Chao Lun
The Treatises of Seng-chao
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY, INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND APPENDICES
by
Walter Liebenthal

I hear you are thinking of republishing Dr Liebenthal's translation of Seng. It was a disaster that most of the first edition was destroyed. Dr Liebenthal is a scholar of the highest standing and it would be of great value to students of Buddhism if the work were again available.
—Dr Arthur Waley to the Publisher

HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS
1968
Other Publications


**The Kural (Ku-la chen-yen 古臘箴言)**. A Chinese translation by CH'ENG HSI of the Tamil Book of Maxims. Size 8½ × 5½ inches, xii + 138 pp. Published by the Hong Kong University Press for the Department of Indian Studies, University of Malaya. 1967

Paperback HK$10; Cloth HK$15

**The Tenth Man** by WEI WU WEI, Author of this remarkable collection of aphorisms and dialogues which stretches the mind of the Reader till it begins to snap and is ready to join W.W.W. in his crusade to attend to our own funeral. 246 pages, 1966.

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**Posthumous Pieces** by WEI WU WEI. We have all heard of the ‘death of the old man’ which is necessary in order that the ‘new man’ may be born. This phenomenal birth and death we all have to experience, or to ‘suffer’ as the Buddha is credited with having taught. 240 pages, 1968.

Paper cover HK$25

**JOURNAL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES REPRINTS**

**The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism** by HERBERT V. GUENTHER (J.O.S. Vol. III, ii, 1955)

HK$3

**The Philosophic Background of Buddhist Tantrism** by HERBERT V. GUENTHER (J.O.S. Vol. V, 1959–1960)

HK$3


HK$16

**The Chang T’an Shih and Taoism in China** by HOLMES WELCH (J.O.S. Vol. IV, 1957–1958)

HK$7


HK$3


HK$4
The Treatises of Seng-chao belong to a discussion about Prajñā, the main topic of the Mahāyāna Sūtras (of the so-called Great Vehicle to Liberty) which reached China in the third and fourth centuries A.D. In the overwhelming information which these texts contained, the Chinese philosophers believed they would find a message from Buddha revealing the solution to the problems which had vexed their minds ever since the '81 Chapters' of Lao-tzu.—The Cosmic Life what is it? Who rules it? And what is our role in the great natural spectacle? To the Chinese Prajñā was merely another name for the Sage who is one with Nature, who is Tao conceived as Person, Order conceived as Wisdom and Grace. Had India the secret passage to the centre of the universe?

Seng-chao believed it did and, in his first treatise, he sought to describe the indescribable. Later his early enthusiasm to learn and penetrate the intricacies of Indian Buddhist thought was transformed into an ardent study of the Buddhist doctrine. Kumārajīva, who came to China in A.D. 401, introduced to Seng-chao the Middle Path, a method of dealing with the transcendent, which held the mind of man far more and far longer than any other doctrine of Eastern or Western philosophy. The process of this study has an almost modern touch as Seng-chao picks out definite problems, those of the inadequacy of language to describe transcendental matters, of time and of causality.

This work is the main scripture of the first period of Chinese Buddhism (about A.D. 300–700) before Dhyāna-Buddhism absorbed all other interests (A.D. 700–1100). The Author believes that the two periods are connected and that in Dhyāna-Buddhism the earlier thinking emerged, cleansed from the traces of its Indian origin. Seng-chao interpreted Mahāyāna, Hsun-neng and Shen-hui re-thought it.

This position of the Author is unusual and might be contested. But, after a life-time given to the study of Chinese Buddhism and the Chao-how in particular he has the right to be heard.

This new edition differs widely from the first one published twenty years ago; in the Translation as well as in the Introduction and the copious Notes. The Appendices and a Bibliography have also been completely rewritten.

Walter Liebenthal, born on the 12th June, 1886 at Königsberg, served in the German Army during the First World War, during which he was badly wounded and taken prisoner. On return from captivity (1918–1920) he became interested in Buddhism and took up Indological studies at Berlin and other German Universities offering courses in Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese. In 1933 he obtained his Ph.D. degree of the University of Breslau for his thesis on Satkārya. During the years 1934–1936 he was research fellow of the Sino-Indian Institute Harvard-Yenching University, Peking; in 1937 Lecturer in Sanskrit and German at the University of Peking, which he followed during the years of exile to Ch'ang-sha and Kunming. In 1946, on return to Peking, he published the first edition of The Book of Chao, now reappearing greatly revised and rewritten at the Hong Kong University Press.

In 1952 he was Visiting Professor of Sino-Indian Studies, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan. The latter, on the occasion of his 70th Birthday, published the Liebenthal Festschrift 中印研究, as Vol. V (3/4) of its Sino-Indian Studies, from which the present information is taken. The author now in his 82nd year lives retired at Tübingen-Lustnau, Germany.
‘... Non-aliud est non aliud quam non-aliud’
Nicolai de Cusa,
De venatione sapientiae, xiv.

更無無用之寂而生於用也

‘There is no passive state produced
by the inactivity of an active one.’

Chao-lun, p. 80.
肇論
Chao Lun
The Treatises of Seng-chao

A TRANSLATION WITH
INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND APPENDICES

by
WALTER LIEBENTHAL

Second Revised Edition

HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PRESS
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CONTENTS

Preface to the First Edition (Peiping 1948) — — vii
Preface to the Second Revised Edition (Hong Kong 1968) xi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Literature — — — — — — xiii
B. Bibliographical References — — — — — xix
C. Abbreviations — — — — — xxxviii

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE — — — — — xi

INTRODUCTION

1. Historical Notes — — — — — 3
   a. The Situation in Ch'ang-an — — — — 3
   b. The Life of Seng-chao — — — — 6
   c. The Extent of Seng-chao's Learning — — 8
   d. His Language — — — — 8

2. The Writings of Seng-chao — — — — 9

3. Introduction and Commentaries on Seng-chao's Writings — — — — 11
   a. Introduction — — — — — 11
   b. Commentaries — — — — — 11

4. Notes and Comments on Seng-chao's Philosophy — — 15
   a. The Term 'Pattern' — — — — 15
   b. Notes on the History of Buddho-Taoist Interpretation 17
      (iii) Speculation on the Tao. (iv) Speculation on the Qualities of Nature.
      (v) The Influence of Buddhism.
      (vi) Seng-chao. (vii) After Seng-chao
   c. Note on 'Prajñā' (Part III) — — — — 23
      (i) The Problem. (ii) 'The Myth
   d. Note on 'Sūnyatā' (Part II) — — — — 27
      (i) 'T'i-yung and Chen-wei. (ii) 'The Middle Path of Nāgārjuna.

e. Note on ‘Time’ (Part I) — — — — — 35

f. Note on Nirvāṇa (Part IV) — — — — — 39

g. Seng-chao’s Ecstasy — — — — — 39

h. Note on the Correspondence — — — 41

THE TRANSLATION OF THE THESES

Part I On Time: 物不遜論 Wu pu-ch’ien lun — — 45

Part II On Śūnyatā: (物)不處真空論 (Wu) pu chen-k’ung lun — 54

Part III On Prajñā not cognizant: 般若無知論 Pan-jo wu-chih lun 64

The Correspondence with Liu I-Min: 劉遺民書問肇公答 Liu I-min shu-wen Chao-kung ta — — 81

Part IV Nirvāṇa is unnameable: 湊槃無名論 Nieh-p’an wu-ming lun — — — — — 101
   a. Dedication to the King of Ch’in — — — 101
   b. Text — — — — — 104

APPENDICES

I. Note on the First Six ‘Schools’ of Chinese Buddhism — 133

II. The Problem of the Authenticity of Part IV — — 150
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

It was easier to translate this work than to understand its true significance. Was Seng-chao a Taoist or a Buddhist? What is the great experience which makes him so happy that he 'cannot keep silent' but must communicate it to those who listen? None of the contemporary efforts in Buddhist philosophy is laden with so much emotion.

Seng-chao does not speak in well-defined terms but in pictures that fade into each other. The Sage—is he the Bodhisattva who out of mercy forsakes his Nirvāṇa in order to convert the needy beings, or is he the Ancient Ruler, Fu-hsi of the I-Ching, who knows what is the destiny of every creature and assigns them their places in the Order of Nature? Chao borrows his language from Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu but also from the sūtras, and it seems that his main efforts were directed to proving a Buddhist tenet, the Doctrine of the Middle Path, as he understood it. Though put forward as a theory of the Identity of Illusion and Reality, the Middle Path actually signified a personal mystical experience; in his vision Seng-chao saw the Absolute—immutable, empty, or filled with the image of Nature itself, aloof and gracious. If we understand this book as a merely philosophical endeavour, it evaporates into plain air and nothing remains but verbal, rather insipid argument. Therefore in my analysis I tried to acquaint the reader with that mystic experience of Seng-chao which according to him cannot be conveyed in words.

As the only witness extant from an epoch full of high hopes, roused by the entry of the foreign religion into China, the Book of Chao1 is a document of greatest interest. Professor T'ang Yung-t'ung in his History of Chinese Buddhism before the T'ang (1938: 333) rates it as 'one of the most valuable contributions' not only to Buddhist but also to Chinese literature in general, a judgment justified by the high esteem in which Seng-chao has always been held by the Chinese literati. C'hih-hsü 智旭 (Ming), who in his Yüeh-ts'ang chih-chin 阅藏知津 listed the Chinese papers among the Tsa-ts'ang 雜藏 (Miscellaneous), made an exception with the Chao-lun.2 The Ch'ing Emperor Yung-chêng 雍正 began with it his Yü-hsüan yü-lu 御選語錄 (Collection of Sayings) published in 1733.3 No other Chinese Buddhist scripture has found so

1 Chao-lun 雜論 (The Treatises of Chao).
2 Cf. Taishô Index, Vol. III: 1008b. 此上流作唯識公及南嶽天台二師略乎其辭，復不愧馬鳴龍樹無著天親，故特收入大藏索論。'Among the Chinese (Buddhist) authors only Seng-chao, Nan-yîeh (T'ao-i 藤一) and T'ien-t'ên (Chih-i 智顒) are first class. These are certainly not inferior to Māṇḍavya, Nâgârjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu. Therefore I selected (their scriptures) to be inserted among the Expositions of the Mahayana Doctrine.'
3 Cf. Hist a. 54.1 138. 'In the Introduction he calls Chao, though he lived long before Bodhidharma, a patriarch of the School of Meditation.'
many commentators and stirred up so much discussion. The Answering Letter is particularly famous.

The Book of Chao has never yet been studied by Western scholars. Our study of Chinese Buddhism is still in its infancy. Only the Translations and Ch’an Buddhism are dealt with adequately; the pre-Ch’an period is almost completely overlooked. This will change when Professor T’ang’s admirable work mentioned above becomes more widely known. For not only has he carefully collected most of the philological material, but he has combined this overwhelming mass of data in a picture where the single facts are shown in their true proportion.

My translation is fairly literal, but sometimes it seemed to be impossible to render the meaning without changing the phrasing. In one or two cases the translation is so free that it almost amounts to a mere outline of the content. I have taken great pains to get the exact meaning of certain terms, collecting much lexicographical material, some of which is incorporated in the notes. All the quotations have been traced, as far as they were traceable at all—for Chao quotes from memory and often gives only the general content of a chapter; or even borrows the authority of the sutras for what is actually the product of his own thinking. I have not been able to compare the Sanskrit texts because they are not available in Peiping but I have retranslated the technical terms into the original Sanskrit in order to enable the reader to look them up in the indices.

The distribution of paragraphs follows that of the commentator Yuan-k’ang.

My interest was that of a philosopher rather than of a historian. Therefore, in the Introduction, I have tried to analyse the contents of our text. This proved to be difficult because in the course of the work my picture of Chao constantly changed. I am aware that the result which I submit to the reader can be no more than a first attempt to do full justice to Seng-chao’s effort.

In the Appendices some historical problems are dealt with. I have added translations of more contemporary documents and biographical notes as a kind of introduction to the period. All the Chinese and much of the Japanese research up to 1938 is incorporated in Professor T’ang’s History, so in general I did not find it necessary to refer to Chinese books of an earlier date such as the History of Buddhism in China by Chiang Wei-ch’iao. The Japanese literature could not be used in full.

4 Cf. the exposé of Han-shan 賀山 in his Commentary on the Tao-te ching 老子道德經解, pp. 277-87. Introduction 詳義取, paragraph 4. A poem in praise of Seng-chiao by the T’ang monk Hsüan-hsien 顯宣 is found in the K’IMCHI, ch. 30.

5 Hsu Hsüan, Chung-hua fo-chiao shih 中國佛教史 (History of Buddhism in China). Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1919.
Professor Fung Yu-lan’s *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, known to foreign readers in the English translation of Professor Derk Bodde, contains a detailed study of Seng-chao in Vol. II, ch. 7. Unfortunately it is mainly based upon the *Pao-tsang Lun*, which in my opinion is forged. I therefore abstained from discussing his interpretation, but I used with advantage his excellent translations from the *Chuang-tzu*. Some of the commentaries on the *Chao-lun* are very good, especially that of Yuan-k’ang, but the commentators are Buddhists and sometimes interpret Taoist phrases in a Buddhist sense. That of Hui-ta, the oldest, has come down in a poor condition and makes difficult reading, but is important for his quotations from scriptures that are now lost. Wen-ts’ai is helpful in tracing the quotations. Te-ch’ing has its own value in showing how Seng-chao was interpreted in later Ch’an.

The compendiums of Chi-tsang, Hui-yüan and Chih-i, although generally reliable for details, must be used with caution because they tend to overrate the importance of dogmatic quibbles and thus distort the historical picture. Here as in the commentaries the tendency to clear the patriarchs from the reproach of heresy is apparent.

The text was first translated in 1935 and again repeatedly in the following years with different Chinese experts and with the help of different commentaries. In every case my English was corrected by one of my friends whose mother-tongue was English. The final translation I did alone comparing again five of the commentaries (*HT*, *YK*, *WTS*, *TCH*, *CHY*). By that time I knew the text so well that in some cases I ventured to deviate from these authorities. This I substantiated in the notes. Dr Margaret Phillips kindly took the responsibility for the correctness of my English in the last version. I owe sincere thanks to Mr Teng Kao-sheng and other Chinese friends who helped in reading the texts. Words would be inadequate to thank each one separately. I am much indebted to Professor T’ang Yung-t’ung, now Dean of the College of Arts in the University of Peking, for valuable help and advice.

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7 *Chuang Tzu*. Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1933.

8 The following ejaculation of Hui-ta is characteristic: ‘Ordinary people often say that Chao’s scriptures propagate the creed of the Ch’eng-shih School or of the Daśabhumika School and that he has borrowed the eccentric language of Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu. Truly, such vicious talk, vilifying the dead, such low gossip, is not worth noticing. The Spiritual Realm contains no forms, Prajñā is indescribable; [Chao’s] wording is concise while his ideas are abstruse, so in all the Schools he is misrepresented. How could his judgment be wrong? It certainly was not. I swear that in none of my reincarnations shall I associate with anybody who indulges in such talk, but when I have found my eternal peace, I shall return and convert those villains’ (Hui-ta, Introduction, p. 30d).
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition of The Book of Chao, or Chao-lun, came out just a few days before the Communist army besieged Peking. I received thirty copies, which I sent to Europe. Not all of them, however, reached their destination; more copies bought in the market were sent out later, but most of the first edition must be considered as lost. Under these circumstances a re-issue was due long ago.

I had thought of preparing a new edition as early as 1955 and made a revised translation for that purpose. When it was finished I received a request from Professor Tsukamoto Zenryū to send a copy of The Book of Chao to the Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyūsho in Kyōto for a group study of Chao-lun under his direction. I sent two copies of the revised version, one to Professor Tsukamoto and one to an American student, Leon Hurvitz, who was entrusted with the translating of my work into Japanese for purposes of comparison. The results of the group study were incorporated in a big volume which is certainly the most thorough study of Chao-lun now existing.

I should have wished to use this invaluable material properly for the present edition, were it not for my ignorance of the Japanese language. My answer to eventual criticisms offered by the Japanese group are therefore to be found only in places where my work is quoted. I could, however, use Tsukamoto’s important article (1954) on ‘The Dates of Kumārajīva and Seng-chao’ and as much as I was told about the contents of Ochō Enichi’s article (1942) on Part IV.

In the winter of 1959–60 I had the honour of being invited to give a series of lectures on Chao-lun at the Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises in the Sorbonne. I availed myself of that opportunity to study the difficult text again. The new translation often differs from the old one. When the first edition was published, Chinese Buddhism before the T’ang Dynasty was virtually unknown in the West. Now a number of studies have appeared on neo-Taoism and Budhho-Taoism and our knowledge of that period has become much broader. I used with advantage Derk Bodde’s translation of Fung Yu-lan’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2, published by the Princeton University Press (1953). E. Zürcher: The Buddhist Conquest of China (1959) closes before our period but could still be used. R. H. Robinson: Early Madhyamika in India and China, containing a thorough analysis of the logical structure of Seng-chao’s syllogisms, and translations of Parts I–III, came too late to be compared. I”ang Yin-t’ung’s Two Essays (1940) brought a better understanding of the early Schools.

1 Cf. notes 151, 150, 150, 170, 184.
During the recent study, more than during the first, I relied on Hui-ta, the oldest commentator. But even he tends to make an orthodox Buddhist out of Seng-chao which he certainly never was. The Chinese Buddhists were all Taoists whenever they wrote philosophy. The clue to Seng-chao's world-interpretation is, therefore, not found in the commentaries but in the contemporary literature even as far back as Kuo Hsiang and Wang Pi.

Among the Chinese philosophers Seng-chao ranks with the greatest. Analogies with Western Philosophy are also found. What to-day is called 'transcendence', and 'non-aliud' by Nicolai de Cusa, isn't it virtually identical with Seng-chao's nirvāṇa which is not different from samsāra—the perennial theme of all philosophy worthy that name?

It was not easy to find a publisher of my manuscript which in style and contents deviates a little from the normal. Finally, the University of Hong Kong was willing to take the risk involved in publications of this kind. I tender my deeply-felt gratitude to Professor F. S. Drake as also to the Publisher, Mr Henri Vetch.

With much good luck I found an ideal reader and corrector of my English in Mr Terence J. S. Gray. Let his selfless labour be acknowledged here with sincere thanks.

W. L.
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Taishō Index—Shōwa Hōbō sōmokuroku 昭和法寶總目錄 (A Complete Shōwa Catalogue of Buddhist Canons). Edited by J. Takakusu. 3 vols. 'Tōkyō, 'Taishō Issai Kyōkai kankōkai. [Contains 77 collections of Indices not only to the Taishō Edition but also to a large number of previous editions and collections of Buddhist materials.]

Wogihara—Japanese Alphabetical Index of Nanjio’s Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripitaka, with Supplements and corrections. Edited by
3. Dictionaries

Dictionaries—The reference is to Japanese and Chinese dictionaries which contain more or less the same material. I used mainly the following.

Akanuma—In-Do-bukkyō kōyūmeshi jiten 印度佛教因有名詞典 compiled by AKANUMA CHIZEN 赤沼智善. Tōkyō, 1931.


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Tsukamoto (1955)—Chōron kenkyū 嶋論研究, Kyōto, Hōzokan 法藏館.

   PART I The Chao-lun, critically edited, translated, and annotated.
   PART III Meng-an Ho-shang, Chieh-shih Chao-lun (Lithograph).


6. WESTERN REFERENCES


MCB—Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, publiés par l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises. Bruxelles, 1932–.


7. Commentaries
The text of my translations is found in Hsūi 2.11: 30–42 and in Taishō 1858 XLV: 150–161. The Commentaries of the text are in Hsūi and partly in Taishō. About these Commentaries, see below pp. 11–16.


HT Introduction—Chao-lun hsiū 序.


TCH—Te-ch’ing 德清 (1546–1923). Chao-lun lüeh chu 楮論畧注.


WTS—Wen-ts’ai 文才 (1241–1302). Chao-lun hsin-su 新疏.

WTSYJ—Chao-lun hsin-su yu-jen 游刃.

YK—Yüan-k’ang 元康 (fl. 627–649). Chao-lun su 輯論.

8. Documents

T'ang KSCH—Hsü 續 Kao-seng chuan (Further Biographies) compiled by Tao-hsüan 道宣 (596-667) in the T'ang period. Taishō 2060 L.

MSCH—Ming-seng chuan 名僧傳 (Biographies of famous monks) compiled by Pao-ch'ang 寶唱 in 510-519. Hsü 2 B.7/I. Extant in Meisōdenshō 名僧傳抄 made by Shōsō 宗性 in 1235.

HMCHI—Hung-ming-chi 弘明集 (Collected Essays on Buddhism), compiled by Seng-yu 僧祐 (435-518). Taishō 2102 LII.

KHMCHI—Kuang Hung-ming-chi (Further Essays) compiled in 664 by Tao-hsüan 道宣. Taishō 2103 LII.

Correspondence—Between Kumārajīva and Shih Hui-yüan 稔慧遠 (334-416): Yüan Shih Ta-ch'eng yao-i wen-ta 遠什大乘要義問答 (＝Ta-ch'eng ta-i chang 大乘大義章). Taishō 1856 XLV.

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MS—Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa śāstra, translated by Kumārajīva: Tu-chih-tu lun 大智度論. Taishō 1509 XXV.

NS—Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra, translated by Dharmakīṣaṇa: Ta-pan nieh-p'ian ch'ing 大般涅槃經 (Northern text 北本). Taishō, 374 XII.

PSK—Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā sūtra, translated by Kumārajīva: Mo-ho pan-jo-po-lo-mi ch'ing 摩訶般若波羅蜜經. Taishō 223 VIII.

PSM—, translated by Moksala: Fang-kuang 放光 pan-jo-po-lo-mi ch'ing. Taishō 221 VIII.

VSC—Vimalakīrti-nirdesa sūtra, translated by Ch'ih Ch'ien 支謙 (c. A.D. 222): Wei-mo chieh ching 維摩詣經. Taishō 474 XIV.

VSK—Kumārajīva's translation: Wei-mo-chieh so-shuo ching 所説經. Taishō 475 XIV.

CVSK—Commentary 註 By Seng-chao et al. to the VSK. Taishō 1775 XXXVIII.

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Chao-lun hsin su 輯論新疏, v. Wen-ts'ai.
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Chao-lun su 輯論疏 (LITERATURE §7) v. Hui-ta, Yuan-k'ang, Kuang-yao.
Chao-lun su-i 輯論疏義. 15
Ch'ao-jih-ming san-mo ching 超日明三昧經. 58
Chen-han-lou ts'ung-shu 塩築樓叢書. 13
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Chi'eng-chü huiung-ming ting-i ching 成具光明定慧經 (Sūtra of Complete Illumination) (Taishö 630). 49, 63, 80, 126
Chi'eng-lu, v. Lu Ch'eng.
Chi'eng-shih lun 成實論, see Satyasiddhi śāstra. 107
134
—Chung-kuan-lun su [Su] 中觀論疏 (Commentary on the Mādhyamika śāstra [MK]). (Taishö 1824). 48, 137, 138, 143, 146
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—Fa-hua hsüan-lun 法華玄論. (Taishö 1720). 11
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Chia-chüeh p’ien 假鶴篇 (SHSH). 135
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Chieh-shih Chao-lun 揣釋雋論, see Meng-an ho-shang chieh-shih Chao-lun.
Chih Ch’ien 支謙. Wei-mo chieh ching 維摩諸經 (LITERATURE §11). 6, 35,
36, 59, 69, 83, 94, 104, 106
Chih-ji 智顗. Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i 妙法蓮華經玄義 (LITERATURE
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集解 (LITERATURE §7). ix, 13
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14, 15, 51, 91, 95, 119, 152
Ch’u Chao-lun su 注雋論疏, v. Tsun-shih.
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on the Great Learning). 85
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THE TREATISES OF SENG-CHAO

Ch'uan-teng lu 傳燈錄 (Saying of the Ch'an Teachers) v. Tao-yüan. 6
Chuang-tzu 莊子 (Literature §10). ix, 8, 15, 21, 23, 48, 50, 54, 58, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 79, 84, 93, 94, 100, 101, 102, 111, 113, 139, 147
Chung-kuan lun 中觀論 v. Chun-lun 中論
Chung-kuan lun su 中觀論疏, v. Chi-tsang.
Chung-lun 中論 (Literature §II, Madhyamaka kārikāh, MK). 48, 57, 134
Chung-lun hsüan 中論玄, v. Fa-lang.
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Chüron-shō jutsu-gi 中論疏記義 [Chung-lun su shū-i or Shu-i]. 134
Chüron shō-ki 中論疏記 v. Anchō.
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Dharmaguptaka vinaya (Sau-fen lu 四分律). (Taishö 1428). 90, 91
Dharmakṣema. *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra* (translation of) *(LITERATURE §11, NS).*

*Dīgha Nikāya* (Pali Text Society). 114

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*Fa-chih lun* 发智論 see *Jñānapratsthāna sāstra*.

*Fa-hsiang chuan* 法相傳. 134

*Fa-hua chu* 法華註, v. Liu Ch’iu.

*Fa-hua hsūan-lun* 法華玄論, v. Chi-tsang.

*Fa-k’ai* (Yū Fa-k’ai) 于法闍 (c. 310–370). *Huo-shih erh-ti lun* 惑識二諦論. 147

*Fa-lang* 法朗 (507–581). *Chung-lun hsūan* 中論玄 (or *Shan-men hsūan-i* 山門玄義). 134

*Fa-lun mu-lu* 法論目錄 *(LITERATURE §9, Ch’eng-lu).*

*Fa-wen* (Chu Fa-wen or Fa-yün) 竦法溫. *Hsin-wu erh-ti lun* 心無二諦論. 136

*Fan-wang ching* 梵網經 see *Brahmajāla sūtra*.

*Fang-kuang ching* 放光經 v. *Pañcavimśati prajñāpāramitā sūtra* *(LITERATURE §11, PSM).*

*Fang-lu* *(LITERATURE §9)* v. *Li-tai san-pao chi*.

l’ci Ch’ang-fang 費長房, *Li-tai san-pao chi* 歷代三寶記 *(LITERATURE §9).*

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Han-shan 惠山 v. Te-ch'ing.


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Hsieh Ling-yün 楊震 (385-433). Pien-tsung lun 明宗論. 124, 151
Hsien-chiéh ching 賢說經, see Bhadrakalpika sūtra.
Hsü Ch'uan-teng-lu 續傳燈錄 (compiled c. 1400), v. Chü-ting.
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Hsü Tsang-ching 續藏經 (LITERATURE §1, Hsü). vii, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 133, 145, 151
Hsüan-lu 宣錄 (LITERATURE §9) v. Tao-hsüan 道宣. 4, 150
Huai-nan tsu 淮南子 (of Liu An 劉安, d. 122 B.C.) 84
Hui-ch'eng 慧證. Chao-lun ch'ao 道論抄. 13
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Hui-kuan 慧觀 Chien-wu-lun 極悟論. 124, 151, 152
Hui-ta 慧達, Chao-lun hsü 轼論序 (LITERATURE §7, Introduction to HT).
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Hui-teng 慧燈. Hui-teng chi 慧燈集. 14
——Correspondence (LITERATURE §8). 87
——Dharmatrāta-dhyāna sūtra (Lu-shan ch'u hsiu-hsing fang-pien ch'an-ching hsü) Introduction 塔山出修行方便禪經序. 84
——Ming pao-ying lun 明報應論.
——Sha-men pu-ching-wang-che lun 沙門不敬王者論. 85
Hui-yüan (Chin 菩) et al. 菩通等, Nien-fo san-mei yung 念佛三味詠.
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Huo-shih erh-ti lun 惑識二諦論, v. Fa-k’ai.
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——Hsi-tzu 繫緒 (Appendix). 54, 64, 68, 70, 84, 85, 87, 99, 111, 115, 136

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*Kosa* (*LITERATURE §6*) v. La Vallée Poussin (1923–31): *Kosa*. 60, 86, 91, 104, 107, 114, 119, 120, 121, 125

*Kuan wu-lang-shou ching* 常無量壽經, *see Amitāyur-dhyāna sūtra*.  
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Laṅkāvatāra sūtra 楞伽經. (Taishō 670). 23

Lao-tzu (LITERATURE §10, Tao-te ching) 8, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 46, 51, 52, 55, 57, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 77, 80, 86, 89, 94, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 114, 121, 123, 139, 142, 143, 146 v. Waley, A. (1934); Wang Pi.

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Lotus sutra see Saddharmapundarika sutra. 41, 118

Lu Ch'eng, Fa-lun mu-lu 法論目錄 (LITERATURE §9). 10, 133

Lu-shan chi 廬山記, v. Ch'en Shun-yü. 81

Lun-yü chieh 論語集解, v. Ho Yen. 7

Madhyamaka-kārikāḥ (LITERATURE §11, Chung-lun 中論 MK), 5, 8, 75, 106, 141 v. Prasannapadā madhyamikavrtti.

Mādhyamika, or Madhyamaka, see s.v. 28, 53

Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra (LITERATURE §11, NS). 21, 109, 151

Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa sāstra (LITERATURE §11, MS) 5, 8, 49, 57, 60, 65, 74, 82, 90, 105, 112, 114, 119, 122, 125 v. Lamotte, É. (1944-9); v. K. Venkata Ramanan.

Mahāvastu (LITERATURE §3, Mhv.) 40, 92, 107, 108, 119

Mahāvihāra, Taishō 1547 v. Vihāśā.


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Majjhima-nikāya (Pali Text). 86, 92

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Miao-fa lien-hua ching 妙法蓮華經 (Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra or Lotus sūtra, Taishō 262). 5, 119
v. Chih-i's hsüan-i 玄義.
v. Tao-sheng's i-su 義疏.
Ming fo lun 明佛論, v. Tsung Ping.
Ming pao-ying lun 明報應論 (HMCHI V 33–34).
Ming-seng chuan 名僧傳 (Literature §8, MSCH). 90, 133, 134, 135, 145, 151
Mukṣalā, F'ang-huang pan-jo-po-lo-mi ching 放光般若波羅蜜經 (Literature §11, PSM).
Mūla-madhyamaka kārikās (＝Madhyamaka kārikās). 9, 23
Nāgārjuna. Mūla-madhyamaka kārikās. Abbreviation: Kārikās. 28, 31, 33, 37, 46, 52, 115
......Dvādaśa-nikāya śāstra. 十二門論. (Taishō 1568). 5, 8
Nīdiśa-kathā (Pali text). 119
Nīsh-p'ūn-ch'ing chi-chih 納勝經巻解 (Collected explanations to the Nirvāṇa sūtra). (Taishō 1763). 83
Nieh-p'an wu-ming lun 涅槃無名論 (Part IV). 9, 101-129, 151, 152
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Pan-jo wu-chih lun 般若無知論 (Part III, On Prajñā not Cognizant). 9, 82
Pao-ch'ang 賓唱 (Liang 梁). Hsü fa-lun 經法論. 133
Pao-tsang lun 寶藏論 (Taishō 1857). ix, 10, 61, 62, 126, 138, 140
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P'ei-ch'ü ching 本慈悲 (Taishō 199). 72
Pi-p'o-sha see Vibhāṣā.


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Pratyutpanna-buddha-sammukhāvasthita samādhi (Pan-cho san-mei ching 般舟三昧經, Taishō 418). 92

Pu-chen k'ung-lun 不真空論 (PART II, On Śūnyatā). 9, 54-63

Pu-sa ying-lo ching see Bodhisattva-keyura sūtra.

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Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra (Miao-fa lien-hua ching 妙法蓮華經, or Lotus sūtra). (Taishō 262). 8, 21, 83, 119


Śālistambha sūtra (Liao-pen sheng-szu ching 了本生死經). (Taishō 708). 127


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Suvāstivāda vinaya (Shih-sung lü 十勝律). (Taishō 1435). 5, 91

Śūta śāstra (Pai-lun 百論). (Taishō 1569). 5, 8, 10

Śūtasahasrikā prajñāpāramitā. 119

Satyasiddhi śāstra (Ch'eng-shih lun 成實論). (Taishō 1646). 5


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Seng-ching 佛鏡 (5th Cent.) Shih-hsiang liu-chin lun 實相六鏡論. 134
Seng-jui 僧叡 alias Hui-jui 慧叡 (352-436). *P'ı-mo-lo-chieh-t'i ching i-su hsü 毗摩羅詣提義疏序* (Introduction to a commentary of the *Vimalakirti-nirdeśa sūtra*, Yu-lu 65). 7, 133

—*Yu-i lun 吸異論*. 103, 149, 151

Seng-pi 僧弭. *Chang-liu chi-chen lun 丈六即真論* (The essential sameness of the two bodies of Buddha). 10

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*Shih-erh-men lun 十二門論* see *Dvādaśa-nikāya šāstra*.

Shih fa-shih 石法師. *San-lun yu-i i 三論遊義*. 135


Shih hsin-wu-i 釋心無義, v. Liu Ch’eng-chih.


Shih T’an-chi 釋曼濟, v. T’an-chi.

Shu-i 舎義 = *Chūron shō jutsu-gi 中論諸述義*, q.v.

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Sui-shu 隋書 (Annals of the Sui dynasty 589–618). 81
Sui-shu ching-chi chih 隋書經籍志. 81
Sun-ch’o 孫綽. Yu-tao lun 喜道論. 17
Sūraṅgama (samādhi) sūtra. 112
Szu-fen lü 四分律 see Dharmaguptaka vinaya.
Szu-i fan-t’ien so-wen ching 智益梵天所問經 see Viṣesacintā brahma-parīpṛcchā.
Ta-ch’eng hsüan-lun 大乘玄論, v. Chi-tsang.
Ta-ch’eng ta-i chang v. Correspondence.
Ta-chih-tu lun 大智度論 see Prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa sāstra [MS].
Ta-fung kuang fo hua-yen ching 方廣華嚴經 (Taishō 278). 112, 113
Ta-hstiéh chang-chü 大學章句, v. Chu Hsi.
Ta-p’iin-pan-jo 大品般若 (Pañcaviṃśatikā, v. PSK). 5
T’ai Fa-shih 法師, v. Kuang-t’ai 光泰.
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Tao-hsüan 道宣 (596–667). Hsü Kao-seng-chuan 續高僧傳 (LITERATURE §1). 4

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Tao-i (Shih Tao-i) 釋道壹. Shen erh-ti lun 神二諦論. 149

Tao-lin (Chih Tao-lin) 支道林 (314–366). Chi-se yu-hsüan lun 即色遊玄論. 139

Miao kuan chang 妙觀章, one of the lost chapters of Chih-tun chi 支遁集. 139

Ta-hsiao p’in tui-p’ao yao ch’ao hsü 大小品対毎要抄序. 142

Tao-sheng (Chu Tao-sheng) 竺道生 (d. 439). Commentaries on the Nirvāṇa, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Vimalakīrti sūtras. Letters. 83

Tao-sui (Yii Tao-sui) 苏道壇. Yuän-hui erh-ti lun 綠會二諦論. 149

Tao-te-ch’ing 道德經 (LITERATURE §10, Lao-tzu) 6, 11, 18; v. Pelliot, P. (1912).

Tao-te ch’ing chieh-fa t’i 道德經解發題. 15

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Tsung-pên 本義. 9, 13

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Tzu-tsai wang p’u-sa ching 自在王菩薩經, see Iśvara-rāja bodhisattva sūtra.

Vaipulya sūtras. 6, 65, 101, 145

Vajracchedikā prajñāpāramitā. 22


Vibhāṣā (Pi-p'o-sha lūn 誼婆沙論) also Mahāvibhāṣā. (Taishō 1546). 72, 122


Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra (LITERATURE §11). 7, 8, 10, 21, 22, 40, 59, 119, 126, 128, 139, 151

VSC, v. Chih Ch’ien.


Viśesacintā-brahma-paripṛcchā (Szu-i fan-t’ien so-wen ching 思益梵天所問經, Taishō 586). 67, 126


Wang Pi 王弼 (226–249). I-lüeh-li 劣略例. 69


Wei-mo-ch’ieh ching 繼摩詣經 v. Chih Ch’ien.

Wei-mo-ch’ieh so-shuo ching chü 繼摩詣所說詣呂, see Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra (LITERATURE §11). 10

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Yao Hsing 姚興 (366-416). Letters. 65

*Yu-lu 筆錄* (Literature §9) v. Seng-yu 僧祐. 7, 10, 54, 64, 65, 72, 82, 83, 84, 86, 90, 91, 92, 102, 104, 120, 133, 141, 142, 144, 149

Yü Fa-k’ai 于法開, v. Fa-k’ai.

*Yü-hsüan yü-lu 御選語錄*, v. Yung-cheng (Emperor).


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*Yüan Shih Ta-ch’eng yao-i wen-ta 達什大乘契義問答* (Literature §8) v. Correspondence.

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C. ABBREVIATIONS

To Literature Section § and works mentioned in the text.

Akanuma—Indo-bukkyō koyūmeshi jiten. §3
Bagchi—Le Canon Bouddhique. §5
Ch‘eng-lu—Fa-lun mu-lu 法論目録. §9
Chi-tsang—Ta-ch‘eng hsüan-lun 大乘玄論. §12
Chih-i—Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsüan-i 妙法蓮華經玄義. §12
Chôron—Chôron henkyû 輝論研究. §5, Tsukamoto (1955)
Chuang-tzu—Nan-hua chên-ching. §10
CHY—Chao-lun chung-wu chî-chieh 輝論中吳集解. §7
Correspondence—Between SHIH HUI-YÜAN and KUMĀRAJĪVA. §8
Conception—STCHERBATSKY (1923). The Central Conception of Buddh-

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Doctrine—OBERMILLER (1933). The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā. §6
DSL—Daśāsahasrikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra 道行般若波羅密經. §11
Fang-lu—Li-tai san-pao chi 歷代三寶記. §9
Fung—Bodde—A History of Chinese Philosophy. §6
HIMCHI—Hsing-ming chi 弘明集. §8
Hodous—A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms. §3
Hsiü—Hsiü-tsang-ching 續藏經. §1
Hsüan-lu—Ta-T‘ang nei-tien-lu 大唐內典錄. §9
HT—HUI-TA, Chao-lun su 輝論疏. §7
HT Introduction—HUI-TA, Chao-lun hsü 輝論序. §7
HT Index—Fo-tsang tsu-mu yin-tê 佛藏子目引得, Harvard Yenching
Institute. §2
I-ching 易經 (Book of Changes). §10
Kośa—L‘Abhidharma-kośa de Vasubandhu (LA VALLÉE POUSSEIN,
transl.). §6
KHMCHI—Kuang Hung-ming-chi 廣弘明集. §8
KSCH—Kao-sêng chuan 高僧傳. §8
KY—KUANG-YAO 光緖, Chao-lun su. §7
Lao-tzu—Tao-te-ching 道德經. §10
LY—Lun-yû 瞻譚 (Confucian Analects). §10
MCB—Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, édités par L. de la Vallée Poussin. §6

Meng-an—Meng-an ho-shang chieh-shih chao-lun 玲安上師釋辨論．§7

Mhv—Mahāvyutpatti. §3

MK—Madhyamaka-kārikā (Chung-lun 中論). §11

MS—Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa sāstra 大智度論．§11

MSCH—Ming-seng chuan 名僧傳．§8

Nanjio (Nanjō)—A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka. §2

NS—Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra 大般涅槃經(北本)．§11

PSK—Pañcaviṃśatīsahasrikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra 摩訶般若波羅密經．
(KUMĀRAJĪVA). §11

PSM—Pañcaviṃśatīsahasrikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra 放光般若波羅密經
(MOKŚALA). §11


Sheng-lu—K'ai-yüan shih-chiao lu 開元釋教錄．§9

SHSH—Shih-shuo hsin-yü 世說新語．§10

Siddhi—Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi (LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, transI.). §6

SPTK—Szu-pu ts'ung-k' an.

Taishō—Taishō shin-shū daiizokyo 大正新修大藏經．§1

Taishō Index—Shōwa Hōbō somokurōkō 昭和法寶總目錄．§2

Takakusu (1947)—The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy．§5

T'ang (1938)—History of Chinese Buddhism before the T’ang Period．§5

T'ang KSCH—Hsü Kao-seng chuan 續高僧傳．§8

TCH—Chao-lun lüeh-chu 輯論略註 of TE-CH’ING 德清．§7

TS—Chu chao-lun su 註釋論疏 by TSUN-SHIH 渾式．§0

Two Essays—T’ANG YUNG-T’UNG (1940). §5

VSC—Vimalakirti-nirdesa sūtra 維摩詣經 (CHIH CH’IEN) 支謙．§1

VSK—Vimalakirti-nirdesa sūtra 維摩詣所詣經 (KUMĀRAJĪVA). §11

VSK Comm.—SENG-CHAO’S commentary to VSK．§11

Wogihara Index—Japanese Alphabetical Index of NANJIO’S Catalogue．
§2

WTS—Chao-lun hsin-su 譯論新疏．§7

WTSYJ—Chao-lun hsin-su yu-jen 滥刃．§7

YK—YUN-k’ANG 元康，Chao-lun su．§7

Yu-lu—Ch’u san-tsang chi-chi 出三寶記集．§9

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**CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE**

Detailed lists of the translations in Ch’ang-an and related dates are found in T’ang, pp. 300–304, Chōron after pp. 298.

**A.D.**

- **344** Kumārajīva born [?].
- **357** Fu Chien 卑堅 ascends the throne of Former Ch’in 前秦.
- **382** He sends Lü Kuang 呂光 to the West.
- **383** Ābhidharmikas in Ch’ang-an translated the *Vibhāṣā* and the *Jñānaprasthāna sāstras*.
- **385** Tao-an 道安 dies. Dharmakṣema born. Fu Chien murdered.
- **391** Sanghadeva on Lu-shan. *Abhidharma-sāra* translated.
- **393** Yao Hsing 姚興 ascends the throne of Later Ch’in 後秦.
- **396** Liu I-min 劉暹民 at Lu-shan.
- **397** Tao-sheng 道生 at Lu-shan.
- **398** Seng-chao joins Kumārajiva in Ku-ts’ang.
- **399** Lü Kuang dies, followed by Lü Tsuan 呂纂, and then by Lü Lung 呂隆. First year of *hung-shih* 弘始 of Later Ts’in 後秦.
- **401** Expedition to Liang. Kumārajiva arrives in Ch’ang-an.
- **402** Huan Hsüan 桓玄 conquers Chien-k’ang 建康 (the Southern Capital). Hui-yüan and his followers vow to be re-born in the Western Paradise of Amitābha. Translation work begins in Ch’ang-an.*
- **405** First year of *l-hsi* 義熙 of Eastern Chin. *Mahāyāna sāstra* translated.

*In the Chronological Table of Manor Henryû two translations are listed under A.D. 401. But because the 12th month of *hung-shih* 3, when K. arrived, falls already in A.D. 402, this is impossible even though K. might have brought along translations which in Ch’ang-an were only revised as e.g. that of the *Mahāyāna Sūtra* which was translated several times as quickly as other texts.
A.D.
406  *Vimalakirti* and *Lotus Sūtras* translated; Buddhabhadra arrives.
408  Tao-sheng, who was for several years in Ch’ang-an, returns to Lu-shan. He carries Seng-chao’s paper ‘On Prajñā not Cognizant’ which Liu I-min sees.
408/9 *Mādhyamika kārikās* translated.
409  Liu I-min writes the Letter. Kumārajiva incapacitated by a stroke.
410  The Letter received and answered. Liu I-min dies.
411  Buddhabhadra leaves.
412  Dharmakṣema in Ku-ts’ang.
413  Kumārajiva dies [?].
414  Death of Seng-chao.
416  Death of Yao Hsing. Fa-hsien returns to the Southern Capital.
417  Ch’ang-an destroyed. The members of the Academy go south and east. Hui-yüan dies.
419  End of the Eastern Chin 東晉 dynasty.
INTRODUCTION

1. Historical Notes
2. Seng-chao's Writings
3. Introductions and Commentaries
4. Notes and Comments
INTRODUCTION

1. HISTORICAL NOTES

A. The Situation in Ch’ang-an

When Kumārajīva1 (Chiu-mo-lo-shih 鳳摩羅什) came to Ch’ang-an, Buddhism was already flourishing there. Tao-an 道安, Fo-nien 佛陀 and a number of Indian translators had prepared the ground. Though Kumārajīva was taken to Ch’ang-an as prize of war, he was well treated by Yao Hsing 姚興, the King of Later Ch’in 後秦,2 who made him Kuo-shih 軍師 (purohita, chief priest of the kingdom) and allowed him all the comfort he could wish. But he had to comply with the whims of the ruler and did not feel at ease. His biographer3 says:

Kumārajīva loved Mahāyāna and wished to propagate it. He used to say: ‘If I should write and compose an Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna it would be better than that of Kātyāyaniputra.4 Now, in the country of Ch’in, the well-learned are scarce, here I am a bird with clipped wings. No use discussing anything’. So he became dolefully resigned to his lot. His only writings were the Shih-hsiang-lun 實相論 (Treatise on Tattva),5 in two chapters at the request of Yao Hsing, and the commentary on the Vimalakirti sūtra which was taken down from his oral discourses, (which were so well-styled that) no corrections were necessary. His (explanations) were very much to the point and went deeply into the subject. As regards his human qualities (apart from his learning)—Kumārajīva’s mind was clever and perspicuous far above the average. He well understood the mental disposition (of his hearers), rarely was there one like him. He was trustworthy and kind, his heart was filled with an all-embracing love, without egoism. He (was a friend who) led towards the good and never wearied. Yao Hsing used to argue with him saying: ‘You are so intelligent and understanding, there is no other like you. When you die, the seed of the Dharma must not be left unpropagated’. So he forced him (to live with) ten females whom he selected for him. Thereupon Kumārajīva

2 See n. 248.
3 KSCCH II, 1: 332c 3.
5 Lost.
moved from the monks' dormitory to a private residence sumptuously furnished (by the King). (Though he suffered under this treatment he did not complain and his relations with the King remained good, yet) before a lecture he always compared himself to a lotus-flower growing in the dirt. 'The flower should be plucked without touching the dirt.'

Kumārajīva was 58 (Chōron 51) years old when he came to Ch'ang-an. He lived first in the Hsiao-yao-yüan, a large compound northwest of Ku-ch'eng (old town) on the banks of river Wei 滑水; later in the Great Monastery (Ta-shih 大寺) within the walls. These places must have had the character of lamaseries rather than of monasteries of the present day. There were probably few solid buildings. The translators of the sūtras met in the western one of the two pavilions which flanked the main building in the Hsiao-yao-yüan, the lectures being held in another hall.

The King, already well acquainted with Buddhism, together with his family took an active part in the work, which comprised lectures to expound the sūtras, and the actual translation. He had composed a short outline of the main tenets of Buddhism for his own use, which he submitted to Kumārajīva. Their correspondence is extant. It is evident that the King was an intelligent man, though not a scholar of great erudition.

When the news of Kumārajīva's arrival spread, students came from all quarters and a large crowd assembled that had to be fed and supervised. The students of the inner circle were called i-hsüeh literally, 'students of the meaning (of the texts)' in opposition to those who performed the ritual.

There exists a correspondence between Hui-yüan, disciple of Tao-an, and Kumārajīva. Hui-yüan, known as the founder of the Sect of the Pure Land (Ching-t'ün 浄土宗) who had assembled a large community on Lu-shan 嵩山 (Hunan), had been notified of Kumārajīva's arrival by Yao Sung 姚嵩, a younger brother of the King. He at once got in touch with him to ask for the explanation of subjects of controversy. The main topics dealt with are the dharmakāya and connected

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8 Chōron has that he lived at Pei-tao yao-yüan 北道苑 sometime after A.D. 403. The topography of Ch'ang-an is not so well known under the Ch'in as in earlier and later periods. Cf. A. Forke (1808): 104ff and Hsiang Ta 顯達 (1933): 33; Sung Min-ch'iu 宋敏稠 (1910-1970), Ch'ang-an chih 長安志 ch. 5: 7ff; Hsiant-lu in Taishō 55: 2511; T'ung (1938): 304-5 and n. 408.

9 The name T'uo-chung 頃洞 (in the Great Monastery) suggests a mat-shed hall.

10 Cf. n. 402.

11 Under four head-monks with official rank, apparently one for each compound.
INTRODUCTION: 1. HISTORICAL NOTES

problems. Kumārajīva explains inconsistencies of theory by quoting different exegeses, though the needs of the Lu-shan community might have been better served by the exposition of a simplified theory of Buddhism. The distance between the mentality of the Indian scholar and the community on Lu-shan, uneducated in dogmatics, was too great for the correspondence, as published by Hui-yüan, to have much success.

In fact the influence of Kumārajīva was due not to his writings but to his oral explanations and his winning personality. His kindness, lack of pride in spite of his eminent intelligence, and the way he suffered shame without complaint left a lasting impression upon the Chinese of the North.

In spite of his youth Seng-chao was counted among the Four Chief Disciples (Szu-chieh 四僧行), and took an active part in the translations. He 'held the brush', i.e. he composed the Chinese text after it had been explained by Kumārajīva, and also took notes of the master's comments. On these he relied for his own compositions (PART IV, Dedication). Kumārajīva was twelve years (?) in Ch'ang-an. He translated a great number of texts, sūtras (ching 經) and sāstras (lun 論). The most important are: the Pañcavimśatika (Ta-pʻīn pan-jo 大品般若) (PSK), and the Prajñāpāramitā-upadesa sāstra (Ta-chih-tu lun 大智度論) (MS), the Daśasāhasrikā (Hsiao-pʻīn pan-jo 小品般若) (DS) (never quoted in Chao-lun), the Vimalakīrti sūtra (VSK), the Saddharmapuṇḍarika sūtra (Miao-fa lien-hua ching 妙法蓮華經), the Mādhyamika kārikās (MK), the Śata sāstra (Pai-lun 百論) and the Dvādaśa-nikāya sāstra (Shih-erh men lun 十二門論), the Satyasiddhi sāstra (Chʻing-shih lun 成實論) and the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins (Shih-sung lun 十論律).

Kumārajīva died in A.D. 413. Four years later Chʻang-an was in ruins and the students of the Academy had dispersed, the centre of Buddhist life having shifted to the South.

12 Called the White-lotus Society in the legend.
13 See Bibliography.
14 He was treated more as a saint than as a scholar. The Wei-shu Shih-lao 釋老 114, 20: 298 [Ware 156-7] says that Kao-tsu (471-499) built a pagoda in the Chʻang-chu ssu 常住寺 where Kumārajīva died. (It was one of the four monasteries into which the Great Monastery was later divided.) He also ordered that Kumārajīva's descendants be proposed for official appointments.
15 Tao-sheng 道生, Hui-kuan 惠覩, Seng-chao, Seng (Hui)-jui 僧(慧)叒. The identity of Seng-jui and Hui-hui has been proved by Ōshō Enichi (1942). Cf. also A. Wright (1957).
16 Prof. Tʻakumoto who has a discussion on the dates of Kumārajīva (Chōron 120-1, 130-5) concluded: 'K. either died suddenly or was incapacitated suddenly at about sixty years of age in Hung-shih (409). We should exclude the first for two reasons: a. The Satyasiddhi was translated in 411-12 and all sources agree that this was done by Kumārajīva. b. The letter of Yao Hsūn, printed in KIIMCHII 228n, says 'shortly thereafter K. had another attack' 束久什公病復重變. The text does not say 'final attack' if chih 病 is taken as the verb. The date A.D. 411 or 413 seems still to be most probable.
The KSCH contains the following biography:

Shih19 Seng-chao came from Ching-chao.20 His family21 was poor, and Chao earned his living as a copyist. As such he had occasion to become acquainted with the Classics and History. He was thoroughly versed in the literary style of writing (as found in the Introductions). His interest was directed to the mystic, and Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu were his favourite philosophers. After he had read the Tao-te ching he exclaimed: 'Beautiful it surely is, but it seems as if the realm has not yet been found where our spirits may rest and worldly sorrows be overcome'. When later he read the old translation of the Vimalakirti sūtra (VSC)22 he was filled with joy and admiration. He read it again and again and thoroughly enjoyed it. 'Now', he said, 'I know where I belong'. So he decided to become a monk. He favoured the Vaipulya sūtras (the Prajñāpāramitās) but also studied the (Hinayāna) Tripitaka.

By the time he came of age his fame had spread all over the Passes and the district round the capital,23 but ambitious people grudged his early appearance upon the scene. They came from afar into the Passes in order to argue with him (in public disputations). But Chao, who was not only a deep thinker but also an able debater, knew how to thrust back, and his opponents had to withdraw. Famous scholars from Ching-chao and from outside the Passes (Liang) were amazed at his keen argument and wondered whether they should not test their ability on him.24

When Kumārajiva came to Ku-ts'ang 姑臧,25 Chao went there in order to follow him as his disciple. Kumārajiva was full of praise

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18 KSCH 6, 13: 365a; Fang-lu 80–81a; Po-tsu li-tai t'ung-ts'ai 佛祖歷代通載 7, 16: 707b; 'T'ang (1938): 328–339; Fung Yu-lan 2: 676–685 (Fung-Bodde 258–270); Iwagishi 204:208; P. Pelliot (1912): 392 n.r.; Wei shu 114, 20: 75 (Ware 1933: 131).
19 Ch'un-t'ung lu 誼畱錄 (Sayings of Ch'an teachers) contains biographies, with legends, but adds nothing of historical value to the older material.
20 Shih 輔, designates, more sinico, the clan-name of Śākyamuni used by Chinese monks ever since Tao-an.
21 北兆郡, the administrative district of Ch'ang-an.
23 This sūtra, which is little known in the West—as it exists only in Chinese—was in the time of Kumārajiva as famous as the Prajñāpāramitās. It had been twice translated before him. The translation mentioned in Chih Ch'ien's 文鏡.
24 請 the passes west and south of Ch'ang-an. Fu 阜 means Sang-ju i.e. three administrative districts including the capital.
25 If this is to be believed then the date of 383 (KSCH) for his birth would be much too late. (Chadou proposes 374)
26 Capital of Northern Liang 北涼 where he was held by the general Li Kuang 陸光. Kumārajiva was there for 17 years.
for him. Later when he went to Ch’ang-an, Chao returned with him. Yao Hsing assigned him, Seng-jui and others to the Hsiao-yao compound where they could help to edit the Buddhist texts. The Sage (Buddha) had passed away long ago, the interpretations of the texts had become controversial, and occasional mistakes had crept into earlier translations. Chao, conscious of this fact, approached Kumārajīva with questions whenever he met him. In this way he enhanced his understanding beyond (what he had acquired through study). So after the translation of the Pañcaviśāṭikā (A.D. 403–404), Chao composed the treatise On Prajñā not Cognizant in over two thousand words. When it was finished he presented it to Kumārajīva who read it, praised it and said to Chao: ‘My understanding does not yield to yours but your phrasing is superior’.

When the recluse Liu I-min from the Lu-shan community saw a treatise of Seng-chao, he said emphatically: ‘I never thought that among the clerics there could be a P’ing-shu’. He therefore passed it on to Hui-yüan. Yüan was enthusiastic. ‘Absolutely unique’, was his comment. Whereupon the whole community read it and enjoyed it; it went from hand to hand and each one wanted to keep it longer. Liu I-min wrote a letter to Chao. (Then follow quotations from the Letters translated below.)

After this Chao wrote the treatises On Time, On Śūnyatā and others. He also commented upon the Vimalakīrti sūtra and composed several ‘Introductions’ which are all extant. After the death of Kumārajīva—while mourning his eternal departure and feeling his hopes blighted—Chao composed the treatise On the Unname-ability of Nirvāṇa. (Here follows a quotation.) When the work was finished he handed it to Yao Hsing. (Here follows another quotation.) Hsing’s answer went into detail and added words of praise for Chao’s work. He ordered it to be copied and distributed among the members of his family. This shows the high regard in which Chao was held in his time. He died in Ch’ang-an in the tenth year of the i-hsi period (A.D. 414) in his thirty-first year.

There is little to add from other sources, but from his writings we can form a picture of his learning and his inner development. The legend of his murder by decree does not appear until the Ch’ān literature.
C. THE EXTENT OF SENG-CHAO'S LEARNING

Seng-chao's language is largely Taoist, particularly in the earliest treatise (PART III). In the later works also quotations from the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu* are numerous. The *I-ch'ing* and *Lun-yü* are often quoted. Seng-chao knew the writings of Wang Pi (226–249) and also those of his contemporary Buddho-Taoists, such as Hui-yüan and Chih Tao-lin.

The sūtras most often quoted are the *Pañcaviṃśatikā* in the older translation (*PSM*), the *Vimalakīrti sūtra* in both translations (*VSK* and *VSC*),30 the *Daśasāhasrikā* in the older translation (*DSL*), the *Mādhyamika kārikās* (*MK*) and the *Mahāyāna śāstra* (*MS*) (?). It is surprising that Seng-chao neither quotes the *Śata śāstra* nor the *Dvādaśa-nikāya śāstra*,31 and only rarely the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sutra*. It seems that not every student participated in all the translations but that they were divided into teams, who perhaps spent their free time in preparing certain texts for publication and therefore could not study other texts. Many of the monks studied a single text during their whole life-time, which partly accounts for the typically Chinese division into schools of single sūtras.

D. HIS LANGUAGE

The style of Seng-chao's Introductions is similar to those of Tao-an, Hui-kuan, Seng-jü, T'ân-ying 彌entral, Tao-sheng and others, but that of *Chao-lun* is very original. The rhythmical prose of its stanzas is built up in pairs of sentences, the latter half of each pair being repeated at the beginning of the next:

*Being* without sides, things, though in-existent, exist (as phenomena); Representing no obstructions, things, though (appearing to) exist, in-exist (in truth).

In-existent (in truth), though they (appear to) exist, they are called different from (merely) existent things. (Appearing to) exist, though they in-exist (in truth), they are called different from the in-existent.32

'This 'turning of the sentences' or 'chain-argument' as A. Waley calls it,'33 is an ancient style of elevated prose. Seng-chao was perhaps the last to use it. Rhymed verses do not occur in *Chao-lun*.

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30 Cf. n. 279.
31 In Japanese tradition Seng-chao is the founder of the *San-lun* 三論 sect (Yamakawa 1947: 14). *San-lun* refers to three scriptures, the *Mādhyamika kārikās*, the *Śata śāstra*, and the *Dvādaśa-nikāya śāstra* which Kumārajīva propagated. Only one of them is quoted in the *Chao-lun*. However, Seng-chao had no disciples, and at that time some sūtras did not exist.
32 Huo p. 87, n. 1.
INTRODUCTION: 2. SENG-CHAO'S WRITINGS

2. THE WRITINGS OF SENG-CHAO

Chinese Buddhist literature developed from commentaries, introductions, correspondence, memorials, and similar short works. These were copied by private persons or by order of an official who was in charge of an editorial organization, and were later collected.

The Chao-lun is such a collection of essays, composed between A.D. 404–414, and probably written in the following order: Parts III, II, I and IV. We shall deal separately with each essay:

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER, Tsung-pen-i. This is not listed in the old catalogues, which were composed during the Liang dynasty and earlier. It was probably added by the compiler of Chao-lun.

PART I, On Time, Wu pu-ch'ien lun 写不遜論 written in A.D. 410 (Chöron), or later?

PART II, On Śūnyatā, Pu-chen-k'ung lun 目不虛論. Both Parts I and II contain quotations from the Mūlamādhyaṁkārī (Chung-kuan lun 中觀論) which was translated in the year 408/9, and therefore they must have been written after that date (in 410 according to Chöron).

PART III, On Prajñā not cognizant, Pan-jo wu-chih lun 般若無知論. The preface mentions Kumārajiva's translation of the Pañcaviṃśatikā which was completed in the year 403. In A.D. 408, Tao-sheng took a copy of it to Lu-shan where it was studied by Hui-yuan and Liu I-min. So it must have been written between 404-408 (Chöron about 405), and before Parts I and II. Cf. T'ang (1938: 299).

CORRESPONDENCE with Liu I-min, concerning the preceding text.

Liu wrote his Questions at the end of A.D. 409 but was dead by the time Chao's answer, written seven months later, arrived.

PART IV, On the Unnameability of Nirvāṇa, Nieh-p'an wu-ming lun 涅槃無名論. Introduction by a dedication to the King of Ch'in, Tsou Ch'in-wang piao 奏奏王表, partly spurious but based on genuine material. See Appendix II, pp. 150–152.

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84 In the old catalogues, each part appears separately. In the Fang-lu (A.D. 597) they are listed together for the first time. In the extant edition they are made up into a book, where the treatises appear as chapters. Makita Taizō (1955): 146, 149 and 272. The Taishō edition of the Tripitaka lists versions derived from earlier editions. Chöron has further versions from MSS found in Japanese libraries. I relied on the Taishō text, but compared it with texts found in early commentaries, above all in YK and HT. HT's being pre-T'ang has a special claim to be authoritative; its versions have proved to be most useful.

85 T'ang (1938): 310 and 315. According to Chöron the Questions were written in 408, arrived at Lu-shan and were answered in 409.
COMMENTARY on the *Vimalakirti-nirdesa sūtra*. It was translated in A.D. 406 and therefore the commentary must have been written between 406-410 (Chôron has 407).\(^{38}\)


**INTRODUCTIONS.** The Ch'eng-lu lists only three: (1) to the *Vimalakirti* sūtra (*Taishō* 1775); (2) to the *Dirghāgama* (*Taishō* 1) translated A.D. 413. (3) the *Śata sāstra* (*Taishō* 1569) translated A.D. 404.\(^{37}\) The Introduction to the *Brahmajāla* sūtra (*Fan-wang-ching*, *Taishō* 1484) translated by de Groot,\(^{38}\) is doubtful because the sūtra itself is probably spurious. (Chôron dates the Introductions the same years as the translations.)

**BOOK OF HIDDEN TREASURE, Pao-tsang lun** 賓藏論 (*Taishō* 1857, Hsu 2.1/1). This has been studied in detail by Japanese scholars and by Prof. T'ang.\(^{39}\) It has a polemical note directed against those who invoke the Buddha (*nien fo seng* 念佛僧) probably the Lu-shan group of the Ching-t'u followers.\(^{40}\) In style and content the author looks like a Budhha-Taoist of the 5th century.\(^{41}\)

**BOOK OF THE ESSENTIAL SAMENESS OF THE TWO BODIES OF THE BUDDHA, Chang-liu chi-chen lun** 丈六即真論, listed in the oldest catalogues.\(^{42}\) There existed another treatise with the same title by Seng-pi 僧僃. No longer extant.

The Japanese Dictionaries\(^{43}\) list more commentaries attributed to

\(^{38}\) *The Taishō Tripitaka* contains two editions with Seng-chao’s Commentary: (i) the *Wei-mo-chieh so-shuo ching chu* (維摩所說經註); (1775, xxxviii), in which the three teachers Kumārajīva, Seng-chao, and Tao-sheng are quoted. Tao-sheng’s commentary was written after Seng-chao’s in an effort to improve on it; cf. Tao-sheng’s biography in *Yu-lu* 13. 4:111b. (ii) The *Ching-ming ching chi-chieh kuan-chung su* 淨名經集解闡小論 compiled by Tao-i 道寂 (2777, LXXXV), dated A.D. 760; besides the above three commentaries there is an additional one by Seng-jui. (According to T’ang a commentary by (Sung) Tao-jung 通融 is amalgamated with the others.) A Ch’in MS found in *T’u-hu-hueng* was published by Lo Chen-yü in the *Ch’i-ching k’an ts’ung-k’an* 七經勳畧 (1937) under No. 3, containing the first three p’i in almost complete.

\(^{39}\) *Translated by Robinson (1967): 210-211.*


\(^{39}\) *T’ang (1938): 332. It is first listed in a A.D. 858 catalogue (*Taishō* 2173, LV: 116b). But Prof. T’ang has seen a blockprint with an introduction of Huai-hui 懷輝 who died A.D. 808.*

\(^{40}\) *Hsu: 201; ‘By means of their invocations they conjure up all sorts of apparitions’* 以金剛力化作眾生色相.

\(^{41}\) *The author, though certainly not Seng-chao himself, must have known his writings. I found the *Pao-tsang lun* helpful in understanding difficult phrases in *Chiu-lun*. The title is usually translated as ‘precious repository’, but cf. *Hsiu* 85-86 如何以佛事之實義在喻如之文.*

\(^{42}\) *Ch’ung-lu 83-85.*

\(^{43}\) *Ono Jongnyǒ (1916) n.v. 僧恥.*
Seng-chao but, since none of them is mentioned in the literature before T'ang, we need not go into detail here.\textsuperscript{44}

The same applies to a commentary on the Tao-te ching, mentioned by Stanislas Julien (1842: xxxviii), which is unknown before A.D. 901.\textsuperscript{45}

3. INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARIES\textsuperscript{46}

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Chao-lun hsü. Introduction by Hui-ta of Hsiao Chao-t'i monastery 小招提寺沙門慧達作.
   \textit{Hsü} 2.1/1. Reprinted in Commentary \textsuperscript{5} and an extract before Commentary 9. Hui-ta is probably identical with the author of Commentary 1 (see below).

2. Commentary to Chao-lun hsü 招論序注 by Yuan-k'ang, printed together with Yuan-k'ang's commentary to the Chao-lun.

3. Contents of the Commentary to the Chao-lun hsü chu (Chia-k'o Chao-lun hsü-chu) 夾科肇論序注. 小招提寺沙門慧達由 Hsiao-yüeh from Lo-t'an\textsuperscript{48} 勸津禪師晦月注.
   Printed in \textit{Hsü} 2.1/2 as a separate article. Hsiao-yüeh was a Ch'an monk of the Lin-ch'i sect. His exact dates are not known but from a passage in the Commentary (97b 8) he was probably contemporary with the Ming-chiao Ch'an-shih Chi'sung 明教禪師契嵩 (A.D. 1007-1072) Cf. Wu-teng hui-yüan 五燈會元 12; \textit{Hsü} Ch'uan-teng-lu 續傳燈錄, 7; and Nakata (1936): 383-4.

B. COMMENTARIES

1. Chao-lun su, in three chüan, by Hui-ta 招論疏三卷陳慧達撰.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Chi-tsang 吉藏 in the \textit{Fa-hua hsüan-lun} 法華玄論 ch. 2 (\textit{Taishō} 1720, XXXIV: p. 363b) reports that Liu Ch'iu 劉虬 in his \textit{法華論} collected notes from ten commentators, among whom was Seng-chao. There exists a commentary \textit{Chin-kang-ching chu} 金剛經集注 (\textit{Hsü} 1.38/3) also contained in a collection of commentaries by Yang Kuai 楊圭 (Sung), \textit{Chin-kang-ching chi-chien} 金剛經集解 (\textit{Hsü} 1.38/5). But because it is first mentioned in a Japanese catalogue of A.D. 1094 (cf. \textit{Taishō} 2183, LV: 1147c) it may be spurious. These commentaries were marginal notes without great value.


\textsuperscript{46} Nakata Genjirō (1936): 335-406 and Matsumoto Bunzaburo (1944) pp. 73-86. References here are to the \textit{Hsü} edition of the Tripitaka; other editions may be looked up in the \textit{IVY Index}.

\textsuperscript{47} The lithographic edition of Shanghui hsü Chao-t'i shu 招提寺 but the photograph published by Matsumoto bun again hsiao 小招提寺.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{West} of Chien-ch'ang 青銅, Kiangsi province.

\textsuperscript{49} The title page of the manuscript printed in the \textit{Tripitaka} is lost but the colophons on pp. 411u and 444b say Hsü-t'ieh chuan 燒滅制燬.
The text, as we now possess it, consists of a first and a middle chüan. The last one seems to be lacking.\textsuperscript{50} The work is in fact complete, though the modern sequence of the parts is changed. As appears from the context,\textsuperscript{51} PART III originally came before PARTS I and II.

It has been doubted\textsuperscript{52} whether the Commentary and the Introduction are by the same author. Nakata draws our attention to two places in the commentary where the author is called Chao-t’i 招提, i.e. by the name of a monastery. Chi-tsang\textsuperscript{53} too quotes him by this name. Yüan-k’ang\textsuperscript{54} reports that the Lesser Chao-t’i ssu was founded under the Chin, the Great Chao-t’i ssu under the Liang; both are possible. But no Hui-t’a of Great Chao-t’i ssu is known.

The contents of the two texts corroborate the view that ‘Chao-t’i’ refers to Hui-ta of the Lesser Chao-t’i ssu in Jun-chou, in Chiang-ning hsien.\textsuperscript{55} The commentary says that ‘PART I expounds laukika, PART II paramārtha’\textsuperscript{56}—an odd idea, not justified by the true meaning of the book. But the Introduction says the same thing.\textsuperscript{57}

Though the identity of the authors seems to be established, there remains one difficulty: a monk cannot refer to himself by the name of his monastery—the honour was reserved for the founder or the most revered member of the community. Now, the first two parts of this commentary are entitled i-chi 義記 and i-ssu-chi 義私記 i.e. ‘record of and private record of the views’—namely, of somebody else. So there must have been a disciple who recorded the expositions of his teacher. This should solve the problem.

Yüan-k’ang tells us that Hui-ta flourished under the Ch’en (557–589). He himself says that he had taught for twenty years when he wrote the commentary. His writings show him as a firm supporter of San-lun as against Ch’eng-shih school.

2. Chao-lun su, in three chüan, by (T’ang) Yüan-k’ang 粹論疏三卷 (唐)元康疏.


Yüan-k’ang is known by his biography in (Sung) KSCH 4.\textsuperscript{58} He was thick-set and energetic, unlike the general idea of a scholar, but eager to learn. ‘In the Chen-kuan period (627–649), when he came to study in the capital, he carried on his back or dragged behind him the three

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. \textit{Ilstit} 2B 1655.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{IIT} 442c: 11 f, and 428d: 15 f.
\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Nakata (1936); and T’ung (1938): 331.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Tu-ch’ing-shih liüan huren} 大乘立論 4: 49c 11, cf. \textit{IIT} 432a f.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{YK} 42a: 10–16.
\textsuperscript{55} 閩州廣寧縣 was south of present-day Nanking.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{IIT} 448a.
\textsuperscript{57} Introduction: 301.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Taishō} 1: 1 787.
books (of the San-lun School) fixed upon a little board on wheels. In a playful way he wished to say that he would run down with his little carriage, and lead to understanding of the truth, all those who believed in Existence and could not grasp the idea of Essential Emptiness.' On Imperial order he lived in An-kuo ssu 安國寺 teaching San-lun. A catalogue of A.D. 1094 lists six books under his name. All are lost.

This commentary contains the Parts in the order in which they are found in all the later editions. For the first time there appears the Tsung-pen-i 宗本義 (Introductory Part).


The Taishō Index, Vol. I, has an entry that says it was written by Hui-ch'eng 惠遠. According to Nakata this manuscript is preserved in Togano Kōzanji 相野高山寺. It was first listed in a catalogue of books which Ennin 僧仁 brought back from China in A.D. 839. In another catalogue of the same author, Ch'eng is listed as Hui-ch'eng 惠遠. In the postscript of Commentary 5, 惠遠 is written Teng 慈遠. Unknown.


The author Tsun-shih (964-1032), of Yao-feng ssu, with the fancy-name Tz'u-yün 慈雲, was a famous member of the T'ien-t'ai School and author of many books, of which some thirty are still extant. Biographies are in Ch'i-sung's 赤松 T'an-chin 持定 and other collections.


Ching-yüan belonged to the Avatāmasaka School: a disciple of Ch'eng-ch'ien 慈遠 from Wu-t'ai shan. He was later active in the South. His biography is found in Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai, 19, and other collections.
Among the material which he collected are Commentaries 1, 2, 3 and three others not extant. In my notes I have sometimes used Yüan’s quotations from a Chao-lun su, in three chüan, by Kuang-yao of I-chou (modern Lin-i in Shantung) 沂州光瑋禪師, a T'ang monk who lived A.D. 716–807.\(^{66}\) Makita (1955) 282.


This is a sub-commentary on the work just cited composed by the same author, extant in a manuscript preserved in the library of the Kozanji.


Wen-ts'ai (1241–1302) was born of peasant parents. He was a great reader and passed most of his life at Pai-ma ssu 白馬寺 (Temple of the White Horse), Loyang. He was therefore also called Shih-yüan tsung-chu 神源宗祖, ‘Patriarch of the place from which Buddhism spread (over China)’. When the Wan-sheng yu-kuo ssu 萬聖統國寺, the main monastery at Wu-t'ai shan, was founded by Ch'êng-tsung 成宗 (the second Yüan emperor) he was appointed its superintendent. Among other works he composed the Hui-teng chi 禪頌集 (Collected works of Hui-teng). The latter is probably the author of Commentary 3 above. Wen-ts'ai’s biography is in the Fo-tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai, ch. 22.\(^{67}\)

Wen-ts'ai says, in his introduction, tsu-hsu 自序, that he used Kuang-yüan’s commentary and a su 論 by a monk called Ta of cloud-hermitage 靈鶴道庵. This might be Hui-ta.

9. Chao-lun hsin-su yu-jen 游刃, in 3 chüan, by Wen-ts’ai. Hsü 2.1/3. This is a sub-commentary of previous work by the same author.


Te-ch’ing (1546–1623) was a Ch’ an monk from Nanking. His biography is extant in his collected writings;\(^{68}\) he is better known under

\(^{66}\) Cf. (T’ang) I-ron chih (Hsin T’ung-shu 50: 13b).

\(^{67}\) Taishô XI:1.1X: 73.5.5.

\(^{68}\) Han-shan tu-shih mêng-yu ch’i’an-chi 隱山大師夢雨集 by Ch’i’an-chi 隱寺 (Hsü 2.3/4:1–7).
the 'mountain-name' of Han-shan 峆山. Among his works are commentaries on Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu.69

This Commentary is partly polemical, as appears from the content.70 It tries to defend Seng-chao against the charge of inherent Taoism, made in a pamphlet Wu-pu-ch'ien cheng-liang lun 物不遷正量論 by Chen-ch'eng 陳澄. The controversy was followed by a whole literature of essays, some refuting, some justifying71 the charge.

Nakata (1936: 42-48) lists a further twelve commentaries all of which are lost. One is Commentary 5; some are mere tables-of-contents; the rest might be reduced to five or six if the originals could be collated with the extant texts. We may add a Chao-lun su-i 聼論疏義, quoted by Ancho72 and in the colophons of Commentary 1.73 T'ang (1938: 837) thinks that this is a Japanese book. An outline of thirteen Japanese commentaries by Makita is found in Chōron: 281-283.

4. NOTES AND COMMENTS ON SENG-CHAO'S PHILOSOPHY

A. THE TERM 'PATTERN'

The philosophy of Chao-lun is not a system such as we are used to in the West, with our well-defined terms and the subject-matter subdivided and built up into a connected whole. It is rather a picture, based on Chinese tradition and stimulated by foreign influences. Instead of facts, we find vision; instead of analysis, we find demonstration. This demonstration is not necessarily true according to scientific standards, as we might expect, but true if convincing. Philosophy in China is, in this respect, not very different from art or poetry. It interprets74 what is, instead of describing it objectively.

We are accustomed to speak of ‘images’ which change in the course of history, as that of the Holy Virgin Mary or that of an American President. What does it mean? No actual change is involved but the change of what the divinity, or the president, undergoes in thousands of minds. This may or may not be in conformity with the reality. Even where it does, this is not essential in the effect which an ‘image’ may have on our

69 The collection includes a Tao-te-ching chieh-fa t'i 道德經解發題.
70 Cf. the text of the commentary: 294b and 295d.
71 Collected in Hill 2,2/4.
72 Chōron shō-ki 中輪雑記 (Taishō 2255, LXV: 93a 3).
73 IVT: 431b and 444d.
74 I use the word in the sense of ‘speculations’ for all views which impute value to facts; see my paper On World-interpretations, Nuntinkuten 1936; 88 pages.
behaviour or actions. Facts do not rouse our emotions before they are interpreted and transformed into 'images'. The meaningless vacuum in which we are placed must be filled by us with meaning, and thereby we create value. How else could we find orientation? Religion and philosophy, myths, ideologies, theatre, rituals or fashions are interpretative in the sense that they are giving a meaning to what is encountered in life. Our images of the realities, not the realities, are what we love and hate, what we fight and die for. This has a bearing on the meaning of ‘truth’, a term which is used in a double sense. The actual truth of a proposition is decided upon by experiment, that of an interpretation by our emotional reaction telling us what it is that we are confronted with, whether friend or foe. We may be deceived, naturally. We may be in doubt. And in that case we look for orientation in the experiences of our past or in the lore to which we are heirs. There we find ‘interpretation’ handed down, not merely in writing but in many other ways which comprise the tradition in which we are born. More stable than institutions, interpretations change but survive, and are traceable through the whole history of a society.

World-interpretations are not patterns, but patterns derive from them. World-interpretations are formed from observation when by means of analogy an observation assumes cosmic proportions and passes for a universal clue. They represent the interpretative milieu in which we live with its figures and standards of value. Patterns are single features which have become transferable and re-appear in other milieu than the original one from which they derive. This will be immediately clear if we now go on to show concrete instances of interpretations and patterns in China.

In my analysis I lay emphasis upon these patterns or motifs, their source and development. This must be distinguished from the task of tracing the sources from which Seng-chao obtained his language.

98 They were called *Denkformen* by Hans Leisegang (1951): *Denkformen*, Berlin. But he distinguished only two patterns, the pyramid and the circle. In my understanding they are much more numerous. The French word *motif* has a similar meaning when used by students of art and music, literature, etc. For our purpose it will be sufficient to distinguish between ‘interpretation’, non-transferable (as a whole), and ‘pattern’, transferable. *T‘i-yang*, of which much will be said later, originally was ‘interpretation’ because built on analogy, but became a ‘pattern’ when it was transferred from cosmology to explain the function of the body, political features, etc. Other examples are easily found. The engine in the West became a pattern immediately after its invention (*l’homme machine*) and there are physicists who interpret the whole world as a machine in the same way. Failure to interpret ‘what that occurs’ as a breaking from an initial inertial state, or Indian philosophers interpret world evolution as proliferation of an initial principle. Hundreds of these interpretations exist which gradually become creeds and lead to the imposition of moral rules and even laws.

99 I mentioned earlier that Seng-chao’s language is peculiar, but referred to his style rather than to his choice of words—his phrases and allegories are not uncommon. I wonder if he has coined a single new simile; in this he is rather sterile. Compare for instance his language with that of a non-Taoist with Buddhist inclinations, a friend of
i. Latent Power and its Manifestation

In a little pamphlet which Ou-yang Ching-wu, the founder of Nei-hsiieh, gave me after a lecture in Nanking, he sets forth the doctrine of  

Before answering this question may I survey two other main Chinese world-interpretations.

T'ien-ming 天命. In the Chinese patriarchal interpretation the world was hierarchically structured with the Son of Heaven at the top, his deputies in the lower ranks, and the people (the families) at the bottom. The structure was crowned by Heaven (t'ien) watching over the honour of the dynasty. He acted as Providence (t'ien-ming). The distribution of duties among the social layers made the nobility responsible for keeping the world in order, and the people responsible for the material support of those in power. As the ideal 'original' state had constantly to be restored, this interpretation of the social order was not completely rigid but demanded changes and permitted discussion among the members of the nobility and the Court. The Emperor and the nobility had a task to perform, for they were responsible for the welfare of the people. Thus far medieval Chinese government might be called liberal, for though the Emperor was not bound to obey a constitution, he had to follow the Will of Heaven (t'ien-ming) as defined in the Confucian classics.

Yin-yang 阴阳 means that two natural forces alternately govern the destinies of man; no progress, either cosmic or individual, is conceivable. Man can only watch the tokens which announce an approaching change for the better or for the worse. Men may try to read their future in the I-ching (Book of Changes), in which all possible cosmic situations are outlined. They may take refuge before the storm. But they never dare to resist. Obviously, this interpretation is fatalistic.

T'i-yung 道用. This pattern is derived from the philosophy of Lao Tzu, though he did not use the phrase. Lao Tzu was probably the first to conceive the cosmos as an infinite whole, not to be measured by
human standards. This whole he called *tsu-jan* 自然 the ‘self-so’ (A. Waley), a term also translatable as Nature or Cosmic Life. For the Cosmos is living, living after its own law, pursuing its own way (*tao*) with the necessity of growth. Lao Tzu himself did not try to make a system out of his vision; in the *Tao-te ching* he communicates an experience. Only when, five hundred years later, this was reduced to a pattern, did it become a system. Wang Pi, in his commentaries, uses the term *t'i-yung*. His approach was as T'ang Yung-t'ung thought ‘scientific’; the system was ‘dynamic’ because the way leads from one state to another state. (In *Lao-tzu* this is not said but perhaps implied.) The Cosmos unfolds from an infolded (latent) state to an unfolded (manifest) one. These states are evaluated, the original one as blissful, the later one as decay. And conclusions of an ethical nature are drawn: return to the origin! Adapt oneself to cosmic harmony and finally, like nature, one may gain eternal life. (This is not said in *Lao-tzu*.) Lao Tzu's interpretation is essentially religious, as it demands a decision and makes us responsible for our own future. Of the three doctrines, it is the only one that later generations of philosophers have continued to work on.

**ii. The Sage**

Lao Tzu denied the ruler the right to interfere in the private lives of the people. As far as they were concerned the natural course of the Universe, the Tao, replaced the Will of Heaven, the *T'ien-ming*. Taoist philosophers did not oppose Government, they merely claimed the right to ignore it where other standards of life ruled their lives. They did so with a good conscience, however paradoxical this may seem. Taoism was for the private use of the people; Confucianism was a State religion. Its rules and dogmas were divine manifestations. They could not be discussed. But Taoism was a philosophy, the work of one who claimed no divine authority. That is why the image of Lao Tzu’s Sage has changed again and again until recent times and why it still lives and activates thought.

What Lao Tzu transferred was an experience repeatable at any time even by people brought up in different traditions. Experience, because it refers to facts, is independent of dogmas. Though Lao Tzu’s
approach was not scientific, it was philosophic in the sense that it touched on actual problems and opened paths to creative thinking.

We all look at the same world, but what we see depends on the significance it has for our individual situations. Somehow, all ontology has an ethical background. We would not marvel at what we see if it were otherwise. Before the scientific age, research was a search for the meaningful. This is what people were interested in. For, we must know who we are and where we should go; we need orientation. Thus, when Lao Tzu discovered the way things take (tao), he simultaneously found the way we should take, and fashioned an ideal figure: he who behaves as the Whole (the Cosmos) behaves, that is, as Nature which rules the world without wilful destruction and without keeping its own.

We do not know who actually created the figure of the Sage. In the Tao-te ching Lao Tzu quotes people who say that he is Nature, wotzu-jan 我自然. Thus, a discussion about the Sage must have begun before 300 B.C. We even wonder whether some kind of messianic hope pervaded the atmosphere in the southern regions of the China of that time, for, in contrast to Heaven, Nature is a benign ruler if ever there was one.

The philosophy of Lao Tzu was a philosophy based on experience, not on any religious tradition. But mythological elements are incorporated in it. Heaven is strictly male: he rules, but Nature (the Sage) has female aspects: he or she cares. Neither the Sage nor Tao are abstract concepts, but interpretative figures and therefore subject to further interpretation. Cosmic figures and forces are not readily definable; they cannot be verified through research in nature. They are true if consistent with the image of the world we have in our minds. This image may change and with it the functions and characteristics of the figures which play roles in it.

This leaves room for speculation and discussion.

iii. Speculation on the Tao

We have mentioned Wang Pi who conceived the Way as development from one state to another one, from t'i to yung. World unfolds, it reveals its contents, it grows. These states Lao Tzu had distinguished as original and final (pen-mo); the terms t'i-yung do not occur in his work. The change from cosmic origin to end he rather conceived as decay. What has come after ‘original simplicity’ is ‘great artifice’ (Waley), it is the

78 I follow T'ang Yung-t'ung. In the Lao-tzu 'Mother' (ch. 1 Wan-wu chih nü 萬物之母), 'Ancestor, 'Root, 'One', a.o. occur; cf. ch. 25, 52, 59, 61. Chuang-tzu has pen
81 of. 13 ch. 5 fol. 22b 天產師師後，寂滅如萬物之本也. (Giles 1961: 132, 'Repose, tranquillity, willhow, inaction, these were the source of all things'.)

79 Tu-wen 大隅 Lao-tzu 18.
negative of what once has been when people and ruler were still unspoiled and when Great Order ruled and nobody thought of leaving the situation in which he was placed, in pursuit of selfish interests.

One may think that in Lao Tzu’s picture also time was involved. This is true but, whenever restoration is demanded of an original state, the time-relation fades and the original state, as present goal, acquires the character of presence, even of futurity, because it is still unrealized. Concepts, as long as they are not yet confined in a system, have sides and the history of the concepts depends very much on which side is emphasized.

Wang Pi reduced the vision of Lao Tzu to a theory of development. The change from t’i to yung occurs in time. Differing from Lao Tzu, he had in mind a cosmic history. This could also be expressed in the following way: first there was nothing, then the manifold things constituting our world appeared, and there was something. Wang Pi defended this slogan of ‘original nothingness’ against those who found that contention shocking and proposed ‘original thingness’.

iv. Speculation on the Qualities of Nature

In Taoism, Nature was conceived of as ‘self-so’, i.e. as independently existing, neither subject to the will of a Cosmic Ruler nor self-willed in itself. Things grow, the seasons arrive in their turns, the heavenly bodies follow their predesignated courses: in Nature there is order (li 理). All beings are fed, each with what he needs. In Nature, there is wisdom. She, mother of all things, seems to feel what is needed (hun 聒) and to respond to these needs (ying 應). Lao Tzu has said that there is a Spirit (shen 神) in the universe who could not be without qualities, but who also could not be supposed to cognize and act like a human being.

China, to my knowledge, is the only country where at that time this problem was strongly felt as a problem and seriously debated. No solution could be found, naturally, but the problem was kept living through the language: han and ying denoted that cognition and reaction which is not human purposive cognition and reaction.

80 He could point at Lao-tzu 40 Yu sheng yì wú 有生於無.

81 Pen-wūn 本無 opposed to pen-yu 本有. The ensuing dispute went on under these catch words. See Appendix I, Third School, and On Śānyāda (PART II, 1.2).


83 In later Buddhism the meaning of these terms changed; the common phrase 聒而使應 simply says that prayer is heard.

84 The passages to which the Buddhists refer whenever they needed proof that the Highest Being was a person, are in Lao-tzu 61 神人不死 and 111 意之為物, 其中有象. In Lao-tzu they have not that significance.
v. The Influence of Buddhism

Roughly speaking, what has been said describes the situation in the third century when Buddhism began to arouse interest in the circles of literati then studying Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. These two works, together with the I-ching, constituted the so-called 'three metaphysical scriptures' (san hsüan 꾀). In the fourth century, those who discussed Buddhism simply continued to deal with this same material believing that the problems of all philosophy must be identical. This did not change until Kumārajīva arrived in China in A.D. 402.

For the Chinese philosophers, including the monks, Buddha was always the Sage, and was called so. Or, more exactly, two figures were amalgamated: Sākyamuni and the Sage of Lao-tzu. In the Mahāyāna scriptures the Buddha is a cosmic figure, and among the philosophers these scriptures aroused much more interest than the story of his earthly life. Who is, they asked, that spirit able to make an appearance in the world and return again to the blissful realm beyond? The Lotus sūtra tells us how the Buddha woke up from his trance and promulgated the Law. The Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa describes his life among men more vividly than the Hinayāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra does. And the Prajñāpāramitās,86 which at that time were only incompletely known, should contain the final truth. For Prajñā is the Sage in the aspect of Seer who should know, and reveal in scripture, the secret of the immortality and all-embracing power of Nature, so eagerly sought by the Taoists.

For the masses the Buddha was a god of a kind they had never worshipped before. Mild and just, demanding moral behaviour and without preference for the rich and powerful, well represented in art and literature, he easily won the people over. They brought their offerings and prayed; they followed rules and expected rewards for their piety in this life and hereafter.

The philosophers or 'seekers of meaning', as they were called, however, wanted to know—not as scholars interested in historical features—but as treasure-seekers dig, or sick people search the healing herb. Therefore among the topics debated we find none of the Buddhist dogmatics such as were discussed in India. Always the Chinese asked themselves questions and, though they found the answers in the sūtras, these were not what an Indian Buddhist could have understood.86 A wall of misunderstanding separated the two religions.

World-interpretations are not transferable but they may stimulate each other. Concepts are misunderstood; seemingly they fit into the other

86 Cf. P. Demiéville (1958), 'Le Councile de Lhassa', p. 39: 'Le système de Dhyāna, dit l'Avell Mubit, ne correspond en rien à ce que prêche la R框che d'Or'.
picture whereas, actually, they are fitted into it. Influence is possible only by way of misconception. Never could the Buddha have passed the Chinese frontier as an Indian conqueror, but as the Chinese Sage who had gone to India to convert barbarians he was received with open arms. To the Chinese, the Buddha spoke Chinese. Only so could he change China. When finally—in the seventh century—the Indian texts were understood philologically, they survived as material for scholarly activities but were lost to the uneducated population.

vi. Seng-chao

In Chao-lun this process of digestion may be studied. All the figures of the Chinese tradition are retained. There is the Sage, there is the Spirit who haunts the centre of the universe, and there are those forces which enable Nature to keep the world going. Prajñā feels and responds like Nature.

The resulting problem is the same. Does Prajñā cognize? Does she act? Even the Middle Path assumes another appearance in Chao-lun. It is neither that of Gotama the Buddha nor that of Nāgārjuna. With Seng-chao the term expresses the identity of the two states of the universe, the unspoiled and the spoiled, the true and the seeming. For Indian Buddhists this would have been perfectly meaningless, because Buddhism does not know of the universe as an integrated whole.

In my translation and in the notes, I do not follow the Chinese commentators in explaining Seng-chao by reference to Indian Buddhist doctrine but try to convey to the reader an exact picture of what he had in his mind. Seng-chao’s language is terse and his propositions extraordinarily intelligent, far beyond what his contemporaries could conceive. His search for a language in which statements could be made about the infinite, his clear comprehension of the antinomy inherent in Existence, his conception of life as cosmic consciousness awakening, all impress us as rather modern and may even stimulate Western thinking once we have become accustomed to their external strangeness.

vii. After Seng-chao

The Chao-lun closes a period. Afterwards, we hear no more of the Sage and his attributes, or about non-World and its relation to World. But we might also say that Chao-lun stands at the beginning of a new period—it had cleared the field. New problems arose with every sūtra newly-translated. Of these, the most important were the Vimalakirti sūtra, the Nirvāṇa sūtra, the Avatamsaka sūtra (Datubhāmika), and later the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā. The translations of Paramārtha and Lalitavatara (Vasubandhu and Asaṅga) were studied but discussed
only in very recent times. The Lāṅkāvatārā sūtra had little influence in China.

Seng-chao is said to have founded the San-lun School. This is certainly wrong. But his conception of the Middle Path, expressed in the formula: ‘World is non-World, non-World is World’ was taken up by Chi-tsong and rather thoughtlessly applied to other subjects. The San-lun School died out soon after the death of its founder. More important is the question of Seng-chao’s influence on Ch’ an Buddhism. As he had no disciples, or they were killed with their teacher, his influence must be attributed not to the man but to the book. This, no doubt, was widely read in Ch’an circles, especially in the Lin-ch’i School, but its impact was probably lesser than that of some sūtras. The followers of the Southern Dhyāna School were mainly interested in their own liberation, while Seng-chao was immersed in ontological problems. These influences need to be studied.

c. Note on ‘Prajña’ (Part III)

i. The Problem

As said before, the treatise ‘On Prajña not cognizant’ is connected with the third-century discussion on ‘whether the Sage (Nature) is conscious of what he is doing or not’. Nature sees things not as a human eye sees them. Chuang Tzu says that ‘human knowledge must wait (upon experience to be acquired) before any action’. Kuo Hsiang comments: ‘(human) knowledge cannot (in advance) say whether (an action) is advisable or not. It has to wait (until all prerequisites are given). But, who lives as Heaven (Nature) lives need not wait. For, (spontaneously) he reacts as each situation demands’. If so, what kind of knowledge has Nature?

Seng-chao’s reply is that Prajña is conscious (cognizes, perceives, knows) and is simultaneously not conscious of what happens on Earth. This must have occurred to him while listening to the lectures which Kumārajīva gave during the translation work on the Mūla-mādhyamika kārikās. Inspite of these comments, Seng-chao never fully understood

87 By Hsiung Shih-li 熊十力, Chou Shu-chia 周叔嘉 and the scholars connected with the San-shih-hui 三世會 in Peking.
88 Chi-tei chi-chiu 即果即成. This is not the Middle Path as conceived by Nāgārjuna. See page 27: Note on Śūnyatā.
89 Yu-hsin yu-hsin 有心無心.
90 Chuang-tzu (6, 3: ful. 20) 夫知，有所待而後富.
91 夫知者未施備可無不可，故必有恃也。恃乃任天而生者即遇物而當也．
92 The Mūla-mādhyamika kārikās, later quoted as Kārikās (and the Chinese translation as MK) consist of 25 chapters filled with argument, each on a different topic. They were composed in the first or, as other scholars believe, in the second century A.D.
what the Middle Path, propounded in the *kārikās*, meant to Nāgarjuna, its author. Nāgarjuna equated saṃsāra with nirvāṇa, that sphere where Buddhist causality (karman) rules with that other one where it has ceased to function. For, actually, there are not two spheres but merely one which is experienced either as a maze of fortuitous changes connected with each other by karmic low, or as perfectly unchangeable. Nāgarjuna did not know of a cosmos which unfolds its contents. All change there can be is that from illusion to true understanding. As long as we are unwilling to resign the illusion of retaining a self in the flux of causally interconnected assemblages of apparently individual entities we will, with all of them, vanish like foam on a stream; rather should we look in the opposite direction, let go all hold on illusive supports, understand ourselves as mere products of our imagination and cease to be infatuated by worldly pleasures. In Indian Mahāyāna there is no Sage whom one could join and no cosmic law (*tao*) with which he could be in harmony. We shall see later that Seng-chao’s famous formula: ‘World is non-World, non-World is World,’ implied a promise very different in content from that concomitant with the Middle Path of Nāgarjuna (*saṃsāra eva nirvāṇam*).

So reference to the various meanings the term prajñā assumed in Indian Buddhism⁹⁴ will not help us to determine the true significance of Chinese *pan-ju* 譬如 (in translating *prajñā*). We do better to turn to the Chinese tradition. To Seng-chao Prajñā is synonymous with the Mind of the Sage. That Mind was discussed in the third century, as said earlier. It was asked whether a Cosmic Actor (the Sage) could act, or a Cosmic Mind could see earthly happenings? Opinions were divided. Seng-chao solved this by equating both alternatives. The main theme of Part III is to prove this equation: Prajñā sees (or cognizes) and simultaneously does not see (or does not cognize as human minds cognize, viz. single things or facts). What does he mean?

The image which Seng-cho had of Lao Tzu, he enriched with a new *motif*.⁹⁵ In the *Lao-tzu* there is no question of a Cosmic Mind which sleeps and wakes up. In the origin the universe was pure, quiet, undisturbed by human passions but it is never said that it was dark first and bright later.⁹⁵ But Prajñā is just that, the light of Cosmic Consciousness *shen hsīn* 聲心 personified. Consciousness may not be awake and then

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⁹⁴ There exist many varying definitions. But, as D. T. Suzuki correctly said, common to all of them is the meaning given in the term *prajñā-pāramitā*, ‘recognition (of the world as understandable, which liberates from common infatuation for worldly happiness’.

⁹⁵ Compare the following two quotations in Part III, 11.4 應而不有，應而不無 ‘(The Cosmos) is full, though not of things, (it is) void, though not nothing’. 應不減照，應不滅顯, ‘the Void is not dark, the Light illuminates no (things)’. The interpretation of Lao Tzu’s ‘living universe’ (*tao*) as ‘living light’ (*shen*) was new.
'not be there' or be 'void', or else it may be awake and then be 'full with the turmoil of life'. This picture made it easier to equate \( t'i \) and \( yung \). For, originally the \( t'i-yung \) pattern involves a 'dynamism'\(^96 \) such as is inherent in every change (as changes always lead from one state to another).\(^97 \) This concept of 'dynamism', Seng-chao was forced to relinquish if his equation of non-World \( (t'i) \) with World \( (yung) \) should hold true.

But Seng-chao had still another analogy by which to substantiate his equation. In the Chinese tradition the universe has not only an origin but also a centre. Contrasted with the centre (\( nei \) 内) is the periphery (\( wai \) 外). This pattern lent itself conveniently to an equation. For, seen from within and seen from without, what is seen is the same.

Thus, whatever words are used, we always remain in the same pattern which is a frame filled with different colours. The expression varies not the meaning. Calling the Mind dark, asleep, speaking of its Within, Seng-chao refers to the Mind in the \( t'i \) position;\(^98 \) calling it illumined, awake, speaking of its Without he refers to the \( yung \) position.\(^99 \) But, though variously described the Mind remains the same. How could what is All be this or that? It is our human mind that makes distinctions.\(^100 \)

At Lu-shan the term \( chi \) 其 instead of \( t'i \) was used by those who tried to join the Cosmic Mind in Samâdhi (meditative trance).\(^101 \) But these meditators understood things differently. You cannot of course get Prajñâ by leaving Samâdhi; only in Samâdhi can you get it. When your Samâdhi is perfect you join the Spirit. With Seng-chao this is a process \textit{in mundo}. Hui-yüan did not think of the Spirit as identical with the world but as the Highest Being acting \textit{in} the world\(^102 \) and during his action showing himself as either dark or bright, like the moon or like \( yin \) and \( yang \).

Seng-chao criticizes this picture in the LETTER. The subject of the Cosmic Act is not any Cosmic Meditator but the universe acts upon

\(^{96}\) Cf. W. Liebenthal, tr. (1947): 'Wang Pi's new interpretation of the \textit{I-ching} and \textit{Lun-yü}', by T'ang Yung-t'ung, \textit{HJAS} 10(2): 143. 'The Original Substance \textit{pen-t'i} 本體 is the "Dynamic Order" of things in which the manifold is contained and in which it originates, but which itself is substanceless and above appearance. \ldots (It) is the undifferentiated, perfect Whole. \ldots All changes are given their laws by Order' \ldots 146. 'It initiates developments in the course of its Great Manifestation (\textit{ta-yung} 大用).'

\(^{97}\) The change implied is not that of a thing which moves from one situation to another situation.

\(^{98}\) 内外有無之際。III 8.

\(^{99}\) 内外有無之際。\textit{(ibid.)}

\(^{100}\) 結因之際於名，結異之異於相。\textit{(ibid.)}

\(^{101}\) Cf. n. 367.

\(^{102}\) Cf. n. 367.
itself. The act of the Tathāgata is the manifestation of Cosmic Life, its self-manifestation or the self-manifestation of the Sage, only possible if he does not play any particular part in it. In this play creator and creation are identical.

A metaphor common with Seng-chao is the mirror. Minds are mirror-like, but—in contrast to bronze mirrors—they do not only reflect things without but reveal things within. They are, therefore, not dependent upon impressions. Life, we might say, is luminiscent, it 'shines'. Shining, Prajñā reflects what is within and thus creates what we call 'world' but what in fact is nothing but her 'inner world'.

On Lu-shan the Sage was conceived as cosmic meditator, but Prajñā's meditation is more than meditation, it is cosmic living. The meditator withdraws from the outside world into silence in order to see the world from within, but Prajñā is within and without simultaneously. Prajñā's very existence is light, life and creation. All dualism is excluded.

What, then, is Prajñā? Is there any experience which could give us an idea of what Seng-chao means, or does he simply let his imagination run wild? In Part I he equates the act of the Tathāgata with the Tao, the law underlying all cosmic changes, which creates the changes, reveals them, knows and acts them. What is a law? It is not a thing. There are recurrent events, such as the movements of the celestial bodies, or those of the seasons, that seem to be guided by laws. Did Seng-chao notice that laws may be discovered anywhere in the seemingly accidental occurrences of daily life? 'Is the Tao far away? The life of ours is Reality. Is the Sage far away? Recognize him as in truth he is and you are the Spirit', he says at the end of Part II. And in Part I he shows an eagerness to search for order in the chronological disorder of events which makes one wonder how far away Seng-chao was from the point where laws cease to be the privilege of the Heavens.

ii. The Myth

In the landscape of 'On Prajñā' (Part III) we see Nature, or the Sage, conscious of all that happens and providing every being with what it needs. He rules destinies and guides them as Order or Law, he guides people to their destinations. Though this order functions like the seasons or like a mirror or echo, naturally automatically, though the Sage reacts without stimulation (by complaints), and though he has no

108 Cf. Part I, n. 163.
109 Cf. Part IV, 17 n. 678 物不異我, 我不異物.
110 Cf. Dennidville (1927), 'Le mirroir spirituel': 'Les concepts d'éclairer, refléter, regarder, voir clairement, comprendre, connaître, tendant à s'absorber et à se confondre dans certaines mots chinois (tehau 視 明 觀). Dans le Nouvihâme chinois, tehau désigne techniquement la fonction de la grasse, prajñā'.
plan upon which he acts—there exists a mysterious bond between Him and all beings in the cosmos, a kind of cosmic causality which makes Him hear their calls. On the whole, Seng-chao’s Sage is not different from the neo-Taoist Sage of his time.

But what about the other figures which replace the Sage? Their functions are quite vague. They may assume all those of the Sage or only a part of them. In II. 3 the Spirit (shen 神) rules the world and cares for the people, while Prajñā knows what happens; in II. 4 Prajñā assumes both kinds of function. This distinction does not seem to matter.

I do not think that this mythology should be taken very seriously. People spoke of the Sage as Western medieval philosophers spoke of God, assigning Him all kinds of attributes and functions. These are not metaphors, but neither do they imply convictions. No Chinese philosopher believed in the Sage as Christians believe in God. Rather did the Chinese play with their cosmical figures, trying to reduce them to more or less abstract conceptions. In Dhyāna Buddhism nothing remains of the Buddha except the problem of how to speak of him at all.

Among Seng-chao’s contemporaries metaphysical pageants and figures, stimulated by Sanskrit terms, seem to have been a fashion. Seng-wei 信衛, whose commentary to the Daśabhūmika sūtra is lost, but whose introduction is extant,108 equates tao and yāna and calls the Cosmic Vehicle (mahāvīna) what was originally the Cosmic Way (ta-tao 大道). On this Vehicle Prajñā rides, flooding the world with the light of life. Seng-chao did not venture as far as this. But, though not a god Prajñā, no doubt, is a person like the Sage or Nature, ‘Mother of all things’. As I am accustomed to speak of religious and other mythologies as ‘interpretations’, (v. above 4A) I propose to refer to these persons as ‘interpretative figures’.

D. NOTE ON ‘ŚūNYATA’ (PART II)

i. T’i-yung 體用 and Chen-wei 臨佛

From the beginning of this treatise it is clear that the mythological landscape of PART III with its figures, the Sage, Prajñā and the Spirit, is still in the background of Seng-chao’s thinking. The Sage ‘passes on unimpeded’, etc. but his attributes or those of Prajñā are no longer discussed. Here the grand theme is the relationship of the two spheres now no longer defined as t’i-yung but as chen-wei, Truth and Illusion.

107 Shen hails from Lao-tzu, but occurs also in Lieh-tzu, Kuan-tzu, etc. Cf. Lao-tzu 39 and PART III, II.4. The translation of Prajñā is shen-hsin 聲心, Mind of the Sage, or, perhaps better Cosmic Mind, Cosmic Life, for Mind is not a quality of the Sage; both phrases are perfectly synonymous.

Nevertheless, from the distinction made between ‘things’ and ‘their counterpart within’ (v. note 180) it is evident that Seng-chao did not fully understand Nāgārjuna.

The formula of the Middle Path as it occurs in the Mādhyamika kārikās, does not refer to cosmic states but to propositions (dṛṣṭिः). These are denied existence as well as non-existence (reductio ad absurdum, prasanga). Again at the end of his treatise Nāgārjuna draws the conclusion that nirvāṇa and saṁsāra are the same.109 Samsāra is the totality of dharma which are born (utpatti-dharma); nirvāṇa is the totality of those which are not born. (This is not quite correct, because when nothing is born, there cannot be a plurality of unborn entities, but in Sanskrit the plural number is used.) It is possible to speak of the same as existent in Illusion and non-existent in Truth. Truth and Illusion (the Two Truths), however, cannot be equated, and this is not done in Indian Mahāyāna. Seng-chao, in doing so, treats the Truths as spheres (t‘ī-yung), as shown in PART III. He distinguishes World (the world) and non-World (personalized as the Sage and other ‘cosmic figures’). In PART II he tries hard to ban from his picture all mythology. There remains the universe and its contents (All and all). The relation between these two entities is not that of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, still less that of Truth and Illusion. As we shall see later, it is antinomic.

As this book is not written for Buddhologists only, something should be said briefly here of Indian Mādhyamika.

ii. The Middle Path of Nāgārjuna

In the Mādhyamika kārikās,110 the equation of Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa is arrived at after twenty-five chapters filled with argument presumed to refute all possible predications. In every proposition a subject (S) is predicated (P). For example in the proposition ‘he goes’ (Kārikā II).

We might expect that an opponent will either assert this proposition or deny it, and then it would be our turn to prove that ‘he actually goes’. But we should consider it unfair to shift the argument to a property which is not disputed, to deny, e.g., that ‘he’ exists, and to follow up with the challenge to prove this point, or else to reproach the opponent of handling ‘irrealities’. Thinking, of course, deals with ‘irrealities’; concepts do not act and move, or suffer, as real things do. Argument

109 MK XXV, 19: ‘There is no difference at all between Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa.’
110 The literature on Mādhyamika is listed by La Vallée Poussin (1933), Mélange 2: 11. His Réflexions sur la Mādhyamika, and Stecherbatsky’s Nirvāṇa are still the best expositions of this philosophy, to which we should add (1927) S. Bohlreyer, Autorenahite Kapitel aus der Pramahmapadda (1941); Rinleitung, and Murti: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (1953). With J. W. de Jong (1949) and J. May (1959), all the kārikās together with the main commentary are now available in Western languages. See also n. 98.
does not shift things from place to place. But that is just what Nāgārjuna demands that it should do and what he considered a valid reason to ‘reduce to absurdity’ (prasāṅga) any proposition whatever, even those which he himself would not dispute because they were orthodox Buddhist. What does he mean? Before answering that question we need define some technical terms which we cannot avoid using.

Karman and Ātman. The Buddha said that the world is suffering. Why? Because nothing lasts. Whatever is born must die. This is the law of karman in its simplest form. What is it that does not last? What is it that changes, that is transferred during transmigration? The soul (ātman), which living things are said to possess, that miniaturized edition of the whole thing? This the Buddha denied. Or perhaps those active parts of which living beings are composed, some of a more material (rūpa) and some of a more mental (citta) nature? Five of them were distinguished, called the skandha.¹¹¹ The last in the row, vijnāna, a shadow-ātman supposed to carry the unresolved karman from incarnation to incarnation, was this ‘the bearer of the burden’? Did it last? This question was answered differently in the different Schools.

Pratītyasamutpāda. Vijnāna, acting in the karmic process, was still rather concrete and not very different from ātman. A more abstract entity was needed. The process itself demands nothing but causes producing effects. These causes (or effects respectively) need no further specification. There is just that ‘interconnected (incessant) rise (and decay) of causes producing effects’ which again become causes producing effects and so on ad infinitum. Is there any lasting substance during this process? Do not the sūtras speak of chains of dharma and of ‘moments’ (kṣaṇa) composing these chains? They, at least, should last during the rise and decay.

Dharma. Dharmas are not things, but types of what goes on in Samsāra. They are common occurrences by which to demonstrate the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanency of everything conditioned. Collected for teaching purposes, they are grouped and numbered in the text-books. Anything not relevant to the goal of liberation, a tree, a house, a king, an historical incident, or any other item of private or public concern, is not considered to be a dharma,¹¹² though it can become a dharma when analyzed and disputed.

¹¹¹ The skandha are matter, perception, mental matter, karmic residues and the shadow which survives and re-incarnates. This last entity is also used as a pars pro toto for the skandha in general. It is a kind of ethereal body duplicating the actual one.

¹¹² Discussion on these topics was forbidden by the Buddha. So, the dharma might also be defined as topics licenced for debate. In the outlines of dharma these are grouped (dharma-saṁśīla). But the same term is also used for individual life-lines (prattīyamāna-saṁśīla). See my article ‘Ding und dharma’. Asiatische Studien, ed. Horst Thomscher, Zürich 1967.
Kṣaṇa. Even before Nāgārjuna those links by which the chains (santāṇa) of birth and death, cause and effect, are formed were called ‘moments’ (kṣaṇa). These ‘moments’, or ‘phases’ as we could also say, as well as the ‘chains’ which are composed of them, can only be dharma not just what ordinary people call ‘thing’ or ‘event’. It does not matter how long some event lasts. The moment of lightning, though short, is not a kṣaṇa because lightning is not a dharma unless it is analyzed. Such an analysis transforms the item in question into a causally, or rather karmically, relevant chain of events, a santāṇa. A santāṇa consists of kṣaṇa. Whenever it is said that a dharma lasts only one ‘moment’ this does not mean that it lasts a shorter or longer stretch of time but that it constitutes just one phase in a karmic process, consisting of several phases. The process of hearing consists of three phases: ear—hearing—sound. Growing old consists of three phases: youth—old age—death. ‘Time consists of three phases: the ‘moment’ when a dharma is not yet there, another ‘moment’ when it is there, and the ‘moment’ when it is gone (future, present, past, see below Note to PART I).

Position. Indian philosophers stood on ‘positions’ (sthāna, drṣṭi) such as God (iśvara) or Cosmic Man (puruṣa). We might call them dogmas but the term ‘position’ has a wider meaning. It is any concept used in argument of which is said that it is or is not.

We are now prepared to continue with our discussion of Nāgārjuna and ask again what he meant when he demanded more from reasoning than it can do: thoughts do not yield life (kriyā). He seems to think that they should.

Nāgārjuna argued as follows: A subject of argument (a ‘position’), in order to acquire new meaning (to change), must last during the process of its predication. If we propose that ‘God creates’, this implies that God exists with and also without the property of a ‘creator’ because by way of predication he acquires the property of creator. Even when we say ‘he goes’, we take the ‘position’ that ‘he’ is an entity which lasts while it moves. We have defined ‘him’ before, but our definition did not contain the specification that he ‘goes’. So we have to decide: is ‘he’ the one who goes or the one who does not yet go, or perchance the one who has gone already? It is obvious that, if we continue querying in this way, the ‘position’ of ‘him’ on which we stood quickly crumbles and finally completely vanishes. For of what else is ‘he’ constituted but of his predications? And what remains of ‘him’ after more and more specifications are added? Where is the propertyless substrate (ātman) of ‘him’ which lasts while ‘he’ changes?

The reader must remember that we are not dealing with the problem itself but with the problem as Nāgārjuna conceived it.
Nāgārjuna contested ‘positions’, and in his eagerness did not stop even before those held by Buddhism. In the Kārikās all the most important creeds of Buddhism are refuted, those on which he, as a Buddhist, certainly stood. Heretical opinions are dealt with only rarely.

When Nāgārjuna refutes himself his intention is not to admit the opinions of outsiders. He stood on kṣaṇikatvam as did all the Buddhists of his time. But he wanted to go one step beyond where others stood and to draw the last consequence of Buddhist analysis, namely, that though thought does not yield life, it could at least yield insight to the fact that life is not subject to analysis, that it is not a ‘position’. It is ‘empty’ of whatever is supposed to last (sat), whether conceived as a person (ātman) or as a substance (dharma); it is śūnya (in-existent). But nevertheless, and for that very reason, it is there (tathā). Dharma are (sat) and are not (asat) because they are posited to be and not to be. What, however, is not posited to be or not to be, what ‘neither is nor is not’ is indestructible (aniruddham), not subject to birth and death (amutpamnam) which means that śūnyatā is nothing but tathatā: inexistence is true existence!

Analysis kills life, it makes corpses which it then handles. This is what we do when we assume a ‘position’. But, being Buddhists, this is not our aim. We want to establish life, to free it from the fetters of obtrusive death; we are seeking liberation. Thus, after we have got to the end of analysis, we turn round. We recognize that, taking up ‘positions’, we create what we want to destroy and that Samsāra is of our own making. It is Samsāra as long as we think of it as Sarīsāra, as long as we want to destroy it. We have to live it. Then it is Nirvāṇa.

In the Kārikās, Nāgārjuna demonstrates the absurdity of reasoning. Argument never deals with what it pretends to deal with, the ‘living’ as it is (as it is in truth). There is no rest in change, nothing but that incessant coming and going of causes which are effects, ceasing to be as soon as they are. But that change itself, if accepted, is real. For change never changes. There is no substance in the changing relations, there is nothing but ‘relativity’ (Stcherbatsky), but this relativity itself, if accepted, is absolute. To prove this, Nāgārjuna imputes reality to the ‘positions’ of his opponents. The dharma ‘sit’ in their places, they fill the ‘space’ of the kṣaṇa so that no other dharma, not even the dharma (P) of the relation in which they are to enter, is able to join them and establish that relation. (S) is a ‘moment’, (P) is a ‘moment’ and the

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114 See below note 198 p. 87. The common translation is ‘void’, Stcherbatsky has ‘relative’. ‘In-existent’ is what neither exists nor does it non-exist. Cf. the Introductory Bhāma of the Kārikā: ‘Nothing disappears nor does anything appear; nothing has an end nor is there anything eternal; nothing is identical (with itself) nor (there anything differentiated); nothing moves, neither hither nor thither.’ Nirvāṇa, p. 98.
copula connecting both, whether positive or negative, is also a ‘moment’.
In this way, obviously no property can be attached to anything, not even
the property of being or non-being. Na san násat. This is the formula of
the Middle Path in India.

To sum up. No thing exists, nor does it non-exist. But what, not being
a thing, does not exist as a thing exists, that in truth ‘exists’ (tat sat),
or, as we might also say, that ‘in-exists’ (tat śūnyam). For in true life
denials and assertions are meaningless. How do we live? Kept in leading­
strings by reason, deceived about our true existence, we are told that we
are this or that, that we are dependent upon causation, bound to the
Karmic Wheel. Must we believe, must we accept a lie as true, and go
on living-dying, dying-living, in endless re-incarnations? One ‘blissful
moment’ and it has gone and the ‘true vision’ has replaced the dream;
life, which is terrible, has lost its sting.

A final remark may be permissible. Nāgārjuna does not distinguish
between mental and bodily acts, which are both phenomena of karmic
life unrolling in thought, speech and action. Error in thought is error in
living. Once this error is removed, thought and life simultaneously change. Oneself and one’s world (bhājana loka), which is not necessarily
that of one’s neighbour, are transformed in the same act which is called
recognition (jñāna) or awakening (bodhi), etc. How is this act to be
described in modern, Western terms? That the world which appears
and disappears is not that of natural science is evident; such truth and
untruth about which instruments tell us is not in question. But we may
think of other un-scientific experience. We too suffer emotionally as
Nāgārjuna did. We love and hate, we hope and despair. To explain these
facts we call forth causes: physical, hereditary, social, psychological,
and others. We change our surroundings. We shift gears where Nāgār­
juna changes minds. He sees things differently. He does not believe
that changing surroundings can remove suffering. But suffering ceases
when one refuses to evaluate it as suffering. With changing values, minds
change and worlds change. One must not take things to be real (least of
all oneself) and they cannot affect one. The West does not dare to project
that experience into universal dimensions or to make a world-inter­
pretation out of it. Nāgārjuna did.116

116 Yogi-pratyakṣa. This ‘vision’ is similar to what in the West is called ‘creative
thought’ in opposition to ‘routine thinking’ though the contents naturally differ.
Previously unknown facts (or rather contexts, laws, solutions of problems) are not
deducible from known premises but appear or are ‘perceived’ (pratyakṣa) though no
thing is perceived. Stecherhatsky in Buddhist Logic (1958): 2, 30 n. 2 says: ‘Mystic
Intuition is the faculty of the Buddhist Saint by which he is capable . . . of contemplat­
ing (perceiving) directly, in a vivid image, that condition of the Universe which has
been established by . . . the philosophers’. (I should rather say, ‘that condition which
afterwards will be established’. . . . Vision precedes theory.)

whether Nāgārjuna’s experience is not identical with what he calls ‘transcendence’.
iii. The Middle Path of Seng-chao

There are scholars in the East, and also in the West, who believe that the Middle Path of Seng-chao is essentially identical with that of the great Indian Buddhist. Is it? In PART III Seng-chao begins with contradictory statements: the Mind of the Sage is empty and also full, Prajñā knows and does not know, etc. In PART II we meet the double exclusions characteristic of Nāgārjuna’s prasaṅgas: Existence exists and does not exist, etc., as in the sadasat-parikṣā. But what does Seng-chao achieve with them? When Existence (existent in Illusion) is said to be not in-Existence (existent in Truth), what is excluded? Where is the ‘middle’ term which ‘neither is nor is not’, where is the dharma which in the Kārikās is proved to be a product of our imagination (māyā), a mirage, the horn of a hare? There is none, but there are two terms mutually exclusive which, nevertheless, both co-exist. Obviously, this kind of contradiction could be practised with every subject if the predicate is used in two different meanings: in-existence is (true) existence.

Existence (Illusion) is not in-Existence (Truth);
In-Existence (Truth) is not Existence (Illusion) (II.3).

With this formula Seng-chao believed that he had found the final solution of the problem which occupied the philosophically-minded Buddho-Taoists of his time: the relation between the two Truths (erh-ti 二諦). To a large extent he had stripped the Truths (World and non-World) of their mythological accessories, though non-World was still described as ‘self-sufficient’ and World as ‘dependent upon causality’. Otherwise, the pair seems quite abstract and, if one may believe the author, a formula had been found in which both concepts were defined only through their mutual exclusion. The formula does not describe World or non-World but a universal structure in which either member exists as the reverse of the same unit.

Nāgārjuna’s Middle Path is a pattern of argument by means of which all possible propositions are refuted in order to demonstrate transcendence such as Nāgārjuna understood it, i.e. life free from birth-death (anutpatti). Seng-chao’s Middle Path, equating Sāraśāra and Nirvāṇa, exactly as the Middle Path of Nāgārjuna does, achieves freedom from suffering (in mundo) and lifts the believer into that blessed realm (coelum)
where the Sage is, which Latin words may convey my meaning. Seng­
chao sees the Sage (Buddha) in a vision, he ‘touches’ him in everything
he encounters, as he says at the end of PART I.

Nevertheless, Seng-chao, like Nagarjuna, has made a scientific
discovery of importance even though it is not the one of the Indian
teacher. Nagarjuna discovered the impossibility of language, and
symbols in general, to describe life (kriyā). Seng-chao discovered the
same fact but only spoke of the case in which language pretends to de­
scribe the true state of all things, the universe (which is not a thing) by
means of words denoting things. In this case words must fail, and since
we must use words because nothing but words are available to us in
communicating our thought, those words we use must be simultaneously
negated to avoid the error that the ‘infinite’ can be a ‘thing’.

One wonders whether the problem which preoccupied Seng-chao is
not what contemporary philosophers call ‘existence’ (Dasein). The
language difficulty is, apparently, present in both cases. In my opinion,
the conceptions of Seng-chao and of Heidegger are too far apart to be
compared. The term ‘antinomy’, however, as used by Kant117 seems to
come very near to that of ‘true language’ (chen yen 聡言) in the sense of
Seng-chao. At least Kant deals with the same problem: Is the cosmic
whole a thing? Impossible, because it is infinite. Is it no thing? Impos­
sible, because it embraces things. This is not to translate Kant literally
but to sketch what I feel is common to both philosophies. Kant deals
with time and space in the first antinomy, with the simple and the
composite in the second, and with spontaneity and causality in the third.
All these sides of the problem are also alluded to by Seng-chao.

The ambivalence of the word ‘to be’ which lies at the bottom of
antinomy is, I believe, now generally recognized. At the time of Seng­
chao the discovery of the antinomical structure of the universe was an
important event.

Nāgārjuna’s doctrine has been called ‘monism’ by Stcherbatsky.
‘Monism’ means that the existence of things is taken for granted without
caring for the dualism of body and soul, cogitatum and extensum (Descartes).
Nāgārjuna is not a ‘monist’ because he knows nothing of Descartes’ problem. His enemy is ‘position’. Seng-chao is not a ‘monist’
either. Being Chinese and a Taoist, he had in mind a universe such as
Lao Tzu conceived. ‘The ten thousand things’ describes the world of
which we are a part. ‘The whole is the ‘cosmic phenomenon’ (ta-hsiang
大象) in opposition to the manifold individual phenomena which consti­

117 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Elementarllehrte II. s. a. s. a. Anthethik d.r.V., Bote
Antinomien: ‘Antinomy is a fact, not an interpretation of existence, not different in itself
from any other scientific fact, and may be discovered anywhere’ (W. L.’s translation).
tute 'daily life' (wan-shih 萬事). Though Seng-chao uses the terms 'Existence' and 'in-Existence' for World and non-World, 'in-Existence' does not mean what Nāgārjuna calls sānyatā which is tathatā, a term which is contrasted to World (samsāra).

The difference in meaning of the word 'existence' as used by the Indian and as used by the Chinese thinker leads to a strange confusion in PART II. Seng-chao, as we have found, uses the term chen 真 (paramārtha) in two senses, as 'permanent' (which could be sat) and as 'true' (paramārtha-sat). Is not the universe both permanent and true? But by this equation the 'positivistic heresy' (sad-dṛṣṭi) and the 'negativistic heresy' (asad-dṛṣṭi) get mixed up with truth and untruth (paramārtha-and samvṛti-satya). When both are refuted (correctly with regard to the heresies) the two Truths are also denied (which is meaningless in the Indian understanding).

One problem never touched in Chao-lun, which is important in Indian Buddhism and still more so in Western philosophy, is what the world is made of. Is the world-stuff mental? Illusion seems to be mental. Seng-chao too must have shared this view but must have dropped it. In none of the Treatises of Seng-chao is there any hint that he considered the phenomena of daily life as merely mental.

E. NOTE ON 'TIME' (PART I)

i. Digression on Time

As for the other chapters, the reader needs to know some of the terms which have a different semantic value in Western languages though they refer to the same facts.

What does Seng-chao mean when he says that 'things move into the past'? In the West one proceeds towards a future (considered as hopeful) from the past. One is carried along in a milieu filled with historical events, spread out before the spectator, which do not move in relation to our motion.

118 Cf. VS Commentary (372c, 17) 夫有由心生, 心由有起, 是非之域, 妄想所存, 故為無殊論, 紛然交錯者也, 若能空盡其懷, 窮心冥境, 妄生盡中, 有無一覷者, 雖復不滿萬物, 未始為有; 霧霧無照, 未始為無.

'Whatever (phenomena) there are originate in mind; whatever mental (images) there are originate in phenomena. The sphere, where assertions and denials are made, harbours vain imagery only. One party says that it exists, the other that it does not, and hot disputes arise. But he who can free his heart of emotions and in the quiet (water of) his mind reflect the true state, he who is able to experience the bliss of staying in the centre (of the moving universe) and recognize the (essential) identity of existence and non-existence, though he be fully aware of all that may happen will never regard it as existent and, though no things are reflected in the dark mirror, will never regard it as non-existent.'
In India 'time' refers to the lifetime of an individual who grows and decays. Future time refers to the period of the unborn, present time to youth or the prime of life and past time to old age and the period after death (adheśānāh). The spectator sees the individual moving, proceeding towards a personal past (considered as gloomy). Thus, in this terminology the relative motion of the time concerned is reversed.

In Buddhism the picture is different again because dharma last only one moment. They flare up, become able to affect other dharma (produce new life) and vanish. The 'chain of the dharma' which ignite each other ('chain of causation') constitutes what is perceived in Illusion as a coherent line, the life-line of an individual, while in fact nothing permanent, no substance, is handed down. Our life, consisting of single, incoherent flashes, is comparable to the fiery circle produced by a whirling torch (alāta-cakra).

Buddhism does not admit that an individual lasts during his life. If permanence comes in question at all, it is that of the single kṣaṇa. An kṣaṇa cannot change, it could be maintained with some sense that they last. 'The born cannot be born, the dead cannot die' (na sad utpad-yati nāsad vinasyati).

The problem of the dead and unborn kṣaṇa, that is, of whether they exist in the past and the future (problem of traikālyam) was answered differently in the different Schools. The Sarvāstivādins believed that they exist, but other schools did not.

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119 Cf. Patanjali, Yoga sūtra III. 14: 134.5 (ed. Buds) and Saktiśraya: 4.5 f. Cf. VS Commentary: 347 n. 14. 從未來到現在，從現在到過去，為過去之世。The life-line of an individual is a context (dimension, or category) in which youth, old age, death occur. It is connected with other life-lines which together form what I call a milieu. There are at least two other types of milieus, namely History and Karman. How these milieus are interrelated need not detain us here. 'Time' in Chao-shih is, of course, not that of Western physics but what Bergson calls la durée, the time of time-periods.
ii. The Starting-point of Seng-chao's Argument

Seng-chao's grand problem was, as we have seen, how to equate the cosmic and the individual, non-World and World which both fill the same space and the same time-space, thus far equal but still widely different. Of this equation he was sure; it was truth revealed (paramārtha) to him, immediately evident (end of Part I) but difficult to express in normal language. A special ‘true’ language was needed where it referred to the ‘true’ state (Part II, 1.3), antinomic because the same thing had to be said twice, asserted and denied simultaneously.

This dialectical problem tormented Seng-chao. If the two aspects were defined as t'i and yung (phases of cosmic development) they remained distinct; and if they were defined as yu and wu (Existence and in-Existence) they became the reversible sides of a perfectly featureless whole, not different from ‘this’ and ‘that’. But in the world things are not featureless. They assume individual positions and exchange them, in short, they change. If change could be asserted in one aspect and denied in the other, then a fundamental characteristic of actual life was fitted into the scheme of the Middle Path, and this rather empty pattern (as it was understood by Kung-sun Lung) gained weight. Did not the Sūtra say: 'Without moving, in Samādhi, the Buddha turns the wheel of the Dharma'?120

Seng-chao searched for substantiation of this statement and he discovered a fact. Things move in relation to each other, but rest (maintain their position) in the milieu with which they move. This seems to have struck him as a marvel, a vestige of that ‘Reality’, life-everlasting in union with nature, which he had been searching. Embedded in the contradictions of the Kārikās he saw revealed the same secret which he had propagated in the other treatises but nearer at hand, almost tangible like an experiential fact. He could prove that the Middle Path worked now and here.

iii. Resting time

Seng-chao takes the example of ageing youth to demonstrate the immutability of time: ‘Youth passes away’, all men grow old and die. This proves the flux of time. In denying this fact, he does not mean to challenge what is obvious. So much is clear from the very beginning. What then does he mean? Figure II is the sketch of a system where the horizontal and the vertical motions are independent of each other. The person who moves along his life-line does not die together with the dharma of his death, let alone together with the dharma of his youth.

120 The 'Wheel of the Law' means that the Buddha preached the Law (Dharma). But Seng-chao obviously understands that the dharma (the ten thousand things) are at rest though they move.
if he had not gone beyond the limits of human existence. What he saw must have been what Indian meditators also experienced when they entered the meditative state of samādhi. In his commentary on the *Vimalakīrti sūtra* he describes that experience.¹²³

‘The lower Vehicles enter a state of meditation called *nirodhasāmāpatti*.¹²⁴ In this (trance) they resemble dry wood, being unable to move. The Mahāyāna Saint enters *bhūtalakṣaṇa samādhi (?)*. The flicker of the mind has completely ceased and (the Saint) fills the universe bodily. His reactions are in harmony with the moving forces of nature answering the calls of innumerable Beings. Proceeding and receding in accordance with the circumstances he retains his Majestic Bearing’.¹²⁵

In Buddhist India two kinds of meditation were practised, *anusmṛti*, recollection of doctrinal materials, and *samādhi*, supposed to be free from mental residues. Samādhi was used for collecting ‘power’ not for what to-day might be called ‘day-dreaming’. Seng-chao’s samādhi might better be rated as an exalted state of mind in which the Saint felt himself in complete accord with nature. Cosmic life was the main problem of Chinese reasoning, union with cosmic life their religious goal. The state in which the Saint or poet felt himself in union with nature was the main theme of Chinese landscape painting, and, most probably, this was what Seng-chao experienced in his moments of samādhi.

Unfortunately, we possess no description of this state by Seng-chao himself. But one of his later commentators tells a lively story of his ‘sudden awakening’. Though writing a thousand years later Te-ch’ing (p. 14) may help us to understand what was meant by samādhi in China:¹²⁶

In my youth, after reading the four sentences (in PART I), the raging storm (at world’s end) which uproots mountains, actually is calm; the rushing streams do not flow; the hot air rising from the surface of a lake in springtime is motionless; sun and moon, revolving in their orbits, do not turn round, for many years I remained in doubt. Then I passed a winter at P’u-fan (Shansi) with my Master Miao-feng.¹²⁷ We prepared a new edition (of *Chao-lun*) and I was reading the proofs. As I came to the above sentences their meaning came to me in a flash. My joy surpassed all bounds. I jumped up and prostrated myself before the image of the Buddha,

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¹²³ VN Commentary 3, 2: 344c 14 f.
¹²⁴ Mhv. 68.8; *Siddhi* 204–214: ‘Final extinction’.
¹²⁵ *tryānatilabha*, the monk’s comportment in daily life: serenity in walking, standing, sitting, lying.
¹²⁶ *TCII* 804b.
¹²⁷ Miao-feng Pu-feng 普澄, famous dhyāna-teacher of Wu-t’ei shan.
but,—oh wonder!—my body remained motionless. I lifted the curtain and went out to look round. A gust shook the trees in the courtyard and falling leaves whirled in the air. But in my vision not a single leaf moved, and I knew that 'the raging storm uprooting mountains' is eternally calm. I went to relieve myself but in my vision the water did not come. 'How true', I said, 'the rushing streams do not flow'. I thought once more of the Lotus sūtra. While formerly I had been uncertain about the meaning of the sentence 'the characteristics of the world are always existent', these doubts now melted like ice in the spring. Then I was aware that Chao-lun has an esoteric meaning. He who dares to criticize it relying upon his experience, unless he has seen the truth, cannot avoid becoming bewildered. My critical friends, some day the time will come when you too will believe.

Te-ch'ing, the writer of this story was a Ch'an Buddhist. He appreciated the paradoxes in the treatises of Seng-chao as kindred to the problems the Ch'an Masters asked their disciples to solve. Indeed, allusions to Seng-chao are common in Ch'an literature. His influence on this latest form of Buddhism is undeniable.

H. NOTE ON THE CORRESPONDENCE

In the Answering Letter the word Prajñā does no more occur. The Sage is called Highest Being (chih-jen 至人) or Cosmic Person (wo 我) who is one with the many single things. In the old Chinese language wo grammatically stands in both, the first and the third persons. Thus I translate 'He', capitalizing the pronoun. He transcends all thingness and cannot therefore either be conceived or defined. The correspondent is warned not to try.

'Because his way leads beyond the nameable, he is called in-existent; because he moves with the world, he is called existent. He is called 'existent', or rather 'in truth existent'. But, even so, a definition is enforced upon him (as somebody who exists). (As definition) how could it fit him (the indefinable one)?' (p. 96).

This correspondence is also interesting in other respects. It is of a kind extremely rare in the Chinese and Western literatures, where one correspondent sincerely wants to know what the other has in his mind and unhesitatingly pours out what is in his. Though a basic difference is revealed which cannot be overcome because both have learnt to interpret the world on other analogies, the sincerity with which they confess to that fact and nevertheless remain friends is note-worthy. It shows the high cultural level on which the literate Chinese society at that time stood.
What actually the members of the community on Lu-shan thought we do not know; the thoughts of Chinese thinkers are not yet studied presently; data, appreciated as facts, still absorb most of the interest of sinologists.

What was that cosmic meditation which was imitated by the believers of the Lu-shan community? Was it derived from Taoist forms? Or was it peculiar to Hui-yüan? Justice wielded by superhuman powers was known in China since Chou times or earlier. One wonders where Indian influence comes in. It certainly is visible in the worship of gods (Buddhas and Bodhisattvas) of a formerly unknown kind, kind-hearted and strict on morality at once, divine social leaders to whom one would willingly submit. Did Buddhist influence exhaust itself in this leadership? Was Hu Shih right to propose that the Chinese accepted Buddhist tradition only in order to discard it piece-meal? They discarded the undigestable. But, could the philosophers have gone all the way from Tao to Him to the unnameable, transcendent One, who is experienced only in the silence of one's own mind (tsu-hsin fo 自心佛) without the influence of Nāgārjuna? Certainly not. If so, how did this influence work? As chemical—biological growth is not possible without the stimulation by an enzyme, so it seems that cultures die a lingering death unless they are rejuvenated by influence from abroad, an influence which is quite specific though wholly unexpected and works without transmitting anything materially.

The history of the Chinese Buddhist philosophy is a convenient instance of this general law.
TRANSLATION

I. ON TIME  物不遷論 Wu pu-ch’ien lun

II. ON ŚŪNYĀTA  (物)不真空論 (Wu) pu chen-k’ung lun

III. ON PRAJÑĀ NOT COGNIZANT  極若無知論 Pan-jo wu-chih lun

THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH LIU I-MIN  劉遺民書問肇公答 Liu I-min shu-wen Chao-kung ta

IV. NIRVĀṆA IS UNNAMEABLE  混槃無名論 Nieh-p’an wu-ming lun
PART I: ON TIME

WU PU-CH’IEN LUN 物不遷論

I. 1

That birth and death alternate, that winter and summer succeed each other, that all things glide along and move is a generally accepted proposition. But to me this is not so.

I. 2

The Fang-kuang says: ‘There is no dharma that goes and comes; there is none that alters its position (in the temporal order).’ On investigating this quotation we find that ‘non-moving’ here does not mean that motion must cease in order to produce rest but that there is rest with motion going on.

There is rest with motion going on; therefore, though (things) move they are forever at rest.

Motion need not cease in order to produce rest; therefore, though (things) are at rest they do not cease moving.

128 Lit. ‘things cannot alter (their positions in the temporal order).’

Life is followed by death, summer by winter. This cannot be changed. There is an order in nature excluding wilful positional alterations. Therefore, in Buddhism, the dharma are arranged in short sequences such as birth-youth-age-death or cause-fruit, called santāna. The totality of santāna forms the world, samsāra. What happens in the world?—The answer is a question: What happens to a wheel which moves up and down, up and down? Nothing. But the single individual bound to the wheel experiences that up and down as rise and fall; he hopes for or fears changes unknowing that whatever he may do, nothing can be changed. For him there is no exit as long as he clings to his hopes, or else, as long as he agrees to be an individual ātman.

If so, if in māyā all is created by Illusion, if in Reality nothing happens, we may as well say that really nothing moves, which means that no dharma is able to move at will among the periods of time, to die to-day and to be there to-morrow, to act and then avoid the karmic consequences.

In Western languages, the word ‘time’ has many different meanings. Here it refers to that time which is the milieu of our experience, la petite durée; cf. Jeanne Hersch, ‘Temps, tragique et liberté’ (1961: 120). This ‘time’ has three periods, but in the first part of his exposition Seng-chao deals only with two of them, viz. the past and the present. Not until he changes from the temporal into the karmic milieu the future assumes importance. He also varies the similes on the analogy of which he argues: at first, it is life and death (the dead cannot return) which proves that the order of time is unchangeable, later it is deed and retribution which follow each other in an irreversible pattern (you cannot unload yourself of what you did to-day and pass on to to-morrow). Thereby, in the last consequence he proves that the totality of santāna (samsāra) in Reality is motionless (nirvāṇa). This is the grand result of this PART.

129 所有之法 not 有法 (saddharma) (117).

130 PSM: 350 19.

131 轉動以求靜, 必求靜於轉動.
TRANSLATION OF

It follows that motion and rest are not two separate states though those who are mistaken (about the nature of things) believe that they are. Hence the true language (of the sūtras) is discredited by conflicting interpretations and its sense is misrepresented by those who insist upon the separation (of these states). It is, therefore, no easy matter to speak about the coincidence of rest and motion.

For when one uses the true language, he gives offence to the public, but when he complies with the public he distorts the true meaning. Distorting the true meaning he misses the nature (of things) and has no chance of finding it (later), while giving offence to the public he hears his words called 'tasteless and without flavour'. Thus it happens that the average man is unable to decide whether he should accept or reject (the fact of coincidence) while the inferior person claps his hands (in glee) and pays no attention. Being near and yet unrecognized such is the nature of things.

I, however, cannot let it alone. I must concentrate upon the relation between motion and rest. Realizing that what I say is not final, I shall try to discuss it.

II. 1

'The Tao-hsing says: 'In reality, there is no place from which the Dharmas come and there is none to which they go'. The Chung-kuan says: 'Observing a place (and noticing that it is empty), one knows that somebody has gone. But (the same) who has gone does not arrive at (the other) place'. Both these quotations say that rest is coincident

133 Antinomic language which alone is suitable whenever one deals with transcendence. See n. 224.
135 Lao-tzu 35.
137 Lao-tzu 41.
139 Though in general it is not advisable to demonstrate a Buddhist theory with the help of a modern simile, it might be permissible to make an exception in order to save the reader time, and with the reservation that I am not describing here the thinking of Seng-chiao. If we count numbers, we begin and end somewhere, i.e., we use time going from one number to the following one. But in doing so we have not shifted any number from its position in the order of numbers. Now, we ourselves are also numbers in a world in which each move is predestined, in a world where causality rules as in the world of karma, and while we pass through, nothing, essentially, is changed.
138 PSK: 475a 19; PSK: 473c (Ts)?
139 MK 印 is Sanskrit parleS.
140 I could not find this sentence in MK but the idea seems to refer to Kāraṇās 11.22: Vasamdu na gatir pārvaśi hādhi hinheil dhi vacchati? 'Because (na gatr) is there before (the your goect) who goes and where?' (Ts: Kārīka I, Taishō XXX: 3v). Motion, according to Nāgārjuna, author of MK, presupposes three moments: that of arrival, that of motion proper, and that of departure. Now, because a dhāraṇī lasts only one moment, the mover who moved was not there (via. there as mover) before he started, and the one who was there is, therefore, not the same as the one who moved and arrived. Thus, actually, during that 'motion' nobody moves.
with motion and prove (our proposition) that things do not alter their positions (in the temporal order).\textsuperscript{139}

\section*{II. 2}

(This people cannot understand.)

From the fact that what once has been cannot join what is now, they infer that things move. So they say: they move and are not at rest. From the same fact, namely, that what is past\textsuperscript{140} cannot join what is present, I infer that they are at rest. So I say: they are at rest and do not move.

(People say:) They move and are not at rest because they cannot come (back to the present).

(I say:) They are at rest and do not move because they cannot leave (the past).

The fact, then, that we are concerned with is the same, but interpretations differ. What the self-willed calls a barrier, the man who is in harmony (with the nature of things) calls a gate. What can check one who has found the right way?

\section*{II. 3}

How sad that the notions of people are always erroneous, that in the very presence of the truth they do not awake to it! They know that what (has gone to) the past cannot come (back to the present) and infer that what is now can pass (over to the past). (I answer:) If what is in the past cannot come (back to the present leaving its position unoccupied), where should what is now go to (supposed that it could pass over to the past)?\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{Demonstration}

9 Looking for what has been ‘once’ in the time where once it has been, one notices that it has never failed to be ‘once’. Looking for what has been once in the time which is now, he notices that it has never been

\textsuperscript{139} This explains the title of this treatise.

\textsuperscript{140} I render \textit{past} first by ‘what was once’, as we normally say, but later by ‘what is past’ as I could not well say ‘what is once’ which makes no sense in English. ‘A man who has lived is a having-lived man.’ As such he cannot join those living but is at rest with those past.

\textsuperscript{141} Each dharma fills its moment (\textit{usana}) completely. There is no space left for a second dharma. In the following quotation marks are used where ‘once’ refers to a standing position of something in the sequence of the times. \textit{In} in the following text is explained by \textit{YK} as 昨日, yesterday, which is, of course, correct. Still \textit{It} has not exactly the same value as \textit{In}. Like English ‘once’ it refers to what one looks at, whether that is past or future. \textit{Age in future} for the youth who wants to be old, \textit{past} for the dying who looks back. But in the time sequence, youth, age and death have their standing positions independent of the direction in which the observer looks.
TRANSLATION OF

'now'. That it has never been 'now' proves that it cannot come (up to and mix with 'things present'). That it has always been 'once' makes it certain that it cannot leave ('things past').

The same reasoning, applied to what is now, would prove that what is now cannot leave 'now', and so on.

It follows that whatever is past is 'past' by its very nature. For, it could not have started from 'present' and passed over to 'past'. (It proves further that) what is present is 'present' by its very nature and could not have come over from 'past' to 'present'.

Therefore Chung-ni\textsuperscript{145} says: 'Yen-hui, seeing you (I feel that) you are a new (person who has not been here before), but a moment later you are (already) no more (the same person I have seen')'. Thereby it becomes clear that no intercourse is possible between things belonging to different time-periods.\textsuperscript{143}

Thus, if this intercourse is absolutely impossible, nothing at all can change. That is to say, the raging storm (at the end of a world) which uproots mountains\textsuperscript{144} in fact is calm; the two streams of China rush along and yet do not flow; the hot air which can be seen in spring time dancing on the surface of a lake\textsuperscript{145} is not moving; sun and moon, revolving in their orbits, do not turn round. There is no need to wonder at this after (what I have said above).\textsuperscript{146}

II. 4

(Objection:) There is a saying of the Sage:\textsuperscript{147} 'The life of men passes away, quicker than streams flow'. Therefore by realizing the impermanence (of things) the Śrāvaka attains Enlightenment; by awakening to the fact that life is conditional the Pratyekabuddha is induced to leave (the world) and to join the Real. If no changes are produced by these efforts, why strive for change and climb the steps to Enlightenment?

(Answer:) Let us look again at the saying of the Sage. Hidden is its meaning, difficult to grasp. (Things) seem to move but he says they are...

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\textsuperscript{144} Cf. Chuang-tzu (21 ch. 7 fol. 32a): 吾終身與女交，而失之可不哀耶？

\textsuperscript{145} Cf. Kuo Hsiang, ibid. 6 ch. 3 p. 9a 今交一臂而失之皆在冥中去矣，故向者之我非復今我乎。Did Kuo Hsiang know of Buddhist nairātmyam? I interpret this passage in the way I believe Seng-chao understood it, but perhaps he misunderstood it.

\textsuperscript{146} 佛不相往來 (往還).

\textsuperscript{147} The Sanskrit name for the storm according to TCH is vairambhaka.

\textsuperscript{148} 'The wild horse', of Chuang-tzu 1 ch. 1 fol. 2b.

\textsuperscript{149} Chi-tsang in his commentary on the MK (Taihō 1824 XLII, 9: 54a 20 f.) quotes this passage and, to illustrate the idea, uses the simile of a dream. He fails to catch the gist of it.

\textsuperscript{150} Seng-chao quotes Confucius usually as Chung-ni 周跟 not as The Sage. YK therefore thinks that the Niruddha sūtra is quoted. But this sūtra was unknown to Seng-chao who probably acknowledged Confucius as the Sage of China like everybody did at that time. Cf. Y 9:16 118 f.
at rest, they seem to leave (their position in time) but he says they remain there. A Sage-like intelligence is needed to understand what is not warranted by the simple facts.

Therefore, when (the Sūtras) say that (things) pass they say so with a mental reservation. For they wish to contradict people's belief in permanence. When they say that things last, they say so with a mental reservation, in order to express disapproval of what people understand by 'passing'. Neither do they want to say that things (bound as they are to their respective position in the sequence of time periods) may advance beyond that position nor that they may stay behind.148

Therefore the Ch'eng-chü149 says: 'The Bodhisattva taking his stand among those who believe in the permanence (of dharma) preaches the doctrine of impermanence'. The Mahāyāna śāstra150 says: 'Dharma do not move, there is no place to which they go or from which they come'. (The disparity between these quotations is for the benefit of an ordinary audience, whose ability to understand must be taken into consideration.) They purport the same idea. Their wording may be contradictory but not their aim. It follows that with the sages: 'Permanence' has not the meaning of staying behind (while the Wheel of Time, or Karma, moves on). 'Impermanence' has not the meaning of outpacing (the Wheel).

Therefore, we might as well say that things, though passing (along with the Wheel), preserve their (temporal or karmic) identity as (say that things), though preserving their (temporal or karmic) identity, pass along (with the Wheel). They pass along but cannot jump positions; they retain their (temporal or karmic) identity but do not preserve their (physical) identity.151

148 豈日去而可達，住而可留也；cf. n. 128. Certain terms are used in a technical sense by Seng-chao who distinguishes between motion (rest) as it is conceived by common people talking about movements in nature, and motion as property of temporal, karmic, or other sequences. We are told that motion 動 is actually rest 靜 because in these sequences nothing can change its position. Formerly 遷 (去來，往去，往遠，化) were used for change in the common sense, now 遷 'be removed to another position in the sequences' is used instead, and 靜 'staying behind in the internal movement of a sequence' is used instead of 住. An event of the present (birth) cannot advance beyond its position in the santōna birth-age-death and join death bypassing age; an event of the past (death) cannot stay behind in the same santōna and join birth. One cannot simultaneously die and be born. So we have two clearly distinguished sets of terms namely:

(i) 遷 (遷) and 住 (住) for motion (forward and backward) or rest respectively, of an observer outside, along the karmic sequence:

birth ← age ← death ← birth . . .

(ii) 動 and 靜 for motion and rest proper to the sequence itself.

birth → age → death → birth . . .

149 Ch'eng-chü kuang-ming ting i ching 成鏡光明定意經, Taishō 630 XV: 451c 25.

150 MS 448b 12.

151 By Atman (self) Seng-chao and everybody at that period understood a physical identity, somewhat as a soul is understood to preserve part of its physical identity. It is difficult to say to which millen Seng-chao refers here and in the following 'abandon to-day and pass on to to-morrow'. Abandon what? It cannot simply be the time period
What Chuang Sheng\textsuperscript{158} called (the impossibility of) 'hiding a mountain in a swamp', and what K'ung Tzu\textsuperscript{158} spoke about as he stood by a river, refers to the lack of permanence in the general flux which both these men's words deplore. They do not say that one can be rid of to-day and pass on (to to-morrow).\textsuperscript{154} It is evident that the thoughts of the Sages cannot be compared with what is thought by human beings.

People who say that the body as possessed by an individual in youth and in age is the same and that (human) substance lasts through a life of a hundred years, only know that years pass, but are not conscious of the fact that the body does likewise. This is explained in a story.\textsuperscript{155} 'A Brahmacarīn\textsuperscript{156} left his family. White-haired, he came home. Neighbours recognizing him said: 'Is the man who once left us still living?' The Brahmacarīn answered: 'I look like him but am not the same man'. The neighbours were startled and not convinced by his words. That is what Chuang Tzu\textsuperscript{157} meant by saying: 'A strong man takes the mountain on his back and goes away. Stupid men do not comprehend'. Doesn't this apply to our problem?

Considering the sort of mental barrier, different in each case (which must be broken down) the Tathāgata preaches in order to remove existing doubts. Aware of the fact that neither positive nor negative assertions can be true, he yet intentionally makes one-sided statements. Paradoxical, though unambiguous, such is the language of the Sages alone.

Therefore, when he has in mind the final truth (paramārtha satya), he says that (things) do not move; when he teaches conventional truth (lauhika satya), he says that everything flows. Though there are a thousand different ways of expressing (the truth), when understood they all convey the same meaning.

but rather the significance with which time (la petite durée) is somehow haunted. So I dared to explain 'karmic' identity: while our life-lines (santāna) roll off we remain karmically, if not physically, identical. Seng-chao seems to equate 'time' with Saṁsāra (the maze of karmically interconnected life-lines). Now, in liberation Saṁsāra is recognized as Nirvāṇa, the state in which all sorrows have vanished. Thus, if we pass with instead of in Saṁsāra (in the Taoist phrasing 'comply with nature') we are no more subject to birth and death. I should wish my reader to understand that Seng-chao is not blurring but that he has seen a very real problem.

\textsuperscript{158} Chuang Tzu in Chuang-tzu 6, ch. 3 fol. 8b: 夫藏舟於壑，藏山於澤，謂之固矣，然後舟有不利於負之而走，澤者不知也。'A boat hidden in a creek, a mountain hidden in a lake, may be considered to be safe. But in the middle of the night a strong man takes them on his back and goes away. Stupid men do not comprehend.' The strong man is explained as the flux of daily renovation (Kuo Hsiang).

\textsuperscript{159} Confucius, cf. L Y i.e.

\textsuperscript{154} 排今而可称'he rid of today' i.e. of one's karma he has acquired to-day.

\textsuperscript{155} I have not succeeded in tracking down this story.

\textsuperscript{156} A man who practises (ascetic) purity. Thukamoto has brahman (?)

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. n. 118.
People who cling to the letter, when they hear that (things) cannot exchange their positions in time agree that (things), once gone, cannot come (back) to the present, but, when they hear that (things) flow, maintain that what is now must go to the past.\textsuperscript{158} Let us, then, speak of things ancient and modern instead of things past and present,—will they still maintain that (things ancient) could exchange (their position with things modern)?

Therefore the sūtras speak of permanence\textsuperscript{159} with a mental reservation. They mean that (things), whether ancient or modern, are always either ancient or modern, because they cannot move (to and fro between the time periods).

They speak of impermanence with a mental reservation. (For they know that) ancient times cannot be reached from modern times because nothing returns (from ancient times).\textsuperscript{160}

(Bygone days) cannot return (to our days). Therefore no intercourse is possible between ancient and modern (events).

Nothing can move (from its position in time). Therefore each individual is stationed permanently in the historical period (to which he belongs).\textsuperscript{161}

The varying passages of all the Scriptures, the contrasting sayings of the Schools—if you penetrate to the point where they agree—their divergence cannot confuse you.

II. 5

Therefore, what people call permanence I call impermanence and vice versa. But then impermanence and permanence, though seemingly different, are ultimately the same. That is why it is said in a Classic:\textsuperscript{162}

'True words seem contradictory. Who dares to trust them?' These words are fraught with meaning.

People who seek (in vain) ancient (events) in our time conclude that (things) are impermanent; I, who seek (in vain) present (events) in ancient times, know that (things) are permanent.

\textsuperscript{158} See above II.2. I read 聶 for 聶.

\textsuperscript{159} We read 往 for 往 with HT 444b because 往 and 去 yield no contrast.

\textsuperscript{160} Cf. the parallel passage in II.4 and n. 154.

\textsuperscript{161} 各性住於一世. The use of一世 seems to suggest that Seng-chao had in mind 三世, the three phases of a single karmic event, viz. appearance, existence, and disappearance (upādā, sthiti, upāyata). These are often translated 'Three Times and are in China identical with 'cause and result' (原因, karmān). But 古 (instead of 去, 往去) is not used in this context. Therefore, I think that here karmān is not in the picture; but cf. the last paragraph II.6.

\textsuperscript{162} Cf. Ch'ao-tzu 78 (first part only); Sūtramātrā T'ainō 186, vol. 111, 537c, cf. Ch'Collapse.
If (what occurs) to-day could have occurred in ancient times, there (would be no reason to) distinguish ancient times from our time; if (what has occurred in) ancient times could occur again to-day, there (would be no reason to) distinguish our time from ancient times.

Because our time is free from ancient (events) we know that nothing returns; because ancient times are free from present (events) we know that nothing leaves (the historical milieu to which it belongs).

(Conclusion:) As (what has occurred in) ancient times cannot occur (again) in our time, and (what occurs) to-day cannot have occurred in ancient times, (or else) as each individual is stationed (permanently) in (his period), who, then, is able to move freely to and fro (among the historical periods)?

Then the four seasons, fleet as the wind, and the Great Bear, revolving with lightning speed; if you understand the least of what I have said, (you should realize) that these, rapid as they are, do not move.

II. 6

That is why the beneficial act of the Tathāgata remains effective for thousands of generations; why the Order (he gave the world) (Tao) after hundreds of aeons (kalpa) is as valid as ever. 'When raising a hill with the first basket (which is emptied) completion has begun; when making a journey with the first step arrival has started.' Thus it is certain: his karmā cannot perish. 'It cannot perish' implies that, though acquired in the past, it has suffered no modification.

Unmodified as it is, it still is there. (It retains its validity as unexhausted 'cause' instead of becoming exhausted 'result'); retaining its validity it is still unspent. So much is clear. The sūtras say: 'When (at the end of the world) the three destructive powers (wind, fire, water) rage, his karmā remains unspent'. These words can be trusted.

(In the following it is proved that causes are unable to produce a result and therefore are always still able to produce one. Two moments,
the cause-moment and the result-moment, must be distinguished. Then
two propositions are possible.)

(Proposition A:) The result does not exist simultaneously with the
cause.166

(Proposition B:) The result is produced by the cause (existing
simultaneously with it).

(From these propositions follow two conclusions.)

(From proposition B:) If the result is produced by the cause, then
the cause has not died in the first (past) moment. (This means that it is
present in the second and takes all the space which should be reserved
for the result. Thus the result cannot be produced.)

(From proposition A:) If the result does not exist simultaneously
with the cause, then the cause (must have died in the first, past, moment.
Thus it) cannot come forward to the second (present) moment (in order
to produce the result, and thus this cannot be produced.)

(The impossibility of causation is proved for both cases.)

Thus, because (the cause) neither dies167 (in the first or past moment,
proposition B), nor comes (forward to the second or present moment,
proposition A), it is proved that it does not move (from its position in
the karmic sequence.)

Can there be any more doubt about motion and rest, any indecision
about impermanence and permanence?

Then, when heaven and earth168 turn upside down, it does not mean
that they are not motionless; when floods rise sky-high there is no
reason to believe that they move. One may convince himself (of the
fact that) things (and non-things) are identical169 and (these sentences)
will quickly lose their strangeness.170

(and each of them must have 'died' before the other could be 'born'), co-operation is
impossible and causation is refuted.

Apparently Seng-chao misunderstands Nāgārjuna. For, what with the Indian
philosopher is the absurdum, he takes for the probandum. While Nāgārjuna concludes
from the immutability of the causes that they cannot produce a result, Seng-chao
believes that Nāgārjuna wishes to prove their immutability. He silently infers: causes
are immutable, therefore not yet exhausted, therefore still effective (sic!).

166 In Buddhism there are always several causes co-operating. But the picture on
which the argument plays contains only one cause in the first, past, kșaṇa and one
result in the second, present, kșaṇa. The motion discussed (the 'birth' of a dharma)
is called 'coming (back)' below. So Seng-chao saves his picture. But notice that the denial
of 'coming' was attributed to the people, and his task has been to prove 'not going' i.e.
the impossibility of the motion present-past! The time direction in the Mādhyamika
hātrikās is Western, i.e. retrograde to that in Chao-tun (past-present). This means that
when Seng-chao had to sacrifice either his tenet or his picture, he sacrificed the first.

167 离—去 (leave their moment).

168 散骨 elegant for 焚烛.


170 Notice the parallelism in the concluding passage of Part II.
A perfect void where nothing grows (and decays) such is, perchance, the transcendent realm as it shows in the dark mirror of Prajñā. Into it all that exists (and non-exists) is resolved. Who, not having the mental power of the Sage with which to penetrate to full understanding, can attain that power of vision in which 'existence' and 'non-existence' lose their meaning? (Only) the Perfect Being may let his mind go beyond the borders of finality, unhemmed by these borders, may send his eyes and ears beyond the limits of seeing and hearing (to regions) where eyes and ears cannot reach. Is it not just that perfect 'voidness', in which all things are equal, which prevents the Cosmic Soul from being troubled by individual sorrows?

Therefore:

When the Sage uses his true understanding to follow the natural course, there is no obstacle which he does not transcend; because he views the transformations (of the universe) as all of one breath, he passes through, adapting himself to whatever he encounters.

He transcends all the obstacles, hence he can reduce the turbid and the mixed to a state of clarity. He passes through whatever he encounters, so he sees oneness behind each particular experience.

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171 The title is explained in II.4 (see p. 61 and n. 222) śūnyatā does not mean that 'things' are just nothing'.
172 Concerning Prajñā see Part III. 難 is 'abode' or 'world' in the Wheel of Life. There are six such worlds, but śūnyatā is none of them. For it is beyond all that is encountered during transmigration. This realm is therefore called 妙難 'transcendent realm'. Cf. Part IV n. 594.
173 有無之宗極, 極 is 'end beyond all end' or 'beginning before all beginning' including both existing and non-existing things. Cf. 角數, the 'last number'. Deva-kuti-ratitavāma.
174 質, literally 'the Mind of the Cosmic Spirit'. 優 is not translated.
175 Shen-ming 聲明, normally soul, also World-soul or World-spirit. See my article (1953): 'On the Immortality of Souls in Chinese Thought', Introduction. The Hsi-tzu 聲 destroys the Eight Hexagrams, displaying the power of his spiritual light and classifying the creatures with regard to their inborn vocations. In Chinese literature shen 聲 is described as a ruler living in a palace from which light emanates. Chihf The-lin (Yu-lu: 55 n. 13) speaks of the Spirit King (shen-wang 帝王).
176 聲, in Thai cosmology it accumulates to form matter. Cf. Chiang-tsu (98 ch. 71 fol. 4) 人之故, 無之兩也.
This being so, although the various forms are different, they are not so in themselves; not being distinct in themselves, it follows that the (multitude of apparent) forms is not truly form; as that (multitude of) forms is not such, it is not form, although it (seems to be) form.179

Thus all things and He180 spring from the same root. Whatever there is and what is not is one in essence. Impalpable and darkly concealed, surely this is not a matter which an ordinary intellect can compass.

I. 2

That is the reason why in the discussions of to-day, everybody has his own opinion, as soon as the subject of śūnyatā is touched upon. But if the undifferentiated is approached with the (preconceived idea of) difference, can anything be established as one? Therefore, the disputations go on and on (trying to define the relation between the Two Worlds) and on that very reason they cannot establish their oneness.

Outline of the Schools

(The first school181 defines śūnyatā as) ‘emptiness of mind’ hsin-wu (心無).

(Tenet:) (Śūnyatā means that) the mind (is ‘empty’ when it) does not reflect things, though things (themselves) are never non-existent (‘empty’).182

(Criticism:) This is correct with regard to mind when it is calm (‘empty’) (like that of) the Spirit, but it fails to understand (the true reason why) things are (called) ‘empty’.183

(The second school184 defines śūnyatā as) ‘emptiness’ (śūnya) identical with matter (chī-se 即色).185

180 The cosmic idea before creation (象之大象), or the Sage, is called wo 我 (He) by Seng-chao, which is rather strange. Throughout Chao-lun the Sage is referred to as wo (notes 429, 605, 678) ! Indian Buddhism does not know of an integrating principle in the kaleidoscopic movement of single entities, the dharma. Nor does it know of an initial state from which world developed. World neither begins nor ends; if it disappears, in nirvāṇa, it does so together with its past and future. But the Chinese could not imagine a world without a centre.
181 Chih Min-tu 支磐陀 and others, cf. APPENDIX I.
182 The mind of a meditator, also that of the Cosmic Meditator (Spirit), is ‘empty’.
183 The term śūnya does not exactly mean empty but rather ‘absence of substance’ (dharma-śūnyatā). Śūnyatā denotes the fact that phenomenal things are not true things but, once recognized as such, they are seen as in truth they are, and, so understood, Śūnyatā is their Reality (lakshitya). Cf. above n. 114.
184 Chih Tuo-lin 支道林, cf. APPENDIX I. A detailed study of the following difficult lines is found there.
185 色 rāpa means colour, form, and also matter.
TRANSLATION OF

(Tenet:) What does it mean to say that ‘emptiness’ is identical with matter? Matter (as it is found) is not in itself matter. Therefore though matter, it is not matter.

(Criticism:) Speaking of matter, (‘emptiness’) is identical with matter, because where matter is there it is. There is no need to wait until it is taken for what in itself it is to justify the saying that it is identical with matter.

The opponent says correctly that matter (as it is found) is not in itself matter but he does not understand that matter (as it is found) is (itself) non-matter.

(The third school defines śūnyatā as) original ‘emptiness’ (pen-wu 本無).

(Tenet:) There are many who are fond of nothingness, so in all their talk they submit to it. Therefore, (when the sūtras) deny that things exist (they understand that) they do not exist; when they deny that things do not exist (they understand) the same.

(Criticism:) If we look for the original meaning of these sentences, (we find that) ‘not existent’ means ‘not truly existent’, that ‘not non-existent’ means ‘not truly non-existent’. They do not deny that here may be something and there may be nothing (in the ordinary understanding).

How can this talk, so partial to the negations, be said to agree with the facts and adequately to describe the identity of things (with śūnyatā)?

I. 3

If one calls ‘thing’ what is a thing then what is called ‘thing’ is (something) fit to be called ‘thing’; if one calls ‘thing’ what is not a thing then though called ‘thing’ it is still not a thing.

Therefore, a thing called up by a name may not appear (as what it is expected to appear); a name calling up a thing may not lead to the real (thing). Therefore the sphere of Truth is beyond the noise of verbal teaching. How then can it be made a subject of discussion? Still I

186 不自為色 = 不自為色.
187 色即色.
188 色色, like 物物 as contrasted by 色於色 (物於物) means taking 色 for what in itself it is without asserting its phenomenal existence. The first 色 is verb. Song-chao tries hard to remove all traces of a subject-object relation from the śūnya-rūpa equation. More of that struggle is found in the Letter in reply to Liu I-min.
189 Two-an, Chu Fu-shen 董詠深 and others, Cf. Appendix I.
190 Read 情國於彼多, 偏書以實無. YK.
191 物不知名不詠實, 名不知物而詠虛. With these phrases Song-chao introduces a new idea, namely that of True Language (實名), which is a quite revolutionary concept. As we shall see, true language is antinomical language. Cf. below II.4.
192 ‘Verbal teaching’ of the Confucian philosopher. The term 色 is often used by Hui-yüan, cf. HMCHI § 33a. Synonymous with "色 ".
cannot remain silent. In spite of (what I have just said) I shall state my opinion and defend it.

II.

The *Mahāyāna sāstra*\(^{193}\) says: 'Dharma neither have the characteristics of existence nor those of non-existence'. The *Chung-lun*\(^{194}\) says: 'Dharma are neither existent nor non-existent'. (These double negations define) paramārtha satya.

These double negations, do they imply that the thousand things must be blotted out, that the senses must be prevented from seeing and hearing, that a state must be created which is soundless, substanceless, void like a gap in a mountain range,\(^{195}\) in order to produce the true state?\(^{196}\) Be assured that things represent no obstruction whenever one passes through them knowing that they are identical (with what is not a thing). (Understanding that) they are not true (when seen from one angle) but true (when seen from the other angle)\(^{197}\) (he will know that) essentially they are without sides.\(^{198}\) Thus,

Being without sides, things, though in-existent, exist (as phenomena);

Representing no obstructions, things, though (appearing to) exist, in-exist (in truth).

In-existent (in truth), though they (appear to) exist, they are called different from (merely) existent things.

(Apparing to) exist, though they in-exist (in truth), they are called different from the in-existent.

Now, things which do not (merely) in-exist, are not truly existent things.\(^{199}\) If they are not truly existent things, what else does there exist apt to be designated 'thing'?\(^{200}\)

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193 YK quotes the MS (105 a 7): '雖如鏡中像，非鏡亦非面，非有亦非無' (Dharma are) comparable to reflections, belonging neither to the reflecting mirror nor to the outside world, they neither exist nor non-exist.'

194 Perhaps an allusion to the *MK* 7c 16. YK. This cannot, of course, mean what Seng-choo believes it to mean, namely, 非有非無. Cf. n. 210.

195 释義略說 Allusion to Lao-tzu 10 and 25. I quote from A. Waley (1934): 'There was something formless yet complete, that existed before heaven and earth, without sound, without substance, dependent on nothing, all-pervading, unfailing'. In the Parts III and IV Seng-choo uses the same characters for his description of the Sage and Nirvāṇa but replaces 賜 by 般. Cf. below n. 476, PART IV, n. 510.

196 paramārtha-satya.

197 即物 = 即僞即真. This is the principle of the Middle Path such as Seng-choo understood it. Cf. n. 175. The following stanzas are said to contain the essence of Seng-choo's teaching. Cf. Chi-tsunung ad MK (Taishō 1824 XLII p. 25) and T'ang (1938): 752.

198 依義之易. In the following I am using the term 'in-existent', unlike the term 'non-existent', for what neither exists nor non-exists, i.e. in truth exists. This word is also used by R. H. Robinson but perhaps not with this meaning.

199 物非實物. As Reality is thing-less there cannot be 'truly existent things'. What, then, does this word mean? Seng-choo answers, 'language creates this difficulty'. Cf. II.3, last paragraph.
TRANSLATION OF

A śūtra²⁰⁰ says: 'Rūpa is śūnya by nature not by destruction'. And thus the Buddha conducts himself in relation to things: 'empty' by nature²⁰¹ exactly as things themselves, he passes through them not waiting until a path is cut out (for him).²⁰²

This is why (Vimalakīrti’s) sickness is explained as unreal,²⁰³ why the Sūtra of the Samādhi Outstanding Sunshine²⁰⁴ says that (the four elements) are ‘empty’. But then, though the expressions in the Tripitaka vary, the leitmotif is noly one. Therefore the Fang-kuang²⁰⁵ says: ‘In the true state (paramārtha) neither (Buddhahood) nor (Nirvāṇa) is attained though in the world (samvṛti) they are attained’. Therefore:

the term ‘attainment’ is conventionally used to designate non-attainment;
the term ‘non-attainment’ is the true designation of attainment.²⁰⁶

Using ‘true language’ (attainment is called) in-existent though in truth (it is realized); using conventional language (attainment is called) not in-existent though it seems (to be realized). Or else, to say that in truth (it exists) implies that (in the world) it could never exist; to say that seemingly (it exists) excludes that (in the world) it could ever in-exist.

These two sentences are surely contradictory but, as surely, what they express is the same.²⁰⁷

This is confirmed by a śūtra²⁰⁸ (in which the Bodhisattva is asked:)

‘Would you say that paramārtha and laukika are different? (He answers:) ‘No’. This śūtra wants to say (what we have said just now, namely, that the same in the aspect of) paramārtha is said not to exist and (in the aspect of) laukika is said not to non-exist. It rejects the proposition that these two aspects are two different things.

²⁰⁰ Probably quoted from VSK 551a 19, cf. CVSK 398.
²⁰¹ 如寓物之自虛.
²⁰² Allusion to the Master-cook in Chuang-tzu.
²⁰³ VSK 545a 26.
²⁰⁴ Ch’ō jih-ming san-mei ching 粗日明三昧經 (Taishō 638: 532b 28). YK reads 不著不保命四大盧也 'You cannot neither save nor protect your life, the four elements are empty'. This corrects the original text, probably justly.
²⁰⁵ PSM 36c 19.
²⁰⁶ Vat 11.3 last paragraph.
²⁰⁷ I have not compared the Sanskrit of the following quotation but, whether the Chinese text translates it correctly or not, it cannot mean that Truth and Illusion both are excluded to the benefit of an even higher reality. Anyway, this is not meant by Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna excludes no absurd the propositions that mundane entities either are or are not. This is his Middle Path.

Pattern 1  
laukika  |  paramārtha
sad-asat  |  hiññata


²⁰⁸ Cf. PŚK 378a 11.
II. 2

Surely, there is a reason why things are called in-existent, and also a reason why they are called not non-existent. For, in the first instance, though existent they in-exist; in the second instance, though in-existent they are not non-existent. For their 'non-existence', as negated in the second clause, does not imply 'spontaneous non-existence' (as of what could never exist) and their 'existence', as negated in the first clause, does not imply 'spontaneous existence' (as of what must always exist).

Now, if 'existence' does not imply 'existence as of the universe which is' and 'non-existence' does not imply 'non-existence as of the universe before it came into being' then these two terms though different as terms refer to the same item.210

Therefore (in the Vimalakīrti sūtra211 the young (kulaputra Ratnakīrti) says with a sigh (of admiration): 'The Buddha) has said: the dharma neither are nor are not, they (simply) arise from causes and conditions'.

The (Great) Bodhisattva-keyura sūtra212 says: 'When the Bodhisattva turns the Wheel-of-the-Law, there is neither turning nor no turning'.218

This means that (the Buddhas) turn the Wheel where there is nothing to be turned. That then is the subtle meaning of all the sūtras.

209 For the following cf. VS Commentary 380a 12, also below II.4 and Part III, II.4.

210 造虚 is synonymous with 轉空 and is contrasted with 'non-existence which, as seen from without, is not existent though in itself it might exist'. Absolute, or spontaneous, or independent non-existence, later also called 虚無, is a heresy in Buddhism (see below). In Sanskrit Buddhism सून्यता and असत्ता are clearly distinguished, but Seng-chao uses 無 for both. To him 有 means sat (existence of something) and 無 asat (non-existence of something), but also mundane existence (संवृत्तिसत) and true existence (परमर्थसत). His argument would be clearer if instead of 虛無 he said 常 (nitya) and instead of 虚無 he said 断 (ucchinn). As it is, he confuses the pattern to the two Truths or Spheres (Pattern I) with that of the two heresies (Pattern II).

existence asserted (absolute thingness)  

sat

šūnyatā (non-existence asserted (absolute nothingness))  

na sad nāsat asat

Somehow, Seng-chao is reluctant to depreciate Reality calling it 無, but also when he has 虚無 he feels the need to contrast it with 虛無, as a little later he actually does (n. 222). In this way he transforms Pattern II (the Middle Path) into the imaginary Pattern III (the Middle Path of Seng-chao).

true existence (paramārtha)  

šūnyatā(?) (pattern of existence)  

true non-existence (paramārtha)  

(what?)

Seng-chao was not probably consciously thinking in these mental patterns; from what he tells us they are derived, in order to clarify the confusion which makes his language mysterious even to himself. He was also able, as we shall see, to see genuine problems. Cf. n. 207.

211 VSK 332 c, CVSK 537c 15.

212 Pu-so ying-lo ching 鴻勒瓊洛經 (Taishō 656 XVI; 1091 1).

218 Māñjuśrī asks the Buddha whether his preaching of the Law actually happens or not. The Buddha answers that the Law can neither be preached nor not be preached. Māñjuśrī asks for an explanation, whereupon the Buddha explains that the dharma are 'empty' (शून्या).
What do you propose? That things are not? Then negativism would not be heretical. That things are? Then positivism would be orthodox. (Actually) because things are not simply nothing, negativism is a heresy; because things are not simply something, positivism is not orthodox. Then it is evident that these two negations describe Highest Truth (paramārtha satya).

II. 3

So in the Tao-hsing (Subhūti) says: 'Mind neither is existent nor non-existent'. The Chung-kuan says: 'Because the existence of things depends on causes and conditions, they are not existent; because they arise from these conditions, they are not non-existent'. The theory expounded (in the sūtras) is such. Why is it such?

Existence, if true, would imply self-sufficiency and permanency; it would not depend upon causation for its existence. Just so, non-existence, if true, would imply self-sufficiency and permanency; it would not depend upon causation for its non-existence. As what exists is not self-sufficient but depends upon causation for its existence, it is obvious that it is not truly existent. Not truly existent, though existent, it should not be called 'existent'. But why is it called 'not non-existent'? Whatever non-exists could be called 'non-existent' only if, like the day before daybreak it were unaffected by mundane changes. If the ten thousand things were unaffected like that, they could not possibly rise (and decay). As they rise (and decay) they are 'not non-existent'. This is expressed in the (above) sūtra: 'Because they rise from conditions they are not non-existent'.

The Mahāyāna sūtra says: 'All dharma must be considered to exist because (though) dependent upon causation (they exist); all dharma cannot be considered to exist because (only) dependent upon

114 II T reads 斷 which makes better sense than 邪, though 邪見 (mithyā-drsti) can have the same meaning. Cf. Koša V: 18 n. 3 常見 (nitya-vāda), 斷見 (tucchda-vāda).

115 The two negations describe the Middle Path. The Middle Path might be called paramārtha satya (真相), the true vision of things. This must not be mistaken for paramārthasat sat (真相) which in Mādhyamika terminology is refuted if attributed to a single dharma.

116 DSI. 435 c 27.

117 Cf. MK XXIV 18.19: 33b 16. The idea of the MK is to refute the assumption that things have, apart from their relative existence (pratītyasa-mutpāda), a nature of their own. Quoted in CV SK 333h 4.

118 Here 凡 in 凡有 replaces 常 (st). Song-chao confounds this term with paramārthata. Cf. n. 207. YK explains 有 and 凡有 as 定有 and 定爾. This shows that he is aware of the problem.

119 Inexact quotation, perhaps from MS: 63a a一切皆不自相者偏因緣生 'The dharma do not exist independently but all arise dependent on causes and conditions'. I understand 偏 as 應當.
causation (they exist). All non-existing dharma must be considered to exist, because (though in modo negativo) dependent upon causation they exist; all existing dharma cannot be considered to exist because (only) dependent upon causation they exist.

These sentences, if properly understood, are more than simple inversions. For, if (in the preceding paragraph) ‘must be considered to exist’ implied that (the non-existing dharma just) exist, (the Buddha could not have added that they) do not exist; if ‘cannot be considered to exist’ implied that (the existing dharma just) non-exist, (he could not have said that they) exist. Saying that they exist he borrows the term ‘existence’ to denote that they do not (just) non-exist; saying that they do not exist he borrows the term ‘non-existence’ to denote that they do not (just) exist. One meaning; two words. Language creates the difficulty. If one knows the reason why (that strange language is used), then all ambiguities disappear.

II. 4

The ten thousand dharma looked at from one side do not exist, and therefore cannot be treated as existent, but looked at from the other side, they do not non-exist, and therefore cannot be treated as non-existent.

If you say: they exist (I answer): (You may call it) existence but it is not true life. If you say: they do not exist (I answer): Phenomenal life has taken shape already. This is not just non-existing.

(The ten thousand dharma) neither in truth exist nor just non-exist. This is the meaning of the title Pu chen-k’ung lun (of the Treatise).}

220 The Taishō ed. 15ac reads 無, YK 173b reads 有. I follow YK. In the Sanskrit text we are told that all dharma, whether positive or negative (sad-asat), are not (in truth) existent (paramartha-sat). Cf. Pattern I. Seng-chao, without regard to the modi, transfers this pattern into that we know from II.1: non-existent if compared with what in truth exists, things though in Illusion still exist, and vice versa.

221 真生 is strange. In the sphere of Truth (真有) of course, nothing ‘is born’. An explanation is found in the Pao-tsang lun 霊藏論 Hsiū 25a 15. It deals with the Highest Being. ‘Decapitation and burning would do him no damage. Magical means such as the golden pill and the jewel ichor applied to achieve longevity (壽生) are out of place. For, true life does not die, true death (真滅) does not bring about new life i.e. reincarnation. We might say: he always dies and always lives.’

222 All versions with the exception of HT read 非真非實有 (HT 430 d 非真非實無). The preceding dilemma 欲有其有 欲有其無 seems to demand a final 無. YK explains 正於非實有, 故有不屬即非有, 所以書無. If so, what would be the difference between 真有 and 實有? And what about the grammar of the title line? If we follow YK we understand 不屬 or 不屬就是 無 which is odd grammatically. To read it as 不屬 (不) 無 would be possible though I prefer to take 無 as a compound. A difficulty remains about the value of 無 which normally is reserved for ‘true experience’. Is 無有 used here in the sense of 無所有 (無所 — 無所 — 無所 — 無所 — 不動等等)? Strange indeed, but possible with Hsing-chiao, as the precedent of 無有 shows. True existence is 'super-
Therefore the *Fang-kuang*²²³ says: 'All the dharma are symbols and are not real. They resemble a man produced by magic: this man is not non-existent, yet he is not a real man'.

*The language problem*

21 If one searches for a thing using its name as a guide (he will discover that) where the name is found the thing is not found also. If one searches for a name using the thing (it names) as a guide (he will discover that) what the thing achieves the name does not also achieve.²²⁴ If the thing is not found where the name is found it is the wrong thing; if the name does not achieve what the thing achieves it is the wrong name. Thus, names do not correspond with facts and facts do not correspond with names. Now, if names and facts do not correspond with each other, how are the ten thousand things to be found (with the help of ordinary language)?²²⁵

Therefore the *Chung-kuan*²²⁶ says: 'Things are not this or that. But some one (in the position of this) makes this a this and that a that, while (in the position of that) he makes this a that and that a this. This and that do not denote only one kind of thing, but ignorant people believe that (these words) have a definite significance. It follows that this and that at first do not exist, while ignorant people believe that (even) at first they may not non-exist. Once one has recognized the non-existence of this and that, what else could there be whose existence he would be willing to assert?

So we know: things are not real, they are just symbols.
That is why the Ch'eng-chü\textsuperscript{227} maintains that names are artificially applied to things, and Yüan-lin\textsuperscript{228} uses the similes of the finger and the horse. So, profound doctrines may be found anywhere.

The Sage rides the thousand (waves) of becoming yet remains unchanged; he falls into a thousand errors\textsuperscript{229} but emerges from all of them. Why? Because he knows that \textit{sūnyatā} is the very nature of phenomenal life and does not misunderstand this term as meaning absence of existence.\textsuperscript{230}

Therefore a sūtra\textsuperscript{231} says: 'Marvellous, World-honoured One! Unchanging Reality (\textit{bhūtakoṭi}) is the realm where all dharma are assigned their places.' Not outside of Reality are they placed. Where they are placed (in the world) that indeed is Reality. This being so, is Tao far away? This life of ours is Reality. Is the Sage far away? Recognize him as in truth he is, and you are the (cosmic) Spirit.\textsuperscript{232}

\textsuperscript{227} Ch'eng-chü \textit{huang-ming t'ing-i ching} 成具光明定意經 (\textit{Taishō 630 VX: 454c 1}).

\textsuperscript{228} i.e. Chuang Tzu whose jurisdiction was in Ch'i-yüan 漁澮. The passage is from the \textit{Chuang-tzu} (2.4 ch. 1: fol. 28b). Fung Yu-lan (1933) translates, 'To take fingers in illustration of fingers as not being fingers, is not as good as to take non-fingers in illustration of fingers as not being fingers. To take a white horse in illustration of horses as not being horses is not so good as to take non-horses in illustration of horses as not being horses'. This passage contains the philosophy of Kung-sun Lung 公孫龍, logician of the fourth century B.C.

\textsuperscript{229} Life itself is error.

\textsuperscript{230} 以異即萬物之實虛, 不假虛而應物也.

\textsuperscript{231} Cf. PSK 4014 1 or \textit{PSM} 1400 18, cf. below Part III, n. 280.

\textsuperscript{232} Not 'spiritual self' as in the first edition, but Lao Tzu's Spirit of the Valley. 'T' as a verb refers to Buddhist-Taoist conundrums where the original state of things appears.
PART III: ON PRAJÑĀ NOT COGNIZANT

PAN-JO WU-CHIH LUN 般若無知論

I. 1

Prajñā, void and dark, is, perchance, the far starting-point of the Three Vehicles.²³⁵ Being cosmic Reality²³⁶ she is certainly not definable as something. Yet attempts to define her²³⁷ have always been numerous.

I. 2

The Indian Sramana Kumārajīva²³⁸ as a small boy ventured into the vast field of the Mahāyāna, desiring to get to the root of things.²³⁹ He alone could grasp (the essence) beyond the 'words and symbols',²⁴⁰ and mysteriously found himself on 'the plane unaccessible to the

²³³ In Mahāyāna prajñā is, essentially, the vision of the Bodhisattva, as incorporated in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Cf. E. Obermiller (1931): 164, 292. In Hinayāna, prajñā may be roughly said to be wisdom acquired in meditation, as e.g. in the term sāntadhī prajñā. Seng-chao's interpretation, viz. the wisdom innate in nature, is, of course, not found in Indian Buddhist literature. Cf. INTRODUCTION. In Sanskrit, prajñā is feminine, in Tantra a female goddess. I did not find it possible to use the neuter pronoun in my translation since she is, in some cases at least (e.g. II.3), though never a god, still a person.

²³⁴ The title is explained in II.3.

²³⁵ 'The Vehicles have a mythical significance. Liebenthal (1961): 44 n.9. 宗極 'The infinitely far ancestor'.

²³⁶ 唯一 — 第一真諦 (paramārtha-satya), here also translated 'non-World' or 'Truth'.

²³⁷ 八端. Cf. LY II.16. HT: 431c enumerates four different opinions.

²³⁸ Kumārajīva who was born in Kucha in A.D. 343 or 344, was an Indian, related on his mother's side to the ruling clan there. His mother, formerly a nun, must have been responsible that, in his seventh year, he started to become a Buddhist priest. At the age of nine, she took him to Kashmir and entrusted him to the famous Sarvāstivādin Bhuddhadaṭta for higher education. Three years later, on the way home, in Kashgar, he met Buddhayāsas who introduced him to Mahāyāna. This monk and the Sarvāstivādin Vimālākṣa, from whom he took the vows, later joined him in Ch'ang-an.

²³⁹ Kumārajīva was a keen reader and absorbed what he could not only from Buddhist but also Vedic literature. His fame induced Fu Chien, ruler of Former Ch'in, to send an expedition under Lī Kuang in order to bring him to the capital, as the legend goes. Kucha was conquered and sacked in A.D. 384. The next year Fu Chien was murdered and Lī Kuang went East into Liang where he founded an independent kingdom in 386. He had taken Kumārajīva with him who remained in Liang seventeen years, connected with the Court in the capacity of a soothsayer, though he was not allowed to propagate Buddhism. Upon the death of Fu Chien the throne of the Ch'in was usurped by the Tungut clan of the Yao 燕. They were ardent Buddhists and repeatedly tried to get the famous scholar out of Liang. When all these attempts were unsuccessful, Yao Hsung sent an army. Lī Lang, ruler of Later Liang, surrendered and Kumārajīva was brought to Ch'ang-an in A.D. 401.


²⁴¹ YK quotes from Wang Pi's 莊績 Lüeh-lü 易略例, 聖教論乃指著數出, 聖教論乃指著數
senses. He reconciled the divergent doctrines in Kapilavastu; he fanned the pure breeze (of the Law) to the East. Willing to carry his candle further he (was forced to) hide his light in the country of Liang. Tao does not work without design; when it works there is a purpose.

In the third year of hung-shih, the cyclical sign of which was hsing-chi (A.D. 401), the ruler of Ch’in used (Lü Lung’s) readiness to surrender to send an army in order to bring (Kumārajīva) to Ch’ang-an. Thus a prophecy concerning the fate of the North came true.

I. 3

The Divine King of Ta Ch’in, whose piety (tao) surpasses that of the Hundred Kings (of Antiquity), whose achievements (te) will make happy a thousand generations to come, skillfully attends to his thousand duties, spreading the Tao (Dharma) all the day. Surely he is to the people of the third period what Heaven is to creatures, the support of the Dharma left by Śākyamuni.

(After Kumārajīva’s arrival in Ch’ang-an) the King gathered more than five hundred students (of Buddhism) in the Hall of the Hsiao-yao garden (where they attended to translation work). Personally interested in the Chinese version, he took part when the Vaipulya sutras were being edited by Kumārajīva. The knowledge which, in this way, he made available will be helpful not only to the present generation, but (will serve) as a ford and bridge (across the Ocean of Becoming) in kalpas to come.

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241 Lao-tzu 14. YK traces all these allusions to events in the life of Kumārajīva.
242 Birthplace of the Buddha, here standing for India in general.
243 HT says Hsi Liang 西凉, YK Pei Liang 北凉 (沮渠蒙遜) but Ku-tsang 古藏, when conquered, was still the capital of Hou Liang 後涼.
244 Destiny sent Yao Hsing to the rescue of Kumārajīva.
245 The cyclical sign of the month stands for that of the year ch’u 丑. YK.
246 YK quotes from the San-shih huo ch’un-ch’iu 三十國春秋 by Hsiao Wan (Liang) 蕭萬 (梁): ‘Lü Lung, pressed by Southern and Northern Liang, announced his surrender’.
247 A prophecy from the PSM that Buddhism would spread first South then West finally North. YK.
250 I follow YK though the mode of expression is somewhat strange. In Seng-chao’s day the last period had not yet begun.
251 These were only the students of the Academy; the number of monks is given as three thousand.
252 The Mahāyāna sūtras, esp. the Pañcavimśatikā, ‘Kumārajīva read the Sanskrit version, the King the old text, together they compared (the new with the old translation) and revised the wording as the meaning required.’ Yu-tsu 10th 10 f.
253 A kalpa is the duration of a world.
Though inexperienced and slow, I was admitted to this fortunate assembly and thus finally heard the message so new and important. Truly, the wisdom of the Sages is obscure and subtle, deeply concealed and difficult to plumb; shapeless and nameless, it cannot be expressed in words and symbols. Should I (behave like the Yellow Emperor who) employed ‘Ignorance’ (to find the pearl after ‘Learning’ had searched in vain)\(^{254}\) and in my inadequate language tell of it? How dare I say that the Mind of the Sage can be described? (Nevertheless) I shall try.

II. 1

The *Fang-kuang*\(^{255}\) says: ‘*Prajñā*\(^{256}\) is not a thing among things, it is not a thing which is born and dies’.\(^{257}\) The *Tao-hsing*\(^{258}\) says: ‘There is nothing that *Prajñā* cognizes, nothing that she sees’.

These quotations describe the act of (Cosmic) Manifestation (*chao* 玄) which is characteristic of (Cosmic) Cognition (*chih* 圓). They say that (in this act) no things are perceived and no cognitive act is performed.\(^{200}\) What does this mean? Evidently, there exists a kind of cognition which is not (related to) an object, a vision which is not cognitive.

II. 2

(In the following syllogism it is proved that such Cognition is possible.)

Where things are cognized other things are not cognized.

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\(^{200}\) In Buddhist psychology the process of perception and re-perception (in memory) is understood as a polluting contact with objects, which are actually non-existent. ‘These possess characteristics, nimitta or lakṣaṇa. A thing is what possesses a lakṣaṇa. ‘To say that the Mind is ‘not a thing among things’ implies that it is free from karman which leads to life-death.

\(^{254}\) Cf. *Chuang-tzu* 12.4. ch. 5 4b f.

\(^{255}\) PSM: ch. 7 97c. Cf. PSK: 354a 13. WTS.

\(^{256}\) In Buddhist psychology the process of perception and re-perception (in memory) is understood as a polluting contact with objects, which are actually non-existent. ‘These possess characteristics, nimitta or lakṣaṇa. A thing is what possesses a lakṣaṇa. ‘To say that the Mind is ‘not a thing among things’ implies that it is free from karman which leads to life-death.

\(^{257}\) 聞 (sa-lakṣaṇa), things which possess lakṣaṇa, individual things.

\(^{200}\) Cf. DSL: 428a 20.

\(^{258}\) (Chih-chao chih yung) 智照之用. Our text distinguishes 智 cosmic, and 知 mundane, cognition. 智 is the power of cognizing, characteristic of Prajñā. But, where Seng-chao wants to be ambiguous, he uses 知 for both kinds of cognitions. To make it easier for the reader, 智 is capitalized. ‘Knowledge’ would fit occasionally, but could certainly be neither reflection nor self-manifestation. It seems better to press the word ‘cognition’ a little. In the Chao-lun Prajñā (the Mind of the Sage) is compared with a mirror which reflects and also illuminates, or manifests things which are in the mind, and in this way creates the world. J. Gernet (1949) 32 n. 4—‘Notons que le miroir reflète toute la réalité en même temps qu’il la rayonne’.

\(^{259}\) 無網不盡. In the following I translate 有網 (sa-lakṣaṇa) by ‘thing’ or ‘object’. Normally ‘object’ is *ayatana* (*yilan* 館 so-*yilan* 創蠟). Seng-chao does not distinguish between these terms.
As the Mind of the Sage is free from things cognized, it is (also free from things not cognized).

(Such) uncognitive cognition is called omniscience.\(^{261}\)

Therefore a sūtra\(^{262}\) says: ‘The Mind of the Sage cognizes nothing (and therefore) nothing is cognized (by him)’. So it is.

Therefore the Sage, ‘his mind empty (of single events), his vision filled with the universe’\(^{263}\) is always and yet never cognizant. He dims his radiance, covers his light,\(^{264}\) and yet, in a mind that is void, mirrors the invisible. He conceals his wisdom, hides his intelligence, and yet he alone is aware of what goes on beneath the surface (of things).\(^{265}\)

II. 3

**Prajñā and Shen 神**

(Prajñā:) (In the mirror of her mind) Prajñā reflects what is totally concealed (from our eyes),\(^{266}\) yet does so without cognition (of objects).

(Shen:) Responding (to our needs)\(^{267}\) the Spirit acts, yet his action is uninterested.

(Shen:) Sovereignly\(^{268}\) he rules the world regardless of what happens to us in the historical process.\(^{269}\)

(Prajñā:) Yet it is this life which she manifests.

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\(^{261}\) 一切知 Here ‘knowledge’ would be better than ‘cognition’. I keep ‘cognition’ for the reason already stated.


\(^{263}\) Allusion to Lao-tzu 3, where we read ‘belly’ for ‘vision’.

\(^{264}\) Cf. Lao-tzu 7 (headline).

\(^{266}\) 鏡覺冥冥者 cf. Kuo Hsiang, comm. to Chuang-tzu, 2.8 ch. 1 40b 體與物冥者. 覺 is synonymous with 感.

\(^{267}\) 智有窮幽之變而無知焉，神有應會之用而無慮焉. The Mirror reflects and also sees. These two lines are the main subject for later discussion, cf. n. 283. In the following I omit repetitions.

\(^{268}\) Ying-hui 應會 is a *dvandva* as in VSK Commentary: 413c. ‘Beyond our experience is the fact that good conduct rouses good response; experience shows that when we remember him we are protected (by the Buddha). As required by the condition of the universe, below the surface of things a commotion (is produced by good or bad conduct). In this way destiny is spontaneously made.’ 行應於內念護於外，應會冥感自然之數耳.

The picture underlying these sentences shows two dimensions (below or within, above or without) which are in mysterious correspondence (*kan-ying* 感應). *Kan-ying* must be distinguished from *pao-ying* 報應 (karman) though there was a certain confusion between these terms because both were occasionally identified with ‘the natural law’ (自然之理). Buddhist and Taoist judges were hostile forces whereas the Sage (Buddha) is kind. He does not judge but helps those who suffer under the karmic law. Karmic is always to be feared for it is dire fate while *kan-ying* (which has no equivalent in Sanskrit) is always ‘response to our needs’ (material and spiritual ones). This response is, basically, beneficient. *YK* explains: 與機緣應會 ‘response to the state of maturity’, *IT* similar. This idea, however, originated later.
(Shen:) Yet it is our life which he 'unceasingly directs'.

Therefore, whether he looks upward (to the supramundane) or downward (to the mundane sphere), the Sage remains in harmony with the cosmic changes and helps wherever he is needed. There is nothing so hidden that it is overlooked but this reflection is not purposive observation. This then is what is found in Cognition which does not cognize, in the Response called forth in the spirit of the Sage.

II. 4

Prajñā

What kind of thing can (Prajñā) be?

'Though full of things she does not exist (as a thing exists); Though void she does not non-exist (as a thing may non-exist).

Prajñā is there and yet defies all qualifications. Such is the Vision of the Sage.

Cosmic life (Prajñā), how it exists

Neither can its existence be asserted because it is nothing visible, nothing describable;
Nor can its non-existence be asserted because the Sage manifests himself thereby.276

He manifests himself thereby. Though void it does not fail to shine. It is nothing visible, nothing describable. Though shining it remains void.

As it is void, 'the phenomenal chaos does not impair its stillness'.277 As it shines it leads the blind (beings to their destinies).278

And that is the reason why the Sage never ceases to be active and why, nevertheless, an individual feature (in the field of his Vision) is never discovered.

Therefore Ratnakūta279 says: 'Without conscious intention (a Bodhisattva) appears and acts'. The Fang-kuang280 says: 'Without moving (the Buddha), in sambodhi, assigns the dharma to their places'. So the footprints of the Sage are a thousandfold, all leading to the same end.

II. 5

That is why Prajñā (Truth), though sightless, still sees; why the True State, though not an object, still is seen; why the Thousand Changes (go on) and still all is calm; why the Sage does not act and still responds.

276 欲言其有無狀無名，欲言其無聖以之靈。The language is suggestive of Wang Pi's Lao-tzu 14. 欲言無耶而物由之成，欲言有耶而見其形，故曰，無狀之狀，無物之象也。Ling 灵 is the light proper to spirits and all animated creatures, here used as verb in the meaning of 'permeating the universe with light'. As this 'light' is internal, it can only refer to the Light of universal life, the Cosmic Flame of which single lives are the sparks. Cf. Lieh-tzu 5 (SPTK, 4a) is an allusion, as YK thinks, to the I-Weh-li, or, as YK thinks, to the Tso-chuan.

277 《周易》 at II and III, as well as Huygens and Haeckel, state the same. The language is suggestive of Wang Pi's Lao-tzu 14. 我貞的，物之自生，其物異形，或天或地，無聖人能通其道，然後有不待神靈而生，有待諸徠而形，其道自然，非聖人之所通也。All that is born is animated by World-soul. These things are of various kinds; some die young, some die old. ... Only sages know their destinies. (Answer:) 'But there must be one who did not wait for animation by World-soul, who did not wait for creation (yin-yang) to be there ... whose destiny is that of nature. This the sages do not know.' Cf. also Lao-tzu 39, Chuang-tzu 27 復聖之生 (alluded to in the Shih-chi [生而神靈], see Ts'u-hai s.v. ling 禮) I think we are justified in saying that one and the same experience underlies these quotations. At some time man became conscious of being in the world surrounded by many various, animated, things. This experience had the value of an awakening. The world, formerly dark, became bright with a strange internal light, interpreted as the manifestation of something latent or as the self-revelation of an incomprehensible cosmic being. Cf. A. Waley (1934): 39, n. 1: ‘This word is cognate to words meaning life. . . .’

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So, here we are confronted with cognition which needs no object to cognize, with action which has nothing on which to act. Now, what cognition, what action are they?

III (Discussion of the Subject)

First Objection

(Opponent.) (You have said:) The mind of the Sage, (containing) the True State of Things, in its own lonely light, reflects every single thing. He leads them forsaking none, he moves with the changing situations.

ARGUMENT

If every single thing is reflected, there must be cognition (so perfect indeed that) no thing remains unnoticed. If he moves with the changing situations, no situation claiming his action is overlooked.

If no situation is overlooked, there must be situations to which he responds.

If no thing remains unnoticed, there must be cognizable things (in his mind).

If there are cognizable things, the mind of the Sage cannot be free from objects.

If there are situations to which he responds, his response is not without design.

Now, if the Sage cognizes and responds, what do you mean by denying him both qualities?

(I shall try to answer this question on your behalf.) Saying that the Sage is free from cognition and response, you may mean: it is for no personal end that the Sage cognizes and responds. ‘So all his personal ends are fulfilled.’ Or, differently formulated: you may not maintain that he does not cognize but that he does not cognize for his own selfish reasons. Is that so?

Author: The Sage’s bounties are spread over Heaven and Earth, though no sympathy is shown (in any individual case). His light, brighter than sun and moon, is all the darker for that. How could I say that he is blind like wood and stone, that he is simply lacking cognition?

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26 Cf. II.3.
262 Lau-teu 8 and Hai-teu A (I ch. 7 ob).
Surely, his divine intelligence\(^{286}\) is different from the human, so it cannot be found in the patterns of daily life.

27 You propose as a solution that 'it is for no personal end' that the Sage cognizes whereas cognition could not be denied to him. Your criticism shows that you misunderstand the nature of the Sage's mind, and also that you err about the meaning of the scriptures. For there is a sūtra\(^ {287}\) which says: 'Prajñā, existing in truth, is pure like the empty space. There is nothing that she cognizes, perceives, by which she is provoked or stimulated'. Such a cognition is in itself non-cognition.\(^{288}\) It need not to be terminated in order to be not.\(^{289}\)

(You may object:) Though (Prajñā) is cognizant, yet (in the sūtra, Prajñā) is called pure, i.e. non-cognizant, because she is empty in herself.\(^{290}\)

(If so, I answer:) In this case (Prajñā) could not be distinguished from Illusion. (Everything is empty in itself.) Even the Three Poisons\(^ {291}\) and the Four Basic Errors\(^ {292}\) would be pure. What then is superior in Prajñā?

(You may further object:) (Prajñā) is to be praised on account of (the purity of her) contents (the True State of things).

(If so, I answer:) It is not possible to draw conclusions about Prajñā from the contents of (Prajñā). (These are two different things.) Even though (Prajñā's) contents are absolutely pure, she need not therefore be pure. Thus the purity of her contents is no reason for praising Prajñā.\(^ {293}\)

\(^{286}\) 諸以異於人之神明，故不可以事相求之耳.

\(^{287}\) Cf. PSK: 262c 24. The quotation is not literal.

\(^{288}\) 知自無知．Prajñā is 'pure' (amālā), not polluted by the images she reflects. Cf. PSK 302a 19b.

\(^{289}\) 豈待返照然後無知哉．

\(^{290}\) HT 435c believes that the opponent is Chih Tao-lin. He quotes him as saying: 'Wisdom (as of the Sage) is free from contents, i.e. it is empty; ignorance (as of the people) is free from contents, i.e. it is empty. Both are free from the contents (of ordinary cognition). But it is also said: The Mind of the Sage sees all the dharma, existing as he does invisible to human eyes. If so, cognition and non-cognition are both attributable (to the Sage)'. 智即空之無知，或即空之無知，俱無知相，而如，聖心異有而知佛法；故名無知。若爾知與無知兩用各陳也．HT explains: 'This is answered in Chao-lun. It suggests that the term "non-cognition" should not be used simply in the sense of non-cognition but in that (of True Language, see PART II, II.2 ff. in which) the opposites coincide.' 此大文述云．豈唯無名無知，知自無知也．Cf. above PART II, Second School and APPENDIX I. This quotation of HT should rather come after the eighth objection.

\(^{291}\) Greed, anger, apathy.

\(^{292}\) These errors wrongly assume that beings, impermanent, unfortunate, without selves and without substance (aniyā, dukhā, anatma, śīnya), are permanent, fortunate, possessing selves and substance.

\(^{293}\) I follow TCH, the only commentary which gives a clear explanation.
(Conclusion:) Where the sūtra says: 'Prajñā is pure' (and thereby denies cognition to her), that can only mean that Prajñā as cosmic (purity) is real and pure, and (therefore) is essentially free from ignorance perceiving (objects).\(^{294}\) That cognition free from perceiving (objects) cannot be called cognition (in the ordinary sense of the word). Thus, if (I said) 'not cognizant', (I did not mean that) Prajñā is not cognizant (in the ordinary sense of the phrase) but that (Prajñā's) cognition is in itself free from cognition.

That is why the Sage by means of Prajñā free from cognition reflects Truth which is free from contents. Truth is not like the hare and the horse which (are limited in size and therefore) fail (to reach to the depth of the stream like the elephant).\(^{296}\) Prajñā is a mirror which reflects no less than the Whole. Therefore,\(^{296}\)

(Prajñā) responds (to want) without erring (among those wanting).\(^{297}\) (Prajñā) is full (of things) though to her no (thing) exists.\(^{298}\)

\(^{294}\) 本無取之知. Seng-chao by 般若體性真淨 has just refuted the assumption that Prajñā is empty (pure) in herself (真). Now he himself contends that she is 體性真淨 (真). Normally, these phrases mean the same but here we are in the t'i-yung pattern which is a cosmic pattern and t'i-yung must refer to cosmic original, true, purity.


\(^{296}\) Here Prajñā assumes both qualities which in II.3 she shared with the Spirit.

\(^{297}\) Hui erh pu-ch'a 會面不差. 會 is 應會, see n. 267. 'Response to our needs.' It is responsive which is not given on purpose, but in case of necessity, like rain.

\(^{298}\) Tang erh wu-shih 當而無是. HT 435c treats the sentence as a parallel version of the preceding 會面不差. YK 62c 當道理無取著 which is preposterous as the term 道理 was uncommon at that time. TS 133a 應會無應 seems to correspond with HT. Later p. 136 he explains 當 as 相當, is as 相是 which means 'corresponding to ...'. Meng-an hu-siang follows. The words were used with this meaning before in 物不當名之實 (Part II, 11.4, cf. n. 224). Words should correspond with the facts to which they refer. One real difficulty is that 當 is here used as an intransitive verb. What does 'the Sage responds' mean? Shih is (實, 實) we had before in the sense of assert, regard as existent what in the aspect of Truth does not exist. In the Chao-lun it is sometimes contrasted by chen 實. Here it is contrasted by 當 and. Now tang, as chen, hint at that harmony with nature which is the goal of Buddha-Taoism. Though these terms are not synonymous, they meet each other in this respect. Tang occurs in Chuang-tzu and is common with Kuo Hsiang, esp. in phrases such as 失當 'lose contact (with nature)' or 至當之極 'elimitating the possibility of being there'. Cf. Chuang-tzu 12.13 ch. 5 fol. 176 當而不知以職等 'They were (reliable) without being conscious of being reliable.' We read in Hui-yüan's Introduction to the Mahāyāna sūtra, Yu-lu 10.21: 75c: 以無當為實, 無當 無為, 無當則事無於所談, 無當則默於所行, 頭以行當則是邪華藏, 是非利眾. 無華藏於所當則事二間間, 造為一乘. (Description of the Sage in his implicit statement 'meditation'.) Not participating (in human life) he makes his existence; not illuminating (the world) he makes his profession. Cessing to participate his spirit is rigidly bound to his goal, not illumining he is unconscious about where the way leads. Walking in the dark, he worries no more about misunderstands, no more judges right and wrong. Then we know that the two 'Truths' (the active and the passive states) lead to the same goal, that the dark path is not divided. Cf. P. Daméville's review of Jomon Kenkō (Young Pao 45, 1087: 247).

In our case tang 當 is used as in the phrase tang-ying 當異, to be or become, assume the position of ... make (a good) milddle. It is a verbum attetminum but with an object understood: be, (embrace, reflect, work) the universe of single things without being
Silent, withdrawn, (Prajñā) cognizes not and yet there is nothing that is not cognized by her.\textsuperscript{299}

\textit{Second Objection}

Opponent: Things cannot cause themselves to be found. Therefore they are given names which lead to their finding. Though things are different from names, there certainly are things which are nameable and which agree with their names. That is the reason why things cannot hide whenever called by the right name. But you said that ‘the Mind of the Sage is not cognizant’ and also that ‘there is nothing not cognized by him’. Now, the first sentence means that ‘there is no cognition at all’ and the second that ‘there is no absence of cognition at all’. (You must keep to your definitions.) This is a rule which we are taught by logic; it is the essential condition of all argument.

You want us (to believe that) the Mind of the Sage is one while you give us (two) contradictory descriptions of it. Those who expect to be led to the actual facts by your descriptions will look in vain for correspondence (between these two).

Why? If ‘cognizant’ qualifies the Mind of the Sage, ‘non-cognizant’ would not be (the proper word) for its definition and vice versa. If both (words) are unfit for this purpose, then there is no point in continuing our argument.

Author: A sūtra\textsuperscript{300} says: ‘Prajñā is unnameable, undefinable, not existent not non-existent, not real not unreal.’ Though void she does not fail to shine; though shining she remains void. (Prajñā) is a dharma which cannot be defined and is therefore unsuitable for use as a subject of argument. Yet speech is necessary if (my message) is to be handed down. And that is the reason why sages speak all the time without speaking. So I (too) shall discuss (Prajñā) for your benefit using words which are (inevitably) inadequate.

\textbf{THE MIND OF THE SAGE}\textsuperscript{301}

It fades into the transcendent (whenever we search for it): it cannot be assumed to exist; restlessly exhibiting (what it contains): it cannot

\textsuperscript{299}\textsuperscript{299} 家悵無知而無不知者。For the following cf. Part II, I.3 n.191 and II.4 n.224.
\textsuperscript{300}\textsuperscript{300} Quoted the general contents of the sūtra (WTS) (?). After the sūtra (?) Seng-chuo quotes his own words: 慼不失照，照不失態，see above II.4, also below LETTERS n.361.
\textsuperscript{301}\textsuperscript{301} This details the earlier description of Prajñā in II.4.
\textsuperscript{302}\textsuperscript{302} 據《Lao-tzu 6, What it contains is Cosmic Life. The Sage visions his self-manifestation.}
be assumed not to exist.

It cannot non-exist; it is a fact—the Vision of the Sage.

It cannot exist; definitions fail to describe it.

Therefore, the word cognition (as used here) does not imply cognition (in the ordinary sense); it is meant to confront (the reader with the problem of) its manifestation. Nor does the word non-cognition (as used here) imply non-cognition (in the ordinary sense); it is meant to hint at the contents of (that manifestation, which are not such as ordinarily are cognized). Still, contents are contents and not nothing though his manifestation is not a something.

Thus, (the Vision of the Sage)
not existent, though cognition, is not cognition,
not non-existent, though not cognition, is cognition.

Or else, in this case, cognition is just non-cognition and vice versa, and you are wrong to say that the two contradictory attributes imply a split in the Mind of the Sage.

Third Objection

Opponent: Truth is so deeply concealed that only in the Vision of the Sage is it discovered. The power of his Vision is proved just by this fact (that he sees Truth). Therefore a sūtra says: ‘Who has not obtained Prajñā cannot see Truth’. So Truth is object of Prajñā and one may, from the existence of this object, infer that Cognition is cognition.

Author: One may, from the existence of an object, infer that Cognition is not cognition. Why?

The Fang-kuang says: ‘If such consciousness (vijñāna) appears as unconditioned by rūpa, it is said not to perceive rūpa’. The same sūtra says: ‘(in the absolute aspect) the five skandha are pure (unconditioned). (Therefore) Prajñā is pure (unconditioned)’. (Demonstrandi causa) let us assume that Prajñā cognizes and the five skandha is what she cognizes. Then, what she so cognizes would be an object.
PART III. ON PRAJÑA NOT COGNIZANT

FIRST ARGUMENT

(Proposition:) Cognition and the object cognized can (only) both exist together or both together not exist.

If (both) do not exist, then there are no things;\textsuperscript{308} if (both) exist, then things exist and nothing else.

(It follows that)

where things exist and nothing else, whatever there is is of the conditioned kind;

where no things exist, whatever there is is not of the conditioned kind.

What cannot be brought about by conditions is ‘object’ of (Cosmic) Manifestation and not object of a cognition;

What is brought about by conditions is caused to arise by the cooperation of cognition and its object (pratitya-samutpanna).\textsuperscript{309}

Conclusion: Whether or not cognition arises depends on the kind of (object) cognized.

SECOND ARGUMENT

Now Cognition.\textsuperscript{310} Supposing that it cognized what is cognized and (in this way) acquired a distinct (impression of the object) (lakṣanam prāpti) it might be called cognition. Truth is by nature free from distinctive features (lakṣaṇa). What (impression) could True Cognition acquire (and be polluted) by in order to be cognitive? On the same reasoning we might say:

Objects are not (in themselves) objects; objects are produced by cognition. While an object produces a cognition, the cognition produces the object. So, the object arises in dependence (pratitya-samutpanna) and therefore it is a conditioned dharma (saṃskṛta).\textsuperscript{311} As conditioned it is not a true (dharma). As such, it is not Truth (paramārtha). Therefore, it is said in the Chung-kuan:\textsuperscript{312} ‘Because things arise from causes and conditions they are not true. What does not arise from causes and conditions is true’.

The very name (paramārtha) implies that Truth cannot be an object. Not being an object, it is not a ‘thing’ of the kind which rise from

\textsuperscript{308} YK explains 物 as 人. But this is rather far-fetched. Seng-chao uses the word 'thing' in a technical sense, viz. for ‘thing of this world’. Cf. PART II, §II.1 and 2. The equivocal use of ‘object’ is rather bewildering, as Cosmic Manifestation is proved not to be object.

\textsuperscript{309} I read 知知.

\textsuperscript{310} YK 613c distinguishes 知 and 知 as noun and verb. HT 436a explains 一切智. The text itself has 符智 and 智智. Seng-chao uses 知 also as noun. Cf. above p. 127 知非知也, where both are noun.

\textsuperscript{311} The Sanskrit would demand साक्षरत and असाक्षरत, not साक्षरत and परमार्था. But Seng-chao makes no distinction.

\textsuperscript{312} Cf. MK: 33 (Ch'üan 158), but is this a quotation at all? If the translation of MK was finished in 409 and Part III of Ch'iao-hun was brought to Lakan in 408, Seng-chao could not have known more than perhaps a first draft of this translation.
(causes and) conditions. Therefore it is said in a sūtra: 313' A dharma which exists (saddharma) and has not arisen from conditions is not to be found'.

Conclusion: True Cognition seeing Truth never perceives 314 an object. 315 On what reasoning could such a Cognition be called cognition? Still, Cognition does not imply absence of cognition. We simply deny that True Cognition is cognition because Truth is not an object (without asserting the opposite). You said that from the existence of an object (Truth) we may infer that Cognition is cognition. As in this case the object is not an object, on what will you base your inference?

Fourth Objection

32 (Opponent:) You have said: 'Prajñā does not perceive objects'. Do you mean that she does not cognize and therefore does not perceive, or that she cognizes but thereafter does not perceive? In the first case the Sage would be blind like a traveller in the night who cannot distinguish black from white; in the second case (the problem of) cognition and (that of) non-perception (must be considered) separately.

(Author:) Both alternatives are wrong. Her cognition is identical with non-perception. Thus she is able not to perceive and yet to cognize.

Fifth Objection

Opponent (tries another explanation of) the sentence: (Prajñā) does not perceive (objects). Then you probably mean that the Mind of the Sage does not take things to be and therefore does not harbour the wrong idea (that things exist and are desirable). 316 As (the Sage) does not harbour this wrong idea, (things) do not exist to him. 317 If they do not exist (in his Mind), it cannot be (full of things). 318 If so, what else fills the Mind of the Sage? Nevertheless you have said that there is nothing not cognized by the Sage.

(Answer:) Your are right to say that (things) do not exist to him, that (his Mind) cannot be (full of things). (I say:) Though (his Mind) is empty (of things), (all things) are (in his Mind); though (things) do not exist to him, (all things) exist to him. Though (all things) exist to him, existing they do not exist. Though (all things) are (in his Mind), being there they are not there. Therefore a Sūtra says: 319 'The Bodhi-mind sees all the dharma and yet no thing is seen'.

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313 Quotes the general contents of the sūtra. YK.
314 Chi't-hsiang 取相.
315 智觀屬智無所執取所知，觀 in pratyanvedha or khyati, i.e. in-seeing which excludes perception.
316 不物於物，YK: 不以物為有物。This is the same as 釆藤取之如 cf. above n. 294.
317 無是。The statement of the author, here refuted, was 當而無是。Cf. n. 298.
318 無是 HT 表示於無執儒 (?) We follow YK, 誰 can only refer to 他 not to A.
319 PNM: 1804 ff.
**Sixth Objection**

(Opponent:) The Mind of the Sage cannot be completely free from things. It may be that there is nothing (occupying his mind) still what is not a thing might serve as a thing.\(^{320}\) The scriptures\(^{321}\) say: ‘Truth has no distinct features, so Prajñā does not cognize’. This means that Prajñā cognizes nothing which has distinct features. If (now we would take it to mean that Prajñā) cognizes what has no distinct features, we need no longer worry about Prajñā.

Author: (The Mind of) the Sage is not ‘what has no distinct features’. If we interpret as you propose, then ‘what has no distinct features’ would mean something ‘that has (just that) distinct feature (of having no distinct feature)’. Rejecting the positive and turning to the negative instead, he would be behaving like one who, in order to avoid peaks, walks into the mountain-torrent. In either case he cannot avoid disaster.

Therefore the Cosmic Man takes his stand on the positive without asserting it (one-sidedly); he takes his stand on the negative also without asserting it (one-sidedly); though he does not hold on to either of them, he also does not let one go. Therefore ‘adapting his brilliance to the dust of daily life’\(^{322}\) he wanders through the Five Planes of Existence.\(^{323}\) Noiseless he goes, unnoticed he comes, not mingled in life and yet everywhere present.

**Seventh Objection**

(Opponent:) You maintain that the Sage, though not cognizant, ‘responding to (our needs), never discriminates’.\(^{324}\) Therefore, when there is an occasion to respond he responds, when there is none he spares himself. His Mind is sometimes awake sometimes not. Is that the right way to put it?

(Author:) Rise and decay are states of mind (citta). As the Sage has no mind how can these states originate? Still, he has a Mind, though a Mind which is not a mind (filled with single facts).\(^{325}\) And he makes Responses, though not responses which are responses (to single demands). Therefore, the Way (Tao) of the Sage, understanding (our needs) and responding to them, resembles the law (which makes) the four seasons (come and go). As there is no substantial core (in this process,

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\(^{320}\) 離以無是可是: What exists in modo negativo also exists, cf. above Part II, II.3, p. 61.

\(^{321}\) This quotation could not be traced. The commentaries give no hint.

\(^{322}\) Cf. Lao-tzu 4.

\(^{323}\) Gods, men, animals, ghosts, and the damned. Notice how Seng-chao simply forgets about Prajñā and goes on with the Sage in her place.

\(^{324}\) 慈應會之道不善 cf. the first objection, n. 207.

\(^{325}\) 習心心 and 不應應 latter. I capitalize again in order to distinguish between the 'true language' and the ordinary one.
such as might undergo changes) the Way of the Sage does not (like a thing) rise and decay.\footnote{326}

**Eighth Objection**

(Opponent:) Non-cognition of the Sage and non-cognition\footnote{327} of ignorant people have this in common that they do not (like normal cognition) arise and decay. If so, how do you propose to discriminate between them? (Both are non-cognitions.)

(Author:) In the case of the Sage, non-cognition means absence of (normal) cognition (\textit{wu-chih}); in the case of ignorant people it means non-cognition of what is (true) (\textit{chih-wu}). Though in both cases cognition is said to be not (\textit{wu}) the reason why (this is said) is not the same.

The Mind of the Sage is blank and tranquil. It contains no cognition (and therefore also none) which could be said to be not true. So I call it \textit{wu-chih}. (Normal) cognition contains cognition which we might say is not (true). So I call it \textit{chih-wu}. (The same might be expressed as follows:) \textit{Wu-chih} refers to Prajñā not cognizant (of Illusion), \textit{chih-wu} refers to Truth not cognized (by the ignorant).\footnote{328}

**PRAJÑĀ AND TRUTH**

(Their relation is describable only in two seemingly contradictory statements depending on whether we regard the internal power of that relation as unfolded or as infolded.\footnote{329}

If we regard it as unfolded both (members) seem to separate though (actually) they remain in union. If we regard it as infolded they seem to be in union though (actually) they remain separate.

In the aspect of union, the Cosmic Mind contains no individual things. In the aspect of separation, (the cosmic contents) are fully displayed in the light (of the Cosmic Mind).

\footnote{326} 以虛無為體. A law 質, or an order, has 'a void as its core' because nothing in the order moves while things progress in accordance with it. Cf. PART I where this interesting idea is enlarged upon.

\footnote{327} 無智. 禪 should be 真, but no version gives this.

\footnote{328} YK 64b explains \textit{wu} 無 as 空. An allusion to Chih Tao-lin. Cf. \textit{HT} 435c and II. 305.

\footnote{329} The underlying picture is that of nature asleep during the cold and awake during the hot season. We use, of course, in the \textit{t'i-yüng} pattern. From Lao Tzu dates the idea that opposites such as high and low or bright and dark, can only exist together or together not exist. This applies to the cosmos and its contents. But Hung-chiao seems to feel that this analogy is insufficient to describe Cosmic Manifestation. Thus he turns to the mirror of the calm pond which in itself is dark but in the morning teasing with forms. The Mind of the Sage, Cosmic Consciousness, is such a mirror though one which actively creates and discards its contents.
Therefore what we consider as single is double and what we consider as double is a two-sided unity.

That, well understood, is neither single nor double.

(The relation regarded as unfolded)

In the (cosmic) centre the Mirror shines. Nothing else is there.\(^{330}\)
At the periphery the ‘ten thousand dharma’ are (waiting).\(^{331}\)
They are there (waiting to be called into being). Surely, this could never take place if (the Mirror) did not shine.
Within (the light) and without (all things) co-operate and thereby produce (World) manifestation.\(^{332}\)
Thus, dividing their union, the Sage manifests himself.

(The relation regarded as infolded)

Within (the Mirror) radiates. But (in the light) no things are perceptible. Without (all things) are (waiting though) not (yet) individualized.\(^{333}\)
Within and without (the cosmos) is calm. Co-operation has ceased.
Thus, restoring the union, the Sage withdraws into silence.

Therefore a Sūtra\(^{334}\) says: ‘Dharma do not differ (from each other)’. Does it tell us ‘to stretch the legs of the duck and cut short those of the crane’,\(^{335}\) to pull down the mountains and fill up the valleys in order to smooth out life? If only you can understand that the diverse is of the relative order then it loses its diversity. Therefore a Sūtra\(^{336}\) says: ‘Marvellous, World-honoured One, taking your stand in oneness you say that the dharma vary’. It also says: ‘Prajñā and the dharma are neither one nor two’. This we may believe.

Ninth Objection

(Opponent:) You have said (of Prajñā and Truth) that ‘they separate in the active state, they unite in the passive state’. Do you mean to say that Prajñā could be either in one or the other of two states?

\(^{330}\) 内有自覺之明.

\(^{331}\) 外有萬法之實. The ten thousand dharma (things) at the periphery of the universe are the facts of actual life. It looks as if Seng-chao visions them as already there and only waiting to be called into being by Cosmic Illumination. In Part IV this act is called creation 造 which is merely another word for that Self-manifestation of the Highest Being with which we get acquainted in this stanza.

\(^{332}\) Chao-kung 照功 in the name in ju-lai kung 如來功, Part I, II.6. n. 163.

\(^{333}\) 内雖照而無知, 外雖實而無相. 有相 are individuals, i.e. beings with individual destinies. This individualisation is brought about by self-manifestation of the Sage.

\(^{334}\) PSK: 38.4. 33.

\(^{335}\) Chuang-tzu II ch. 4 fol. 4b.

\(^{336}\) PSK: 39. 4.
These states are two aspects of the same state; they do not occur in isolation.\footnote{337} ‘Springing from one root they are given different names’.\footnote{338} There is no passive state produced by inactivity of an active one.\footnote{339}

Thus, the more Cognition fades, the brighter shines the Light (of Prajñā); the calmer the Spirit becomes, the more vividly he moves. How can it be said that light and darkness, motion and rest, are different states (in Prajñā)?

The \textit{Ch'eng-chu}\footnote{340} says: ‘(The Bodhisattva) not acting, acts untiringly’. And Ratnakūta\footnote{341} says: ‘Neither mind nor consciousness are required (of the Buddha-mind) to be intuitively cognizant’. These words refer to the World-spirit and his perfect wisdom, to things utterly beyond our reach. Interpreting them in the spirit of the Middle Path one should know the Mind of the Sage.\footnote{342}
THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH LIU I-MIN

LIU I-MIN SHU-WEN CHAO-KUNG TA

Covering Letter

I-min greets you.

The good news (that came from the Sangha in Ch'ang-an) gave me great delight; my thoughts seek you from afar. The year is near its end; the frost is severe. How is your health? Because communication was interrupted I had to store up (my longing thoughts). Your disciple lies seriously ill in the wilderness, always plagued by a fever. As Brother Hui-ming is going to the North, there (is now an opportunity to) make my feelings known to you.

Main Letter

I.

The men of old, though separated in body, kept their sentiments alive; if their thoughts harmonized, they were near each other. Though we are separated by streams and mountains and, up to now, there has been no possibility of our meeting, yet I have always longed to inhale

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343 Liu Ch'eng-chih, with the tsu Chung-szu and the hao I-min, descended from the ruling clan of the Han Dynasty. He came from P'eng-ch'eng in the province of Kiangsu of to-day. This well-educated and pious man was a small official under the Chin. When, with the revolt of Huan Hsüan, the breakdown of the Chin seemed imminent, he retired to Lu-shan to join the community which has gathered around Hui-yuan (see n. 354). After peace had been restored he refused to return to official life. Tradition tells of his simple life in the mountains and how in meditation he saw the Western Paradise of Amitābha. We are told in the letter that he was taken ill in A.D. 409. The disease must have been fatal, for he died in the following year. He composed the famous vow recited by all the members of the community when it was founded. Ch'eng-lu p. 83a lists one paper, the Shih hsin-wu-i and the Answering Letter mentions a song. Both are lost but the vow is extant in the biography of Hui-yüan KSCH 61. Cf. Lu-shan chi 廬山記 ch. 3 (Taisho LI: 1039b, c). The Sui Shu lists a commentary on the Lao-tzu hsüan-p'u 老子玄譜, 1 ch. Cf. Sui-shu ching-chi chih 隋書經籍志 29 (Kaiming vol. 34: 107b). A correspondence with Hui-yüan is preserved in the KHMCHI 27: 304 f. Cf. also Pelliot (1903): 304, 306 and (1912): 417 n. 1; and Zürcher (1959): 217–8.

344 The headline differs in the commentaries.

345 Text has Sanskrit vandanam (ho-nan).

346 Probably brought by Tao-sheng who must have arrived in the summer of 408 if the letter was written the last month of 409. Read wen 會 HT.

347 Read (T'ung). The eight characters after 會 are wanting in HT and YK.

348 The hostilities leading to the breakdown of the Chin Dynasty centered in the middle Yangt'sou Region north of Lu-shan.

349 The character 病 is to-day used for tuberculosis.

350 Otherwise unknown.
the breeze (of your piety), to reflect the trace of your earthly existence (your scriptures) in the mirror of my heart. Yearning for this pleasure, I suffered torments. You are so far away that there is no hope of meeting you; I can only gaze at the sunset-coloured clouds and sigh deeply. Take care of yourself as the season requires. I hope that (for the future) there will be messengers, so that our correspondence may be lively.

Humbly I pray that the community (in Ch’ang-an) may continue in good harmony and that the foreign teacher (Kumarajiva) may be comfortable. You, my master, famous for your power of understanding, were able to participate in the discussions concerned with abstruse matters. I feel that your work of exegesis (translating and expounding the scriptures) is equal to that done by the T’uan-tz’u 參辯 of the I-ching. Therefore, whenever I remember how far I am from you, I am deeply distressed.

The monks of the mountain (Lu-shan) lead a pure and regular life, the rules of the Law (dharma-śīla) are strictly observed. Outside the hours reserved for lonely meditation, they only study or lecture. They are so demure and well-ordered that it is a joy to see them. Watching this excellent course of conduct, your disciple (has achieved his desire harboured since past incarnations. The sincerity of my gratitude for being accepted (in this circle) is engraved (on my heart) for as long as the sun and moon (turn round).

The Dharma-teacher Hui-yüan 惠遠 bears himself as well as ever. He progresses in insight and meditation; he resembles the gentleman in the I-ching who is ‘lordly in the daytime and cautious at night’. Only a man who is permeated by Tao and whose mind is ruled by the Cosmic Law could possibly, at an age of over sixty years, still keep his soul as

388 All commentaries follow HT and explain ‘trace’ by Pan-jo wu-chih lun.
389 Cf. HT, YK. Hui-yüan uses the same phrases for the Mahāyāna śāstra (MS) cf. Yu-lu 10.21: 75c 5.
390 省心. Not in the Dictionaries but cf. 宿願, 宿念, 宿善, a.o.
391 Shih Hui-yüan 惠遠 is the founder of the Pure Land Sect (Ching-t’u tsung 淨土宗) who was a disciple of Tao-an. When the latter on the eve of his flight from Hsiang-yang 故揚 scattered his followers Hui-yüan went to Ching-chou 荊州. During his wanderings in the Yangtze Valley he discovered Lu-shan. He lived at first in the foothills, in a place called the Western Monastery (Hsi-lian 太林寺), later he had his own built, called the Eastern Monastery (Tung-lin 東林寺). Here he assembled a large community of monks and laymen, known in the legend as the White Lotus Community (Hui-lien-she 惠連社). Their religious activities centered in the worship of Amida. Their method of meditation was famous (cf. n. 369). Hui-yüan was a great organizer and well learned. His community and that in Ch‘ung-an were the two most important centres of Buddhism at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth century. He died in 416 or 417, at the age of 83 or 84. A part of his correspondence and some introductions are preserved in the KII/MCHI. Also his Correspondence with Kumārajiva (cf. the Bibliography). Cf. KSC II 6.1, trl. Zürcher (1950) 240-283. KII/MCHI 27, T‘ung (1938); 11.
392 (Cf. Hui-yüan 惠遠 and Ch‘ien Kua 欽若, third line (1 ch. 1 p. 1).
vigorous as he does. Filled with confidence and consolation my gratitude knows no limits.

At the end of last summer I was introduced by the venerable Tao-sheng to your book On Prajñā not Cognizant. It is written in a dignified and elegant style and contains deep and convincing ideas. In expounding the Scriptures you lead the reader gradually to an understanding of their conceptions. I found its thesis so interesting that I was unable to put it down. Truly, you have bathed your heart in the ocean of the Mahāyāna scriptures and obtained insight into their transcendental subjects. When the book is published, then Prajñā will be understood all over the world without further explanation. What joy! What joy!

It is difficult to put the subtle subject (you are concerned with) into words. He who sings such strange songs has few accompanists. The reader who cannot disentangle himself from words and symbols but sticks to them, will be lost. I should think that your criticism, answering the objection that 'from the existence of the object (Truth), one may infer cognition (of Prajñā)' is elaborate and conclusive, very ingenious and leaving no possibility of objection. But one as stupid as I cannot comprehend all at once. So I have still a few doubts which I shall now lay before you one by one. When time allows, I hope you will give me a brief explanation.

II. 1

Stating your thesis (II.4) you say: 'In essence Prajñā neither exists nor does not exist'; ‘Prajñā, though void, does not fail to shine;

356 Chu Tao-sheng 崔道生 was born in P'eng-ch'eng (as Liu I-min) in about A.D. 360 (T'ang). Disciple of Fa-t'ai. He spent seven years on Lu-shan. There he learned Sarvāstivāda dogmatics. After Kumārajīva's arrival in Ch'ang-an he wandered there and was well received. He returned in A.D. 408 (Ts 407) with Seng-cho's paper On Prajñā not Cognizant to be handed to Hui-yüan. When two years later Seng-cho sent his Commentary on the VŚK to Lu-shan, Tao-sheng must still have been there for, having read it, he found that he could do better and composed another Commentary on the same (Yu-lu: 111b 3). Later in the capital he had a dispute concerning the icchantika problem which lead to his expulsion from the monks’ community. In the incomplete text of the Nirvāṇa sūtra, brought to the South by Fa-hsien 法顯, these were said to be excluded from salvation. Tao-sheng dared to contest this point. He was justified when the complete text was translated. He opposed many of the dogmatics even of his near friends such as the belief in the Western Paradise, rewards for good deeds, illumination by degrees, etc. He wrote a number of important papers that are all lost. Only some letters are extant in the KHMCHI, and two Commentaries, a complete one on the Saddharma-pundarika sūtra (Miao-fa lien-hua-ching su 妙法莲花経疏) and parts of two others, on the Vimalakīrti sūtra (in the VŚ Commentary) and on the Nirvāṇa sūtra (in the Nich-pan-ch'ing chi-chieh 刚槃經集解). T'ao-sheng died A.D. 434 at Lu-shan. Cf. KSCH 7.1, T'ang (1938): chapter 16; cf. W. Liebenthal (1956a).

357 Allusion to a story told by YK.

358 See the account, 師法繁華經疏, III. third objection, cf. n. 305.

359 I here follow after a short introduction three questions.

though shining she remains void';\footnote{361} Therefore (the Fang-kuang) says: ‘Without moving (the Buddha) in sambodhi, assigns the dharma to their places’.\footnote{362}

In the following discussion (III) you say: ‘(Surely, his divine intelligence is) different from the human, so it cannot be found in the patterns of daily life’.\footnote{363} And further: ‘The passive and the active states are aspects of the same state. They do not occur in isolation’...

‘The calmer the Spirit becomes, the more vividly he responds’.\footnote{364}

The Mind of the Sage is dark and silent; as the Order of Nature, it is so truly existent that it has ceased to exist at all.\footnote{365} (It works without working, thus it is said to be) ‘though quick yet not quick, though slow yet not slow’.\footnote{366} Therefore, we know that cognition is not apart from tranquillity and tranquillity is not apart from cognition. Never is cognition absent, never is tranquillity absent.\footnote{367} Thus the Way of the Sage, leading beings to their predestined ends and (thereby) achieving his purpose\footnote{368} though it leads right through this world of symbols, is yet in that other world of the Unnameable.\footnote{368a} I confess to having never been able to understand this abstruse theory.

\footnote{361} 虽不失照, 照不失照 Cf. n. 277.
\footnote{362} 不動尊覺而建立諸法. Cf. n. 280.
\footnote{363} (職以) 輕於人之難明, 故不可以事相求之耳. Cf. first objection, n. 286.
\footnote{364} 靜即寂, 寂即用, 神藏靜, 应遙動. Cf. ninth objection, n. 337. After these quotations I-min uses his own language; he tries to give the phrases of Seng-choa a sense which he could understand, but, as he finally confesses, without success.
\footnote{365} 昏心冥寂, 理極同無.
\footnote{366} Cf. Huai-nan Tzu, ch. 泰族訓. 聲響寂流, 以聲相應也. 'The echo reacts to sounds. (It has no sound of its own.) Thus it is sometimes quick, sometimes slow.' This phrase, originating in Chuang-tzu, common with Hui-yüan, is here used by Liu I-min to interpret Seng-choa. Liu I-min thinks that the Sage or Nature, though answering the needs of beings, is not always active but waits for a situation which calls for him (kan 士) arousing him from his eternal trance. The same text is found in the I-Ching, Hsi-\footnote{367} 靡靜, 故不疾而速, 但最後一字亦另外具一意義. Cf. n. 712.
\footnote{368} 如不寂寂, 寂不寂知, 未始不寂, 未始不知. In the section ‘Prajñā and Truth’, above, eighth objection, I translated chi 寂 by 'passive state'. There we were in the common which unfolds or awakes from its primeval trance. Liu I-min, however, thinks of an individual meditator who awakes. This is, as cannot be emphasized too often, quite irrelevant in Buddhist-Taoist philosophies which do not work on facts, as Western science does, but on analogies, patterns and figures. It needs no saying that we remain in the t'i-yung pattern however much the milieu changes. When chin 知 is in the yung position ren-chih becomes t'i. When chih 知 is replaced by chao 知 (prajñā) we are transferred into Indian meditation and t'i becomes chi 被 'tranquillity' (sāmādhi), a term with which chao 知 is traditionally contrasted. But, in spite of this opaque assimilation and adaptation, which in translation makes the original pattern virtually unrecognizable, this pattern remains alive under the wrappings with extreme tenuity and can be traced by one who dares to dispense with the deceptive safety of the dictionaries. Cf. Hui-yuan's Introduction to the Dharmatāra-dhyāna-sūtra, Yu-lu 65b: ‘知不離寂, 寂不離知’, 知即佛智. 對必同理 ‘prajñā is not apart from sāmādhi, sāmādhi is not apart from prajñā. When (the Sage) is roused then both are activated, when he responds both achieve the same purpose.’ Prajñā is here Indian Buddhist prajñā.

\footnote{368a} 增駿成功. The commentators explain this passage in the Buddhist way: the Bodhisattva with the help of his accumulated good karma leads the Beings to salvation. One may think of the I-Ching. Cf. Hsi-t'ung A 10 (I ch. 7 p. 88) 增駿成功, 增天下之雄.
II. 2

A

But to-day I only wish to convey those doubts (which the members of the Lu-shan community have) concerning what is said in your excellent treatise about the double nature of the Mind of the Sage. (They propose the following explanation). 369

I. The Sage as Cosmic Meditator

(His mind) throws full light 窮靈 370 on the cosmic contents 極數.371

In blissful perfection 妙盡 372 his destiny is fulfilled 冥符.373

Hui-yüan, i.e. (in n. 367) 6sb 25 says: 豔俗成務, 功不待積 'converting the people he makes his profession; (success is immediate) not needing accumulation of karman', which shows that he thought of the Sage as the compassionate Buddha. 369a

369 YK thinks that the following two groups of eight words each refer to 有知 and 無知. HT understands similarly 有冥義 and 無冥義. TS explains that the first group represents 體 the second 用, which is certainly wrong. The later commentaries follow YK. All these explanations overlook the fact that the debatants are not orthodox Buddhists of the eighth but Buddhist-Taoists of the fourth century unacquainted with the style and the ideas of the other party. We have to study the writings of the Lu-shan community in order to understand these cryptic phrases. I propose the following interpretation: the two groups are alternatives (wei ... wei).

The first group 窮靈極數妙盡冥符 tries an explanation of Prajñā as intuition arrived at in meditation (as in samādhi-prajñā). This might be understood as cognition 知. The second group 將心體自然靈悟觀感 describes Prajñā as the natural law of deed and retribution. This law is silent 知, acting automatically, or rather reflectively and is, therefore, in Liu I-min's terminology, non-cognitive 無知. I guess we can, in spite of YK, this time dispense with the t'i-yung pattern.

Meditation at Lu-shan was understood as a sublimation 豐. Gradually the meditator loses his body and becomes more and more spirit. Finally he is an 'immortal' (as they are called in Taoism). There he communicates with the other spirits and lives in the bliss of the other world, having vanished from earth. (This is how 無生法忍 [anuttaradharmašāsā], quiescence, in which dharma do not arise, was understood by the Chinese.) Cf. Hui-yüan's description of this process in the Sha-men pu ching-wang che lun 沙門不敬王者論 3 (HMCHI ch. 5: 30c 13 f), (tr. by L. Hurvitz 1959: 96–114)反本求宗者...不以情累其生, 則生可滅; 不以生累其神, 則神可冥. 神神絕繫, 故謂之寂滅. 'He who returns to the origin striving for the essential, does not nourish his spirit with a mortal body; so the spirit may merge with nature and vanish in the unearthly realm which is called nirvāṇa.' For the community at Lu-shan nirvāṇa was something positive to be reached at the end of a career, while with Seng-chao it was not different from samsāra, and could be realized any time by those who would open their eyes.

370 HT has 禪, I read 識 which is more generally accepted, following Ts. Actually both terms are almost synonymous. 識 is light of spirits, which is at once reflection and illumination, is void or immaterial. It is a light which permeates bodies (throws no shadow). Chu Hsi (ad Ta-hui 九勒大學) 1 uses both terms as a compound 人之所得乎 天而庸靈不識, 以異鬼神而偏於佛者也. 'That heaven where we go is a spotless luminous void; adapted to cosmic order we are then in harmony with all motions.'

371 Cf. Hui-tsu A (fo ch. 7 p. 6b) 大衍之數五十，其用四十有九，and the commentary on this passage: 四十有九之數也。And later 散常於有物之殼而必明其所由之宗也. 'Always if one operates with the full number, i.e. if one has all the data available which are necessary for divination, the meaning of the respective combination of numbers is revealed.'
2. The Sage as Cosmic Judge

The term 'Mind (of the Sage)' refers to the Natural Law (of deed and retribution) which works in the dark and there waits (before it is applied to a case) in the human imperfection and of one's individual destiny.

In the first description (of the Sage as cosmic meditator) what you call the passive and the active states is certainly the same as what we call 'Meditation and Insight' (定慧).

For Hui-yuan and his contemporaries chi-shu 極數 signifies omniscience, the end of human imperfection and of one's individual destiny.

Y.C commenting on this phrase explains 能知法性 'he sees dhammatā'. But that is orthodox Buddhism. Cf. Hui-yuan in Yu-lu 55b: 妙存故數無 and ibid. 數無不約. This describes the Paradise of Amitābha. These quotations say exactly the same as our text. In samādhi World goes and blessed non-World appears. Cf. also ibid. 64e 1 f: 每妙物者，踞群動以至壹而不有，虜大意於未形而不無，無思無為而無不為。'Why is (the Sage) called a blessed being? Though moving with the various changes towards unity, he is not existent, though wide as the universe, being immaterial, he is not non-existent. He does not ponder, does not act and yet is not inactive.' Notice how here a whole cluster of cosmological associations has broken loose and settled in a description of psychological facts.

Ming 冥 is all that is dark, i.e. invisible to human eyes, or 'under the surface'. The term may refer to Nature or karman. Why do dry branches put forth buds in spring? Why must a certain person die in his youth without having done anything wrong? The reason is unknown, invisible, ming. Therefore the term refers also to that dark realm where our destinies are decided upon. 房 means 'tally', like the two parts of a bamboo-slip used in identification. A Taoist, reading ming-fu, would think of the judge in the nether ying world who studies the record of a soul, 'strikes the balance', and decides what retribution is due. Cf. the following passage from Liu I-min's Vox (in Hui-yuan's biography KSHC 6: 358c27f.): 聚化之理既明，則三世之徴然矣。運數之數符，則運數之報必矣。The Natural Law of (Buddhist) causality has been revealed and we know that our good and bad karman is handed down through the Three Times. The configurations (which form in the karmic milieu) brought about by commotions (right or wrong hopes and despairs) are transferred (invisibly) and finally checked (with the Natural Law). (A decision is arrived at reflectively) and the (proper) retribution for (our) good and bad (actions) is determined (by striking a balance). This quotation shows rather clearly the picture in which the meditators around Hui-yuan thought. Evidently, the picture to which Seng-chao's language refers is completely different.

Ming pao-ying lun 明報應論 (HMCHI 5:33c). 'Evil and good deeds are responded to in due course. Because call and response correspond (nature) is called spontaneously answering calls.' I understand the phrase 獨感 not as Seng-chao but as Liu I-min did. 造業之業其所感，感之然而然故獨之自然. Cf. n. 267 and n. 373. 自然 = 自然之理. Natural Order (Li or Tao) has two sides or phases: that of feeling or waiting in expectation (han) and that of acting or really responding (ying). In the phase of han forebodings appear in heaven while in the phase of ying destiny (shu) is changed in earnest. On Lu-shan the metaphor of the moonphases was used in this meaning. Notice that these patterns are not to be mixed up with yin-yang.

A term from the Lao-tzu, 20 (河上公) 獨確兮其未兆 (The Sage) waits before world-origin.

Cf. n. 267, 獨感，欠感.

Seng-chao does not say 獨然 but 獨然, which does not refer to a mental state (心) only.

定慧——止觀, two terms which later became important in the T'ien-chi School. Cf. Seng-chao's commentary on the VSKY 344b 30. They translate the Pali samatho evipassadda, of Mafājī, nib. (P.T.S.) 11 494 and passim, Kota VII 131 Ohrniller (1933) 161 f. Lamotte (1938), Samādhinirmocana nīṭta, text VIII. Manekri samādhi and paññā.
In the second description (of the Sage as cosmic judge) is expressed that (his) response to the manifold commotions (caused in the karmic field by our deeds) has ceased.\(^{379}\)

(I could accept this interpretation of the Sage as cosmic judge, but if you insist that) the configurations of destiny which form in his mind\(^{380}\) have faded (from the picture) and yet his Illumination holds sway, that the Spirit stays unaffected beyond the Changes and yet the light of his lonely Vision shines,\(^{381}\) (then I am unable to follow and) only hope that you will let me know what profound proof you possess (for this theory).\(^{382}\)

Further, my friends think it absurd to call non-existent a mind which rules in continuous response to any given karmic situation, foreseeing future changes. You called this mind ‘essentially free from ignorance which perceives objects of its own imagination’\(^{383}\) But you have never stated how it could not perceive objects. We think you should first decide whether (the Sage) rules our destinies because he is only able to reflect (in his mind) a thingless world, or because he foresees all the changes (on Earth).

If he foresees the changes, he would not (reflect) a thingless world; in the other case no world which he could rule would be there.\(^{384}\) I am unable to see how in these circumstances his rule could take effect, and beg you to explain this point again.

You write:\(^{385}\) ‘Though (his Mind) is empty (of things), (all things) are (in his Mind); though (things) do not exist to him, (all things) exist to him. Though (all things) exist to him, existing they do not exist. Though (all things) are (in his Mind), being there they are not there’. Now,

\(^{379}\) 聞數之應固以幾乎息矣 cf. Hsi-ts’u A 12 易不可見，則乾坤或幾乎息矣. When no more changes are seen then heaven and earth have disappeared from the scene. 

\(^{380}\) 心數 HT: 善智; YK: cittamahābhumika (?). These are the configurations of destiny in the Mind of the Sage.

\(^{381}\) 智明獨存. Cf. n. 330.

\(^{382}\) Hui-yüan, in the Correspondence 2 (Ch’ung wen fa-shen 重問法身): 123c if discussing the dharma-kāya says: 陰陽之表豈可感而成化乎．如其不可則造窮數蠻，理無所出．水鏡之像有因而像，真法性生復何由哉 ‘Separated from yin-yang (Earth) how is it possible (for the dharma-kāya) to succeed in converting the beings? If that is impossible, then the end of the earthly pilgrimage is reached, destiny is fulfilled, and there is no reason for him to reappear on Earth. It is said that he appears like an image reflected by the surface of a pond, but even then the image is caused (by an external body). But what is there which could cause true dharma-kāya to reappear?’

\(^{383}\) 本無成取之知, cf. second objection 火融心著微妙無相.

\(^{384}\) 無會可顯.

\(^{385}\) In the fifth objection.
'though (his Mind) is empty (of things), (all things) are (in his Mind)' could mean that Cosmic Life is there; 'though (things) do not exist to him, (all things) exist to him' could mean that Reality exists (in his Mind). But how could Reality exist and not exist; how could Cosmic Life there be and not be? Nevertheless you say that 'things are and are not in his Mind', that 'they exist and do not exist (to him)'. If you simply mean to say that Cosmic Life is not normal life, that Real Existence is not normal existence, this would just refer to the basic disparity between Truth and Illusion. I really do not know what you aim at. Please explain yourself again so that our doubts may disappear.

II. 3

The day the treatise arrived, I examined it thoroughly with the Dharma-teacher Hui-yuan. He too understood it well and perceived the meaning. But it seems that each of us has his own doctrinal background (which colours his opinion) and that therefore the theory may not be identically the same in all cases. We handed your work round. All liked it and many scanned it with relish. We only regret not being able to be with you.

Seng-chao's Answer

COVERING LETTER

For a long time I have hoped to meet you but my wish has always been frustrated. When Brother Hui-ming arrived, I received the letter of the twelfth month of last year, containing your questions. I unrolled and perused it over and over again and was filled with joy as if you were with me in person. Autumn has brought cool winds. How is your health? An old disease often pestered this unworthy one. I rarely feel well. Since the messenger is leaving for the South I must be short.

The 15th day of the 8th month (A.D. 410).

Reply of Shih Seng-chao.
Though our garb is not the same our religious aspirations are one. Though separated by mountains and rivers, we are neighbours in that we agree about (main) principles. Therefore, turning my mind in your direction, my thoughts meet you and my longings are soothed. By living of your own desire in proud retirement you manifest a more than common beauty of mind; leading a solitary life in seclusion your heart is filled with joy. (The members of your community resemble Juan Ssu-tsung who) never gossiped but discussed only the philosophical principles underlying a case. (Your songs remind me of) the noble poems (composed by the Seven Philosophers in the Bamboo-grove). (I admire) your high aspirations which reach forward to the supramundane sphere. I trust that your peace will not be disturbed and that you will take care of yourself. (I hope that) I shall receive a letter from you whenever there is a messenger available.

I. 2

I wish the monks on your mountain good health and all happiness to the clergy and the laymen. I was comforted to hear that the Dharma-teacher Hui-yuan is well as ever. Though I cannot yet join your pure life, my wish to submit to your high regulations becomes more ardent from day to day. (I admire) Hui-yuan who, though over sixty now, still leads a life of the strictest austerity, watching his flock in the remoteness of the mountain, ‘embracing unity in the emptiness of the valley’. People from far and near revere and praise him. Can there be anything more beautiful?

I stand on tiptoe and peer in your direction but the horizon is covered with clouds. Being unable to express my veneration, I am deeply grieved. You are fortunate to be in the presence of this model of pure life all day long, and (growing in) understanding, you rejoice.
I. 3

The large community here (in Ch'ang-an) is as usual, the Dharmateacher Kumārajīva is well. Piety is the very nature of the King of Ch'in. His abilities are extraordinary. He is a wall and moat to the Three Jewels; he feels that propagating the Law is his official duty. This induces eminent monks from foreign countries to come here from afar. The spirit of the Grīḍhakūṭa Mountain permeates this country.

Chih Fa-ling went abroad to get Scriptures which will be as fords and bridges for thousands of years to come, and brought back from the West over two hundred new Mahāyāna sūtras. (The King) invited a teacher of Mahāyāna meditation, a teacher of the Tripitaka

400 Read 園 for 典 YK.
401 The mountain where most of the sermons are preached.
402 No biography is extant but he is mentioned in the Biographies of Hui-yüan and Buddhahadra. He was a disciple of Hui-yüan who sent him to Central Asia in A.D. 392. He collected manuscripts in Khotan, among them the Avadānajāka sūtra in 60 chapters which was later translated by Buddhahadra.
403 The date of his arrival in Ch'ang-an is much discussed. The Introduction to the Dharmaguptaka vinaya (Szu-fen-lu) says that he came with Buddhayasas and this is improvable because Buddhayasas arrived A.D. 407 in convoy on the invitation of the King, and Fa-ling may have availed himself of the opportunity. The Dharmaguptaka vinaya was translated in 410-412, but earlier Buddhayasas had already translated the Daśabhūmika sūtra (Shih-chu ching); so he must have come before this date. Our text says that Fa-ling invited the two monks mentioned below (n. 407). MSCH 18 gives an even earlier date: 406, but then Seng-chao's news would have been stale because Tao-sheng arrived at Lu-shan in 408 and would certainly have reported the arrival of Fa-ling and his books. The Introduction mentioned above is probably spurious. T'ang (1938): 303, 306.
404 The following nineteen characters are lacking in HT and in the Yu-lu. They may be interpolated, which would help to solve the difficulty dealt with in the preceding note.

405 Buddhahadra (Chih-hsien 聖賢). A strange but important person. He was a disciple of the Sarvāstivādin Buddhhasena and renowned for his grandeur and his supernatural faculties. He reached Ch'ang-an via Kansu (not Annam as the legend given) in A.D. 410 or earlier (A.D. 406). There he found disciples and enemies. In 411 he was expelled and went to Lu-shan, where he was well received by Hui-yüan who sent a messenger to complain about his treatment. He died in the Southern Capital A.D. 449. A story related in his Biography (KSCH 2.6) is characteristic of the man and his relation to Kumārajīva. He had come to Ch'ang-an expecting to meet a great thaumaturge but found in Kumārajīva a very modest and rational man with no other powers than his personal charm. Once he asked Kumārajīva: 'All the texts you translate are within the reach of normal understanding. There is no reason why these translations should make you famous.' Kumārajīva answered: 'People respect me because I am old and wrinkled. One is not necessarily flattered for one's virtue.' Cf. HT, T'ang (1918): 306-310, 397-398; Buguchi (1927): 341.

406 Buddhayaśas 佛陀敷多羅 (Chih-hsien 聖賢). A proud Brahman, Kumārajīva's teacher and friend, from whom he had learned Mahāyāna in Kushan. He had followed Kumārajīva to Kucha, but when the latter urged him to come to Ch'ang-an he repeatedly declined the invitation. When he came he was treated with great respect and had premises in the palace placed at his disposal. His surname was Vaiśālīnītika with the red mantuca. Biography in KSCH 2.6; cf. T'ang (1908): 315; Buguchi (1927): 305. The Commentaries with the exception of YK hold that the teacher of the Tripitaka mentioned in the text was another monk, Dharmarāja 嘉那良, who arrived in Ch'ang-an in A.D. 408
and two teachers of the (Hinayana) Vibhūṣā.\textsuperscript{407} In the Great Stone Monastery\textsuperscript{408} Kumārajiva is translating the sūtras which recently arrived. The storehouse of the Law is deep and wide, it daily shows unexpected features.

The teacher of meditation (Buddhabhadra) in the Palace Monastery (Hsiao-yao Park)\textsuperscript{409} is teaching the practice of meditation. He has several hundred disciples who work without rest day and night. They are reverent and harmonious. It is very gratifying.

The teacher of the Tripitaka (Buddhayāsas) is translating the Vinaya\textsuperscript{410} in the Central Monastery. His recitation is as completely free from mistakes as if it came from the lips of the Tathāgata himself.\textsuperscript{411}

The teachers of the Vibhūṣā (Dharmayāsas and Dharmagupta) are reading the Śāriputra-abhidharma sāstra\textsuperscript{412} from a Sanskrit manuscript and continued the translation of the Sarvāstivāda vinaya (Shih-sung lū 十藏律), interrupted since the death of Punyatrāta 佛若多羅. Dharmaruci had a bad record in the Academy, for after eight years of labour he had not succeeded in completing the translation which was later finished by Vimalākṣa. He lived in the Ta-szu 大寺 in the Hsiao-yao yuăn 檜築園 while the translator mentioned in our text lived in the Chung-szu 中寺. It seems that the Commentary rejected Buddhhayāsas because they assumed that the letter was written in 409, when the translation of the Dharmagupta-ka vinaya had not yet begun. This objection is untenable if the letter was written in 410, as T'ang thinks. Buddhhayāsas was famous and it is probable that Seng-chao mentioned him rather than the mediocre Dharmaruci. Cf. Ch'oron: 100 n. 128, T'ang (1938): 306.

\textsuperscript{407} These can only be Dharmayāsas 梵摩耶舎 and Dharmagupta 梵摩須多. Both arrived in A.D. 407. Dharmayāsas was a Sramana from Kashmir. He later went to Chiang-ling 江陵 where he found disciples, among whom was the well-known Fa-t'ung 法護.\textsuperscript{408} Ta-shih szu 大寺 is Ta-szu 大寺. In A.D. 405 (Ch'oron has A.D. 403) Kumārajiva moved inside the town. The topography of Ch'ang-an is not very clear (cf. the literature listed in n. 6). We have to distinguish two large compounds and several smaller places of which two are mentioned here. (a) The Hsiao-yao Park 檜築園 north-west of the town on the border of River Wei 沃水. Here the King had built a palace (Hsiao-yao kung 檜築宮 or kuan 觀 or kung-szu 官寺) flanked by two pavilions, of which the western one was used for translation work. Lectures were held in the Ch'eng-hsian T'ang (the later seng-cheng 僧正) inside the walls. Here the majority of the monks were lodged. This place was so large that it was later divided into four single monasteries. (b) The Great Monastery with the Matshed Hall (Ta-s'ao-t'ang 草堂) inside the walls. Here the Central Monastery (Chung-szu 中寺), also inside the town. (c) The Stone-sheep Monastery (Shih-yang szu 石羊寺). The monks were organized under a seng-chu 僧主 (the later seng-cheng 僧正) with the rank of a shih-chung 僧中. The first head-official was Seng-lüeh 僧勳 (KSCH 6.8) who directed two offices, an educational and an administrative one (Tso-yu liang-hsü 左右兩序).

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\textsuperscript{410} The Dharmagupta-ka vinaya (Taishō 1428) translated in A.D. 410-412 (according to Seng-chao's Introduction to the Dīrghāgama Yu-lu 9.7; cf. T'ang 1938: 306).

\textsuperscript{411} Buddhhayāsas intoned the whole text (447 pages in the Taishō edition) from memory. The Chinese first doubted that this could be done without a mistake, but he proved his proficiency by intoning a manual of medicine, the written text of which was at hand. YK.

\textsuperscript{412} Shi-l'i fo a-pi-t'ao hui 向利佛阿毘混 (Taishō 1548). A text of the Dharmagupta Sūtra Kōta, Introduction VII. The Sanskrit was taken down in A.D. 407/8, but the Indians were unable to interpret it in Chinese and had to wait till they were better acquainted with the language. They finished it in 414. YK. Cf. Tso-pha'n 郭 Phạm Introduction in the Yu-lu 10.8 718.
in the Stone-sheep Monastery; though the translation has not yet started, whenever one asks about the contents, one hears interesting details.

My unworthy self has had the unique opportunity of sharing regularly in this noble endeavour and of joining in these thriving cultural activities. Since I cannot see the disciples of Śākyamuni, assembled in the Jetavana Garden, I have no other wish left except that you gentlemen who prosper by standing aloof (from business and politics) could belong to our community.

The venerable Tao-sheng was with us for several years. Whenever there was time for conversation we spoke of you with affection. Unexpectedly he went South and you have met him (as I learn from your letter). Apart from that news I have had no word of him and feel unspeakably uneasy.

Brother Wei brought (from Lu-shan) your Song called ‘Meditation on the Buddha’, another with the same title by Hui-yūn and Hui-yūn’s Introduction (to the whole collection). Everybody with literary taste praises this work for its high intention and clear and beautiful wording. One might say, you have wandered to the dwelling of the Sage and knocked at his gate. There must be other compositions of yours and the teacher. Why do you send so few?

In the year wu (A.D. 406) Kumārajīva translated the Vimalakīrtiniśruta. I then attended regularly and, between the sessions, took down what the Master had said, in order to make a commentary on it. Though this cannot be considered as a literary composition it derives some value from being based upon authority. So I take the occasion of

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413 Cf. Seng-choo’s Introduction to the VSK Yu-lu 8.12.
414 ‘Till the summer of 408. How long was Tao-sheng in Ch’ang-an? YK Ts a.o. say two or three years. But did he come so late? Mano Senryū: 11 dates his sojourn in Ch’ung-an 407-409(?).
415 Lit. ‘inside the limits of speech’.
416 Otherwise unknown.
417 This collection of songs, all with the same title Nien-fo san-mei yung, was written at Lu-shan in 402, when some hundred pious Buddhists, monks and laymen, led by Hui-yūn, assembled and took the vow to be reborn in the Western Paradise (the realm of Amītābha). The religious practice of this sect (nien-fo 念佛 Jap. numbutsu) consists to-day in the devout mumbling of the name of Amītābha: namu amitābha, words that can be heard everywhere in the Buddhist Orient. But this was a later development. Originally it was a kind of meditation in which the Paradise was visualized, Sanskrit buddhānusmytī nāma samādhi (Mbh. 51.1 and Majjh. Nik. 28, P.T. ed. p. 186, 188 foll.). Hui-yūn had read about this practice in the Pratyutpanna-buddha sammohavasatiḥta Samādhi (Pau-chou san-mei ching 殿舟三昧經, Taishō 418). He discussed it with Kumārajīva in the Correspondence 11. (Cf. also the Amītāyur-dhyānasūtra (Kuan wu-ling-chou ching 觀無量壽經, Taishō 364). Only one of the songs by Wang Ch’il-chih 三寶之 and Hui-yūn’s Introduction to the whole collection are extant in the KUMON 301 581. Cf. Yung (1958): 371 foll. and 708/9.
418 Read 翭, YK.
this letter to send you a copy. You might, in your leisure, judge if it is worth reading.\textsuperscript{419}

Your questions are beautifully put and to the point. In answering them I feel like the man from Ying.\textsuperscript{420} My thoughts do not reach very deep and I am not skilful in expressing them. Besides, the path to the goal cannot be defined because definitions define only one path each, (never the final path).\textsuperscript{421} Words, words—and what is finally achieved? But let us set to work and answer your objections as far as my inadequate powers allow.

II. 1

Commenting (on my treatise) you quote me saying: 'The Mind of the Sage is dark and silent; as Order of Nature it is so truly existent that it has ceased to exist at all.'\textsuperscript{422}—'Though present in this world of nameable things it also belongs to that far world where no nameable things exist'.\textsuperscript{423}—And you 'confess to have been never able to understand this abstruse theory'.

(I answer:) If this worries you, forget about the words and let your understanding naturally grow. Meditate upon it. Why take the inconsistency of our human minds as a standard of the Mind of the Sage?

II. 2

A

You say that those with whom you discussed (my treatise) wonder (at the double nature of the Sage and that they propose two explanations), namely:

(1) (His mind) throws full light on the cosmic contents. In blissful perfection his destiny is fulfilled.

In the first description (of the Sage as cosmic meditator) what you call the passive and the active states is certainly the same as what we call Meditation and Insight.

(2) The term 'Mind (of the Sage)' refers to the Natural Law (of deed and retribution) which works in the dark and there waits (before it is applied to a case).

\textsuperscript{419} Read 謹請取看 YK.

\textsuperscript{420} Chiang-ling in the modern province of Hupeh. Ying had a piece of chalk on his nose as big as a fly. He asked a mason to knock it off. The mason took a hammer and swung it so cleverly that the fly was removed and the man not hurt. Cf. \textit{Chuang-tzu} 24.6.

\textsuperscript{421} 六地無常, 會必無常. 飛 may be gati. Six gati form the wheel of Life. The 'final gati' is the exit.

\textsuperscript{422} 聽心冥寂, 聽靜問俗. Cf. \textit{Questions} II.1 n. 365. The phrasing is Liu I-min's. But Hsang-chiao does not mind that he is incorrectly quoted.

\textsuperscript{423} 聽淡有光之中而虛無無名. Cf. n. 366.
In the second description (of the Sage as cosmic judge) is expressed that his response to the manifold commotions (caused in the karmic field by our deeds) has ceased.424

But Meditation and Insight (I) are not the right words to describe (the Sage) who, blissfully perfect, vanishes (into the other world). And (2) ‘he works in the dark and waits (to apply himself)’ cannot imply that ‘his response to (karmic) commotions has ceased’.

These two statements may seem contradictory but in the aspect of Blissful Union they are not so.425 Traces are different from the one who leaves them but they are not so with the Sage.426

You have said that ‘the dark Mind of the Sage shines with a lightless light; as Order of Nature it is so truly existent that it has ceased to exist at all.’427 This implies that (Order of Nature) belongs in the category (of in-existent entities) and yet exists most truly. Can ‘what is so truly existent that it has ceased to exist at all’ have a name, viz. ‘Meditation and Insight’? (No.) And this term is also out of place if it is meant to designate anything else (but what is so truly existent that it has ceased to be existent).

(To say the same in the form of two _prasanga_)

(i) Could the term (‘Meditation and Insight’) be used to describe (Cosmic Order) for the reason that it belongs to the category (of in-existent entities)?428 (No.) As a term it could not denote (an in-existent entity).

(ii) Could the term (‘Meditation and Insight’) be used to describe (Cosmic Order) for the reason that it does not belong to the category (of in-existent entities)? (No.) It would be unrelated to Him (the subject of our argument).429

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425 妙用常一.
426 阅读此句，如果无殊也。HT has no comment. YK and the latter comms. merely guess. 这无须被理解为 这和 所以 這 a phrase which occurs in _Chuang-tzu_, Book 5, and _passim_ with Kuo Hsiang.
427 黑暗 = 竟寂, see n. 365. I read 黑 with YK.
428 生, as we had before in 不畏生. See n. 221.
429 We 軒, the one who 'leaves traces', or the Buddha as Cosmic Creator, is identified with 無, Cosmic Order. Cosmic Order is, ‘as it were in-existent’. ‘Meditation and Insight’, words used by Liu I-min to describe the Cosmic Mind, is a name of something which occurs in the world and is, for that reason, existent. Whatever exists is not ‘as it were in-existent’ but belongs to the category of existent entities. It cannot be used to designate Cosmic Order. So much is clear. But why does Seng-chao, at the end of his argument, replace 'Order' by 'Him', the Sage? Is his intention to introduce to the reader the term 'He' 軒 as one more synonym of 'Sage'? This is the second time that 'He' is used in this sense. (It is done in PART II, 1.1 and _passim_ in PART IV). Seng-chao knew the NS and quotes it in the _NS_ Commentary: 342c, so it is possible that 轒 translates _dāman_ or rather _bhādraman_, the 'true self' of that _ātma_. However, in Ishihara (1966) _'Nya', Variations of Meaning', I show that Seng-chao more probably thought of 'Him who is self-sufficient' ou _teu-jen_ 頭真無 of _Lao-teu_ 17, the Sage.
Though the Mind of the Sage is void and invisible, though (the Sage) is not of our world, yet he responds to all our requirements and remains in sympathy with every need.\textsuperscript{430} (Sitting) unseen in the pivot of the Universe\textsuperscript{431} he makes it wheel around him, a manifestation achieved without exertion.\textsuperscript{432} In his fateful response, what action is involved which could cease?

\textbf{B}

\textit{What there is in (our) mind, what is it?}

(We take it for granted that things) are what in the mind they appear to be. But these appearances do not exist in their own right.\textsuperscript{433} Therefore the Sage does not take their existence for granted. It follows that (what we know to) exist is not existent (as He knows it) and (what we know not to) exist is not non-existent (as He knows it). The Sage neither asserts nor denies existence. His Mind is void.\textsuperscript{434} What does this mean?

(Things), existent and non-existent, are reflections and echoes within the mind. Sounds and forms (outside) are the objects producing these reflections and echoes.\textsuperscript{435} Where (things), existent and non-existent, have gone, such a mind is free from reflections and echoes and what sounds and forms there are, are no longer experienced. That (mental) landscape contains no phenomena (like those which impede our vision). So we might say that ‘(the Sage) throws full light\textsuperscript{436} (on the cosmic contents)’ which means that ‘he is blissfully perfect’. ‘Blissfully perfect’ he is nowhere.

\textit{Nowhere, he has ‘vanished (into the other world)’}.\textsuperscript{437} Therefore, I used the word ‘void’ to make clear that he is no longer in this world. ‘Blissfully perfect he shares cosmic fate’. Therefore, I used the word ‘fate’ to make clear that his fate is cosmic.\textsuperscript{438}

Because he has a fate, he moves with the world; because his fate is not of this world, his way leads beyond the nameable.

\textsuperscript{430}妙絕常境 = 無絕群方, later translated ‘his mental landscape contains no phenomena’. 会無不應, 會無不通. Kan-ying 感應 sympathetic response, is here dissected and each term enlarged upon without adding anything substantial. Later the final terms, 應 and 道, are picked out for further re-phrasing.

\textsuperscript{431} 神機, hidden spring, HT: 神機. My free translation gives the correct picture.

\textsuperscript{432}其用不勤, HT quotes the \textit{Book of Songs}.

\textsuperscript{433} 自有, ‘existing in freedom’, not dependent on causation.

\textsuperscript{434} 神 is not an organ as 心 but the author needed a contrast to 心 (our minds). 諸神 stands for 聲心. I rend 聲人 for 聲心 with Chéron. Cf. n. 272.

\textsuperscript{435} 影響之所標線 (\textit{Nambana-pratyaya}).

\textsuperscript{436} 則sta, it quotes the above 於處. I was in doubt whether Liu I-min did not also write 聲 above, but later Song-uh-ke explains 聲 as 聲.

\textsuperscript{437} 種數 replaces 種為 above translated as ‘his destiny is fulfilled’. See n. 373.

\textsuperscript{438} See n. 431.
Because his way leads beyond the nameable, he is called in-existent; because he moves with the world, he is called existent. He is called ‘existent’, or rather ‘in truth existent’. But, even so, a definition is enforced upon him (as somebody who so exists). (As definition,) how could it fit him (the indefinable one)?

A sūtra says: *The Mind of the Sage is simultaneously non-cognizant and all-cognizant. He does and yet does not take part in all that happens*.

He who has vanished into silence, the indescribable, inqualifiable one can he be said either to exist or not exist, either to move or have stopped—to stop like a tired person?

I am afraid your friends lay too much emphasis on words. ‘You look for corners in infinite space’. *You behave like a fortune-teller pretending to know the dark future*. You keep to what you know and believe you are infallible. Therefore, when you hear that the Sage cognizes, you mistake it for mental activity; when you hear that he does not cognize you mistake it for inability to cognize. Assertion and denial, both are one-sided; (as long as you hold fast to them) you are not on the Middle Path which is free from the Two Extremes.

Though things are manifold, essentially they are only One. Their existence should neither be taken for granted nor denied. If it is taken for granted, (illusive) conceptions grow and multiply; if not taken for granted, these same things are recognized as in truth they are. Therefore the Sage neither asserts nor denies the existence of things.

As he does not assert (their existence), (for him) they do not exist; as he does not deny (their existence), (for him) they do not non-exist.

As (their existence) is not asserted, they are not owned; as (their existence) is not denied, they are not disowned.

Not disowned, they are (with him) in eternal bliss—which is their true state;

Not owned, illusive conceptions cannot produce karman.

Because no karman is produced there is no cognition; because (with all things) he lives in eternal bliss—which is their true state—, there is no non-cognition.
Therefore a sūtra\textsuperscript{449} says: ‘Prajñā neither owns nor disowns dharma. (Prajñā) neither cognizes nor does not cognize’. Is it not rather ridiculous to describe in terms of existence and non-existence a landscape where nothing happens that has karmic consequences, where nothing is experienced?\textsuperscript{450}

Listen, you who argue whether (the Sage) cognizes or not. Cognition occurs—where?\textsuperscript{451} Only among phenomena. But, ultimately dharma are not phenomena. Then what does the Sage cognize? (On the other hand), what people call non-cognition is found in inanimate nature, wood, stones, in empty space. Can this kind of non-cognition be attributed to (the Sage) for whom the universe has no secrets,\textsuperscript{452} who was before life stirred, resplendent mirror, candle in the dark?\textsuperscript{453}

Non-cognition is conditioned by cognition.\textsuperscript{454} Where cognition is absent, non-cognition is also absent. Where cognition is absent, it (is said) not to exist; where non-cognition is absent, it (is said) not to non-exist. Therefore (I could say): ‘(Prajñā), though void, does not fail to shine; but, though shining, she remains void’.\textsuperscript{455} Her ‘light, like nature’s light, is dimmed’, she is forever ‘passive’,\textsuperscript{456} she neither rules nor controls. Still, who dares to say that, moving, she exists whereas when at rest she does not exist? Therefore a sūtra\textsuperscript{457} says: ‘Prajñā neither exists nor does non-exist. She neither rises nor decays’. This (fact) can never be brought home to the people.

Saying, ‘she does not exist’, I mean, ‘she is not a thing existing’, I do not mean, ‘she is a thing non-existing’.

Neither does she exist nor does she not exist;
Neither does she non-exist nor does she not non-exist.\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{449} Cf. \textit{PSM}: 61c 6. \textit{WTS}.

\textsuperscript{450}非唯不立, 無所依也.

\textsuperscript{451}夫智之生也.

\textsuperscript{452}歯無幹端. The ‘motive’ of Tao, ‘the course things must take’, is not hidden to Prajñā.

\textsuperscript{453}喜動無常.

\textsuperscript{454} Read 無知生於有知 (HT 441b). They form a pair of things born.

\textsuperscript{455} PART III, II.4, p. 69 無不生, 生不失時.

\textsuperscript{456}然亦不滅. Alludes to 賴  above.

\textsuperscript{457} YK says that the general contents of the \textit{PSM} is quoted. What could 頃殫殫 he in \textit{Husskrit}?

\textsuperscript{458} This is the fourfold formula of the Middle Path (\textit{catuppaddhi}). As to the difference between 師 (\textit{maṇḍala}) and 師, cf. \textit{PART II}, n. 588.
Therefore Subhûti\textsuperscript{459} preached Prajñā all day long, but denied that he had said anything. How indeed, can a subject be communicated which is beyond the reach of language?\textsuperscript{460} I hope that you, gentlemen, who are acquainted with metaphysics,\textsuperscript{461} will understand me (without words).

\textbf{D}

You said further: 'You should first decide whether (the Sage) rules our destinies because he is only able to reflect a thingless world or because he foresees all the changes (on Earth?).\textsuperscript{462}

Those who discussed my treatise seem to assume that these Two Worlds are separated. (They think that the Sage) in order to foresee the Changes must leave the thingless World,\textsuperscript{463} that in order to reflect that World he must cease to rule our destinies in accordance (with natural law). If that is your idea, you are mistaken about the theory of the Middle Path.\textsuperscript{464}

A sūtra says: 'Rūpa is not different from śūnya and śūnya is not different from rūpa but what rūpa is that śūnya is also'.\textsuperscript{465} If you were right, then, when rūpa is recognized as śūnya, in one moment of recognition rūpa would appear, in another moment śūnya. In the first moment rūpa would only be rūpa not śūnya; in the (second) moment śūnya would only be śūnya, not rūpa. This shows that you have not grasped the main idea (of the sūtra).\textsuperscript{466}

Therefore, when the sūtra says 'non-rūpa', it wishes to say that rūpa is non-rūpa, not that non-rūpa is non-rūpa. Or else, empty space would also be non-rūpa. What significance then would the word 'non-rūpa' possess? But, if rūpa is equated with non-rūpa, which implies that non-rūpa is nothing else than rūpa, then both are (transcendentally) the same. It follows that the Changes are simply the Thingless World and the Thingless World is simply the Changes. People, however, are different, and therefore the Scriptures (making allowance for the individual case) emphasize various sides of the same problem.

\textsuperscript{459} One of the disputants in the \textit{Pañcasūtrā}, cf. \textit{PSM}: 39c 20 f.
\textsuperscript{460} 絰言之違.
\textsuperscript{461} 當屬玄子, 當 as in 玄學.
\textsuperscript{462} Cf. \textbf{QUESTIONS} II.2 B p. 87.
\textsuperscript{463} 變 is Chinese (延變通化), 無粗 is Sanskrit (a-ํakṣaya); understood is World and non-World.
\textsuperscript{464} 両之之義, 即異 -- 即偏両異. Cf. n. 107.
\textsuperscript{465} 色即是色, 色即是色. Cf. \textit{PSK}: 233a 13 and the \textit{Prajñāpāramitā-hydaya sūtra (Tuishō 250 VIII: 847c 13)}. For Seng-chuo the terms rūpa and śūnya are synonymous with sāttvika—nirvāṇa or with the two sayas; but in Indian Buddhist rūpa is just one of the five skandhas, all of which are dharmas and therefore śūnya.
\textsuperscript{466} A typical Mādhyamika \textit{pramāṇa}: predication is impossible because subject and predicate are two dharmas that cannot exist in the same moment, \textit{YK}. 
If we investigate the abstruse texts thoroughly, if we search for the basic intention of the Sage, shall we still believe that Truth and Illusion involve a change in the Mind (of the Sage), that, when it is empty and when it is full (of things), these are two different phases? Therefore when (the Sage) reflects Reality, we still enjoy the (full) benefit of his benign rule; when he looks at the turmoil (below) this does not mean that he turns away from Reality. Simultaneously, when he creates 'World' he also creates 'non-World', when he creates 'non-World' he creates 'World'. Never, never one only, excluding the other one. The quotation from the Fang-kuang means just that when it says: 'Without moving, (the Buddha), in sambodhi assigns to the dharma their places'. Can we deduce from this that the two states, the passive and the active, exclude each other? How then can you believe that when (the Sage) foresees the Changes he loses sight of Reality?

I am afraid that saying 'it is absurd to call non-existent a mind which foresees future changes' you actually mean that there are two minds, one vacant, one full, and, correspondingly, two phases, that of rest and that of motion. You must abandon your narrow human standpoint and look for the hidden motive behind phenomena, understand that the World with all it contains is nothing but one Void and that this Perfect Void is not nothing. Then you will agree that the response of the Perfect Being never pauses, that he shares our restless life, that riding (the wagon of) Fate, he rules the Changes, and that yet he has never existed as (we exist).

The Sage being thus, what is there that he could perceive? And yet you object to me saying that 'his Mind is essentially free from ignorance perceiving objects'.

(You quote me saying:) 'Though no (thing) exists to him, all (things) exist to him' and conclude that this might refer to his Reality.

457 I complete the picture with 'below', though it does not occur here but elsewhere.
458 還未不異無. HT, YK reads ts'ao which would be absolutely unique. A parallel in PART IV, 17 (n. 669) where tsao could not be ts'ao. Taoists believed in creation of the world by natural growth. Chuang Tzu's famous 還化者 is explained as allegory by Fung Yu-lang. Still, if Chuang Tzu uses the word in the sense of 'building', why not Seng-choa? In the I-Ching occurs in a similar meaning. Cf. I-Ching, Hsi-tz'u A4: 範圍天地之化而不知，詠成萬物而不違. The Sage, incarnation of the natural law, builds the world as nature does in accordance with the Cosmic Order.
459 Cf. n. 280.
470 Questions II.2, p. 87.
471 無有間心. O. 有心細心. Later I read 命騷jets心於舍內.
472 無納為有出，'was never an existing thing'.
473 The opponent is now Liu I-min himself. HT distinguishes single opponents in D. As he never gives names, I have always referred to the whole community as 'you'. 
100 TRANSLATION OF

(You quote me further:) 474 ‘Though (his Mind) is empty (of things),
all (things) are there’ and conclude that this might refer to his Cosmic
Life. You may say so. If you can free your mind from mistaking Reality
for something real and recognize that what is real is not real, and free
your mind from mistaking Life for somebody’s life and recognize that
what is life is not life, then you (might see that) he always exists and never
exists, always lives and never lives and that these statements are not
contradictory.

But be careful, when excluding one assertion, not to include the
assertion of the negative. This is what troubles me. For, in that case,
'Truth and Life would again be limited entities, and we would be back
among phenomena, nameable and describable. 475 (And what would
happen?) Disputes would follow; they would proliferate in ever increas­
ing proportions and who could stem the tide?

Therefore, the Sage eludes (all definitions). He is beyond what we
experience, what we can know. That is to say: dwelling on the scene of
restless activities, he still remains unaffected by all this unrest. Living
among the nameable, he dwells where no names are. He is unfathomable;
no description, no name can fit him. That is all we can say. 476

Still you doubt 477 and tell me that you ‘do not know what I aim at’.
I am afraid that your definitions are adequate if applied to things, though
not if applied to that (which transcends all things). 478 As definitions,
how could they be?

III

A wealth of words produces (various arguments) as many footprints
produce various paths. But behind the words is what they express;
behind the footprints is the place where they lead. A master of words
looks for (the meaning) beyond them; a master of footprints looks for
(the goal) where they lead. 479 The ultimate principle is darkly concealed.
As soon as one begins thinking about it, he is already on the wrong
track, and still more so if he goes on talking. I wonder whether my
exposition is not too prolix, and only hope that you profound-minded
gentlemen will be able to supplement what I could not express in script.

474 Cf. Questions II.2 B, p. 87.
475 無名相不形.
476 The terms 慣名相 聲音 are separately translated on p. 93. Cf. Part II, n. 105; and
Part IV, n. 510.
477 Here follows a repetition of the sentence translated on p. 90 at the beginning of
II, omitted here.
478 造沿不相. IT: 無相不相, which is making things too easy. YK: 造.
NIEH-P’AN WU-MING LUN 涅槃無名論

A. DEDICATION TO THE KING OF CH’IN

I

Seng-chao says: I have learned that ‘Heaven reaches oneness by being pure, Earth reaches oneness by being peaceful and princes and kings reach oneness by ruling the world’. Bowing before your Majesty’s wisdom and sagacity (I say): Tao harmonizes with your spirit. Mysteriously you act (without acting) in complete conformity (with the Order of Nature), as does ‘the centre of the circle’ (which enables the gate to turn freely on its hinges, itself being unmoved). You manage your thousand affairs as easily as ‘a master-butcher wields his knife’ (and yet you have time to) propagate the Tao all day. Your Majesty shields the people. Your written statements become laws (for your subjects). So it is said: ‘In the universe there are four things that are great, and royalty is one of them’.

The realm of Nirvāṇa. It is the home whence the three Vehicles derive; it is the palace from which the Vaipulya sūtras hail, a wide ocean, a desert, a realm not to be seen not to be heard, a hidden place, a profundity such as cannot be plumbed by an ordinary intellect.

Though unworthy, by the grace of the government I obtained permission to stay in the ‘Academy’. For more than ten years I belonged to the disciples of Kumārajīva. Though the topics dealt with in the sūtras are many, and more than one subject of importance was dealt with, the one problem of nirvāṇa always occupied the first place in our studies. But because my mental faculties are limited, though I was favoured with repeated instruction, there remained doubts which

480 Unnameability wu-ming 無名 denotes the impossibility of defining nirvāṇa or translating it into Chinese, cf. Ta-ch’eng hsuan-lun 大乘玄論 ch. 3 46a (Shih ming-men 鐘名門). But this term, as appears from the description below sub B.1, is also associated with Taoist conceptions, cf. Lao-tzu 1: 有名萬物之母.

481 Allusion to Lao-tzu 39.
482 Allusion to Chuang-tzu 2.3 ch. 1 fol. 28a.
483 Allusion to Chuang-tzu 3.2 ch. 2 fol. 4a.
484 i.e. Dharma.
485 Allusion to Lao-tzu 25.
486 The Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas.
487 Notice the parallelism with the beginnings of Part II and III.
488 Allusion to Lao-tzu 14.
489 The organisation around Kumārajīva.
seemed to admit of no solution. If now it looks as if they were dissolved, yet (the reader should know that I) would not dare to insist (upon the correctness of my interpretation) were it not for the approval of one greater (than myself). Unfortunately, Kumārajīva has left the world. Now I have nobody to whom to apply (for instruction) and I feel heartbroken.

The virtue of your Majesty could not remain without response, so you found a spiritual friend in Kumārajīva. 'At the first look you understood each other', and rejoiced in your hearts. Thus you were able to kindle the flame of esoteric learning in order to enlighten our period of decay.

II.

One day I was permitted to see your Majesty’s letter answering Yao Sung, the marquis of An-ch’eng, who inquires about asamskṛta, the final principle. You write: ‘Greed is the reason why the beings must wander through many births and deaths. When greed has ended in their heart this wandering ceases. Then their souls withdraw into Silence and become (unassailable) like Empty Space. This is called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa—how could it contain a nameable thing?’

These words are the cream of subtle beauty, speech utterly beyond the common. Were not your wisdom like that of Mānjuśrī and your virtue equal to Maitreya’s, how could you propagate the profound
creed and be wall and moat around the Dharma? How could you once again unroll the scroll of the great Doctrine, to make the hidden meaning, already lost, reappear?

I studied (your letter) again and again, unable to put it down for a moment. Feeling at once joy and illumination, my whole body trembled and I did not take time (for anything else). Not only in our time are your words our model but for aeons to come they will be ford and bridge.

II. 2

Your conceptions are deep and penetrating, the theory abstruse, the wording concise. (From you) the elders can learn; the great scholars (of old) would feel surpassed. I am afraid that those who take words in their literal sense cannot fully understand you.

(That is why I feel it necessary to comment upon your letter.) In this I shall follow K'ung Tzu who did not aim at writing a brilliant piece of literature when he composed the ten ‘Wings’ of the I-ching, but only intended to bring to light the inner meaning (of the Basic Text). So I composed the treatise ON THE UNNAMEABILITY OF NIRVĀṆA, containing nine objections and ten explanations. I quote extensively from the sūtras for evidence and illustration. In respectfully commenting upon your Majesty’s statement that ‘Nirvāṇa is unnameable’, how dare I say that I laid open your divine mind or that I penetrated to the very bottom of your thoughts? So I now shall say what I think about the Gate to the Depths (Nirvāṇa) hoping that it will be distributed among the students (of the Academy).

II. 3

At the end of your answer you say: ‘All authorities agree that paramārtha satya is wide, void and silent, with no Sage living in it. I find that assertion too bold, more than people can be expected to accept. If there were no Sage who would know that there is nothing? Just as your Majesty’s letter says, so it is, so it is. ‘Tao is vague and elusive, beyond our reach, but a vital principle is in it’. If there were no Sage who would there be to conform with Tao?

496 Supplements wrongly attributed to Confucius.

497 In these texts synonymous with asamkrta and nirvāṇa.

498 Cf. the Yu-i lun 壅疑論 by Hui-jui 飛(world (Seng-hui 世界) who went from Ch'ang-an to the South and died there in A.D. 439. Yu-hu 5.6: 42a 每至苦間，佛之真主亦復虛妄，積功累德，能為不惑之本，或時有言，佛若虛妄，誰為真者？若是碌者，積功累德，誰為其主？ In every session (of the translators in Ch'ang-an) such questions were showered (upon Kumārajīva): If Buddha, the true ruler of the Universe, is merely a vain notion, what certainty is there that (our exertions) to accumulate good karmic and to become more and more virtuous are not mere illusions? Or it was said: If Buddha is a vain notion what else is real? Who rules over our karmic? . . .’ Tr. W. Liebenthal (1918): 94 a.

499 Allusion to Lao-tzu 81.
The scholars of to-day hesitate before the Gate of the Tao and feel uncomfortable about this problem (of Nirvāṇa). Always in doubt, they are without anybody to advise them. Fortunately your solution has come and with it relief for them. The crowds who stood knocking at the gate now swarm through the entrance into the interior. We surely are right to say that the Wheel of the Law is again turning in Jambudvīpa⁵⁰⁰ and the light of the Tao will again radiate through thousands of generations.

II. 4

Now the intention of this treatise is to discuss in detail the (meaning of your statement that) 'nirvāṇa is not nameable' and to put an end to the talk that 'in boundless Space (there is no Sage)', which removes the Sage from our life.

Respectfully presenting the following paragraphs, I beg your Majesty, should the treatise render your ideas reasonably well, to order that it be published. If it contains mistakes I humbly ask for your corrections.

From Seng-chao.

B. TEXT

Note: There exist three Chinese transcriptions of the Sanskrit nirvāṇa, ni-yūsh, ni-yūn and meh-p'an, because when the translations were made earlier or later, (the characters) read differently in Central China and the Border Regions. The correct transliteration is meh-p'an.⁵⁰¹

59 1. (The first exposition). Statement of the subject.

The author⁵⁰² says. The sūtras mention two kinds of Nirvāṇa, that 'with residue' and that 'without residue'.⁵⁰³ In the state of the Ch'in this is translated wu-wei 無為 or meh-tu 淡度. The first characters are used because it is void, silent, not found among what exists (yu-wei 無為).⁵⁰⁴ The latter characters mean that 'human misery has completely vanished',⁵⁰⁵ the Four Streams are crossed.⁵⁰⁶ It (nirvāṇa) is the home

⁵⁰⁰ India or the Buddhist world.
⁵⁰¹ Seng-chao and Hui-yūn used to write 湛, see Yu-lu: 77b 12. This note is certainly an emendation, perhaps copied from HT: 413c. In the VSC Seng-chao writes 湛槃.
⁵⁰² In the text the author is always called 無名 and the opponent 有名.
⁵⁰³ 有餘涅槃 and 無餘涅槃. Sanskrit sopadhiśeṣa and nirupadhiśeṣa. Sopadhiśeṣa is defined in the Vībhāṣa, as translated by La Vallée Poussin (Kosa VI: 211 n. 3): 'Si d'un Arhat, d'un homme dont les vices sont complètement détruits, la vie continue, la série des grands éléments et de la matière désiree n'est pas coupée, la série des peines se poursuit en raison d'un corps muet des cinq organes'. This is the 'surplus breath' 残氣, dealt with in Correspondence 1 and 2. It is used to explain why the Bodhimattta, though in nirvāṇa, can reincarnate and continue his work of conversion.
⁵⁰⁴ wu-wei 無為 is understood in maññhitara, yu-wei 有為 maññhiṣṭa. The identification with nirvāṇa and maññhiṣṭa, non-Existence and Existence, is not quite correct as most Indian schools had more than one maññhiṣṭa.
⁵⁰⁶ The streams of greed, of existence, of illusion, of innate ignorance.
where the images in the Mirror (phenomena) return, the hidden lodging of that to which no name can be given. If so, how may we explain the above two appellations? Surely, they must be understood as mere names (which do not tell anything about the content) but describe how, proceeding and withdrawing, (nirvāṇa) appears to us Beings. I shall try to explain this more comprehensively.

What is that realm (Tao) called Nirvāṇa? Silent, void, no description suits it, no name defines it. Transcendent, without the characteristics (of things), nothing that is met with in the waking state. Beyond the (bright layers of the universe) where people live, it stretches into the dark (layers of death). Unlimited of size like empty space and (like it) eternally persisting. Follow it, and you see no rear; go towards it and you see no front.

Life in the Six Destinies cannot contain it; Time cannot change it. An ocean, a fogbank—it seems to be there—it seems to be gone. The Five Sorts of Eyes do not see its form, the Two Sorts of Ears do not hear its sound. Dark and distant: who has seen it, who has conceived it? It covers everything existent and yet extends to the realm beyond Existence and non-Existence.

Then he who gives it a name does not understand its real nature; he who presumes to know it mistakes it for something common, because it looks 'simple'; he who takes it for existent misunderstands the particularity of its existence; he who takes it for non-existent does injustice to its substantiality.

That is why Śākyamuni was silent (before turning the Wheel-of-the-Law) at Magadha; why Vimalakīrti refused to answer at Vaiśāli; 'Subhūti preached the Law without words, and why Śakra, the King of

507 See above PART III, II.4.
508 Ch’u-ch’u 出處. An allusion to the Hsi-ts’u (A 5 ch. 7 6a): 其子之道出於或處.
509 The preceding text gives the general proposition. The following elaborates on it.
510 This description is identical with that of the Sage in PARTS II and III. Cf. n. 476.
512 Hell, ghosts, animals, men, gods, and giants (Asuras).
513 Lit. 'the strong man', cf. above PART I, n. 152.
514 The Corporeal Eye (of men), the Divine Eye (of gods), The Eye of Wisdom (of the two lower Vehicles), the Eye of the Doctrine (of the Bodhisattva), the Eye of the Buddha.
515 The Corporeal and the Divine Ear.
516 無人於有無之表.
518 Lalitavistara ch. 23 (Taishō 188 III 528b): The Buddha sat seven weeks in silent meditation under the Bodhi-tree and only by the meditation of Brahma was induced to preach the Doctrine. Cf. also MN: 1990 27 傳道後凡下七日復不說法, HT.
519 In answer to the question of Māñjūśrī how to reach the Middle Path. Cf. VSK Commentary ch. 19. 304 4.
the Gods (devānām indra) though he heard nothing, rained flowers'.

In all these cases words were unnecessary because these persons were in harmony with the Order of Nature. These were silent sermons on that which cannot be expressed in words.

A sūtra says: ‘Final release is beyond (the sphere) where things, nameable and with individual destinies, still exist. It is safe from the unrest of life, without beginning and end. There is no day and night, no summer and winter. Pure it is, spacelike, not describable, not subject to argument’. A sastra says: ‘Nirvāṇa neither exists nor does it not exist. The sound of discussion has ceased, the rôle of thought is over. Could what is quoted from the sūtras and sastras possibly be fanciful? Surely, neither existence nor non-existence of nirvāṇa can be correctly asserted because in both cases the opposite can also be proved.’

Demonstration:

Placing it in the sphere of Existence (we find that) the five skandha are totally absent.

Placing it in the sphere of non-Existence (we find that) its light, though invisible, is not extinguished.

Its light is not extinguished, so it ‘embraces unity’ like the unborn world.

The skandha are absent, so it is free from the thousand tribulations (that plague mankind).

Being free from tribulations it is immaterial like Tao; Being like the unborn world it is inactive like the (World-Spirit). Inactive like the Spirit it is still active, always and everywhere; Immaterial like Tao it

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520 Cf. PSK ch. 7-8 273b-277a: 須音提唱無說以釋道，釋梵絕聽花華. WTS.
521 與Selected Tsukamoto (1955: 103a), suggests ‘whose mind is ruled by reason’, which explains the grammar. HT: 417b 18: 以無言表無相，是為教之論理 (?) ‘The situation is well known. The Buddha, or another Saint, as Vimalakirti, transfers his message without speaking, either through a kind of sympathetic thought-transference (as common in the Pāli sūtras) or by a symbolic action, as the famous ‘turning of a flower’ niun-hua 拾花. Li 錦, of course, is not ‘reason’ but (Cosmic) Order, the Vehicle on which both teacher and pupil must ride in order to understand each other without words.
522 Cf. NS: 392b 12-396b 11. Dharmakṣema’s version.
523 繼於日鼓 Seng-chuo always uses 數 for destiny as pictured in the I-Ching. This phrase might have been copied from the VS Commentary (cf. HT 419c 4, also the quotation from (Liu) Kuang-chai 光宅 of Lung-kuang sSu 龍光寺, ibid. 420a 12).
524 According to YK this is an allusion to the MK, probably to Kārikā 25.23-4: अतिसत्तम असत्तमम् ca kīm viśuddhayam api adhā sarvopalambhapadāmāh prapañcota­ lāhāh kīvah... . Cf. MK: 35n 4.
525 Cf. Part II, 11.2 p. 99 f. The following looks characteristic of Seng-chuo’s style.
526 This invisible light of cosmic life (彌霊) (the name of the 靈) which here is an epithet of nirvāṇa is, in other places, attributed to the Hugo, prajñā, and other entities (all standing for Cosmic Life).
527 同一, of. Lavoüen 10. The light is not yet broken into colours (things).
528 無動 without karmic.
permeates (the world), itself unchanging. Unchanging, it cannot be termed existent; Always active, it cannot be termed non-existent.

It follows:

Seen from within, it is neither existent nor non-existent; seen from without, it is found to be indefinable. It is where it cannot be seen or heard, veiled by the Four Meditations (of the Hinayāna). Magnificent but plain, desolate but sublime; in it the Nine Classes of Beings have their home, in it all the sages mysteriously meet.

This land imperceptible to our senses, beyond the beyond, is it not preposterous to label it as existent or non-existent, to trace its frontiers or to tell us about the wanderings on Earth (mārga) of the Spirit?

2. (First objection). Questioning the nature (of Nirvāṇa).

Opponent. Names are not given without reason, terms refer to something. Thus the terms Nirvāṇa-with-residue and Nirvāṇa-without-residue used in the sūtras (must have two distinct meanings) namely, return to the origin, in and wanderings of the Spirit (on Earth). I beg to detail this.

(a) Nirvāṇa-with-residue

(After practising meditation for six years, The Buddha Gautama, sitting below the Bodhi-tree, attained Enlightenment. He then preached the Doctrine until he passed away. In death he went into nirvāṇa but left to the world the Dharma embodied in the scriptures. The opponent calls this his Nirvāṇa-with-residue).

With the attainment of Enlightenment a dharmakāya was formed by the Tathāgata. After having bathed in the clean waters of the Eight Meditations he reposed in the flourishing grove of the Seven Members of Enlightenment. With the karma accumulated in remote kalpas he washed off the dirt handed down from countless ages. Having acquired

529 The four ārūpya-dhyāna (Mhv. 162. YK).
530 YK and WTS propose the Nine Schools of Philosophers, but YK doubts this. One could think of a subdivision of the Three Worlds TS, of the chiu-yeh 九業 (Ch'eng-shih lun 成實論 9.7), of the eight kinds of hearers meeting in the assemblies (p'ā-p'u 八部) that together with men form nine, or simply of the nine types of characters chiu p' in 九品.
531 互本 = 'without-residue' WTS. The term is Taoist, Buddhism does not know of a return to the origin.
532 The life of the Buddha on Earth, his incarnations. For the opponent the Buddha is a historical person, for the author he is the Sage, manifesting himself in life, to be joined for ever in Nirvāṇa. The terms 真名 and 妙名 are synonyms, therefore without significance and left untranslated. The opponent is indifferent to the technical meaning of 真名 as opposed to 世名 (PART II, §2.4).
533 Pitavistara 23.
534 The terms 大覺 and 佛果 (mahābodhi and dharmaśāya) have here a Hinayānistic meaning. Dharmaśāya is the patanāyika dharmaśāya, cf. Mhv. 4, 1–5. Cf. also n. 646.
535 The eight stages of meditation called vimukti-bhāṣyāya, as known from the Pali texts. Cf. Kh.p VIII 3:91:904 and Mhv. 70.
536 The bodhumuni, cf. Mhv. 43.
the inner (power) of looking through (the past, present, and future of) all Beings\(^{537}\) and the outer (power) of radiating spiritual light,\(^{538}\) he first armed himself\(^{539}\) by the decision (to release all Beings),\(^{540}\) until finally in great compassion he threw himself into the sea of suffering. Upward he rose to grasp the hidden root (of Existence) and downward then bent to hand it to the helpless, agonizing people. Crossing the Three Worlds\(^{641}\) he stepped into the Cosmic Void,\(^{542}\) as he alone could do. Opening up the straight path of the Eight Right Modes of Conduct\(^{543}\) he paved a way which people could easily tread. Driving the spirit-steed of the Six Magic Power\(^{544}\) he came riding the Vehicle which brought peace to the five \(yāna.\)\(^{545}\) He could even be born and die, revolve (in saṁsāra) with the Beings (though free from worldly bonds). His rule was mild;\(^{546}\) its blessings were bestowed on everybody. He penetrated to where the Mother of Creation\(^{547}\) gives birth to things; he reached the centre about which the World revolves. Spreading the firmament of Emptiness over the borderless, he lit \(sarvajñatā\)\(^{548}\) to give light in the dark.

When he was ready to pull up his roots in the Nine Abodes of Beings\(^{549}\) and to plunge forever into the Great Void, there remained a residue of causes (which had not yet borne their fruit), a residue of traces\(^{550}\) not yet effaced. The reward of his deeds stayed like a spectre, the wisdom of the Sage was still living. That was Nirvāṇa-with-residue. A sūtra\(^{551}\) says: 'Free from dross like molten gold, human troubles have disappeared and the light of wisdom alone remains'.

\((b)\) Nirvāṇa-without-residue

When there was no more reason to continue and the Perfect Being ended his teaching, when the light of his life\(^{552}\) was forever extinguished the lifeless gap that remained is spoken of as ‘without-residue’.

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\(^{537}\) Mhv. 14 and Dictionaries s.v. 三明.

\(^{538}\) The light radiating from the \(uṣṇīṣa\) (?)

\(^{539}\) Text has Sanskrit \(sāṁśāha-saṁnaddha\).

\(^{540}\) \(Pradhama-cittotpāda\) (?)

\(^{541}\) 欲界, 色界, 無色界; \(kāma-, rūpa-, ārūpa\)-world.

\(^{542}\) 大方.

\(^{543}\) 八聖道 (aśṭāṅgika mārga) Mhv. 44.

\(^{544}\) 六神通 \( (Saḍ abhijñāḥ)\) Mhv. 14.

\(^{545}\) The text has the Sanskrit word which means Vehicle. The Vehicles of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Tathāgatas, men, and gods.

\(^{546}\) An allusion to the Book of Rites 隆記, but perhaps with a Buddhist meaning. Cf. YK 79a 8.

\(^{547}\) Cf. \(Lǎo-tzu\) 1.

\(^{548}\) Text has the Sanskrit word meaning omniscience.

\(^{549}\) \(Sattvadharma\) Mhv. 119.

\(^{550}\) The \(Būtras\) (?)

\(^{551}\) Quotation untrace. The Commentaries give no hint.

\(^{552}\) 風即 which with \(Māyā-vibhūti\) means the Light of Cosmic Life. He never uses
PART IV. NIRVĀṆA IS UNNAMEABLE

No suffering is as bad as where there is a body. Therefore, destroy the body and suffering will cease. Unrest is impossible without mental contacts. Therefore, avoid contacts and unrest will cease.\(^{553}\)

It follows that knowledge is weakened by the body and the body is worried by knowledge. A (vicious) circle has formed which turns and turns, and misery (is the result). A sūtra\(^{554}\) says: ‘We are poisoned in various ways by knowledge, we are bound hand and foot by the body.

Thus (two) make Deep Silence inaccessible, they cause our suffering and difficulties’.

Therefore the Perfect Man burned his body and (thereby) discarded knowledge;\(^{555}\) he broke his form and ceased to worry. Within he ceased caring for illumination (of the people),\(^{556}\) without he obstructed (the source) of great suffering. He raised himself above the mundane sphere withdrawing for ever, and his track disappeared in the Great Void. He has come to rest where there is no sound and no trace of life,\(^{557}\) in the dark realm, whence there is no return. Nobody knows where he has gone, as a lamp goes out when the oil is consumed, oil and light disappearing at once. Such is Nirvāṇa-without-residue. A sūtra\(^{558}\) says: ‘The five skandha have forever disappeared as if a lamp has gone out’.

(c) Conclusions

Nirvāṇa-with-residue should be called nameable, Nirvāṇa-without-residue non-nameable. For, as non-nameability is established the advocates of Emptiness can rejoice over its annihilation; as nameability is established, the pious can always hope for the blessings of the Sage. That is the wisdom preserved in authoritative scriptures, the tradition handed down by the sages of yore. But you say:

‘Seen from within, it is neither existent nor non-existent, seen from without, it is found to be indescribable. It is where it cannot be seen or heard, veiled by the Four Meditations.\(^{559}\)

Such (nihilism) makes the pious despair and the advocate of Emptiness even more self-confident; it makes one feel as if one’s ears and eyes were buried in a womb, or as if the celestial lights were behind a veil of

both terms together. The opponent understands as historical what for Seng-chao is symbolic of cosmic processes.

\(^{553}\) An allusion to Lao-tzu 13 吾所以有大患若吾有身及吾無身吾有何患.

\(^{554}\) Quotation untraced.


\(^{556}\) 舉一對舉; 例一功, 例顯 enlighten wherever there is an occasion.

\(^{557}\) 今妙有不次.

\(^{558}\) NS 41 No 28.

\(^{559}\) Cf. above n. 550.
rain, and still one pretended to be able to distinguish between tones of a scale or between things one saw or did not see. You only know how to push the Perfect Being out of existence and non-existence and to sing aloud the song of annihilation in (that realm) where nothing visible or describable exists. It is impossible to know at what your arguments actually aim; the dark path (Nirvāṇa) is, therefore, automatically veiled and not lit up (as you promised). Though thinking calmly and searching deeply, I find nothing I could agree with (in your talk). Is that what you call illumination of the lightless room and celestial music in the soundless solitude?

3. (First answer). Defining the nature (of Nirvāṇa).

Author. These terms, Nirvāṇa-with-residue and Nirvāṇa-without-residue, are mere names which do not coincide with what Nirvāṇa means but are used as a convenience. He who holds fast to the literal meaning of words will find mere words; he who cares for outside forms will see mere forms. Names can only describe describable objects; forms can only picture something square or round. But there exists what cannot be pictured as square or round, and there are objects which cannot be described. Surely it is not possible to name the ineffable or to picture the formless.

I agree that your outline adequately describes the two nirvāṇas if understood as the two kinds of teaching, the exoteric and the esoteric or as the apparent duality of the Tathāgata who seems to emerge (from Nirvāṇa when he is born) and to vanish (when he dies) but it neither evokes that cosmic silence which is beyond description nor the mystic craft of the Perfect Being holding sway in the centre round which the universe turns. Did you never hear the word Right Insight? Vimalakīrti says: "The Tathāgata I envisage, is without beginning or end. He has surpassed the six āyatanas and has crossed over the Three Worlds. He is not found in any place nor away from any place, neither sāṃskṛta nor asaṃskṛta, not to be fancied by imagination or known by any knowledge. He is beyond words and speech, he has left the playground of thoughts. To see it in this way means to have Right Insight; to see it otherwise means not to see the Buddha'. The Fang-kuang says: 'The Buddha is like the Void, neither going nor coming. He appears at the proper moment but has no fixed place (among beings)."
The Sage’s role in the world: Utter silence prevails in the Perfect Void. He neither is slow nor quick. He guides without leading forward and when he feels (himself needed) he responds like the echo in a deep valley, like the image in a clear mirror. Encountering him we do not learn whence he came and following him we do not learn whither he has gone. Unforeseen he is there and suddenly he is no more there. The more he moves, the stiller he is; the deeper concealed, the more manifest. He emerges from the depths and descends to them, being always the same in his many manifestations.

His names: They are given to express his changing relation (to the World). If his life is spoken of, the word signifies that his traces appear (to us); if his death is spoken of, it means that his traces disappear (from us). So understood, his ‘life’ is termed Nirvāṇa-with-residue’, his ‘death’ Nirvāṇa-without-residue. Both terms refer to something which in fact is beyond description. Which name fits the Unnameable?

The Perfect Being, dwelling in the square is square, in the round is round. In Heaven he is a god, among men he is a man. To be god or man (at will), is that possible for either god or man? No. But because he is neither god nor man, he can be god as well as man.

His reign: It is response and not action, compliance and not charity. Being compliance and not charity, his charity is greater than any. Being response and not action, his activity is greater than any.

His activity being greater than any, he still turns to the small duties (of daily life);

His charity being greater than any, it still hides in anonymous actions.

A sūtra says: ‘The nature (Tao) of bodhi cannot be plotted. It is higher than any height, wider than any width, lower than any abyss,'
deeper than any plummet can reach, great enough to compass heaven and earth, fine enough to enter where no crack is visible. Therefore it is called Tao'. Thus it is proved that the nature of Nirvāṇa cannot be defined either as existing or as non-existent.

Those caught in Illusion see the many shapes (in which the Buddha appears) and so take him for existent; they see him fading away (in nirvāṇa) and so take him for non-existent. These periods of existence and non-existence are vain imagery. How can they describe the dark ways of the Sage or tell us anything about (his) Mind?

You say 'The Perfect Being has come to rest where there is no sound and no trace of life' (I should rather say that) appearance and disappearance spring from one root, that presence and absence (as said of him) do not imply existence and non-existence (in the ordinary sense of these words).

The Buddha says: 'I am neither born nor unborn, I am born and yet unborn. I am neither with body nor bodyless, I am with body and yet bodyless'. This shows that his presence is not existence (in the ordinary sense of the word).

A sūtra says: 'The Bodhisattva entered the unbreakable samādhi. He saw all the Buddhas who had entered Nirvāṇa in the past'. Another passage (of the same sūtra) says: 'He entered Nirvāṇa and yet did not enter'. This shows that his absence is not non-existence (in the ordinary sense of the word).

His absence is not non-existence but, though absent, he exists; his presence is not existence but, though present, he non-exists.

Though present he non-exists. Thus he is said not to exist.

Though absent he exists. Thus he is said not to non-exist.

It follows that the realm of Nirvāṇa lies beyond Existence and non-Existence and that it is separated from those regions which are describable in words and images. So much is sure.
You said further:578 "The suffering of the Sage was caused by his body. Therefore, he destroyed the body and suffering ceased. (He knew that) unrest is impossible without mental contact. So he avoided contacts and unrest ceased'.

But saying that he is no more (suffering), you overlook (His) divine in-Existence579 and ignore its mysterious side.

A sūtra580 says: ‘The dharmakāya has no form, but it assumes different forms according to the needs of beings. Prajñā does not cognize but merely reflects the state of maturity of beings'. (The Sage) appears at once on thousands of occasions and yet remains unaffected; one by one he answers a thousand needs and yet is never tired of attending to them. (He) moves like wandering clouds and stays still like ‘the spirit of the valley’.581 How possibly could he be a party to our disputes and, prompted by emotions, start or cease to act? It follows that:

As he is not emotionally involved while he moves or rests, he does not show during his movements.

As he does not show during his movements, he has no body of his own which would be shaped individually.

As he does not show during his movements, there is no stuff from which an individual body could be formed.

As he is not emotionally involved, while he moves and rests, he neither feels nor responds (to what he feels).582 It follows that, if emotions are not roused in Him, ‘he does not feel the heat which causes ore to melt’.583

If emotions are not His emotions, they may stir all the time without moving Him, and what disputes may arise (among us human beings), what concern are they of His?

Therefore (the Sage), though fully aware of mundane life, is not worried; though (His) body fills the eight directions, he is not suffering. Gains do not make him rich and losses do not make him poor. How (can you take the story of his death in a literal sense and say:) Half-way (to Kușanagara) he got dysentery. (As he felt death approaching, he lay down) under a twin-tree and died. His light was extinguished in a stūpa584 and his body ended in the flames (of a funeral pyre)?


580 TCH refers to the general contents of the Avatāmśaka sūtra 31 (Ta-fang kung fo hua-yen ching 大方廣佛華嚴經 (Taishō 278 IX: 599b 21).

581 Lao-tzu 6.

582 YK explains 感 as 習. The Sage answers calls, or fulfils hopes.

583 Cf. Chuang-tzu I.2 ch. 1 fol. 14n. The Sage has no ego 生死我, so he has no individual body. But he has a cosmic body which is also called 我 (真我). I capitalize the possessive pronoun in this case.

584 'The locito difficilior in 身聖 117', which is certainly correct. Sanskrit mukujabanda- 
dhana, name of the stūpa where Nākyanuni’s ashes were buried. Cf. Akanuma (1921).
The man caught in illusion, relying on what he sees and hears, searches for the traces of his various deeds, tries to measure the Infinite with compasses and square and assumes that the Perfect Being is worried by his knowledge, that the Cosmic Sage has a body which causes him suffering. He says that (the Sage) left Existence and entered non-Existence and accordingly gives him names. But then it cannot well be said that this man has heard the Low Voice beneath the din of life or that he has gathered the Mystic Root in the field of the Void.

4. (Second objection). Questioning the transcendence (of Nirvāṇa). 585

Opponent. When chaos split (into heaven and earth) and the Thousand Things joined in and began to proliferate, 586 (from that moment, some things) existed and consequently others did not. Non-existence did not occur independently but presupposed existence. Therefore (it is said 587 that) 'high and low are dependent upon each other, being and non-being originate in each other’. This is the order of Nature. Cosmic evolution culminates (in a first split) 588

Considered in this way, whatever ‘the Mother of Creation’ 589 carried in her womb, the whole chaos which existed when the abodes of ghosts and men were not yet separated, was without exception existent. (Later,) when existence turned into non-existence, all this became without exception non-existent. In the two spheres of existence and non-existence everything is comprised. A śūtra 590 says: ‘In the two dharma ( -categories) of Existence and non-Existence every dharma is contained’. It further enumerates 591 three asamkhyata, viz. ākāsa, pratisamkhyānirodha, apratisamkhyānirodha. 592 Apratisamkhyānirodha is Nirvāṇa. 593

585 Author: ‘Nirvāṇa is not bound by the limits (of Existence and non-Existence)’. Cf. above p. 112.
586 Cf. Lao-tzu 25. Two became three. In Taoism proliferation starts with three (the family).
587 Cf. Lao-tzu 2.
588 同性於是. Following the cosmic numbers of the Hsi-tzu' to their source, the 50, we find that the first split is that in the positive 49 and the negative 1.
589 Cf. Lao-tzu 1. For the following cf. HT.
590 The Commentaries give no clue to the origin of this quotation but the MS through not a śūtra, contains a similar passage on p. 289b 1-3.
591 MS: 288a 23 三無為, 態空, 智緣緣, 非智緣緣. Our text has 數 for 数, HT has 数 言 'deathly has ended'. Sanskrit pratisamkhyā is a cognitive process without relation to 'deathly'.
592 Space, cessation of karmic motion by way of spiritual training, cessation of karmic motion in a natural way. There are Hinayana terms, cf. Conception 81. Kotar: Index w.v. asamkhyta.
593 This is not correct. Both nirodhas are nirvāṇa.
And you say that 'beyond existence and non-existence there is another mysterious realm, which is called Nirvāṇa'\textsuperscript{594}. Let us examine this mysterious realm. \textit{i.} Supposing it is existent, (you have said yourself that,) ‘though mysterious, it is not non-existent’. Thus it is within Existence. \textit{ii.} Supposing it is non-existent, then it is not distinguished (by any individual characteristics) and is (therefore) within non-Existence. In whatever way you may take it, there can be no thing, other than existent, which is not non-existent and none, other than non-existent, which is not existent. That is evident. The above words of yours about there existing a third, mysterious realm beyond Existence and non-Existence, called Nirvāṇa, though they enter my ears, do not enter my mind.

5. (Second answer). Asserting the transcendence (of Nirvāṇa).

Author. It is true that the categories of Existence and non-Existence include dharma of all denominations, that this division is exhaustive, but all (dharma) they include are of this world (laukika). A sūtra\textsuperscript{595} says: ‘What is supramundane (paramārtha)? Nirvāṇa. What is mundane? The dharma, existent and non-existent’.

Demonstration. Existence is the opposite of non-Existence, non-Existence is the opposite of Existence. Both definitions are obtained by negation of the opposite. It follows: Existence originates in non-Existence and vice versa. Neither is possible without its counterpart. They form a pair of opposites, such as high and low, mutually dependent upon each other’s existence. It follows that existence and non-existence, though different, are both of necessity existent.

It is this (reciprocity which) determines the content of words and likenesses and which makes assertion and denial possible. But how can it be used to define the Inscrutable or to circumscribe the Way of the Spirit?\textsuperscript{596}

Conclusion. So, if we said that (Nirvāṇa) is beyond Existence and non-existence, this was done with the intention of confining this duality\textsuperscript{597}

\textsuperscript{594}有無之表別有妙道 cf. Part II, 1.1. n. 173. Refers to 獨曳於有無之表, transl. p. 105 n. 516.

\textsuperscript{595} Cf. PSK: 378c (?). ‘Existent and non-existent’ is here sat and asat. In India nirvāṇa was never confused with asatī as the opponent does (and Seng-chao also occasionally, cf. INTRODUCTION, p. 35). Cf. Kārikās XXV 7 in Stcherbatsky’s translation (1927): ‘If nirvāṇa is not an Ens, will it then be a non-Ens? Wherever there is absence of an Ens, neither is there a non-Ens’; and 16: ‘If Nirvāṇa neither is Ens nor is non-Ens; who can then really understand this doctrine which proclaims at once negation of them both together?’ In the following I capitalize Existence and non-Existence whenever it refers to the two spheres of laukika and paramārtha and have in-existence for transcendence, the text does not distinguish.

\textsuperscript{596} 利和, C.f. 1Li-s'âu (A 4 ch. 7 p. 41) 陰陽不測之顯神.

\textsuperscript{597}有無之義, shù in the Chinese correlative to dharma. As in India the contents of the world were outlined in lists of 80 or 100 dharmas, so in China they were pictured in the 64 diagrams of the I-ching.
to the sphere of the six sense objects.\textsuperscript{598} This sphere is not concomitant with Nirvāṇa, so we availed ourselves of the word ‘beyond’ in order to mark it off (from Nirvāṇa).

You, believers in Tao, who crowd the road to Nirvāṇa, hoping for eternal peace, forget about the words after you have found the meaning and seek that ecstatic acceptance\textsuperscript{599} whereby Existence and non-existence disappear! How could I have meant that ‘beyond Existence and non-Existence there is a third Existence that also might be defined’?

What is it that the sūtra call ‘the three asaṁskṛta’? Daily life with its numerous frictions causes severe suffering. No such suffering is implicated unless there is Existence. There is no other word than Existence to express the overcoming of Existence. Therefore (the sūtra) speak of in-Existence in order to make clear that Existence is overcome, but they do not intend to admit non-existence (in the ordinary sense of the word) as a quality of the Supramundane.

6. (Third objection). Questioning the Unfathomable.

Opponent. You said\textsuperscript{600} that Nirvāṇa is neither within nor without Existence and non-Existence. Thus it cannot be sought either within or without. If it is found nowhere, it is nothing real. And yet it should be an entity of some kind. A secret path should lead to it. A thousand sages followed it and did not return empty-handed. Thus it is something. And yet you said that it is neither within nor without (of Existence and non-Existence). There must be a hidden meaning. Please let me hear it.

7. (Third answer). (Nirvāṇa) is mysteriously present.

Author: Words derive from notions. Notions denote phenomena. Phenomena are confined to the phenomenal. What is not phenomenal admits of no denotation. Without denotation there is no speech. Without speech no instruction. A sūtra\textsuperscript{601} says: ‘Nirvāṇa is neither dharma nor non-dharma. It cannot be learned, it cannot be spoken about. It is nothing contained in a mind. ‘How should I dare describe it so that you may learn it (as subjects in a textbook are learned)?’ And yet there exists a word of Subhūti\textsuperscript{602} saying: ‘If people were able to hear (my words) without seizing them, to listen without listening, then I should speak to them without speaking’. So, since you look forward to my answer, I may use speech.

Vimalakīrti\textsuperscript{603} says: ‘Not apart from Samsāra is Nirvāṇa found’. And

\textsuperscript{598} \textit{dха,} the six āyārtrna, objects of the kейa.

\textsuperscript{599} \textit{citi} (verb). Cf. above Part II, end, n. 232.

\textsuperscript{600} Quotes the general content of the preceding text, but misunderstands it.

\textsuperscript{601} Cf. NS: \textit{487} f. which gives the general meaning.

\textsuperscript{602} Cf. PSK: \textit{878b} 81.

\textsuperscript{603} Cf. VNK: \textit{5390} 83.
the Heavenly Maiden\textsuperscript{604} (in the same sūtra) says: 'Without leaving the world of Māra the world of the Buddha is entered'.

It follows: The Inscrutable is found in an intuitive experience which opens insight into the Middle Path. The Middle Path is 'insight into the sameness of existence and non-existence'.\textsuperscript{605} (To one who has this insight) subject and object are not two. It follows that heaven-earth and He (the Sage) sprang from the same root, that all single things and He form one body. (All things) being one with Him there can be no question of existence of non-existence. For (if things were) different from Him, His omnipresence would be jeopardized. He is not apart from the world and he is not a part of the world, yet He is in it, not belonging to either side.

Demonstration. Perfect Man, his vacant mind shining internally, is, like Cosmic Order, present in every phenomenon. He embraces the six directions, and floods them by his Light. In his heart the universe is reflected, though his mind is vacant. Thus he is able to pluck the hidden root from outside Time and reduce the din of this world to the silence in his mind. There is no shape, no sound, nothing but blissful harmony with Nature.\textsuperscript{606}

Thus, lodged in Existence he is not existent; dwelling in non-Existence he is not non-existent.

Dwelling in non-Existence, he is not that which is not;

Lodged in Existence, he is not that which is.

So he is neither part of, nor apart from, either (of the two opposites).

Conclusion. Seen in this way neither are the dharma things which are and are not, nor does the Sage discriminate between things which are and are not.

If the Sage does not discriminate between what is and is not, (phenomena) which are and are not do not show in his mind.

\textsuperscript{604} YK quotes a passage from the VSK: 548a 17 f. (Commentary: 388b), TCH another from the Pao-nù so wen ching 賽女所問經 (Taishö 399 XIII: 471a). Both are not literal. The maiden is probably the apsara who scatters flowers on the assembly in the seventh p'ın of the VS and answers questions of Sāriputra.

\textsuperscript{605} 有無齊觀. In the following text I read 彼已莫二 with HT 423d 18. 已 is the same as later 我. It does not refer to the author but to any subject which has insight into the Middle Path. I therefore translate 'subject' at first. But it should be remembered that any person who has insight into the Middle Path acquires identity with the Sage, and that then it ceases to be 'any person'. In the following sentence this happens and 我 refers to the Sage. This is evident, for the property of 賽通 could never be assigned to any individual. Thus we have no choice but to translate 'He', denoting by the capital that He is a definite figure in the mythical landscape. This passage should be studied together with par. 17, eight answer, (n. 678). Cf. also n. 180 and n. 429. The possibility that 我, when used as above, refers to 源 of the NS (bhūtātm) cannot be excluded, but I found no corroboration for this assumption.

\textsuperscript{606} 他無區隔.
If dharma are no longer things which are and are not, they have no individual destinies.\textsuperscript{607}

'This being so, this and that do not split, He and things have merged. 'He has come to rest where there is no trace of life.'\textsuperscript{608} This is (his) Nirvāṇa.

If it is thus, if it cannot be measured by any standard, how can you confine it either within or without the boundaries of Existence or non-Existence?\textsuperscript{609}

8. (Fourth objection.) Challenging the distinction (of three Nirvāṇas).

Opponent: If Nirvāṇa cannot be measured by any standard, then it is not an object of the six sense-organs.\textsuperscript{610} If it is neither without nor within, and yet maintains a transcendent ‘existence’, then (it may be described as) ‘in complete harmony with Cosmic Order (unfailingly acting as demanded by) its nature’,\textsuperscript{611} a \textit{summum} like the blissful state when the universe was still undivided.\textsuperscript{612} It must be such for logical reasons.

But the \textit{Fang-kuang}\textsuperscript{613} says: ‘The three Vehicles are distinguished with regard to \textit{asamskrta} (Nirvāṇa)’. And (in another sutra)\textsuperscript{614} the Buddha says: ‘When I was once a Bodhisattva called Sumedha\textsuperscript{615} in the reign of the Buddha Dipaṁkara, I entered Nirvāṇa. As Bodhisattva Sumedha, I ...

\textsuperscript{607} Cf. Part III, III. For the following 彼此寂滅, 物物冥一. cf. n. 605, n. 673.

\textsuperscript{608} 彼爾無跡. Very strangely, the author uses the same words as his opponent. Cf. n. 557 and n. 573. This shows that something is wrong with the text.

\textsuperscript{609} Any reader who has enjoyed the precision of language in the first Parts will agree that the verbosity of sections 1–7 is not characteristic of Seng-chao though his writing might have been used. Paragraphs 8–14 are perhaps an emendation. T'ang Yang-tung believed that they contain a discussion between the defendants of Gradual and Instantaneous Illumination, Hui-kuan (author) and Tao-sheng (opponent) (?). The relevant documents have been translated in Liebenthal (1956a): 256-262.

\textsuperscript{610} The sixth organ is \textit{manas}, the organ coordinating impressions.

\textsuperscript{611} 窮源本性, an allusion to the \textit{I-ching}, \textit{Shuo-kua} 说卦.

\textsuperscript{612} 秦一無常.

\textsuperscript{613} Cf. \textit{PSM}: 114b 10 云何離言, 是須陀洹, 是阿羅漢, 是辟支佛, 是三耶三佛乎. 弁, 是非因無為而有名.

\textsuperscript{614} Cf. the \textit{Itivarāja-bodhisattva sūtra} (\textit{Tsu-tsai wang p'u-se ching} 自在王菩薩經) (Taishō 420 X111: 932b), quoted in the \textit{Correspondence} 2: 132c. "The Buddha said to Itivarāja Bodhisattva: In the time of the Buddha Dipaṁkara I accomplished the four \textit{nirvāṇas}, thus I became a Buddha and entered nirvāṇa. That was my last incarnation. The Bodhisattva said: If you have attained nirvāṇa what remains to be accomplished? The Buddha said: I fulfilled my aims, but in order to convert all beings so that they may be born in the Pure Land I equipped myself with magic powers. . . ." VK quotes the \textit{Lotus Sūtra} but there it is a question of Dipaṁkara, not of Sumedha.

\textsuperscript{615} Itkunamoto 145 quotes the text of \textit{Taishō 420}. None of the sources contains the sentences after ‘nirvāṇa’. But, since in 14 (seventh objection) the opponent refers to the last sentence by 謂故腫 as other \textit{sūtra}-text must be underlying. That is why now we here end the quotation with ‘Hence’.

\textsuperscript{616} The story of Sumedha is old. It had already been depicted on the \textit{stūpa} in Barhut. Gautama at the time of the Buddha Dipaṁkara had been born as a rich Brahman, named Sumedha, who one day felt disgusted with the world and became a hermit. Hearing
i.e. in the seventh Stage, 616 I attained anutpatidharmakṣaṇī. 617 I practised (teaching) through three more Stages. 618

If nirvāṇa is one, then there cannot be three (of them). If three (nirvāṇas are distinguished), then (none of them) can be incomparable. Incomparability does not allow degrees. 619 Where the sūtra are at variance among themselves, how can we find a solution?

9. (Fourth answer). Explaining the distinction (of three Nirvāṇas).

Author. A summum is, logically, undifferentiated. The Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra 620 says: ‘The One Great Way has not two courses. Only out of regard for the dullness of people I preached three Vehicles instead of one’. 621 This is illustrated by the simile of the three carriages which leave the burning house. 622 Because all Beings (in the three Vehicles) free themselves from Samsāra, the one term asamskṛta is used. Because (the Vehicles) they mount are different, there are three names. Ultimately there is one goal they all reach.

And the passage you quoted (from the Fang-huang), ‘the three Vehicles are distinguished with regard to asamskṛta’, (you interpret wrongly).

about the arrival of the Buddha he came to worship him. Spreading his hair out on the dirty ground, he lay face downwards in expectation of the Buddha and his host. In this position he took the vows, and had his future prophesied by the Buddha. He determined to realize all the ten paramitās in order to become a Buddha himself. Thus runs the version of the Buddhavarāja (Winternitz, 1933: 161, and T'ai-tzu jui-ying pen-ch'i ching 太子瑞應本起經 Taishō 185 III 478c). The story is repeated in the Cariya-piṭaka and the Nīdiṇa-kathā. In the Mahāvastu it is connected with the ten Stages (J. Rahder, 1926: XVII, Siddhi 19: 732, Kōsa IV: 227).

616 Kṛtāvi, so-tso-ti 所作地, the Arhat Stage, the end of the career of the Hūnayāna Saint.

617 無生法忍, the peaceful state in which dharma are no longer born. It is a technical term of distinct meaning in the Kōsa. In the Vimalakirti nirdesa sūtra it occurs often and is defined by Seng-chao in his Commentary: 338b 22. Cf. also Suzuki (1930): 381.

618 These three Stages, as appears from the following, were actually not Stages but yāna (Vehicles), each of which had its own Career. They were originally not to be passed in succession. This is most clearly shown in the Śatasāhasrikā (Siddhi 726, MS 585). To the author of the Prajñāpāramitā the Bodhisattvabhūmīs were not yet known but only the Śrāvaka-bhūmīs suktavidarājanādi (Mhv. 50), which were seven. Together with the three yānas, later mistaken for Stages, the seven became ten and were then called common Stages 三乘共十地. These are the Stages in question. Cf. The Book of Chao (1938): Appendix III, 1.

619 有升降之殊, lit. ‘degrees of immersion’. Allusion to the simile of animals crossing a river. Cf. above Part III, iii.


621 ‘The Vehicles of the Śrāvaka, the Pratyekabuddha and the Bodhisattva.’

622 Simile from the Miao-fa lien-hua ching, ch. 2 (Taishō 262 IX: 13c 1). The three carriages, drawn by a goat, a deer and an ox, are used to induce children to leave a burning house, where they are playing unaware of the danger. This is a simile of upāya, the skilful means the Bodhisattva uses to convert the beings.
People are of three kinds, therefore asamskṛta has three names. Therefore asamskṛta. (That becomes evident in another passage from) the Fang-kuang: 'Is there more than one Nirvāṇā?—No, there is but one; but in the case of the Tathāgata the moral defilements have completely vanished, while in the case of the Śrāvaka they partly remain'.

Allow me to illustrate a profound truth by a simple fact. Supposing somebody cuts wood (faggots), whether he removes a foot or an inch, the wood will be so much shorter whereas the empty space is unchanged. Individuals are of a thousand different species, their mental faculties are not the same, their insight is shallow or deep, their virtue greater or smaller. Nevertheless, all of them reach the opposite bank (of the river of life) but they are immersed more or less deeply. The opposite bank is always the same, but we ourselves are different. Thus the pictures of the sūtras may vary but what they aim at is not different.

10. (Fifth objection.) Questioning the difference (of the asamskritas).

Opponent: All (the children) leave the burning house, so there is only one release from suffering. All leave Samsara, so there is only one asamskṛta (for everybody). Now you said: 'The opposite bank is always the same, but we ourselves are different'.

(1 define:) The opposite bank is that of asamskṛta: we, the single individuals, are those who merge with asamskṛta. Then I beg to ask you (two questions), supposing that we are merged and supposing that we are not yet merged with asamskṛta.

624 This equation is purely Chinese. It does not fit at all, for one of the asamskṛta is empty space and the other two also have no relation to mental faculties. Cf. n. 591/592. Asamskṛta and nirvāṇa are apparently considered as synonymous.
625 Cf. PSK: 1146b29-b 3 and PSK: 375c25 f. (We always read 無極 for 無極). Subhāti greeted the Buddha and said: 'World-honoured One, concerning the removal of the klesha, is there any difference between saρvājñāta, saρvākārajñāta and mārgajñāta? Are (in all cases) the ideas removed or not?'—The Buddha said: 'They are, there is no difference. But the residual pollutions (vāsanā) are completely removed only in the case of the Buddha, not in that of the Śrāvaka'. World-honoured One, as long as the residual pollutions are not removed, is nirvāṇa possible? The Buddha said: 'No'. The meaning of this text is not clear. The Śrāvaka who enters nirvāṇa is free from klesha and no further exertions are necessary. Still the nirvāṇa of the Bodhisattva or Buddha is considered as superior to that of the Arhat. So further barriers are to be removed, which commonly are not called klesha (cf. n. 630). Seng-cho in the VSK Commentary (399a 10 f) maintains just the opposite, namely that the Arhat, not the Bodhisattva, is free from klesha.

626 無聞, klesa (polluting elements) and vāsanā (unresolved pollutions). The compound is defined by Seng-cho in the VSK comm. as 'the devil in us' (內鬼).
627 This simile occurs also in the Introduction to the Amityarthā sūtra (Wu-liang-ch’ing 前量義經) of Liu Ch’iu, Yu-lu 9.22: 68b. It had originally been used by the adherents of Gradual Illumination (Chien-wu wu 昇叢悟, Hui-kuan) but was picked up by those of Instantaneous Illumination (T’an-wu wu 頓悟悟, T’an-sheng) who altered it, adding 'only because there is still wood, can a foot or an inch be removed' (木存故尺可無). nirvāṇa is not attained in instalments. Cf. The Book of Chao (1048): Appendix III, 8.
(i) (If we are merged) we are identical with asaṁskṛta and asaṁskṛta is identical with us. If so, you are not allowed to say that asaṁskṛta is always the same but we ourselves are different. (ii) (If we are not merged) we are different from asaṁskṛta. Then we are not asaṁskṛta (released). Asaṁskṛta remains what it is and we remain what we always have been: saṁskṛta (bound). The access to that mysterious union being blocked, none of the (Vehicles) could gain (freedom).

It follows that, whether we are merged with asaṁskṛta or not, we cannot possibly be of three kinds and I wonder why you speak of Three Vehicles at all.

11. (Fifth answer). Unity of the different.

Author. As long as we are on this side we are of this side (Saṁsāra); as soon as we have reached the other side we are of the other side (nirvāṇa). 'He who meets with success, success shall meet with him, he who meets with failure, failure shall meet with him.' Having attained asaṁskṛta we are identical with asaṁskṛta. Though asaṁskṛta is one, there is no need to wonder why we are several.

For example, three birds escape the net. All reach the joyful land (of freedom). Though the joy is the same (for all of them) the individual birds are different. You are not allowed to infer a variety of joys from the variety of birds. And you cannot infer the sameness of all the birds from the sameness of joy. A joyful bird is a joyful bird. Need joy for that reason be several? No, but the birds could be several.

In the same way all beings in the three Vehicles, escaping the cage of Illusion, reach the land of release (asaṁskṛta). Though release is the same in each case, the Vehicles are distinct from each other, and you are not allowed to infer a variety of release from the variety of Vehicles, or the sameness of the three Vehicles from the sameness of release. An individual released is an individual released. Need release for the reason be several? No, but we ourselves are several.

If follows: Though their joy is the same, the birds rise more or less high into the air; though the release is the same, the insight (of the Vehicles) is more or less limited. A Vehicle released is a Vehicle released. Not because we are different from asaṁskṛta but because we are incompletely merged with it, are there three (Vehicles).

12. (Sixth objection.) Questioning Gradual Illumination.

Opponent: Illusion causes the thousandfold misery of life to develop. When Illusion has vanished all misery ends. The first two Vehicles attain kaśyajñāna, the Bodhisattva attains anutpādaajñāna. An adaptation of two sentences in Lao-tzu 33.

628 629 Ilum and nisfjfr (kaśyajñāna and anutpādaajñāna). La Vallée Poussin (Koha VII; 3, IV 521) defines the first as 'le savoir de la destruction des passions', the second as 'le
Illusion has completely disappeared, the kleśāvarāṇa have been removed forever. When that has been brought about, then the mind is imper­urbed (asaṃskṛta) and the fog (which has covered truth) rises.\(^{631}\)

A sūtra\(^{633}\) says: ‘All ārya-jñāna are equally good (for bridging the ‘gap’ between Saṁsāra and Nirvāṇa). For, neither (Saṁsāra) is left nor (Nirvāṇa) entered. In truth, they both are ‘empty’.\(^{633}\) The same sūtra says: ‘The cosmic plain of asaṃskṛta spreads evenly, without break’.\(^{634}\)

If no diversity is possible, it is not permissible to imagine mental diversity (among those released). (Or we may say:) As long as (the Vehicles) are not merged (with asaṃskṛta) it is permissible; later (divisions must) have gone completely. Still you say: they have merged though more or less deeply. On this point I cannot follow.

13. (Sixth answer). Explaining Gradual Illumination.

Author. Asaṃskṛta is indivisible. I shall take this for granted. It remains unexplained how the accumulated kleśa could at once be done away with. A sūtra\(^{655}\) says: ‘Three arrows hit the target; three animals cross the river’.\(^{636}\) The hitting and the crossing is the same but (the Illusions) penetrate more or less deeply and (the animals) are submerged in different degrees because they differ in strength.\(^{637}\) All the beings in the three Vehicles cross the Ford of (Insight in) the Conditions,\(^{638}\) all see the Four Fundamental Truths;\(^{639}\) abandoning Illusion they see ‘truth’\(^{640}\) and (like the birds) rise together to freedom.

\(^{631}\) savoir de la non-production à nouveau des passions. Both constitute Bodhi and are acquired at the last moment, the Thunderbolt. These are Hinayāna terms; they are apparently misunderstood by the opponent who distributes them among the Vehicles.

\(^{633}\) aśā (kleśāvarāṇa), the bonds of moral defilement. There exist two types of bonds: the kleśa- and the jñeya-āvaraṇa, the first to be removed by the Śrāvakāna saint, the second by the Bodhisattva. Cf. E. Obermiller (1933): 32.

\(^{634}\) timira (timira) an eye-disease used as a metaphor for human blindness.

\(^{635}\) An inexact quotation from the PSM: 5a 27 foll. (WTS, TCH) or from the PSK (VK).

\(^{636}\) The four ārya-satyāna have each its own jñāna. These form a series. The problem is which of these meditative acts is the final? Which bridges saṁsāra and nirvāṇa? As both are the same, what can be the meaning, if any, of ‘bridging’?

\(^{637}\) ‘Cosmic order is indivisible’.

\(^{638}\) Probably not from a sūtra but from a śastra, the Mahāvibhūţā (Pi-p’o-sha lun 神婆庐論, Taishō 1547 XXVIII: 445c 17 and 9). The simile is quoted in the Correspondence, Question 2: 130c 13.


\(^{640}\) We should suppose ‘in size’, but all versions have li jì.

\(^{641}\) The twelve Conditions (nidāna) which constitute the former pratyaya-samutpāda.

\(^{642}\) The ārya-satyāna: life is suffering; suffering rises; it vanishes; there is a way out.

\(^{643}\) The author of 13 cannot be Seng-chiao who maintained 即已即滅.
PART IV. NIRVĀṆA IS UNNAMEABLE

But they do not all ride on the same Vehicle because they vary in mental strength.

Numerous as mundane things are, their number is limited. Yet, though a man might be equal in wisdom to Sāriputra and in sagacity to Pūrṇa Maitrāyaniputra, in spite of all his genius and knowledge he would not be able to know them all. How much less could one in one act measure the infinity of empty space and lift the veil from ‘the secret of secrets’? Is it not said in a book, ‘He who seeks learning must daily increase; he who seeks tao must daily diminish’? To seek Tao means to seek asamskrta. We are told that he who seeks asamskrta must daily diminish. Are we told that it can be reached at once? You must diminish again and again until nothing is left. A sūtra uses the simile of the glow-worm and the sun as an illustration of the wide variety of insight.

14. (Seventh Objection.) Development is impossible (in Nirvāṇa).

Opponent: The sūtras say that when the dharmakāya has been formed (the Bodhisattva) enters the land of asamskrta. What his mind then contains cannot be comprehended by (ordinary) knowledge and his body cannot be compared with any mundane body. His ‘body’ is free from the skandha and āyatana, his mental faculties have ceased to function. Yet (the sūtra) says further: ‘(The Buddha as Sumedha) practised (teaching) through three more Stages’, i.e. he amassed more and more good karman.

The practice of teaching presupposes endeavour; amassing good karman presupposes purpose. Where there is endeavour, a tendency to accomplish (the good) and abandon (the evil) is still in evidence; where there is purpose, success and failure both are still possible. If a tendency to accomplish (the good) and abandon (the evil) is still evident, if success and failure befall that ‘body’, this is inconsistent with the above sūtra saying ‘his “body” is free from the skandha and āyatana, his mental faculties have ceased to function’. Neither the wording nor the content

641 Punna Mantāniputta (Pāli reading) is known in the Pāli literature for his mildness and equanimity.

642 Cf. Lao-tzu 1: 宅之又宅.

643 Cf. Lao-tzu 48. 說 contrasts with 經 which the author reserves for sūtras.

644 Cf. PSM: 5b 16.

645 Allusion to the Prajñāpāramitā in general TS (?).

646 The opponent is here the same as in the fourth objection. So the dharmakāya should be the Mahāyāna dharmakāya and not the pāṭimokkha dharmakāya which is meant in the first objection. Cf. n. 514. This is one more reason which proves that PART IV has several authors.

647 This quotation occurs in chapter 8. Cf. p. 119 n. 610.
of these two quotations agree so how can they refer to one and the same person? You act like somebody who points to the South if he is asked for the North by someone who has lost his way.648

15. (Seventh Answer) Development is identical with its Opposite.

Author. A sūtra649 says that the Sage does not act (asaṁskṛta?) and yet all is acted by him (saṁskṛta?).

He does not act (wei): though moving he reposes. All is acted by him: though in repose, he moves.

Though in repose, he moves: things are not one. Though moving, he reposes: things are not dual.

Things are not dual: the more he moves, the deeper he is in repose. Things are not one: the deeper he is in repose, the more he moves.650

It follows that action (wei) is identical with non-action (wu-wei), that, though motion and rest are distinguished (by language), they are (actually) the same. The T'ao-hsing651 says: 'The mind (of the Sage) neither exists nor does it non-exist.' It neither equals the (human) mind when it is active nor does it equal the (human) mind when it is passive.

THE HUMAN MIND

When the (human) mind is active all phenomena come alive; when it ceases to act, this means the end of phenomenal life.652 But, phenomena are mere images and their end is of no consequence for (the existence of) Cosmic Life. If so, how can the Way of the Spirit and the Mind of the Sage be flatly explained in analogy to phenomenal death by which Cosmic Life is not touched at all?

THE MIND OF THE SAGE

Though the Cosmic Mind does not exist (phenomenally) it cannot be said to non-exist (phenomenally); though it does not non-exist, it cannot be said to exist.

648 ITT: 426c quotes the Pien-tsong lun 輝宗論 by Hsieh Ling-yün 謝靈運 who in a trinitie of the South and North in order to explain T'ao-sheng's theory of Inner-Illumination. It was later picked up and altered by Hui-kuan. Cf. The Hunk of Chao (1938): Appendix III 8: 189 and the li-huo lun 立惑論 (Taishō LII: 6c 20 f). The Chinese have a popular saying nan-yu an pei-ch'ê 南遊北極.
650 Cf. PSM: 12.53 (f) Asamshriya is translated 無為, there it refers to the famous 'action without acting' of T'ao. The phrase 人無為而無所不為 is not retranslatable into Sanskrit. The author just changes to the Chinese pattern.
651 Cf. PANT I, l.s.
652 Cf. DSI: 435o ff. I read the text as the author seems to read, not as the Manakris would warrant.
653 太虚, as above 無常 出現 in PANT II.
As it does not exist, phenomenal images are absent in the Mind; as it does not non-exist, it does not fail to (act) in accord with Cosmic Order. Therefore, as Order rules (his actions), all things unfold their innate virtues; as images are absent, the act (of Cosmic Self-manifestation) is not spoiled by (individual) performances.\textsuperscript{654}

Therefore, responding and changing incessantly he is never active; reposed and unchanging he is never passive.

A sūtra says:\textsuperscript{655} 'He makes no effort, yet every effort derives from him'. This is to be believed.

Sumedha says:\textsuperscript{656} 'During my incarnations which lasted innumerable kalpases I spent the treasures of my kingdom, and even my life, for the benefit of innumerable beings. But because I did it under the illusion (that my spending was real), it was not dāna.\textsuperscript{657} To-day I presented the Buddha with five flowers, conscious that they are not born (anupāṇa)\textsuperscript{658} and now this is justly called dāna'.

The Bodhisattva K'ung-hsing,\textsuperscript{659} as he entered the Gate of Salvation called 'empty',\textsuperscript{660} said: 'I am still on the way (to Nirvāṇa), I have not yet realized it'.

It follows that the less the mind (of the Bodhisattva) contains, the fuller it is (of merciful effort)\textsuperscript{661} but, though his efforts last all day long, he still makes no effort.

That is why the Hsien-chieh sūtra\textsuperscript{662} speaks of dāna without present-
ing anything, why the Ch'eng-chü sūtra\textsuperscript{663} praises acting without acting, why the Dhyāna Classic\textsuperscript{664} extols mercy which asks no (reward in Heaven), why the Szu-i sūtra\textsuperscript{665} preaches Cognition non-cognizant.

The intentions of the Sage are incomprehensible, transcending (human understanding); the texts may differ but their meaning is the same. It is impossible that he either acts or does not act. The Bodhisattva (in the Vimalakīrti sūtra) takes his stand on the principle of the Sameness of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa,\textsuperscript{666} so he neither terminates Samsāra nor stays in Nirvāṇa. This applies to our case. Therefore the use of the simile of the South and the North betrays little understanding.

16. (Eighth Objection). Questioning the beginning (of Nirvāṇa).

Opponent. If there are no Beings, there is nobody to drive in the three Vehicles. If there are no Vehicles there is no means of reaching Nirvāṇa. So the beings were first and then came Nirvāṇa. It follows that Nirvāṇa has a beginning. Whatever begins also ends. (On the other hand) a sūtra\textsuperscript{667} says: 'Nirvāṇa has no beginning and no ending, it is like the unborn day, like empty space', which means that Nirvāṇa was first. If that is so, it is useless to make any effort to realize it.\textsuperscript{668}

17. (Eight Answer.) Time is meaningless (in the case of Nirvāṇa).

Author: Perfect Man eludes (all description), no likeness (is found of Him), and yet it is He who has created all things on Earth.\textsuperscript{669} In unison with all things he realizes himself. This the Sage alone can achieve. The cosmos (li) is essential for (the existence of) the Sage; the cosmos is essential for (the existence of) the cosmos. Apart from the cosmos there is no Sage; apart from the Sage there is no cosmos. Since it is the cosmos that is from the Sage, the Sage is nothing but the cosmos.

\textsuperscript{663} Cf. Ch'eng-chü huang-ming ting-i ching 成具光明定意經 (Taishō 630 XV: 452b 29).
\textsuperscript{664} Cf. Ts'ao-ch'an san-mei ching 坐禪三昧經 (Taishō 586 XV: 39b 11).
\textsuperscript{665} Cf. Szu-i fan-t'ien so-wen ching 思彘梵天所問經 (Taishō 614 XV: 282c 7).
\textsuperscript{666} Cf. VSK: 554b 3. Lit. 'Sameness of termination and non-termination (of samsāra)'.
\textsuperscript{667} Cf. NS 21: 487a 22, WTS. It is a faint similarity.
\textsuperscript{668} The problem of 始也本覺 originated in the NS and had not yet been discussed at the time of Seng-chiao. This is another reason why PART IV must be considered as at least in part spurious.
\textsuperscript{669} 萬物無非我徒，HT yields no version; YK has 賀 for 遠 which seems to be a 'correction'. 远 the same as 成 in the following half sentence and must be read tsao. The Sage is identical with the cosmos or nature. Nature creates itself, so he creates the ten thousand things in realization of himself. For he is chi-shu 無數, cosmic fate. An interesting passage is found in Pao-t'ang hun (Hisil 1 B 11, 28c 13 f): 尖端千秋而不朽，死而不當...所謂萬古萬死，公正無累，法師自無， dejar secunda, 'The Sage, born, does not exist; dead, does not non-exist... When a thousand times he is born and dies again, this does not mean anything (to him), for no individual (hope is frustrated or fulfilled). His way is that of nature. There is no personal creator (in the universe). This contrasts with our text: 'It is He who has created the ten thousand things'. In this
Therefore the Lord of the Gods says: 'Where is Prajñā to be sought?' Subhūti answers: 'Prajñā can be sought neither within matter nor without'. And it is said: "To see the pratityasamutpāda is to see the dharma; to see the dharma is to see the Buddha." This means that He and the dharma are not separate entities.

That is why Perfect Man conceals his dark motive in the world unborn, why he hides his supramundane origin while moving in conformity with the Changes, why he embraces the universe reflecting it in his mind, and why he merges past and future in the timeless state (t'i).

Ancient and modern interpenetrate, beginning and end are identical (to him); the very first and the very last finally meet and no duality remains. That unbroken cosmic extension is called Nirvāṇa.

A sūtra says: 'Nirvāṇa is not found apart from the dharma'. Another sūtra says: 'Because the dharma are not limited, bodhi is not limited'. So we know that by force of an inexorable conformity Nirvāṇa is present (in our life); that this conformity is based on a unity (of Nirvāṇa and Śāṁśāra) which defies (human) understanding.

It follows: Our world is nothing but He (the Sage); the Sage is nothing but our world. Both are alike where life ends; (both) are at home in the infinite. 'Going near, in front of you, stepping back, in your rear, nowhere is Nirvāṇa found'. How can you argue its ending or its contrast accidental? On p. 125 n. 654 we read that 'the deed he performs is not a personal deed' ( 功成不自). For he creates without any intention to create 心想都滅. Or, as Seng-chao could also have said: he creates and yet does not create. There cannot, of course, be any question of creation in the Biblical sense. Still, the words, 'it is He who has created the ten thousand things', sound like a retort. Was a discussion going on as to creation, the last offshoot of the much older discussion as to the acts, the consciousness etc. of the Sage? In the DEDICATION II.3 we read that the Eastern Ch'in believed in a personal ruler in Heaven (the Sage) and that Seng-chao wrote this pamphlet to put an end to the talk that in boundless space there is no Sage. Had he to write this to prove his loyalty? Were there parties forming for and against the belief in a personal God? (Cf. n. 498). Tao-sheng's early departure and the rough treatment accorded to others who then moved to Lu-shan (n. 405) suggest some impatience on the part of those in power. Might there be a grain of truth in the legend that Seng-chao was killed on order of the Ruler? Cf. INTRODUCTION, n. 29. On the semantic value of 我 cf. n. 180, n. 429, n. 468, n. 605, n. 678.

670 Śākro devānām indraḥ in the PSK: 278b 26.
671 Cf. NS: 524a, b, also VS Commentary: 330a and 429c. This passage occurs in the Śālistambha sūtra (Liao-pen sheng-szu ching 丁本生死經, Taishō 708 XVI: 815b).
672 The Law-of-Causation identical with śūnyatā.
673 物我不異. Cf. above n. 180, n. 605.
674 以成體, lit. 'in order to realize t'i', when unmanifested.
675 The universe.
676 Cf. VSK: 539c 45.
677 Cf. PSM: 146b 11.
678 物不異我, 我不異物. 物我空會, 輔乎無極, 無極 (anuttara).
679 Cf. the parallel passage on p. 111.
beginning? The Heavenly Maiden (in the *Vimalakirti sūtra*) says (to Śāriputra): 'Elder, how long is it since you were liberated?'

18. (Ninth objection.) Can (Nirvāṇa) be attained?

Opponent: A sūtra says: 'The destiny of a being is bound up with the five skandha'. And it says: 'For all those who attain Nirvāṇa the five skandha have disappeared as if a lamp were extinguished'.

It follows that all mundane life is passed inside the five skandha (Samsāra) and that the sphere of Nirvāṇa lies completely outside the Three Planes of Existence. Both spheres are radically apart from each other and for that reason no beings can attain Nirvāṇa.

(Argument.) a. If beings could attain Nirvāṇa then their destinies would not be terminated with the five skandha (but would continue on the Nirvāṇa-side). b. If you insist, however, that their destinies are terminated with the five skandha, then the five skandha would still be there (in the moment of termination and Nirvāṇa would stretch into the Samsāra-side). c. Supposing, however, that (in the moment of termination) the five skandha were not there, then there would be no need to free oneself from them and) there would be no candidate to attain Nirvāṇa.

19. (Ninth Answer.) Attainment remains a Mystery.

Author: Truth appears when (the world) is left. Illusion arises when one clings (to worldly pleasures). Clinging calls for the attainment of something; abandoning calls for the Unnameable. He who follows Truth becomes one with Truth; he who follows Illusion becomes one with Illusion. You believe in the reality of attainment and try to attain something; I believe in the unreality of attainment and while not attaining attain.

Before any discussion it is necessary to place one's argument on a firm basis. We cannot say anything about Nirvāṇa without being in Nirvāṇa. But, if now, talking about it, we are in Nirvāṇa (everybody else would also be there). Or who would not be there and, therefore, wish to attain it?

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680 In the fifth chapter *VSK*: 548a 8. Śāriputra asks the heavenly servant in the house of Vimalakirti which symbolizes Mahāyāna: How long have you been here? The girl answers: As long as your nirvāṇa lasts. Whereupon Śāriputra keeps silent and is taught by the girl that nirvāṇa is timeless.
681 Cf. *NS*: 537a 11.
682 The hātara-, rāpa-, arūpya-worlds.
683 Read mao for maos.
684 Cf. *Māhyāmyika kārikās* IV, skandha-parihāra, and XXV, nirvāṇa-parihāra, 11-16. The five skandha constitute the transmigrating shadow-person (vījñāna, see above introduction, n. 111) and are here treated as equivalents to sāttra. Three dharmas are distinguished: sāttra—attainment—nirvāṇa. As no dharma can leave its kṣema, but all three are necessary to effect the termination of sāttra, no attainment of nirvāṇa is possible.
685 Author agrees with the opponent: no candidate for nirvāṇa!
In Nirvāṇa every mundane life has come to a blissful end. Into it Heaven and Earth are dissolved, the thousand things have been washed away, gods are equal with men, and sameness is not distinguished from difference. (In this Mirror) no individual image appears, no individual voice is echoed. It is never attained and always attained. A sūtra says: ‘Nirvāṇa is neither identical with mundane life nor not identical’. Vimalakīrti has said: ‘If Maitreya has attained release, all beings must be released. Why? Because beings as beings are already released, they need not again be released’. These words show that they are released though they are not released.

It follows that if beings are not beings who attains (Nirvāṇa)? If Nirvāṇa is not Nirvāṇa what is attained? The Fang-kuang says: ‘Is Bodhi attained from Existence? (The Buddha) answers: “No”. “From non-Existence?” He answers: “No”. “From both?” He answers: “No”. “From either?” He answers: “No”. “Is it not attained at all?” “No”. “What do you mean?” He answers: “(To know that) there is nothing to be attained is attainment”.’ It follows: Attained is what is not attainable. If attainment means attainment of what is not attainable, who is exempt from attainment?

Further consequences. The Blessed Path leads where there is no path. It is not attained by ‘attaining’. The Blessed Knowledge is ignorant of facts: Knowing ‘it’ is knowing not. The Cosmic Shape is hidden in the shapeless: seeing ‘it’ is seeing not. The Cosmic Sound is concealed in silence: hearing ‘it’ is hearing not.

Therefore (Nirvāṇa) compasses all the past and leads all creatures to their (predestined) ends. It nourishes them all, and as far as it reaches, it overlooks nothing. Wide as the ocean, what does not come from it?

The Brahmacārīn says: ‘I hear about the Way of the Buddha, that it is wide and deep like the great shoreless ocean. There is nothing which he does not accomplish and no being that he does not release’.

Now I have opened the road to the Three Vehicles; I have determined what is Truth and what Illusion. The teaching of the sages and wise men has been handed down; the unnameability (of Nirvāṇa) is proved.

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686 Read chi 己 for szu 己. Cf. HT: 428b. YK makes wo 我 refer to the Sage. The text then means that the Sage is not found, neither within nor without (Nirvāṇa). In this case 我 should come before 己.
687 Cf. NS: 495a 1.
688 Cf. VSK: 542b 13.
689 PSM: 113a 29-113b 5 contains a similar passage.
690 Cf. the Fo-shuo pa-shih ching (Taishō 581 XIV: 965a 10 f.).
691 The reader may have noticed that the last chapters are much better than the first, and indeed enrich considerably the picture we have from the other Parts. Possibly they belong to a genuine manuscript.
APPENDICES

I. The First Six 'Schools' of Chinese Buddhism
II. The Problem of the Authenticity of Part IV
I. NOTE ON THE FIRST SIX ‘SCHOOLS’

In the time of Seng-chao there existed no ‘schools’ in the proper sense of the word, but teachers held different opinions. These became more rigid when contested in public. But none of them survived the discussion which had stimulated their formulation. Later these views were arranged under headlines and then called ‘schools’ (chia 家 or tsung 宗). Seng-chao was the latest thinker who, in Part II, contributed to this discussion called in the literature ‘on the Two Truths’ (erh-ti lun 二論).

The grand theme on which the teachers formed their opinions was the age-old Taoist one: how to understand the strange contrast between the cosmic whole and its contents, World and non-World. Buddhist Emptiness (śūnyatā) seemed to be the same as Lao Tzu’s ‘cosmic void which is inexhaustible’. How to characterize this apparent antinomy? Was the whole first, the manifold later? Did the present state of the universe unfold from an original infolded one (t'i-yung)? Is one dependent on causation while the other one acting spontaneously like nature? Or, are these states distinguished like sleep and awakening, dream and reality? Is it, perhaps, by some peculiar act of realization, or in meditation, possible to transform World into non-World? Various analogies were proffered to conceptualize Existence.

These ‘schools’ had no relation to Indian Buddhist controversies. The Chinese asked all the questions and, though they searched the sūtras, the answers were often not different from those found in the heritage of their own sages.

The Schools are almost as old as Chinese Buddhism. Lists of them existed already in Seng-chao’s time. In an Introduction by Seng-jui, written in A.D. 406 or a little later, six houses (chia) are blamed for misinterpretation of the Scriptures. Seng-jui refers to an unknown treatise which must have been current in Ch'ang-an without, however, quoting the author. Yüan-k'ang, commenting on a passage in Hui-ta’s Introduction of Chao-lun, mentions a book written in the Sung

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694 Cf. li-shu 2.1/1: 360 1 f. 司馬真七系譜述十二, YK 44n. Yüan-k'ang quotes from the Hall Pa-lun 潘論 in the ch'iao (supplement to the Pa-lun of Lu Ch'eng, the Ch'ung-lun), now lost. It was written under the influence of Pan-ch'ang 韋叡, disciple of Seng-yi and author of the MSCH. This book contained two lists of Six Houses (chia) each: a. those mentioned by T'iu-chii; b. those mentioned by Seng-ching. These from Hsin Ting-lun on 下盛論 who died between A.D. 472 and 476 (KSCII 7.60). The
period by Shih T'an-chi 釋彌濟 of Ta Chuang-yan ssu 太莊嚴寺 called Liu-chia chi'-tsung lun 六家七宗論 (Treatise of the Six Houses and Seven Schools). They must be identical with the Six Houses of Sung-jui. T'an-chi only lists the key names without saying who the teachers were, so we are left guessing.

The most important historical material for this purpose is Chi-tsang's commentary of the Mādhyamika kārikās, the Chung-kuan lun su 中觀論疏, in 10 chüan (short Su) where on page 29 is a detailed study of the Houses and Schools with quotations from the founders, and a sub-commentary of the Su, written in A.D. 801–806 by the Japanese monk Anchō, the Churun sho-ki 中論疏記 in 8 chüan which contains (pp. 92, 94) further quotations from otherwise unknown histories of these Schools.

Schools of Seng-ching, described in his Shih-hsiang liu-chia lun 實相六家論, probably coincided with those of T'an-chi at least partly, but cannot be identified with certainty. Cf. T'ang (1938): 231.

T'an-chi was a pupil of Seng-tao 僧導, a follower of Kumārajiva, and belongs to the generation following Seng-jui. In A.D. 458 he crossed the Yangtse River. KSCH 7.14 (T'an-pin 录赋), MSCH 16.5, T'ang (1938): 721.

These are listed in the following order: pen-wu 本無 (pen-wu-i 本無異), chi-se 諸色, shih-han 嚴含, huan-hua 幻化, hsin-wu 心無, yün-hui 車慧. Here I deal first with those schools refuted by Seng-chao, combining pen-wu and pen-wu-i. Chi-tsang and his sub-commentators keep to the above order, but not the authorities quoted in the Churun sho-ki (quoted Su-chi 疏記 by T'ang) who list as many as thirteen and fifteen schools. Because these belong to a much later epoch they are not treated here. See below n. 700.

A famous scholar of the San-lun School, A.D. 549–623. His biography is found in the Dictionaries.

Taishō 1824 XLII. T'ang (1938) always quotes this commentary as Chung-lun su 中論疏記.

Taishō 2255 LXV.

They were written at the time when the controversies between the San-lun and the Ch'eng-shih teachers were fiercest, i.e. under the Liang and later. They are: a. The kōh-it sui-hsüan lun 二論復玄論 by (Sui) T'ai Fa-shih (師) 僧法師 from Yeh-ch'eng 業城寺 (Su-chi: 818). The latter has been tentatively identified with Shen-t'ai 謝胎 by Prof. T'ang in his lectures. Cf. KSCH 14: Fa-hsiang chuan 師相傳. But Shen-t'ai was younger than Chi-tsang and could not have been quoted by him. T'ai might well be identical with Kuang-t'ai (光大 or 太) from Yeh-ch'eng 耶城寺 which must be a misreading of Yeh-ch'eng 耶城寺. He took part in the discussions about the two Truths. Cf. Chi-tsang, Ker-li i 二論義 (Taishō 1854 XLV: 115a) and Chung-ming hsin-tshen lun 神名玄論 6 (Taishō XXXVIII: 89a: 光法師撰復玄論十四神名二論). He is referred to in the Ta-ch'eng hsüan-lun under the name of his monastery (Taishō 1931 XLV: 22a 26b) b. The Shun-men hsin-tshen 信門玄論, probably identical with the Chung-lun hsüan, written by Fa-lang 師朗 from Hsing-huang 鸿黃寺, the Master of Chi-tsang. Cf. Taishō LV: 1150 20 and T'ang (1938): 43a. Shun-men refer to the Shuen-tien 山, centre of the Nan-lun School.

The jutsu-ji 結義, quoted by Anchō, is by an unknown Japanese author. Its full title is Churun-sho jutsu-ji 中論結義 (not Churun jutsu-ji, cf. Taishō Index 1: 431e and h). Several of these Japanese commentaries are quoted in the Churun sho-ki (Shu-chi).
Altogether the material that can be scraped together from these sources and from the MSCH, the San-lun yu-i-i 三論遊意義 by Shih fa-shih 砺法師,\footnote{Cf. Taishō 1855 XLV: 121c.} the KSCH, etc. is very scarce and difficult to interpret. On the whole I follow the outline of T’ang (1938) chapter 9, all deviations being duly stated and substantiated.

**FIRST SCHOOL**

*Hsin-wu* 心無 (*emptiness of mind*)\footnote{No biography, but mentioned in that of K’ang Seng-yüan 康僧淵 (KSCH 4.3). Crossed the Yangtze River in the time of Ch’eng Ti 成帝 (326–342), probably on account of troubles in the North which followed the conquest of Ch’ang-an (316) and caused many people to emigrate. Known as compiler of two Combined Editions (*k’o-\pen* 合本) in which several translations were combined into one, and of two famous Catalogues of Buddhist scriptures. T’ang (1938): 267, Zürcher (1959): 99-102.}

According to *YK* Chih Min-tu 支慜度 (also 敏, 敏)\footnote{Cf. Academia Sinica Ts’ai Yiian-pei Memorial Volume I, 1-18, Ch’en Yin-k’o 陳寅恪 (Beiping 1933), *Chih min-tu hsüeh-shuo k’ao 支愍度學説考*, The story is reprinted in *YK*: 53.} is the representative of this School. The story he tells has been reconstructed by Ch’en Yin-k’o\footnote{Cf. T’ang (1938): 266f and (1957): 48–61; Fung-Bodde: 252–258; Zürcher (1959): 100, notes p. 353.} with the help of *Shih-shuo hsin-yü 世說新語*.\footnote{Crossed the Yangtze River in the time of Ch’eng Ti 成帝 (326–342). "In the opinion of the Tathāgata, "..." ... ... ... the former said: "Tell Min-tu on my behalf that he must not propagate *Emptiness (of Mind)*. We invented the idea as an expedient to save us from hunger. Cease, lest you offend the Tathāgata". Whether this story is true or not, it may well be that Min-tu was one of the first to propagate this doctrine which gradually spread along the Yangtze valley.}

‘When the religious mendicant Min-tu was about to cross the river (Yangtse)\footnote{Cf. T’ang (1938): 266f and (1957): 48–61; Fung-Bodde: 252–258; Zürcher (1959): 100, notes p. 353.} he made friends with a mendicant from Honan. After talking the matter over, they decided, ‘If we come to the Eastern Yangtze region with nothing up our sleeves but the Old Doctrine, we may not be able to make a living’. So together they originated the New Doctrine of *Emptiness of Mind*. Then it happened that the other fellow could not cross and Min-tu alone came to the South. He had already preached the (new) doctrine (for several years) when (another) Honanese arrived carrying a message from his former companion. It said: ‘Tell Min-tu on my behalf that he must not propagate *Emptiness (of Mind)*. We invented the idea as an expedient to save us from hunger. Cease, lest you offend the Tathāgata’.

Whether this story is true or not, it may well be that Min-tu was one of the first to propagate this doctrine which gradually spread along the Yangtze valley.
Some twenty or thirty years later\textsuperscript{705} the same idea was defended by Tao-heng 道恒\textsuperscript{706} against a pupil of Chu Fa-t'ai 法㤅\textsuperscript{710} named T'an-i 異 in a famous meeting at Ching-chou. The story is told in the biography of Chu Fa-t'ai:\textsuperscript{712}

At that time the Sramana Tao-heng, a very gifted man, used to propagate Emptiness of mind in Ching-chou with great success. (Fa-) t'ai said: ‘This is a heresy that has to be refuted’. So he arranged a large meeting of famous monks and ordered his pupil T'an-i to question him. (T'an-i) put forth theories, based on the sūtras, and the debate became more and more heated. Tao-heng flashed his arguments (like swords); he hated to be rebuffed. When the day was drawing to a close (they separated), only to start again the next morning. Hui-yuan who was also present had (also) repeatedly attacked him and tempers grew hot. Tao-heng himself felt that his reasoning was faulty; he lost his mental poise, his fly-whisk beat the table and he answered without waiting his turn. Hui-yuan said: ‘Make haste by not hurrying;\textsuperscript{713} where goes your weaving-shuttle?’ The assembly broke into laughter. After this nothing more was heard of Emptiness of mind.

The last statement is a little exaggerated, for we hear of this doctrine much later. In fact, the adherents of Emptiness of mind must have been numerous. Chi-tsang and his sub-commentators, as well as Hui-ta, K'un-t'ai, and Fa-lang, propose another man, Chu Fa-wen 竺法溫 (also quoted as Chu Fa-yün 竺法溫, Shih Seng-wen 釋僧溫, etc.\textsuperscript{714}) a pupil of Chu Fa-shen 竺法深,\textsuperscript{715} of the second generation after Chih Min-tu. The Ch'eng-lu\textsuperscript{716} lists a treatise of Liu I-min, the Shih hsin-wu-i 聲心無一.

\textsuperscript{706} Tao-heng has no biography, but is mentioned in the biography of his teacher, (KSCI) V 344c). Zürcher (1939: III n. 358) is right in distinguishing this man from another monk of the same name who wrote a pamphlet in defence of Buddhism, the Shih-po lun 聲婆論, and who lived 346–417. His biography is found in KSCI VI: 365 and mentioned in that of Kao-tsu 高祖 (ibid. VI: 363); cf. T'ang (1938): 325.
\textsuperscript{707} Chu Fa-t'ai lived 320–387. He was a companion of Tao-an in Yeh and on his travels West and South. When Tao-an dispersed his followers in Hsin-yeh 新野 T'ai went to Ching-chou. He spent the rest of his life in the capital. Neither his correspondence with the Neo-Taoist Hsi Ch'ao 西超 concerning pen-wu 本無 nor his other treatises are preserved. KSCI 5.4. T'ang (1938): 254, 252. Zürcher (1939): 148.
\textsuperscript{708} T’an-i (Number One, there was also a Number Two, both pupils of Fa-t'ai) is otherwise unknown. T'ang (1938): 254. Zürcher (1939): 149.
\textsuperscript{709} 誠有才力,常執心無義,大行荆州,竺法溫門,此其邪說,應須破之,乃大憤明悟,令弟子奮其揮之,撰經引umont止教編校,風吹其日滿,不昔受領,自道就業,明日更奮,蠟酒流於凝凝數篇,聞賞終起,此日集義道異,師色激動,廖鳳相圍,末即有答,還曰,不狀而願,行軌何為,坐者皆交,心領之義,於此而息。
\textsuperscript{710} An allusion to the 1-ching, Hsi-tsu Ag, cf. Punn-Budden 1155 n. 3.
\textsuperscript{711} Mentioned in the biography of Chu Tao-ch'I'n 釋道, (KSCI 4: 348b). Kuang-t'ai, quoted by Anchi (Suo-chi: 94b), tells of a treatise he wrote, the Hsin-wu 甲之論.
\textsuperscript{712} 聲心無一者,見 below n. 728.
I. THE FIRST SIX SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

and a letter of Huan Hsiian 恒玄 (Ching-tao 敬道)\textsuperscript{717} about hsin-wu 心無.

Liu Hsiao-piao 劉孝標 the SHSH commentator, defines the distinction between the Old and the New Doctrine, invented by Chin Min-tu and his companion as a means of living, as follows;\textsuperscript{718}

'The old doctrine maintains: When Omniscience (sārṇākāra-jñātā) is attained\textsuperscript{719} and the universe is mirrored, then the misery of life has ended. This is called "emptiness" (śūnyatā). It implies eternal life, free from mundane changes. This is called Blissful Existence.'

'The new doctrine maintains: Omniscience, properly speaking, is vacant like empty space. Yet, though vacant it is cognizant, though nothing, it is responsive (to the needs of beings). It dwells at the root of things and has attained consummation, which is unattainable where (things) still exist.'

The old doctrine seems to assume that śūnyatā is merely negative, it means 'end of suffering' while eternal life is waiting for the deceased. The new doctrine (Min-tu) sees the positive side of śūnyatā. Though this happened long before Kumārajiva Min-tu might have heard of the Middle Path (?)

A very different doctrine was propounded by Chu Fa-wen, a disciple of Chu Tao-ch'ien. He wrote a Hsin-wu lun 心無論 of which part is extant in quotation.\textsuperscript{720}

'To exist means to be shaped; not to exist means not to be shaped. What is shaped could not well be called non-existent; what is not shaped could not well be called existent. Therefore, to exist means actually to exist, rūpa means actual rūpa. When the sūtras say that rūpa is śūnya this (only) means that no heed is taken of things so that the mind is not bothered by rūpa. When internally all interest (in rūpa) has gone, obviously it is no more. (What the sūtras say namely) that rūpa is non-existent, cannot mean that where shapes have been there is now an empty hole.'\textsuperscript{721}

\textsuperscript{717} Scholar and statesman who usurped the throne of the Chin in 403, but was killed the following year.

\textsuperscript{718} SHSH 1.c. 華厳者曰 種智是有而能圓照，然則萬物盡謂之空無，常住不變謂之妙有，而無者者曰 種智之種智如太虛，虛而能有而能應，居無至極者無乎。\textsuperscript{719} T'ang (1938) reads Chung-chih shih yu 種智是有 and 與新 for 與無 but cf. n. 705. T'ang (1940): 68.

\textsuperscript{720} Cf. HT: 420c, Chi-t'ang, Su: 29a 25f; Anchō, Su-chī: 94b 8f. The latter quotes Fa-lang and later the Jutsu-gi, which in turn quotes Kuang-t'ei. All these quotations are similar. I translate from the last mentioned. Cf. also Zürcher (1950), 139. 有形 者，無，無像者也。然則有像不可釘錐，無像不可釘錐 (有形)。是故有覇有者，色是異色，法所變，非是霊者；於內止其心，不著外色，不存餘情之內，非謂如何，無想無想離形而為無色者。

\textsuperscript{721} [Jose Fa-wen in these three recommend meditation as a way to peace of the mind]
Apart from Fa-wen’s shallow doctrine *hsin-wu* could have other meanings. Not only Neo-Taoists but also Buddhists spoke of the Sage as unconscious of what he is doing. Like nature, he provides all beings without a preconceived programme.\(^{722}\)

This theory fits well into Seng-chao’s argumentation and therefore Fa-wen should be the opponent, listed under the keyword *hsin-wu*. That the unconsciousness of nature was, under Buddhist influence, understood as a meditative state is suggested also by the Letter of Liu I-min.

**SECOND SCHOOL**

*Chi-se* 即色 (‘emptiness is identical with matter’)\(^{723}\)

Rūpa is colour, matter or the phenomenal world. Phenomena are conditioned, they do not arise by themselves. Though they exist (in Illusion) they do not exist in Truth (*chen*) and, therefore, are called ‘empty’ (*k’ung, śūnya*), i.e. unable to master their destinies. This implies that beyond this world there is not-this-world describable only in negations. Though truly existent it does not exist phenomenally (as a thing exists) and its true existence, is, in this understanding, non-existence (*wu* 無) or ‘empty’ (*k’ung 空*). The term ‘śūnya’ has, therefore, two meanings, appreciating if applied to Truth, and depreciating if applied to Illusion. This was difficult to grasp.

Chih Tao-lin 支道林 is assumed to be the representative of this school by all the authorities with the exception of Chi-tsang. Chi-tsang mentions a teacher in Kuan-nei 關內 who he thinks is refuted by Seng-chao.\(^{724}\) This man is otherwise unknown. Did Chi-tsang introduce this face-saving device to prevent the appearance of one patriarch blaming another?\(^{725}\)

\(^{722}\) *Pao-tsang lun*, Hsü (1B 1/1 24 d): 唯道無心萬物固備. Unconscious life alone (as that of nature acting) yields the key to the universe, and *27b*: 應物緣化, 萬有水月, 形象, 無主, 此謂道通. Responding (to the needs of the creatures) nature guides them which resemble the moon in the water, the flower in the sky, the echo and reflection. There is no (cosmic) ruler. This means: living in Tao.


\(^{724}\) *Chi-t’ang*, *Su*: 20a 18. Ančhö, *Su-chi*: 94a 8 f. quotes his tenet from the *Jutsu-gi* 稲色即合而成色, 彼相時相空顯色, 不然相色, 實顯色而顯色, 不自色故, 又實顯色而實若白, 白色不自色, 故實即色. ‘Fine particles of rūpa (*āyā*), accumulating, produce (a lump of) coarse rūpa (*piśāda*). That is to say: when (we speak of rūpa) which 'is not' (*śūnya*) we mean coarse rūpa which (before accumulation of fine rūpa) 'is not'; (we do not mean) fine rūpa. Fine rūpa is coarse rūpa in expectation, it is not in itself (coarse) rūpa. (A lump is rūpa proper.) Just so, black is white in expectation (to be whitened); (earlier, before being made white,) white is not white. That is the meaning of 'śūnya' is rūpa'. This is reminiscent of Classic Chinese sophists: nothing exists but in relation to its opposite; white and black, śūnya and rūpa are mere modes of the same, unspecified, thing.

\(^{725}\) *T’ang* (1938): edc.
I. THE FIRST SIX SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

Tao-lin,⁷²⁶ a leading personality in the Neo-Taoist discussions of the fourth century, wrote a treatise, the Chi-se yu-hsiian lun 即色遊玄論 that probably gave this school its name. This and all other treatises of Tao-lin's are lost, so we must deduce from quotations what his opinion was. YK says that the passage criticized by Seng-chao did not occur in the Chi-se lun but in the Miao-kuan chang 妙觀章⁷²⁷ which is no more extant.

In the following pages I comment on the text found in Chao-lun (see Translation on page 90f), and then on the text found in Hui-t'a's Chao-lun su (HT) as corrected in T'ang (1938: 259). Preceding the later version is a quotation from the Vimalakirti sūtra.

Chi-se 即色 means 即色空.⁷²⁸ Since we are already acquainted with the t'i-yung pattern and its many variations we may simply equate rūpa with yung and sūnya with t'i. But then what is the meaning of 色不自色, rūpa is not rūpa because it is not in itself rūpa? Seng-chao, in the third line of the above text agrees with this statement, though as he says 'for other reasons'. We remember these reasons: 'World is non-World, non-World is World, or rūpa is sūnya and sūnya is rūpa, see ANSWERING LETTER II, 2(d). Tao-lin's reasons are different, for which we should go to him for an answer. In the quotation given below he describes

⁷²⁶ Chih Tun 支遁, tsu Tao-lin was a nobleman from Hopei. He lived from 314 to 366 (KSCH). After the destruction of the Northern Capital (Shih Lo 石勒 took Lo-yang in 309) or, as the Chinese chronicles say, in the yung-chia 永嘉 period, his family wandered south and settled in Chiang-tso 江左 (Chekiang). He spent his life partly in the Capital (Chien-k'ang 建康) partly in the hilly region near K'uai-chi 開稽. There he built himself a monastery, the Ch'i-kuang ssu 伽光寺 on Shih-ch'eng Shan 石城山 in the Shan mountains 石山. Tao-lin had taken the vows of a monk. He studied and commented on the Buddhist sūtras but also on Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu, believing that they contained the same truth. His amalgamation of both religions helped to make Buddhism popular among the influential of the Court. Cf. KSCH 4.8. Some material is extant in the Shih Shi 師史: T'ang (1938): 177-181; Zürcher (1959): 116-130. Zürcher (1959): 360-9 gives a complete bibliography of Tao-lin’s works.

⁷²⁷ YK: 33d 18, cf. SHIH All 文集 (q): p. 218. It was contained in the Chih-tun chü 文集 which is now lost.

⁷²⁸ Notice that Tao-lin like Seng-chao, uses 色 in a perjorative sense, for 'unreal'. Cf. below the quotation from the Shih Shi 師史, 144a, also n. 92a.
the ‘Perfect Being’ who has adapted himself to cosmic conditions and ‘floats about unchecked upon the waves (of becoming)’. Then he adds that ‘he identifies himself with things and then is no longer in any relation whatsoever to them (物物而不物於物). This doubling, but in the form of 色色, occurs also in the second line of the above text: 善待色色而後為色哉。Yuán-k’ang believes that this line is by T’ao-lin, but Tao-lin would then be in contradiction with his own tenet (色不自色 = 不色色 = 色色色). In fact it expresses Seng-chao’s view and would imply that Seng-chao agrees with Tao-lin concerning the use of 自(自性) and of 色色, but disagrees with Tao-lin’s distinction between the two states 他 and 真. Seng-chao wants them identified: 他 is 真 and 真 is 他, etc. We do not know what Tao-lin exactly thought about this identification and whether Seng-chao was right in attributing to him the opinion that one state has to wait for the other to disappear before replacing it. In the quotation below, we read that ‘non-existence’ (in the position of 真) is different from non-existence (in the position of 他): 但非無矣; later we even read of stages. Tao-lin, most probably, did not know of the Middle Path and thought of a difference between World (rūpa) and non-World (śūnya) which had to be overcome by the believer.

There remains the 殿 in the second line to be explained. If this line, as I think, represents Seng-chao’s opinion, 殿 denotes a relation to rūpa in which rūpa is there, though it is not asserted, as we had it in Part III. Above he says 但當色即色, ‘śūnya is identical with rūpa as it is found’, not by any steps taken to overcome any differences which there may be. Because there is identity, it need not be made. It is made. There is no need to wait until rūpa is identified with itself in order that there be rūpa. Surely Tao-lin was not as coarse as the teacher in Kuan-nei (n. 724) who understood the change from rūpa to rūpa-in-itself as physical. Still, by Tao-lin, as by all other neo-Taoists, the universe was always understood as a state (a blissful, mysterious, realm) superior to human imperfection, attainable only through some kind of change.

The following lines are quoted from the Jutsu-gi: 228

Concerning the nature of matter (rūpa): Matter is not, as it is, matter. Not being (matter) as it is, it is, though matter, ‘empty’. This is as with mind (citta). 229 Not being mind as it is, it is, though mind, ‘calm’. When matter is ‘in itself’ it is true matter, when mind is ‘in itself’ it is true mind. As both are found, they are ‘empty’, ‘calm’. (N.B. that here the latter term has a depreciating meaning.) Not


229 知 means cognition, but is used for 心, cf. Pao-ts’ang lu, Hs. 11a 11a. 外色人所以遺知實為有心，‘The reason why the Sage cognizes, he has a mind’. 
until our individual limitations are gone, are we perfect like Perfect Man. The following quotation describes this state:

Hsiao-yao 道遙 is the mental state of the Perfect Man. The Perfect Man, righteous as Heaven itself, rises above (death) and floats unchecked upon the waves (of becoming). Not claiming anything, he owns the whole world; he is always the same wherever he may be, without individual limitations. . . .

Seng-chao’s language is very similar to that of Tao-lin, especially in PART III. Perhaps he would not have criticised him were it not for one point: in Tao-lin’s phrasing the goal which is the state of the Perfect Man, and also the original state before creation, is reached by turning back from the present complicated and dangerous condition to original simplicity. Existence is one thing and non-Existence another.

This contradicted Seng-chao’s theory of oneness of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa. He resented hearing ‘emptiness’ defined as ‘merely empty’ without an additional ‘but nevertheless filled with the manifoldness of life’. For this was his great discovery: that there is no sublimation necessary to reach the final state, but that in a single moment of intuition all may be seen and salvation attained.

Seng-chao in PART II quotes an unnamed adversary who defines nirvāṇa as ‘absence of life, a gap in a mountain range, (a state, to be created by) preventing the senses from seeing and hearing’. This may refer to Tao-lin who in the beginning of an Introduction says: ‘Final “emptiness” is like a gap in a mountain range, a complete Void’. Tao-lin of course could not be conscious of the implications of the Middle Path, being unacquainted with the MK and with Kumārajiva’s teaching.

In the following quotation it is even more evident that Tao-lin assumed a material distinction between the two states which here he calls li and pien (chiao) instead of t’i and yung. Li is not the world, the world is not li; practice is not t’i, t’i is not practice. Lī is unchanging, the world changes. They are widely apart. How could the Cosmic Spirit move?
With the writing preserved from Tao-lin and from his intimate friend and disciple Hsi Ch’ao who probably expresses the ideas of his Master, it is difficult not to get lost in words which to the uninitiated reader all seem to express very much the same outlook. Gradually one notices the significance of certain expressions.

Hsi Ch’ao says that existence and non-existence are mental states and that these terms do not denote presence and absence of external things. So we do not have to detach ourselves from existence in order to reach non-existence. Seng-chao too could have said this, but he would have meant it differently. Though with Hsi Ch’ao the goal is reached by a mental act, not by ascetic practices, it is still distinct from the way to the goal.

‘Empty’ means that ‘interest is lost’ (in something); it does not mean ‘vacant’ as (is said of) an (empty) residence. Non-existence (viz. want) is surely non-existence. If one cares, then he feels frustrated. Existence is surely existence; but if both become uninteresting, transcendent life is freed (from the interference of actual life). It follows that ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ are mental phenomena; these terms do not involve external situations. Though useful and beautiful things are spread out in practical life (alluringly, they are there only as long as one cares). If he ceases to long for them, then Cosmic Order shines below the surface. Nothing need be destroyed in order to make it non-existent; gradual diminution cannot lead to the final goal. Is this the meaning of chi-se, or of wu-hsin?

As a Madhyamika, YK thinks in the pattern of the Middle Path. So he blames Tao-lin, saying ‘he thought of existence as something positive’ (若存假有). Tao-lin denies this. Two centuries placed so great a distance between the author and his commentator that the first had become unrecognizable to the latter.

注释：
2. C. Taishō I.11: 89a 23 f. I have corrected 忘 for 莫 in 莫忘.
3. 夫存亡之謂之國, 為形宅之謂也。無處無矣, 存無則僞情。 有實有矣, 復忘則 安辭。然則有無由方寸而無偏於外物。器象離於事用, 感應則理異。假觀有而 黙無, 非復更為違。 Cf. translation by Zürcher (1930): 175. The last sentence contains an allusion to the Vimalakirti and Tao-tzu.
4. Tao-hsiao-p’ien tai-pi yao ch’ao hsi 聶孝鼎比翼要妙三觀。Yushu (sh. 3 f.): 存乎存 卻非其存也, 留乎留者非其留也。'That presence one clings to is not the cling-to presence. That absence one hopes for is not the hoped-for absence.' This we might translate 有於存者非其存也, 無於無者非其無也. Both teachers, Tao-lin and Heng-ch’an, struggling with the words, here seem to have reached a point where the mere necessity of using words defies all efforts. Cf. Part II, 1.3 and 11.4, n. 384.
I. THE FIRST SIX SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

In order further to acquaint the reader with Tao-lin’s language we translate (or rather re-phrase) some sentences from the Introduction: 741 'Non-existence, how can it not exist? (It cannot.) Now, if it cannot not exist (viz. in isolation, but in order not to exist, needs a counterpart which exists), then order can also not be order (in isolation but in order to be order, needs a counterpart viz. disorder). If so, then order is different from (Cosmic) Order and non-existence is different from (Cosmic) in-Existence (śūnyatā). It follows that the Final Stage (the tenth bhūmi) which transcends (all stages) is no more a stage (but is essentially different from the first nine stages of the Bodhisattva’s career), and that non-Birth (the final goal) is not a birth (but essentially different from all births whether in Hell or Heaven). And we conclude: transcendence springs from what is not transcendent; non-Birth springs from what is birth (and death). So we may speak of the tenth Stage only with the understanding that we miss the meaning when we use a definite term which can never be adequate; we may speak of Prajñā as cognition but with the understanding that we use a name which, as name, (can never be adequate but) is permissable only for teaching purposes’.

THIRD SCHOOL

Pen-wu 本無 (Original ‘emptiness’) 742

‘Tao’s movement is regressive: motion reverts to (stillness, strength to) weakness. For, while all things under the sky spring from other existing things, Existence itself has sprung from non-Existence.’ 743

Non-World, pregnant with World, comprising the Whole, before it split into numerous existent things and rendered possible the conflicts and shortcomings of our life—that was the picture called forth by the maxim ‘non-existence first’ (pen-wu) in fourth century Chinese minds. It was opposed by another one, ‘existence first’ (pen-yu 本有), held by a conservative group of Chinese philosophers who found the first maxim revolutionary. We cannot go into the ramifications of these disputes,—it is sufficient to say that, when Buddhism entered China, it was hailed by the Taoists as corroborating their view that non-existence came first.

The term pen-wu was used in translations rather indiscriminately and doubts soon cropped up as to whether it correctly interpreted 744 the
Buddhist doctrine. Many teachers occupied themselves with this problem, as e.g. Chih Tao-lin (see above), but the historians picked out two whom they listed under this key word. Their choice was rather arbitrary and we must keep this in mind if, lacking material, we deal with these teachers only.

I have mentioned already the six Houses (chia) of Seng-jui, probably identical with the six of T’an-chi. The names recur in T’an-chi’s list of seven Schools (tsung) but there pen-wu is listed twice, as pen-wu and pen-wu-i. In other respects both lists agree.

In all the outlines with the exception of YK, pen-wu is represented by Tao-an, pen-wu-i by Chu Tao-ch’ien with the style I’a-shen. Thus Tao-an would be among the six teachers blamed by Seng-jui, and among the three Schools refuted by Seng-chao (if we assume, as is generally done, that the three are included in the six). T’ao-an was famous and held in high respect by the community in Ch’ang-an. So Ancho, followed by Professor T’ang, assumes that not he but Fa-shen was the teacher refuted in Chao-lun. But Seng-chao calls his opponent pen-wu. Thus the same school would first have been called pen-wu and later pen-wu-i. Pen-wu-i means a second pen-wu; if Tao-an was added to the outline, he should have been listed under this catchword. Besides YK (44a) does not say that another School was ‘added’ but that the six Houses ‘split’ into the seven Schools. Thus pen-wu in the Houses comprises two or even more teachers. Seng-chao himself tells us that ‘there are many (who hold this view).’

Shih ‘Tao-an 鐲道安, like the other teachers in these lists belongs to the time before Kumārajīva, and he, like them, reads the Taoist world-view into the Buddhist system. Dharmakāya is explained as ‘the eternal that is final’ (ch’ang chih chih-chi 常之至極) in the sense of Kuo Hsiang; Sanskrit asamskṛta becomes ‘non-action’ (wu-wei 無為),

445 Above p. 131.
446 Cf. Yu-lu 8.14: 59b 2–4: 故義迂而筆本，大家儒而不即，性空之宗，以今贊之，震其一失。 ‘The method of quoting Taoist scriptures in order to elucidate Buddhist terms distorted the original meaning. The six Houses held one-sided opinions and, (unacquainted with the) Middle Path, (they did not find the solution). Judging from our present knowledge, the Hsing-k’ung School (Tao-an?) came nearest to the truth.’
447 For the life of Tao-ch’ien see below n. 755.
448 ‘Ch’ihon sho-ki: 93a, b.
449 有大家分成七條。
450 Shih Tao-an was born in the mountains of North Shanai A.D. 312. Brought up in the community of Chu Fu-tzu-ting (Buddhamatanga?) in Yeh 鄭 (Hopei), he spent his life in Ch’ang-an and wandering in the region of present Shanai, Shanai and Hopei. He died 385. He was perhaps the first Chinese who took Buddhism seriously enough to feel it its duty to propagate it. On several occasions, when forced to move by political disorder, he went forth his disciples as apostles to regions where Buddhism was little known. All his interest seem to have been concentrated on the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras of him scripture only some introductions are extant. KSCH 4.11, T’ang (1958): 183–84, 464–465, Zürcher (1950): 184–2041. A. N. Link (1934): Biography of Shih Tao-an.
and śūnyatā is non-Existence (wu 無), i.e. Lao Tzu's non-World pregnant with World. It is perhaps unnecessary to stress this point again after all we have said before. I here translate what is possibly a quotation from Tao-an's Pen-wu lun 本無論 showing very clearly the Taoist background of Tao-an's thinking.

‘When the Tathāgata arose in the world he proclaimed non-existence preceding existence (pen-wu). Therefore in all the deep Vaipulya sūtras we read that the five skandha were originally non-existent (pen-wu). That was the reason why there was much speculation about pen-wu. What is meant (by pen-wu)? Before the dark of creation there was a gaping void until the Primal Breath transformed it. Then a host of phenomena assumed shape. Though these continually evolved, at the basis of this evolution and assisting it there was the self-so (nature). The self-so moves spontaneously. How can there be one who created it? Therefore we may say: non-Existence has preceded the beginning of evolution, “emptiness”751 is at the origin of all phenomena, and this is called pen-wu. This term does not suggest that all the ten thousand things that exist, could have sprung from a gaping void.752 It follows: What restricts (our liberty of action), is the existing (world-situation) after creation (mo-yu); if one rests his mind in non-existence preceding existence (pen-wu), then these annoying restrictions disappear. Summarizing we might say: worship the beginning and you may calm the end.’

Tao-an opposes the assumption that before creation there was just nothing. No—there was not the world, but there was nature, pregnant with the unborn world. Tao-an seems to argue with an opponent in these sentences. Did he mean to distinguish himself from other teachers? From Wang Pi? From Fa-shen? Is the state which he describes as a gaping void the same as Seng-chao’s ‘emptiness’ which is identical with its opposite? Certainly not. The fact that he calls it nature and that it fills a time-period preceding creation alone would disprove that. To Seng-chao śūnyatā existed now as always; it was the voidness of the infinite.753
Obviously Tao-an thought in Taoist terms. Wang Pi commenting on a passage in the *Lao-tzu* uses the same phrases as Tao-an to characterize original non-existence. He, like Tao-an, knew that non-existence is not just nothing, that in withdrawing from life one will not be destroyed but join with nature, filling the universe.

Chu Tao-ch’ien, considered to have propagated a ‘Variant School of original non-existence (pen-wu i-tsung 本無異宗),’ was one generation older than Tao-an. He cannot be expected to have held views different from the other teachers of his period. He described ‘original non-Existence’ as a ravine (*ho* 窪). All that we know of him is contained in two quotations, both having the same purport. I translate one of them quoted in the *Erh-ti sou-hsüan lun* by Kuang-t’ai.

‘Non-Existence, what it is? An empty ravine without shape, yet out of which all things have developed. Though the existent is created, the non-existent has created all things. Thus the Buddha told the Brahmacārin that the four elements (mahābhūta) arose from emptiness.’

Is any empty ravine different from a void? Is there something else to distinguish these teachers? And what distinguished their tale from the *Lao-tzu* 40, quoted in the beginning of this paragraph?

The above three Schools—or four Schools (if we count *pen-wu* as two) are those assumed to be refuted by Seng-chao. In the enumeration of ‘I”nin-chi there are three more which we shall now consider briefly.

**FOURTH SCHOOL**

Shih-han 諧含 (‘The world is a dream’) 757

According to Chi-tsang758 the representative of this School was Yü Fu-k’hi 十法師.759 We would know nothing of his teaching but for a
I. THE FIRST SIX SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM 147

quotation from the Huo-shih erh-ti lun 湛然二諦論 found in the Su.\footnote{Chûron sho-ki: 4ac 22, also Zürcher (1959): 142. 三界為長夜之宅, 心煩爲大夢之主。今之所見所聞, 遠於夢中所見。其於大夢初覺, 長夜獲寤。即倒懾教滅, 三界都寂, 是時無所悟而應不生。}

The threefold World is the abode in which the 'long night' (of our mundane existence, dirgha rātra) is passed. The (transmigrating) souls are the dreamers of this long dream. All those many presences which are seen now are appearances in a dream. When they awake from the long dream and the long night grows light and changes into day, the souls which are (mere) phantasms dissolve, and the Three Worlds become 'empty'. Nothing remains from which life could rise and yet there is everything from which (true) life rises.

Buddhism is known to deny the existence of a soul as the unchanging centre of the general flux. But the Chinese, longing for immortality, inferred from the doctrine of Karma that, if pollution is transmitted through the circle or reincarnations, there must be a core, pure and lasting, which will appear untouched at the end of the cleansing process. This was called soul, shen 神, or shih 謹 (vijñāna). Apart from 'soul' vijñāna may mean (illusory) consciousness. But at the time of Fa-k'ai the theory of 'mere consciousness' wei-shih 唯識 was still unknown in China. With Fa-k'ai shih 謹 can only mean 'soul' (phantasm of the dead). Probably Fa-k'ai thought of the famous story in Chuang-tzu rather than of any Buddhist theory.

Things were different a century later when we meet the term 謹含 again in a pamphlet called Ming-fo lun 明佛論 (Treatise on Buddhism).\footnote{Ikutani in HMCIII 4.11: 4 f. Translated in part in W. Liobenthal (1952a): 378-794.} It was composed towards A.D. 433 by Tsung Ping 宗炳,\footnote{Tsung Ping (374-443), whose tsun was Ming-wen 仲文, was a nobleman who preferred a life filled with journeys, and studies, painting and music to a political career (Zürcher 1959: 218, 219).} a Buddhist Tao-lin arrived. This may help to explain the antagonism between the two. Cf. Zürcher (1959): 140-3.

The following story from his biography in KSCH (4.10: 359a 28 f.) sheds light on the social milieu in which the debates of the Schools were held. Another version is found in the SISH AB 文學 (4): 24a. 閒嘮使咸出都。咸行山陰支那袒小品。聞語謗言，澄林議，比汝至，當至某品中，示語。法難數十番，此中實難通。咸既至郡，正當論譭，果如聞言。往復多番，遞遠屈。因厲聲曰，君何足復受人駕駛來耶。故東山嗤云，深設聞思，林談譭記。

'(Fa-) k'ai sent (his pupil) Wei (Fa-wei 法威) out of the Capital. (He calculated that), when Wei passed through Shan-yin (K'uai-chi), Chih Tun would be lecturing on the Small Text (Dasasahasrika). So he said to Wei: 'When you arrive, Tao-lin may have come to a certain controversial point in his lecture. Then argue with him persistently, pretending that you have difficulty in understanding'. When Wei reached the district, he was in time for Tun's explanation (of the point in question). So he did as he had been told. Objection and retort had followed each other many times until finally Tun gave in. Angrily he shouted: 'Don't you think more highly of yourself than to be the mouth-piece of another?' After that it became a current saying in the Eastern Hills: 'K'ai's plan was well contrived, but (Tao-)lin spoke out what he had in mind'. Here the term ort stands for 謹含.
layman connected with the community at Lu-shan. Here we translate from his treatise:

‘The finest order is that of Heaven, the worst disorder is that which engulfs Heaven. Both are produced by (karman affecting) the (migrating) soul.’

Yao is absolute virtue, Chieh absolute wickedness. But Chieh has seen Yao freeing himself of wickedness and ‘the reminiscence of this fact adheres indestructibly to his soul’. This may be the reason why, after a long period of expiation, Chieh too may ‘free himself of desires and cleanse his soul as that of Yao’.

Here the terminological value of shih-han has changed and now we may translate ‘impressions stored’, or simply karman, a term unknown to Fa-k’ai. With the Ming-fo lun begins the discussion centred on the problem of the immortality of souls (ts’un shen 存神). Liang Wu-ti 莊懷帝 in a pamphlet Can souls attain Buddhahood? (Li shen-ming ch’eng fo i-chi 立神明成佛義記) expounds again the theory of shih-han but with significant modifications. He says:

‘The soul (central intelligent agent) is the basic force which has many experiences. It is one, while the experiences are many. Being many, the experiences must naturally come and go, while the nature of the basic force remains unchanged. This one basic force is the lightless light of the soul.’

The soul is originally blinded by avidya (wu-ming 無明). In the course of its pilgrimage, however, it may cleanse itself and restore its luminosity (shen-ming 神明). This shallow theory was the last offshoot of the debate over souls and their migrations. Rather strangely, Nirvāṇa was misunderstood as immortality of the soul only at the courts, never by Buddhist philosophers and mystics. It is strictly opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of nairatmyam which denies survival. Nevertheless, with the worshippers it continued to be popular.

Tsung Ping himself seems not to have known of Fa-k’ai, or else he would have mentioned him in his list of Buddhist Worthies which contains Fa-k’ai’s teacher Yü Fa-lan and also his opponent Chih Tao-lin but not K’ai himself.

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763 大至治則天，大亂治天，其要心神之為也 l.c.: 106 8 f. 764 則向者神之所含，知無勝亡之際，必當有所用矣．

765 神 has no Sanskrit equivalent. It is synonymous with 心神 or 意神 and means the soul element in living beings. 神神，which is immortal (神神於佛性 l.c.: 126 3).

766 HMCII 3 11 54b 19 f. 767 心為用本，本一而用殊。離用則有歸屬，一本之恆不移，一本之，即相開神妙也。

768 In his correspondence with Hsü Ch’eng-ch’ien 何承典 (HMCII 3 11 10c 39 f.),
I. THE FIRST SIX SCHOOLS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

FIFTH SCHOOL

Huan-hua 幻化 ('The world is māya')

In the outlines of the Su and Su-chi this School is represented by Shih Tao-i 謝道壹 (小慧), a pupil of Chu Fa-t'ai. 'Tao-i wrote a paper, the Shen erh-ti lun 神二諦論, which is quoted by Fa-lang:

'All the dharma are like phantoms; so they are called laukika. But the soul which is in the centre (heart) of a being is real and not śūnyā. It is, therefore, called paramārtha. If the soul were also śūnyā, to whom could the Doctrine be taught, who would be there to cultivate the Way, renounce the World and become Sage? Therefore we know that the soul is not śūnyā.

Tao-i must have belonged to those who believed in the immortality of souls (tsun-shen 存神). He misunderstood the meaning of Buddhist śūnyā, which is synonymous with paramārtha. He seems to have represented a trend of thought that has always prevailed in the Buddhist populace in China.

SIXTH SCHOOL

Yüan-hui 緣會 ('The world is conditioned')

The representative of this School is, according to Chi-tsang, Yü Tao-sui 于道邃. He was together with Yü Fa-k'ai a pupil of Yü Fa-lang. He wrote a treatise, the Yüan-hui erh-ti lun 緣會二諦論 which is quoted by Fa-lang:

'What exists after the assemblage of conditions is mundane. What does not exist after their dispersion is real. Clay and wood combined make a house. Earlier the house has no substance. Names are not real. Therefore the Buddha told Rādhā that, when the form (rūpa-lakṣaṇa) is destroyed, there remains non-existence.'
The underlying problem is reminiscent of Indian Vaisesika philosophy. A house (or a pot, or a texture) is a whole which did not exist before construction, or, as it was said, 'did not exist in the parts before they were composed to the whole (asat-karya). This simile cannot be used for the demonstration of Buddhist causality (yuan-hui). But somehow it ventured into Buddhist theory and was there picked up by Tao-sui. This had no consequence.

Summary

The reader will have noticed that the pamphlets written by the disputants who represent the above Six Schools deal with the problem of the Truths (or spheres of existence) su-ti and chen-ti: World and non-World. The problem is the same as that of sunyata, over which the disputants in Chao-lun PART II split. For the Chinese held sunya and rupa to be only other names for the two Truths.

The answers that are given take the form of short dogmatic statements which are supposed to express the 'whole truth'. They are often illustrated by similes that make it easier for us to guess what the abstract formulas actually meant. They naively misrepresent Indian Buddhism, but are interesting from another aspect because they show clearly that, from the beginning of the history of Chinese Buddhism, the Chinese themselves defined the course to be taken. Their interest was religious. Hoping for another World, distinct from this world of suffering, they wished to know where the way to it leads and what the relation between these two Worlds is. In their statements the religious fervour, which some centuries later was replaced by a dry scholasticism, is still apparent.

II. THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF PART IV

It has long been doubted whether On the Namelessness of Nirvana is by Seng-chao. T'ang Yung-t'ung thinks it is spurious and gives three reasons:

1. In the correspondence mentioned in the Dedication, the King speaks about a box containing letters from Kumara-jaiva, which he sends to his brother. Kumara-jaiva died in a.d. 413(?), Seng-chao in 414(?), the King in 416. The King writes as if Kumara-jaiva had died long before.

   But Hui-chiao in Seng-chao's Biography quotes from an edict of the King answering Seng-chao's request for publication.

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782 Cf. above PART IV ff.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE AUTHENTICITY OF PART IV

(b) Commentators trace a number of the quotations in Part IV to the Northern version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra (Dharmakṣema’s translation) which appeared in the South in the yüan-chia period (A.D. 424–453) and in Yang-chou 郗州 in 430. It is possible that a part of these quotations may also be found in the incomplete edition brought to China by Fa-hsien and translated in 418–420, but even so, since Seng-chao died in 414, this would prove that the FOURTH PART, such as we possess it, cannot have been compiled by Seng-chao himself.

But we do not know exactly when the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra (NS) came to Ch’ang-an. Perhaps at least some parts, some popular quotations from it, came there before 416. Reading the Yü-i lun (cf. n. 498) one has the impression that they did. If the quotation of the NS in the VS commentary (p. 342c) is not an emendation, it would prove that Seng-chao knew about the NS as early as 407, long before the Northern version was published. Improbable? But what do we know about his experiences in Ku-ts’ang?

(c) Paragraphs 8–13 of PART IV contain a discussion about Instantaneous Illumination that reminds us of a similar one in MSCH which was probably copied from Chien-wu lun 漸悟論 of Hui-kuan 惠觀 written after 423. The similarity is not very strong but sufficient to prove that the Chien-wu lun was known to the compiler of these paragraphs.

If the Dedication is genuine, as we do not doubt, for the reason stated, there must have existed a treatise on nirvāṇa written by Seng-chao. What we do possess is certainly not equal to PARTS I–III, yet there are some stanzas in the paragraphs following ch. 14 which breathe his passionate style. Someone must have tampered with the original Nieh-p’an wu-ming lun.

It is not very probable that this was Hui-kuan himself. His Chien-wu lun was published under his name. What reason could he have had to incorporate parts of it in a work published under the name of somebody

784 Taishō 374.
785 Huś 2 B 7/1: 8c f. The date of 423 is probable because Hui-kuan’s treatise and Hsieh Ling-yün’s 謝靈運 ‘Correspondence’, published under the name of Pien-tsung lun 統宗論 belong to the same discussion about Gradual and Instantaneous Illumination. See the first edition of this book (1948), Appendix III and Fung-Bodde: 274–283.
786 The MSCII always speaks of shihk-hsing 實相; PART IV 13 speaks of tou-wei 無為 which is an adaptation to the terminology of the preceding paragraphs. It means that the MSCII text was used by the author of PART IV; and therefore must have been written first.
787 In PART III, III, First Objection, Seng-chao uses the simile of the animals crossing a river to prove that ‘absolute truth is not like the hare and the horse (but like the elephant)’ whereas in PART IV, 13 he defends the opposite view (cf. n. 635). Passages are copied from other parts of Chao-lun, cf. n. 410, n. 629, n. 635, n. 646. This is unusual.
else? Paragraphs ch. 8–13 are certainly an emendation; for the question put in ch. 8 as to why after the Sumedha incarnation the Buddha 'practised austerities during three more stages' is answered twice, in ch. 9 and in ch. 14. But what precedes is not from the Chien-wu lun, as it has no connection with the problem of Instantaneous Illumination, but is also not by Seng-chao.

Someone composed Part IV from material partly taken from the Chien-wu lun and partly from the original Nieh-p'an wu-ming lun of which perhaps only fragments were saved from destruction when Ch'ang-an perished. This might have happened soon after A.D. 430. At the present stage of our researches it is not possible to make a more definite statement.788

788 Readers who know Japanese are referred to the critical study of Ōhō Eizei in Chōron henkyō (1953) 160–199, especially 197 ff. Prof. Ōhō believes Part IV to be genuine.
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第一章

四篇