

Reification and Deconstruction of Buddha Nature in Chinese Chan

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I. Preliminary Remarks

Although much has been said about deconstruction in Mādhyamika Buddhism, very little has been done in the study of deconstructive strategy in Chan Buddhism. In his study of deconstruction in Nāgārjuna's thought, Robert Magliola adds several passages that discuss the same topic in Chan/Zen Buddhism. Magliola's major contribution is his distinction between logocentric and differential trends in Chan/Zen Buddhism (Magliola: 96-7). This distinction allows us to take a fresh look at, and to re-examine, those inner struggles in the evolution of Chan Buddhist thought. However, Magliola's study of deconstruction in Chan is not systematic, despite its insights. He uses only a few cases to show the deconstructive tendency in Chan, without applying his distinction to a closer examination of the different schools of Chan thought. Thus, his study leaves only the impression that the deconstructive or differential trend is connected with the Southern School of Chan. He does not justify this thesis through a closer doctrinal and textual-contextual investigation.

Bernard Faure, on the other hand, touches upon the same issue of logocentric and differential trends in Chan in his comprehensive critique of the Chan tradition. Faure's study of this issue has two main problems. First, since his study is a criticism, he shows only what he thinks is the logocentric side of Chan, without providing a constructive study of deconstruction in Chan. Second, he criticizes Magliola for relating his logocentric/differential

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distinction to the historically well-defined distinction between Northern and Southern Chan. Faure believes that this hasty connection is “counterproductive” (Faure 1993: 225). His own approach, as opposed to Magliola’s, is to suggest that it is impossible to identify one school or one figure in the Chan tradition as either logocentric or deconstructive. He asserts that there are “only combinations” of these two types in the Chan tradition (Faure 1993: 225). It appears that this position of “combination only” avoids a one-sided view and the error of jumping to a conclusion. However, by concluding that there are only combinations, Faure turns away from the necessity and possibility of analyzing and identifying individual deconstructive trends in Chan Buddhism, and from the necessity and even the possibility of a coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought. The coherent reinterpretation and reconstruction of Chan thought obviously demands more than a mere criticism. It is true that the thought of one school or one figure may involve elements of two trends; but this fact does not preclude the possibility of its being coherently interpreted as representative of one trend.

This paper, therefore, will attempt to investigate a major deconstructive trend in Chan Buddhism, namely, that of the Huineng 慧能 and the Hongzhou 洪州 Chan, and its target—certain reifying tendencies in Chan. This investigation will aim to accomplish the following things. First, it will reveal how it is possible to rediscover or reinterpret mainstream Chan.¹ I am fully aware that this investigation runs the risk of being accused of relying on traditional oppositions, since the Huineng and the Hongzhou Chan are part of Southern Chan. However, the Hongzhou Chan not only subverts the logocentrism of Northern Chan, but also performs its deconstructive operation upon the logocentric trend within Southern Chan itself.² Therefore, our investigation will not be confined to the opposition between Northern and Southern Chan. Moreover, a critical examination, it seems to me, should not be restricted to overturning the hierarchy of orthodoxy/non-orthodoxy, as the critical historians have done. It should also make possible a reinterpretation or rediscovery of orthodoxy itself. Here I want to make a distinction between the historical orthodox form of Chan and the modern orthodox interpretation of Chan. Our interpretation will definitely be different from the modern orthodox interpretation, but this does not mean that the orthodox thought in the history of Chan is necessarily and completely wrong. In this sense, Faure’s equation of the historical orthodox form of Chan with

¹ Here I refer to the main line of Huineng through Mazu/Shitou to Linji/Caodong, etc. Mazu was seen as the founder of the Hongzhou School of Southern Chan. For information on main line or main stream of Chan Buddhism, see Dumoulin, and Yanagida and Umehara.

² My use of the term *logocentrism* or *logocentric* is based on my distinguishing a broad sense of *logocentrism* from a narrow use of the term. In my view, logocentrism can be applied to various discourses outside Western philosophy, the tradition of metaphysics to which only a narrow sense of the term can be applied. I therefore define the broad sense of logocentrism or the logocentric as an intellectual maneuver to establish a fixed binary opposition, a hierarchy, a system of privileged concepts, and the like. Obviously, a similar kind of maneuver can be found in the history of Chan thought.

the modern orthodox interpretation of Chan in his criticism of Magliola is hermeneutically incorrect (Faure 1993: 225).

Second, our investigation will be about the reification and deconstruction of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhism. There are many Buddhist terms and concepts, such as *nirvāṇa*, *paramārtha*, *śūnyatā*, the uses of which are soteriological and functional, not metaphysical. The concept of Buddha nature is one of them. The advent and prevalence of this concept in the Buddhist world, especially in East Asia, constitutes one episode in the long evolution of Buddhist thought. The notion of Buddha nature originates from the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha* and is nurtured by the Chinese transformation of Buddhist thought. Like all other Buddhist soteriological terms, the word "Buddha nature" can be easily reified or sedimented into a logocentric term, since the word, after all, comes out of the conventional vocabularies of binary discrimination. Chan Buddhism, like other sinic Buddhist schools, uses the notion or concept of Buddha nature. The central Chan notion of "self nature" may appear nothing more than a Chan version of the idea of Buddha nature. However, upon closer inspection, one may note that mainstream Chan Buddhism does not engage so much in developing a theory of Buddha nature as in deconstructing the concept of Buddha nature. The Chinese adaptation of *tathāgatagarbha* thought eventually evolved into the deconstruction of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhism, as demonstrated by Huineng, the Hongzhou school, and others. What a dialectic of history!

In deconstructing Buddha nature, Chan Buddhists, to some extent, restore the spirit of the *Prajñāpāramitā* and *Mādhyamika*, while transcending their limits in echoing the call of practice. In other words, Chan Buddhists use a deconstructive operation as a negative strategy inherited both from their Indian predecessors and from indigenous Daoists, but with noticeable flexibility and simplicity. They are even more thoroughgoing in self-deconstructing. We will see how Chan Buddhists use a deconstructive strategy to serve their soteriological thesis and practice.

Third, the investigation into the reification and deconstruction of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhism will be an inquiry into the context of inner struggles within the evolution of Chan Buddhist thought. I will provide a contextual analysis of those inner struggles between the reification of soteriological terms and the deconstructive operation. Here we raise the question of the contextual analysis of Chan Buddhist sayings, as even a "careful" textual reading may not necessarily be a persuasive contextual understanding. Recent critical readings of major Chan texts by MATSUMOTO Shirō, a figure from Critical Buddhism, is just one example. Matsumoto does a great deal of philological work to draw parallels between the Chan master Linji's words and the Upanishadic terminology of *ātman*. He concludes that Linji's thought is under the Hindu influence of *ātman* (Matsumoto; see also Lusthaus: 52-53). This premature conclusion ignores or even cancels out the entirely different context of the Chinese use of Buddhist soteriological terms.

Closer attention is thus called for in the analysis of context in under-

standing culturally-historically deferred/different Buddhist discourses. For our present purpose, we will analyze *in what specific context* a Chan Buddhist criticism can be called a deconstructive operation, and a Chan Buddhist saying a reifying expression—the target of that deconstruction.³ This Chan context of struggle between reification and decomposition is certainly different from the European context of struggle between metaphysical appropriation and deconstruction, and from the Indian context of struggle between Buddhism and Brahmanism. Outside this historically-culturally specific context, there would be no Chan deconstruction but only the imposition of labels.

II. The Reification and Deconstruction of Buddha Nature reflected in the *Platform Sūtra*

Huineng's deconstructive operation and its target—Shenxiu's 神秀 doctrine of *linian* 離念 (being free from thoughts)—in terms of the *Platform Sūtra*, concern the understanding of Buddha nature. Huineng's famous verse about enlightenment most clearly shows his subversion of Shenxiu's tendency to reify enlightenment and the Buddha nature:

Originally there is no tree of enlightenment,
Nor is there a stand with a clear mirror,
From the beginning not a thing exists;
Where, then, is a grain of dust to cling? (Dumoulin: 133)⁴

This verse radically denies the Buddha nature as something entitative or substantial by undermining the dichotomy that Shenxiu's verse maintains

³ Deconstruction here is regarded as a contextual strategy or a situational operation of overturning oppositional hierarchies with the characteristic of self-subverting. Its main target is reification or substantialization. This is my definition of deconstruction, from which I will start to examine Chan Buddhist deconstruction. Obviously, this broad meaning of deconstruction is not limited to Derridean deconstruction.

⁴ I have made a minor change in this translation. Here I am aware that contemporary historians of Chan Buddhism have questioned the authenticity of the *Platform Sūtra* as the collection of Huineng's teaching in general and these verses historically attributed to Huineng and Shenxiu in particular. My use of these materials from the *Platform Sūtra* does not mean that I want to ignore or completely reject those critical studies. My relatively uncritical approach to the text is based on the reason that the thoughts attributed to Huineng and Shenxiu in this text and others still reflect the strategies employed in the history of Chan discourse, which are religiously-philosophically significant and need to be studied. In other words, they are extremely useful materials for our examination of deconstructive and reifying tendencies in Chan. These materials can serve the purpose of this study well, helping to provide a coherent interpretation of different Chan strategies, no matter whom we could identify as the real thinker behind them. The significance of this text in collecting crucial Chan thought and its role in the evolution of Chan thought cannot be reduced for its suspicious authorship and for some historical inaccuracy of its narrative. I therefore focus basically on the analysis of these thoughts themselves and the related Chan linguistic strategies demonstrated in the text, shedding new light on the understanding of these inner struggles while utilizing the traditional divisions and distinctions.

between the Buddha nature and the deluded mind in the metaphor of mirror and dust. However, to more completely see Huineng's deconstructive endeavor, we must examine more details of Huineng's and Shenxiu's doctrines.

Shenxiu drew his idea of *linian* from the text of the *Dacheng Qixin Lun* (大乘起信論). In a treatise on the five expedient means of the *Mahāyāna*, which is believed to be the collection of his teachings, Shenxiu quoted passages directly from the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*, for example, "What is called enlightenment means that the whole of the mind is free from [deluded] thoughts" (T 85, 2834: 1273c).⁵ The use of the term *linian* (being free from thoughts) here thus appears to be the starting point of Shenxiu's own interpretation of *linian*. The *Dacheng Qixin Lun* identifies the Buddha nature, or the mind of suchness, with emptiness in an effort at de-substantialization. By emphasizing *yinian xiangying* 一念相應 (the corresponding of one instant of thought) or *linian*, and by identifying suchness with the minds of sentient beings, it also suggests a way of existentializing the issue of Buddha nature. However, that is only a suggestion in the text as it stands. It relies on further interpretation. Moreover, despite this treatise's identification of the mind of suchness with the mind in *samsāra*, it puts a great deal of emphasis on this mind of suchness and its purity.⁶ As a result, the idea of *linian* could entail very different understandings.

Shenxiu's interpretation is a quasi-reifying one. It is not utterly reifying, mainly because the general context of his doctrine is soteriological-practical and he maintains certain nondualistic clarifications, though not always clearly, as some critical historians have tried to reveal (see McRae: 213 & 225; Faure 1997: 43-4). Nevertheless, the criticisms from other Chan Buddhists should not be seen as merely polemic and sectarian. There are obvious doctrinal and practical reasons that require the deconstruction of Shenxiu's interpretation in the history of Chan Buddhism. Let us look at how Shenxiu interprets *linian*

⁵ *Dacheng Wusheng Fangbian Men*. For the original words of the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*, see T 32, 1666: 576b; cf. Hakeda: 37. Scholars may notice that I translate the Chinese word *xinti* 心體 as "the whole of the mind" and avoid translating it simply as the substance or essence of the mind. To my knowledge, the Chinese word *ti* 體 originally involved the meaning of body and the organic whole. It may be even distinguished from the English word subjectivity which involves the meaning of substance in modern Western philosophy. However, the *ti* in Chinese philosophy nonetheless reflects the relatively static dimension of the whole and is distinguished from the dynamic dimension of the *yong* 用, the functioning, even though the two are often considered non-dualistic. This makes a privilege of the static *ti* possible and the deconstruction of it necessary. In the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*, although the use of the *ti* and *yong* is mixed with another term *xiang* 相 and does not indicate a mature Chinese usage, it has been broadly admitted that the text is influenced by Chinese thought. My rendering of the *xinti* as the whole of the mind is thus to take into consideration the historical-cultural background of the text and of the ensuing Chan adoption. It avoids the ignorance of the difference between the Western metaphysical appropriation and the one we are now examining. For Shenxiu's quotation and the relation of this treatise with the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*, see McRae: 175 & 221-3. Also see Faure 1997: 41-5.

⁶ In this regard, I agree with Gadjin Nagao. In "What remains in *Śūnyatā*," Nagao points out that the *Dacheng Qixin Lun* "seems to put more emphasis on 'the mind of suchness' . . ." (Nagao: 60).

first:

The mind of the Buddha is pure and detached from being as well as nonbeing. If the body and the mind are not aroused, one constantly maintains the true mind. What is suchness? When the mind does not move, that is suchness; when the form is not in motion, that is also suchness. (T 85, 2834: 1273c; see Fauer 1997: 43 and McRae: 174)

The whole [or essence] and the function are clearly distinguishable (*ti yong feng ming*, 體用分明): being free from thoughts is the whole; seeing, hearing, feeling and knowing are the function. (T 85, 2834:1274b; see McRae: 178)

Question: By what means can one achieve Buddhahood?

Answer: One achieves Buddhahood with the whole [or essence] of the pure mind (*jiang jingxin ti cheng fo* 將淨心體成佛). (Yinshun: 141; see McRae: 195)

Shenxiu's interpretation clearly leaves room for a logocentric hierarchy that privileges pure over impure, motionlessness over motion, the true mind over the ordinary mind, the whole (*ti* 體) over the function (*yong* 用), even transcendence over immanence. Although the Buddha nature or the mind of suchness in the *Dacheng Qixin Lun* involves the aspects of pure and impure, true and deluded, *ti* and *yong*, Shenxiu places his notion of *linian* solely on the side of pure, true, and *ti*. Thus "being free from thoughts" not only means being free from deluded thoughts, but also from motions and actions, including seeing, hearing, feeling, knowing, and thinking. By entering into this "pure" and "quiet" state, Shenxiu and his followers believe that they can attain liberation.

What kind of liberation they are searching for? Does not it reflect a sort of Chan escapism?⁷ Related to this escapism is an inevitable tendency towards reification, pointing to an enchanted place, a foundation. Although Shenxiu did talk about the identification between *ti* and *yong*, *ti* is like something from which *yong* flows and to which it also returns. This dialectic of *ti* and *yong* looks somewhat analogous to a Hegelian dialectic, insofar as it privileges *ti*.

Such a notion of *linian* becomes the target of Huineng's deconstructive operation. It is true that Huineng's idea of *wunian* 無念 (no-thought or no-thinking) also comes from the *Dacheng Qixin Lun* in which the two terms, *linian* and *wunian*, are almost synonyms. However, if we look at Huineng's creative interpretation of *wunian*, we must admit the great difference between Shenxiu's *linian* and Huineng's *wunian*. To subvert Shenxiu's *linian*, Huineng did not simply fall back on the opposite of Shenxiu's abandonment of all thoughts, such as an emphasis on the importance of thoughts. Rather, Huineng proposed something that is neither Shenxiu's nor its opposite. Huineng's endeavor is a typical deconstructive one. He interpreted *wunian* as follows.

⁷ YANAGIDA Seizan has called this a sort of "Chan sickness," a word taken from the early Chan writings. See Yanagida 1976: 12.

No-thought means not to be carried away by thought in the process of thought. . . . Successive thoughts do not stop; prior thoughts, present thoughts, and future thoughts follow one after the other without cessation. . . . If one instant of thought clings, then successive thoughts cling; this is known as being fettered. If in all things successive thoughts do not cling, then you are unfettered. Therefore, we consider this non-abiding essential. (Yampolsky: 138; minor change in translation made)

But do not stop thinking about everything and eliminate all thoughts. As soon as thought stops, one dies and is reborn elsewhere. (Chan: 51)

What is no-thought? The [*dharmā*] of no-thought means: even though you see all things, you do not attach to them. . . . Even though you are in the midst of six dusts, you do not stand apart from them, yet are not stained by them, and are free to come and go. (Yampolsky: 153)

If you do not think of anything in order to stop all thoughts, that is bondage by [*dharmas*]. That is called a one-sided view. (Chan: 83; minor change in translation made)

Huineng did several things to dismantle Shenxiu's misleading ideas. First, Huineng appealed to the causal chain of thoughts and things. All thoughts and things are interrelated and one causes another. We all live with this flow of thoughts and things, and no one can stop it. Huineng regarded this unceasing flow, this non-abiding, as the essential condition for human existence or human nature (*weiren benxing* 爲人本性) (Chan: 50). Both freedom from thoughts (here referring to Shenxiu's idea) and attachment to thoughts (a common illness addressed by Buddhist soteriological discourses) are, for Huineng, two extremities that run counter to this essential condition or nature. For this reason, they are a hindrance to the way of liberation. Huineng's solution to this problem is to maintain the Middle Way. Though difficult, his advice is not to stop something that you will never be able to stop, but to detach yourself from it. This is none other than *flowing together* with thoughts and things. To some extent, to practice this (as a soteriological expedient) is to return to your own nature.

Next, in relation to this advice, Huineng proposes his thesis that *dao* must flow or circulate freely (*dao xu tongliu* 道須通流) (Yampolsky: 136; see also Chan: 46). He asks: "Why should *dao* be impeded instead (Chan: 49)? If the mind does not abide in things, the *dao* circulates [or flows] freely; if the mind abides in things, it becomes entangled" (Yampolsky: 136, with my minor modification). He also names this mind of *dao* the "straightforward mind (*zhixin* 直心)" and teaches his disciple about "only practicing straightforward mind, and in all things having no attachments whatsoever" (Yampolsky: 136). In other words, they should "practice the straightforward mind at all times, whether walking, standing, sitting, or reclining" (Chan: 47). These statements, tinged with a Daoist spirit, make it clear that for Huineng, enlightenment or the realization of the Buddha nature should not impede the living flux of the everyday world. Enlightenment or *dao* is rather the unimpeded or straightforward flowing together with thoughts and

things in all everyday circumstances. Huineng's deconstruction of Shenxiu's idea apparently serves this soteriological motif. From this perspective of free flowing together with all thoughts and things Huineng strongly opposes Shenxiu's way of "contemplating the mind and contemplating purity, not moving and not activating the mind" (Cf. Yampolsky: 137). Huineng's thesis foreshadows or is echoed by the Hongzhou notion of *renyun* 任運 (following along with the movement of all things or circumstances), a thesis central to mainstream Chan, although not always properly understood as such.

The consequence of Huineng's interpretation of *wunian* is significant. For instance, the affirmation of the causal chain and unimpeded flux of thoughts and things provides the legitimacy for the emphasis on the existential awakening of the human mind. According to Huineng, the imagined cessation of this causal chain and flux leads nowhere but to continuous suffering. Only by practicing non-attachment within this chain or flux of thoughts and things can we hope to attain liberation (Yampolsky: 148).⁸ For it is this chain or flux that also makes possible the transformation or awakening of the human mind or thought from delusion to enlightenment. The reason is obvious: this flux (or the change of all individual thoughts or objects) brings about passion, craving, impermanence, disillusionment, as well as enlightenment. Although one instance of suffering does not necessarily entail enlightenment, how could there be enlightenment without the affliction resulting from passion? They are not only interrelated, but also mutually involved. Therefore, Huineng stressed: "[T]he very passions are themselves enlightenment (*ji fannao shi puti* 即煩惱是菩提)" (Yampolsky: 148).

On the other hand, since the existence of a person is the flow of thoughts and feelings, the existential difference of the mind and thought is always possible. In this sense Huineng underscores: "[U]nawakened, even a Buddha is a sentient being," and "even a sentient being, if he is awakened in an instant of thought, is a Buddha" (Yampolsky: 151); again, "when past thoughts are deluded, this is the common man; when future thoughts are awakened to, this is Buddha" (Yampolsky: 148). In other words, "[E]ven these sentient beings, filled with passions and troubles," are able to "gain enlightenment" through the change of one instant of thought (Yampolsky: 150). This emphasis on the existential transformation of the human mind and thought has, without doubt, the consequence of excluding any substance, essence or foundation outside the function of the human mind. Nor does it tend to reify the human mind or subjectivity itself, since the goal of this transformation is to flow together with all things through an empty mind, the mind devoid of self-attachment. Thus Huineng's teaching develops the existentializing point of the *Dacheng Qixin Lun* concerning the realization of the Buddha nature, without relying too much on a "true mind" distinguishable from the mind of the sentient being.

It is also in this context that Huineng's use of the term *zixing* 自性 (self

⁸ "If in successive thoughts you practice it, this is called true existence."

nature) should be correctly understood. Throughout the *Platform Sūtra*, Huineng seldom used the term “Buddha nature.” He substituted “self nature” for “Buddha nature.” At first sight, this use is no different from those in the previous texts of *tathāgatagarbha* thought, since these texts refer to the *tathāgatagarbha* as the mind of self nature and purity as well. It is true that there are linguistic and phrasal links between the *Platform Sūtra* and those texts of *tathāgatagarbha* thought, especially the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*.

However, upon closer inspection, Huineng’s use of “self nature” is actually unique, for it tends to emphasize more plainly the possibility of existential awakening *within* the living body and mind of every sentient being. It underlines the point that every human being can actualize this possibility or fulfill this goal through the practice of non-attachment in all everyday circumstances. As we have indicated, it does not stress the need to establish a Buddha nature or true mind clearly distinguishable from the living mind of every sentient being, namely, the mind in *samsāra*. Attaining Buddhahood is but the existential transformation of the same mind of the human being in everyday life. This point is made much clearer than in the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*. The meaning of this term, therefore, is soteriological, functional, and non-substantialist.

Huineng’s point is clearly non-substantialist, since “self nature” here does not mean something existent in and by itself, or self-identity. No such meaning is involved in the use of this term at all. Rather, Huineng pointed out: “Human nature is empty (*shiren xingkong* 世人性空)” (Yampolsky: 146; Chan: 68). Here empty is used, first of all, in the same sense as the *Prajñāpāramitā* and Mādhyamika would maintain, namely, devoid of self existence or self nature. Secondly, it is used in the Post-Mādhyamika sense as the Yogācāra school and some *tathāgatagarbha* texts would maintain, namely, that emptiness, or being devoid of self existence, is the nature of all things. This understanding of the empty nature of all things, in its best form, is maintained as something like the condition of the possibilities of all things. It is not an origin or essence of all things, but nonetheless involves everything. Everything becomes possible because of this emptiness, this web of relativity. Huineng’s saying that the self-nature involves the ten thousand things should be understood in terms of this meaning (Yampolsky: 146). Clearly, this view involves an objective or cognitive element, insofar as it describes the condition of the possibilities of all things. We may call it quasi-transcendental or ontologically neutral, since it can lead to a reified view by substantializing this condition or to a de-substantialized view by stressing its pragmatic, expedient function. However, when Huineng stated that emptiness is human nature or human nature is empty, he did not stop with this second usage, but gave the term new meaning. His use of the term involves the meanings of relationality, the existential changeability of personhood, and the accomplishment of action.

To make this point clearer, I must clarify the linguistic-cultural background of Huineng’s use of the term *xing* 性 (nature) or *renxing* 人性 (human

nature) in relation to the term *xixing*. Scholars have commonly accepted that the Confucian, especially Mencian, emphasis on the innate goodness of human nature had great impact on the Chinese Buddhist acceptance of *tathāgatagarbha* thought. However, scholars also have recently revealed that the notion of human nature in Chinese philosophy is different from the Western notion of human nature as a changeless essence contained in all individual human beings. For instance, TANG Junyi 唐君毅, in his extensive study on *renxing*, explicated that the classical Confucian conception of *xing* is concerned primarily with the existential changeability and growth of each living human being. The *xing* is discussed from a practical and dynamic perspective. The meaning of *xing* involves directionality, relationality, and existential-practical development (Tang: 3-11). In the Mencian theory of mind-nature, the *xing* is explained in terms of the growth of each individual mind: "It should not be termed an essence or principle deeply rooted in the mind" (Tang: 29).

In a similar vein, Roger Ames radically questions the adequacy of the translation of the Chinese term *renxing* as "human nature" in its Western sense (see Ames: 145). Ames clarifies the Chinese meaning of *xing* as "a creative act" (Ames: 145). According to him, "[X]ing denotes the entire process of being a person.... [A] person is not a sort of *being*, but first and foremost a *doing* and *making*.... [X]ing is not reducible to what is innate or a priori" (Ames: 149-50). These expositions have, to some extent, clarified the linguistic-cultural background of Huineng's use of *xing* as well.

Let us now look at one example of Huineng's use of *xing* in the *Platform Sūtra*:

immediately awakened. It is like the great sea which gathers all the flowing streams, and harmonizes the small waters with the large waters as a whole. This is realizing your own nature. [Such a person] does not abide either inside or outside; he is free to come or go. Readily he casts aside the mind that clings [to things], and there is no obstruction to his passage. (Yampolsky: 150; some modifications made in translation)

Realizing one's own nature here is not explained in terms of what one recognizes but how one acts, how one achieves the existential transformation of the mind, and how one practices the free flowing together (or being harmonized) with all things. The focus is not on the cognitive element contained in the second usage, but on the existential function of the mind and pragmatic wisdom (*zhi* 智), on the practical-behavioral carrying out of non-attachment. The usage of *xing* here is plainly operational. We have no difficulty in detecting the underlying accord of Huineng's usage with the Confucian one, despite its Buddhist context. The understanding of this unique usage is crucial to avoid any accusation that Huineng's, or his followers', "self nature" represents a substantialist view, and that the Indian Brahmanical concept of Self has been smuggled into Chinese Chan through the back door, as implied or suggested by recent critiques of Chan Buddhism. The usage is also a good example of the Chinese transformation of the

original Buddhist usage. Without paying enough attention to this transformation of usage, one would fail to discern any profound difference between Indian and Chinese Buddhism or between Brahmanical thought and Chan.

By this investigation of reifying and deconstructive tendencies reflected in the *Platform Sūtra*, I see clearly the fact that the traditional distinctions between Huineng and Shenxiu or between Southern and Northern defined by this text and others may not necessarily or absolutely be “counterproductive,” as Faure has claimed. They still can be utilized and serve the purpose of our new investigations. A reinterpretation or a different interpretation is often and always possible, even with the traditional distinctions. However, my investigation virtually goes beyond the traditional distinctions not only by giving them new interpretations, but also by helping to subvert the monolithic view of Southern Chan. If Southern Chan performs deconstructive operations only on Northern Chan and other outsiders without any internal operation within or upon itself, it is not an authentic deconstruction. The ensuing study will show that the Chan struggles between reifying and deconstructive tendencies are continuous and pervasive. They apparently exist within Southern Chan. The most noticeable case is the Hongzhou school and its deconstructive operation.

III. No Root, No Foundation, No Mind, No Buddha: Deconstruction in the Hongzhou Chan

A main target of the Hongzhou school's deconstruction is Shenhui's teaching of “establishing awareness and cognition (*li zhijian* 立知見)” (*Lidai Fabao Ji*. T 51, 2075: 185b; see also Yanagida 1976: 154) in relation to his understanding of the Buddha nature. Although Shenhui 神會 was on the side of Huineng and made a significant contribution to the criticism of Shenxiu's idea of *linian*, scholars have indicated that Shenhui's thought deviates from Huineng's in some important aspects (Mou: 1041-69; He: 244). Shenhui's own interpretation of *wunian*, if we make a careful comparison between it and Huineng's, is problematic. This fact, to a great extent, results in the Hongzhou school's deconstructive operation. The Hongzhou school should be considered the true inheritor of Huineng's thought in those essential aspects. Since the context of Shenhui's teaching is soteriological, and in some aspects he does stand with Huineng and with Hongzhou, we may define only some elements of his thought as quasi-reifying or quasi-logocentric. However, these elements make the difference between the Hongzhou and Shenhui's teachings and make a deconstructive operation indispensable.

Two major interrelated problems exist in Shenhui's teaching. First, he privileged a kind of awareness or intuitive knowledge over ordinary, discriminative cognition. The former is called “empty tranquil awareness (*kongji*

zhi zhi 空寂之知),”⁹ and the latter refers to ordinary activities of seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing (*jian wen jue zhi* 見聞覺知) with respect to discriminative consciousness. All such ordinary activities must be emptied or transcended in the state of *wunian*, according to Shenhui (SL, 10).¹⁰ This disruption of ordinary cognitive activity is overemphasized by his interpretation of awareness. As he states, “This awareness does not have any causal link, since it is the *prajñā* wisdom of the original whole [or essence] of emptiness and tranquillity itself that is aware” (SL, 67).¹¹ By cutting off this causal link, Shenhui showed his tendency to isolate this awareness from all everyday activities. He equated the achievement of this awareness with the attainment of Buddhahood. In Zongmi’s 宗密 terms, he considered “the one word awareness [or intuitive knowledge] the gate to all wonders” (T 48, 2015: 403a).¹²

Second, in using the category of *ti* and *yong* to explain awareness, Shenhui favored the *ti* and saw awareness as the *benzhi zhiyong* 本智之用, that is, as the function of the wisdom of the *ti* itself that relies on no other conditions. For instance, he stated: “In the whole (*ti*) of emptiness and tranquillity, there is the original wisdom, the illuminating function (*yong*) of which is called awareness” (SL, 119).¹³ It is true that this view involves the identification of the *ti* and the *yong*, since the *yong* is only the *yong* of the *ti* and the *ti* is that which functions (*yong*). However, upon closer examination, we find that in fact he cancelled out *yong* in favor of *ti*. Zongmi’s explanation is revealing on this point. He asserted: “[Shenhui’s notion of] the awareness of tranquillity points to the *ti*” (HTC 14: 279d).¹⁴ It is the *ti* that is aware of itself and of all things. This *ti* is also equivalent to the mind of non-abiding, the Buddha nature or self nature. Since this *ti* does not rely on any causal link or causal condition, it is clearly distinguishable from the mind in *samsāra*. This is an apparent departure from Huineng’s notion of self nature or the mind of non-abiding that is identified with the mind of one instant of thought, namely, the mind of the sentient being.

As we have noted, the mind of non-abiding, in Huineng, is the existential awakening of the same mind of the sentient being. It does not presuppose a foundation-like “whole of mind” (*xinti* 心體). Shenhui’s privileging

⁹ Here I tentatively follow Peter Gregory in translating *zhi* as awareness. See Gregory: 215. Note that Shenhui’s notion of awareness or intuitive knowledge nonetheless involves the element of cognition, even though it is intuitive and different from ordinary knowledge. See Jan: 40, note 1.

¹⁰ Shenhui, *Nanyang Heshang Dunjiao Jietuo Chanmen Zhiliaoxing Tanyu*. This edition of the recorded sayings of Shenhui, which I use here, not only is a synthesis, based on careful comparison and examination, of the previous editions by HU Shi and D. T. Suzuki, but also includes the most recent discoveries of the different versions of Shenhui’s sayings.

¹¹ “... *bujia yuanqi* 不假緣起.” *Nanyang Heshang Wenda Zazhengyi*.

¹² “*Zhizhiyizi zhongmiao zhimen* 知之一字聚妙之門.” Zongmi, *Chanyuan Zhubuanji Duxu*. Also see Kamata: 95 and Jan: 40.

¹³ *Nanyang Heshang Wenda Zazhengyi*.

¹⁴ “*Jizhi zhibi* 寂知指體.” Zong Mi, *Yuanjue Jing Dashu Chao*. See Jan: 49.

of the *ti*, it seems to me, falls back on Shenxiu's notion of true mind (*zhenxin* 真心) and to that of the *Dacheng Qixin Lun*. There seems to be no fundamental difference between Shenhui's *xinti* and Shenxiu's *zhenxin* in their quasi-reifying aspect. Although Shenhui showed the non-objectified feature of this "mind of emptiness and tranquillity" by relating it to wisdom and to the function of awareness, it is not clearly distinguishable from an absolute subjectivity—an inverted substance.

The Hongzhou school overturned Shenhui's position in both of these respects. First, the Hongzhou school strongly opposed any characterization of the realization of the Buddha nature or enlightenment as *zhibian* 知見 or *zhibie* 知解. It challenged two opposed positions: equating enlightenment with ordinary cognition and equating enlightenment with awareness or intuitive knowledge isolatable from ordinary cognitive activities. The second position is Shenhui's. The Hongzhou position is best represented by the following exposition found in the sayings of Huangbo Xiyun 黃檗希運.

[Y]ou students of the *dao* ... will realize your original mind only in the realm of seeing, hearing, feeling and knowing. Although the original mind does not belong to seeing, hearing, feeling and knowing, this mind cannot be separated from them. You should not simply start your cognitive maneuver from them, nor allow them to give rise to any conceptual thought; yet nor should you seek the mind apart from them or abandon them in your pursuit of the *dharma*. Do not let your mind be identical with them nor separated from them...be free everywhere, and nowhere is a place where the *dao* cannot be practiced. (CF in *CJ* 13: 8975a; see also *Ui*: 14-6 and Blofeld: 36-7)

The point of the Hongzhou school expressed here by Huangbo is evident: although enlightenment cannot be pursued through mere cognition, it cannot be isolated from all activities that may be related to a further cognitive maneuver. The prerequisite for enlightenment is the cessation of one's cognitive maneuver—the illusory grasping of the object of self-identity. However, of equal importance is not separating oneself from everyday activities, as the Hongzhou school held that seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing are part of our everyday activities. All everyday activities are opportunities or necessary conditions for the realization of enlightenment. This understanding is due to the Hongzhou school's belief in the Mahāyāna dictum that without *samsāra* or *samvṛti* there is no *nirvāṇa* or *paramārtha*, a strictly relational perspective. Enlightenment is only the establishment and function of the attitude of non-clinging within ordinary activities. The Hongzhou masters often asked where one can go or how one can be enlightened apart from this conventional world and everyday activities. As authentic followers of the Middle Way, the Hongzhou masters saw Shenhui's isolation of awareness from ordinary activities as another kind of attachment or fixation. From a relational perspective, it must be overturned.

Second, the Hongzhou school invalidated Shenhui's logocentric hierarchy of *ti* and *yong*. Shenhui's *ti* is independent of all conditions (*yuan* 緣). Zongmi defined Shenhui's hierarchy as "the original [or self] function of the

self nature (*zixing benyong* 自性本用),” while the Hongzhou position is criticized by him as only “the application [of the self nature] in various conditions (*suiyuan yingyong* 隨緣應用)” (HTC, 110: 437d).¹⁵ Since Shenhui’s *ti* or self nature is independent of all conditions, its own *yong* is abstracted from everyday activities and all circumstances. Shenhui and Zongmi preferred this kind of self function. However, without that “application in conditions,” how can there be any real function at all? There is no doubt that Shenhui’s view results in the cancellation of *yong* in favor of *ti*. From the Hongzhou perspective, on the contrary, there is only “application in conditions,” and there is no such thing as the “self function of the self nature.” The Hongzhou position, as formulated by Zongmi, is as follows.

If one examines the nature of this whole [or essence], he will find that ultimately it can neither be perceived nor realized just as the eye cannot see itself, and so forth. If one considers its application, he will see that every move and every action that he takes is the Buddha nature, and that there is nothing else that can either realize it or be realized. (HTC 110: 435b; also see Kamata: 307. For the English translation see Gregory: 237; I have made some changes)

The stance of the Hongzhou Chan here is to restore more completely the existential-soteriological and pragmatic-behavioral concern of Buddhism in the Chinese context. It strives against any quasi-metaphysical or quasi-reifying use of the Chinese category of *ti* and *yong*, including Shenhui’s. The Hongzhou Chan does not oppose the use of the term *ti* itself. What the Hongzhou masters are concerned with is how one should use it. It is all right for them to use *ti* as equivalent to the realization of the Buddha nature or enlightenment. However, it must be used in the perspectival, relational, dynamic, pragmatic-behavioral sense and as temporary expedient only, just as *xing* is used in the *Platform Sūtra* that we have discussed above. Since the *ti* or the Buddha nature or enlightenment is not any kind of substance or entity, we can neither perceive nor grasp it.

If we consider the *ti* as a dynamic whole or a web of relativity in which we live and act every day and with which we attempt to live and act in harmony, then every move or action is connected to, or a part of, that whole. Precisely for this reason the Hongzhou masters emphasized that all everyday activities are nothing but the function of the Buddha nature. The *ti* (or the Buddha nature), the *yong* (function or application), and the *yuan* (temporal conditions) cannot be separated. This identical relation favors *yong* and subverts Shenhui’s privileging of the *ti*. One may object that this seems to be the cancellation of *ti*. However, if the *ti* is only a temporary expedient and is understood in the sense of action, application, and relation, there is no need to cancel it out. The *ti* cannot exist in and by itself, and cannot be independent of this practical-behavioral context.

Although Zongmi’s formulation of the position of the Hongzhou school is fair, his interpretation of it is definitely wrong. For example,

¹⁵ Zongmi, *Zhonghua Chuanxindi Chanmen Shizi Chengxi Tu*. Also see Kamata: 336.

Zongmi explained the Hongzhou position as follows: “[T]he blackness itself is the bright pearl, and the substance of the bright pearl is ever invisible. If one wants to know the pearl, blackness itself is brightness” (*HTC* 110: 436d; also see Kamata: 326. For the English translation see Jan: 52). Metaphorically, Zongmi meant that the Hongzhou school mixes the ordinary activities of the unenlightened person with the activities of the enlightened person. In that case, Hongzhou Chan runs the risk of denying the necessity of Buddhist practice, which is a complete misunderstanding of Hongzhou. The central point of the Hongzhou teaching is, of course, not to cancel Buddhist practice, but to further remove all hindrances to this practice. One such hindrance is the tendency toward reification. As is indicated in Zongmi’s own description, Hongzhou Chan took as its motto “let the mind be free (*renxin* 任心)”:

Dao is the [ordinary] mind itself, and one cannot use the [Buddha] mind to cultivate the [ordinary] mind; evil is also the mind itself, and one cannot cut off the [evil] mind by means of the [other] mind. Do not cut and do not produce; letting the mind follow along with all circumstances and letting it be free, this is called liberation. (*HTC*, 14: 279b; for the English translation, see Jan: 47)

Thus, the Hongzhou identification of all activities of the ordinary mind with the Buddha nature is intended to deconstruct the dualistic distinction of the ordinary mind and the Buddha nature, to recover enlightenment as the existential-practical transformation of the ordinary mind. The Hongzhou view is not to demolish the existential changeability of the sentient being, but to reaffirm it through overturning the original hierarchy of the Buddha nature and the ordinary mind. It echoes and develops Huineng’s teaching by placing more weight on the relation between all activities of the ordinary mind and the realization of the Buddha nature.

The Hongzhou view must be understood in terms of this relational perspective. As we have mentioned, everyday activities, for the Hongzhou school, are the necessary condition for enlightenment in the first place. Without *samāra*, there is no *nirvāṇa*; therefore, the ordinary mind is *dao*. I call this the pre-enlightenment aspect. The Hongzhou view also involves a post-enlightenment aspect, which reminds us that we must verify our own enlightenment in everyday activities. After realizing enlightenment, we are still ordinary people doing ordinary tasks. The only difference, as pointed out by many Chan masters, is that we now have an attitude of non-attachment and that attitude always works in everyday activities. To an enlightened eye, then, every action is or can be seen as a function of the Buddha nature. The relational perspective, therefore, is an enlightened perspective, not an unenlightened one.

However, the disclosure of, and emphasis on, this enlightened perspective is extremely important for unenlightened practitioners, leading them in the right direction—to resist any separation of enlightenment from everyday activities. Here our distinction of pre- and post-enlightenment aspects is only intended for the purpose of analysis. Generally speaking, the

Hongzhou view advises students to realize the mutual conditioning and mutual involvement of the enlightened and the unenlightened. This does not confuse the two, but rather sees them in the living reality of change and flux. The promotion of Buddhist practice is possible only within this living reality of change and flux.

To flow together with this ever-changing reality is called *renyun* 任運 in the Hongzhou school. The result of their deconstructive maneuver is not to replace all old binary distinctions or logocentric hierarchies with new ones. Rather, its standpoint or its strategy is to eschew or detach from any dualistic oppositions. In other words, the Hongzhou masters kept themselves busy moving with all things and circumstances, staying with neither the Buddha nor the sentient being, neither the extraordinary nor the ordinary, neither grasping nor rejecting, neither nihilistic nor permanent, neither knowledge nor non-knowledge, and so on. This elusive position is referred to by the Chinese words *renyun zizai* 任運自在, meaning “following along with the movement of all things or circumstances and being free” (HTC 14: 279b). It constitutes both part of the deconstructive strategy of Hongzhou and the underlying thesis that this deconstructive strategy ultimately serves. In the recorded sayings of famous Hongzhou masters, we find frequent use of these words and similar expressions.

Following along with the movement of all things and in this way living out your time (*Renyun guoshi* 任運過時). (JCL, fascicle 6, T 51, 2076: 246a)

At all times...never attach yourself to one thing; just follow along with the movement of all things the whole day long (*zhongri renyun tengteng* 終日任運騰騰). (WL in CJ 13: 8987b; see also UI: 78-79 and Blofeld: 90)

Following along with the movement of all things without any restriction is called liberation (*Renyun buju fangming jietuo* 任運不拘方名解脫). (WL in CJ 13: 8996b)

Merely according to circumstances as they are, use up your past karma; following along with [the change of] circumstances, put on your [different] clothes (*renyun zhuyishang* 任運著衣裳). (LY in CJ 11: 7351a; see also Yanagida 1972: 79, Watson: 26, and Sasaki: 9-10)

A similar expression is also found in Master Linji's quotations: “The mind changes in accordance with the myriad circumstances;/the way it changes is truly profound./If you can realize its nature through this flow,/you will have neither joy nor sorrow” (LY in CJ, 11: 7357b; see also Yanagida: 145, Watson: 55, and Sasaki: 27).¹⁶

In view of these understandings, the soteriological goal of Buddhist practice, for Hongzhou Chan, should by no means be static or isolatable. The goal is to keep us moving or flowing with all things or circumstances. The

¹⁶ It is alleged that this hymn was written by the Twenty-Second Indian Patriarch, Manorhita. Probably, however, it was fabricated by Chinese Buddhists. In any event, the hymn quoted by Linji reflects Linji's own thought.

masters know very well that the living process of change and flux will ruthlessly undercut every fixed position and every attachment to self or self-identity without ever stopping. Reality itself is deconstructive. Enlightenment cannot occur *outside* this flow. Enlightenment is nothing but being harmonious with change and flux. An enlightened person would find inexhaustible wonders by living a life in harmony with change and flux. This is the exact content and context of the Hongzhou teaching of realizing the “self nature” or “self mind,” insofar as the Hongzhou masters did use these words sometimes. They have nothing to do with an *ātman* or a logocentric privilege of self over the other. Moreover, the profundity of this soteriological motif pushes their deconstruction completely home, just as their deconstructive strategy helps to reveal the profundity of this motif.

A remarkable characteristic of the Hongzhou deconstruction is its self-cancellation or self-effacement. This self-deconstruction is as compelling as its deconstruction of the position of others. One famous case is Mazu Daoyi's 馬祖道一 self-effacement of his notion that “the mind is Buddha.” When the notion was first taught by Mazu Daoyi, it involved an attempt to oppose the misunderstanding of the Buddha nature as something outside or separable from the ordinary mind. It was itself a kind of deconstructive operation upon the reifying view of the Buddha nature. However, after he taught this notion for a certain period, it was inevitably sedimented or abstracted from the original context. His students displayed a tendency to attach themselves to this notion. Then Mazu started to teach a different notion that apparently ran counter to his original teaching, a notion now emphasizing that there is neither mind nor Buddha (GY, fascicle 1, CJ, 11: 7310b; Cf. Cheng: 78). In this way Mazu kept himself moving with different situations, avoided misleading students, and helped them to eschew sedimentation, fixation, and reification. This self-effacement indicates that for Mazu, there is no need to establish any logocentric hierarchy. He did not privilege any notion at all. He is able to use any kataphatic terms in his soteriological teaching, whenever the situation requires; but he is always also able to deconstruct the terms he has used.¹⁷

Another famous example is Linji 臨濟. Much attention has been paid to his notion of “an authentic person without rank.” However, little heed has been paid to his self-erasing of this “authentic person without rank.” The saying that there is an authentic person without rank, just like many other sayings, is a kind of soteriological expedient pointing to the existential transformation of personhood. The words themselves do not designate the reality of any metaphysical Self or absolutized subjectivity. Linji knew well

¹⁷ About two decades ago, Whalen Lai, though taking a different approach, wrote a very similar comment on Mazu: “Ma[z]u accepted Nāgārjuna's *prāsaṅgika*: one cannot postulate (*li*) anything that cannot be in the next minute destroyed (*po*).... As Mind, as Buddha; Neither Mind, neither Buddha. This is ‘never to postulate a thesis’ boiled down to a Zen Mādhyamika in eight words.” See Lai: 180. I would like to express my gratitude to an anonymous reader for providing me with this important information.

that someone, among his audiences, may understand the notion in a reifying way. Therefore, soon after proposing of this notion, he suddenly declared: "What kind of shitty ass-wiper this authentic person without rank is!" (LY, in CJ, 11: 7349a; also see Yanagida 1972: 52. Cf. Watson 1993: 13). It lets people know that Linji himself was not so serious about this notion. In fact, this non-serious attitude is simply a strategy of self-erasing. The aim of this strategy is similar to Mazu's.

However, Linji may be the one, among all Chan masters, who used the clearest language to deconstruct all kataphatic terms that Chan Buddhists have been using, including those used by himself. Let us take a quick look at some of his sayings:

[M]y insight is different: I make no choice between the secular and the sacred without, nor do I stay in the root and foundation within. (LY in CJ 11: 7352a; see also Yanagida 1972, and Sasaki: 11)

[Y]ou must understand right now that the person here listening to the *Dharma* has no [fixed] form, no characteristics, no root, no foundation, no [particular] place he abides, yet he is vibrantly alive. (LY in CJ, 11: 7353a; see also Yanagida 1972, and Watson: 36)

There is no Buddha, no [*Dharma*], no training, and no realization. What are you so hotly chasing? Putting a head on top of your head, you blind fools? Your head is right where it should be. . . . Do not be deceived. If you turn to the outside, there is no [*Dharma*]; neither is there anything to be obtained from the inside. (LY in CJ, 11: 7357a; see also Yanagida 1972, Schloegl: 44-5, and Watson: 53)

Linji also pointed out: "The true *dao* is without substance (*Zhendao wuti* 真道無體) (LY in CJ, 11: 7359b; also see Yanagida 1972: 159, and Watson: 62). As we can see, all those terms, such as *ti* (substance), *ben* 本 (foundation), *xin* 心 (mind), *fo* 佛 (Buddha), *fa* 法 (*dharma*), *zheng* 證 (realization), used either by others or by Linji himself, have no legitimate reification. In this aspect, Linji was unmistakably clear and quite radical. He was most resolute and exemplary in taking a stance of flowing freely with all things and circumstances. His de-reifying maneuver, as it stands in the text, should not be ignored by any scholar who intends to treat him with a fair and critical attitude. The entire *Linji Lu* is full of the spirit and energy of deconstruction and self-deconstruction.¹⁸

One characteristic of his discourse, shared by the discourse of other Hongzhou masters, is the use of both kataphatic and apophatic language. The Hongzhou masters both reconstructed and deconstructed Buddhist themes, notions, and concepts. On the one hand, they ceaselessly deconstructed all terms including their own; on the other, they never stopped using positive terms. Deconstruction, for the Hongzhou school, is not the end of

¹⁸ My study of Linji's strategy thus refutes both Matsumoto's accusation of Linji's authentic person as *atman* and Faure's censure of Linji for being logocentric. Based on this study, I regard Linji as a representative of the deconstructive trend in mainstream Chan. For my disagreement with Faure in this regard and for more related details, see Wang: 113 & 211.

all kataphatic discourses; it is the companion of kataphatic discourse. In other words, the Hongzhou masters did not attach themselves to deconstruction or any negative strategy. They can even deconstruct deconstruction, if their practice calls for it. The principle for them is to meet the challenges and requirements of all flowing situations. The move and development of situations call forth both the continuous use of positive language for soteriological purposes—to liberate the human mind from all forms of attachment and fixation—and the continuous use of deconstructive language for the same purposes. The Hongzhou masters were always aware of this call of practice. They echoed it and did both at all times without hesitation. This may be a good lesson for our contemporary thinkers in dealing with the post-deconstruction situation.

The foregoing investigation clearly indicates that an important thread running through the early development of the mainstream Chinese Chan thought is the inner struggles between the reification and the deconstruction of Buddha nature. The struggles remained after the early period. However, to explore those struggles in the later period is beyond the reach of this article. Suffice it to say that the above investigation has reconstructed and reinterpreted a major part of early Chan thought in terms of this running thread. Based on the careful reading and analysis of extant Chan texts, we have been able to identify different reifying and deconstructive tendencies in Chan, while paying enough attention to their unique linguistic-cultural contexts. As a result, not only have we recognized the otherness of the Chan deconstruction, but have also reached a new, constructive and coherent understanding and interpretation of some central aspects of Chan thought—a contribution that some contemporary critics of Chan would not make.¹⁹

Abbreviations

- CF: *Huangbo Chanshi Chuanxin Fayao*. CJ, vol. 13.
 CJ: *Chan'zong Jicheng*. Reprint of the collection of Chan school from HTC. 25 vols. Taipei: Yiwen Yinshu Guan, 1968.
 GY: *Guzunsu Yulu*. 48 fascicles. CJ, vols. 11-12.
 HTC: *Xu Zang Jing/Hsu Tsang Ching*. Reprint of *Dainippon zokuzōkyō* (Nakano Tatsue, ed. Kyoto: Zōkyō shoin, 1905-1912). 150 vols. Taipei: Xinwenfeng Chubun Gongsi, 1968-1970.
 JCL: *Jingde Chuandeng Lu*. 30 fascicles. T, vol. 51, no. 2076.
 LY: *Zhenzhou Linji Huizhao Chanshi Yulu*. GY, fascicle 4. CJ, vol. 11.
 SL: *Shenhui Heshang Chanhua Lu*. Yang Zengwen, ed. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1996.

¹⁹ I like to thank two anonymous readers for their recommendation and important suggestions for improving the article.

- T: *Taishō shinsbū daizōkyō*. Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe kaigyoku, eds. Tokyo: Daizo shuppan kai, 1922-1933. 100 vols.
 WL: *Huangbo Xiyun Chanshi Wanling Lu*. *CJ*, vol. 13.

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Dacheng Wusheng Fangbian Men 《大乘無生方便門》. *T*, vol. 85, no. 2834.
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Nanyang heshang dunjiao jietuo chanmen zhixing tanyu 《南陽和上頓教解脫禪門直了性壇語》. *SL*, 3-14.
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