mind first arises in the Perfect teaching. No principle is indicated whereby the practitioner could realize the ultimate stage of buddhahood within a single lifetime.”

Ennin replied, “Since you already have the words ‘the ten grounds are accomplished’ (manzoku), which refer to the ten grounds of the Perfect teaching, when the text says buddhahood (Butsuji), it means the ultimate stage.”

The advocates of the Mo-ho chih-kuan said, “Within the various teachings, we find references to entering the first abode within a single lifetime, but not to realizing the ultimate goal.”

Ennin said, “According to the passage, ‘the ten grounds are accomplished.’ Our case is clear. When you argue that the various teachings do not have a passage [indicating that the ultimate goal can be attained in a single lifetime], you are one-sidedly claiming that only the first abode [can be realized in one lifetime], and not allowing for leaping (chōshō) to [the ultimate goal]. Followers of the Perfect teaching already have a doctrine that the practitioner can ‘leap to the ten grounds in a single lifetime.’ Why don’t you say so?”

The advocates of the Mo-ho chih-kuan believed and yielded to Ennin.

At the same time that they actively studied Esoteric teachings, Tendai monks had to defend the Tendai interpretation of sokushin jōbutsu against Shingon claims that exoteric Tendai was inferior to Esoteric Buddhism. The Tendai position was based on Saichō’s argument that the Perfect teaching of the Lotus Sūtra and Esoteric Buddhism had the same purport (enmitsu itchi). For example, in the above passage, Ennin cited a sentence from the Fa-hua hsüan-i, indicating that the practitioner can “leap to the ten grounds in a single lifetime,” to prove that exoteric Perfect teachings coincided with Esoteric doctrines on rapid realization. Thus Tendai monks had to respond to two sometimes conflicting demands. On the one hand, they had to defend and interpret the Lotus Sūtra story of the Nāga girl as a major source for sokushin jōbutsu (without Shingon criticisms of Tendai, the story might have quickly come to play a minor role as Esoteric doctrines became more central in Tendai thought). On the other hand, Tendai monks had to give Esoteric teachings a major role in sokushin jōbutsu and explain its relation to the story of the Nāga girl. Some of their attempts to combine Tendai and Esoteric teachings in interpreting sokushin jōbutsu are explored below.
Saichō did not specify exactly which practices were to be used to attain sokushin jōbutsu. In his discussions of the direct path (jikidō) to buddhahood, he did mention the use of ordinations with the Perfect precepts, the four types of Tendai meditation, and Esoteric practices based on the Mahāvairocanasūtra. Although his discussion of sokushin jōbutsu in the Hokke shūku was based almost entirely on the Lotus Sūtra, without mention of Esoteric sources, his analysis of the Nāga girl’s realization reflected his interest in Esoteric Buddhism. He compared her words to the Esoteric mystery of speech (kumitsu) and the transformation of her body to the mystery of the body (shinmitsu). In addition, Saichō’s citation of a passage from the Kuan P’u-hsien p’u-sa hsing-fa ching (Sūtra concerning the Meditation of the Bodhisattva Universal Virtue) that identified Śākyamuni with Vairocana (Birushana) contributed to the impression that Esoteric Buddhism might be used to realize sokushin jōbutsu. Most of Saichō’s immediate followers did not apply Esoteric practices to sokushin jōbutsu. Gishin did not mention them in his Tendai Hokkeshū gishū, nor was their role in sokushin jōbutsu mentioned in the questions that Enchō, Gishin, and Kōjō submitted to Chinese T’ien-t’ai monks. However, during this time, Kūkai had advanced Esoteric teachings concerning sokushin jōbutsu. A clear reference by a Tendai monk to the relationship between Esoteric Buddhism and sokushin jōbutsu appears for the first time in Tokuen’s Tōketsu. Tokuen began by citing the traditional scriptural support for sokushin jōbutsu—namely, the story of the Nāga girl from the Lotus Sūtra. He then alluded to a passage from the apocryphal Jen-wang ching (Sūtra of the Benevolent King), “translated” by Amoghavajra, that mentions “realization of buddhahood with one’s current body” (genshin jōbutsu). Finally, he asked about Esoteric Buddhism:

According to I-hsing’s commentary on the Mahāvairocanasūtra, upon entering the gate of Esoteric Buddhism [Shingon], essentially there are three subjects: (1) the mystery of the body, (2) the mystery of speech, and (3) the mystery of thought. By using these three expedients, a practitioner purifies his three types of activity (sango) and [receives] the empowerment of and response (kaji) to the three Mysteries of the Tathāgata. Thus in this lifetime a person can complete the perfections of the [ten] grounds without going through aeons of practice and completing the various practices to vanquish the defilements. As is stated in the Greater Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra (Ta-p’in ching), “There are bodhisattvas who at the time of the aspiration to enlightenment attain the stage of nonretrogression [the eighth ground] and others who attain supreme enlightenment.”

On the basis of the previously quoted passages [some monks of] the Shingon School say that through the empowerment and response from the mantra, the body is transformed into the golden one [of a buddha] without abandonment of the current body or acquisition of a [new and] separate body. But there are also [monks of the] Shingon school who reject this
teaching and argue that the body which has arisen through ignorance [and its karmic results] must necessarily be abandoned and a new body without any taint (muro) must be obtained for supreme enlightenment [to be realized].

If we speak of the realization of buddhahood with this body, then within our minds we should embody Birushana. When our bodies are identified with the three activities [or mysteries of the Buddha (sanbyōdo)], this [state] can be called "supreme enlightenment." However, we should not identify supreme enlightenment with a body which moves as if it were in a dream (mukan no shin). If the Nāga girl did not abandon her body, then how could she have ascended to the Lotus throne?

Tokuen’s question contains the first clear reference to Esoteric sources in a Tendai discussion of sokushin jōbutsu. Although Esoteric practices eventually occupied a major place in such discussions, Tokuen maintained a skeptical attitude when he argued that supreme enlightenment must involve a profound mental transformation, not just the performance of Esoteric rituals in a dreamlike state. Moreover, he questioned whether the Nāga girl was a good model for sokushin jōbutsu, since her transformation into a male and miraculous travel to a different land before attaining buddhahood suggested that she had indeed received a new body.

Tsung-ying’s reply to Tokuen’s question once again demonstrated that the Chinese T’ien-t’ai monks were interested in different issues than their Japanese counterparts. Tsung-ying did not even mention Esoteric Buddhism, but did note that the transformation of the Nāga girl was a change in sexual identity only, not a complete bodily change and not the beginning of a new life. Moreover, he did not seem to understand the importance of the practical issue of whether sokushin jōbutsu was a viable possibility for Japanese monks. After noting that only those with the most superior religious faculties could attain sokushin jōbutsu, he dismissed the urgency of the issue by stating that, once they were enlightened, the aeons that people with lesser religious faculties had spent practicing religious austerities would seem "like awakening from a dream of one hundred years and [realizing that it had been] only an instant."

In 847, approximately a decade later, a major step was made toward introducing Esoteric sources into the discussion of sokushin jōbutsu when Anne listed twenty-five passages from the Buddhist canon that supported sokushin jōbutsu in his Min’yu benwakushō. Twenty of the twenty-five were from exoteric sources such as the Hua-yen ching (Avatamsakasūtra), Nieh-p’an ching (Nirvāṇa Sūtra), and Ying-lo ching (Sūtra on the Garland of the Primordial Acts of the Bodhisattva). However, the other five were from Esoteric sources: one from the Hsin-ti kuan ching (Sūtra on the Discernment of the Mind-Ground), one from the Ta-jih ching
(Mahāvairocanasūtra), and three from the P'u-t'i-hsin lun (Treatise on the Enlightened Mind; T 1665), a text attributed to Nāgārjuna. Among the passages from the P'u-t'i-hsin lun was the following statement, which played a major role in Kūkai's Sokushin jōbutsugi because it provided the Esoteric Buddhist locus classicus for the term "sokushin jōbutsu": "Only in the Mantra Vehicle is the realization of buddhahood with this very body found. Hence the method of samādhi is explained in it, but is missing in other teachings and not mentioned." 59

Anne's citation of this passage was clearly the result of Tendai efforts to develop teachings that could compete with the Shingon school's use of Esoteric practices to realize sokushin jōbutsu. At the time Anne compiled the Min'yu benwakushō, at least some Tendai monks were probably relying on Kūkai's teachings as the basis of their practice of Esoteric Buddhism. 60 However, Anne's citation of the P'u-t'i-hsin lun may have seemed inappropriate to many Tendai monks because the passage implied that the exoteric teachings which had formed the basis of the Tendai interpretation of sokushin jōbutsu up to that time might be of lesser value than Esoteric practices. In addition, the passage seemed to deny the importance of the very exoteric sources that Anne had cited, and thus seemed to violate Saichō's position that the Perfect teaching and Esoteric Buddhism are identical in purport. Anne himself did not comment on the meaning of the passage and thereby ignored the difficulties of reconciling exoteric and Esoteric sources. However, he did note that "in Nāgārjuna's treatise the doctrine of sokushin jōbutsu is established as the ultimate teaching." 61

When Ennin returned from China in 847, shortly after Anne had composed the Min'yu benwakushō, he began formulating a Tendai version of Esoteric Buddhism that could compete with Kūkai's Shingon school. In the process, he used terminology similar to that found in Saichō's discussion of sokushin jōbutsu, particularly in the classifications of exoteric and Esoteric Buddhism. Exoteric Buddhism described a path that required aeons, whereas Esoteric Buddhism led to the rapid realization of enlightenment. 62 In his discussions, Ennin referred to the superior speed of Esoteric practices by claiming that they led to "realization during one's current life" (genshō shōtoku), a goal identified with the three highest of the six degrees of identity. 63 The ultimate goal of buddhahood, however, could be attained through either exoteric or Esoteric practices; the difference lay both in the amount of time required and in the effectiveness of the practices themselves. Thus even though followers of exoteric practices might "perform aeons of practice, some attained [supreme enlightenment] and some did not." 64 Esoteric practices were both faster and more reliable.

Ennin countered Shingon criticisms that the Lotus Sūtra was an exoteric text by including it in the category of Esoteric Buddhism.
Although Ennin’s view can be seen as a development of Saichō’s dictum that the Perfect teaching and Esoteric Buddhism are identical in purport, the interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra as an Esoteric text is suggested by passages both in the Lotus itself and in the Ta-chih-tu lun (Commentary on the Greater Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra). The Lotus Sūtra refers to itself as “the secret essential of the buddhas” and “the secret treasure of the Thus-Come One.” It warns that “it may not be distributed, then given at random to men.” Such views, though not identical to those found in Esoteric scriptures, were adopted by commentators on the Lotus such as Chih-i, but were ignored by others such as Tao-sheng (355-434) and Fa-yün (467-529). Later, I-hsing (673-727), author of the authoritative commentary on the Ta-jih-ching, used many of Chih-i’s views on the Esoteric qualities of the Lotus in advancing his interpretation of Esoteric Buddhism. Thus Ennin’s argument for the Esoteric nature of the Lotus had substantial precedents.

Ennin claimed, however, that the Lotus and other one-vehicle sūtras were Esoteric only in principle (yuiri himitsu), not in terms of practice, because they did not mention the three mysteries (sanmitsu). In contrast, key Esoteric works such as the Ta-jih ching were Esoteric in both principle and practice (riji gumitsu). This line of argument permitted Tendai monks to discuss the theoretical significance of the Nāga girl’s story for sokushin jobutsu while ignoring practical issues; those would be found in Esoteric scriptures. As a result, after Ennin discussions of sokushin jobutsu based on the Nāga girl usually took the form of debate manuals rather than guides to practice.

Although Ennin brought a copy of the P’u-t’i-hsin lun back from China with him, he rarely if ever cited the text, perhaps because of its problematic implications for the harmony of Esoteric and Perfect teachings. Yet because the P’u-t’i-hsin lun was a major source for Esoteric Buddhism, it could not be ignored for long. Enchin cited it occasionally; however, later in life he argued that it had not been written by Nāgārjuna but had been compiled by Amoghavajra. Enchin had probably noticed that several passages in the text were from I-hsing’s commentary on the Ta-jih ching, and although he still used the P’u-t’i-hsin lun, it did not play an essential part in his writings. In contrast, Enchin’s contemporary, Annen, gave it a major role in his writings, arguing that it had been written by Nāgārjuna and that the passages from I-hsing’s commentary had been inserted by a later monk. After Annen, the P’u-t’i-hsin lun was generally recognized as an authoritative source for the Tendai Esoteric tradition.

Many of the problems left undecided by earlier Tendai Esoteric thinkers were resolved in Annen’s writings, which completed the systematization of the Tendai classification of doctrine and criticized some of Kūkai’s teachings. His genius at systematic interpretation is reflected
in his treatment of Esoteric Buddhism and sokushin jōbutsu. For example, Annen argued that "while the Nāga girl was in the ocean she heard the [Lotus] Sūtra from Mañjuśrī, received a prediction of her eventual buddhahood, and entered the first abode. She then went south and during the time ‘she’ went through the eight major events of a Buddha’s life, ‘she’ practiced these [Esoteric] meditations." Annen thus suggested that the practitioner of Perfect teachings would inevitably progress to Esoteric practices when he entered the first abode according to the Perfect teaching, if not before. The stages of the Perfect teaching above the first abode were therefore considered to be fictitious, with the actual stages being those of the Esoteric tradition.

In fact, Annen equated the stages from the first abode onward for the practitioner of the Perfect teaching with the stages from the worldling onward for the follower of the Esoteric teaching. Hence someone considered a sage in the path according to the Perfect teaching might be a worldling according to the Esoteric path. Annen thus rejected Ennin’s view that either exoteric or Esoteric practices could lead to supreme enlightenment; only Esoteric practices would result in the ultimate goal. Any cases of supreme enlightenment being realized by followers of exoteric teachings were explained as expedient measures taken to encourage those of lesser abilities. Ennin had suggested one way of maintaining Saichō’s dictum of the common purport of Perfect and Esoteric teachings while still giving Esoteric Buddhism the primary role in sokushin jōbutsu; in contrast, Annen clearly subordinated the role of the Lotus Sūtra in sokushin jōbutsu.

Several centuries later, Hōjibō Shōshin suggested an approach that restored the importance of traditional T’ien-t’ai meditations. In his interpretation of the troublesome passage on sokushin jōbutsu from the P’u-t’i-hsin lun, Shōshin wrote:

Question: . . . If [the passage from P’u-t’i-hsin lun] is correct, then how could the doctrine [of sokushin jōbutsu] have been elucidated through the Lotus Sūtra?

Answer: [Annen’s] Bodaishin gishō (Explanations of the Doctrine of the Mind of Enlightenment) stated that although the [Esoteric] meditations were explained in the Lotus Sūtra and other texts, bodhisattvas to transmit the teaching were missing and it was not written down. Moreover, texts such as the Lotus are Esoteric (himitsukyō), as is explained in [Ennin’s] Soshitsujikyōsho (Commentary on the Susiddhikara [Acts of Perfection] Sūtra). In addition, it is not the case that just one single type of practice results in sokushin jōbutsu. It is not written in any teaching that [only] Esoteric practices result in sokushin jōbutsu. The Lotus explains that through Perfect and Sudden meditation, the practitioner quickly realizes the body of a bud-
Despite Shōshin's efforts, the teaching of the realization of buddhahood with this very body sometimes came to be thought of only in terms of Esoteric Buddhism within the Tendai school. Many Tendai monks came to believe that Esoteric practices were superior to exoteric meditations such as those described in the *Mo-ho chih-kuan*. Although passages in exoteric works might refer to *sokushin jöbutsu*, it was believed that they had theoretical significance only and were of little use in practice. By the thirteenth century one of the topics in Tendai debate was, "Is the doctrine of *sokushin jöbutsu* limited to Esoteric teachings or does it also extend to exoteric teachings?" The way the question was phrased implied that the Esoteric component was generally considered to be more important than the exoteric one.

**Conclusion**

The most striking characteristic of the early Tendai questions on *sokushin jöbutsu* that Japanese monks directed to their Chinese counterparts was the Japanese tendency to constantly inflate claims for the efficacy of practices and for the stages thereby attained. As time passed, Tendai monks suggested that *sokushin jöbutsu* applied to increasingly lower levels on the path, brought the practitioner to higher goals, and did so in shorter periods of time. Even when Tendai scholars received answers from their Chinese counterparts that were disappointing or missed the point, Japanese monks persisted in developing their views. Although later Tendai monks such as Hōjibō Shōshin criticized the more extreme claims for *sokushin jöbutsu*, arguments for either a shorter path or virtual elimination of stages came to dominate medieval Tendai thought. These trends, evident in Tendai by the second half of the ninth century, point toward the emergence of *hongaku* (innate enlightenment) thought and the views of the path that emerged in the Kamakura schools. To conclude this study, answers to two further questions are suggested: What factors led the Japanese to interpret the path in this manner, and what practical significance did these discussions of *sokushin jöbutsu* have for Tendai monks?

**The Factors behind Tendai Insistence on a Shorter Path**

Although no detailed answers to this complex issue can be advanced in this limited space, several important factors can be suggested. First, geographical isolation played a role. Tendai developed without much
direct guidance from Chinese monks, who did not travel to Japan to insist on a balanced view of T’ien-t’ai doctrine and practice. In fact, Chinese T’ien-t’ai was moribund during much of the time when Japanese Tendai was developing. Although a few Japanese monks such as Ennin and Enchin spent long periods of study in China, they focused their attention on Esoteric Buddhism more than on Tendai. With no Chinese T’ien-t’ai monks in Japan, Japanese monks could ignore Chinese positions when they wished to do so and emphasize scriptural passages conducive to rapid realization.

Second, Esoteric Buddhism played a major role in Tendai discussions of sokushin jūbutsu. The physical side of buddhahood had played an important role in Chinese Esoteric Buddhism, even though it does not seem to have been emphasized in the literature to the extent that it eventually was in Japan. The physical side of Esoteric rituals, including special hand gestures (mudrā) and the physical performance of ritual actions, must have impressed Japanese monks. The physical emphasis in Esoteric Buddhism was even reflected after death. For example, when Shan-wu-wei (Śubhakarasimha), translator of the Mahāvairocana-sūtra and coauthor of the most authoritative commentary on that text, died, his body did not decay. Thus both ritual performances and the legends surrounding one of the most important monks in the Japanese Tendai Esoteric lineage might have suggested to Tendai monks that realization of the highest truth should be accompanied by physical attainments.

Although the need to compete with the Shingon school was probably the most important factor in the development of Tendai Esoteric views of sokushin jūbutsu, it should not be overemphasized. Early Tendai monks devoted considerable effort to explaining sokushin jūbutsu in terms of the Lotus Sūtra’s story of the Nāga girl and studiously avoided mentioning Esoteric practices. However, Tendai efforts to compete with Shingon—and to develop interpretations of the Lotus Sūtra and a Tendai Esoteric tradition—lay behind many of the discussions of the term. With time, Tendai discussions of sokushin jōbutsu and the Lotus moved toward an accommodation with Esoteric Buddhist concerns, until the Esoteric perspective dominated exoteric discussions. When sokushin jōbutsu was discussed in exoteric terms, it was usually intended for use in the theoretical investigations of the path that occurred in the Tendai debate system. Inclusion of the term “shiki” (private record) in the titles of much of the literature on sokushin jōbutsu shows that it was intended for use by debating monks rather than as a guide for practice. In contrast, the practical aspects of sokushin jōbutsu came to be dominated by the Esoteric Buddhist tradition.

A third set of factors that pushed Tendai monks toward shortening the path is found in the other traditions in Japan that permitted the real-
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ization of high spiritual states while still alive. Taoism was not established in Japan as an independent tradition, but Japanese monks and emissaries to China brought back Taoist longevity techniques and traditions about physical immortality. With the rise of Esoteric Buddhism during the early Heian period, Taoist immortality techniques influenced many intellectuals and Buddhist monks. Many of the this-worldly benefits of Taoist practices were similar to those promised in Esoteric Buddhist texts. Both Kukai and Ennin were included in Ōe Masafusa’s Honchō shinsen den (Biographies of Japanese Immortals). Japanese emperors during the Heian period sometimes partook of alchemical potions, and immortals (hsien) were sometimes associated with buddhas. Kukai was clearly aware of Taoism and wrote about it in his Sango shiiki (Indications of the Goals of the Three Teachings) before he traveled to China. Although Tendai and Shingon monks did not cite Taoist sources to support their views on sokushinjobutsu, Taoist concerns with physical immortality might well have bolstered their interest in the physical dimensions of buddhahood. In addition, the mummification practices that turned deceased practitioners into “buddhas in this very body” (sokushin Butsu) were affected by both Taoist teachings and Buddhist traditions surrounding sokushinjobutsu.

Shinto traditions that human beings might be installed as deities (kami) shortly after their death or, in the case of emperors, recognized as “kami that manifest themselves as men” (arahitogami) or as “present kami” (akitsukami) also may have contributed to setting the stage for sokushinjobutsu. Notions such as these led Japanese monks to make exaggerated claims about the spiritual accomplishments of figures such as Gyōgi (670-749) and Shôtoku Taishi (574-622). However, neither Taoist nor Shinto traditions were mentioned in early Tendai discussions of sokushinjobutsu. Tendai monks limited themselves to citing sources within their own tradition, just as they sometimes rigidly differentiated between discussions based on Esoteric and exoteric sources.

The Practical Significance of Discussions of Sokushin Jōbutsu

Although later sources included statements that a particular Tendai monk had realized a stage high on the path, contemporary sources for the lives of Tendai figures include few claims that sokushin jōbutsu or a particular stage on the path had been realized. Moreover, texts on sokushin jōbutsu by figures such as Anne, Rinshō, and Annen present both theoretical discussions of sokushin jōbutsu and a variety of scriptural evidence indicating the possibility of rapid realization, but few if any details about actual practices. What practical role did discussions of sokushin jōbutsu play in the lives of Tendai monks?

The answer depends, of course, on which figure is investigated. For Saichō, sokushin jōbutsu was one of a series of ways to demonstrate the
superiority of Tendai over Hossó teachings. For his disciples who composed the questions in the Toketsu concerning sokushin jōbutsu, the topic played a vital role in their attempts to define a path to enlightenment and to determine the possibilities of rapid realization. However, with the establishment of an independent Tendai Esoteric tradition, discussions of sokushin jōbutsu, particularly those framed around the story of the Nāga girl, appeared increasingly in the context of debate manuals. In such cases attention was paid to reconciling contradictory doctrinal claims, not to laying out a scheme for practice. Actual practices were described in other genres, such as manuals for meditation or for Esoteric rituals, not in the debate manuals about sokushin jōbutsu.

Sokushin jōbutsu did have practical consequences for Japanese Buddhism, however. It laid the theoretical foundation for the many Tendai monks who used Esoteric practices to advance themselves on the path and to attract patrons. It also contributed to the rise of teachings on hongaku (innate enlightenment) and eventually to the formulations of the path found in the Kamakura schools.

Notes

1. Individuals usually were called "bosatsu" because of their efforts to help others rather than because they exhibited wisdom; see Yoshida Yasuo, Nihon kodai no bosatsu to minshū (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1988), 8-41. However, sometimes they were said to have reached specific stages on the path. Prince Shōtoku is said to have realized supreme enlightenment in Ssu-t'o's Jōgū kōtaishī bosatsu den, Dainihon Bukkyō zensho (Tokyo: Suzuki gakujutsu zaidan, 1970-1973; hereafter BZ), 71.122c8. BZ was first published in a different format in Tokyo by Bussho kankōkai, 1911-1922. Since I've used both sets, the edition is specified.

2. Taizo kongō bodaishingi ryakumondōshō 2, T75.472a24-26.

3. For Saichō's views on sokushin jōbutsu, see Paul Groner, "The Lotus Sūtra and Saichō's Interpretation of the Realization of Buddhahood with This Very Body (sokushin jōbutsu)," in George and Willa Tanabe, eds., The Lotus Sūtra in Japanese Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 53-74. In writing this chapter, I benefited considerably from a seminal article by Fujita Kairyū ("Nihon Tendai ni okeru sokushin jōbutsu shisō," Shiikyo kenkyū new L1.3 [1933]: 459-480) as well as from a number of more recent articles by Okubo Ryōshun that are cited below. In addition, Okubo kindly supplied me with a copy of Rinshō's Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugi.


5. For a discussion of the difficulties in determining whether Saichō or Kūkai was the first to use the term "sokushin jōbutsu," see Groner, "The Lotus Sūtra and Saichō's Interpretation," pp. 54-57. Sueki Fumihiko has suggested that the Hossó monk Tokuitsu (fl. early ninth century) may have played a key role in calling the importance of sokushin jōbutsu to the two men's attention through his criticism of the concept ("Nihon Bukkyō: Sokushin jōbutsu wo chūshin to
6. The sources for this article are discussed in more detail in Paul Groner, "Tendai Interpretations of the Realization of Buddhahood with This Very Body (sokushin jōbutsu) after the Death of Saichō: Sources and Preliminary Considerations," in David Chappell, ed., Tendai Studies, forthcoming. In that article, I suggest that Tendai sokushin jōbutsu literature played a variety of roles within Tendai thought, some of them only tangentially related to discussion of the path to enlightenment.


8. Daikyō yōgishō 6, BZ (Bussho kankōkai ed.) 42.434b15–435a17. The Daikyō yōgishō is a polemical defense of Shingon teachings against criticisms by monks from other schools, especially by the Tendai monks Enchin and Annen. Jippan, author of the Daikyō yōgishō, follows Kūkai’s classification of doctrine by placing Kegon above Tendai teachings.


10. Fo-tsu t’ung-chi 6, T 49.178c13–14, 180b30–31. Neal Donner has commented that Chih-i was generally uninterested in speculating about the speed with which a person could realize enlightenment, despite having had several “enlightenment experiences” himself (Donner, “Sudden and Gradual Intimately Conjoined: Chih-i’s T’ien-t’ai View,” in Peter Gregory, ed., Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987], 201–226). The attainments for Hui-wen and Hui-ssu were probably based on Chih-i’s claim that he had realized the third degree of identity, with the teacher in each case having a higher degree of attainment than his disciple.


12. See Groner, Saichō, pp. 289–290, for Tsung-ying’s discussion of the place of the Ta-jih ching (Mahāvairocanasūtra) in the Tendai system of the “five periods.” Tsung-ying is said to have mastered Sanskrit and to have taught Ennin the Sanskrit writing system (siddham) used in Esoteric ceremonies and the proper pronunciation of the siddham characters at the Hsi-ming Monastery in Ch’ang-an (Ono Katsutoshi, Nittō guhō junrei kōki no kenkyū [Tokyo: Suzuki gakujutsu zaidan, 1964–1969], 1:273–274). Tsung-ying may also have been influenced by Hua-yen teachings linking the realization of buddhahood with the completion of the degrees of faith (shinman jōbutsu), since his discussion is similar to this teaching. In fact, Annen explicitly identifies shinman jōbutsu with the Nāga girl in his Bodaishin gishō 1 (T 75.471b13–14).
Several of Kōjō’s positions indicate that he was a willing advocate of doctrinal positions that allowed for a broad interpretation of the path and practice. He is one of the few Tendai monks who seriously considered the implications that Esoteric Buddhism had for monastic discipline. His most important text, the Denjutsu isshinkai mon (T2379), includes passages indicating that he was familiar with some Ch’an teachings that might have led to his interest in a quicker path to enlightenment. For a discussion of Kōjō’s views on the precepts, see Groner, Saichō, pp. 292–298.


14. Tōketsu, ND 46.423a17–b3. The Hua-yen patriarch Fa-tsang (643–712) praises Hui-ssu and Chih-i in the Wu-chiao chang, T45.481a25–26. Tsung-ying refers to the legend that Prince Shōtoku (574–622) of Japan was a reincarnation of Hui-ssu (515–577), a story that was actively spread by Japanese Tendai monks to aid them in their relations with their Chinese counterparts. Ennin dreamt that he was protected by Prince Shōtoku on his trip to China (Saeki Ariyoshi, Jikaku Daishiden no kenkyū [Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1986], 240, 243–244); and Enchin mentioned the legend in his conversations with Chinese monks (Ono Katsutoshi, Nittō guhō gyōreki no kennyū [Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1982], 2:359, 365–366). The story was widely known among Chinese monks and referred to in the late Nara or early Heian period by Chien-chen’s (J. Ganjin, 688–763) disciple Ssu-t’o (Jōgū kōtaiši bosatsu den, BZ [Suzuki ed.] 71.122). Even though Shōtoku was born three years before Hui-ssu died, this discrepancy does not seem to have bothered Japanese monks until the Kamakura period. Virtual enlightenment is the stage immediately preceding supreme enlightenment.

15. Later debate topics suggested that the three types of defilements were essentially identical and could be cut off with a single type of practice, namely, the three views realized in an instant (sangan isshin). As a result, the path did not have to be defined by the defilements cut off. See Kouda Ryōsen, Wayaku Tendaihū rongi ni hyakudai (Tokyo: Ryubunkan, 1966), 101–105, 292–295.


17. Kōjō probably based his question on a famous passage from Chih-i’s writings: “The defilements are enlightenment (bonnō soku bodai)” (Fa-hua hsüan-i 9a, T33.790b15). Kōjō may have been inspired in part by Chih-i’s use of evil as the subject of some of his meditations. See Neal Donner, “Chih-i’s Meditation on Evil,” in David Chappell, ed., Buddhist and Taoist Practice in Medieval Chinese Society (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 49–64; and Daniel Stevenson, “The Four Kinds of Samādhi in Early T’ien-t’ai Buddhism,” in Peter Gregory, ed., Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 75–84. Related questions on the link between enlightenment and the defilements were asked by Enchō (ND 46.403a13–b7) and Tokuen (ND 46.417b7–418b8). Kōjō’s interest in easier forms of practice is also reflected in his view of the precepts; see Groner, Saichō, pp. 292–298. Needless to say, if defilements are not used as the main criteria to define the path, a very different structure than that discussed in abhidharma texts is suggested.

18. Tōketsu, ND 46.424a8–b2.

19. Ibid. 46.424b4–16.

20. Rinshō, Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugi 11a-b. Annen’s Sokushin jōbutsugi shiki (Tendai sōsho [Tokyo: Tendaishū daigaku shuppankai, 1922], 206–211)
includes a more extensive discussion on the relationship between the _roku soku_ (six degrees of identity) and _sokushin jōbutsu_.


22. Rinshō, _Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugishiki_ 1b–2a; Annen, _Sokushin jōbutsugishiki shiki_, p. 186. Rinshō went beyond Saichō’s position that even practitioners who had advanced faculties might require three lifetimes to realize buddhahood by arguing that even the dullest person who followed the Perfect teaching would realize buddhahood within three lifetimes. Enchin also noted that even the person with the dullest faculties within the Perfect teaching should be able to realize enlightenment within three lifetimes (Kan Fugen bosatsu _gyōhō kyō mongu goki_ 1, _BZ_ [Bussho kankōkai ed.] 26.414a17–b16, 419a13–b3).


27. All that is known of Wei-chüan is that he was a disciple of the eighth patriarch, Kuang-hsiu (770–844?), and that he probably participated in the revival of Buddhism after the Hui-ch‘ang persecution (Ono, _Nittō guhō junrei kōki_, 1:388–389).

28. The interpretation of the story of the Nāga girl depended on whether it was considered to be an ultimate or provisional teaching, a difficult issue for Tendai monks. For a discussion, see Groner, “Tendai Interpretations.”


30. Annen, _Sokushin jōbutsugishiki shiki_, pp. 195–196, 204.

31. Ōkubo Ryōshun, “Shōshin no sokushin jōbutsuron,” _Firosofia_ 73 (1985): 145. In contrast, some Tōmitsu (Shingon) scholars argued that the Nāga girl had attained full enlightenment (ibid.).

32. Ninkū Jitsudō, _Dainichikyō gishaku sōketsushō_, _Tendaijū zensho_ (Tokyo: Daichi shobō, 1973), 10.275; Kouda Ryōsen, _Wayaku Tendaijū rongi hyakudai jizaibō_ (Tokyo: Rinkōin, 1972), 525–527. Ninkū is famed as a scholar of both Pure Land (in the Seizan lineage of the Jōdoshū) and Tendai (in the Rozanji lineage). His _Dainichikyō gishaku sōketsushō_, important as one of the few Taimitsu (Tendai Esoteric) commentaries on the _Ta-jih ching_, draws on the teachings of...
Ennin, Enchin, and Annen to advance the view that the first stage of the path is identical with the goal. See Okubo Ryoshun, “Ninkü no sokushin jōbutsuron,” Tendai gakuhō 31 (1989): 134–138.

33. Hokke gengi shiki 3a, TZ Hokke gengi 2.140. Some Tomitsu monks maintained similar positions on sokushin jōbutsu (Okubo, “Shōshin no sokushin jōbutsuron,” p. 146).

34. Hokke gengi shiki 3a, TZ Hokke gengi 2.140.


36. Ta-jih ching (Mahāvairocana Sūtra) 1, T 18.1b3–4.


38. Fa-hua hsüan-i 2b, TZ Hokke gengi 2.138.

39. Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugi 9a. Esoteric Tendai had its own version of leaping past some stages (hīshō).

40. Bodaishin gishō 4, T 75.524a5–6.

41. Hokke mongu shiki 8b, TZ Hokke mongu 4.1999a; BZ (Bussho kankōkai ed.) 22.679a. Shōshin’s comment is reminiscent of Tokuitsu’s criticism of sokushin jōbutsu in the Shingonshū miketsumon (T 77.863b8–c26).

42. Hokke mongu shiki 8b, TZ Hokke mongu 4.1999a–2000a; BZ (Bussho kankōkai ed.) 22.679a–b.

43. Chih-i, Mo-ho chih-kuan 6a, TZ Maka shikan 3.653–666.

44. Ta-jih ching 1, T 18.1b3–4.

45. Hokke gengi shiki 2b, TZ Hokke gengi 2.140. The question and answer are found in a long discussion of “leaping over” (chōtō) stages and going to the tenth stage in a single lifetime with a body of flesh (nikushin).

46. Annen also ignored Kūkai in his Sokushin jōbutsugi shiki, but mentioned Kūkai’s teachings in works such as the Bodaishin gishō. However, even though Annen usually mentioned the author of the work he cited, when he quoted Kūkai’s Sokushin jōbutsugi he did not mention Kūkai as the author (T 75.472a26–b2). Since some of the six versions of the Iho sokushin jōbutsugi (T 77.384a–401b) attributed to Kūkai are very close to the Himitsu sokushin jōbutsugi (Tendai sōsho, Annen senshii 2.167–177) attributed to Annen, if their relationship were clarified, the role of Esoteric Buddhist teachings in early Tendai formulations of sokushin jōbutsu could be elucidated.

47. Ta-jih ching i-shih 1, Hsū-tsang ching (Taipei: Hsin-wen-feng ch’u-pan kuang-ssu, 1977; hereafter HTC) 36.521b14; Ta-jih ching su 1, HTC 36.67b15.

48. Ta-jih ching, T 18.1b3–4. Although Ennin was pointing out the identity between Butsuji (buddha-ground) and the ten grounds, in other contexts the passage he cited also served as evidence for those who argued that a practitioner had to pass through all the stages in order (shidai), a process that might require a long period of time. I plan to consider the issue of whether the tenth land is identical to the buddha-ground in a forthcoming article on the physical aspects of sokushin jōbutsu.

49. The Tendai monks thus were following the position maintained by Saichō and Gishin.

50. Fa-hua hsüan-i 2b, TZ Hokke gengi 2.138.

51. Reported in both Enchin’s Dainichikyōsho shō (BZ [Bussho kankōkai ed.])
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26.678) and in a fuller form in Shōshin’s Hokke mongu shiki 8b, TZ Hokke mongu 4.1998a. The translated text is a composite of these two sources compiled by Ōkubo Ryōshun, “Ennin no sokushin jōbutsuron,” p. 44. The translation of shikan no shosō as “advocates of the Mo-ho chih-kuan” comes from the division of Tendai studies into an Esoteric course (shanaqō) and an exoteric course (shikangō) based on exoteric sūtras and Chih-i’s works, especially the Mo-ho chih-kuan (J. Maka shikan).

52. Skugo kokkaishō, DZ 2: 349.

53. The passage from the Kuan P’u-hsien p’u-sa hsing-fa ching (T 9.392c15–16) is cited in Hokke shūkū (DZ 3.264, 266). For a discussion of the significance of this passage in Saichō’s thought, see Groner, Saichō, pp. 260–262. Although Tendai monks maintained that Shaka-butsu (Sakyamuni) and Birushana-butsu (Vairocana) were identical, Shingon monks argued that Shaka was inferior to Birushana. The Tendai monk Tokuen included a question about this issue in his Tōketsu (ND 46.414b2–415b1). As a result, Shingon monks could argue that Esoteric texts were clearly superior to the Lotus Sūtra because they were preached by a superior form of the Buddha. Tendai monks could reply that Shaka and Birushana were identical and that the Lotus was essentially equal to the major Esoteric scriptures.


55. Tā-jih-ching su, HTC 36.58a9–15; Tā-jih-ching i-shih, HTC 36.512a9–15. Tokuen omitted several phrases within the passage without changing the meaning. The passage from the Ta-p’in ching (fasc. 2) cited by I-hsing is found at T 8.226a8–10.

56. Tōketsu, ND 46.416a5–17. Little is known of Tokuen’s biography except that, like Ennin, he studied under Köchi in Shimotsuke (Saeki, Jikaku Daishi-den, pp. 348–353). He eventually became Saichō’s student and was active in encouraging Tendai monks to study Esoteric Buddhism.

57. Tokuen’s questioning of the identification of performing Esoteric ritual with buddhahood is reminiscent of the second of the three types of sokushin jōbutsu described in the Himitsu sokushin jōbutsu (Tendai sósha, Annen senshō 167) attributed to Annen—namely, the temporary realization of buddhahood during Esoteric rituals due to the Buddha’s empowerment and response (kaji sokushin jōbutsu).


59. P’u-t’i-hsin lun, T 32.572c13–14; cited in Kūkai’s Sokushin jōbutsu, T 77.381c11–13, and in Anne’s Min’yū benwakushii, DZ 3.382. Although Saichō was aware of this text (Hokke shūkū, DZ 3.78–79), he had not used it in his discussion of sokushin jōbutsu.

60. An example of this tendency is Enchō’s 831 letter to Kūkai asking him to teach Tendai monks. See Groner, Saichō, p. 82, note 25.

61. Min’yū benwakushii, DZ 3.382.

62. Kiuchi Gyōo (Tendai Mikkyō no keisei [Tokyo: Keisuisha, 1984], 301) notes that the terminology Ennin used in his classification system was influenced by Saichō’s discussion of sokushin jōbutsu.

63. Ōkubo, “Ennin no sokushin jōbutsuron,” p. 41.

64. Kongôchôkyôshō 1, T 61.9c4–5. Ennin followed I-hsing in maintaining this position (Tā-jih-ching su 1, T 39.584a21–23).

65. T 9.10b8, 31b18–19, 39b18–19; Hurvitz, trans., Lotus, pp. 46, 178, 219. The Ta-chih-tu lun 4 and 100 classifies Buddhist teachings into categories and hints that the Lotus Sūtra is a secret teaching (T 25.84c16–85a6, 754b18–27).

66. These arguments are developed by Misaki Ryōshū, “Tendai ni okeru


69. Sasa gimon 1, *BZ* (Suzuki ed.) 38.217c3-5. Although Enchin does not directly refer to the passages from I-hsing’s commentary in this passage, they are referred to in Annen’s *Bodaishin gishō* 1, T75.451b6-452a7.

70. *T*75.451b6-452a7. Enchin cited the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun* seventy-nine times in his *Bodaishin gishō* (T2397), a text compiled just three years after Enchin had suggested that the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun* was by Amoghavajra. Moreover, the very structure of the *Bodaishin gishō* relies on the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun* (Kaneko Tesshō, “Annen oshō no enmitsugi ni tsuite,” *Eizan gakuin kenkyū* 8 [1985]: 235).

Disagreements between Enchin and Annen can be seen in a number of other sources (Groner, “Annen, Tankei, Henjō and Monastic Discipline,” pp. 132-133).

71. Fukuda Gyōei (*Tendaigaku gaisetsu* [Tokyo: Bun’ichi shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1954], 321) noted that the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun* is one of “the three sūtras and one śāstra” considered basic sources in the Taimitsu tradition. Fukuda also commented that whereas Shingon monks wrote a number of commentaries on the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun*, Tendai monks treated the text in a less direct manner, mentioning it in passing in texts such as the *Bodaishin gishō* (ibid., 344). The *Tairō shinshū* daizōkyō sakun 40 (jō).573b reveals that the citations of the *P’u-t’i-hsin lun* in Tendai works increase markedly from Annen onward.

72. *Bodaishin gishō* 1, T75.471a10-12. In the next paragraph, Annen reiterates this position in response to the question, “In the *Lotus Sūtra*, the Nāga girl hears the [Lotus] *Sūtra* in the sea and realizes sokushin jōbutsu without using [Esoteric] meditations. Why is it necessary to use [Esoteric] meditations?”


74. *Shingonshū kyōjigi* 3, T75.415b23-c17.

75. *Hokke mongu shiki* 8b, *TZ Hokke mongu* 4.2000b12-19; *BZ* 22.680b11-681a1. The passage cited from Annen’s *Bodaishin gishō* (fasc. 1 and 4) is found at T75.471c3-4, 534a15-17. Shōshin makes the same point found in this passage again in the *Tendai Shingon nishū doishō*, T74.420c14-24. He follows it by noting that the three mysteries are appropriate for those with dull faculties during the latter period (matsudai) of the Dharma, but that Tendai meditations are more appropriate for those with better faculties (T74.421a19-23). The term “missing” in the passage is from the sentence “sokushin jōbutsu . . . is missing in other teachings and not mentioned” (*P’u-t’i-hsin lun*, T32.572c13-14).

76. Kouda Ryōsen, *Wayaku Tendaishū rongi hyakudai jizaibo* (Tokyo: Rinkōin, 1972), 209-214; idem, *Wayaku Tendaishū rongi nihyakudai* (Tokyo: Ryūbunkan, 1966), 494-497. Although debate texts generally focused on esoteric subjects, and could therefore be expected to be more sympathetic to the esoteric position on sokushin jōbutsu, the way this question is stated clearly revealed the Esoteric bias of most later discussions on the topic. In the modern survey of Tendai thought by Fukuda Gyōei, a study that generally reflects traditional Japanese Tendai views, sokushin jōbutsu is treated as a topic under Esoteric Buddhism.
Fukuda notes that although it is mentioned in esoteric texts, only in Esoteric treatments is the topic carried to its ultimate conclusion (Tendai-gaku gairon, pp. 467-468). Despite the controversy associated with sokushin jōbutsu within the Tendai school, this teaching does not seem to have assumed the central position it had in Shingon thought. A survey of the indices of modern studies of Taimitsu, such as Misaki Ryōshū’s Taimitsu no kenkyū (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1988) and Shimizutani Kyōjun’s Tendai mikkyō no seiritsu no kenkyū (Tokyo: Bun’ichi kabushiki kaisha, 1972), reveals few entries for the topic.


78. For a discussion of the Tendai debate and examination system, see Paul Groner, “The Significance of Ryōgen’s Revival of the Tendai Examination System,” to be included in a forthcoming monograph on Ryōgen.

79. Inoue Mitsusada and Ōsone Shōsuke, Ōjōden Hokke genki (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1974), 261-265. Approximately half of the biographies included in this collection, compiled around 1098, concern Buddhist figures. For a discussion of views of immortals during the Heian period with special reference to sokushin jōbutsu, see Matsuda Chikō, Codai Nihon Dōkyō juyōshi kenkyū (Nara: Ningen seitaigaku danwakai, 1988), 297-312.


81. Sueki Fumihiko, “Nihon Bukkyō: Sokushin jōbutsu,” p. 197. For example, a passage in Ssu-t’o’s Jōgū kōtaishi bosatsu den (BZ [Suzuki ed.] 71.122c8) noting that Shōtoku had abandoned his status as a lesser buddha (shōbutsu) to become a greater buddha (daibutsu) includes notes that equate butsu (buddha) with sen (immortal). Since Ssu-t’o was a disciple of Chien-chen, who brought the first T’ien-t’ai texts to Japan, Saichō was probably aware of this text. I plan to publish an article on the physical dimensions of sokushin jōbutsu.

82. For representative studies of sokushin Butsu that relate it to Shingon theories of sokushin jōbutsu, see Matsumoto Akira, Miira-butsu no kenkyū (Tokyo: Rokkō shuppan, 1985), and idem, Kōbō daishi nyūjō setsuswa no kenkyū (Tokyo: Rokkō shuppan, 1982). For a study of mummies in English, see Bernard Faure’s forthcoming study on the subject.

83. Funaoka Makoto argues that doctrines such as sokushin jōbutsu were used primarily as theory. As evidence he notes the seeming contradiction between Kūkai’s advocacy of sokushin jōbutsu and the Shingon traditions that Kūkai was deep in meditation awaiting Maitreya’s arrival on earth (Zenshū no seiritsu [Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1987], 138). Although Funaoka’s position is useful in raising the issue of the practical import of such teachings, it is too extreme in denying any practical significance. Sokushin jōbutsu surely had practical significance at certain periods in Tendai history, especially for practitioners of Esoteric ritual.
| akitsugami | 現神 | Hua-yan ching | 華厳经 |
| Anne | 安慧 | Hui-ch'ang | 会昌 |
| Annen | 安然 | Hui-ssu | 悅思 |
| arahitogami | 現人神 | Hui-wen | 悅文 |
| Asai Endō | 浅井典道 | I-hsing | 一行 |
| bon' i jōbutsu | 凡位成仏 | Ihon sokushin jōbutsugi | 言本即身成仏義 |
| bosatsu | 薬師 | isshō jōbutsu | 一生成仏 |
| bundan shōji | 分段生死 | Jen-wang ching | 仁王経 |
| bunshō soku | 分証即 | jikidō | 直道 |
| butsujī | 仏地 | Jippan | 宣範 |
| Chan-ji | 澤然 | Jōgū kōtai shi bosatsuden | 上宮皇太子薬師伝 |
| Chien-chen | 鑑真 | | |
| Chih-i | 智顕 | | |
| chii | 地位 | | |
| chō | 超 | | |
| chōshō | 超証 | | |
| chōtō | 超登 | | |
| Daikyō yōgishō | 大經要義抄 | | |
| Dainichikyō gishaku sōketsushō | 大日經義抄撰表抄 | | |
| Dainichikyōsō sho | 大日經疏抄 | | |
| Enchin | 円珍 | | |
| Enchō | 円徹 | | |
| enmitsu itchi | 円密一致 | | |
| Ennin | 円仁 | | |
| Fa-hua hsiān-i | 法華玄義 | | |
| Fa-tsang | 法湛 | | |
| Fo-tsu t'ung-chi | 仏祖統記 | | |
| Fujita Kairyū | 藤田海龍 | | |
| genshin jōbutsu | 現身成仏 | | |
| genshō shōtoku | 現生證得 | | |
| Gishin | 義真 | | |
| Gyōgi | 行基 | | |
| hennyaku shōji | 契易生死 | | |
| himitsukyō | 秘密教 | | |
| Himitsu sokushin jōbutsugi | 秘密即身成仏義 | | |
| hishō | 被接 | | |
| Höjibō Shōshin | 室利法師真言 | | |
| Hokke gengi shiki | 法華玄義私記 | | |
| Hokke mongu shiki | 法華文句私記 | | |
| Hokke shikū | 法華秀句 | | |
| Hokke-zanmai | 法華三昧 | | |
| hongaku | 本覚 | | |
| Honchō shinsenden | 本朝神仙伝 | | |
| Hossō | 法相 | | |
| Hsi-ming | 西明 | | |
| Hsin-ti kuan ching | 心地觀經 | | |
Shortening the Path

shidai 次第
shikangō 止観業
shikanō 止觀僧
Shingon 真言
shinman jōbutsu 信滿成仏
shinmitsu 身密
shō 修
shōi jōbutsu 聖位成仏
shōtoku 性得
Shōtoku Taishi 聖徳太子
Shugo kokkaishō 守護国界章
shutoku 修得
Shūyō kashiwabara anryū 宗要柏原案立
sōji soku 相似即
sokushin jōbutsu 即身成仏
Sokushin jōbutsugi 即身成仏義
Sokushin jōbutsugi shiki 即身成仏義私記
Soshitsuujikarakyō ryakusho 蘇悉地羯羅経略疏
Soshitsuujikyōsho 蘇悉地經疏
Ssu-t’o 思託
Sueki Fumihiko 末木文美士
Ta-jih ching 大日経
Ta-jih-ching i-shih 大日經義釈

Ta-jih-ching su 大日經疏
Ta-p’in ching 大品經
Ta-sheng chi’i-hsin lun 大乗起信論
Taizō kongō bodaishingi ryakumon-dōshō 胎蔵金剛菩薩心義略問答抄
Tendai 天台
Tendai Hokkeshū gishū 天台法華宗義集
Tendai Hokkeshū sokushin jōbutsugi 天台法華宗即身成仏義
Tendai Shingon nishū doishō 天台真言二宗異異章
T’ien-t’ai 天台
T’ien-t’ai Chih-che ta-shih Pieh-ch’uan 天台智者大師別伝
tōgaku 等覚
Tōketsu 唐決
Tokuen 徳円
Tokuitsu 徳一
Tsung-ying 宗頴
Wei-chüan 維譚
Wu-chiao chang 五教章
Wu-liang-i ching 無量義経
Ying-lo ching 隆路経
yuiri himitsu 唯理秘密
zasu 座主
Zen Soteriology

Zen Buddhism is famous for its no-nonsense approach to religious salvation. “We are,” Zen likes to say of itself, “a special tradition apart from scripture that does not depend on the written word; we simply point directly at the person’s mind, that he may see his own nature and become a buddha.” The contrast between this self-definition and what we are used to in religion could hardly be starker, particularly when we consider what has been left out of it. There is no talk of God, of course, nor of a savior by whom we are redeemed; no mortal sin from which we are delivered, nor better land to which we shall repair. There is no holy writ to be revered nor divine revelation before which to bow; no church dogma to be believed nor church ritual to be performed. Instead, we are to abandon our rituals and dogmas, simply examine directly our own minds and see into our own natures. “Just turn the light around,” says Zen, “and shine it back.”

How are we to accomplish this revolutionary shining? Here Zen offers concrete, practical advice. We are to sit quietly in the exercise known as zazen (seated meditation), focusing our minds (perhaps on the enigmatic kōan stories of Zen tradition) until our conceptual thought processes have come to rest and we suddenly perceive things as they are “before” we have understood them. In this sudden perception, we discover the preconceptual level of consciousness that is the nature of our minds; in this discovery, or satori, we have become buddhas, freed forever from attachment to the false dualities of conceptual thought and done with the need for religion.

This is, to be sure, a crude model of Zen soteriology, but I think that something like this model (no doubt loosely derived from the sort of psychology cum metaphysics introduced to the West by the great Japanese
Zen scholar D. T. Suzuki) helps to account for some of the popularity of Zen in our day. It looks like a kind of "secular mysticism" for skeptical modern man: no dogma, no faith, no ritual; just a frankly utilitarian psychological technique for achieving an "altered state," a "peak experience" of raw reality that will radically and permanently transform our relation to ourselves and the world (presumably for the good). Perhaps so. Perhaps this is all there is to Zen Buddhism. But if we are to follow Zen's advice to question religious dogma, it may behoove us to ask about the status of Zen's own self-definitions; and if we are to represent skeptical modern (or perhaps "post-modern") man, we shall want to be suspicious not only of the epistemological claim that Zen Buddhism offers direct, preconceptual access to reality, but also of the historical notion that there is something called "Zen Buddhism" in the abstract—some single, definable religious entity that stands behind the various expressions, modern and premodern, of those who have called themselves Zen Buddhists. In particular, we may want to doubt whether our present model of Zen soteriology—or any given model—can adequately capture the range of what Zen Buddhists throughout history have wanted from their religion and how they have gone about getting it. This doubt arises not only from the historical range but also from the ambiguities of soteriology itself. Before I proceed to the historical case, I want to say a few words about these ambiguities.

Soteriological Models

The term "soteriology," drawn as it is from a branch of Christian theology, initially suggests the science of the salvific or healing function of the sōtōr, or savior, and in this sense seems a peculiarly inappropriate designation not only for our model of secular mysticism but for most (though perhaps not quite all) of what we find in the records of Zen. Yet, depending on how far we want to stretch the term from this initial theological context, it can reach to the very limits of religion itself and, at least by analogy, even beyond. Though these limits are by no means clear, and it would be naive to imagine that we can set neat stages in the stretching of "soteriology," it is helpful to distinguish narrower and broader senses of the term. The narrower senses tend to get fixed in one or both of two ways: (1) according to genre, by retaining the idea of a theological "science" and by limiting the extension of "soteriology" to explicit, more or less systematic accounts of religious goals and means; and (2) according to content, by accepting some version, more or less tightly defined, of the religious notion of salvation (though not necessarily of a savior) and by restricting "soteriology" to accounts of those religious goals, and their means, that are taken to be functionally or conceptually analogous to this notion. The former restriction yields a
distinction between what we may call “theological” and “nontheological” religious expression. The latter restriction, when based on a loose definition of salvation as something like the final spiritual goal, gives a distinction between “ultimate” and “proximate” religious concerns; when derived from tighter criteria (such as notions of transcendence, liberation, transformation, and the like), it implies additional distinctions between forms of religion or religiosity that are “salvational” and “nonsalvational,” “otherworldly” and “this-worldly,” and so on.¹

When thus restricted in these two ways to systematic, theological accounts of ultimate spiritual ends and their means, soteriology tends to be associated with the “great religions,” and with the “great traditions” within those religions. When it is not thus restricted, there is a broader sense in which we can say that all religions have (or even are) soteriologies, insofar as all are cultural systems that have as a goal the justification of human experience (whether of individual or group) by bringing it into right relationship with a particular value structure. In this latter sense, “soteriology” intends little more than definitions of this relationship and the ways it is supposed to be achieved. Those “great” theological systems that define the relationship as individual salvation, seen as the transcendental solution to what is considered a radically problematic human condition, are in this sense simply subsets of the broader soteriological enterprise.

Buddhism is usually treated as such a “great” theological system, and discussion of its soteriology tends to assume the more restricted senses of the term, focusing on its systematic accounts of such transcendental ends as nirvana or buddhahood, and on the renunciate’s path of meditation and wisdom through which they are achieved. Yet as a historical phenomenon, the Buddhist religion is of course much more than this, and an adequate historical understanding even of its disparate theological systems can hardly do without some consideration of the broader soteriological interests within which they occur and with which they continually interact. Such an understanding must take into account not only what Buddhists should want and should do according to the norms of the “explicit,” “official” soteriologies of the theologians, but also what Buddhists (including the theologians) have wanted and have done in the exercise of their “implicit,” “de facto” soteriologies. Whether at explicit or implicit levels, it must acknowledge not only the “ultimate” soteriologies of final goals and means but also the many and varied “proximate” soteriologies of more immediate religious needs. Whether taken as ultimate or proximate, it must be willing to ask about the implicit soteriological purposes of the explicit soteriological systems themselves and be ready to recognize that both the production of such systems and the specific forms they take may well serve ends (whether individual or group) quite different from those defined by the
systems themselves. Moreover, such an understanding must come to appreciate a wide range of soteriological genres—elite and popular, metaphysical and ethical, scientific and poetic, public and private, theoretical and practical, descriptive and prescriptive, and so on—each with its own ends and its own devices. And it must be sensitive to the complex conversation among these various kinds of soteriologies and to the ways they have talked to and against each other in particular historical, social, and intellectual settings, as they continually redefine what we call Buddhism.

One approach to understanding the major redefinitions of Buddhism that have occurred throughout its history is to see them as responses to crises or breakdowns in the soteriological conversation. Such crises can arise when, for whatever reasons, the perceived gap among the various soteriological models—and especially that between the dominant explicit and implicit models—no longer admits easy intercourse. At this point we can expect some attempt at reformation of the models—a reformation that typically tries simultaneously to lift the implicit and proximate to some “higher,” more “orthodox” level of discourse and to lower the explicit and ultimate to some more accessible, more familiar stage of meaning. Something like this process was at work, I think, in the redefinitions of Buddhism that occurred in the early Kamakura (1185–1333), the period that saw the introduction of Zen to Japan.

The Kamakura Reform

According to the explicit soteriology of the regnant scholastic Mahāyāna systems imported to Japan from the T’ang, the ultimate goal of Buddhism was buddhahood—by official definition, a state transcending time and space, a state of omniscience, a state of substantial mastery over the forces of history and nature that gave one the paranormal powers through which a buddha was supposed to work for the spiritual benefit of all beings. This sublime state was not only the sufficient condition for liberation from the misery of rebirth in samsāra, it was also the necessary condition: in the standard versions of the Mahāyāna favored in Japan, there was no true liberation short of buddhahood. The recognized means to this ultimate goal were appropriately daunting: they required a life of strictest renunciation and purest self-sacrifice, a life of perfect morality, profound meditation, and universal learning. Indeed, they demanded not just one such life but countless lives: by official sūtra count, it was to take no less than three great incalculable aeons to master the myriad practices and ascend the many stages of the bodhisattva’s career.

In contrast to this imposing official religion, the implicit Mahāyāna soteriologies offered a range of considerably less exalted, more immedi-
ate goals. Generally speaking, I think it fair to say that most Buddhists of Japan, like most Buddhists elsewhere, whether monk or layman, probably looked to their religion less for final liberation from samsāra than for various kinds of consolation in samsāra—for the proximate resolution of particular personal problems, to be sure, but also for some broader, more comprehensive sense that these problems made sense; that in the big picture, their sufferings were not in vain; that in the long run, the ups and downs of their lives were headed more up than down. The means to such consolation were basically twofold: first of all, faith—faith in the compassionate power of the Buddha, the verity of the Buddhist teachings, and the purity of its institutions; and second, action—ethical action, to the extent possible, but more importantly, the ritual actions that were the most powerful forms of spiritual merit (donation of alms, recitation of sacred texts and formulae, participation in religious rites, and so on).

The gap between the explicit and implicit soteriologies was bridged by the notion that the means to consolation were also the first steps toward the official goal of liberation—steps that would eventually lead, through the laws of karma, to rebirth at higher spiritual levels, on which the distant ideal of buddhahood and the arduous path of the bodhisattva would one day become personally relevant. Yet for many Buddhists of the late Heian (794–1185) and Kamakura, this bridge no longer spanned the gap. On the near side, so to speak, the historical upheavals of the age, and the attendant prevalence and intensity of personal anxiety and pain, threw into doubt the hope that real consolation in samsāra could be found short of total liberation from it, raising the demand for more immediate access to the ultimate goal in this lifetime (or at least in the one to come). Meanwhile, on the other side of the gap, the possibility of actually achieving this goal in any lifetime looked increasingly remote. The validity of the sanctioned soteriological models was being undermined by two sorts of theological developments within the official systems themselves: one that gave exaggerated emphasis to the metaphysical interpretation of buddhahood and hence cast doubt on its status as real religious experience; and another that introduced the historical doctrine of the inevitable decline of the dharma and thus raised fears that no one in the present, final age could actually negotiate the bodhisattva path. These theological doubts and fears were exacerbated by the increasing empirical evidence of the times that the established Japanese Buddhist institutions supposed to embody the official soteriology fell far short of the ideal.

To meet the new religious demand and to revalidate the Buddhist response, some of the Kamakura reformers looked back to China for culturally sanctioned but hitherto neglected soteriological strategies that might liberate them from the practical and theoretical difficulties of the
old bodhisattva path. They found there two prime candidates in the flourishing traditions of Pure Land and Zen. Of these, perhaps the more radical, and surely the more popular, was that of the Pure Land. This movement took seriously the soteriological implications of the doctrine of the last, degenerate age. In effect (though of course it had ways to soften its break with tradition), it abandoned the remote, official ideal of buddhahood in favor of the more proximate goal of birth in the Western Paradise of the Buddha Amida—a goal already assured by Amida's vow to take into his land all who called on him in faith. Given this new goal, the movement could substitute for the difficult practices of the bodhisattva path the more accessible style of the implicit religion: faith in the saving vow of Amida, and ritual participation in the power of this vow through the recitation of his name. In the reformed soteriology, then, the same means by which one was consoled in this life—faith and ritual action—became the sufficient conditions for deliverance into the new final goal of the Pure Land.

In the Chinese Zen tradition, the Kamakura reformers discovered a soteriology that was in some ways structurally similar. While continuing to pay lip service to the traditional ideal of buddhahood, the Zen masters had brought the ideal down into the human sphere in two ways. First, they had "demythologized" the perfections of the Buddha, such that his omniscience tended to be seen simply as freedom from epistemological error and his supernormal powers over the world became his pure, spontaneous participation in the world, as enacted in the lifestyle of the Zen master himself. Second, they had taken advantage of the metaphysical definitions of buddhahood to emphasize that such a demythologized buddha was latent in the mind of every being and needed only to be recognized there. The single, simple practice of Zen meditation, in which one abandoned the erroneous thoughts that covered this latent buddha, was sufficient to uncover it and permit the Zen Buddhist to discover, in the new goal of satori, that his own mind already possessed the ultimate spiritual state.

We may notice here that, for all its reputation as a radical critique of religion, Zen Buddhism was theologically (and institutionally) more conservative than Pure Land: the end of its soteriology remained (in name, at least) the traditional goal of buddhahood; the way to this end remained (albeit in truncated form) meditation, one of the central spiritual practices of the standard bodhisattva path, and a practice traditionally left to the professional religious. This conservative quality made it easier for the Kamakura Zen Buddhist apologists to argue for the orthodoxy of their reform, but it also made it more difficult for them to bring that reform down to the implicit soteriologies of the mass of Japanese Buddhists. For all the theoretical proximity of the latent buddha-mind, to those without the actual experience of satori, it offered little
consolation; for all the claimed spiritual power of Zen meditation, to those without the spiritual power to master the meditation—to those more comfortable with faith and ritual—Zen practice remained rather remote. In fact, many historical expressions of Zen have tended to remain rather remote and frankly elitist, but in spreading the religion in Kamakura Japan, the early Zen reformers did have ways of softening their definitions of both goal and practice to accommodate the values of the implicit soteriologies. Here I want to look at the ways such softening might be at work in one text of the period.

The Zazen ron

The Shōichi kokushi kana hōgo (Vernacular Dharma Words of the National Teacher Sacred Unity) is a work attributed to the important Kamakura figure Enni (or Ben’en, 1202–1280), one of the first and most successful exponents of Zen in Japan. Like many of the early Japanese Zen converts, Enni began his career as a Tendai monk. After studying with a disciple of the famous Tendai and Zen teacher Yōsai (or Eisai), he traveled to the continent, where he was eventually certified in the understanding of his new faith by Wu-chun Shih-fan, a prominent master of the Yang-ch’i branch of Lin-chi who trained several of Japan’s first Zen students. Soon after Enni’s return to the islands in 1241, he was invited to the capital by the powerful Fujiwara minister Kujō Michiie and installed as the founding abbot of Michiie’s grand new monastic complex, the Tōfukuji. From this exalted post he quickly became one of the most influential leaders of the nascent Japanese Zen movement, enjoying the patronage of both court and shōgunate, serving as the abbot of several important monasteries, and producing a goodly number of dharma descendants.

Unfortunately, little of Enni’s Zen teaching is preserved for us. We know that, like his forebear Yōsai and many of his Zen contemporaries, he retained broad interests in various forms of Buddhism and taught both the esoteric and exoteric systems popular in his day. Aside from a brief collection of his recorded sayings, his teachings on Zen are best known from the Kana hōgo. The provenance of this work, however, is quite problematic. The text is a brief tract, in the form of a catechism of twenty-four questions and answers preceded by a short introduction. It is traditionally said to have been written for Enni’s patron, Michiie, and the vulgate version of the text ends with the complimentary close of an epistle and a colophon identifying it as Shōichi’s private instructions to the minister. Nevertheless, not only this tradition but Enni’s authorship itself are subject to considerable doubt.

Enni’s Kana hōgo is perhaps more popularly known as the Zazen ron (Treatise on Seated Meditation), a title identical to that of a work attrib-
uted to Enni’s contemporary Lan-ch’i Tao-lung (Rankei Dōryū, 1213–1278), the first Sung missionary to Japan. Tao-lung’s text is of course written in Chinese, but one need not read far in it to recognize that it is a version of the Japanese work associated with Enni. It has been suggested that, when asked by Michiie for private instruction, the overworked abbot of Tōfukuji simply borrowed Tao-lung’s text and put it into the vernacular. But this suggestion is rather dubious. The association of Enni’s text with Michiie seems to have been a late development and does not appear in the earliest extant version. More importantly, whoever wrote the original text, and whether in Chinese or Japanese, it was probably not the Chinese master Tao-lung: the writing bears no resemblance to his other work, and the diction, scriptural sources, and religious themes of the Zazen ron all seem to stamp it as a work of Japanese authorship. I am reluctant at this point to hazard a guess about its provenance, but I do think the internal evidence of style and content allows us to accept the Zazen ron as a product of the early Kamakura; for my purposes here, this is enough.

By the early Kamakura, the Japanese had been Buddhists for some seven centuries, but they had not been Zen Buddhists. While Zen Buddhism had been enjoying a long and glorious history on the continent, the Japanese had continued to favor the older, more scholastic forms of Mahāyāna imported from the T’ang. Hence the first native converts to Zen were forced to contend with these established forms, and it is not surprising that, like the Zazen ron, much of the earliest Japanese Zen writing has a strongly apologetic character. As such, it tends to involve arguments for three general points: the orthodoxy of Zen, in terms acceptable to traditional Mahāyāna; the superiority of Zen over other forms of Mahāyāna; and the relevance of Zen to the religious needs of the community of Mahāyāna believers. Needless to say, such arguments are not necessarily mutually supportive: certain sorts of claims for the superiority of Zen, for example, can undermine the grounds for both orthodoxy and relevance; by the same token, overemphasis on orthodoxy may vitiate the case for superiority or rob the teaching of its appeal to those seeking new, more accessible forms of religion.

Of course, what one chooses to emphasize and how one goes about it depend to a large extent on the particular audiences and purposes of the argument. Thus, within the broad category of early Zen apologetic writing, we find quite disparate presentations of the religion. Yōsai’s famous Közen gokoku ron (Promotion of Zen for Protection of the Country), for example, addressed as it was to the government and written to defend the faith against charges of antinomianism, emphasizes the institutional integrity and superior social benefits of Zen practice; Shōjō’s Zenshū kōmoku (Outline of Zen Teaching), in contrast, composed in response to theological doubts among the author’s colleagues in the
Kegon school, focuses on the legitimate place of Zen within the doctrinal structure of the Kegon orthodoxy.\(^8\)

The *Zazen ron* is rather different from these more traditional, more learned essays. As its alternative title, *Kana hōgo*, indicates, it belongs to the popular new homiletic genre through which reformed versions of Buddhism (both Zen and others) were being spread throughout (at least the marginally literate levels of) late Heian and early Kamakura society. Given its intended audience, this genre eschewed the classical literary language of Chinese in favor of the contemporary vernacular; largely abandoned the traditional rhetorical device of argumentation through the marshaling of scriptural citation; and translated and reduced the complex technical vocabulary of scholastic Buddhism to a relatively few key religious notions. Due to both its audience and its purposes, the genre tended to put strong emphasis on the last of our apologetic points: the relevance and accessibility of the faith to everyman. Typically, as in the *Zazen ron*, it focused directly on the ultimate issue of individual salvation and offered more or less concrete advice on how to win salvation. Thus it was deeply concerned with soteriology. As we shall see in our text, not only this general concern but also the particular approaches taken to soteriology go hand in hand with the means and ends of the apologetic argument.

**Sudden Awakening**

Although the *Kana hōgo* is popularly called a "Treatise on Seated Zen," and although it opens by declaring this practice to be the very essence of Buddhism, the text as a whole is both more and less than an account of zazen—less, in that it does little to describe the actual techniques of seated meditation; more, in that it ranges well beyond this practice to offer an apologetic for a particular vision of Buddhism. This vision is very close to the sort of thing one finds in some of the literature of the early Zen movement of the T'ang, especially in the eighth-century texts associated with the so-called sudden teaching of the Southern school. Like that literature, it often seems to reduce Buddhism to a single, transformative insight into the ultimate truth.

When asked, for example, to explain how Zen can lead to buddha-hood, the author of the *Kana hōgo* distinguishes between two kinds of practice: that of the traditional bodhisattva path, which is based on the accumulation of good karma and requires three great incalculable aeons; and that of the Zen way, which "points directly at the person's mind" (*jikishi ninshin*) and permits him simply to "see his nature and become a buddha" (*kenshō jōbutsu*) (7; 414).\(^9\) Similarly, the author calls on us to abandon the quest for the paranormal spiritual powers developed on the path and simply "extinguish at once the three great incalcu-
lable aeons [of the bodhisattva path] and abruptly see our natures and become buddhas” (15; 416). Elsewhere, quoting “an ancient,” he says, “When you suddenly recognize the Zen of the Tathāgata (nyorai zen), the six perfections and the myriad practices [of the bodhisattva path] are all complete within your body” (3; 412).10 Dismissing the study of the Buddhist scripture, he remarks that “reading the true sūtra” consists of nothing but “awakening to the original mind and returning to the root source” (6; 413). Knowledge gained by studying the sūtras and śāstras is not “true knowledge,” which lies only in “recognizing the inherent buddha-nature by turning the light around and shining it back (ekō henshō)” (16; 416). All the teachings of the sūtras are merely “a finger pointing at the moon”; all the words of the Zen patriarchs are simply “a tile [taken up] to knock on a gate”: once the moon is seen and the gate opened, once we have “awakened to the one mind,” the teachings are irrelevant (23; 419-420). The awakening to this mind itself suddenly dispells all the delusions and afflictions of samsāra; it is like the bright moon emerging from behind the clouds (18; 417), like a lamp taken into a dark cave (22; 419). There is no need for any spiritual verification beyond this awakening (2; 411).

As a kind of corollary to its emphasis on awakening, the Zazen ron repeats the classical Zen warnings against misguided attempts to overcome the afflictions (bōnō, Skt. klesā) through meditation. This is the way of the Hinayāna practitioners who, hating the afflicted state, try to “extinguish body and mind, becoming like dead trees, tiles and stones.” This practice leads only to rebirth in the formless realm (mushiki kai, ārūpyadhātu); it is not “the true dharma” (12; 415). In a similar vein, the author rejects the notion that Zen practice is limited to seated meditation (19; 417) and criticizes those who “stop the thoughts of the three poisons (sandoku) [of desire, aversion, and delusion] only in zazen” and therefore “lack the authentic mind of the way (dōjin)” that “clarifies the root source of samsāra” (20; 418). In more general terms, he dismisses all efforts to seek buddhahood through religious endeavor: lesser types cling to the characteristics of things and seek the goal outside of themselves; higher types abandon these characteristics and turn within, trying to “rouse the mind to seek the mind”; both types fail to see that the afflictions are empty and the mind originally pure; their practices simply lead to more samsāra (22; 418-419).

As this last passage indicates, the rationale for the Zazen ron’s criticism of such spiritual practices is, not surprisingly, the ancient Mahāyāna notion of emptiness and the classical Zen teaching of the inherent buddha-mind (busshin). “Everything merely appears provisionally, like a dream, like an illusion” (11; 415); “when we awaken to the one mind, all things are empty, and not a single thing remains” (21; 418). “If we seek the source of the afflictions, they are like dreams, illusions, bub-
No-Mind and Sudden Awakening

bles, or shadows" (22; 419); “when we open the gate of the great liberation (dai gedatsu no mon), . . . there is no Buddha and no sentient being; from the beginning there is not a single thing” (23; 420). Since (as the usual Zen logic goes in these matters) “from the beginning the mind neither arises nor ceases, . . . samsāra is nirvāṇa”; since “the mind is originally pure, . . . the afflictions are enlightenment” (22; 418-419). In like fashion, since there are no real buddhas or sentient beings, they are equivalent (23; 419-420). To put this more ontologically,

All beings have a self-nature (jishō). This nature is intrinsically without arising or cessation; it constantly abides without change. Therefore, it is called the inherent self-nature. The buddhas of the three worlds [of past, present, and future] and all sentient beings have this same nature, which is the dharma body of the original ground (honji hosshin) (17; 417).

To put it more personally, “One’s own mind is the Buddha” (2; 411). This buddha-mind is free from attributes and free from attachments (musō mujaku) (5; 413); it is immaculate, without concepts, with no thought of attainment (6; 413). It is, to use the standard metaphors, like the bright moon behind the clouds, like the clear mirror beneath the dust (18; 417). Because this mind is our “original lot” (honbun) (24; 421), we are buddhas from the beginning (jiko honrai) and not only as the fruit of the path (7; 414). It is only because this mind is covered by the clouds and dust of deluded thoughts (mōnen) that we fail to recognize it (18; 417); it is just because we believe that these thoughts are the “original mind” (honshin) that we wander in samsāra (17; 417). If we once awaken to the mind that is the source of these thoughts, we share in the supernatural clarity and power of buddhahood (18; 417).

Those familiar with the early Zen texts will recognize the standard moves of the sudden teaching, complete with the orthodox equivocation on the notion of buddhahood as ultimate truth and as realization of this truth, and the usual uncertainties on the question of whether we really need to eliminate deluded thoughts (as in 3; 412) or only (deludedly) think we do (21; 418). More interesting for our purposes here (and for Zen study more broadly) than these tricky bits of Zen soteriological strategy is the way in which the strategy is played out in the actual tactics of salvation. For these tactics, the opening questions posed by the sudden teaching become something like this: Assuming that being a “buddha from the beginning” is not quite the end of the matter, what is that end and how do we reach it? Assuming that the emptiness of deluded thoughts does not eliminate the need to eliminate (at least deluded thoughts about) them, how shall we proceed? In the apologetic context of our text, these questions take on a particular thrust: How is the Zen understanding of the ends and means of Buddhism related to other, more familiar versions of the religion—especially those Mahā-
yāna versions that also teach emptiness and posit an innate buddha-mind? And what are the implications of this understanding for those who choose to adopt the Zen religious life? Let us consider these two questions in order.

The Buddha-Mind School

The apologetic thrust and polemical concerns of the Zazen ron are already apparent in its opening section, which provides a brief introductory statement announcing the basic position of the text:

The school of seated meditation (zazen no shūmon) is the way of the great liberation. All the various dharmanas flow from this gate; all the myriad practices are mastered from this way. The mystic functions of wisdom and psychic powers are born from within it; the life of men and gods have opened forth from within it. Therefore, the buddhas have resided in this gate, and the bodhisattvas practice it and enter into this way. Even those of the Lesser Vehicle and non-Buddhists practice it, although they do not yet accord with the true path. All the exoteric and esoteric schools have their self-verification by attaining this way. Therefore, a patriarch has said, "All the wise men of the ten directions enter this school." (1; 411)

Here we see a familiar style of Zen apologetic argumentation: Zen is the most orthodox form of Buddhism because it is the very essence of the religion, that "way of the great liberation" (dai gedatsu no michi) from which all else derives and toward which all else intends. All the Buddhist teachings and practices flow from Zen; all the Buddhist goals are achieved through Zen. Therefore, all religious seekers of whatever spiritual level—whether pagan or Buddhist, Hinayāna or Mahāyāna, exoteric or esoteric—strive to practice this way; and all who would attain the great liberation of enlightenment must ultimately do so through this way.

If this opening statement reflects familiar Zen apologetic strategy, it also raises familiar questions about the implications of that strategy for understanding the relationship between Zen Buddhism and other forms of the religion. This question is immediately taken up in the first section of the catechism:

Q: Why do you say that this Zen gate is the root of all the teachings?
A: Zen is the buddha-mind. The discipline is its outer marks; the teaching is its explanation; the recitation of the [Buddha’s] name is its expedient. These three samādhis have all come from the budhha-mind. Therefore, this school represents the root. (1; 411)

Zen is the "root" (konpon)—both the essence and source—of all Buddhism because it is the Buddha’s own mind—that ultimate state of mind
achieved by the Buddha, that enlightened set of mind from which he
taught his religion, that fundamental quality of mind through which we
are one with him. Here, of course, the Zazen ron is implicitly invoking
the common Zen distinction between the buddha-mind (busshin) and
buddha-teaching (bukkyō) schools—that is, between the tradition based
on the actual experience of enlightenment, as transmitted from mind to
mind by the Zen patriarchs, and the other Buddhist traditions that rely
on the explanations of the experience in sūtra and śāstra.

To this distinction, the text seems to be coupling two other dichoto-
mies regularly employed in Zen apologetics: (1) that between the ordi-
nary, mundane religion of “marks” (sō, laksana), or phenomenal charac-
teristics, and the noumenal Zen religion, which, being grounded only in
emptiness, transcends all characteristics; and (2) that between religion
based on “expedients” (hōben, upāya, in the sense both of the Buddha’s
accommodation to the spiritual level of the practitioner and of the prac-
titioner’s spiritual techniques appropriate to his or her level) and the
Zen religion, based solely on the ultimate truth revealed to enlighten-
ment and therefore beyond any need for such expedients. It is no acci-
dent that the styles of religious practice identified here with marks and
expedients (i.e., discipline, ritsu, and recitation, shōmyō, respectively)
were probably the two most powerful alternatives to Zen meditation in
the new religious movements of the Kamakura—the former empha-
sized especially by the monastic reformers of the established Nara and
Heian schools, the latter, as we have seen, by the swelling ranks of
Amida devotees.

Taken by itself, the metaphysical claim that Zen represents the root
buddha-mind, from which all Buddhism emerges, seems to leave open
the question of how the Zen Buddhist is to view its relationship to the
historical forms of the Buddhist religion. From one angle, this claim can
be read to mean only that there is one spiritual truth (or state or prac-
tice)—here called “Zen”—that stands behind or runs through all forms
of Buddhism, and that, insofar as they participate in (or express or aim
toward) this truth, all forms are valid as the explanations, marks, and
expedients through which the buddha-mind is made accessible to the
world. This kind of reading is sometimes adopted by those in the tradi-
tion who emphasize the ultimate unity of the buddha-mind and bud-
dha-teaching schools. It is a reading, however, that is not well suited to
the advertisement of Zen as a compelling religious alternative, not only
because it validates the spiritual utility of competing Buddhist forms,
but also because it does not address the question of whether and in what
way Zen actually takes some concrete, historical form beyond its merely
metaphysical status as pure, transcendental essence. The author of the
Zazen ron of course wants to promote such a form and hence must argue
that Zen is not only the one truth that stands “behind” all forms of Bud-
dhism but the supreme version of Buddhism that stands "above" all others and obviates or supersedes their practice. The argument takes two, probably not wholly compatible forms: one negative, which dismisses the ordinary goals and practices of the Buddhist path as being based on shallow understanding; the other positive, which locates Zen at the final stage of this path, as the culmination of all Buddhist religious endeavor.

**Zen and the Path**

We have already seen the negative form of this argument in the Zazen ron's frequent attacks on traditional Buddhist accounts of the spiritual life. Here I shall consider just two examples, one theological, the other practical, that help show how the polemical positions of the apologetic impinge on soteriological issues. The first example concerns the common Buddhist expectation that the spiritual adept will possess (and be able to display) paranormal powers and supernatural qualities. According to the traditional theology, the buddhas, through aeons of cultivation on the path, were supposed to have perfected a wide range of such powers and qualities; but even less exalted types, insofar as they were masters of meditation, were held to be skilled in psychic travel, mental telepathy, and so on. Thus it is not surprising that adherents of the early Zen school, which claimed to be the meditation school par excellence and to offer buddhahood to all, were embarrassed by such expectations and felt the need to counter them. The problem is directly addressed in our text:

Q: Why is it that, although one who sees his nature and awakens to the way is immediately a buddha, he does not have the psychic powers (jinzū) and radiance (kōmyō) [of a buddha] or, unlike ordinary people, show the mystic functions (myōyü) [of a buddha]? (15; 416)

The answer comes in several forms. First it is held that the physical body, even of one who has seen his nature and become a buddha, because it is the karmic product of past delusion, does not display the powers and radiance. Behind this position one can imagine the common Mahāyāna distinction between the physical body of the Buddha (nirmanakāya) that appears in history and the spiritual body (sambhogakāya), known only to the advanced adept, that is the product and shows the signs of the Buddha's perfections. The text itself, however, does not invoke this distinction, and later on in section 15, it takes a rather different approach to the problem, declaring that the desire for paranormal powers is "the way of Mara and the pagan religions" (tenma gedō). Even
foxes, the author reminds us, have magical powers, but they are not particularly honored for that. In either case, whether it relegates them to a hidden world or limits them to the mundane world, the thrust is to dismiss the common understanding of the paranormal powers as irrelevant to the Zen religious program.

The real meaning of the powers, the text goes on to explain, is the "mastery of the six dusts and the deluded conceptions" (rokujin mosō)—i.e., psychological freedom from attachment to the objects of sensory and intellectual experience. In like fashion, the "mystic functions" of the enlightened are identified with the sudden practice of one who, without requiring the three great incalculable aeons of ascetic practice, "abruptly sees his own nature and becomes a buddha"; and the supernatural "radiance," or aureola, supposed to emanate from the body of the Buddha is interpreted as the "light of wisdom" through which the Buddhist teacher saves beings from the "darkness of ignorance" (15; 416).

The Zazen ron's redefinitions of the supernatural powers and qualities are quite typical of the way Zen apologetics likes to use the standard categories of Buddhist theology to its own ends; they are also quite suggestive of how this use at once closes and discloses the gap between ultimate and proximate soteriological concerns. On the one hand, the dismissal of the "literal" interpretation of the supernatural or superhuman character of buddhahood and its redefinition as an internal, epistemological state demystifies and humanizes the ultimate spiritual goal and thus reduces it to a level seemingly more accessible to actual experience. On the other hand, by dismissing the supernatural as irrelevant, this internalization and demythologization rob it of its power as a buffer between real and ideal. To the extent that the buddhas are within, there are no other powers "out there" to whom we can turn for solace and aid; we are left alone with ourselves. To the extent that buddhahood is directly within our reach, there is no safe distance from which we can gaze on the glories of the ultimate end to come, or across which we can imagine ourselves gradually progressing toward them; our proximate hopes and partial victories are in vain. In effect, our spiritual options have been reduced to indefinite suffering in samsāra or immediate ascent to supreme, perfect enlightenment.

The stark soteriological implications of the Zen apologetic are equally evident in our second example, the Zazen ron's treatment of the traditional Buddhist practices of sūtra reading and recitation. In section 6, the interlocutor complains that the uncompromising Zen style of religion seems "difficult to believe in and difficult to practice" and asks whether one might not "seek the merits of reading the sūtras and reciting dhāranī, or keeping the precepts, or recollecting the Buddha and calling his name" (6; 413). The answer begins on a high note, by
declaring that “the sūtras and dhāraṇī are not words: they are the original mind of all beings.” This metaphysical interpretation is immediately followed by a rather different, more utilitarian reading: “They are speech, intended for those who have lost their original minds,” taught simply in order to “bring about awakening to the original mind and put an end to birth and death in delusion” (ibid.).

Such a reading seems to hold out the hope that those who have lost their minds might yet make use of reading and recitation to regain them; and elsewhere the Zazen ron does somewhat grudgingly acknowledge the utility of scripture reading for those who, having not yet “awakened to the buddha-mind,” must “rely on the finger” to “see the moon” (23; 419-420). But in our passage, the text immediately shifts back to its initial approach with the remark that “reading the true sūtra” consists simply of “awakening to the original mind” itself. It then goes on to dash any hope for the spiritual efficacy of reading or recitation: to use language to bring about realization is like saying “fire” to get warm or “breeze” to get cool, like trying to assuage one’s hunger with the picture of a pastry or quench one’s thirst with the word “water” (6; 413). Finally, the author moves his argument beyond the topic of language to a deeper religious issue: the problem here lies not merely in the futility of the particular practices of reading and recitation but in the more fundamental mistake of practicing the Buddhist dharmas with the intention of attaining something (ushotoku). This is “the great stupidity” of the ordinary man (bonpu, prthagjana), deluded by his belief in birth and death; in the “wisdom of the Great Vehicle,” one “practices all dharmas with no thought of attainment” (ibid.).

If the rather rambling rhetoric of this passage reflects the venerable Zen tradition of a rough-and-ready approach to argumentation, its content reminds us of the tradition’s readiness to play rough with the religious aspirations of proximate soteriology. The Zazen ron’s final warning in section 6 against the fundamental Buddhist practice of merit-making recalls the legendary opening statement of Zen in China, in which the First Patriarch, Bodhidharma, dismisses the pious deeds of the Liang Emperor Wu with the remark, “No merit whatsoever.” As in our passage, the patriarch goes on to contrast mundane notions of merit with “pure wisdom, perfect and profound.” This wisdom, of course, is the Zazen ron’s perfect “wisdom of the Great Vehicle” (daijō hannya)—the knowledge that, as Bodhidharma says, “the substance is naturally empty and still.” In the light of such wisdom, which sees through the causal structure of “birth and death,” there is no confinement by that structure and hence no “thought of attaining” (ushotoku no kokoro) the spiritual fruits of karma within it. As Bodhidharma tells the emperor, “the primary sense of the holy truth” (sheng ti ti-i i) taught by the Buddha is that there is nothing particularly holy. Here again, if we are
absolved of the obligation to perform the religious deeds that would make us holy, we are also deprived of the faith that such deeds will serve us in the short run or lead us in the long run to the goal. In this sense, at least, we can appreciate the interlocutor’s lament that Zen is difficult to believe in and difficult to practice.

This difficulty of Zen is only intensified by some of the Zazen ron’s positive claims for the superiority of its religion—claims that seek to identify it with the highest levels of the spiritual path. For these purposes the apologetic must reaffirm the very notion of religious progress that we have just seen it dismiss, and in several places the Zazen ron does explicitly acknowledge the validity of such a notion. In section 7, for example, the author admits that “one who seeks buddhahood through accumulating the merits and good roots (zenkon kudoku) [of spiritual karma] may become a buddha after three great incalculable aeons,” whereas one who “sees his nature” through Zen recognizes that he is a buddha from the beginning (7; 414). Here we seem to have two alternative forms of religion—one slow, the other quick—from which we are free to choose.

Elsewhere, however, the choice seems not so free. In section 14 we are told that “the three [ranks of the] wise and ten [stages of the] holy (sangen jishō) [i.e., the laukika ranks of the bhadra and lokottara stages of the ārya that together constitute the bodhisattva path] are established for the sake of those of dull faculties (donkon);” Zen, in contrast, is intended for those of such acute faculties (rikon) that they reach enlightenment at the very outset of the bodhisattva path, “when they first produce the thought (hosshin, cītottāpā) [of seeking enlightenment]” (14; 416).

Here we can see quite clearly how the apologetic is caught between two conflicting desiderata: by invoking the standard Buddhist hermeneutical categories of more and less spiritually advanced audiences and identifying itself with the former, it asserts its superior religious status at the expense of its relevance to those who count themselves among the latter. For the less spiritually advanced, it would seem, the old path, long and difficult as it is, remains the only choice. Indeed, however much we may celebrate the ease and speed with which the spiritually acute come to Zen practice, if we measure this practice against the stages of the traditional path followed by the dull, it is almost out of reach. When asked whether the bodhisattvas of the Great Vehicle have achieved Zen practice, the author of the Zazen ron responds that, until they have completed the tenth and final stage of their path, bodhisattvas still have not reached it; they only achieve it at the last moment of their careers, in the state of “virtual enlightenment” (tōgaku) from which they pass directly into buddhahood (13; 415).

The reason the bodhisattvas do not achieve Zen practice until the end
of their careers is, we are told, that throughout their path they are still subject to the afflictions (*wakuchi no shō*). At first glance this may seem an odd way to explain the matter, since we have already been warned against making the Hīnayānist mistake of hating the afflictions and enjoined to understand them as empty and as enlightenment itself (13; 415, 418-419). This oddity is not peculiar to our text or to Zen: it is the sort of thing that comes easily to all Mahāyāna theologians, who can nimbly move back and forth across the distinction between ultimate and conventional levels of discourse. Though such moves are common throughout our text, at this point the author prefers a slightly different approach: to say that the bodhisattvas are subject to the afflictions, he explains, is simply to say that they have “aspirations to seek the dharma” (*guhō no nozomi*) and hence “do not accord with their original lot” (*honbun ni kanawa[zu]*) (13; 415).

In other words, the prime attitudinal failing that separates the religion of the traditional Buddhist path from Zen practice is its intentionality—the “thought of attainment” (*ushotoku no kokoro*) that is the key defect of merit-making. Zen practice begins where this failing stops, in the attitude that the *Zazen ron* calls “no-mind” (*mushin*). Despite its seeming remoteness at the very end of the bodhisattva path, it is precisely this attitude of no-mind that the *Zazen ron* uses to span the gulf between real and ideal and bring the experience of awakening across from the other shore.

**No-Mind**

When asked how one is to use the mind (*yōjin*) in Zen spiritual practice, the author of the *Zazen ron* replies that the true use of the mind is no-mind and no-thought (*munen*) (5; 412-413). Since all things appear only provisionally, we should not consider (*shiryo*) them (11; 415); if we do not consider them—if we have “the ultimate [practice of] no-mind”—we put a stop to all false views and discriminations of thinking (*akuchi akuken shiryo junbetsu*) (9; 414). This way of no-thought, or no-mind, “does not consider any good or evil” (9; 414); hence it has no aspirations for merit (*kudoku*) (8; 414) or even for the buddhadharma itself (13; 415). It simply “sees all things without seeing them in the mind and hears all things without hearing them in the mind” (24; 421). This is by no means the Hīnayāna practice of stilling the mind (12; 415): indeed, it is beyond the stages of the bodhisattva path (13; 415) and eliminates the three aeons of the path (15; 416). One who “does not consider any good or evil” directly cuts off “the root source of saṃsāra”; he is “a buddha without beginning or end and is [practicing] Zen whether walking, standing, sitting or reclining” (19; 417).

The teaching of no-mind, or no-thought, is one of the most famous
features of early Zen literature, especially that espousing the sudden doctrine. Like many of the central terms of this doctrine, “no-mind” and “no-thought” function at several levels, from concrete religious prescription to abstract metaphysical description. At the former level, they are associated with the common warnings about the evils of conceptual thought and with the standard injunctions to avoid “giving rise to thoughts” in regard to sense objects—injunctions no doubt reflected in the Zazen ron’s suggestive claim that, in no-mind, one “sees all things without seeing them in the mind.” As I have pointed out elsewhere, this general psychological advice is sometimes linked in the early literature to a particular contemplative exercise in which one suspends consideration of good and evil and passively observes the arising and ceasing of one’s thoughts until one has recovered, or uncovered, one’s original mind. By the Kamakura, this exercise had been formalized as “the essential art of zazen” in the meditation instructions of the Ch’an-yüan ch’ing-kuei (Pure Rules of the Zen Gardens), the Sung Zen monastic code introduced to Japan around the turn of the thirteenth century.15

In this practical sense, then, “no-mind” could refer to a spiritual expedient for the psychological uncovering, and epistemological discovering, of the buddha-nature; as the Ch’an-yüan ch’ing-kuei says, once the waves of the mind are stilled, the pearl of enlightenment resting beneath will appear.16 Even as it used the term in this sense, however, the tradition was acutely aware that the soteriological model resting beneath that use could threaten some of the claims of the sudden doctrine. Hence, at the upper end of the Zen theological spectrum, no-mind was simultaneously held to represent a metaphysical disclosing of the nature of the buddha-nature and a theoretical foreclosing of the expedience of spiritual expedients. At this higher level, the point of no-mind was not that one should avoid giving rise to thoughts (pu ch’i nien) but that thoughts do not arise (nien pu ch’i). Everything that appears to the mind, as the Zazen ron says, does so only “provisionally” (kari ni) (11; 415); the mind itself—the inherent buddha-nature—is “intrinsically without arising and ceasing.” We arise and cease in saṃsāra only to the extent that we believe our thoughts to be our original mind (17; 417). In this sense of no-mind, the only authentic Zen practice was the abandonment of such belief through the sudden recognition of the original mind.

Between the psychological and metaphysical senses of no-mind lay what we may loosely describe as an ethical sense of the term, which I am calling the “attitude” of no-mind—namely, the attitude of nonintentionality expressed in the early literature by the notions that Zen practice was “without action” (wu-wei), “without artifice” (wu-tso), and so on. Since the religious goal of buddhahood was inherent and not something to be achieved, the key to religious practice was, as the Zazen ron emphasizes, to give up merit-making and abandon aspirations for the
dharma; since our distance from the goal is measured only by the persistence of our attempts to achieve it, one who abandons such attempts—one who, in the famous words of the Sixth Patriarch, “does not consider any good or evil”—immediately closes that distance. He is, as the Zazen ron says, “a buddha without beginning or end, [practicing] Zen whether walking, standing, sitting or reclining” (19; 417). To put the point a little differently, in the attitude of no-mind, Zen practice is its own reward—the direct, spontaneous expression of Buddhahood in daily life.

As models for the religious life, these various traditional uses of no-mind are clearly in tension with one another: (1) the psychological use seems to imply a contemplative life aimed at cultivating the zazen exercise for control of the mind; (2) the metaphysical sense of no-mind tends to undermine such a religious style and, at least in theory, reduce spiritual practice to the single transformative experience of sudden awakening to the buddha-mind; and (3) the ethical use appears to dismiss the quest for such an experience and locate the goal of spiritual practice in the ongoing expression of the mind in action. From the broader perspective of intellectual history, the tension among these uses of no-mind may be viewed as a sudden-style analogue to such venerable Buddhist polarities as samatha and vipaśyanā, darśana and bhāvanā, and to such enduring Chinese ethical dichotomies as knowledge and action, recovery and cultivation, and the like. But rather than pursue this broader perspective here, I want to ask how our text handles this tension in dealing with the troubled relationship between its twin themes of no-mind and sudden awakening.

Historically speaking, the Zen tradition was loath to abandon any of these three models of no-mind; hence the tension among them became a prime ideological factor in the development of variant interpretations of the tradition’s sudden soteriology. By the thirteenth century, when the Zazen ron was written, these interpretations had already begun to crystallize in the two styles of teaching that would eventually dominate Japanese Zen: the so-called kōan (story viewing) Zen of the Rinzai school, based on the kōan teachings of the Sung figure Ta-hui (1089–1163); and the mokushō (silent illumination) Zen of the Sōtō, promulgated by Enni’s famous Japanese contemporary, Dōgen (1200–1253). Ta-hui strongly rejected the notion that zazen was an end in itself and emphasized the need for the experience of awakening, brought about through concentration on the sayings of the Zen patriarchs; Dōgen criticized the utilitarian interpretation of zazen as means to an end and held that its practice was itself the enlightened activity of the patriarchs. 17

Accustomed as we are to associating the Rinzai tradition with kōan Zen, the attribution of the Zazen ron to the Rinzai master Enni might lead us to expect it to offer a spiritual program designed to generate
direct intuitive insight into the mind through kōan concentration. However, the Zazen ron makes no mention of the kanna technique and shows almost no awareness of the kōan stories so popular during the Sung, or of the considerable corpus of Zen transmission histories and recorded sayings already circulating in Japan. In fact, the Zazen ron seems blissfully ignorant of the contemporaneous disputes swirling around it over the interpretation of meditation and awakening. Yet to the extent that we can identify it with any position in these disputes, our text seems to fall closest to those that would emphasize the ethical attitude of no-mind.

Practice after Getting the Point

In his commentary to Dōgen’s Shōbō genzō (Treasury of the Eye of the True Law), the Kamakura author Kyōgō criticizes Dōgen’s rival Enni for teaching that zazen is a practice to be done only after one has “gotten the point” (tokushi), in contrast to Tao-lung, who is supposed to have made the opposite mistake. Enni’s follower Ichien has a similar charge against certain unnamed disciples of his master who say that zazen before one has “seen one’s nature” (kenshō) is worthless. Kyōgō, who probably felt some animosity toward Enni’s more prosperous Rinzai movement, wanted to assert the superiority of Dōgen’s Zen; Ichien, who has been called “a voice for pluralism,” wanted to play down the distinction between Zen and Tendai meditation. Whether or not their claims about Enni (or his followers) are historically accurate, we cannot say; but they do give us pause. Whether or not Enni actually wrote the Zazen ron I also cannot say; but I do see some interesting reflections of the claims in the text. Elsewhere I have written in passing that the remarks of Kyōgō and Ichien bear little relation to the Zazen ron, but I may have been wrong.

The issue raised by these remarks can be put as follows: Is Zen meditation something to be done simply to gain a special insight, after which it is unnecessary? Or is it something else—something supposed to presuppose such insight, without which it is inauthentic? Clearly this issue is closely cognate to the dispute between kanna and mokushō. Though the Zazen ron does not enter into the dispute and, like many earlier Zen texts, can probably be read in either way, its treatment of no-mind seems to tip it heavily toward the latter style. Its penultimate dialogue is particularly interesting in this regard because it addresses the very issue raised by Kyōgyō and Ichien. The question here is, “After one has seen his nature, must he still use the mind [to practice]?” The answer, bits of which I have already cited for its emphasis on awakening, seems at first glance to be “no” and hence to be an assertion of the merely utilitarian view of Zen practice:
All the teachings of the sutras are like a finger pointing at the moon. . .
After one has awakened to the one mind, there is no use for any of them.
All the words of the patriarchs are like a tile [taken up] to knock on a gate.
. . . Once you have entered the gate, why pick up the tile? (23; 420)

Note, however, that the answer has sidestepped the question: the question had to do with the need for practice (yōjin) after awakening (kenshō); the answer concerns the role of the teachings in such practice. Before one has awakened, the text explains, "to the original meaning of the buddhas and patriarchs," one should study the Zen teaching of "seeing your nature and becoming a buddha"; after one has awakened, one will realize that "seeing your nature" is nothing special (kitoku) and 'becoming a buddha' cannot be attained (fukatoku)" (ibid.).

The answer does emphasize the pivotal point of awakening, but it does not tell us on which side of that point we should put the cultivation of no-mind. I have no doubt that the author of the Zazen ron fully expected this cultivation to yield spiritual insights into Buddhism and therefore to serve as a means to an end; but this is not the prime justification he offers for it. On the contrary, we should remember that the key characteristic of no-mind is precisely its freedom from all aspiration for spiritual advancement: "Since [in the state of no-mind) we do not produce any views of cultivation, we do not aspire to become buddhas" (9; 414).

Where the text first takes up the notion of no-mind, it cites the Diamond Sūtra's (Vajracchedikā) famous teaching that buddhas are free from "marks" (lakṣaṇa) and says, "The buddha-mind is without marks and without attachments (musō mujaku). . . . Therefore, we should be without mind and without thought (mushin munen)" throughout all activities (5; 413).22 This, I think, is the prime justification: we should practice no-mind because it puts into practice what is distinctive about our buddhahood. No-mind is not merely our practice but the very nature of our "original mind" (22; 419); it is not merely our mind but "the original teacher" (honshi) of all the buddhas of the three worlds. It is "the cardinal buddha" (daiichi no butsu), the realization of which is called the supreme perfect enlightenment of the buddhas (24; 422). It is probably this enlightened practice of no-mind that the author has in mind when he claims that Zen is itself the buddha-mind (1; 411) and reiterates that Zen cultivation represents "the ultimate of the buddha-mind" (4; 412). In the latter section, the concrete implications of this way of understanding Zen practice are expressed in dramatic terms:

Even if you have not attained the way, when you sit in meditation for one period, you are a one-period buddha (ichiji no butsu); when you sit in meditation for one day, you are a one-day buddha; when you sit in meditation for one lifetime, you are a lifetime buddha. To have this kind of faith is to be one of great faculties, a great vessel of the dharma. (ibid.)
Sōtō exponents of the enlightened zazen of "just sitting" (shikan taza) would no doubt find little to quibble with here; advocates of kanna would surely smell the stench of silent illumination and ask what has happened to satori. The answer, I think, lies in the last line of this passage.

The fact that one can practice buddhahood without having "attained the way" (tokudō) reminds us that the Zazen ron has not abandoned the notion that its Zen practice leads somewhere, and that there is some difference between the practitioner who has attained the way and one who has not. Yet the soteriological thrust of our passage is not on this difference but on the simultaneity of practice and buddhahood; to focus on the difference and the spiritual attainments produced by the practice is to miss that thrust and put the horse before the cart. The cart here must go before the horse. The real awakening—the real turning point for the practitioner that frees him to put buddhahood into practice—must precede the practice, in some act of turning to it and taking it up. As soon as he turns to it and takes it up, he is a buddha, whether or not he has attained the way. If we call this turning point "getting the point," then Kyōgō's depiction of Enni's zazen could be applied to the Zazen ron.

Belief and Liberation

The difference between a style of Zen that teaches meditation practice only before awakening and one that speaks of it only after awakening can be seen in part as a reflection of the difference between psychological and metaphysical approaches to the interpretation of enlightenment. But in practical terms—in terms of the religious experience of the practitioner—that difference may also point to a distinction between two senses of the famous Zen call for a sudden "awakening" to, or sudden "seeing" of, the original nature. The former (the kind of seeing that occurs within, and comes as a result of, meditation practice) suggests a direct, intuitive apprehension of the higher state of mind that is supposed to be our original nature; the latter (the kind of seeing that precedes, and becomes the basis for, the practice) looks more like an act of intellectual assent to the doctrine of such a nature, and of emotional and volitional commitment to the religious course that is said to follow from that doctrine. The epistemological difference here is something like that between "knowing" and "knowing that." In soteriological terms, this difference can provide a distinction between the ultimate attainment of liberation through mystical identification with the buddha-mind and the more proximate goal of consolation in the certainty that there is such a mind. 23

Traditional systems of Buddhist soteriology, of course, included analogous distinctions in their schemas of the path—distinctions, for exam-
pie, between the initial “seeing” (darśana) of the truth, through which one eliminated the intellectual afflictions (usually counted as doubt and false views) and entered the transmundane path, and the final cessation of all cognitive and affective afflictions in complete enlightenment at the end of that path; or between the bodhisattva’s preliminary knowledge of the metaphysical nature of all dharmas (sarvajñatā), which establishes him irreversibly on his religious course, and the full omniscience of buddhahood (sarvākārajñatā). 24

It was no doubt in recollection of such distinctions that the famous T’ang scholar Tsung-mi (780–841) was able to divide the Zen spiritual experience into a first, sudden “awakening of understanding” (chieh-wu) of the buddha-nature, which launched one into authentic Zen practice, and a final “awakening of realization” (cheng-wu) of buddhahood, which was the culmination of such practice. 25 Tsung-mi’s doctrine was directed against those within the Zen movement who wanted to draw antinomian conclusions from the sudden teaching; it sought to rationalize the teaching in terms of the path, to play down the soteriological significance of the initial understanding, and to emphasize the need to proceed to the final realization through a continued “gradual practice” (chien-hsiu) after the sudden awakening. In contrast, the message of the Zazen ron, directed as it is to those outside of Zen who seek alternatives to the hierarchies of the bodhisattva course, has little use for the notion of progressive stages in enlightenment but prefers to advertise the sufficiency of an initial awakening experience and to celebrate the freedom from spiritual need beyond.

The salvific power of the initial encounter with the buddha-mind teaching and the sense of liberation that follows from it are well expressed in sections 3 and 4 of the text. In the former, the questioner asks why we should abandon the spiritual merits of “the myriad practices and good works” of the traditional Buddhist path in favor of the sole dharma of “the one [buddha-]mind.” The answer given is twofold: first, that this one practice fulfills all Buddhist practices; second, that, whatever practices we may do, in the end the only significant issue is “putting a stop to delusion and attaining the awakening” that is the necessary condition for buddhahood (3; 412). In the next section, the questioner pursues this second point. Surely Zen cannot guarantee such an awakening, “and, if it is not certain [that we will attain awakening], what good is there in cultivating [the buddha-mind teaching]?” The answer is that this teaching is itself “the way of inconceivable liberation” (fushigi gedatsu no michi). Hence, “if one but hears it, it forms the surpassing cause of bodhi (bodai no shōin); and, if one cultivates it, it is the ultimate of the buddha-mind (busshin no shigoku).” Simply to hear (and presumably to acknowledge) the good news of the buddha-mind is to be assured of the inconceivable liberation; simply to act on it is to be
liberated. To seek awakening beyond this is to miss the point, since "the buddha-mind is basically without delusion and awakening" (4; 412).

Once we are assured of liberation, there is nothing to do but be liberated; once we have put the issue of awakening behind us, there is only the waking life before us. In other words, once we shift the turning point of the Zazen ron's soteriology from the adept's achievement of mystical knowledge in meditation to the neophyte's experience of belief in the teaching, we also shift the religious role of its practice of no-mind from that of a concentration exercise designed to bring about the transcendent goal to that of a spiritual attitude or psychological habit that frees the believer from the demands of the path so that he may go about his business in the world. By allowing him to abandon all "considerations of good and evil," no-mind offers him an ongoing vehicle for liberation from nagging doubts about his spiritual state and the need to perfect it; by permitting him to "see all things without seeing them in the mind," it provides him with a moment-to-moment means for taking the world as it comes to him, in all its ambiguity. For no-mind, then, the karmic law of birth and death in saṃsāra holds no fear.

In the final, most poignant (and in some ways most religiously telling) passage of the Zazen ron, the questioner asks how the unenlightened man should use his mind (yōjin) to prepare himself for the end. The answer is that there is no end:

When there is no thought and no mind, there is no birth and no death. . . . When we do not think that there is birth and death, when we are without mind and without thought, this is the same as the great nirvāṇa. . . . If we only cultivate no-mind and do not forget it, whether walking, sitting, standing or reclining, there is no special way to use the mind at the last. When we truly rest on the path of no-mind, [we go] like blossoms and leaves that scatter before the wind, like frost and snow melting in the morning sun.(24; 420-421)

If we have clearly come quite far from our initial model of Zen as a utilitarian approach to mystical experience, we have also come much closer to the values of the implicit soteriology of Kamakura Buddhism. While the orthodox ideal remains the ancient Zen call to the direct seeing of the buddha-nature, the operative goal is now the hearing of that call itself; while the official means to the ideal continues to invoke the traditional Zen practice of no-mind, the meaning of the means now lies not in its end but in itself.

By this reading, the Zazen ron is not far from the Pure Land. As in the contemporaneous Pure Land soteriology, the liberated state of buddha- hood has come down to this world as the liberating fact of a buddha—not, to be sure, an external buddha who has vowed to free us from this land to another, but a buddha nonetheless, whose presence within
promises to free us from our need to free ourselves. As in the Pure Land, this promise is activated by abandoning the old models of spiritual perfection in favor of faith in this buddha—not perhaps the *fideea* of the devotee's trust in that buddha's saving compassion, but at least the *fides* of the believer's assent to the saving fact. The promise is realized here, as in the Pure Land, through commitment to the ongoing expression of this faith in daily life—if not in the continuous celebration of the peerless power of this buddha's primal vow, then in the habitual reenactment of the markless wisdom of the inherent buddha-mind. The disagreement within Pure Land theology about whether such expression is to be found primarily in the inner life of piety or in the outward recitation of Amida's name has its analogue in the *Zazen ron*'s equivocation about whether its enactment of buddhahood is simply the internal habit of no-mind, "whether walking, standing, sitting or reclining," or whether it requires (or perhaps also is) the external ritual act of zazen—one period of which, we may recall, makes "a one-period buddha." Whichever is the case, in this style of Zen, as in the Pure Land, meditation is no longer an obstacle: one does not have to be good at it to be a buddha.

**The Soteriology of Conversion**

In the end, it will not do to overstate this "protestant" reading of the *Zazen ron*—a reading that represents, at most, a likely ideal type against which to test the more complex, more ambiguous mix of soteriological models found in this text. For example, the psychological distinction I have drawn between the mystical and intellectual experiences of the buddha-mind may not be easy to maintain in a teaching, like that of the *Zazen ron*, that tends to dismiss conceptual understanding as incapable of grasping religious truths; similarly, the soteriological distinction between ultimate and proximate stages in such experience cannot always be charted neatly in a text, like the *Zazen ron*, that wants to avoid the model of an articulated spiritual path. Nevertheless, as a heuristic device, the reading as a whole and some version of the distinctions on which it is based may help to make sense of the paradoxes of our text, to adjudicate the conflicting models of no-mind, and, more broadly, to take some of the mystery out of the sudden practice of Zen. At the very least, the notion of awakening as an act of faith points up the religious importance of that mystery and the extent to which it could—and in certain historical contexts probably did—serve as the main gateway (in the sense both of barrier and entrance) to Zen life.

The mystery of the sudden practice of Zen lies in its conflation of cause and effect. Whether the practice is reduced to the goal of awakening or whether the goal is embedded in the act of practice, the two must
occur simultaneously. Theologically speaking, such a conflation is supposed to represent the culmination of the path, the crowning vision of the buddha himself, who sees no distinction between himself and the beings below him on the path. Because Zen claims to be the buddha-mind school, based solely on this vision, it must keep itself above any such distinction by collapsing the path and its goal and by asserting a transcendental plane of religion beyond the causal laws governing human spiritual works. Hence the key soteriological issue of the sudden practice becomes how one ascends to this higher plane and gains access to such religion. By definition, this cannot be done by climbing to it on the path but only by leaping to it from the path.

In existential terms, then, the path functions for the Zen Buddhist, perhaps no less than for the Pure Land believer, not as a road to freedom but as a symbol of bondage—as the law that binds him to cause and effect and thus chains him to the worldly plane. The power of the symbol grows, and the chains of the law bind ever more tightly, precisely to the degree that the would-be Zen Buddhist is a believing Buddhist whose faith is rooted in traditional scripture and whose religious life is grounded in the common assumptions and established practices of the path. For him, the leap to the higher perspective of Zen means abandoning his old faith, and the call to the sudden practice of Zen is a summons to a second “going forth” (shukke)—not from family life, this time, but from the familiar confines of Buddhist life.

The distance between the old law of the path and the new dispensation of Zen varies with the particular style of Zen teaching. In more conservative, more catholic styles that seek accommodation with the tradition, it may be merely the gap between alternative readings of what is taken to be a common spiritual system; in more radical, more protestant versions, it can become a yawning chasm—in effect, the gulf between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa itself, and hence the very stuff of Zen soteriology. Most Zen teachings probably fall somewhere between these extremes, but wherever they fall, Zen’s distance from the path is most strongly felt and most explicitly expressed in those contexts in which the religion is addressing itself to the believing Buddhist and seeking to convert him to the faith. This was, of course, the context for many of the early Kamakura Zen teachings, as it had been for the T’ang originators of Zen.

By the late Heian and early Kamakura, when they first began to take Zen seriously as a religious alternative, Japanese Buddhists were quite familiar with the transcendental teaching of a supreme, sudden vehicle—a teaching they had long heard espoused by Kegon, Tendai, and Shingon scholars. What they lacked, and what seems to have most struck them about Zen (apart from the fact that it represented the preferred Buddhism of the Southern Sung elite), was (1) its claim to a reli-
igion based solely on the ultimate truth and perfect enlightenment of the buddha-mind itself, as transmitted outside scripture in the lineage of the patriarchs, and (2) its offer of a single, simple spiritual practice, beyond the techniques of the bodhisattva path, through which anyone could directly realize the buddha-mind and immediately accede to this lineage. Here was the ancient ideal of the final buddha-vehicle made flesh; and the sudden advent of men (not yet, so far as we know, women) claiming to be living buddhas and offering as much to everyman must have been a scandal to some learned doctors of the dharma.

Scandal or no, it certainly raised the question of just how these men understood their buddhahood and why they thought their practice immediately ensured it; dharma doctor or not, it raised both the eyebrows and the anxiety of those accustomed to looking at the final ideal from the safe distance of three incalculable aeons. Faced with such resistance, the early Zen apologists argued along two lines: one, as seen conspicuously in Dōgen’s famous kana hōgo text, the Bendō wa (Talks on Pursuing the Way), that linked the Zen claims to the authority of the historical Buddha through the esoteric lineage of the patriarchs; the other, pursued by our Zazen ron, that grounded those claims in the ultimate import of the transhistorical buddha-mind. Though they differ in style, it is not surprising that both lines of argument end with a call for a leap of faith in the new dispensation, an abandonment of the old models of spiritual perfection, and a commitment to the life of buddhahood in the immediate world of everyday experience.

In one sense, the emphasis on these three elements—faith, and the abandonment and commitment that flow from it—can be seen as a reflex of the particular purposes of the apologetic genre itself: just as the goal of the genre was to turn the faith of its reader from the old religion and establish him in the new, so the goal of the new religion was to be found precisely in this turning. In this sense, the model of sudden awakening that I have proposed here might be styled a “soteriology of conversion,” of a sort we could look for in Zen (and perhaps elsewhere) especially in those contexts of religious reformation where the new is pitted against the old. The original Mahāyāna soteriology itself arose in such a context, and there is another sense (not without its ironies) in which these same three elements in the new religion of Zen can be seen as a recapitulation or revalidation of the old model of the bodhisattva path, at least as it may have functioned at the implicit level.

In the religious structure of the Zazen ron’s call to a higher faith that abandons the old ideal in favor of renewed commitment to everyday experience, there seems to be what we might call a “poor man’s parallel” to the bodhisattva’s vow to relinquish the old goal of early nirvāṇa for the sake of indefinite service in saṃsāra. If the explicit consequences of this vow were supposed to demand three great incalculable aeons of
heroic ascesis leading to buddhahood, the implicit result was the indefi-
nite postponement of the demand for final transcendence and the rejusti-
fication of participation in the more proximate affairs of worldly life. 
At this implicit level, the Zazen ron's critique of the bodhisattva path, 
despite (or precisely because of) its assertion of the radical immediacy of 
buddhahood, may amount to much the same result: whether the end of 
the path is too far away to see or too close at hand to miss, the way is 
open all the way to the horizon, and the wayfarer is free to linger along 
it where he will.

Notes

1. The tighter definition, in other words, would recognize soteriology only in 
the “ultimate” ends of those forms of religion that have some notion of “salva-
tion” from the world; the looser definition would include as well the ultimate 
ends of forms that do not seek such salvation.

2. This was the soteriological dark side of the famous doctrine of the “one 
vehicle” taught in the popular Lotus Sūtra (Saddharmapundarīka): if the doctrine 
proclaimed that everyone was really destined for the ultimate goal of buddha-
hood, it also revealed that no one really entered nirvāṇa except through bud-
dhahood.

3. The former development, seen especially in the theology of the influential 
Tendai school, is now often referred to as the hongaku, or “original enlighten-
ment,” movement; the latter is, of course, the famous mappō, or “final 
dharma,” doctrine that is widely (if perhaps somewhat too easily) used to 
explain the religious sensibilities of late Heian culture.

4. The text appears at Zenmon hōgo shū 2 (Tokyo: Kōyūkan, 1921), 411-422; I 
have published an English translation in The Ten Directions 9:1 (Spring/Summer 

5. For an English account of Enni’s biography, see Martin Collcutt, Five 
Mountains: The Rinzai Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan, Harvard East Asian 

6. On these grounds Enni’s version has been dated between 1246, the year of 
Tao-lung’s arrival, and 1252, when Michie died; see Etō Sokuo, Shōbō genzō 
josetsu: Bendō wa gikai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1959), 156. The text of Tao-
lung’s Zazen ron can be found at Kokuyaku zengaku taisei 23 (Tokyo: Nishōdō 
shoten, 1930), 1-8; it has been translated into English by Thomas Cleary in The 
Original Face: An Anthology of Rinzai Zen (New York: Grove Press, 1978), 
19-41.

7. A Muromachi manuscript discovered in the Hōsa bunko; see Sanae Ken-
sei, “Hōsa bunko bon Shōichi kana hōgo no kenkyū (1): Honbun hen,” Zen 

8. For the Zenshū kōmoku, see Kamata Shigeo and Tanaka Hisao, eds., Kama-

9. Numerals in parentheses following citations refer to the pagination of the 
Japanese text in the Zenmon hōgo shū (see note 2 above); though the sections of 
the text are not numbered, for convenience of reference, I also supply the sec-
tion number (always before the relevant page reference).

10. The quotation is from the Cheng-tao ko of the T’ang master Yung-chia; Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu 30, T’51.460a.
11. The words of the patriarch here are from the *Hsin-hsin ming*, attributed to the Third Patriarch of Zen, Seng-ts' an; *Ching-te ch' uan-teng lu* 30, *T* 51.457b.
12. So, for example, the five “supernatural knowledges” (*abhijñā; jñāṇa*), held to be accessible to advanced yogis, whether Buddhist or pagan.
13. The conversation occurs at *Ching-te ch' uan-teng lu* 3, *T* 51.219a.
14. That is, the *klesa* - and *jñeyāvarana*; in the text’s subsequent definition of the afflictions, only the former is mentioned.
17. I have discussed these two styles of Zen in Carl Bielefeldt, *Dōgen’s Manuals of Zen Meditation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
22. The *Diamond Sūtra* passage cited here occurs in Kumārajīva’s translation at *T* 8.750b.
23. It can provide such a distinction, but of course I do not mean to imply here that what I am calling the intuitive experience is necessarily supposed to be the ultimate soteriological goal.
24. The analogy here is to the soteriological distinction between proximate and ultimate stages of spiritual awakening, not to the epistemological characteristics of the awakening. The traditional schemas generally assumed that even the more proximate experiences here were the product of, and occurred within, yogic practice; to this extent, we might find a closer analogy in the common distinction between wisdom derived from hearing (or reading, *śrūāmāyī*) and that derived from meditation (*bhāvanāmāyī*).

**Glossary**

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<tr>
<th>Akuchi akuken shiryō funbetsu</th>
<th>cheng-wu 譯悟</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>悪知悪見思量分別</td>
<td>chieh-wu 解悟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bodai no shōin 福智の勝因</td>
<td>chien-hsü 渐修</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bonnō 福報</td>
<td>Ching-te ch' uan-teng lu 景德傳燈錄</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bonpu 凡夫</td>
<td>dai gedatsu no mon 大解脱の門</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bukkyō 佛教</td>
<td>daiichi no butsu 第一の佛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>busshin no shigoku 佛心の至極</td>
<td>daijō hannya 大乘般若</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch' an-yüan ch' ing-kuei 禪苑清規</td>
<td>Dōgen 道元</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng-tao ko 譯道歌</td>
<td>dōjin 道心</td>
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No-Mind and Sudden Awakening

donkon 鉈根
ekō henshō 回光返照
Enni (Ben‘en) 因爾辨圓
fukatoku 不可得
fushigi gedatsu no michi 不思議解脫之道
guhō no nozomi 求法之望
hōben 便
hongaku 本覚
honji hoshin 本地法身
honshin 本師
honshin 本心
hoshin 發心

Hsin-hsin ming 信心銘
Ichien 一面
ichiji no butsu 一時之佛
jikishi ninshin 直指人心
jiko honrai 自己本來
jinzū 神通
jishō 自性
kanna 看話
kari ni 便
kenshō jōbutsu 見性成佛
kitoku 奇特
kōmyō 光明
konpon 根本

Kōzen gokoku ron 興祿護國論
kudoku 功德
Kujō Michiie 九條道家
Kyōgō 祐高

Lan-ch‘i Tao-lung (Rankei Dōryū) 蘭溪道隆
mappō 末法
mokushō 黙照
mōnen 妙念
munen 無念
mushiki kai 無色界
mushin 無心
musō mujaku 無相無著
myōyū 妙用
nien pu ch‘i 念不起
nyorai ch‘i 如來禪
pu ch‘i nien 不起念
rikon 利根
riku 律
rokujin mōsō 六塵妄想
sandoku 三毒
sangen jishō 三賢十聖
Seng-ts‘an 僧璨
sheng-ti ti-ī 聖諦第一義
shikan taza 只管打坐
shiryo 思量
Shōbō genzō shō 正法眼藏抄
Shōichī kokushi kana hōgo 聖一國師假名法語
Shōjō 證定
shōmyō 稱名
shukke 出家
sō 相
Ta-hui 大慧
tenma gedō 天魔外道
Tōfukuji 東福寺
tōgaku 等覚
tokudō 得道
tokushi 得指
ushotoku 有所得
wakuchi no shō 感智之障
Wu-chun Shih-fan 鶴運師範
wu-tso 無作
wu-wei 無為
Yōsai (Eisai) 禪西
Yüan-chüeh ching ta-shu ch‘ao 圓覺經大疏鈔
Yung-chia 永嘉
zazen no shūmon 坐禪の宗門
Zazen ron 坐禪論
zenkon kudoku 善根功德
Zenshū kōmoku 禪宗綱目
Zōtan shū 雑談集
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