Early Ch’an in China and Tibet

Edited by Whalen Lai and Lewis R. Lancaster

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Luis O. Gomez
Foreword

The papers which have been published in this volume were first presented at a conference held in San Francisco under the joint sponsorship of the University of California and the San Francisco Zen Center. Support for the travel of the attending scholars was provided from two sources, a grant from the Graduate Division of the University and another grant from the Joint Center of East Asian Studies at Berkeley. The meetings were held in the Zen Center seminar area and all hospitality, transport and meals were arranged by the center and its leader, Roshi Baker.

In the preparation and the production of this book, assistance was given by the staff of the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies on the Berkeley campus and by Ms. Nancy Carlton who coordinated the design, proof-reading and correspondence.
Preface

Ch'an Buddhism happened on the West through the popular writings of Alan Watts and D.T. Suzuki, as a new vision to compliment, or to act as a critique of, the alleged poverty of our rationalism. Presented in abstraction outside of history, Ch'an was for a long time the Ch'an of the Platform Sutra, mainly represented through the Lin-chi tradition, and closely associated with Zen aesthetics and the various military arts of Japan.

At the time when the practice of Zen was being introduced to the West in the 1930s, a series of important scholarly studies were being pursued in Japan and China. Lesser figures in the Ch'an tradition, lost lineages of teaching, and little known works were receiving the attention necessary to make them a part of the contemporary appraisal of Buddhist history and development. One of the early figures in this study of Ch'an was Hu Shih, the Chinese historian, an iconoclast of his day and a challenger of the approach to study taken by D.T. Suzuki. Hu Shih presented to the interested community of specialists his major discovery of the Shen-hui movement which took place after the time of Hui-neng. It was from this community made up of Shen-hui and his supporters, announced Hu Shih, that we have the origins of the Platform Sutra, not from the shadowy person of Hui-neng. In taking this critical stand, Hu Shih challenged the Bodhidharma legend, questioned the centrality of meditation, and provided a Confucian humanistic alternative to the cult of Ch'an. At the present time this avenue of research has been continued by Prof. Yanagida, who has reached different conclusions than his predecessors, namely that the Platform Sutra belongs neither to Hui-neng nor the Shen-hui group but is a document originating in part from the Ox-head school. Such research tells us that early Ch'an was made up of a number of alternative and competing ideologies and teaching lineages, some of which, forgotten through the centuries, are now being rediscovered, often from the cache of manuscripts at Tun-huang. The notion of Ch'an as a single line of transmission from Bodhidharma has been replaced by a much more complex picture of contending and even hostile factions that all made their various contributions to this emerging school of Buddhism.

Another area of research has been directed to the question of whether Ch'an, in all its multi-faceted forms, is a synthesis of Buddhism and Taoism. Hu Shih went to what many criticized as the extreme, seeing Ch'an as the final sinicization of Indian Buddhism, the much welcomed secularization of
the other-worldly and ascetic plague of India. However, the sinicization which Hu Shih saw in Ch'an was more Confucian than Taoist. The often stated identification of Ch'an with Taoism centers on the philosophical treatises of Lao-tzu and other ancient masters, but this approach is severely limited because it does not deal adequately with Taoism as it appeared during the formative years of Ch'an. It is now clear that this contemporary Taoism of the time of Bodhidharma and Hui-neng encompassed a whole range of practices that involved great attention to longevity, exorcism, a host of deities to be propitiated, dietary regimes, and eschatological concerns, which all combined to create a rich array of folk practice and metaphysical alchemy. This Taoism, an integral part of the religious life of China at that time, had a major role to play within the development of Buddhism, but it may more appropriately be seen in relationship to the Tantric tradition rather than Ch'an. The Taoism traced within Ch'an seems closer to the earlier traditions of Chinese Buddhism in which philosophical Taoist words were used to convey Buddhist ideas. Since this practice can be seen in many canonic texts, the appearance of Taoist terms in Ch'an writings does not make those works unique. It is important to note the lack of many of the critical elements of Taoism in Ch'an; the significance of the omissions may be greater than the inclusions. It was the resistance to Taoism and the move toward the traditional Mahāyāna stance which allowed Ch'an to take a dominant position in Chinese Buddhism in later centuries. As Ch'an matured into a series of self-conscious schools each having an identity and history, it took its place in the mainstream of Buddhism, and claiming to have a teaching superior to that of the Taoists, did not emphasize any of the shared elements.

By the ninth century, the Ch'an tradition as a school and as an institution had been formed, with its own organization, practices, ideology and economic base. The Southern school had largely triumphed over other competitors and Ch'an was no longer the limited inner circle of the disciples of any one lineage of teachers, nor was it being pressed to assert its independent identity against Taoism. In the security of its established status, a new genre of literature developed different from the crisp treatises attributed to the first three patriarchs, different even from the discursive records of Tao-hsin, and different from the legitimation myths of the Platform Sutra. This new literature was the Yu-lu, the collected sayings devoted to one master. In this literary form Ch'an had established its own unique texts and achieved victory in its revolt against dependency on the canonic texts.
The Yu-lu achieved an authority equal to if not surpassing that of the sūtras. The liberation of Ch’an from the canon translated from Sanskrit works led to a burst of creative energy, especially during the era of Ma-tsu. It is from this great master that all surviving schools of Southern Ch’an derive, rather than from the lineage of Shen-hui or Hui-neng. The content covered in this volume ends with the period when the two schools of Lin-chi and Ts’ao-tung came into existence, the two traditions that have led to the contemporary forms of Ch’an found in China, Japan, Korea and the West.

As scholarship on Tibet has developed over the last few decades, the issue of the contact between Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism has received attention. Pioneers in this study, such as Prof. Tucci, spotted within the Tibetan literature doctrinal statements which appeared to be Ch’an rather than Indian. The differences between the two approaches was of concern to the Tibetans as can be seen in the importance placed on the “debate”, said to have been held between a Ch’an master and his opponent from India. We can assume that the two meditative and philosophical traditions met in Tibet, not just in a one-time debate before the royal judge, but in a cultural interchange that lasted many years and was thus more than a simple conflict between Indic orthodoxy and sinicized Ch’an. The problem of separating out the Chinese and Indian elements in the Tibetan tradition is no easy task and the studies which follow focus on establishing some of the principles of this type of research. Many of the statements which are possibly of Ch’an origin can be explained within the Indian framework. Identifying the sources in the Tibetan literature is difficult and scholars still have before them material that requires careful investigation before this particular issue can be finally settled. It is clear, however, that in addition to the Tun-huang materials, the bSam-guan mig-sgron of gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas ye-shes has emerged as a work of singular importance.

Not all of the issues of Ch’an, whether in Tibet or China, are included in the material contained in this volume; it has not been gathered with any idea of being a definitive study. The field is still new and developing in exciting ways. The intent of this study is to provide an overview of some of the work being done. Not the least of the objectives in the conference, where the papers were first presented, was the attempt to put the studies of Ch’an on a firm basis free from some of the barriers to research, especially in the area of history, that have kept this topic from being dealt with in an adequate fashion. It is a step in a direction, by no means a complete journey.
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BBKK</td>
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<td>EFEO</td>
<td>École Francaise d’Extrême Orient</td>
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<td>HKSC</td>
<td>Hsi Kao-seng-chuan</td>
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<td>Indogaku Bukkyō gaku Kenkyū</td>
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<td>Li-tai fa-pao chi</td>
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<td>Lania</td>
<td>Lārikāvātārasūtra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923.</td>
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<td>LCSTC</td>
<td>Leng-chia shih-tz’u chi</td>
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<td>LSI</td>
<td>An Index to the Lankavatara Sutra. D. T. Suzuki, Kyoto, 1934 (2nd ed.).</td>
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<td>MBT II</td>
<td>Minor Buddhist Texts II. G. Tucci,</td>
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<td>NCGK</td>
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<td>PhEW</td>
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<td>PLC</td>
<td>Pao-lin-chuan</td>
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<td>RGVV</td>
<td>vyākhā to the RGV, ed. E. Johnston, Patna, 1950.</td>
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S. Stein
SKSC  *Sweg-kao-sêng-chuan*
S.tib. Stein Tibetan
T.  *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*
TG  *Tōhō Gakuhō*
Tib. Tibetan
Tōy G  *Tōyō Gakuhō*
TP  *T’oung Pao*
ZKK  Zenbunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō
ZZ  *Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō*
New Japanese Studies in Early Ch’an History

Philip Yampolsky

The study of the early history of Ch’an Buddhism has, over the years, fascinated a small body of scholars who have dedicated themselves to the detailed research that such study entails. Investigation of the Tun-huang documents, as gradually they become available for research, has revealed a corpus of literature that relates to early Ch’an. The appraisal of this literature has given us a not inconsiderable knowledge of the historical background of early Ch’an.

The first studies were made in the late 1920s and early 1930s when such scholars as Hu Shih, Yabuki Keiki, Suzuki Daisetsu, Ui Hakujō, Kuno Hōryū, and others began publishing texts, editing them, collating various editions, and writing detailed studies of these materials. Hu Shih described in dramatic detail Shen-hui’s attack on Northern Ch’an and his claims for Hui-neng as the Sixth Patriarch. Writings of priests of Northern Ch’an, histories purporting to prove the legitimacy of various schools, and a vast number of other works were brought to light. Studies were continued in postwar years by a handful of scholars, but it was not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that scholars turned again to detailed studies of the Tun-huang documents. Hu Shih resumed his interest; Paul Demiéville continued his studies. In Japan major contributions were made by several men, but by far the most significant were those made by Yanagida Seizan. In addition to producing a constant succession of learned articles, more popular works and translations, and the monumental Shoki Zenshū shissō no kenkyū, Professor Yanagida has made translations of several early works with detailed annotations, published in the Zen no goroku series. Indeed, without the studies of Professor Yanagida and other Japanese scholars, our knowledge of early Chinese Ch’an would be negligible.

I intend here to summarize the results of some of these recent studies without going into great detail and without providing specific references to the large number of works these scholars have examined. I do not pretend to be able to offer any new or substantive contributions to our
knowledge. It is obvious, however, that many new elements have been added to our conceptions of the early history of Ch’an.

One of the most peculiar features of this early Ch’an history is that for the most part it has nothing whatsoever to do with the Ch’an of the five schools and seven teachings that derive from Ma-tsu (709–788), Lin-ch’i (d.866) and other famous T’ang masters. In fact, we know considerably more about the origins and development of the schools that no longer exist, that were virtually forgotten for over a thousand years, than we do about the origins of the kind of Ch’an that developed in China, was transmitted to Japan and that is preserved there today. We have, of course, names and lineages, concocted at an early time to establish its legitimacy, but we have no contemporary documents that lend clue to its early history. The Tun-huang documents contain no materials relating to this school of Ch’an, whereas they are rich in documents concerning Shen-hui, several branches of the so-called Northern School, Ox-head Ch’an, and Ch’an materials translated into Tibetan. There are several possible reasons one could advance for this lack: materials relating to this school did not exist; if they did exist they never reached Tun-huang; or the Tibetans were simply not sufficiently interested to translate such materials.

Let us examine some of this new material to see what inferences can be drawn from it. The story of Shen-hui’s attack in 734 on the so-called Northern Ch’an of Shen-hsiu and his claims that this school represented a gradual approach to enlightenment as opposed to the sudden teaching that he advocated, is of course derived from the Tun-huang documents, but it is too well known to merit repetition. One should note, however, that Shen-hui’s Ch’an, although it champions Hui-neng, is not the predecessor in any way of the surviving Ch’an schools. Shen-hui’s school, together with Northern Ch’an, lost out in the turmoil that overwhelmed the T’ang from the mid-eighth century onward, virtually destroying the Buddhism that centered in the capital cities. The final blow was the Hui-ch’ang persecution of the 840s from which these schools of Ch’an failed to recover.

To begin with, I should like to summarize what is known of the development of Ch’an in China, leading up to the so-called Tung-shan fa-men, the school of the East Mountain, associated with Tao-hsin and Hung-jen, the Fourth and Fifth Patriarchs. I base myself largely on an article by Yanagida that appeared in Zen Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō, v. 6.
Zen as a sect is not found in India; that a well-known priest should devote himself solely to meditation practice is a Chinese phenomenon. The term *hsi-ch'an*, in the sense of practicing Ch'an *samādhi* or meditation sitting, appears first in the *Kao seng ch'uan* and the appellation Ch'an or Ch'an-tsung was applied by those outside the group to priests who concentrated on meditation. Indeed, the term Ch'an-tsung, meaning Ch'an Sect, does not appear until the latter half of the eighth century. The sources of Ch'an lie in the Buddhism of the non-Chinese Kingdom of Northern Wei. This Buddhism differed to no great extent from that practiced elsewhere in China, but at the time intercourse with the nations of Central Asia was quite active and Yogācāra, Vijñaptimātra and other forms of Mahayana Buddhism were introduced. At Lo-yang, the capital, the number of meditation masters coming from the West increased, for this city at the end of the silk road was the goal, the haven for priests coming from Central Asia. It was in this atmosphere that Ch'an was born; it was here that Bodhidharma, only one of many Central Asian meditation masters, arrived in China.

Our only source for the history of this early Ch'an is the *Erh ju ssu hsing lun*, the “Discourse on the Two Entrances and Four Practices,” the only one of many works attributed to Bodhidharma that can be considered authentic. Professor Yanagida has published an edited text and Japanese translation, *Daruma no Goroku* in the *Zen no Goroku* series. The preface to the edition found at Tun-huang is by Bodhidharma's disciple T'an-lin who makes the claim that Bodhidharma was the third son of an Indian king, a legend that still persists in Ch'an literature. The *Lo yang chia lan chi*, the “Record of Lo-yang Temples,” identifies him merely as a native of Central Asia.

At this time there was a sharp division between priests who lectured and studied scriptures and those who practiced meditation. Textual records to the conflict are numerous; but it is evident that both practices are vital to Buddhism. The famous T’ien-t’ai priest Nan-yüeh Hui-ssu, for example, is said to have spent his days in lecturing and his nights in sitting. Indeed, no textual evidence remains to tell us how the early Ch'an people practiced meditation or what particular works they used. The legend of Bodhidharma sitting silently facing the wall is no more than a later myth. There is no support either, in this Tun-huang text, for the claim that Bodhidharma used the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and wrote a commentary on it. Professor Yanagida believes that the work that influ-
enced this text the most was the *Vimalakirti Sūtra*; but the *Vimalakirti*
can not be limited merely to Ch'an, for it has long been one of the most
popular of works throughout all of Chinese Buddhism.

The “Discourse on the Two Entrances and Four Practices” talks of
the essential gates for entering the way: entering into principle and
entering into practice. Entering into principle is to awaken to the
religion through teaching. This is scarcely the “separate teaching outside
the scriptures” so much spoken of in later Ch'an, yet one cannot say
that it represents a total dependence on textual writing. It is to awaken
to the teaching of the historical Buddha; in other words it is to believe
with deep faith that all sentient beings are possessed of the Buddha-
nature.

We know little of the men who came to be regarded as the Second
and Third Patriarchs of Ch'an, but by the middle of the Seventh Century
a substantial establishment existed on the East Mountain. Among cer-
tain elements of this group was a growing consciousness of themselves
as a separate school, and a need was felt to establish a tradition that
would provide them with a viable history of their origins. We do not
know when the monks of the school of the East Mountain first referred
to Bodhidharma as the founder of the school. The first sources to men-
tion it, the *Ch'uan fa pao chi*, the “Records of the Transmission of the
Law” and the *Leng chia shih tzü chi* “Records of the Transmission of
the Laṅka” are of a later date. Around this time the monk Fa-ch'ung
was claiming Bodhidharma as founder of the Leng-chia or Laṅkāvatāra
School. A disciple of the Fifth Patriarch by the name of Hsuan-yi at-
ttempted to take over this Laṅkāvatāra tradition. It was his disciple
Chiung-chiao who wrote the “Records of the Transmission of the Laṅ-
ka.” One cannot attribute the introduction of Laṅkāvatāra thought to
Tao-hsin, the Fourth Patriarch; there is evidence instead of close contact
with the T'ien-t'ai school. In fact, Ch'an and T'ien-t'ai meditation
practices were probably established at roughly the same time in the
early sixth century.

In the establishment of the East Mountain School one must note the
appearance of the *Chin kang san mei ching*, the “Diamond Samādhi
Sūtra.” This is a spurious sutra, composed in China in the late seventh
century. One purpose of the work was to tie together Bodhidharma’s
discourse of the “Two Entrances and Four Practices” with the then-
current East Mountain thought and at the same time attribute to them
the authority of words spoken by the Buddha. This work is strongly
influenced by *Lanka* thought and established Tathāgata-garbha concepts in this early Ch’an. It reflects the status of this East Mountain school in the late seventh century. Because it had attracted a large following it could claim affinity with the Buddha; it was not necessarily the case of a weak cause attempting to strengthen itself, but rather that of a strong cause adding further strength to itself. By the end of the seventh century the East Mountain under Hung-jen was a major religious establishment.

Hung-jen, the Fifth Patriarch, had many disciples, some of whom figure most prominently in the history of Ch’an (see chart). A large number of them were able to establish, with varying degrees of success, schools of their own. And remarkably, many of them left records, traditions of their schools, and minor works, many of which have been preserved at Tun-huang. The teachings of four of these disciples are associated with the Northern School:

1) The school of Shen-hsiu. This school is most closely identified with what came to be known as Northern Ch’an. In the first four decades of the eighth century it was one of the most powerful schools of Buddhism in the capital cities and it held very close ties to the Imperial Court. Its priests were given the highest honors. Uji Hakujū has studied the rise and fall of this school in detail, and although somewhat outdated his work still provides much useful information. Although Shen-hui accused this school of taking a gradual approach, Tun-huang documents give evidence that Northern Ch’an also adopted many of the sudden teachings, perhaps because of the success Shen-hui had gained. Ma-ho-yen, or Mahayana, the Chinese representative in the religious debates at Lhasa, stemmed from this school.

2) The school that produced the *Leng chia shih tsu chi*, or the “Records of the Transmission of the Lanka.” The work is important historically and represents a conscious effort to establish the *Lanka*-tāra Sūtra as an essential element in Ch’an teaching. It attempts to epitomize Bodhidharma’s thought, as found in the Discourse on the Two Entrances and Four Practices, within the *Lanka*-tāra tradition. The author found Bodhidharma’s concept of “entering into principle” a convenient place on which to focus. The book makes Gunabhadra, the translator of the *Lanka*-tāra Sūtra, into Bodhidharma’s teacher, thus assuring a connection with this sutra. The work is typically Northern Ch’an and supports the claims of Shen-hsiu as the heir of the Fifth Patriarch. This work and the following one have been translated
and annotated by Professor Yanagida in volume 2 of the *Zen no goroku* series.

3) The school descending from Fa-ju (638–689). This school flourished very briefly at Sung-shan and is distinguished for having composed the earliest Ch’an history that is still extant, the *Ch’uan fa pao chi*, dating to around 713. This work is the only text to mention Fa-ju, other than an inscription that is preserved elsewhere. The text supports Shen-hsiu but makes him an heir of Fa-ju rather than the Fifth Patriarch.

4) The school derived from Hui-an, otherwise known as Lao-an, who lived to be 128, we are told (582–709). There are problems with the lineage of this school that cannot be examined here. One of Hui-an’s heirs, Hui-kuang is the compiler of a document found at Tun-huang known as the *T’un wu chen tsung lun*, “On the True Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment.” While it reflects Laṅkā and typical Northern Ch’an thought, it combines them with a considerable admixture of Shen-hui’s sudden enlightenment doctrines.

Let us now turn to a consideration of the work known as the *Li tai fa pao chi*, or “Historical Record of the Law,” and the school that it represents. Here again we are indebted to Professor Yanagida for an annotated translation and established text. The *Fa pao chi* itself dates to around 780 and was written to champion the teachings of a school of Ch’an that was situated in Szechuan. The work to a great extent comprises a compendium of the teachings of a priest known as Wu-chu (714–774) and was composed in the Chien-nan area of Szechuan, a region that was at times the center of Sino-Tibetan struggles. The book itself is aware of the conflict between Northern and Southern Ch’an, but in an effort to establish its own independence, keeps itself aloof from the conflict, which at any rate was no longer a problem by this time. The work, however, is clearly in the sudden enlightenment tradition. One purpose of this book was to refute the Laṅkāvatāra lineage and to deny any connection between Gunabhadra and Bodhidharma. It accepted Shen-hui’s version of the transmission and acknowledged Hui-neng as the Sixth Patriarch, but invented an elaborate story to prove that Bodhidharma’s robe was in its possession. Where Shen-hui has the Sixth Patriarch state that the robe was no longer to be handed down, the *Fa pao chi* devised a story whereby Chih-hsien, the school’s first patriarch, had been given the robe by the Empress Wu, who had previously requested the robe of the Sixth Patriarch. Chih-hsien, 609–702, handed the robe to his heir Chu-chi, (669–732), known also as T’ang
ho-shang, or the priest T'ang. Chu-chi handed down the robe and the teaching to Wu-hsiang (684–762), better known as Chin ho-shang, who was a native of Silla. Wu-hsiang handed the teaching and the robe to Wu-chu.

Before discussing this school in more detail it would be wise to turn briefly to Tibet to see what was happening in this area fairly close to Szechuan. Here I use the findings of Obata Hironobu, a colleague of Professor Yanagida. Obata relates a story contained in an ancient historical record, the *Sba bzed* (see also R.A. Stein. *‘Sba bzed, une chronique ancien de bSam-yas’,* Paris, 1961) in which two famous priests, San-ši and Gsal-snaṅ, narrate stories on the occasion of the founding of a new temple in Lhasa.

The story goes like this:

San-ši was the son of a former envoy to China and was the friend of the Prince who was later to become King Khri-sroṅ Ide-brtsan (742–797). The Prince asked San-ši various questions about some Buddhist texts he was reading and San-ši provided him with instruction. The King, seeing that his son was interested in Buddhism, decided to send San-ši, together with four others, to China to learn of the Buddhism there. Since there had been a prediction in China that a bodhisattva would be coming from the West, San-ši and his group were honored greatly. They met the Chinese Emperor who wanted San-ši to remain as a close minister because he was the son of the former envoy. San-ši, however, declined and the group was given one thousand rolls of the scriptures to take back with them. On their return they encountered the Priest Chin (Chin ho-shang) of I-chou who was strolling along with a tiger tethered to a rope. He told the group that the King of Tibet had died and that the country was dominated by two ministers who were followers of the Bon religion and who were intent upon destroying Buddhism. Chin stated, however, that should the present Tibetan Prince, upon reaching adulthood, speak heresy then he should be preached to, at which time he would turn to the Buddhist faith. He then presented them with three rolls of sacred texts and predicted that Buddhism would be spread in Tibet by a bhiksu, Sāntaraksita, the son of the King of Bengal. The group stayed for two months, then paid a visit to Wu-t'ai-shan and after further adventures returned home to find that all that the Priest Chin had said was true. Therefore, they hid the sacred scriptures to keep them safe. One day the Prince spoke of Lao Tzu and other Chinese teachings. San-ši hurried to recover the
hidden Buddhist texts, had the Prince read them, thus converting him to Buddhism.

Admittedly there are parts of this story that are obviously of a later hand, but if we examine the history of this time there is much that holds up. In 742 the Prince, later to become King, was born. Since the reigning King died in 754 and the Prince ascended the throne at twelve years of age, it may be assumed that Sañ-ši’s visit to China was around 751. It was in this year that the Kingdom of Nan-chao (in present-day Yunnan), that bordered on southern Szechuan, disassociated itself with the T’ang court and allied itself with Tibet in an association that was to last until 794. With this Tibet gained a direct route to Szechuan running through Nan-chao. Since Chin ho-shang, the Priest Chin, lived in I-chou in Chien-nan, a part of Szechuan, it is logical that Sañ-ši should pass through this area on his return home. In 754, on the death of the King, ministers affiliated with the Bon religion gained control and began an anti-Buddhist movement that continued until about 761, when the King became an adult. Meanwhile in China the An Lu-shan rebellion occurred in 755, lasting until 763, and in the seventh month of the following year Emperor Hsüan-tsung took refuge in the Chien-nan area of Szechuan and Su-tsung ascended the throne. In 759, according to the Fa pao chi, Wu-chu appeared at services that were being conducted at Chin ho-shang’s temple. Perhaps around this time Sañ-ši was on his way home and hid the sacred texts. At any rate, in 761 the King attained adulthood and the two anti-Buddhist ministers met an unnatural end. Buddhism now was officially adopted and the priest Gsal-snañ was sent to India by the King to invite Śāntaraksita. In 762 Chin ho-shang died, an epidemic swept Tibet and supporters of the Bon religion once again gained power. Buddhist activities were stopped and Śāntaraksita returned to India. In 763 the Tibetans swept over North China and occupied Ch’ang-an. The conquering general, a member of the Buddhist faction, was appointed minister on his return home, and Buddhism became firmly established in Tibet. At this time Tibetans were greatly attracted to Buddhism and it would seem only natural that Buddhism should have entered that country both from China and India.

Let us turn briefly back to the Fa pao chi. This work, as mentioned before, dates to around 780. Essentially it represents the recorded sayings of the Priest Wu-chu, as compiled by an unknown disciple, with a history of the school, deliberately written to enhance Wu-chu’s prestige and teachings. The work lays great emphasis on Wu-hsiang, or Chin
ho-shang whom we met in the Sañ-ši story. The principle sources for his biography are the Fa pao chi, the Pei shan lu written by his disciple, Tsung-mi’s commentary on the Yüan chi̤eh ching and the Sung kuo seng ch’uan. With the exception of this latter work, all the information provided is fairly similar. Chin was a Korean priest, characteristically identified as the third son of the King of Silla. In 728 he arrived in China and met Emperor Hsüan-tsung. Later he went to Szechuan where he became heir to Chu-chi, received Bodhidharma’s robe and the name Wu-hsiang. He is said to have met the Emperor a second time when the latter came to Szechuan. His school is referred to as the Chiung-chung Tsung 淨衆 after the name of his temple, and he appears to have had the support of many high officials. Undoubtedly at this time he was a man of great renown. At the same time in Szechuan there was a sect known as the Pao-t’ang 保唐 school. This was the name of the temple occupied by Wu-chu, who later was to become Chin ho-shang’s heir. Wu-chu was for a long time a layman and received his sanction from another layman Ch’en Ch’u-chang, a disciple of Hui-an. But so famous was Chin ho-shang that Wu-chu found himself obliged to become associated with him. It is a very strange story indeed: to have Wu-chu become the heir of a man he never met. At any rate, after Chin ho-shang’s death the Pao-t’ang school spread throughout Szechuan. There is considerable evidence to show that both the Chiung-chung and Pao-t’ang schools were known in Tibet. Although the Fa pao chi is not found in Tibetan translation, mention of both Chin ho-shang and Wu-chu is found in Tibetan texts. There is at present no positive proof but it is fairly certain that both these schools, representing the teachings of the sudden enlightenment doctrine, reached Tibet in the latter half of the eighth century. Tun-huang was under Tibetan control from the late eighth century to the mid-ninth century. Tibetan confidence and consciousness of its own culture was high. Great temples were constructed in Lhasa. There is a tendency to view the documents discovered at Tun-huang as representative of some kind of local phenomenon, developed under the Tibetan occupation, but one perhaps may better see Tun-huang as the focal point for the interaction of Chinese and Tibetan cultures.

Tibet was vitally interested in all the various schools of Ch’an of which it was aware, and by the end of the eighth century all schools of Ch’an, no matter what their origins, advocated some form of sudden enlightenment.

Indian Buddhism and Chinese Buddhism differed, at least in terms of
the Ch’an Buddhism with which the Tibetans had become acquainted. In Buddhism, whatever the school, the aim is always enlightenment, but the method for achieving it differs radically. In India it was still a step-by-step process, a series of rebirths over a long period of time until one was suddenly confronted with the opportunity for enlightenment. In China, of course, it was achievement in this life. Interest in these conflicting views was high and the King of Tibet called for a debate, inviting to Lhasa high priests from India and China. The date of this conference, or debate is uncertain; Japanese scholars are inclined to favor the year 781. Unfortunately, the man called to represent the cause of sudden enlightenment was a priest from Tun-huang named Ma-ho-yen. By training and origin he was from the Northern Ch’an school. Tsung-mi has identified him as a member of Shen-hui’s school, but this is in error. In his own preface to the Tun wü ta ch’eng cheng lu chüeh, 頓悟大乘正理決, “The True Principle of Sudden Enlightenment Mahayana,” a document found at Tun-huang, he identifies his teachers as Chiang-mo-tsang and I-fu, both prominent priests of Northern Ch’an. In this work he sets out his own position. But Ma-ho-yen’s arguments were weak; he had to prove the validity of sudden awakening; he was obliged to justify areas of which he himself was not sure; he quoted from works that had been forged in China. It was not unnatural that he lost the debate. Tibet lost interest in this Chinese Ch’an; the Chinese themselves turned to other forms of the teaching. Virtually all knowledge of these Chinese teachings of Ch’an lay buried until the Tun-huang documents were brought to light. Now, thanks to our Japanese colleagues, we are beginning to learn more and more of what these documents contain.
The *Li-Tai Fa-Pao Chi*
And The Ch’an Doctrine of Sudden Awakening

By Yanagida Seizan
Translated by Carl Bielefeldt

1. CHINESE CH’AN IN EARLY TIBET

“Look at this banner flapping in the wind,” say the Tibetan lamas to the seeker. “Is it the banner that is moving, or is it the wind?”
The answer is, “Neither the banner nor the wind—it is the mind.”

Jean Grenier, *Les Iles*

Gazing on a dark sea from a hill in Algiers, Albert Camus’ teacher, Jean Grenier, realized the profound stillness that exists in the very midst of a storm, and recalled these words of the lamas. They are the words of the Sixth Patriarch of the Chinese school of Ch’an, passed down from China to Tibet, and then from Tibet to a twentieth-century French existentialist.

The transmission of Chinese Ch’an to Tibet took place toward the end of the eighth century. Tibetan culture at this time was experiencing a period of remarkable political, military, economic, and spiritual growth. In the first year of Kuang-te (763), late in the reign of Emperor Su-tsung, Tibetan armies, taking advantage of the An Lu-shan rebellion, had invaded North China, and for a time occupied the imperial capital of Ch’ang-an. This event marks the only time in the long history of China that the imperial capital fell into the hands of alien troops. During the following decades China and Tibet continued to have military and diplomatic contact; a peace treaty was finally arranged, and in 822 a monument in Chinese and Tibetan was erected in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa commemorating the alliance between the two countries. It is quite natural that during these decades of close contact the Chinese Buddhist school of Ch’an should have been introduced into Tibet. The Tibetans of this period were deeply interested in Buddhism, and the new Ch’an movement was spreading rapidly, not only within China, but throughout Central and East Asia. Indeed, it is time that we laid to rest once and for
all the myth that Ch’an represents simply an indigenous Chinese form of Buddhism.

Toward the end of the eighth century the Tibetan King Khri-sron Idemtsan (r. 755–97) invited learned monks from India and China to debate their doctrines in Lhasa. This famous event, sometimes called the “Council of Tibet,” is thought by Japanese scholars to have taken place around 780. The gradual revelation of the facts of this debate represents one of the major achievements in the study of ancient Tibetan history. While many details remain unclear, it is certain that the debate was called in part out of an interest in the Chinese Ch’an doctrine of sudden awakening. The Tibetans at this time must already have had rather detailed knowledge of the new developments taking place in the Ch’an movement in China following its split into Northern and Southern schools. Some twenty years had passed since the Tibetan occupation of Ch’ang-an, and the Tibetan rulers were well aware of, and deeply interested in, the Buddhist cultures of their neighbors. This was the period which saw the construction of the great government-supported monastery of bSam-yas, intended as a center for the study of the newly-imported religion. The Tibetans turned eagerly to the Buddhism of China, and set to work translating and composing texts on Ch’an.

Most of our knowledge of early Tibetan contact with Ch’an derives from the materials discovered at Tun-huang. The fact that Chinese Ch’an texts were taken to the remote town of Tun-huang may itself be understood as a reflection of Tibetan Buddhist activity, for it is important to remember that this desert oasis was under Tibetan administration from the late eighth to the mid-ninth centuries. Consequently, the type of texts preserved here reflects the biases of the Tibetan interest in Ch’an, an interest which seems to have been limited to the early literature of the Northern and Southern schools. In part, this is undoubtedly the result of events which tradition has ascribed to the Council of Tibet. As is well known, following that council the mainstream of Buddhism in Tibet was occupied by the missionaries from India, and the Tibetans turned away from the serious study of Chinese Buddhism. The Ch’an texts included in the Tun-huang materials are all from the early period of the school, the latest dating from the end of the eighth century. There are no records from the school of the great T’ang master Ma-tsu 馬祖 (709–88), which was developing rapidly in South China at this time. There are no texts of yū-lu 言錄, the recorded sayings of the Ch’an masters, which represent the characteristic literature of the school in its
most flourishing age after Ma-tsu. It is precisely because the Tun-huang texts have not been affected by the fully-developed Ch’an literature that they are so important for an understanding of the actual character of early Ch’an. This means, however, that the kind of Ch’an found in the Tun-huang texts contrasts sharply with the tradition as it came to be known in China and Japan; for the East Asian tradition has focused almost entirely on the later period, and has conceived of early Ch’an simply as the historical background for the post Ma-tsu school. Yet whatever the peculiarities of the Tibetan contact with Ch’an, the Chinese teaching of sudden awakening, once kindled in Tibet, continued to burn within certain quarters of Tibetan religion. The Ch’an literature found among the Tun-huang documents bears witness to one aspect of the complex Buddhist tradition being created in eighth-century Tibet.4

Ancient Tibetan cultural history is, in effect, a history of the adoption of Buddhism. When the rulers of Tibet first became conscious of their own tradition around the time of the early T’ang dynasty, they sought to understand that tradition in terms of the Buddhist cultures of their two great neighbors India and China. Yet they quickly found that Chinese Buddhism, and particularly the new Chinese school of Ch’an, showed certain differences from the religion taught by the Indians. The issue of sudden awakening (*tun-wu* 頓悟) vs. gradual awakening (*chien-wu* 渐悟)—or more properly, gradual practice (*chien-hsiu* 渐修)—which formed a central theme at the Council of Tibet, was one such difference. Liberation, or the complete freedom from transmigration in samsara, is the final aim of all Buddhists. As Buddhists both the Chinese and the Indians accepted this ideal, but they differed markedly in their understanding of the process and the methods by which it is achieved. Indian Buddhism taught that liberation is achieved at the end of a long process of graduated practice over many lifetimes. Chinese Buddhism, as represented by Ch’an, held that one can attain liberation at once on the basis of practice in this lifetime.

In terms of the Indian tradition, what the Chinese refer to as a “sudden awakening” is equivalent to that point at which the power of one’s practice, accumulated over a long series of rebirths, has reached completion. For the one whose practice is thus completed this life will be the final rebirth in samsara: with the death of this physical body he will attain complete liberation. The Chinese Buddhists themselves, however, were not interested in this kind of mythological explanation. For them the real issue was simply how one attains the conviction of liberation in
this life—that is, what the conditions are for sudden awakening. Yet the search for the conditions for sudden awakening is at base a contradictory one. For the notion of sudden awakening implies that which is unconditioned; as soon as enlightenment is defined in terms of any conditions it becomes gradual awakening, or gradual practice. This difficulty in the understanding of the sudden doctrine is a key element in the controversies which split the Ch'an school after the Fifth Patriarch Hung-jen 弘忍 (601–74) into its Northern and Southern branches.

The split in Chinese Ch'an occurred early in the eighth century, when Shen-hui 神會 (670–762), the disciple of the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng 慧能 (638–713), raised the banner of the tun-wu doctrine of the Southern school and attacked the Northern school as a heterodox lineage advocating gradual practice. Tibetan interest in Chinese Ch'an began in the period just following Shen-hui. By this time his issue of sudden awakening had begun to challenge all schools of Chinese Buddhism. The Northern school gradually came under its influence; the Niu-t’ou school of Ch'an, originally a movement within the San-lun tradition, became a strong advocate of tun-wu; even the classical schools of T’ien-t’ai and Hua-yen began to respond to Shen-hui's challenge. Beyond China the issue of sudden and gradual was making itself felt, not only in Tibet, but in Korean and Japanese Buddhism as well.

2. THE LI-TAI FA-PAO CHI AND THE EARLY CH'AN SCHOOL

The Tibetan lamas' teaching on the wind and the flag with which we opened this piece is well known to students of Ch'an from the Liu tsu t'an ching 六祖壇經. [T.48(2008),349c.] For some reason, however, it does not appear in the oldest version of this work preserved at Tun-huang. [S.5475; T.2007.] The Liu tsu t'an ching's source for the story would appear to be an early Ch'an history known as the Ts'ao ch'i ta shih chuan 曹溪大師傳. This text is not included in the Tun-huang literature; it was brought to Japan by the Japanese Tendai monk Saichō 最澄 (767–822), where it was preserved unstudied at the Tendai monastery on Mt. Hiei. In any case, the Ts'ao ch'i ta shih chuan was unknown to the Tibetans. Their first contact with the Hui-neng story came from the Li tai fa pao chi 歷代法寶記 (LTFPC), another early Ch'an work discovered among the Tun-huang documents, and one of the first of the Ch'an histories known to the Tibetans. The exact date of the LTFPC
is unclear, and its chronological relationship to the T'sao ch'i ta shih chuan cannot be definitely established. As we shall see, however, certain contents of the latter work can only be fully understood on the basis of the former.\(^7\)

The LTFPC ranks with the literature of the Niu-t'ou school and the materials on the Council of Tibet as one of the most significant late works found among the Tun-huang documents on the early Ch'an school. It contains, with the possible exception of the Niu-t'ou teachings, all the major issues of early Ch'an history. Moreover, it is the longest of all the Tun-huang Ch'an texts. Thus, it represents in both quality and quantity an excellent example of early Ch'an literature. Because of its unique historical position it forms a crucial link between Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism on the one hand, and between early Ch'an and the later tradition of Ma-tsu on the other. The problem of the LTFPC in Tibet has been studied in some detail by Obata Hironobu 小畠宏允, and I shall not go into it here.\(^8\) Rather, in what follows I should like to consider the position of this work in the history of Chinese Ch'an, specifically with reference to the doctrine of tun-wu.

The Chinese Ch'an movement begun by Bodhidharma first became conscious of its own tradition during the first half of the eighth century. The earliest records we have from this period are the Leng chia shih tzu chi 拢伽師資記 and the Ch'uan fa pao chi 傳法寶紀, both of which are works of the so-called Northern school, composed in Ch'ang-an or Lo-yang.\(^9\) They date from the early reign of the Emperor Hsüan-tsung (713–55), the high point of T'ang culture and a time when the Ch'an school was still very young. Yet within the space of fifty to one hundred years following the appearance of these works Ch'an had spread throughout China, and had created its own independent tradition. This rapid development of the Ch'an movement coincides with sudden and profound changes in T'ang society, changes clearly reflected in the rebellion of An Lu-shan and the rise of Tibet. Abroad the school was already becoming known as the newest trend in Chinese Buddhism. The monks Saichō and Kūkai 空海 (774–835), sent to China by the Japanese government in the early ninth century, took an interest in Ch'an. Saichō, as we have noted, brought back to Japan the Ts'ao ch'i ta shih chuan, and he also transmitted the Niu-t'ou tradition; Kūkai's reports of Ch'an in China were indirectly responsible for the welcome given by the consort of the Emperor Saga (r. 809–23) to missionaries
from the Ma-tsu line. The Japanese monks who visited T’ang China after Saichō and Kūkai brought back large numbers of important Ch’an works.

We must also not overlook the role of Korean monks in the history of Chinese Ch’an. Indeed, as we shall see, the author of the LTFPC belonged to the lineage of the Silla master Wu-hsiang 無相 (Kor., Musang; 694–762), who was also the first Ch’an monk known to the Tibetan tradition. The activity of Koreans in the Chinese Ch’an movement is reflected in the popular story of the Silla monk who sought the head of Hui-neng. This story first appears in the Pao lin chuan 寶林傳, a work composed in the early ninth century. The Pao lin chuan is based on the Ts’ao ch’i ta shih chuan, and records the history of the Buddhism of the Pao-lin monastery at Ts’ao-ch’i—that is, the Ch’an tradition of Hui-neng’s school. This work was also introduced to Japan at an early date. By the time of the Pao lin chuan the Ch’an movement had already taken on international dimensions, and through it Chinese Buddhism had become, not merely the extension of an Indian religion, but a vital new force in Asian culture from Tibet to Japan.

The LTFPC, the text with which we are concerned here, occupies a chronological position in the early history of the Ch’an school between the Ch’uan fa pao chi and the Leng chia shih tsu chi on the one hand and the Pao lin chuan on the other. It belongs neither to the Northern nor to the Southern branch of the school; rather, it records the separate Ch’an tradition of what is sometimes called the Pao-t’ang school—that is, the school of Wu-chu 無住 (714–74) of the Pao-t’ang-ssu保唐寺 in Chengtu, Szechwan. Due to the unique circumstances of its composition the LTFPC takes a distinctive stand on all the major issues of the early Ch’an movement. Before discussing the composition and content of the text, however, let us first attempt to get an overview of the central theme of Ch’an intellectual history during the eighth and ninth centuries.

The teaching of sudden awakening, which split the Ch’an movement in the eighth century, finds its most concrete expression in Shen-hui’s central doctrine of “no-thought” (wu-nien 無念). This doctrine was originally put forward as a criticism of the Northern school’s teaching of “detachment from thought” (li-nien 離念). The notion of li-nien is later described by Shen-hui’s follower Tsung-mi 宗密 (780–841) as the practice of “wiping away defilements and viewing purity” (fu-ch’en k’an-ching 擦塵看淨), a characterization based on the famous verse attributed to Hui-neng’s Northern school rival Shen-hsiu 神秀 (606?–706) in the
The Northern school believed in the original purity of the mind—that is, in an original self free from all defilements; its practice was to maintain and to magnify this self. This teaching is common to the *Ta sheng ch'i hsin lun* 大乘起信論 [*Mahāyāna-sraddhātopāda*, T.1666], the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* [T.475], and many other basic Mahayana texts. But the belief in the original purity of one's own mind can itself become a form of attachment, in which one becomes bound by the notion of purity. The danger of such attachment is recognized in the *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* itself, and the Northern school was by no means unaware of it. In fact, despite the criticism leveled against it by the followers of Hui-neng, the Northern school taught a sophisticated and coherent system of Buddhist philosophy. Nevertheless, by emphasizing purity it seemed to be in danger of falling into a form of quietism. It was this point which Shen-hui attacked.

Shen-hui summarized what he considered the mistaken practice of the Northern school masters in a four-line maxim, which was later used by Lin-chi 臨濟 (d. 866) as well: "To concentrate the mind and enter samadhi, to settle the mind and view stillness, to arouse the mind and illumine the outside, to control the mind and verify the inside" (*ning-hsin ju-ting chu-hsin k'an-ching ch'i-hsin wai-chao she-hsin nei-cheng* 凝心入定住心看靜起心外照攝心內證). According to Shen-hui, the Northern school's doctrine of li-nien, taught on the basis of the *Ta sheng ch'i hsin lun* and the *Vimalakīrti-sūtra*, involves a bondage to purity: it is the practice of intentionally attempting to look at one's own pure mind. Shen-hui's summary of the Northern school teaching is, in fact, a criticism of a form of Ch'an sickness, in which one is attached to the detachment from thought and the contemplation of the pure original mind. Historically it does not seem that the masters of the Northern school were particularly attached to the practice of li-nien, but it must be admitted that philosophically their thought left them open to such criticism. At least Shen-hui saw the school as attached to li-nien, and taught his own doctrine of wu-nien in opposition to it.

Shen-hui's wu-nien doctrine is based on the notion of "natural knowledge" (*tzu-jan chih* 自然知) or "original knowledge" (*pen-chih* 本知). The emphasis on such knowledge is the key issue separating the Northern and Southern schools. For Shen-hui, no-thought is itself sudden awakening, and as such there must be knowledge at work within it. The centrality of original knowledge for the Southern school's wu-nien doctrine was later recognized by Tsung-mi, who held that "the single
term knowledge is the gateway to all mysteries” (chih chih i-tzu chung-miao chih men 知之要妙之門). Tsung-mi’s emphasis on original knowledge was an attempt to defend Shen-hui’s concept of wu-nien from misinterpretation by his contemporaries. On the one hand he was warning against the rise of the Ma-tsu school of Ch’an, which had transformed the teaching of no-thought into an emphasis on vital activity within everyday life. Such was the thrust of the school’s famous sayings, “The ordinary mind is the Way” (p’ing-ch’ang hsin shih tao 平常心是道) or “This very mind is the Buddha” (chi hsin chi fo 即心即佛). For Tsung-mi this emphasis on the concrete function of the mind suggested blind activity devoid of original knowledge. At the same time, as we shall see, Tsung-mi’s teaching was a criticism of the followers of the LTFPC who, while adopting Shen-hui’s doctrine of no-thought, had in Tsung-mi’s eyes forgotten that wu-nien is based on the functioning of knowledge.

In its interpretation of wu-nien the LTFPC may be said to have pushed Shen-hui’s position of sudden awakening to its ultimate conclusions. In this it was already moving in directions that were subsequently to be taken by the later Ch’an schools. On the one hand the LTFPC was intimately linked with Shen-hui and the earlier Ch’an teachings; yet on the other, perhaps because of the unique historical setting in which it was composed, it was able to break through the restrictions of time and place to a new vision of the future of Ch’an. In fact, the teachings of Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu recorded in the LTFPC were not merely a phenomenon of Szechwan: they involved an international dimension stretching from Tibet to Korea and Japan. Still, to understand the LTFPC we must understand something of Szechwan and the political conditions under which the book was composed.

3. BUDDHIST POLITICS IN SZECHWAN

The last years of the reign of Hsüan-tsung, famed as the most glorious and peaceful in the 300 years of the T’ang dynasty, were suddenly shattered by the rebellion of An Lu-shan (755). This event marked a watershed in the long history of China; for it signalled the breakdown of her traditional social structure and the rise of new centers of power. The bitter grief of the great Hsüan-tsung is recorded in Po Chü-i’s famous Ch’ang hen ko, which describes the Emperor’s tragic flight to Szechwan
in the face of the rebel army. It is not surprising that the retreat was to Szechwan, for throughout Chinese history during major political upheavals it has generally been in this region that the deposed powers have sought refuge. Szechwan was a breeding ground for political machination, the haunt of men ambitious to tread the stage of history. Among them there were some, known to their detractors as “slick Buddhists” (ning fo-chia 佞佛家), who were willing to take advantage of the religion to further their own ends.

Two such Buddhist politicians were Tu Hung-chien 杜鴻渐 (709–69) and Chang-ch’iu Chien-ch’iung 章仇兼瓊 (d.u.), both of whom appear in the LTFPC. [L.142, 189ff.] Tu Hung-chien was one of the most prominent of the rising hopefuls on the national political scene, having gained a reputation for his role in maintaining order in the Szechwan region following the An Lu-shan rebellion. Chang-ch’iu Chien-ch’iung is said to have rendered distinguished service in the struggle with the T’u-fan (i.e., the Tibetans). He was an exceedingly adroit provincial power figure, who took advantage of his connections with Tu Hung-chien to advance his political fortunes. Li Po’s Shu tao nan provides a caricature of his rather dubious activities. The fact that two such men were numbered among Wu-chu’s powerful supporters gives us some sense of the atmosphere in which the LTFPC was written. We know from this work that countless numbers of similar talented and ambitious minor officials swarmed around Wu-chu in Szechwan, and this fact does much to explain the strongly political character of the LTFPC.

The LTFPC is, in effect, a family history. It is a record of the sayings of Wu-chu under the guise of a history of the Ch’an patriarchs. Though he does not identify himself as such, the author of the LTFPC is clearly Wu-chu’s disciple, and his work is intended to provide an account of his teacher and his teacher’s tradition. This tradition is outside of, and older than, the division of Ch’an into the Northern and Southern schools; for while the author of the LTFPC accepts this division and clearly assumes the superiority of the Southern school, he does not attempt to identify Wu-chu with that branch of Ch’an. Rather, he traces his lineage back to Chih-shen of Chien-nan 劍南知讀 (609–702) who, along with Hui-neng, was one of the ten great disciples of the Fifth Patriarch Hung-jen. A list of these disciples already appears in the Northern school’s Leng chia shih tzu chi,19 a text which the LTFPC constantly takes into account. Occasionally it attacks this work directly
[e.g., L.592]; more often it indirectly criticizes its tradition by adopting the position of the Southern school and praising Shen-hui’s teachings against Northern Ch’an.

In order to establish his claim that Wu-chu’s lineage represents the orthodox transmission from the Fifth Patriarch the author of the LTFPC elaborates on Shen-hui’s story of the robe of the patriarchs. As is well known, Shen-hui introduced the story that Hui-neng had received the robe of Bodhidharma from his teacher Hung-jen. The LTFPC goes on to tell us that the robe was subsequently presented to the Empress Wu (r. 684–704), who then gave it to Chih-shen, from whom it was ultimately handed down to Wu-chu. [L.129–30]. This curious tale of a transmission through Empress Wu is clearly a device to explain how Hui-neng’s robe came into the hands of Wu-chu. It testifies to how widely Shen-hui’s story of the robe had become accepted. But the LTFPC’s version of the story, though a transparent fiction designed only to benefit the Pao-t’ang school, appears itself to have gained some currency. For we find in the Ts’ao ch’i ta shih chuan an elaborate account of the robe which clearly seems designed to counter the LTFPC position. Here it is said that, despite repeated attempts to steal the robe, it remained for many years at Ts’ao-ch’i; but during the Shang-yüan era (760–62) it was taken by order of the Emperor Su-tsung to the court in Ch’ang-an, from which it was subsequently returned to Ts’ao-ch’i. [ZZ.2B,19,5,487c.]

The politics of the LTFPC do not stop with its account of the transmission of Bodhidharma’s robe: its claim to a separate and distinct lineage dating back to the Fifth Patriarch is also somewhat suspect. According to the author, Hung-jen’s disciple Chih-shen transmitted the dharma to Ch’u-chi 處寂 (665–732), who in turn transmitted it to the Silla monk Wu-hsiang. Wu-chu is said to be Wu-hsiang’s sole dharma heir. [L. 171–2.] Very little of a definite nature is known from earlier sources about any of these men. For Chih-shen in particular we have nothing except the fact that he appears in the Leng chia shih tzu chi as one of the ten great disciples of Hung-jen. [T.85,1289c.] Clearly the choice of this man as the source of the LTFPC’s tradition was a calculated one. According to the author, Chih-shen was originally a disciple of the famous translator Hsüan-tsang 玄奘 (600–64). He is said to have written three works, one of which, the Pan jo hsin ching shu 般若心經疏, is preserved among the Tun-huang documents. In content it is almost identical with a work hitherto attributed to Hui-ching of Chi-
kuo-ssu 纪国寺慧浄 (578–649?). [ZZ.1,41,3,20ba-212c.] If this work is in fact by Chih-shen, he was obviously well acquainted with the Vijñānavāda doctrine. It is a far cry indeed from the Ch'an of Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu.

The major history of the Ch'an school, the Ching te ch'uan teng lu, composed in the early Sung, lists Chih-shen and his descendents in the table of contents for chüan four [T.51,224a,b,c], but only Wu-chu is afforded a biography [234b]. In one sense, this neglect of the Pao-t'ang lineage is not surprising in a work which emphasizes the Southern school, especially in its development after Ma-tsu. Yet the complete absence of any biographical information on Chih-shen is significant. The Sung kao seng chuan 宋高僧傳, on the other hand, provides biographies for Ch'u-chi [T.50(2061),836b] and Wu-hsiang [832b], but omits Wu-chu. Mention of Chih-shen is made in the biography of Wu-hsiang, but the information there differs markedly from his treatment in the LTFPC. The dates given for Ch'u-chi also differ from those of the LTFPC. These differences cast doubt on the LTFPC's reliability. Moreover, the Sung kao seng chuan includes fairly detailed biographies of individuals connected with the Pao-t'ang movement who are ignored by the LTFPC. This fact is particularly interesting for the light it throws on the LTFPC's biography of Wu-chu.

As the LTFPC itself admits, Wu-chu was not a direct disciple of Wu-hsiang. Originally he was a lay disciple of Ch'en Ch'u-chang 陳楚章 (d.u.), who was himself a lay follower of Lao-an 老安 (582–709), one of the ten great disciples of Hung-jen. According to the LTFPC, Ch'en Ch'u-chang was famed as a reincarnation of Vimalakīrti, and advocated the doctrine of the sudden teaching (tun-chiao fa 頓教法). In the T'ien-pao era (742–55) Wu-chu, after succeeding to the dharma of Ch'en Ch'u-chang, heard of three disciples of the Sixth Patriarch who were spreading the doctrine of the sudden teaching: Ming 明 at Tao-tz'u-shan in Fan-yang, Shen-hui in Tung-ching, and Tzu-tsai 自在 in T'ai-yüan. Wu-chu went first to Tzu-tzai, under whom he took the tonsure. The text goes on to say that he subsequently abandoned the idea of visiting Ming and Shen-hui, because after hearing of their teachings he knew that he already understood their doctrine. Finally, Wu-chu moved to Szechwan, where he is said to have inherited the dharma of Wu-hsiang. Interestingly enough, however, a careful reading of the LTFPC reveals that Wu-chu never actually met his supposed master Wu-hsiang. Rather, the author asks us to believe that at the time of his death Wu-hsiang had the
robe of Bodhidharma sent to Wu-chu through one of his followers. [L. 171.] According to the LTFPC, then, Wu-chu was heir to three dharma lineages, which can be diagrammed as follows:

```
Hung-jen —— Hui-neng —— Tzu-tsai
            |                     |
            Lao-an —— Ch’en Ch’u-chang —— Wu-chu
            |                     |
            Chih-shen —— Ch’u-chi —— Wu-hsiang
```

This version of Wu-chu’s lineage contains several rather suspicious elements. In the first place, the association of Tzu-tsai with Hui-neng conflicts with Tsung-mi’s identification of Tzu-tsai as a disciple of Lao-an. It would appear that the author of the LTFPC intends to take advantage of the fame of the Sixth Patriarch by linking Wu-chu with Hui-neng. This would explain why he goes out of his way to mention Shen-hui, the foremost exponent of Hui-neng’s Southern school.

Having associated Wu-chu with the famous Southern school, the LTFPC goes on to claim that he is the sole heir to the dharma of the important Szechwan master Wu-hsiang of the Ching-chung-ssu 淨衆寺. Yet the Sung kao seng chuan provides biographies for Wu-hsiang’s disciple Ching-chung Shen-hui 淨衆神會 (720–94), as well as for Shen-hui’s disciple Nan-yin 南印 (d. 821?). [T.50,740c; 772b.] In fact, it would appear that it was this line which represented the main stream of Wu-hsiang’s descendents. To be sure, the LTFPC was composed at a time when Ching-chung Shen-hui’s reputation was not yet established; still, its claim that Wu-chu was the sole heir to Wu-hsiang is clearly an arbitrary and self-serving one, particularly when we recall that they never actually met. Moreover, we may also count among the followers of Wu-hsiang the author of the Pei shan lu 北山錄, Shen-ch’ing 神清 (d. 806–20). Although his biography in the Sung kao seng chuan [T.50, 740c] does not record his relationship with Wu-hsiang, in the Pei shan lu Shen-ch’ing represents himself as a disciple of Wu-hsiang, and is sharply critical of Wu-chu’s school. [T.52(2113),611b.]

In sum, then, the lineage of Wu-chu appears to have been quite different from that claimed by the LTFPC. It may be represented thus:

```
Hung-jen —— Hui-neng —— Tzu-tsai
            |                     |
            Lao-an —— Ch’en Ch’u-chang —— Wu-chu
            |                     |
            Chih-shen —— Ch’u-chi —— Wu-hsiang —— Shen-hui
```

24
It is possible, of course, that Wu-chu actually changed his lineage three times, and certainly he can hardly be criticized for studying under a variety of masters from different traditions. But the story that he ultimately fell heir to the dharma of Wu-hsiang has a rather strong political smell. As we have seen, Szechwan in this period was a lively political arena, and Wu-chu was a man of his time. Through the intervention of his patron Tu Hung-chien, Wu-chu’s monastery, the Pao-t’ang-ssu, was granted the title “Ta-li” 大廈, and designated an official government temple (kuan-ssu 官寺). It would appear that Wu-chu was a brazen cleric who, like many of his contemporaries in Szechwan, was ready to take advantage of anything that might serve his ends.

4. SHEN-HUI AND THE LI-TAI FA-PAO CHI

It is important to note the extent to which the LTFPC, in attempting to establish its lineage, is conscious of Shen-hui. We have seen how the author of this work borrows Shen-hui’s story of Bodhidarma’s robe, and how he intentionally brings Hui-neng and Shen-hui into Wu-chu’s biography. At the same time, of course, he is concerned to distinguish Wu-chu’s tradition from that of the Southern school. These two tendencies may be seen throughout the LTFPC, and represent an important key to the understanding of this book. On the one hand it draws heavily on the teachings of Shen-hui; on the other, it seeks to go beyond those teachings to a new, and in most cases more radical, position.

The LTFPC’s claim to a separate tradition, of course, is based on the conviction that Wu-chu is heir to the spirit of the First Patriarch Bodhidharma, and hence, that his school represents the orthodox lineage of Ch’an. In terms of the later development of Ch’an history this school is merely one of several subsidiary branches stemming from the Fifth Patriarch; but at the time of the composition of the LTFPC the members of the Pao-t’ang school undoubtedly saw their own tradition as the repository of the true dharma. The very title of this book expresses such a conviction; for it claims to be a record of the dharma-ratna—that is, of the true teaching of Buddhism—as transmitted directly from the Buddha himself through the lineage of the patriarchs. The author also offers several alternative titles, all of which are suggestive of the basic position of the work: “A record of the lineage [of the correct transmission] from master to disciple” (Shih tzü hsüeh me chuan 師資血脈傳); “A record [of the dharma] in which the true and the false are deter-
mined, the heterodox is suppressed and the orthodox revealed, and all cittas are destroyed” (Ting shih fei ts’ui hsieh hsien cheng p’o huai i ch’ieh hsin chuan 定是非摧邪顯正破壞一切心傳); “The dharma of the sudden awakening of the supreme vehicle” (Tsui shang sheng tun wu fa men 最上乘頓悟法門). [L.37.]

While these titles assert the independent authority of the Pao-t’ang tradition, they also reveal an acute awareness of Shen-hui’s famous attack on the Northern school, and an obvious intention to inherit the spirit of that attack. As is well known, in the second year of K’ai-yüan (714) Shen-hui called a large assembly at the Ta-yün-ssu at Hua-t’ai, where he debated with Dharma Master Ch’ung-yüan 樂遠法師 of Tung-shan, a representative of the Northern school. Shen-hui attacked his opponent by calling his lineage a collateral branch of Ch’an and his doctrine the gradual teaching. This debate was recorded by Shen-hui’s lay disciple Tu-ku P’ei 獨狐沛 in the P’u t’ie ta mo nan tsung ting shih fei lun, “A treatise determining the true and the false regarding the Southern school of Bodhidharma.” Fortunately, several fragments of this work have been preserved among the Tun-huang documents, and by combining them it is possible to reconstruct almost the entire text. The editing of these manuscripts was one of the last contributions of Prof. Hu Shih.25 The LTFPC’s subtitle “Ting shih-fei . . . i-ch’ieh hsin chuan” is clearly adopted from the title of this work.

The title “Shih-tzu hsüeh-me chuan” is also taken directly from Shen-hui. According to Tu-ku P’ei, on the occasion of the debate Shen-hui produced a work with an identical title, in which he described the biographies of, and the dharma transmission between, the generations of Ch’an patriarchs from Bodhidharma to Hui-neng. [Hu Shih, 260.] The title “Tsui-shang-sheng tun-wu fa-men” also clearly shows the influence of Shen-hui.26 In this way, the author of the LTFPC apparently sought to model himself on Hui-neng’s famous disciple, and to establish his own position by succeeding to the tradition of Shen-hui and then going beyond it. This consciousness of Shen-hui is testimony to the latter’s great authority at this time. We know that accounts of the debate at Hua-t’ai were already well known throughout China. Among the Tun-huang documents are several fragmentary manuscripts entitled Ho tse Shen hui ho shang wu keng chuan 荷澤神會和尚五更轉, Nan tsung ting hsieh cheng wu keng chuan 南宗定邪正五更轉, or Ta sheng wu keng-chuan 大乘五更轉, [Hu Shih, 452ff.] These texts are a kind of popular verse in the rhythm of the number song, giving a simplified account of
the position of the Southern school. They are probably not the work of Shen-hui himself, but their circulation clearly derives from his debate at Hua-t’ai.

Another characteristic feature of the LTFPC which can be traced to Shen-hui’s influence is its identification of the founder of the Chinese Ch’an school as Dharmatrāta (Ta-mo-to-lo 達摩多羅). This name comes from the Ta mo to lo ch’ an ching 達摩多羅禪經 [T.618], a text which purports to record the meditation instruction of the master Dharmatrāta. There is no historical connection between this Dharmatrāta and Dharma—or Bodhidharma, the founder of the Ch’an school in China. Little is known of the First Patriarch Dharma, other than that he was said to have been the third son of a South Indian king. As the Ch’an movement developed, however, a need was felt to establish the biography, the teacher and the lineage of the man considered to be the founder of the school. Efforts in this direction can already be seen in the Ch’uan fa pao chi and the Leng chia shih tzu chi. The former is noteworthy for its reference to the Ta mo to lo ch’ an ching. [T.85,1291a.] The first attempt to explain Dharma’s Indian background on the basis of the Dharmatrāta text appears in the late seventh century in a memorial for Fa-ju of Shao-lin-ssu 少林寺法如 (638–89), one of the ten great disciples of Hung-jen; the Ch’uan fa pao chi draws on this memorial. The Fa-ju memorial and the Ch’uan fa pao chi limit themselves to references to the Ta mo to lo ch’ an ching, without identifying Dharma with Dharmatrāta. Shen-hui also never positively identifies the two names, but he carries their connection a step further. In the Nantsung ting shih fei lun, in giving the Indian background of Bodhidharma’s Ch’an, he cites the list of seven patriarchs from Buddha to Dharmatrāta given in the Ta mo to lo ch’ an ching [T.15,301c], simply substituting the name Bodhidharma for Dharmatrāta. [Hu Shih, 294–5.] It would appear that Shen-hui was virtually insensitive to the question of the relationship between these two names.

The LTFPC, however, makes a positive identification of the two men under the name Dharmatrāta. Yet interestingly enough, the author, recognizing that the content of the Ta mo to lo ch’ an ching is not in accord with the Mahāyāna doctrine of sudden awakening, introduces in its stead a text known as the Ch’ an men ching 禪門經, which he attributes to Dharmatrāta, and for which he provides a detailed account of its transmission to China and its translation under Hui-yüan of Lu-shan 廬山慧遠 (334–416). [L.68.] The Ch’ an men ching does indeed profess
the doctrine of the sudden teaching, but it has no connection with either Bodhidharma or Dharmatāra. This text is known prior to the composition of the LTFPC; it is probably a work by members of the Northern school of Ch’an, composed in order to establish the origin of their Ch’an doctrine in the teachings of the Buddha.30

The LTFPC’s identification of Dharmatāra as the first patriarch of Ch’an, and the attribution to him of the Ch’an men ching can only be seen as further examples of the author’s willingness to grasp at anything that might be of convenience to him. Here again he would seem to be trying to better Shen-hui by pressing one step beyond his teaching. Yet the LTFPC’s use of Dharmatāra was not without influence. Tibetan tradition associates the name Dharmatāra, rather than Bodhidharma, with the First Patriarch of the Chinese Ch’an school. The origin of this association is the LTFPC, though its continued popularity in Tibet may also reflect the Tibetans’ preference for a form which is attested in Indian sources. In China, the name Dharmatāra appears in the Ts’ao ch’i ta shih chuan [ZZ. 2B,19,5,484a], in Tsung-mi’s Yüan chüeh ching ta shu ch’ao [ZZ.1,14,3,276d], and in Yen-shou’s 延壽 Tsung ching lu 宗鏡錄 [T.48(2016),939b]. The Ching te ch’uan teng lu explains that the First Patriarch’s name was originally Dharmatāra, but that upon receiving transmission from his master Prajñātāra, he changed his name to Bodhidharma. [T.51,217a.] Thus, it is clear that on the question of its founder’s name the later Ch’an tradition continued to labor under the influence of the LTFPC.31

A closely parallel example of how the LTFPC’s embroidery of Shen-hui left its mark on the later tradition can be seen in the book’s list of the 29 Indian patriarchs. [L.59.] The names on this list are derived from two sources: the seven names given in the Ta mo to lo ch’an ching, which Shen-hui used in his Nan tsung ting shih fei lun, and the list of 24 names appearing in the Fu fa tsang chuan 付法藏傳 [T.50(2058),297–322]. The LTFPC arrives at the figure 29 by combining the two lists and eliminating those members common to both. The 24 patriarchs of the Fu fa tsang ching were originally used by the T’ien-t’ai master Chih-i 智顗 (538–98) in explaining the tradition of his Mo-ho chih-kuan 摩訶止觀 [T.46(1911),1.] As we have noted, after Shen-hui began to preach the tradition of the Southern school in 714, the other Buddhist schools became conscious of their own traditions. The T’ien-t’ai school was no exception, and it was during this period that it fixed its lineage of the six patriarchs beginning with Chih-i. Reference to the 29-patriarch theory
of the Ch’an school can already be seen in a memorial by Li Hua for the Fifth Patriarch of T’ien-t’ai, Tso-ch’i Hsüan-Jang 左溪玄朗 (673–754). The LTFPC’s doctrine of the 29 patriarchs may be seen as a reflection of the general interest in establishing Indian lineages prevalent at this time.

The LTFPC’s list of patriarchs ultimately became an established doctrine of the Ch’an tradition. The combined lists of the Fu fa tsang chuan and the Ta mo to lo ch’an ching serve as the basis for the lists of Ch’an patriarchs given in the Ts’ao chi ta shih chuan [ZZ.2B,19,5,484a], the Tun-huang version of the Liu tsu t’an ching [T.48,344b-c], and Tsung-mi’s Yüan chüeh ching ta shu ch’ao [ZZ.1,14,3,275d-76a]; they also appear in Saichō’s Naishō buppō sōjō shiji kechimyaku fu 内證佛法相承師資血脈譜 [Nihon daizōkyō, 日本大藏經, Tendai kengō bu 天臺顕教部, 1,1a-b]. Slightly different lists are given in the Pao lin chuan [Hōrin den. Dentō gyokuei shū, 1–132 passim], and in the Ch’uan fa t’ang pei 傳法堂碑 written by Po Chü-i for Ma-tsu’s descendent Wei-k’uan of Hsing-shan-ssu 興善寺惟寬 (755–817) [CTW.678,5a], but the differences represent only shifts in emphasis away from the Ta mo to lo ch’an ching toward the Fu fa tsang chuan or other texts; the basic source remains the tradition begun by Shen-hui and finalized by the LTFPC.

5. THE DOCTRINE OF NO-THOUGHT

Shen-hui’s influence on the LTFPC is by no means limited to questions of lineage: it permeates the text’s basic Ch’an doctrine. As we have said, the LTFPC represents the recorded sayings of Wu-chu, together with the history of his school. Wu-chu’s teachings begin and end with the doctrine of wu-nien, a concept we have seen to be fundamental to Shen-hui’s criticism of the Northern school. Yet here again Wu-chu attempts to go beyond Shen-hui, and to apply the full consequences of the wu-nien doctrine to the traditional practices of the Buddhist religion. This application provoked strong reaction from some of his more conservative contemporaries.

Though the LTFPC’s doctrine of wu-nien is clearly derived from Shen-hui, Wu-chu claims that it represents the true teaching of the First Patriarch Dharmatāta as transmitted to him by Wu-hsiang. According to the LTFPC, Wu-hsiang taught the so-called “three propositions” (san-chū 三句): wu-i 無憶 (“no-recollection”), wu-nien (“no-thought”), and mo-wang 莫忘 (“no-forgetting”). Wu-i is said to correspond to the Buddhist ethical practices (chieh 戒; šila); wu-nien, to
meditation (ting 定; samādhi); and mo-wang, to wisdom (hui 慈; prajñā). Hence, the three propositions constitute a new definition of the three traditional subjects of Buddhist study (san-hsūeh 三學). [L.200.] Wu-hsiang claims that, though the three propositions were not taught by his predecessors Chih-shen and Ch’u-chi, they represent the doctrine originally transmitted by the First Patriarch, which he was able to acquire due to his superior abilities. The fact that he has indeed succeeded to Bodhidharma’s ultimate teaching is demonstrated by his possession of the symbolic robe of the patriarchs. Therefore, it is said that Wu-hsiang, without relying on the words of Chih-shen and Ch’u-chi, always taught his disciples by means of the three propositions, which he called the “all-embracing doctrine” (tsung-ch’ih men 總持門) transmitted by the Patriarch Dharma: “All the Buddhas of past, present and future, as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, have entered [enlightenment] through this doctrine; there is no other doctrine apart from this one.”34

It is noteworthy that immediately following this passage on Wu-hsiang’s three propositions the LTFPC refers to Ho-tse Shen-hui, remarking that every month he held a ceremony for administering the precepts at which he refuted the Ch’an of purity (ch’ing-ching ch’an 清淨禪), established Tathāgata Ch’an (ju-lai ch’an 如來禪), and taught the doctrines of no-thought and of seeing one’s nature (chien-hsing 见性). [L.154–5.] The intention of the author is obvious here: Shen-hui may expound the doctrines of wu-nien and chien-hsing, but he does not have the robe of the patriarchs to verify his teaching. Indeed, Shen-hui does not claim to have the robe, precisely because, according to the LTFPC, it is already in the possession of Wu-hsiang.35 The introduction of Shen-hui here represents an undisguised attempt to lay claim to his doctrine of wu-nien, while pushing that doctrine to a new and more radical position.

Wu-hsiang’s three propositions were not merely a theoretical redefinition of the three studies: he actually applied this doctrine in converting the masses and attracting popular support. Wu-chu carried this application still further. He reduced Wu-shiang’s three propositions to the single term wu-nien, which he then carried to its logical conclusion in the notion of “non-discrimination” (wu-fen-pieh 無分別). For Wu-chu, no-thought itself is merely an expedient teaching: as he repeatedly affirms, “When there is truly no thought, then no-thought itself does not exist.” [L.200.] Like Wu-hsiang, he took this radical message directly to the people.
Wu-chu was attracted to Shen-hui, not only by his doctrine of wu-nien, but by his skill in mobilizing popular support. As we have mentioned, on several occasions Shen-hui staged large public debates, called *wu-che ta-hui* 無遮大會, which were open to all members of the community. Following the rebellion of An Lu-shan, he held simplified precepts ceremonies (*chien-i shou-chieh hui* 簡易授戒會), at which he collected donations, known as “perfume money” (*hsiang-shui ch’ien* 香水錢), for the support of the imperial armies. Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu were in no way inferior to Shen-hui in the mobilization of mass support. They too held large public meetings in Szechwan, at which they practiced the direct conversion of the masses. Indeed, we cannot appreciate the nature of Szechwan Buddhism at this time apart from such practices of public conversion and mass mobilization.

The danger of preaching a radical doctrine of wu-nien to the lay public attracted the attention of Tsung-mi. Tsung-mi was himself originally from Szechwan, from Hsi-ch’ung in Kuo-chou. He was a disciple of Sui-chou Tao-yüan 連州道圓 (d.u.) in the lineage of Ching-chung Shen-hui. For some reason, however, Tsung-mi purposely concealed his background, and described himself as the fifth-generation descendent of Ho-tse Shen-hui. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the importance of Shen-hui’s reputation; yet it is worth noting what appears to be a pattern among monks from, or active in, Szechwan at this time of intentionally altering their lineages. It is not certain that Tsung-mi was familiar with the LTFPC, but it is certain that he took special notice of Wu-chu’s Pao-t’ang school. He makes mention of Chih-shen in both his *Ch’ an yüan chu ch’ iüan chi tu hsü* [T.48,400c, 402b-c, 404a] and his *Chung hua ch’ uan hsien ti ch’ an men shih tzu ch’ eng hsi t’u* 中華傳心地禪門師資承襲圖 [ZZ.2,15,5,433d, 434b, 435]; and particularly in the *Yüan chiüeh ching ta shu ch’ao* he discusses Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu in some detail.

Tsung-mi was extremely critical of Wu-chu. He attacked his doctrine of wu-nien as advocating the “extinguishing of consciousness” (*mieh-shih* 滅識)—that is, the elimination of all knowledge and feeling.

The expression ‘extinguishing consciousness’ [used in reference to Wu-chu’s school in the *Yüan chiüeh ching ta shu*] refers to the way [that school] cultivates. Their idea is that the cycle of birth and death is due to the arising of thought (*ch’i-hsin* 起心): when thought arises there is delusion (*wang* 妄); when no thought, either good or evil,
arises there is truth. Moreover, they do not rely on the practice of religious observances (shih-hsiang 事相). They consider discrimination the adversary; and non-discrimination (wu-fen-pieh), the profound way (miao-tao 妙道) . . . Their rejection of all doctrines (chiao-hsiang 教相) is intended to put an end to discrimination and bring about the realization of truth. Therefore, in their living quarters, they make no arrangements for food or clothing, but rely on others’ offerings. If something is offered, they have clothes and food; if not, they accept cold and hunger. They neither seek donations nor beg for food. If someone enters their cloister, they neither rise nor go to greet him, regardless of his status. They accept whatever praise or blame, support or harm may come from others. This is based on their teaching of non-discrimination. Thus, their practice is not [concerned with] right or wrong, but only values no-mind (wu-hsin 無心) as the profound ultimate (miao-chi 妙極). Hence, it is said to be the ‘extinguishing of consciousness.’ [ZZ.1,14,3,278d.]

This passage undoubtedly contains some unfair exageration. The expression, “extinguishing consciousness,” it should be remembered, is not Wu-chu’s own, but Tsung-mi’s criticism of Wu-chu. Still, it must be admitted that Wu-chu’s doctrine of wu-nien does point inevitably toward an emphasis on non-discrimination, and ultimately toward the concept of no-mind. The implication of this doctrine for Buddhist practice was pointed out by another of Wu-hsiang’s followers, Shen-ch’ing, in the Pei shan lu, a work we have already had occasion to mention.

Certain parties teach that to have any intention to practice Buddhism or to have anything to study is the dharma of the šrāvaka. (Ch’an masters consider lecturing and study to be the dharma of the šrāvaka, the saṃskṛta-dharma.) Therefore, only when images are abandoned and the sutras discarded can it properly be called the sudden doctrine. If one has anything to expound he should determine the text from within himself. What need is there for exegesis and commentary? (This corresponds to the present-day practice of extemporaneous dialogue [lin-chi ying-pien wen-ta 臨機應變問答].) [T.52, 612c. Parenthetical remarks are Shen-ch’ing’s.]

This passage occurs in a section devoted to the criticism of con-
temporary heterodoxies. “Certain parties” here clearly refers to Wu-chu, and indeed the teachings attributed to him by Shen-ch’ing correspond closely to his message in the LTFPC. Of this message Shen-ch’ing concludes, “This is too much! It looks like the words of a sage, but it is nowhere near the way of the sage.” [Ibid.]

Tsung-mi also had grave doubts about the application of the wu-nien doctrine in the teaching of the masses. Wu-chu’s methods, he held, do not adhere to the teachings and practices of Buddhism.

While the doctrine that he taught was generally similar, [Wu-chu’s] transmission ceremony was completely different from that of Kim [i.e., Wu-hsiang]. The difference is that [Wu-chu] does not follow any of the observances of the Buddhist tradition. As soon as the [disciple’s] head is shaved, he simply dons the seven-fold robe, without receiving the prohibitory precepts. Worship and repentence, reading [of scripture], painting of Buddhist images, and copying of sutras are all rejected as deluded ideas (wang-hsiang 妄想), and no Buddhist services are given in the cloister where [the monks] live. Therefore, it is said [in the Yüan chüeh ching ta shu that Wu-chu’s Ch’an] does not adhere to either teaching or practice (chiao-hsing pu-chü 教行不拘). [ZZ.1, 14, 3, 278d.]

It appears from this that Wu-chu was in the habit of inducting disciples into the Buddhist order without performing any of the traditional ceremonies such as the conferring of the precepts; he simply shaved their heads and allowed them to don the Buddhist robe. This attitude toward Buddhist practices follows quite naturally from Wu-chu’s reduction of Śīla, samādhi and prajñā to the single concept of wu-nien. It reminds one of the direct, incisive approach of Bodhidharma’s famous words, “No merit” (wu-kung-te 無功德), in answer to Emperor Wu’s question on the amount of merit he had attained by his work for the sangha.36 Wu-chu rejects all Buddhist ritual. Disliking fixed forms of doctrine and practice, in effect he simply leaves himself open to any doctrine or practice, placing no restraints on the religious life. This is a radical approach indeed, and an approach infinitely appealing to the man large enough to embrace it. If it is radicalism, it is a radicalism to which religion always needs to return.

Quarrels over orthodoxy always seem to begin with questions of correct observances. We may recall that the original split between Mahā-
yāna and Hīnayāna involved a dispute over ten unorthodox practices, including such issues as whether or not it was permissible for a monk to keep salt. Wu-chu’s radical concept of no-thought, which threw into question all the traditional practices of Buddhism, obviously struck a sensitive spot in Mahāyāna Buddhist theory. But in practice he may well have gone too far. According to Tsung-mi, Wu-hsiang held regular ceremonies for conferring the precepts in the first and twelfth months. Though they were open to all—men and women, monks and laymen—they always followed the procedure of the vinaya school, and included a certificate from the state. Moreover, this ceremony was held only once a year or less. Wu-chu, however, would openly preach his doctrine to anyone—to a multitude or a single individual—at any time, always encouraging them simply to see their nature and become a Buddha (chien-hsing ch’eng-fo 見性成佛). Whatever his intentions in this, it is obvious that his approach had no way of excluding from his audience the unscrupulous and insincere, and it is possible that among the masses who followed his teachings there were some who took advantage of his rejection of Buddhist ethical practice. In the reign of Emperor Te-tsung (780–804) there were numerous messages to the throne from the Chien-nan Tung-ch’uan district of Szechwan reporting on the misdeeds of both Buddhists and Taoists, and calling for a purge of both religions.

Whatever the historical effects of Wu-chu’s preaching, it is clear at least that his doctrine provoked a strong response from more conservative quarters. It seems certain that one motive behind Shen-ch’ing’s composition of the Pei shan lu was his criticism of the extreme radicalism of Wu-chu’s school. This work, also known as the Pei shan ts’an hsüan yü lu 北山參玄語錄, belongs to that Chinese tradition which emphasizes the unity of the three teachings of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism (san-chiao i-chih 三教一致). The book not only gives an impartial survey of the three teachings, but ranges over a wide spectrum of topics from the formation of heaven and earth, through the appearance of the sages and the composition of the classics, to the characteristics of society and the events of history.

Tsung-mi’s works, of course, are very different, but their underlying motive is probably the same. His Ch’an yüan chu ch’üan chi is an attempt to repair the estrangement between the doctrinal tradition and the Ch’an movement; his Yüan chüeh ching ta shu ch’ao opposes the radical inter-
pretation of tun-wu with the doctrine of sudden awakening and gradual practice (tun-wu chien-hsiu). Both these works seek to warn against, and to correct, the extreme philosophy of sudden awakening prevalent at this time. As we have noted, Tsung-mi’s criticism of tun-wu was directed, not only at the Szechwan school of Pao-t’ang, but at Ma-tsu’s Hung-chou school. It is interesting to note that all the parties in this debate—Shen-ch’ing, Tsung-mi and Ma-tsu—were from the Szechwan region.

6. SOME LITERARY FEATURES OF THE LI-TAI FA-PAO CHI

According to Tsung-mi, Wu-chu discarded all Buddhist observances and had nothing to do with either doctrine or practice; but Wu-chu as represented in the LTFPC in fact made free use of a wide variety of texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Indeed, one of the characteristic features of the LTFPC is its intellectual orientation. The work opens with a list of 37 books [L.39], ranging from the Pen hsing ching 本行經 (Buddhacarita) [T.190] and Tsa a han ching 雜阿含經 (Samyuktāgama) [T.99] to the Yang Leng chia Yeh tu ku shih 楊楞伽鄴都故事 [not extant]. This list probably covers most of the major texts in use by the various schools of Chinese Buddhism at the time. It is a splendid list, and an odd one. Undoubtedly it is in part merely a conceit; but these books must have been familiar to Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu, and have had an influence on their disciples.

The LTFPC does not quote from all the works given in its opening list of titles; on the other hand, it does quote from works not included in the list, not all of which have been identified. It is important to note that among the sūtras used by the LTFPC there are quite a few which are not translations from Indian originals, but of Chinese origin. Some of these have come into doubt only in the light of modern research; until recently they have been considered authentic Indian sūtras, and the compiler of the LTFPC undoubtedly so considered them. Such, for example, are the Chin kang san mei ching 金剛三味經 [T.273] and the Ta fo ting ching 大佛頂經 [T.945]. Others, such as the Fachü ching 法句經 [T.2901] and Ch’an men ching  have until recently been known only by their titles. The Ch’an men ching in particular, as we have seen, plays a role of considerable importance in the LTFPC. The use of these Chinese sūtras as support for the doctrine of sudden awakening is a fact
of great significance for any consideration of the early Ch’an movement; for it reveals that Ch’an has already moved beyond the realm of translations from Indian texts to express a Buddhism of the Chinese people.

The quotations in the LTFPC are not limited to Buddhist works; there are passages from the Lao tzu and Chuang tzu, and from other texts associated with Taoism. In addition, the LTFPC cites various spurious sūtras and histories arising out of the long struggle between Buddhism and Taoism which took place during the Six Dynasties period: such are the Ch’ing ching fa hsing ching 清淨法行經 [not extant] and the Tao chiao hsi sheng ching 道敎西昇經 [T.2139], the Chou shu ich’i 周書異起 [not extant] and the Han fa nei chuan 漢法內傳 [T.2105], A related text is the Shin fa lin chuan 釋法琳傳 [T.2051], which represents a history of the Buddhho-Taoist struggle itself. The appearance of these texts in the LTFPC is a reflection of Wu-chu’s concern for the refutation of Taoism, a problem to which we shall return below.

It is also noteworthy that Wu-chu quotes from the works of Wang Fan-chih 王梵志 (d.u.), an important figure in vernacular literature. Tsung-mi was also interested in this author, and he had a certain amount of influence on the history both of poetry and of Sung dynasty Ch’an. In recent years, as the greater part of his works have become known through the Tun-huang manuscripts, he has attracted attention as a precursor to the poetry of Han-shan.38 The presence of quotations from Wang Fan-chih suggests something of the character of Wu-chu’s Buddhism, and is undoubtedly related to his contacts with the literati styled shan-jen 山人, or “mountain men.”

Wu-chu quotes from all these texts with great freedom, putting them to use in support of his basic teaching of no-thought. Wu-chu was no tired apologist for the wu-nien doctrine: his Ch’an is vivid and alive; and despite the criticisms leveled at him by Shen-ch’ing and Tsung-mi, his teaching of wu-nien seems to have been full of freedom and power. He did not simply deny Buddhist teaching and practice; rather, he used it freely without being bound by it. It is this approach, in fact, which became the mainstream of Ch’an after Ma-tsu. The real vitality of Wu-chu’s Buddhism of sudden awakening is demonstrated by the fact that his teachings, as known through the LTFPC, found ready acceptance in Tibet. Yet the Tibetans may also have appreciated Wu-chu for his ability to draw on a wide range of Buddhist literature. It is interesting to note that at the Council of Tibet, the apologist for tun-wu, Ho-shang
Mahāyāna, used in support of his doctrine virtually the same texts that appear in the LTFPC.

Considerable light can be thrown on the LTFPC's use of scriptural sources by an examination of another Tun-huang text known as the *Shokyō yōshō* 諸経要抄 [T.2819]. This manuscript, housed at the library of Ōtani University, is missing both its title and colophon; it was given its title by the editors of the *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*. At first glance the work appears to be a random collection of passages taken from various Buddhist texts, but in fact these passages are grouped around certain basic themes: the good and evil friend (o-chih-shih shan chih-shih 惡知識善知識), the provisional Buddha (chia-fo 假佛), the worship of the dharma (fa-shen li 法身禮), the provisional and the true triratna (chia san-pao chen san-pao 假三寶真三寶), the provisional and the true precepts (chia-chieh chien-chieh 假戒真戒), the impure and the pure teaching (pu-ching shuo-fa ching shuo-fa 不淨說法淨說法), and so on. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the text quotes from such works as the *Leng chia ching* 楞伽經 (*Laṅkāvatāra*) [T.672], *Chu fa wu hsing ching* 諸法無行經 (*Sarvadharma-pravṛtti nirdeśa*) [T.650], *Chin kan san mei ching*, *Fa chū ching* and *Ch' an men ching*. Inserted throughout the text are comments on such topics as "knowing the mind and seeing the nature" (shih-hsin chien-hsing 識心見性), "the doctrine of the sudden teaching of the Mahāyāna" (ra-sheng tun-chiao fa-men 大乘頓教法門), "the supreme Mahāyāna" (wu-shang ta-sheng 無上大乘), and so on. Thus, in both its doctrinal concerns and its scriptural sources the *Shōkyō yōshō* shows close connections with the LTFPC. It may also be noted in this regard that in quoting from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, like the LTFPC, it uses the T'ang translation. While it quotes from the *Ta fo ting ching*, it does not mention the *Yüan chüeh ching*, despite the fact that this text was already known to the author of the *Ch' uan fa pao chi*.

The doctrine of shih-hsin chien-hsing was a characteristic feature of the Southern school of Hui-neng and Shen-hui, but these masters did not attempt to connect their teaching with canonical sources. The LTFPC and the *Shokyō yōshō*, however, share a concern for collecting essential passages from sūtra texts which can be interpreted as teaching the doctrines of shih-hsin chien-hsing or ta-sheng tun-chiao. These two texts, then, seem to belong to a teaching tradition which emphasized the scriptural support for the doctrine of sudden awakening. It should
perhaps be noted in connection with this tradition that the Tun-huang documents contain other fragmentary texts which redefine basic terms of Buddhist doctrine—the good friend, the three treasures, the three studies, and so on—in the light of tun-wu. Some of these texts are accompanied by Tibetan translations.

In quoting from scriptural sources those Ch’an texts of both the Northern and the Southern school which teach the doctrine of tun-wu tend to make use of the same works, and of the same passages within these works. This is true of the Tun wu chen tsung lun 頓悟真宗論 [T. 2835], the Tun wuchentsung chin kang pan jo hsiu hsing ta pi an fa men yao chüeh 頓悟真宗金剛般若修行達彼岸法門要決, the Tun wu ta sheng cheng li chüeh 頓悟大乘正理決, and the Tun wu yao men 頓悟要門 [ZZ.2,15,5,412c-426d]. The next to last is a record of the Council of Tibet; the last is a work by Ma-tsu’s disciple Ta-chu Hui-hai 大珠慧海. The motives behind these works differ with the traditions to which they belong, but their way of teaching tun-wu remains basically the same, and is similar to that of the LTFPC. The Shokyo yoshō definitely has much in common with these works; beyond this, the tradition of this text remains uncertain. A comparison of its tun-wu doctrine with that of the LTFPC should do much to illumine the positions of both works.

We have seen that the LTFPC quotes from the literature of Taoism and from the writings of Wang Fan-chih. Wu-chu’s audiences contained a considerable number of Taoists and those known as shan-jen, apparently Confucianists who had withdrawn to the mountains. There is a strange current of anti-Taoism and anti-Confucianism running through the LTFPC. At the very outset of his work, for example, the author relates the story from the Han fa pen nei chuan of the Taoist opposition to the introduction of Buddhism in the Later Han. [L.39.] Without some sense of the historical setting within which the LTFPC was composed, it is difficult indeed to see what place this story could have in a history of Ch’an.

From early times Szechwan was a stronghold of Taoism. As far back as the Later Han it was the center of Chang Ling’s Wu-tou-mi tao movement. We know from the biographies of monks recorded in the “Hu-fa”護法 section of the Hsiu kao seng chuan 續高僧傳 [T.50(2060),631b-43b] that the Buddhists had several struggles with the Taoists in this area during the Six Dynasties and early T’ang periods. These struggles must have continued up to the time of Wu-hsiang and Wu-chu, a period when the Taoists were particularly powerful. It was the policy of the T’ang
court to favor Taoism; the Ch'üan t'ang wen records the fact that among the imperial edicts from the early T'ang on there were quite a few which favored the Taoists over the Buddhists, and provided that Taoist masters be seated above the Buddhist monks at court. This tendency of the T'ang administration was at its height during the K'ai-yüan and T'ien-pao eras (713–55), and there was a triumphant spirit among the Taoists of the time. It was during this period that the Taoist canon, modeled on the Buddhist ta-tsang-ching, was completed; here again, Szechwan was a center for this work. The Han fa pen nei chuan, which relates the tradition of Buddhism's introduction to China and its early struggle with the Taoists, was once banned by the government of Hsüan-tsung. Thus, the fact that the author of the LTFPC uses the text at the very opening of his work is itself of significance, and again reflects the strongly political character of this book.

The later Ch'an yü-lu literature introduces, not only Taoists and Confucianists, but specialists in Buddhist doctrine—often identified as tso-chu 座主—in order to refute them.42 These Buddhist opponents already appear in the LTFPC, and they are undoubtedly introduced intentionally as a criticism of the doctrinal schools.43 Here as elsewhere the LTFPC is a forerunner of the T'ang yü-lu. Wu-chu's dialogues have much in common with the stories of the first encounters between Hui-neng and his disciples given in the Liu tsu t'an ching. The story of the two monks known as Shih Fa-hua 史法華 [L.251], for example, bears close resemblance to the account of the Sixth Patriarch's first meeting with Fa-ta 法達, a long-time student of the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka [T.48, 342c; 355b]. Other passages remind one of the "K'an-pien" 勘辨 and "Hsing-lu" 行錄 sections of the Lin chi lu. [T.47,503a–506c.] Like Lin-chi, Wu-chu makes free use of the colloquial language in teaching his disciples. His Ch'an of no-thought can already be expressed in ordinary everyday speech, free from the standardized technical terms of the Buddhist lexicon. Wu-nien is the primeval forest of the mind, from which there is no telling what may appear; for that very reason it holds the intense fascination of freedom, before which all fixed concepts are forgotten. Sudden awakening is the opening through which we are lured into that forest.

Perhaps no word better captures the flavor of Wu-chu's Ch'an than the term huo-p'o-p'o-ti 活潑潑地. In chapter twelve of the Chung yung there is a line which reads, "It is said in the Book of Poetry, 'The hawk flies up to heaven, the fishes leap in the deep.' This expresses how this
If you want to freely live or die, go or stay, to take off or put on [your clothes], then right now recognize the man who is listening to my discourse. His is without form, without characteristics, without root, without source, and without any dwelling place, yet is brisk and lively (huo-p’o-p’o-ti). Apparently there were some who objected to the use of huo-p’o-p’o-ti here as representing the intrusion of a Ch’an term, for Chu Hsi is at pains to defend Ch’eng-tzu: “This is not a Ch’an term, but a colloquial expression; there is nothing wrong with Ch’eng-tzu’s using it.”

Huo-p’o-p’o-ti was originally an adjective describing the leaping of a fish. By extension, it indicates a spirited, vigorous state. The tao pervades heaven and earth, alive and active everywhere in daily life—to describe this activity of the tao Ch’eng-tzu uses the vivid expression huo-p’o-p’o-ti. He undoubtedly had in mind a passage from the Lin chi lu:

If you want to freely live or die, go or stay, to take off or put on [your clothes], then right now recognize the man who is listening to my discourse. His is without form, without characteristics, without root, without source, and without any dwelling place, yet is brisk and lively (huo-p’o-p’o-ti). [T.47,498c. R. Sasaki’s translation, The Recorded Sayings of Ch’an Master Lin-chi (1975), 15.]

Man is originally free—vividly, irresistibly alive. As Lin-chi says, “Do you know who it is who right now is running around searching this way? He is brisk and lively, with no roots at all. Though you [try to] embrace him, you cannot gather him in; though you [try to] drive him away, you cannot shake him off.” [501b. Sasaki’s translation, 29.] Here again he expresses the basic activity of man’s life, an “aliveness” which cannot be contained, dispersed or in any way controlled. Huo-p’o-p’o-ti was indeed a colloquial term, but it was the T’ang Ch’an masters like Lin-chi who discovered it.

In the LTFPC Wu-chu tells a parable of a man standing atop a high mound. Three passersby discuss various theories about what he is doing there, but when they finally go to ask him he replies simply, “I’m just standing.” Wu-chu then comments,

My Ch’an neither sinks nor floats, neither flows nor congeals; yet it truly works. It works, free from birth and death, free from purity
and defilement, free from right and wrong; vividly alive (huo-p'o-p'o), it is Ch'an in every single moment. [L.304.]

This is probably the earliest appearance of the term huo-p'o-p'o in Ch'an literature. The parable of the man on the top of a mound is an interesting one. But what is more important here is the emphasis on activity, a totally free activity in which the actor is beyond all limitations. The doctrine of no-thought leads necessarily to the notion of this kind of unlimited activity within ordinary life. The emphasis on boundless freedom in every moment of man's daily activities, in fact, later becomes the hallmark of Ma-tsu's style of Ch'an. Wu-chu's words are a harbinger of things to come: they point ahead, not only to the Ch'an of Ma-tsu, but to the development of Sung Neo-Confucianism. Whether we agree with Chu Hsi or not, the fact remains that the evidence for every one of his criticisms of Buddhism can be found in the LTFPC.

7. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LI-TAI FA-PAO CHI

The LTFPC is the longest of the Tun-huang Ch'an texts, and probably one of the earliest to be identified; yet in the half century since its discovery it has never been carefully studied. One cannot resist a certain sense of shock and frustration at the neglect of this important work. The reason for this neglect, however, is not far to seek. The common view of the history of Ch'an has long been that the school developed from the Sixth Patriarch in two lines founded by his disciples Nan-yüeh 南嶽 (677-744) and Ch'ing-yüan 青原 (d. 740); in the late T'ang and early Five Dynasties periods it split into the Five Houses (wu-chia 五家); and then in the Sung, developed into the Seven Schools (ch'i-tsung 七宗). The popularity of this view derives from the great authority of the Ch'ing te ch'uan teng lu, the monumental Ch'an history composed in the early Sung and included in the Sung printing of the canon by imperial order. The rediscovery in recent years of the earlier Tsu t'ang chi 祖堂集, a long-lost work of the Five Dynasties, has done little to diminish the influence of the Ch'uan teng lu. In any event, the notion that the Southern school of Ts'ao-ch'i represents the orthodox lineage of Ch'an has never been seriously questioned.

The Ch'an texts discovered at Tun-huang have destroyed the traditional theory of the early history of the Ch'an school. The LTFPC is particularly noteworthy in this regard because it provides primary
material on the history and doctrines of the Pao-t'ang and Ching-chung traditions of Szechwan, which during the middle T'ang represented a separate movement outside the Northern and Southern schools. The existence of these two traditions was by no means unknown: as we have seen, they were already acknowledged by Tsung-mi. Indeed, as I should like to emphasize, it now appears that Tsung-mi’s position originated from a criticism of the teachings of the Pao-t’ang and Ching-chung masters. This aspect of Tsung-mi has only very recently become clear to us. It was first discussed by Prof. Hu Shih in his “Po P’ei Hsiu te T’ang ku Kuei-feng Ting-hui ch’an-shih ch’uan-fa pei” 跋敎休的唐故圭峯定慈禪師傳法碑.47 This article, which in fact takes its start from a re-evaluation of the LTFPC, was a stimulus for my own Shoki zenshū shi-sho no kenkyū, in which I made a preliminary attempt at providing a new perspective on the course of Ch’an in the middle T’ang.

The LTFPC belongs to the latest period of Ch’an texts unearthed at Tun-huang, a period followed immediately by the age of Ma-tsu and Tsung-mi. There is no proof that these Ch’an masters were acquainted with the book, but neither can we discount the possibility. I suggest, in fact, that they established their own positions in opposition to the developments in Szechwan of which the LTFPC is a record—such was the profound historical influence of the Pao-t’ang and Ching-chung schools. Ma-tsu’s claim to be the third patriarch in the Ts’ao-ch’i line, and Tsung-mi’s assertion that he represents the fifth patriarch in the Ho-tse line both reflect an awareness of the rival claims made by these Szechwan schools. We must not allow ourselves to become absorbed solely in the content of these two masters’ teachings, but should attend as well to the motives behind them. Unfortunately, previous studies of T’ang Ch’an history have tended to ignore this issue. Of particular importance here is the connection between Wu-chu and Tsung-mi.

Tsung-mi sought to soften the more radical aspects of Ch’an: identifying himself with both the Hua-yen and the Ho-tse lineages, he taught the unity of the doctrinal and Ch’an traditions (chiao-ch’an i-chih 敬禪一致), and advocated the position of sudden awakening and gradual practice. The entire body of his writings—from the Ch’an yüan chu ch’üan chi tu hsü to his many works on the Hua yen ching (Avatamsaka) and Yüan chüeh ching—may be seen as arising from his dissatisfaction with the extreme doctrines of sudden awakening taught by Wu-chu’s Pao-t’ang school and the Hung-chou school of Ma-tsu. Tsung-mi also represents a major figure in the history of the interaction between
Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in China. Whatever our evaluation of his position in this history, it cannot be denied that he had considerable influence on the origin and development of Sung Neo-Confucianism. There is an interesting parallel between Tsung-mi’s rejection of Wu-chu’s doctrine of wu-nien and Chu Hsi’s criticism of Li Cha’s notion of “extinguishing feeling” (mien-ch’ing 滅情). Though in general he admires Li Cha’s Fu hsing shu, Chu Hsi attacks, and rejects as a Buddhist intrusion, the idea that the extinguishing of feeling is a condition for returning to the nature (fu-hsing 復性). There is a sense in which Tsung-mi and Chu Hsi share the same line of thought in regard to this issue.

One cannot understand the development of T’ang dynasty Ch’an without understanding Tsung-mi; and one cannot truly understand Tsung-mi without knowing Wu-chu. Without the stimulation provided by Wu-chu, Tsung-mi’s thought could never have achieved the vitality it displays. None of the studies of Tsung-mi to date has adequately explained the historical motivations behind his doctrines of chiao-ch’an i-chih and tun-wu chien-hsiu and his system of the three teachings. We will not understand his position until we are able to see it against the background of Wu-chu’s extreme doctrine of tun-wu. This is not to say that this fact alone makes Wu-chu’s theory significant, but it is to say that without Wu-chu, Tsung-mi would never have been led to the remarkable synthesis and fusion that his thought achieves.

Beyond its importance for the history of Ch’an in China, we must not forget that the LTFPC played a central role in the spread of the school’s teachings throughout Asia. With this work Ch’an thought, born and nurtured in China, spilled over the borders of its homeland into the cultures of her neighbors. We have seen that the tun-wu doctrine of Wu-chu’s school was influential in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism. In Japan, the teachings of the LTFPC clearly had an impact on Saichō’s Naishō bppō sōjō kechimyaku fu, and hence, on his struggle to establish the independence of the Mahāyāna precepts. Through Saichō these teachings ultimately found their way into the Japanese setsuwa 說話 literature, where they appear in the famous twelfth-century collection Konjaku monogatari.

Because of the distinctive historical character of Wu-chu’s school, his position has never been adequately investigated. Despite our acceptance of several new ideas about early Ch’an history derived from the materials discovered at Tun-huang, we remain under the spell of the
early Sung view of the Ch’an tradition, which focuses on the Northern and Southern schools and the lineages of Nan-yüeh and Ch’ing-yüan. To this extent we have failed to perceive the actual development of Ch’an in the middle T’ang. The new materials discovered at Tun-huang, which could have done so much to correct our perspectives, have in fact served only to supplement old conventions.

8. TEXTS AND STUDIES OF THE LI-TAI FA-PAO CHI

The text of the LTFPC was first made available in March, 1928, in volume 51 of the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō [2075, 179–196]. This version was based on Stein 516 and Pelliot 2125. Shortly thereafter the discoverer of the text, Yabuki Keiki 矢吹慶輝, provided the first detailed explanation of the work in his Meisha yoin 喃沙餘韻 (1930) and Meisha yoin kaisetsu 解說 (1933). The Taishō daizōkyō text was essentially a collation of the two Tun-huang manuscripts; the first true edition was brought out by Kim Kugyōng 金九經 in Kyokan Lyokdae poppo gi 校刊歷代法寶記, Kangwŏn ch’ongsŏ 翠軒文庫 (Shenyang, 1935). In 1945 another manuscript was partially photocopied and described by Kawase Kazuma 川瀨一馬 in Ishii Sekisuiken bunko zenbon shomoku 石井積翠軒文庫善本書目, but the present whereabouts of this text is unclear. Five additional manuscripts (P.3717, 3727; S.1611, 1766, 5916) became known following the publication in 1962 of Tun huang i shu tsung mu so yin 敦煌遺書總目索引 by the Shang-wu-yin Shu-kuan in Peking. Unfortunately, all these are fragments, but P.3717, except for a short section at the beginning of the text, is almost complete. The Tun-huang manuscripts of the LTFPC, then, can be summarized as follows:

P.2125 (T.2075, kō 甲 text)
P.3717
P.3727 (fragment, one chapter on P’u-t’i-ta-mo-to-lo)
S.516 (T.2075, original text; Meisha yoin, 76, 2)
S.1611 (fragment, chapter on the Third Patriarch)
S.1776 (fragment, chapters on the Fifth and Sixth Patriarchs)
S.5916 (fragment, title and quotation from Han fa nei-chuan)
Ishii text (Ishii Sekisuiken bunko zenbon shomoku, no. 20; fragment, apparently of considerable length, beginning with the chapter on Chih-shen).

Other than the Taishō text and the works by Yabuki and Kim, there has been no comparison of these various manuscripts. The few studies
to date which have dealt with the text may be found in the following:


Finally, on the LTFPC in relation to Tibetan Buddhism we may list the following Japanese studies:

——, "Rin lugs rBa dPal dhyaṅs: bSam yaṅs shurō o meguru ichi mondai 宗論をめぐる一問題," Hirakawa Akira hakase kanreki kinen ronshū: Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kenkyū 平川彰博士還暦記念論集佛教における法の研究. 1975.

Ueyama Daishun, "Tonkō shuhtsudo Chibettobun zen shiryō no kenkyū: Pelliot 116 to sono mondai ten" 敦煌出土チベット文書資料の研究 Pelliot 116 とその問題点, Bukkyō banka kenkyūjo kiyō 佛教文化硏究所紀要, 13 (1974).


——, "Chibetto no zenshū to zōyaku gikyō ni tsuite" チベットの禪宗と藏訳儀經について, Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū, 46 (1975).

NOTES

1 This article originally appeared in Japanese as the introduction to Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山, Shoki no zenshi II: Rekidaib hōbō ki 初期の禅史 II—歴代法寶記, Zen no goroku 禅の語録, 3 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1976), pp. 3–35. It was revised under the title “Mujū to Shūmitsu: Tongo shisō no keisei o megutte” 無住と宗密頴悟思想の形成をめぐって, in Hanazono daigaku kenyū kiyō 花園大学硏究紀要, 7 (3/76), pp. 1–36. The present English version is based on the latter text, edited for translation and supplemented by the bibliographic material appended to the original version. Source references in brackets within the body of the text and, unless otherwise indicated, numbered notes following the text are by the translator. The following abbreviations have been used in citing references: CTW. = Ch‘uan T‘ang wen 全唐文; L. = Li tai fa pao chi 歴代法寶記; P. = Pelliot; S. = Stein; T. = Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經; ZZ. = Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō 大日本続藏經. The translator would like to thank M. Strickman for making several helpful suggestions on this MS.

2 See Fujieda Akira 藤枝晃, “Shashū kigigun setsudoshi shimatsu” 沙州鎧義軍節度使始末, Tōhō gakuhō (Kyoto) 東方學報京都, 13:3 (3/42), 94, n. 50; Satō Hisashi 佐藤久, Kodai Chibetto kenyū 古代チベット研究, II (1959), 634, n. 16.

3 The completion of bSam-yas is dated at 787. [Author’s note.] See Yamaguchi Zuihō 山口瑞虎, “Chibetto bukkō'’ チベット仏教, Kōza tōyō shisō 講座東洋思想, 5 (1967), 237.


5 ZZ.2B,19,5,484c. This text is better known by the title given it by its Japanese editor: Sōkei daishi betsuden 寺徳大師別傳.

6 For the banner story, see L.123. For the convenience of the reader who wishes to take advantage of the author’s copious notes on the text, this and all subsequent references to the text of the LTFPC are to Prof. Yanagida’s edition in Shoki no zenshi II. MSS and other editions of the text are given in the bibliography at the end of this article.

7 Elsewhere Prof. Yanagida has tentatively dated the TCTSC at 781, and the LTFPC in the period between 774 (the last date recorded in the text) and 781. See his Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū 初期禅宗史書の研究 (1967), 223, 279.

8 For Obata’s works, see the bibliography below.

9 T.2837; T.2838. These texts have been re-edited and translated into Japanese by Prof. Yanagida in Shoki zenshi I: Ryōga shijii ki. Denbō hōki, Zen no goroku, 2 (1971).
10 Also known as Chin (Kor., Kim) Ho-shang 金和尚. For the Tibetan contact with Wu-hsiang, see Obata, “Rekidai hōbō ki to kodai Chibetto no bukkō” 历代法寶記と古代チベットの仏教, in Yanagida, Shoki zenshū II, 326.

11 The PLC biography of Hui-neng is no longer extant, but this story is quoted in the Tsu t'ing shih yūlan 契庭事苑 (ZZ.2,18,1,80c). See Yanagida, Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū, 252, n. 49. The extant portions of the PLC have recently been published by Prof. Yanagida in Sōzō ichin: Hōrin den. Dentō gyokuei shū 宋磁遺珍寶林傳明燈玉英集, Zengaku sōshō 禪學叢書, 5 (1975), 1–154. The story of the Korean monk concerns a certain Kim Taebi 金大悲, who is said to have hired a man to steal the head of the corpse of the Sixth Patriarch. For the version of the Liu tsu t'an ching, see T.48,364b.

12 By the Tendai monk Ennin 圆仁 (794–864).

13 T.48,337c. “The body is the Bodhi tree, the mind is like a clear mirror. At all times we must strive to polish it, and must not let the dust collect.” (Phillip Yampolsky’s translation, The platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch [1967], 130.) For Tsung-mi’s description of Northern Ch’an, see Yūn chūeh ching ta shu ch’u'o 禪覺經大疏鈔 (ZZ.1,14,3,277c).

14 See, for example, Vimalakīrti’s criticism of Śāriputra’s practice of samadhi. (T.14,539c.) The literature of the Northern school draws heavily on this sutra. See, for example, the Ta sheng wu feng pi'en 大乘五方便, Ui Hakujū 宇井伯訥, Zenshū shi kenkyū 禪宗史研究, I (1939), 468–510.

15 This maxim seems to have been known to the Tibetans quite early. Reported by Kimura Ryūtoku 木村隆徳 on the basis of S.709 at the October, 1975, meeting of the Chibettō Gakkai. [Author’s note.] For Shen-hui’s use of the maxim, see, e.g., P'u t'i ta mo nan tsung ting shih fei lun 菩提達摩南宗是無論, in Hu Shih 胡适, “Hsin chiao-t'ing te Tun-huang hsieh-pen Shen-hui ho-shang i-chu liang-chung” 新校定的敦煌寫本神會和尚造詠兩種, Shen hui ho shang i chi 神會和尚造詠, rev. ed. (1970), 285ff; for Lin-chi, see Lin chi lu 臨濟錄 (T.47[1985],499b).

16 Prof. Yanagida has discussed this issue at some length in his “Zen shiso no seirisu” 禅思想の成立, Mu no tankyū: Chūgoku zen 無の探求中國禅, Bukkyō no shisō 仏教の思想, 7 (1969), 115–44.

17 See Ch’an yūan chu ch’üan chi tu hsü 禪源諸詮集都序 (T.48 [2015], 403a).

18 The first is attributed to Chao-chou 趙州 (778–897); see Ching te ch’üan t’eng lu 景德傳灯錄 (T.51[2076],276c). The second is usually attributed to Ma-tsu; see ibid. (246a).

19 More precisely, in the Leng chia jen fa chih 勐伽人法志, quoted therein. [Author’s note.] T.85,1289c.

20 See Nan tsung ting shih fei lun, in Hu Shih, Shen hui ho shang i chi, 161–2.


22 According to the SKSC (T.50,836b), Ch’u-chi died in the first month of 734 at age 87; the LTFPC (140) gives the fifth month of 736 at age 68.

23 Lao-an also appears as Hui-an 惶安. The LTFPC’s account of Wu-chu’s biography, on which this paragraph is based, appears at 168ff.
24 Yuan chüeh ching ta shu ch'ao (Z.Z.1,14,3,278c-d).

25 All the fragments edited by Hu Shih have been collected in the revised edition of Shen hui ho shang i chi, 159–67, 175–86, 258–319.

26 See, e.g., Shen-hui’s definition of the supreme vehicle in terms of the sudden teaching in the Nan yang ho shang wen ta tsao cheng i 南陽和尚問難徵義 (Shen-hui yu-lu 神會語錄), Hu Shih, Shen hui ho shang i chi, 112.

27 L.68. The LTFPC (67) also uses the name Bodhidharmatrāta (P’u-t’i-ta-moto-lo 菩提達摩多羅).


29 T’ang Chung yüeh sha men Shih Fa ju ch’an shih hsing chuang 唐中嶽沙門釋法如禅師行狀. See Prof. Yanagida’s edition, Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū, 487.

30 S.5532; P.4646. Edited by Prof. Yanagida in “Zenmon kyō ni tsuite” 神門經について, Tsukamoto hakase shōju kinen bukkyō shigaku ronshū 塚本博士顕記念佛教史學論集 (1961), 869–82.

31 As is well known, the history of the name Dharma (Ta-mo) is itself complicated by the fact that it appears in two forms, 迦摩 and 達摩, in the Chinese, but this problem need not detain us here. [Author’s note.] For this problem, see Sekiguchi Shindai 關口貞大, Zenshū shisō shi 神宗思想史 (1964), 17–28; Daruma daishi no kenkyū 達摩大師的研究, rev. ed. (1969), 443–59. For the Tibetan tradition of Dharmatrāta, see Obata, “Chibetto den Bodaidarumatarara zenji kō” チベット仏菩達摩多羅禪師考, Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū, 47 (1976).

32 Ku Tso-chi ta-shih pei 故左溪大師碑 (CTW.320,1b).

33 L.143. According to Wu-chu (L.200), Wu-hsiang’s third proposition is not mo-wang 莫忘 (“do not forget”) but mo-wang 莫忘 (“have no delusion”). Tsung-mi comments that Wu-chu changed Wu-hsiang’s teaching from 莫忘 to 莫忘. See Yuan chüeh ching ta shu ch’ao (Z.Z.1,14,3,278d).

34 L.144. The translation of tsung-ch’ih men here follows Prof. Yanagida’s interpretation; see Shoki no zenshi II, 153.

35 Wu-chu quotes a dialogue between Shen-hui and his Northern school opponent, Dharma Master Yuan, in which Shen-hui admits that, while the robe has been transmitted, he does not have it: “There is another who has it, and this will subsequently become known. When he preaches, the true dharma will spread and heresies will be destroyed.” (L.155). This passages appears to take advantage of a similar dialogue in the Nan tsung ting shih fei lun (Hu Shih, 286), in which to Yuan Fa-shih’s question on who has inherited Hui-neng’s dharma Shen-hui modestly replies, “This will subsequently become known.”

36 This story, too, has its origin in Shen-hui. Indeed, there is an interesting parallel between this story and the structure of the LTFPC, which opens with a discussion of the traditional observances of Buddhist practice, followed by Wu-chu’s denial of them all. [Author’s note.] For Shen-hui’s version of Bodhidharma’s dialogue with Emperor Wu, see Nan tsung ting shih fei lun, in Hu Shih, 261–2.

37 Yuan chüeh ching ta shu ch’ao (Z.Z.1,14,3,278c); L.163–64.

38 See Wang Fan chih shih chi 王梵志詩集 (T.2863). For studies, see Iriya Yoshi-taka 入矢義高, “Ô Bonshi ni tsuite” 王梵志について, Chūgoku bangaku hō 中國文學
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This text does not appear in the LTFPC's list of sources. It is quoted, however, by other early Ch'an works, such as the Erh ju zuhsing lun, attributed to Bodhidharma, and the Leng chia shih tsu chi.

40 Ta sheng ju Leng chia ching 大乘入楞伽經 (T.672), by Śikṣānanda, rather than the four-chūan version of Guṇabhadra (T.670) traditionally associated with Bodhidharma's school.

41 The Tun wu ta sheng yao chüeh (S.5523; P.2799, 3922) has recently been published together with the Tibetan text (P.116) by Ueyama Daishun 上山大峻 in "Chibetto yaku Tongo shinshū yōketsu no kenkyū" チベット譯頌佛陀宗要決の研究, Zen bunkagaku kenkyū jo kiyō 禪文化學研究所紀要, 8 (8/76), 33–103. For the TWT-CCLC (P.4646; S.2672), see Paul Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhassa (1952), planches IXXXII; “Deux documents de Touen-houang sur le dhyāna chinois,” Tsukamoto hakase shōju kinen bukkyō shigaku ronshū, 1–27, repr. in Choix d'études bouddhiques (1973), 320–46.

42 See, e.g., the criticism of tso-chu in the Tun wu yao men. [Author's note.] ZZ.2, 15,5,427c.

43 Wu-chu debates with tao-shih and shan-jen at L.276ff, with Dharma masters at 286ff, with Vinaya masters at 289ff, and with śāstra masters at 298.

44 Chu Hsi yu-lui 朱熹語類, 126.

45 It appears in this sense, for example, in the Han shan shih, and it may be noted that the word p'o is also written with the radical for fish (鱗). The term is the same, however, whether written 鱗, or 鱗. [Author's note.]

46 Preserved in the Korean canon. Prof. Yanagida has recently published this text in Sodō shū 祖堂集, Zengaku sōsho, 4 (1972).


48 Chu Hsi yu-lui, 59. See Yanagida, “Bukkyō to Shushi no shūhen” 佛教と朱子の周辺, Zen bunka kenkyūjo kiyō, 8 (7/76), 21.

49 This fact was first pointed out in Tokushi Yūshō 禪籍傳來考, Ōtani daigaku ronsō 大谷大學論叢, 282 (1928). Unfortunately, this article seems to have been completely ignored. It is remarkable that it was written in the very year that the LTFPC first appeared in print in the Taishō shinshū daijō-kyō. [Author's note.]

50 The material in this section is translated from Yanagida, Shoki no zenshi II, 31–4.

51 Prof. Yanagida's edition is based on P.2125, supplemented by the other texts only where the original is unintelligible. He does not provide textual notes.
Seng-ch'ou's Method of *Dhyāna*

Jan Yün-hua

**THE PROBLEM AND MATERIALS**

When one looks into the studies of Ch'ān Buddhism one finds that most of the historical records as well as the recent publications are overshadowed by the sectarian development, especially from Hui-neng 慧能 (638–713) onward. However, when one looks into the early history of meditative practices in China, the picture is rather different. The sect of Bodhidharma, though it was highly respected, was much less popular and populous amongst Buddhist monks during the period of the sixth to the seventh century A.D. As far as the existent sources go, the most popular practice of North China, including the capital city Ch'ang-an, during the period, was in the tradition of Seng-ch'ou 僧稠 (480–560). Tao-hsüan 道宣 (596–660), the Buddhist historian, for example has described the situation as follows: "Only these two worthies (i.e. Seng-ch'ou and Seng-shih 僧寶 476–563) had successive followers to transmit the lamps. Their schools and influences are still not stopped . . . "1 The words like ‘only’, ‘successive’ or ‘not stopped’ etc., have adequately impressed readers with their positions in the history of Chinese Buddhism during the period. A study such as this paper, therefore, will be useful for an understanding of Buddhism in China at large, and helpful for a more accurate view on Ch'ān development in particular.

Being overshadowed by the sectarian Ch'ān development, very little research has been done on Seng-ch'ou's method of *dhyāna*. As far as my knowledge goes, Yanagida's chapter on *Dhyāna* Buddhism and its background in the North Dynasties2 is the only lengthy research on this monk, and there are only brief references in some of the general histories of Buddhism in China.3

Materials for the study of Seng-ch'ou are available from three categories of sources: First, biographies of the monk and those of his teachers and disciples as contained in *Hsü Kao seng chuan*, a record with dates which is regarded as the most authentic source. Although these biographies are scattered over several places in the collection, and are historical rather than doctrinal, these references have at least provided
some authentic clues to scholars for identifying his teachings as well as for an examination of other questionable sources.

Second, relevant documents discovered by Paul Pelliot preserved in Paris. As far as Seng-ch’ou is concerned there are five important manuscripts: Manuscript 1 is a summary of twelve dhyāna masters’ teachings. Though Seng-ch’ou himself is not mentioned in the Ms. his patriarch, Buddha, is named and summarized in the document. Ms. 2 has been described as a work based on “the intention or outline of dhyāna master Ch’ou” (Ch’ou ch’an-shihi 藍禪師意). The work begins with questions on the Mahāyāna method of how to quiet the mind and how to enter into the path, so Yanagida gives the title of An-sin-fa 安心法 (‘The method for quieting down the mind’) to the work. Ms. 3 is a hymn which comprises sixteen verses in three-words-per-line style. Ms. 4 is a humourous ‘Medical Prescription’ for spiritual diseases. And the No. 5 Ms. is called Ta-ch’eng hsin hsing lun 大乘心行論 (‘Treatise on mental practice of Mahāyāna’). All these five works are contained in the same scroll, Pelliot’s Collection No. 3559. A facsimile has been published by Yanagida as one of the front pieces of his book on the early historical texts of the Ch’an School, and a new edition of these five manuscripts has been completed by myself.

Third, some questionable materials on Seng-ch’ou and his dhyāna include the work of Tsung-mi (780–841) and also that of Yen-shou (904–975).

The approach I shall follow in this paper is to combine and to compare these three categories of materials, as an attempt to find out what Dhyāna methods were ascribed to him. In other words, if the information from these sources is congruent, then the authenticity of Seng-ch’ou’s methods will become more creditable.

**THE LIFE OF SENG-CH’OU**

There are different elements in the biography of Seng-ch’ou as written by Tao-hsüan in his Hsü Kao seng chuan. The space and attention given to the life of this monk testifies to the biographer’s respect and the importance of Seng-ch’ou in the history of Buddhism during the period. Before going into a discussion on his method of dhyāna, a brief description of his life is necessary, as some of its elements might be helpful to an understanding of his teachings. Before his renunciation of household life, he was surnamed Sun and was a professor at the Imperial Academy (t’ai-hsüeh Po-shih). He has been respected eminently in the teaching of
Confucian Classics and was regarded as a model of Confucian virtues. This background perhaps helped him a lot in his relationship with the royal court of the Northern Ch'i. This also meant that he was a highly cultured official and well-versed in scholarly works. Such qualifications were not found in himself alone, but also in the record of his disciples.⁷

The next was the mysterious element, namely, his rather romantic encounter with the goddess of Ch'ueh 羅 mountain, his commanding and supernatural power over the goddess of Sung mountain, and his subduing two tigers and a python. Among these, the claim of his encounter with the two tigers and the Taoist scripture are dramatic. The biographer writes that at a time when he went to Wang-wu 王屋 mountain to continue his cultivation and practice of the method of dhyāna which he had achieved previously, “he heard thunderous roars from two fighting tigers. He disengaged them by putting his staff between the two and the tigers went away respectively.” At one time he found two chapters of a Taoist scripture (hsien-ching 仙經) on his couch. Ch'ou declared that “I am practicing the Tao of Buddha. Why should I be confined to longevity in the world?” Moments after these words were pronounced, the scripture vanished by itself. The effect of his power on strange manifestations was always like this.”⁸ During the later period, his mysterious power was constantly and emphatically noted.⁹ If this mysterious story itself cannot be seriously regarded as a fact, it at least reflects his connection with Taoist scripture. Since Taoist religion was very popular in the region at that time, his acquaintance with it is highly possible. In one of the Tun-huang manuscripts ascribed to Seng-ch’ou, there is also a reference to Taoist practice. Perhaps not accidentally, in Manuscript No. 4 it is stated:

If the Gold Elixir is inadequate to compare [with the Buddhist prescription]
How can the Jade Powder surpass it?¹⁰
Since this reference is congruent with biographical material, it indicates the authenticity of the work as written by Seng-ch’ou as ascribed.

The third element in the biography of Seng-ch’ou is his relation with the government. Being well trained in Confucian tradition and familiar with bureaucratic systems, his dealing with the government of North Ch'i was impressive and tactful. Apart from his skillful discourses to the king and officials, his tactful confrontation with them, especially the manner in which he overcame the royal suspension was very dramatic. The biography recorded that at the time when someone misrepresented
him before the king on the ground that the master was arrogant and disrespectful towards his Majesty, the king was infuriated and went to the residential monastery in order to harm the monk. Seng-ch’ou knew this secretly, so he asked his kitchen workers to prepare food for the expected guests, while he himself went and waited for the king and his group at a place miles away from his monastery. When the king met the monk, the latter stood waiting alone. When asked, the monk said, ‘I am afraid that my blood may sully the monastic ground, that is why I am here!’ On hearing this the king was shocked, expressed his regret and asked the monk for pardon. The whole business was conducted with tact and wit. Such spirit is also found in Manuscript No. 5. The manuscript describes the ten practices of a Bodhisattva not in the usual positive terms, but in negative expression, with a sense of humour.

THE ‘DHYANA’ METHOD

It is well-known that the monk first learnt the dhyāna method from the Indian master Fo-t’o or Pa-t’o (Buddha).

At the initial stage, he (Seng-ch’ou) has followed and learnt the practice of ‘Cessation and Insight’ (chih-kuan 止観) from a Master of dhyāna, Tao-fang 道房, who was an outstanding disciple of dhyāna master Buddha. However, the method he learnt did not work for him. The biography states that ‘After receiving the dhyāna method . . . he had controlled his thoughts (lien-nien 歙念) for a long period, but completely without either concentration or realization.’ Being frustrated, he intended to leave the mountain where he sat in meditation. Unexpectedly there came a monk from Tai mountain 泰嶽. Seng-ch’ou related his frustrations and he was advised by the monk that “the cultivation of dhyāna should be with care and should not have any other will than carefulness because all the sentient beings universally possess the initial taste of dhyāna,” Seng-ch’ou followed this advice, concentrated his mind for ten days and actually achieved the concentration. So he mediated according to the holy practices of the Four Applications of Mind as taught in the Mahâ-parinirvâna-sûtra, and freed himself from desires and thoughts.

Apart from Tao-fang and the monk from T’ai Mountain, he also learnt the Sixteen Extraordinary and Victorious Methods from a dhyāna master named Tao-ming 道明. After a long period of practice and effort, Seng-ch’ou “demanded his mind with death” and determined not to be distracted, “he consequently entered into deeper concentration (shenting 深定). He sat for nine days without movement. After waking from
the concentration, both his feelings and thoughts became purer. When he examined and defined worldly affairs, he found that there was absolutely no happiness.”

After that experience, he went to Shao-lin 少林 monastery, met and presented his experience before patriarch Buddha. The patriarch praised the attainment of the monk by saying that “From Pamir eastward, you are the person who knows the highest taste of dhyāna.” Thereafter, Seng-ch’ou stayed with the patriarch and further learnt the deeper essence. The biography also informs us that on a request from Li Chiang 李獎, a huang-men shih-lang 黃門侍郞 and several great monks, Seng-Ch’ou wrote a book called Chih kuan fa 止観法 (‘The method of Cessation and Insight’) in two chapters. The book was very popular among those who were interested in dhyāna as it has been copied and preserved in many houses.

Apart from Seng-ch’ou’s biography, we do also have some references on his method of dhyāna from other biographies, which are helpful to an understanding of his teachings. For example when Seng-yung 僧邕 (543–631) became a disciple of Seng-ch’ou, he quickly learnt the method of dhyāna from the master within a few days. The master was impressed, so he touched the disciple with affection and said: “The five stops and the four Applications of Mind are completely in his control!”

Another example is found in the biography of Chih-shou 智首 (567–635), which states that “Chih-min 智旻 was another great commander of the dhyāna school, and a pre-eminent figure in the Learning of Mind, and he was the gifted disciple of noble Ch’ou.”

From the aforementioned material, some clues of Seng-ch’ou’s methods of dhyāna emerge. We may now proceed to inquire into these technical terms, and attempt to find out their relation to meditative practices in the context of the Buddhist tradition at large.

First of all, it is well recognized that the method of dhyāna learnt by Seng-ch’ou was from the Indian monk, Buddha. What was the method? The biography states that his “learning was to devote his attention to quiet controlling, and his determination was to look into correct [insight] (kuan-fang 観方).” The term kuan-fang is tricky as it can also be translated as “to see places” or “to look a square object.” The former relates to the wandering to places and the latter refers to the technique of entering into dhyāna. All these interpretations are relevant to dhyāna practice, and my choosing of the vague expression is mainly because our knowledge of Buddha’s practice is rather ambiguous. The biography
continues that "associated with six friends including himself, they mutually followed the way of karma (nieh-tao)。Five of them have attained the fruit, only Buddha alone got nothing. Thereafter he practised more diligently as if to save the cloth on his body [from fire]."²³
The term nieh-tao probably is a rendering of the Sanskrit term karma-patha or kammappatha in Pali, which has been translated as "course of action."²⁴ Edgerton has noted that in many Buddhist texts, this is a reference to a set of ten good or bad actions. It is regarded as a "belief in the law of fruition of actions."²⁵ The practice must have been popular in India as both Pali and Sanskrit sources referred to the term. Buddha's early failure in his attempt recalls Seng-ch'ou's earlier unsuccessful effort in the practice of dhyāna. This karmic practice of dhyāna seems more traditional.

The other clue to Buddha's method is found in a Tun-huang manuscript, which summarizes his doctrine as "the highest principle is not in words, and the sage's mind is unhindered."²⁶ The manuscript itself is a collection of summaries without other indication. I have attempted to find out whether the words on Buddha's method are a quotation from any scripture but the result is negative. However, since Buddhists always regard the word (vac) as instrumental but not absolute in itself, I trust it as traditional.

'CHIH-KUAN' 止觀 OR 'CHENG-KUAN'正觀?

Another important term in Buddha's method of dhyāna which has occurred in the biography of Seng-ch'ou is chih-kuan or 'Cessation and Insight.' As has been noted earlier in this paper, the term has twice occurred in the biography: once to describe what he learnt from Tao-fang, and again as part of the title of a manuscript written by Seng-ch'ou. Apart from this, there is no other source to support the claim, nor has the term appeared in the biographies of his teachers and disciples. Henceforth, we do not have any clue to work on this term, although it was very popular in meditative texts.

However, in manuscript 5 ascribed to Seng-ch'ou, there is a paragraph which is very significant to the discussion. It states:

The Szuyi ching 思益經 (Viśeṣacintābrahmaparipṛcchā) says that the non-clinging of nirvāṇa is the right insight (cheng-kuan). Right insight is of three kinds: first, the insight which differentiates falsity and preserves the real; second, the insight of the real wisdom of true Such-
ness; and third, true Suchness that originally has no arising. Ultimately speaking, scholars should never seek concentration by abandoning deconcentration, nor seek purity by turning back on impurity. If one abandons deconcentration in order to seek concentration, what he will attain is the deconcentration but not concentration. If one turns back on impurity in order to get purity, he will get impurity but not purity.  

Although the term chih-kuan was a popular term in the earlier dhyāna texts translated into Chinese, it became a term of the T'ien-t'ai school exclusively from the seventh century A.D. onward. With this in mind, we may say that the term occurred in Seng-ch'ou's biography due to two possibilities: one was that the monk followed the term from the early dhyāna texts; the other was that the term is a miscopying of cheng-kuan. In Chinese characters chih 止 and cheng 正 are very similar in appearance and it is quite easy to mistake one for the other.

Because there is no reference to Seng-ch'ou's association with the translated dhyāna text, and the emphasis on his learning of dhyāna from his teachers, as well as the usage of cheng-kuan in the manuscript ascribed to him, I am inclined to think that cheng-kuan seems more likely the term for his method. However, there are some other unsolved problems on the manuscript itself at this stage, thus making the discussion inconclusive. Of the problems concerning the manuscript, some quotations are found in current versions and some are not.

FOUR APPLICATIONS OF MIND (四念處)

The other term that appeared in his biography is the Four Applications of Mind (szu-nien-ch'u or smrtypasthāna). This doctrine is one of the old teachings accepted by all Buddhists. The term has occurred twice in the biography of the monk, and once in the life of his disciple. As far as the monk is concerned, we are informed that he has deepened his meditation by practicing the method. It has also been stated that he has discoursed on the doctrine extensively to the king of the North Ch'i. In the biography of his disciple Chih-hsün 智舜 (533–604), it was stated that he was originally a distinguished Confucian scholar, who unexpectedly obtained the Contemplation on the impurity of the Body. Thereby he visualized that his bowels etc. flew out. His shock and disgust at this was inexpressible. Not only did he see the impure phenomena in himself, but he saw other people he met suffering from the same.
This is exactly the first Application of Mind, which advises, “the monk should reflect on this very body enveloped by the skin and full of manifold impurity.”

The term *smṛtyupasthāna* or *satipatthāna* is usually translated as “application of mentality, of awareness” or *nien-ch’u* as the subject for reflection in meditation. It is connected with mindfulness, hence a part of the *dhyāna* method in Buddhism. As this is an orthodox method of meditation, and it is mentioned both in Theravādin and in Mahā-yāna texts, and in the biographies, it is doubtless an important subject in the method of *dhyāna* followed by Seng-ch’ou.

**THE FIVE STOPS (‘WU T’ING’ 五停)**

Along with the term of Four Applications of the Mind, we find another term in the biography of Seng-yung (543–631), a disciple of Seng-ch’ou. It states that this monk renounced his household life and learnt the *dhyāna* method from Seng-ch’ou. He was able to learn it within a short period of a few days only. The teacher was very pleased, so he told others that “The Five Stops and Four Applications of Mind are [now] completely in this disciple.” The term Five Stops is rare and I have found almost no other reference on it. However, when looking into the Tun-huang manuscripts, there is a reference to the term. The reference is in manuscript 2. Since the term has not occurred in other material but is only found in the biography and the manuscript, and both of these materials are ascribed to Seng-ch’ou, this makes one inclined to think that the manuscript really contains the doctrines of Seng-ch’ou as described. It is with this in mind that some of the teachings contained therein may be counted as his.

What then is the *dhyāna* method taught by Seng-ch’ou? The manuscript states:

**Q:** What is called *dhyāna*?

**R:** *Dhyāna* is concentration. As it is achievable in sitting, so it is called *dhyāna*.

**Q:** When *dhyāna* is called concentration, does it mean the concentration of mind or body?

**R:** Sitting cross-legged concentrates the body, mental controlling concentrates the mind.

**Q:** The mind is formless, how can it be looked upon and be controlled?

**R:** It is like wind having no form of itself; one can determine it
The aforementioned manuscript shows that the Five Stops are a unique term and a concept of the monk. It refers to the achievement of freedom of mind from material and mental objects. Because the Five Stops are mentioned in connection with the 18 dhatus or realms, my suggestion is that the term means the stopping of the five physical organs, namely eyes, ears, mouth, nose and body from external influences. These five belong to the physical category; the mind alone belongs to another category which is more crucial to spiritual cultivation. It is probably for this reason that the two longest Tun-huang manuscripts ascribed to Seng-ch’ou were entitled “The Method for Quieting down the Mind” and “The Mental Practice of Mahāyāna.” This shows that mental condition and practice are the principal teachings in the Seng-ch’ou dhyāna method. This emphasis on the mind has also the support of biographical reference. Taking the life of Chih-min, a disciple of Seng-ch’ou as an example, the biography says “Min was another commander in the dhyāna school, and a pre-eminent figure in the Learning of Mind (hsin-hsūeh) and he was a gifted disciple of noble Ch’ou.”

MENTAL CULTIVATION

The manuscripts contained several passages on his concept of the material world and its impact on the mind. It also, of course, gives advice as to how to free the mind from the impact or to stop the impact on the mind. Manuscript 5 states that the cultivation is of two kinds: “First to enter into the Principle (li 理 from the external realms; and second, the functions which arise from the Principle.” The entering into the Principle means both the mind and body are free from thought of
worldly objects. When this is translated into actions, it means the mind does not arise when one hears good works nor will it stray when one sees evil objects. How can one free himself from the good and bad experiences? A higher understanding or Principle is required. Manuscript 2 states that it should be so because:

All external conditions have no immutable forms of their own. Right and wrong, becoming and disbecoming are all only from the mind. If one is able to attain no-mind, he will not be hindered by dharmas . . . If one's mind does not mind anything, who will distinguish right from wrong? If rights and wrongs are all negated, all forms of things will be peaceful forever. Because dharmas and the ten thousand delusions are all like the Principle of Suchness.36

Interestingly this quoted passage is also found in the Tsung-ching lu 宗鏡錄 (‘The Mirror of the School’), a Ch’an collection of the 10th century A.D. This indicates that in the history of Chinese Buddhism, Seng-ch’ou’s method of dhyāna has always been understood as such. And, because his influence had already declined considerably at the time when the sectarian Ch’an struggle became hot in the later half of the eighth century and onward, the Ch’an monks occasionally criticized Seng-ch’ou’s method, but probably did not bother to alter it as it did not affect their sectarian interest.

The method for the cultivation of mind as stated in the manuscript comprises two stages: the first one is to enter into the Principle from the external realm. This, I believe, refers to how to stop the impact or effect of external affairs on the mind. To achieve this means one must have a thorough understanding of what the worldly phenomena really are. This is one of the essential doctrines in Buddhism. Seng-ch’ou’s method, therefore, seems nothing new, though his expression is more explicit and concise. The second stage of his cultivation is the functions arisen from the Principle. This means that once one’s mind understands the true nature and hence is freed from the worldly phenomena, one will act differently. The body and mind still function in the world but no longer are affected by the world. The understanding of the world was not for the sake of an understanding itself, but aimed at a transformation of life. The first stage is the transcendence of mind, and the second is the transformation of action and thought. The two stages are equally important.
Once the mind is transcended, the manuscript states that the mind will be like a great sea that is able to receive all water from big rivers and small streams without any discrimination. It will be like the great earth which carries all lives of the world, tireless and without distinction towards whatever it has carried. It will be like an axletree while the world resembles a wheel. The wheel turns while the axletree remains still.

**SIXTEEN EXTRAORDINARY AND VICTORIOUS METHODS**

It may be recalled that Seng-ch’ou had learnt the Sixteen Extraordinary and Victorious Methods from the dhyanā Master Tao-ming. We have no other reference on Tao-ming and the Sixteen Methods ascribed to him are peculiar. The earlier reference to the term is found in the Hsiu hsing Tao ti ching one of the earlier dhyanā texts translated into Chinese by Dharmaraksa in 284 A.D. The text has been classified within the Hinayāna tradition, and the full title of the methods is called the Sixteen Extraordinary and Victorious Methods For Counting Breath (Shuhsi shih-liu te-sheng fa). The subject matters of the methods are reflective awareness of breath and mental process.\(^{37}\)

Because dhyanā is a practical method but not the end of religious life itself, our knowledge of dhyanā in Hinayāna and its relation to Mahāyāna meditation is still ambiguous. As far as my limited research is concerned, except the difference of the place of dhyanā in the whole of religious life as expressed in the stīla-samādhi-paśñā and the six pāramitā systems, Hinayāna and Mahāyāna respectively, we really know very little about other differences if there were any. In his method Seng-ch’ou has mentioned the six pāramitās, Bodhisattva, Mahāyāna etc. All these indicate that he has consciously expressed that he followed the Mahāyāna tradition. This indication is also supported by his teaching. His analogy of mind as a great sea, the earth and an axletree as well as that the functions arise from the principle, all give us an impression that after the awakening, the enlightened holy man still remains within and works for sentient beings. There will, however, be no “withdrawal from the world” or the eight cognitions as in the Hinayāna Tradition.\(^{38}\)

**THE CH’AN CRITIQUE**

There are some expressions in the manuscripts that are similar to later Ch’an documents: “It is like drinking; only the drinker knows how cold or hot the water is,”\(^{39}\) for example, is a well-known phrase. “No Mind” and “Nothing is obtainable”\(^{40}\) are other examples. These

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expressions testify to common views shared both by Seng-ch'ou and later Ch'an monks. Yet on the other hand, there is Seng-ch'ou's insistence on sitting in meditation, the usage of traditional terminology like the six pāramitās, as well as expressions like "the doubt and delusion will gradually be removed. One will then read Mahāyāna Scriptures and immediately one's mind will correspond with them." The sitting in meditation, the reading of scriptures and the gradual progress in religious life are, of course, not acceptable to many sectarian Ch'an monks. These doctrinal and practical differences between the method of Seng-ch'ou and the later sectarian Ch'an Buddhism are the reasons why the latter has criticized Seng-ch'ou and Shen-hsiu.

NOTES

1 Translated from Hsü Kao seng chuan 續高僧傳 ('Further biography of the Eminent Monks' Hereby it is referred to as HKSC) in Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經 (hereafter it will be referred to as T.) No. 2060, p. 596b.


3 For example, see T'ang Yung-t'ung 湯用彤, Han wei liang chin nan pei ch'ao fo chiao shih 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 ('A History of Buddhism from the Han to the South-North Dynasties period'), Peking, 1955, vol. II, pp. 791-2.

4 See Yanagida Shozen 柳田聖山, Shoki zenshu shisho no kenkyu 初期禪宗史書の研究 ('A Study on the Early Historical books of the Ch'an School), Kyoto, 1967, facsimile plates xv-xviii.

5 See later parts of this paper.

6 HKSC op. cit. pp. 553b-555b. Unless it is noted, all translations from HKSC and the Manuscripts ascribed to Seng-ch'ou are mine.

7 For example, see HKSC p. 583c, 569c and 614a.

8 From HKSC op. cit. p. 554a.

9 The biography of Seng-ch'ou in Shen seng chuan 神僧傳 ('Biog. of divine monks') in T.2064, pp. 966b–967b is the best example.

10 From 金丹未足比，玉屑豈能勝 Ms. 4 line 10 in coloph.

11 From HKSC op. cit. p. 555a–b.

12 Ms. 5 lines 60–67.

13 In the biography of the Indian monk, his name appeared as Fo-t'o 佛陀, HKSC op. cit. p. 551a; while in the biography of Seng-ch'ou, the name appeared as Pa-t'o 跋陀, ibid. p. 553c.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 554c.
From Nyanasatta Thera’s translation of Satipatthana Sutta, The Foundations Nyanamoli op. cit. see Edgerton, loc. cit.

Translated from 至理無言, 聖心無礙 in Ms. 1. lines 3–4.

Translated from Ms. 5, lines 89–93.

For example I could not find the quotation from Szu yi ching in Kumarajiva’s translation in my preliminary check.


Edgerton, op. cit., p. 614b.

For Buddhaghosa’s description of concentration, see Nyanamoli op. cit. pp. 386 ff.

From HKSC op. cit. p. 583c.

Translated from MS. 2, lines 14–19.

See note 21 above.

From Ms. 5 line 17.


For a detailed description of these 16 methods, see T.606 vol. XV, p. 216a.

For example, see Ed. Conze, Buddhist Meditation (New York, 1968) pp. 158ff.

Ms. 2 lines 29–30: 如人飲水冷暖自知.

i.e. wu-hsin 無心 wu-te 無得 from Ms. 2 lines 5 and 6.

See ibid. translated and noted in n. 33 above. It is of great interest that the cross-legged sitting is also referred to in Seng-ch’ou’s biography, see HKSC op. cit. p. 554a line 7.

Translated from Ms. 2, line 27.

T’an-ch’ien  and the Early Ch’an Tradition: Translation and Analysis of The Essay “Wang-shih-fei-lun”  亡是非論

Whalen W. Lai

Gautama the Buddha attained enlightenment under the bodhi tree through a series of yogic trances. This being the case, it is natural that meditation (dhyāna, ch’an 禅) should be seen by many to be at the heart of the Buddhist path. Precepts (śīla, 戒), meditation (samādhi, 定) and wisdom (prajñā, 慧) were set down by the Buddha as the three steps leading to liberation. If these three are seen as normative, then one has to say that when the Buddhist Dharma was introduced into China beginning some time in the first century A.D., more often it was the magical and/or the intellectual aspects of the faith that attracted the attention of the Chinese. The declassé intellectuals, the Neo-Taoists, were drawn to the emptiness philosophy. The rulers and the populace were fascinated by the magical powers of foreign monks. It took a relatively longer period of time before the vinaya 律 and the dhyāna aspects sank into the Chinese Buddhist consciousness. The southern dynasties during the period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–589) were especially notorious for their laxity in cultivating these two “practice” aspects of the program leading to wisdom and enlightenment. Thus we find, in the Lives of Eminent Monks (Kao seng-chuan 高僧法), a predominance of “lecturer-monks” known primarily for their philosophical expositions of the sūtras (義解)—primarily the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.¹ The compiler of the Lives, the monk Hui-chiao 慧皎, could not count one truly great meditation master during his time, that is, under the reign of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (502–556) 梁武帝.² The Emperor’s reign is supposed to be the high watermark of Buddhist piety and prosperity in the south; the king alone had in his entourage five hundred ‘black and white monks’ (黑白僧).³ Since the Kao seng chüan recorded primarily eminent monks’ biographies in the south, a simple comparison of the percentage of meditative masters in this collection with the later Lives
The meditative tradition is clearly under-represented in the Liang collection: there were only 32 biographies or 6.43% of the total number of lives recorded.

In all three Lives, miracles abound and are not associated only with the miracle-workers (shen-i 神異 [Liang KSC] but kan-t'ung 感通 [T'ang, Sung KSC]), because magical powers were often seen as attributes of yogins also and associated with foreigners (translators included). Asceticism went to the extreme of self-immolation and religious suicide (wang-shen 亡身 [Liang KSC] but i-shin 遣身 [T'ang, Sung KSC]) by the “body-forsakers,” some of whom followed this path in “defense of the Dharma” (護法, a category absent in the Liang KSC which predated the 574-6 persecution of Buddhists in the north). My count of ascetic practitioners among the Liang meditative masters numbers fifteen out of the
total of the twenty-one individual biographies. More than any other group in the biographies recorded, these yogins were clouded with mystery for they were seen to be spiritual virtuosos (Weber's term) and therefore verging upon the superhuman. Great yogins were usually of "unknown origin" and without the usual family, clan and such earthly beginnings. They also disappeared mysteriously in many legends: the corpse would not decompose or the person vanished without a trace.

That yogic powers should awe men in this medieval period of spiritual extravagance should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with such eras of faith. However, in comparing Hui-chiao's appreciation of dhyāna with Tao-hsüan's 道宣 understanding of Ch'an in the Liang and the T'ang Lives' prologues to the sections on meditative masters, one comes away with the impression that Hui-chiao was more susceptible to a magical interpretation of the power of yoga. This is how Hui-chiao viewed dhyāna:

As to dhyāna 禪也, it is that which is in tune with the myriad things. Therefore there is no dharma (no reality) that it does not 'engage' itself to (i.e. 'go alongside with') and no object-realm that it cannot inspect. However, [the ability to] go along with all things and inspect all realms is only [the function of] its being quietistic and lucid. It is like the deep pond: when the waves are calmed down, then you can see clearly through to the fishes and the stones. When the water of the mind is clear, it (too) can quietly illuminate (all), there being nothing hidden (from its view). Lao-tzu said, "Weightiness is the root of lightness; quietude is the master [alternative version: the root] of hurried activity." Therefore lightness will always have weightiness as its basis and hurried activity will make quietude its foundation. The Ta chih tu lun [Mahāprajñāparamitā-sūtra]? says, "(It is) analogous to taking medicine: (it) makes the body provisionally [i.e. temporarily] cease from its household chores. When spirit and power are (once more) balanced and healthy, (the body) is recalled to take charge of the family affairs." Thus one relies on the power of meditation to take in the medicine of wisdom. When the powers return, one returns (to the world) to edify sentient beings. Thus the Four Infinite Minds (四等 視) and the Six (supernatural) Powers (六通, sadabhiṣṭā) arise from dhyāna. The Eight Excellent (yogic means) (八勝 視) and the Ten (meditative) Focuses (十通 視) are established by samādhi. Therefore we know the
greatness of function of dhyāna . . . [A brief history of the meditative tradition in China is given at this point by Hui-chiao, who noted how meditation enabled men to “tread in joy within, control the evil and good spirits without, ward off ghosts in layered rocks and gain visions of spirited monks at precipices . . . ” The ch’an masters could come and go within the infinite or return to the pure sources . . . ] The function (i.e. the external power) of meditation is well-manifested and pertains to the realm of the miraculous. Thus it makes the Three Thousand (worlds) reside in (one) single pore and turns the Four Seas into coagulated butter. (It permits a man) to walk through a wall with no obstruction or to control the masses, missing no one. Furthermore, the many ways of the world and the multiple crafts of the immortals can halt the waves and put a stop to the rain, evoke fires and burn down countries. Thus Hsüan-kao 元高 rose from the dead and Tao-fa 道法 rejoined the (great) transformation [of nature] while seated (in meditation). These (achievements) are not exceptional at all! However, in the cases of Udārak-Rāmaputra who finally was disturbed by [sounds of] animals [as he attempted to meditate] or (the case of) the Single-horned Immortal [in India] who was in the end distracted by [the nymph] Śaṁta [in the form of a beautiful maiden],¹² these (failures) are due to the fact that, although the mind and the Tao were already in harmony, yet the eye and the desired object of sight mutually corresponded [and the yogins thereby lost their composure]. (Their achievement) is like the fireflies’ light compared to the sun and the moon [the latter being an attribute of the Buddha’s glory]:¹³ how can they be compared to or put on par with the Buddha? In praise:

Quiet and silent is (the art of) meditation
Deep is the proper cultivation (of it)
If you can put an end to all (mental) burdens (ponderings)
Only then are you equipped to seek out the mystery
Abandon the evils affiliated with the Five Gates (senses?)¹⁴
Attain the ninefold meditations within the forest (temple-monsoastery)
Fast and practise asceticism in mountains and o’er seas (Observe then) the gathering and scattering, the rising and falling (of the elements)
Wide indeed is the power so attained
[Effortlessly as if] the mind is undisciplined!
Hui-chiao’s description and praise of meditation syncretized Taoist categories and Buddhist meditational terms. Although Hui-chiao recognized the importance of meditation for gaining wisdom, he was more intrigued by the ‘functional’ aspect of yogic powers. In his compilation of lives of eminent monks, he gave more coverage to the lecturers and philosophers as if wisdom were the monopoly of the thinkers instead of the goal of the meditationist. Tao-hsüan’s *Lives* written in T’ang after the founding of the Ch’an school is, in this regard, much more sensitive to the integral relationship between meditation and wisdom and shows greater critical disinterest in “miracles for miracles’ sake.”

Yen Chih-t’ui, a gentry convert to the Dharma, also acknowledged the greater understanding the Buddhists had of the working of the mind. Though critical of Taoist miracles and claims to longevity, Yen was receptive to the ‘higher miracles’ found in the *Lotus Sūtra* and was appreciative of the ethical nature of the *karma* doctrine. Except for acknowledging the quietism of the Buddhist faith, his *Family Teachings of the Yen Clan* did not demonstrate a deep understanding of what Buddhist meditation was about. The north, in this regard, was more informed of the nature and purpose of meditation. Wei Shou 魏守, writing in Sui, noted the following concerning the spirit of the Buddhist tradition, in the section “On Buddhism” in the *Wei Shu* 魏書：

The word “Buddha” means ‘pure enlightenment’ (that is), someone who has put an end to the impure and has attained the pure enlightened Tao (or) the Sage enlightenment itself . . . . By gradually accumulating good deeds and eliminating the defilements and evils, and by various transformations, the spirit (in man) can attain the state of No-birth and become enlightened. The stages are many in between, all leading however from the shallow to the deep, the incipient to the manifested. They are based on virtue, on the lessening of desires and the practice of quietism until a pure reflecting mind is attained.

Although the account given above of ‘Buddha’ and the Buddhist path is almost indistinguishable from a conceivably Taoist account of the man of Tao and the Taoist way, Wei Shou had, in my opinion, a more integrated understanding of the nature and goal of the Buddhist meditative tradition. This is to be expected, for the dynamic meditative tradition in sixth-century China was located in the north.

Meditation in China had a minor tradition. An-shih-kao 安世高 and
Dharmarakṣa had made available to the Chinese texts on Buddhist meditation. The techniques involved are those that scholars now would, in the light of the so-called Mahāyāna mediation founded by Bodhidharma and Chih-i, label “Hīnayānist.” There was meditation upon the emergence of evil thought 念惡, meditation based on breathing exercises 安般, meditation based on analyzing impurities 不淨 or on the fifty-five causalities 五十五因縁, etc. Tao-an 道安 is usually credited with insisting upon the importance of both the vinaya and the dhyāna strands and he was critical of armchair Buddhist wisdom-seekers. Therefore The Eastern Chin period in the south saw the growth of a meditation tradition. The arrival of Buddhhabhadra, a meditative master of some renown, encouraged this growth in the Sung and the Ch’i period. Even within the Liang dynasty, there were meditative masters, but the later half of the Liang period saw the advent of mystagogues, especially Fu Ta-shih 傳大師 and Chih-kung 誌公 (both were later recruited into the Ch’an lineage). In the meantime, the north under barbaric rule, nurtured even more famous meditational masters. The barbarian rulers were not cultured enough to appreciate the “empty talk” of the Neo-Taoists and had patronized, from an early date, yogic masters (partly for their magical demonstrations) and monks of pure conduct (because of their examplary model, e.g. Fa-ko). These monks were made spiritual and political advisors or leaders of the sangha. Central Asian influence also prevented the Buddhist faith from lapsing into a salonist enterprise, and Tun-huang 燧煌 and Liang-chou 梁州 exerted their influence in the central plains 中原. Hermitic withdrawal from the world was necessitated in part by the barbaric massacre of natives and by the heroic but questionable enterprise of hierocrats in government stooping to a Tathāgata-king 如來皇帝. The very prosperity of popular piety in the cities, Lo-yang especially, also produced the conservative reactions of meditative masters. Bodhidharma, according to tradition, found all the temple-building in the south to be of no avail as far as enlightenment was concerned and built his home supposedly in a cave; thus the north, by avoiding the pitfalls of intellectualism, has always been the home of the “practice” side of the Buddhist faith.¹⁸

The contrast between southern theoria and northern praxis should not be overdrawn. For the future Ch’an school to take form, a certain level of intellectual sophistication was required—if only for the purpose of discriminatively setting itself off from whatever Hīnayānist legacy there was. (The iconoclastic and anti-intellect style of some Ch’an
masters belonged to a later development.) Already by the early sixth century, the north had mastered the theoria aspect as well as the south. The new capital of Lo-yang saw the patronage of the arts by the cultured emperor, Hsiao-wen-ti (the filially pious and cultured ruler), himself an admirer of the layman Vimalakirti. The arrival of translators Bodhiruci and Ratnamati meant a new era for scriptural learning from the Sanskrit. A Mahāyāna self-consciousness was emerging. Several treatises were written by Chinese monks specifically on the meaning of "Mahāyāna." It is true that the followers of praxis (meditation and sūtra-chanting) did not always look at the new scholar-monks with favour and that the new prosperity only brought about the persecution of the Buddhists in 574–6. Nevertheless, the baptism of rational thinking was in the end necessary. The intellectual stimulations led to better self-understanding and possibly a new Buddhoh-Taoist encounter. One notable figure at that time who combined in himself both the praxis of meditation and the theoria of learning was the monk T'an-ch'ien. One of his surviving writings also testifies to a subtle blending of Taoist and Buddhist elements. It is this piece of writing, the Wang shih fei lun ("On Terminating Opposites"), that I will translate and analyze below.

T'an-ch'ien (542–607), known as the meditative master of a dhyāna temple in the western capital of Sui, was originally surnamed Wang. A native of Hopei, he was born into a family of prestigious background, four years after the northern Wei empire was divided into an eastern and a western half. T'an-ch'ien studied under a famous Confucian scholar, Chuan-hui 極會, and excelled immediately in the I Ching ("Book of Changes"). He digested the Classics and was drawn especially to Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. In the end, he found his heart's refuge in the Buddhist Dharma. After convincing his unwilling parents concerning his vocation, T'an-ch'ien left home and officially entered the order at the proper age of twenty-one, under the vinaya-master, T'an-ching 曇靜. The very first day, he surprised his master with his immediate grasp of the Śrīmālā Sūtra. He accompanied his master to Wu-t'ai-shan and registered more miraculous happenings associated with his spiritual gift. He then went to the capital, Yeh, and studied under T'an-tsun 曙澄, one of the ten famous disciples of Hui-kuang 慧光. Hui-kuang studied under Ratnamati and was a keen interpreter of the Daśabhūmika Śāstra by Vasubandhu. T'an-ch'ien avoided the public and dissociated himself from the outward piety at the capital. He retreated to a temple when, in addition to his meditation, he mastered the Avatamsāka Sūtra, the
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra and the Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna 大乘起信論. Incidentally, this is the first historical reference to the Awakening of Faith, which was to leave its stamp upon the subsequent history of Chinese Buddhist thought. T’ān-ch’ien, only twenty-five or so in 567, diligently worked at the new Yogācāra philosophy introduced to China by Bodhiruci and Ratnamati, so much so that he felt sick. Relying on the power of the Three Refuges and also medicine, T’ān-ch’ien freed himself from the psychic sickness. In a dream, he saw the moon fall and as he ate it, he was cured. Henceforth he adopted the name Yüeh-te 月德 (Moon Virtue). In 574, Emperor Tai-wu of northern Chou (in the western half of the original northern Wei empire), outlawed Buddhism and Taoism while pursuing a strict Confucian orthodoxy. The emperor also waged war against eastern Ch’i. In 577, in the first month of the year, the capital Yeh fell and the Buddhist persecution spread to the east. T’ān-ch’ien and other eminent monks fled south.

Arriving in the south, T’ān-ch’ien immediately impressed the southerners with his scholarship. An official from Kuangsi 廣西 who was staying in the capital made available to T’ān-ch’ien the She ta ch’eng lun 撄大乘論 (Mahāyāna-saṅgrahā) by Asanga and annotated by Vasubandhu, the most detailed text on Yogācāra philosophy available then in China. It was translated in Canton by Paramartha but was neglected by the southerners. Overjoyed with the discovery of this text, T’ān-ch’ien brought it back to his northern fellow-monks at the first opportunity. Even the god of the river ended his stormy temper to provide safe passage for the scripture. T’ān-ch’ien then taught himself the She-lun and gave the first lecture on it in the north, in effect founding the northern She-lun school. In 587, he was recalled by the founding emperor of Sui 隋, Wen-ti 文帝, to the capital and made the resident monk at the Meditative Temple in the western capital. Through his various petitions and influence, the Buddhist Dharma prospered in the new era of political unity. In his own days, T’ān-ch’ien was much revered. He was the leader of the seng (sangha), and despite his youth, his scholarship was recognized even by Ching-ying Hui-yüan 淨影慧遠 who studied under him. His death was much mourned by his contemporaries and his biography in the Hsü Kao seng chüan is one of the longest and clearly well-remembered.20

Yet it is ironic that T’ān-ch’ien did not exert any direct impact upon the future Ch’an schools21 and his scholarship was apparently soon left
behind. He did not belong to any solid Ch’an lineage but stood alone in some outfield. His writings were virtually all lost except for two pieces: one dealing with his bodhisattvic repentence and the other, the Wang shih fei lun, written originally as an occasional piece to put an end to a revival of Neo-Taoist hsüan-hsüeh 玄學 debates in the capital. Were it not for the fact that Chih-yen 智巖 of the Hua-yen school recruited T’an-ch’ien as a forerunner of the hsing-ch’i 性起 theory, even this essay in its entirety might not have been preserved. Perhaps the reason why T’an-ch’ien turned out to be a transitional figure is suggested by Kama- ta Shigeo’s remark below:

The essay on “Pacifying the Mind” by the Monk Wang-ming 僧亡名息心 and the piece “On Terminating Opposites” by T’an-ch’ien, etc. can be seen as attempts to harmonize Buddhism and the philosophy of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. However, in the early Ch’an tradition, there was a conscious effort to dissociate Ch’an from Lao-Chuang, an awareness that the (Buddhist) Dharma was unique, and a critical spirit directed against the limitations of Taoism.22 (Italics added)

The last sentence is significant, especially in light of the general opinion that Ch’an (Zen) is nothing but the synthesis of Taoism with Buddhism. That opinion is not incorrect, but there is critical synthesis and there is uncritical syncretism. Furthermore, it is important to note that during the founding days of the Ch’an tradition (as well as of the T’ien-t’ai and the San-lun school), all the subtle influences of Taoism notwithstanding, the masters seldom had a good word for Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. The masters consciously avoided citing Taoist works to support their thesis, and critically blamed Taoism for failing to comprehend the deeper insights of the Buddhist Dharma.23 For example, Taoism was criticized for being fixated with “mere Void,” for not understanding thoroughly the (contradictory) self-nature of being and non-being, for failing to see the identity between form and emptiness...yes, even for being too otherworldly!24 The last charge is hardly expected since most of us would associate a basic earthliness and love of life with the Taoist tradition and associate its opposite, a kind of death instinct, with the Buddhist nirvāṇa. Whether the charge was fair or not is secondary. What is important is the ideological purity the Buddhists insisted upon their Dharma. The Buddhist argument was that the Taoists sought immortality beyond this life, while the Bodhisattva was truly the person who,
in recognizing *saṃsāra* is *nirvāṇa*, could live in this world, here and now, as if it is *nirvāṇa* itself. (Judging from the dominant trend of religious Taoism, the Buddhist criticism was hardly unjustified.) Because T'an-ch'ien was apparently more receptive to the enterprise of a Buddho-Taoist synthesis, he was probably disowned by the emerging founders of the Sinitic Mahāyāna schools. As a consequence, his one-time renown was covered over as more charismatic figures emerged upon the scene.

It is to put the essay “On Terminating Opposites” into its proper historical context and ideological perspective that I now attempt to translate a fairly difficult piece and to analyze its contents. It is important to note that the essay, though unrepresentative of the perfect Buddho-Taoist synthesis, was definitely not a syncretic jumble of ideas that were only half-digested. Unlike the well-studied Buddho-Taoist encounters in the fourth and fifth century, namely, the scholarship of *ko-i* 格義 Buddhism, T’an-ch’ien did not put Buddhist and Taoist ideas side by side seeking for likely parallels. The early “parallelism” only managed often to reduce the Buddhist Dharma into the Taoist Way. That syncretism put the Dharma on the weaker side of the balance. And it was natural that Tao-an should be critical of such easy accommodations. However, more than a century had passed since the days of Chih-Tun and others, and T’an-ch’ien’s attempt was built upon the more solid foundations of having understood the import of the Buddhist teachings. T’an-ch’ien’s essay may best be characterized as a case of mutual instruction. The Taoist and the Buddhist elements, in cross-fertilization, pointed toward something higher. The *Aufgaben* into a higher synthesis was, however, never complete, yet Chih-yen properly recognized in this essay the germs of the sophisticated Hua-yen doctrine of *hsing-ch’i*, “Essence Aroused” or “Nature Origination.” A century after T’an-ch’ien, the subtle Buddho-Taoist synthesis produced the Hua-yen school, and the result was a sinitic understanding of the Dharma that transcended known Indian and Chinese limits. In the eighth century, overt Taoist motifs re-emerged within the Buddhist fold, and some of the critical sensitivity—to elevate the Dharma above the Tao—was slowly disappearing in a more compromising atmosphere. (That was also the time when Seng Chao and Tao-shen were rediscovered as the predecessors of Ch’an, and unfortunately we still latch onto that retroactive evaluation.) Tsung-mi’s 宗密 *Essay on Man* 原人論 was probably the last successful attempt, while accepting the native Tao as a Buddhist
path, to relegate it to the lowest of the Ch’an paths (外道禅 heretical Ch’an). After Tsung-mi, the fusion of Taoism and Buddhism was such that, at times, the submergence of the Dharma beneath the Tao became a possibility. A critical analysis of the various modes of Buddho-Taoist encounter through the centuries, as outlined above, would require a study in itself. I can only suggest the broad outlines in the more specific analysis of the essay below.

In order to provide a sharp contrast with what a Buddho-Taoist synthesis should not be, I include here an essay by the Taoist, Chang Hsüan-pin 張玄賓, a person “versed in his discourses on emptiness and non-being” (sic). The poem is taken from the Taoist collection, Tung hsien chiian 洞仙传. Chang lived some time during the reign of Wei Wu-ti 魏武帝 (Tsao Wei, third century).

\[
\begin{align*}
&Wu \text{ (nonbeing) is the home of the Great Yu (being)} \\
&\text{Small Yu is thereby born} \\
&\text{Accumulate small } yu \text{ to nurture the small } wu \\
&\text{Intuit the Great } Yu \text{ to ground oneself upon the Great } Wu \\
&Yu-yu \text{ (there-being-being) is also } wu \\
&Wu-wu \text{ (there-being-not nonbeing) is also } yu \\
&\text{Therefore my eyes do not see things} \\
&\text{Things do not recognize } wu \\
&\text{Abide by } yu \text{ to complete } wu \\
&\text{Abide by } wu \text{ to gain } wu \\
&\text{This } wu \text{ is without a home} \\
&\text{The ultimate void (t’ai-k’ung 太空) also resides in } wu \\
&\text{Before I was born} \\
&\text{All under heaven is } wu-wu^{21}
\end{align*}
\]

Except for the poetic charm (or license) in juggling the suggestive metaphysical terms \( yu \) and \( wu \), the poem is a weak imitation of Mādhyamika dialectics. In the end, the poem makes little logical or inspirational sense and no higher vision emerged out of the juxtaposition. Such is not the case with T’an-ch’ien’s essay.

A word of caution is needed before going on to an attempt at translating the essay below. The essay is extremely abstruse because of the nature of the Chinese language and T’an-ch’ien’s attempt to create a Buddhist dialectic out of the simpler Taoist paradoxes found in the writings of Chuang-tzu. The task of translation is further made difficult
by the corrupted text and variants of the text. By and large, I am following
the critical edition in the Taishō Tripitaka, within the Hua yen... k'ung mu chang 華嚴(經內章門等雜)孔目章 by Chih-yen 智嚴: who cited
the essay by T'an-ch'ien in full.28 Part of the essay is included in the biogra-
phy of T'an-ch'ien in the Kao seng chuan29 and further variants have
been noted by Takamine Ryōshū. I have tried to consult and to incorpo-
rate these textual issues as much as possible, and checked my trans-
lation against two Japanese translations: the incomplete one by Yuki
Reimon30 who was probably the first scholar to call attention to this till-
then obscure figure, and the complete translation by Ui Hakuju pub-
lished posthumously.31 Punctuation in the Taishō is wrong on several
occasions and the meaning is often thereby lost or distorted. On top of
that, I disagree with the Japanese translations at times as well as on oc-
casions with Robert Gimello’s reading,32 though given such a text, I
must admit I can hardly have the final word! A basic problem is the
expression shih-fei, hitherto taken as a compound and given as “oppos-
ite.” Literally, shih means “is” and fei “is-not.” As a verb, shih means
“to affirm” and fei “to deny.” By extension, as a noun derived from
that verb, they mean “affirmation” and “negation,” or “right” and
“wrong,” “agreement” and “disagreement,” etc. At times, as a com-
 pound and for brevity’s sake, shih-fei is “opposites,” “pros and cons,”
“ay and nay.” The multivalence will be evident in the translation.

TRANSLATION

T’an Ch’ien’s Wang shih fei lun 亡是非論33
(“Essay On Terminating Opposites”)

That (there is the tendency) to affirm (shih) oneself and to deny (fei)
others, to heap good upon oneself and evil upon others, is only natural
to (all) things. Because (all) things are so, therefore (there is) wide
dissension in the world and there is nothing that [truly] self-validates.
(Such a situation) is due to the non-attainment (of knowledge) con-
cerning the ills of (holding on to positions of) right (shih) and wrong
(fei). As to the ills, there are ten fallacies to avoid:

1. There is no appropriate subject to right and wrong (shih-fei)
2. The self-nature (of a thing) is indeterminable
3. Both he and I have (truth on his and my side)
4. The bases (of judgement) arise in a dialectical interchange (between the two parties)
5. (Such judgements) fail to reach (i.e. touch) the other
6. There-being (yu 有) and there-being-not (wu 無) [truth on one’s side] (depend on their being) manifested or hidden
7. The (self-)nature (of things) mutually negates
8. Grasping (on to one position) is due to partial feelings
9. [Fallacy exists in] distinguishing (between) right and wrong
10. [Ultimately there is] neither shih nor fei (distinctions)

1. Initially to Elucidate the Absence of an Appropriate Subject

This (person) says, “I am right.” That (person) says, “I am right.” This and that compete (between themselves), thereby making it impossible to (establish) a standard for ‘right’ to follow. Furthermore, that (person) says this (person) is wrong. This says that is wrong in return. This and that compete (in denouncing the other) and consequently do not allow ‘wrong’ an appropriate standard (to follow). The deluded ones always want to have right on their side and always attribute wrong to others. How can this be said to have any (rational) principle? Reason being not thus (present) and (yet) people (still) forcibly make it so—it would lead only to defeat. Can things (themselves) know why they are what they are?

2. The Nature of a Thing is Indeterminable

The nature of (what a thing is) is [i.e. is-ness], shih-hsing (是性), is by virtue of (what it) is (shih-yü-shih 是於是) or (it) is by virtue of (what it) is-not (shih-yü-fei 是於非). The nature of (what a thing) is-not, fei-hsing (非性), is-not by virtue of (what it) is-not or (it) is-not by virtue of (what it) is. [That is to say, the positive or negative nature of a thing can be defined positively or via negativā.] However, the foolish people stealthily merely mutter (among themselves, saying), “What-is is (i.e. being affirms itself; shih-shih 是是); (what-is or being) is not allowed to affirm what-is-not (shih-fei 是非). Also (it is) only permitted (to have) what-is-not (to define) what-is-not (fei-fei 非非; nonbeing only denies). (There should) not be any discourse on (nonbeing) denying being (fei-shih 非是; what-is-not affirms). 37 That is to say, the positive can only be defined positively, the negative negatively, but not otherwise.] (These foolish people) think they themselves possess the principle without
realizing the fallacies involved (in their argument). (I will) venture to
debate with them.

If what-is is (only) by virtue of what-it-is (shih-shih-yu-shih)是是於是，
then there are two mistakes concerning this ‘what-is’ (being): (i) the
fallacy of that-which-is-affirmed (so-shih 所是, i.e. the object affirmed)
and (ii) the fallacy of that-which-affirms (neng-shih 能是, i.e. the subject
that affirms). [Concerning the first fallacy]: if the object affirmed is
(already) is, it already is [that is, being is already being]—what need is
there to affirm (its is-ness). If the object affirmed is not is (fei-shih 非是)38
(if the object is said to be non-existent), then (you) ought to say that its
being is not being (shih-fei-shih 是非是). [This would constitute illogic.]
Why or how can you say that what-is is? [Concerning the second fal-
locy]: That-which-affirms (i.e. the subject that affirms) depends on that-
which-is-being-affirmed (i.e. the object affirmed). (Because of that) it
is said to be the subject. (However, as shown above), if that-which-is-
affirmed (i.e. the object) cannot be established [to be existent, or to have
self-nature, svabhāva by itself], then that-which-affirms (i.e. the subject)
can also not be so established. If both the subject and the object cannot
be established [as real], where is the ‘being’ that ought to be? Again,
concerning (the corollary doctrine held by the foolish people, that) what-
is-not can only be defined negatively (by itself, fei-yū-fei 非於非), the
fallacy (in logic) is just the same. (The foolish people who) customarily
hold on to this mistake without further making distinctions39 (only)
stretch reason (to the above mentioned extent). That cannot be (the
right way to understanding the issue).

3. Both He and I have (Truth on His and My Side)40

When this is, then that is-not. When that-is, then this is-not. This to
that is to have one right and one wrong. The foolish people claim
right to be only on their side, without ever admitting that [from an-
other’s perspective] they (also) have wrong on their side. (They) say that
wrong resides only in others, not allowing (others) to have right. How
can there be any reason to this?

4. The Base (of Judgement) Arises in Dialectics

The cause to deny (others) arises from the mind that self-affirms.
The cause to affirm (oneself) arises from the mind that denies others.41
Because (denying others) arises from the self-affirming mind, therefore
(this) self-affirming [i.e. this self-righteousness on one's part] is not (based upon) the (objective) negation of the faults of others (此即自是者/非/非他非/也). Similarly, (the claim of) right (on my side) comes from the other-deriding mind (in me), therefore (this right) is derived from the (self-righteous) right of deriding others and is not [necessarily] my right. ⁴² [That is, since self-affirmation is derived from the mind's natural impulse to deny others, the fact that others are wrong does not mean that I am thereby inevitably right.] However, the deluded people so partially take 'right' to be their own and attribute 'falsehood' to all others. There is no such principle. This should not be.

5. (**Subjective Judgements**) **Cannot Touch the Other**

All acts to affirm oneself and deny others basically want to see the 'wrong' reaching the other party. However, the other person still says that he is right. Because (he still) claims to be right, it is proven then that the "wrong" never touches him. The tendency to negate others and affirm oneself also wants to have 'right' arriving at this (i.e. one's) side. Yet (the claim that I am right) is still being negated by the other person. Since he denies (my claim), therefore (we) know that 'truth' has not (objectively) arrived at this end. ⁴³ Truth has not abided to my side and yet I still claim to be right. Wrong has not reached his end, and (I still) say that he is wrong. Reason is exhausted and therefore it cannot be so.

6. **Having and Not-having (Truth) Depends on Manifestation and Latency**

It is the nature of things, it seems, to be deluded by their (subjective) feelings ([shih] ch'ing [私情]). (They are) all alike in (their self-affirming tendency) and equal in their detailing wrongs (of others). ⁴⁴ Since (men) equally detail (others') wrongs, there is none in the world who is ever right (by himself). How can I claim to have the sole truth? Since (men) are alike in their self-affirmation, then there is none under Heaven who is with faults. Because (none is) with faults, how can I be at fault? Yet the deluded people says that there is (still) truth that can be (objectively) affirmed and there is falsehood that can be (similarly) denied. The meaning (of reality) is not so, therefore (this way of looking at things) cannot be. [Truth, seen as subjective, is shown here to oscillate between the 'manifested' and the 'hidden' 隱顯. Truth is dependent on perspectives of the moment. The implication is that the hidden and the manifested are two aspects of a shared and changing reality.]
7. The (Self-) Nature (of Things) Mutually Negates

Right, by nature, would automatically negate wrong. Wrong naturally would by itself harm right. As I alone want to set up a standard of right and wrong, then since (one) right is established, inevitably (that would make) many wrongs negate the one right. Since the (one) right has been negated by the many wrongs 是/多非/非故45 how can the one right be right? As the right cannot be right, then how can the wrong be shown wrong? As there is nothing (no object) that can be shown wrong (by a subject), then the wrong has to be shown wrong by itself. (But) the self-invalidating (wrong) cannot itself be wrong; and that which negates the right cannot itself be right. The deluded people are rash.46 (They) want to make right a judge of wrong and use wrong to deny the right. (Their arguments) are not sufficient.

8. Grasping (on to One Position) is Due to Partial Feelings47

That things are biased is all (a matter of) not seeing the other’s point of view (lit. “not seeing what the other sees.”) (This is) because (a person) only knows what he himself knows. As (he) knows only what he knows, (he) thereby assumes (what he knows) to be truth.48 As (he) does not see what the other sees, (he) says the other can only be wrong. If (he) has seen what the other has seen and (then) says that the other is wrong, this perhaps is permissible. However, not having seen what the other has seen, he says that the other is wrong; but why must the other be wrong? Again, if, one knows (only) what one knows and therefore assumes oneself to be right, then this is just a private (or subjective) right. If (the person) intends to make the other person affirm it as (an objective) right then, it would be a mistake and (the person) is being irrational.

9. [Fallacy exists in] Distinguishing Right and Wrong

As the people, arrested in the mundane realm, regard right to be right and wrong to be wrong (they are being) misguided by subtle defilements49 (in the mind). (If they) assume the right to be wrong and the wrong to be right, (it would constitute a case) of perverted views.50 Still (there are others who understand) a higher principle transcending (mundane) realities; (they) regard (making distinctions between) what-is and what-is-not (between, right and wrong) to be wrong and see the absence of (the distinction) between what-is and what-is-not to be right. Still (they are) misguided by one (last) fallacy concerning what-is and
what-is-not: they still retain (the distinction) of a right (view) and a wrong (view). Although what-is and what-is-not is (seen as) similar [at one level], the principle is (still) ruthlessly transgressed [in their total argument]. Now, the deluded people, hearing that (opposites) are (the same), propose that (thereby) sages and common people are the same. Hearing that (opposites) are not (in the wrong), they propose that both the sages and the common people are in the wrong. Reason is abused to such an extent. (Their understanding) is insufficient indeed.

10. [Ultimately There is] Neither ‘shih’ nor ‘fei’

If (one) regards it wrong to (hold on to the distinction between) what-is and what-is-not, and right not to (make) what-is versus what-is-not (distinctions), he is still abhoring [this last set of] right and wrong and cannot avoid being burdened [in his thinking] by (the distinctions between) right and wrong. (He) may, in wanting to put aside this (last) burden, aspire for something still higher, yet in (so aspiring) for something higher, [the distinction between the here and the higher] already exists in his mind and his mind cannot avoid being (once more) burdened (by this distinction). If (one) desires to be without any (form of mental) burdens, nothing is more effective than acquiring a no-mind. There being no mind, what is there to make (the distinctions between) what-is and what-is-not? Right and wrong vanishes, (the distinction between) he and I consequently passes away. As (the distinction between) the not-I and the I disappears, there too is (no longer the sense) of [egocentric] gain and loss.51

The not-so is (now) so. The not-possible is (now) possible. Thus (one can) be free and be actionless (wu-wei 無為), roving at ease (hsiao-yao 逍遙) beyond all (mental) burdens.

[Remarks by Chih-yen:] This (treatise) is in harmony with (the doctrine of) “essence arousal” (hsing-ch'i 性起: “nature origination”). Therefore (I) record it and append it [to this collection, “Notes and Commentaries on the Various Chapters of the Hua-yen Sutra”].52

Assessment of the Significance of the Essay

The Wang shih fei lun was an occasional piece by T'an-ch'ien and should not be regarded as representative of his more major scholarship. The Buddh-Taoist synthesis in the essay might be innate to the intention of the piece—to put an end to hsüan-hsüeh debates then. The Japanese scholars have noted the obvious link with Chuang-tzu, and I
will not belabour this point. The opening lines of the essay were almost taken verbatim from Kuo Hsiang’s commentary on the *Ch’i wu lun* 齊物論. Chuang-tzu knew too well the debaters’ subjectivity of his days and sought to “equalize the opinions” through a demonstration of their relativity, while, at the same time, pointing to the “perspective of the Tao” from which Archimedean viewpoint, differences can be smoothed out into one. Psychologically, this involves “fasting of the mind” 心齋 and cultivating the “no-mind.” This is because, says Kuo Hsiang, “That which lords over (all) is no-mind.” (Nature has no consciousness.) The imitator of nature 自然 “attains no-mind and can function selflessly in the world, adapting to all changes without being burdened.” More specific parallels between T’an-ch’ien and Chuang-tzu have been pointed out by Takamine. The concepts of relativity and no-mind can also be found in the Prajñā-pāramitā sūtras. In the early fourth and fifth century, the so-called prajñā-ist philosophers in China already had a school by the name of *hsin-wu* 心無 (mind being-not; no-mind). If the mind is emptied, all phenomena will disappear and thus phenomena are *proven empty*. The concept of no-mind re-emerged later in Ch’an, in the *Platform Sūtra* no less, and Daisetsu Suzuki has so written on this theme. T’an-ch’ien, in this sense, belonged to a long subcurrent of “no-mind” ideology bridging the Taoist and the Buddhist tradition.

Looking forward, however, we should evaluate why Chih-yen regarded T’an-ch’ien to be the forerunner of a complicated Hua-yen theory called *hsing-ch’i* 性起, “essence-arousal”, a doctrine involving the idea of an autogenesis of the universe in itself and by itself, in all its parts in a coordinated, orchestrated efflorescence of reality. It is not possible to explain the *hsing-ch’i* doctrine here, and it is not at all easy to see T’an-ch’ien’s contribution to the final version of this theory. T’an-ch’ien did suggest, obliquely, the “interrelationship” of all realities, and his use of “mutual causation” 互因 echoed with Hua-yen ideas of “simultaneity” of the parts (for example, in the *Shih hsüan men* 十玄門). Definitely T’an-ch’ien had mastered the Madhyamika tradition better than Seng Chao. If he did not labour on the antinomies involved in concepts of cause and effect (as Seng Chao tried to do, not always successfully), he did explore the more immediate and direct dialectics of mutual negation/dependence of shih and fei. T’an-ch’ien was the necessary transition figure from the days of Seng Chao to the neo-Madhyamika 新三論 practised by Fa-tsang 法藏.

The value of his essay, however, should in the end be judged not by
precedents and continuity (with Chuang-tzu) nor by subsequent developments (in Hua-yen). The essay should be judged on its own terms. Here, two readings are possible, one emphasizing its limitations and the other stressing its potential. The basic drive of the ten points can be summarized as follows:

1. Opposites are basically due to subjective bias.
2. The nature of a thing cannot be self-determined.
3. Rights and wrongs are relative.
4. Affirmations and denials are self-serving in the end.
5. They cannot touch the party affirmed or denied.
6. No one man can be fully and always in the right or in the wrong.
7. Self-validation or -invalidation involves a paradox.
8. Private emotions lack sympathy with others’ viewpoints.
9. Opposites are results of a grasping, discriminating mind.
10. Opposites should be transcended by a no-mind.

Under review, many of these ten items are redundant, repeating a basic point—human subjectivity—in various ways. T’an-ch’ien only applied a more analytical dialectics to proving a Taoist point.

However, a second reading is perhaps possible, and although I might be projecting a hierarchy and a telos that might not be evident in the essay as such, I would nonetheless offer this as the “higher” reading. The ten-steps are then to be understood as a progression:

1. Opposites are due to naive subjectivity.
2. Opposites are shown to contain each other.
3. Opposites are (furthermore) mutual monopolies.
4. Opposites are (also) individually autonomous.
5. Opposites are not negatable by one another.
6. Opposites are two sides of one reality.
7. Opposites may self-destruct.
8. Opposites rest with the false self or subject.
9. a) Opposites exist only at the mundane level.
   b) Opposites disappear at the highest truth level.
   c) Opposites existing between the mundane and the highest truth still come from the mind.
10. Opposites are terminated with the termination of the mind.
The points listed above cannot always be shown to be well-argued by the essay itself. But could not T’an-ch’ien be analyzing oppositions in terms
more than subjectivity (1), that is, also in terms of relativity (2), relationality (3), individual autonomy and negation (4, 5)? By suggesting that being and nonbeing are one in essence but different in manifestation and latency (6), could he not be pointing to the emptiness of the object (7) and then of the subject (8)? Was not the Two Truths theory then brought in (9) only to point to the final doctrine of no-mind (10)?

NOTES

1 The basic survey book is T'ang Yung-t'ung 湯用彤 Han Wei liang Chin Nan pei ch'ao fo chiao-shih 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 (Peking: Chung-hua reissue, 1955).
2 Ibid., p. 794; but the Hsü Kao seng chuan 祥虛 vacid record six.
3 Meaning "a mixed group" with dubious ones.
5 Yūlan 禪, lit. pratyāya, "conditions"; I am following the more original reading, of yūlan "going alongside" or "rim."
6 A common metaphor in Buddhist literature.
7 Better than "heaviness," for weight has dignity.
8 Translated by Kumarajiva, attributed to Nāgārjuna.
9 Sanskrit counterparts based on Issaikyō's notes, vol. 75, p. 265; the four are the yogic states of 慈悲喜捨.
10 Involving telepathic vision and hearing, foreknowledge, etc.
11 No Sanskrit given; meditation upon four colors, four elements, consciousness and emptiness, overlaps with the preceding one.
12 Issaikyō notes, ibid.
13 I am grateful to Prof. Masatoshi Nagatomi (Harvard) for reading my translation and making suggestions, especially for pointing out this frequently-used analogy, for example, in T.32, no. 1651, p.325a, etc.
14 See Jan Yun-hua's essay on Seng-ch'ou above, p.
15 Compare the descriptions; Tao-hsüan's is in T. 50, pp. 595c–7b.
16 Translated as Family Instructions for the Yen Clan by Teng Ssu-yu (Leiden: Brill, 1968).
17 My translation; see Leon Hurvitz' trans. Wei Shou on Buddhism and Taoism (Kyoto: Kyoto University, 1956), for greater details.
18 See Miyakawa Hisayuki 川宮彦雄, Rikuchōshi kenkyū: shukyo hen 六朝史研究宗教篇 (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1964) and Sasaki Kentoku Kan-Gi-Richuchō Zenkan hattenshiron: Retsudentai 漢魏六朝禪観發展史論列傳 (Yamazaki: Kōbuntō, 1936, revised ed.)
19 In contrast to the older theory of a "natural maturation into T'ang Buddhism" (followed by Arthur Wright), Japanese scholars—Tokiwa Dainō, Yuki Reimon,
Michibata Ryōshū, Kamata Shigeo and Ōchō Enichi—emphasized the “charismatic breakthrough and “crisis-mentality” in the north. Robert M. Gimello and I cross paths here on the issues of “New Buddhism” and study of T’an-ch’ien; see his “The Doctrine of ‘Nature-Origination’ in Early Hua-yen Buddhism” (paper read at the Regional Seminar on Chinese Studies at Berkeley, 2/11-12/77) and my “The Emergence of Sinitic Mahayana: T’ien-t’ai,” (paper at the National Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Toronto, 1976).

20 The preceding is from his biography in T.50, pp. 571b-74b.
21 See Yanagida, op. cit., in body of essay, p. 23 (on T’an-ch’ien) and pp. 19–31 for general discussion of the lineages.
24 For example, see Chi-tsang’s disowning of Seng Chao 僧肇 in his San-lun hsuan-i 三論玄義 (T.45, pp. 1c-2a).
26 See my essay on Ts’ai-tung Ch’ian below, pp.
28 T.45, pp. 580c-81b.
29 T.50, p. 573ab.
32 Prof. Gimello presented a talk on T’an-ch’ien at Stanford, April, 14, 1977 and I presented one at Berkeley on the same, February 7, 1977. I am grateful for both conference participants for their comments, and especially to Gimello to letting me draw on his study and the reference to Takamine Ryōshū 高峯了洲, Kegon kumokushō kaisetsu 華厳孔目章解説 (Nara: Nanto Bukkyo, 1964), pp. 190b–92b.
33 Literally, “there-is, there-is-not”; see A. C. Graham’s translation of the second chapter of Chuang-tzu 齊物論 in “Symposium on Taoism”, History of Religions, IX, no. 2–3.
34 Or: Manifested, there-is, hidden, there-is-not.
35 Slight variants in the two earlier versions: 無主 vs. 無適主.
36 Or: How can knowledge of things’ so-being be? I am basing my translation on the Taoist idea that “things are just so” and the sage-knowledge of chih-ch’i-jiang erh-phu-chih-ch’i-so-i-juan 知其然而不知其所以然 knowing they are without knowing why they are.
37 Rf. to point 4 below: common people think that shih is shih, fei is fei without ever recognizing their interdependence or relativity.
Punctuation in Taishō is wrong.

Language here is unclear; other readings possible.

The point seems to be that both, under certain circumstances, can have right on this side.

* Tzu-shih 自是 and sei-t'a 非他 are taken as adjectives describing the mind; alternative reading would run into trouble.

* Alternative reading: "This is the rightness is based on the negation of other non-他者 and is not 非 (thereby) my right 我是.'

* Punctuation in Taishō is wrong; no stop after 驚. Similarly, later on, the ming 明 should be followed by the fact (is not this) that (it) understands (ming).

* Takamine notes variant for 詳 as 相 (p. 191a. op. cit.), i.e. "equal in mutual negation." This is the better reading.

* Alternative cutting—是·多·非·非——would not do.

* Alternative reading, not falling for Taishō's punctuation, is taken by Takamine: "The deluded people strongly want . . ."

* Chinese assume opposition between private feeling 私情 and public principle 公理, or between biased feeling 偏情 and proper principle 正理. Since the word principle has been used, this tension is implied.

* "Wisdom is admitting knowing what one knows and ignorance of what one does not know." 知之為知之不知為不知是知也 (Confucius).

* Defilements, klesa 質; perverted views, viparyāsa 傾倒.

* Or, ignoring the Taishō punctuation, "However, since what they desire is already stored in the mind . . .".

* The language is heavily that of Chuang-tzu, and only tangentially do we see the Madhyamika idea of wu so te k'ung 無所得空.

* T.45, p. 581b.

* See Yuki Remon and Takamine Ryoshu, op. cit.

* Chuang-tzu often made the distinction between "speaking from the side of things" 以物言之 and "speaking from the perspective of the Tao" 以道言之. Differences existing in the former will disappear in the latter.

* This school, unfortunately, has been alleged to be created by a scheming monk merely to make a name for himself . . . and a good living among the Neo-Taoists. For more details, see T'ang Yung-t'ung, Fochiao-shih, pp. 66-72

* In Japanese, Suzuki speaks of mushin no shin; in English, see his The Doctrine of no-Mind.

* A topic virtually untouched in English, see Gimello's paper on 'Nature-Origin' cited and my "Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories," Philosophy East and West (August, 1977). Gimello approaches this issue from a scriptural context while I do so from a more general, philosophical perspective.

* See Gimello, paper cited, for one link.

* Hua-yen, by emphasizing the indissociability of cause and effect, finally abolishes the temporal element; see Garma Chang, The Buddhist Philosophy of Totality (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975) and Francis Cook, Hua-Yen Philosophy: Indra's Net (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977) for two recent English treatments of this school.
It would be interesting to compare T'an-ch'ien's set of ten with the classical Hua-yen tenfold systems on some future occasion.

It is perhaps significant that T'an-ch'ien did not discourse on being and non-being (yu-wu), ontological issues, as did the early prajñā-ists but turned his focus on the more epistemological issue of shih and fei that pertains to "knowledge" or "propositions."

The term Neo-Madhyamika has been applied, in the study of Chinese Buddhism, to the revival of Nāgārjuna by the She-shan masters as well as to an alleged transmission of a late Indian Mādhyamika tradition to Fa-tsang. T'an-ch'ien used a "pyramidic dialectic," i.e. piling up negations in a series upward:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No-Mind</th>
<th>Two Truths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;there-is and there-is-not&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;neither there-is nor there-is-not&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;There-is&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;There-is-not&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This 'ascending dialectics' points finally to the denouncement of the desire to make a distinction (between level 1 and 2) and of the desire to go beyond (distinctions) . . . until the No-Mind solves the impasse. Use of such serial negations, more typical of China than India, has its roots in Chuang-tzu and resurfaces in the Ch'eng-shih school and finds final expression in Chi-tsong. T'an-ch'ien was steeped in this sixth-century tradition but points also toward the neo-San-lun of Fa-tsang.
INTRODUCTION

Tao-hsin 道信 (580–651)\(^1\) is the first Chinese master in the history of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism whose teachings survive. All later Ch'an lineages are unanimous in tracing their origins back to him, and thence to Seng-ts'\(\text{an}\) 僧璨, Hui-k'o 慧可 and Bodhidharma. However, virtually nothing remains of the teachings of Hui-k'o and Seng-ts'an,\(^2\) whereas the discovery by Hu Shih in 1926 of two Tun-huang manuscripts (one in Paris and the other in London) of the *Leng chia shih tz'\u chi* 梶伽師資記 gave us a reasonably authentic version of Tao-hsin’s *Ju-tao an-hsin yao f\i\i\ien f\a\men* 入道安心要方便法門.\(^3\) Furthermore, there are serious problems with the authenticity of the transmission from Bodhidharma to Tao-hsin, so that there is some weight to the argument that it is actually Tao-hsin who is the first patriarch of Ch'an Buddhism and not Bodhidharma. Because this issue has serious consequences and could catapult Tao-hsin into the leadership role of early Ch'an, I shall first examine the historical problems surrounding Tao-hsin before outlining Tao-hsin’s teachings and contributions based on the *Ju tao\ an hs\in yao f\i\i\ien f\a\men* (cited hereafter as *JTFM*).

INFLUENCES ON TAO-HSIN

The earliest biography of Tao-hsin is found among the 133 meditators (Ch'an practitioners) which Tao-hsüan (596–667) inserted into his *Hsü kao seng chuan*\(^4\) (cited hereafter as *HKSC*). In this biography there is no mention that Tao-hsin ever met Seng-ts’an, his traditional link to Bodhidharma. Instead we learn that Tao-hsin was born to a family called Ssu-ma, and became interested in Buddhism at the age of six years old. He spent the next fifteen years of his life studying the Vinaya and meditation under unknown monks. (Later biographers tried to claim that Seng-ts’an was one of these monks.) For the next two decades during the years of his intellectual and spiritual formation he
lived in south China along the Yangtze River where he was deeply influenced by the Perfection of Wisdom tradition and the San-lun School of thought. In particular, he went to the Ta-lin-ssu on Mount Lu, a temple established by Chih-k'ai (533–610), a master of the San-lun School who had studied meditation with T’ien-t’ai Chih-i (538–597). Although Tao-hsin went to the Ta-lin-ssu about the time of Chih-k’ai’s death, by staying on for the next ten years Tao-hsin must have been influenced by the legacy of Chih-k’ai’s T’ien-t’ai religious cultivation. Indeed, the only Chinese master quoted by Tao-hsin in the JTSM is Chih-i, although he did refer with approval to a relatively unknown master, Layman Fu, whose meditation method Tao-hsin had adopted.

When Tao-hsin was about forty years old, he journeyed to Mt. Shuang-feng in the district of Huang-mei, Hupeh. There he became famous and is supposed to have had 500 or more students. Some of those who consulted with him are known: viz., Hsüan-shuang (d. 658), Fa-hsien (577–653), and Shan-fu (d. 660). However, there is no reliable evidence to support the claim of the Ox-head School that their founder, Niu-t’ou Fa-jung (594–657), studied with Tao-hsin. It was during these last three decades of Tao-hsin’s life on Mt. Shuang-feng that the Fifth Patriarch Hung-jen (601–674) studied under him. Later, Hung-jen established his own temple on Mt. Feng-mu which is also in Huang-mei but to the east. Hence, Hung-jen’s teaching (and, by association, Tao-hsin’s teaching as well) came to be known as the East Mountain School (Tung-shan tsung 東山宗). Tao-hsin finally requested Hung-jen to build a mausoleum for him, and on October 23, 651, he passed away.

According to Yin-hsun, the practices of Tao-hsin exhibit important differences from the ascetic, hermit tradition of Bodhidharma. Early Ch’an practitioners had followed the formless path of a Pratyekabuddha based on “silent teaching” which eschewed the paraphernalia of rules, ritual and methods of meditation, and the secure but confining life inside a monastery. In contrast, Tao-hsin’s principle of “establishing a Buddha-image in the temple” (yín-yù li-hsiang 烏字立象) indicates that he advocated some form of institutionalization, whereas his writing on the Bodhisattva precepts (P’u-sa chieh-fa 菩薩戒法) shows his concern with revising traditional monastic regulations in terms of Mahāyāna insights. Furthermore, there is a new focus on specific methods of practice, one of which was “reciting the Buddha’s name to purify the mind” (nien-fo ching-hsin 念佛淨心). All of these innovations
made Ch'an practice more accessible to the people, turning the private and individual act of silent cultivation without any fixed location into a public and group activity grounded in a particular temple. Accordingly, the popularization of Ch'an did not begin with the Sixth Patriarch Huineng (d. 713) but is evident with the Fourth and Fifth Patriarchs, and utilized not the koan (kung-an 公案) or hua-t'ou 話頭 method, but nien-fo 念佛 meditation.\textsuperscript{14}

Based on the HKSC biography and the analysis of Yin-shun there is little reason to connect Tao-hsin with Bodhidharma in preference to the heritage he received from T'ien-t'ai. The JTFM never even mentions Bodhidharma and his lineage, although at the beginning of the JTFM there is a reference to the \textit{Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra} which Bodhidharma had recommended for study.\textsuperscript{15} On the other hand, each of the three main T'ien-t'ai scriptures are quoted in the JTFM.\textsuperscript{16} For example, the \textit{Lotus Sūtra} is used in order to defend the importance of balancing the activities of tranquilizing illusions (chih 止) and discerning the truth (kuan 観), which is a central theme of Chih-i. Furthermore, as we saw, the manner of teaching and practice used by Tao-hsin contrasted radically with the silent asceticism of Bodhidharma. However, it is similar to the T'ien-t'ai style of combining the insight of emptiness (śūnyatā) with its practical realization through such concrete activities as chanting, worship or meditation devices. All of these reasons enable one to appreciate the suggestion made by Sekiguchi Shindai that based on the life and teachings of Tao-hsin one should look for the roots of Ch'an meditative practices not so much with Bodhidharma as in the T'ien-t'ai tradition exemplified by the \textit{T'ien-t'ai hsiao chih-kuan} of Chih-i.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{LEGACY OF BODHIDHARMA}

What then of Bodhidharma? Could the most famous representative of the Ch'an School of Buddhism be nothing more than a symbolic means of providing an “Indian connection” to the lineage stemming from Tao-hsin? Certainly this elusive but unmistakable figure did have a following in his lifetime. We know of at least four direct disciples of Bodhidharma: viz., Hui-k’o, Tao-yü, Seng-fu, and T’an-lin. In the biography of Hui-k’o we read that Bodhidharma commended the \textit{Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra} to him, and that it was esteemed by Hui-k’o’s disciple, Master Na, and by his disciple, Hui-man, for having the essence of Buddhism.\textsuperscript{18} The other disciple of Bodhidharma who made his mark was T’an-lin who compiled Bodhidharma’s only surviving work (\textit{Erh ju
ssu hsing 二入四行
ewline
and may also have written commentaries on the Śrīmālādevi Sūtra and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Thus, we know of two strands of Bodhidharma’s influence that are associated with two different texts: viz., the Laṅkāvatāra line of Hui-k’o, Master Na, and Hui-man; and the Erh ju ssu hsing heritage of T’an-lin.

Although little is known about any transmission beyond T’an-lin, we have some vivid details about the line connected with the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. First of all, the austerities associated with Bodhidharma’s legend are quite evident. When Hui-k’o had his arm severed by villains, his mind was sufficiently in harmony with the idea of non-discrimination and non-dualism that he cauterized the wound with fire and calmly went on begging alms as before. Similarly, his disciple, Meditation Master Na, and Na’s disciple, Hui-man (589–642), only had one robe and ate only once a day, practiced austerities (頭陀行 dhūta-guṇa), and on occasion even refused the normal comforts of warm lodgings amid winter snows.

Secondly, the line became formalized enough to be called the One Vehicle School based on the doctrine of one vehicle found in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra wherein the enlightened do not discriminate, for there is no grasping and nothing grasped, but only abiding in Suchness. This effort to reject false discrimination and dualism is a prominent feature of the Erh ju ssu hsing and also the JTFM of Tao-hsin, while the use of the label “one vehicle” recurs in Hung-jen and in the epitaph of his student Fa-ju.

Thirdly, by the seventh century the lineage of the One Vehicle or Laṅkāvatāra School became complex and controversial. In the biography of Fa-ch’ung 法沖 (587–665?) in the HKSC there are twenty-eight people connected with the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, twelve of whom had written commentaries totalling seventy fascicles. Amidst this hub of activity, Hui-k’o at least is recognized as the link to Bodhidharma. In contrast to Hui-k’o’s own biography, however, Master Na is just one among many heirs to the teaching. Nevertheless, it is important to note that included along with him is a disciple called Seng-ts’an, although Tao-hsin’s name is conspicuous by its absence. Nor is Tao-hsin linked with the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra in his own biography. Instead, it is Fa-ch’ung who claimed to be the true inheritor of the tradition, although when the biography was written the issue was far from settled. What is clear, therefore, is that in the eyes of Tao-hsüan, who must have written this biography near his own death, the line of transmission
from Bodhidharma based on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* involves Seng-ts'\'an as a secondary figure while Tao-hsin is not involved at all!

This posed a problem for Hu Shih since the *Leng chia shih tz'u chi* ("Record of the Masters and Disciples of the Laṅkāvatāra," cited hereafter as *LCSTC*) which he had uncovered in 1926 gave extended biographies for (1) Guṇabhadra, the translator of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, (2) Bodhidharma, (3) Hui-k'\'o, (4) Seng-ts'an, (5) Tao-hsin, (6) Hung-jen, and (7) Shen-hsiu.\(^{29}\) As we can see, this lineage is very close to the classic Ch'\’an lineage of later times. However, this account from the *LCSTC* represents a very different view of the Laṅkāvatāra lineage from the earlier account in the *HKSC* by Tao-hsüan which we have just examined. According to all the biographical items in the *HKSC* which have any remote connection with Bodhidharma, there is no connecting link between him and Tao-hsin. Indeed, there is more evidence to suggest that Tao-hsin follows in the T'ien-t'ai tradition through the influence of Chih-k'ai, and this is supported when we examine the content of Tao-hsin's *JTFM*. If there is any validity to the lineage from Bodhidharma to Tao-hsin as advocated by the *LCSTC* and later Ch'\’an, we must look to other documents.

**EARLY CH’AN LINEAGE**

The very first historical record of the classic Ch’\’an lineage appears almost forty years after the death of Tao-hsin. A disciple of Hung-jen for sixteen years named Fa-ju 法如 (638–689) was commemorated with an epitaph which recorded the traditional lineage from Bodhidharma to Hui-k'\'o, Seng-ts'\'an, Tao-hsin, Hung-jen, and finally to Fa-ju.\(^{30}\) In addition, the epitaph contains assurances of being able to attain one’s original nature quickly and to enter into the “one vehicle,” but also affirms that this is through a special transmission not relying on words. Although the author of the epitaph is unknown, the custom was to have a well-known acquaintance compose it shortly after the death of the person being honored. Thus the lineage reported here would have been learned from Fa-ju, who had ample time to learn it from Hung-jen, who certainly would have known who Tao-hsin’s teacher was. Indeed, since Fa-ju spent sixteen years with Hung-jen, he would have arrived in the Huang-mei area in 658 when many of Tao-hsin’s students and teachings were still alive and the memory of Tao-hsin’s teachers still fresh. Thus, it appears that the traditional lineage of Ch’\’an existed by 689, and probably was constructed by 650 before the death of Tao-hsin.\(^{31}\)
A similar record in stone of the first five Ch’an masters is found in the stele to Ta-t’ung Shen-hsiu (d. 706) written by Chang-yüeh (667–730). In this epitaph the “teaching of East Mountain” is referred to, while the Lankavatāra is given as the core of Buddhism. However, after listing Bodhidharma down to Hung-jen, Fa-ju is replaced by Shen-hsiu as the inheritor of the lineage.

Another document of the same period shortly after the death of Shen-hsiu is the Chuan fa pao chi which harmonized these two epitaphs by presenting the lineage of Bodhidharma, Hui-k’o, Seng-ts’an, Tao-hsin, Hung-jen, Fa-ju and Shen-hsiu. This text also presents the first biography of Tao-hsin which gives a narrative report of his encounter with Seng-ts’an. As we have seen, the lack of any biographical materials showing a meeting between Seng-ts’an and Tao-hsin (as well as the lack of any significant influence from the Bodhidharma line) made it hard to give credence to the lineage advocated by later Ch’an. However, in the Chuan fa pao chi not only does Tao-hsin stay for eight or nine years with Seng-ts’an, but he wants to follow Seng-ts’an to Lo-fu but is not able to do so. Thus, the lineage of Fa-ju becomes embellished with enough persuasive details to replace the silence of the HKSC and to establish the line for later orthodoxy.

However, the best source for our study of Tao-hsin appears in a fourth document. It is in the LCSTC compiled by Ching-chüeh (683–750?) that Tao-hsin achieves his highest position. Although this text is generally placed in the K’ai-yüan period (712–741), Yanagida and Hu Shih feel it was written by 716, whereas Yin-shun dates it about 720. The LCSTC is the first text which lists the early masters in numerical order. As if to emphasize the role of the Lankavatāra Sūtra, it inserts the translator Guṇabhadra (394–468) as the first master ahead of Bodhidharma, but later omits Fa-ju, and ends with Shen-hsiu and P’u-chi. Among the eight masters listed, clearly the most space is given to Tao-hsin whose section occupies a third of the whole text. Obviously by this time Tao-hsin had been accepted as a legitimate exponent of the Lankāvatāra line. However, even here we should not ignore the underlying discrepancies between the actual teachings and practices of these great masters and the efforts of Ching-hsüeh to make them appear as enthusiasts of the Lankavatāra Sūtra. As the JTFM demonstrates, this is hardly the case for Tao-hsin who only refers to it once, nor is it true for Hung-jen. Instead, what seems to be expressed by the LCSTC is a vivid change in the religious climate. Early in the seventh century the
many teachers listed in the biography of Fa-ch’ung earned their prominence through proving their expertise in the transmission of an Indian Buddhist text, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. However, by the end of the seventh century exponents of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* probably were being left behind as Chinese developed confidence in the authenticity of their own Buddhist experience. Accordingly, by the early eighth century “Laṅkāvatārists” sought to draw strength to themselves by exploiting their connection with the Chinese meditation masters Tao-hsin, Hung-jen and, especially, Shen-hsiu, whose role in Chinese Buddhism had gradually gained national recognition.  

In conclusion, I would advise that we bow to the evidence in the *HKSC* that the line from Bodhidharma which was connected directly to interpretation and exegesis of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* leads to Fa-ch’ung and has little to do with his older contemporary, Tao-hsin. Nevertheless, we can also affirm the classic Ch’an position that there was a line of influence from Bodhidharma through Seng-ts’an to Tao-hsin. However, the nature of this transmission is expressed in the affinity of their spirit and essential teaching, and may or may not have resulted from extended personal contact, and certainly was not based on exegetical preoccupation with the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Because the evidence is slim, further substantiation (or rebuttal) is needed through a careful study of the *Erh ju ssu hsing* and its comparison with the *JTFM*. For the moment, we can at least follow the classic lineage based on its unmistakable presence in the epitaphs of Fa-ju and Shen-hsiu, both disciples of Hung-jen, and grandsons in the Dharma to Tao-hsin. Even the *LCSTC* is partially based on the *Leng chia jen fa chih* written by Hsüan-tse, another disciple of Hung-jen.  

Thus, a line of transmission from Seng-ts’an to Tao-hsin first became an important article of faith for those who were either disciples of Tao-hsin’s disciple, Hung-jen, or in his line.

**THEMES OF TAO-HSIN**

The *LCSTC* lists two works written by Tao-hsin: the *P’u sa chieh fa* and the *Ju tao an hsin yao fang pien fa men* (“The Fundamental Expedient Teachings for Calming the Mind Which Attains Enlightenment,” cited as *JTFM*).  

Although the *P’u sa chieh fa* no longer survives, it is the consensus of modern scholars that the lengthy description of Tao-hsin’s ideas in the *LCSTC* is, in fact, the text of Tao-hsin’s *JTFM*.  

Two centuries separate the time of Bodhidharma and the split into the Northern and Southern lineages of Shen-hsiu (d. 706) and Hui-neng
(d. 713). The only documents which shed significant light on this lengthy time span are the *JTFM* of Tao-hsin and the *Hsiu hsin yao lun* 修心要論 of Hung-jen. These two texts, plus the *Erh ju ssu hsing* of Bodhidharma, give the most reliable and fullest accounts that we have of the early development of Ch'An practices and ideas. It must be over against these documents that we measure the significance of any new departures made by Shen-hsiu or Hui-neng. Accordingly, it is important to get as firm a grasp as possible on the principal themes in these three texts.

Standing in the middle of these texts, the *JTFM* is perhaps the most developed in terms of language and thought. We immediately see from the title that it picks up a theme from Bodhidharma by emphasizing "fundamental expedient teachings for calming the mind" (*an-hsin yao fang-pien* 安心要方便). In the *HKSC* biography of Bodhidharma and in the preface to the *Erh ju ssu hsing* attributed to T'an-lin by the *Transmission of the Lamp*, *an-hsin* 安心 is equated with *pi-kuan* 壁觀 ("wall-like contemplation") as a key practice of Bodhidharma. In a Tun-huang manuscript of the *Erh ju ssu hsing*, *an-hsin* was listed as one of four practices subsumed under the general title of "The Method of Calming the Mind (*an-hsin*) According to Mahāyāna." Consequently, we see that *an-hsin* in the title of the *JTFM* links it directly to a term designating the overall practices of Bodhidharma. In addition, in the section on Gunabadhra in the *LCSTC*, *an-hsin* is broken down into four stages in terms of the degree to which one actualizes the mind which has insight into true reality (*li-hsin* 理心). This identifies *an-hsin* not with a specific practice, therefore, but with realization of the truth. For Tao-hsin, *an-hsin* is a unified mindfulness which is to be maintained without deviation (*shou-i pu-hsun* 守一不移). It is the removal of all objectified or dualistic thinking in the clear light of nonsubstantiality and interpenetration.

Within a Tun-huang manuscript of the *Erh ju ssu hsing* appears the name of a set of verses called *Ju tao fang pien* ("Expedient Methods for Entering the Way"), which also foreshadows the title of Tao-hsin's work. *Ju-tao* ("entering the way") does not refer just to the initial practice of entering the study of Buddhism or becoming a monk, but is a general term for enlightened behavior. Thus, Bodhidharma spoke of the two Entrances, insight (*li* 理) and practice (*hsing* 行), which are not methods to attain enlightenment but instructions for living enlightenment. Nevertheless, it is striking that the theme of expedient aids (*fang-pien* 方便) is so emphasized in this early period whereas it is generally denounced
in the Hui-neng legacy as mirror-wiping or brick-polishing. Certainly Hui-neng and Tao-hsin are in agreement in suggesting that these methods are considered methods to achieve enlightenment only by the ignorant. For those with insight, these methods are enlightenment. Where they differ is that Bodhidharma, Tao-hsin, and Hung-jen seem to adopt and advocate certain expedient aids which can lead people to enlightenment. Hui-neng urges the more absolutist position that practice or meditation is only deserving of the name when it is the function of enlightenment.

In any event, even in the title of Tao-hsin’s *JTFM* we see important themes which are shared by Tao-hsin, Bodhidharma and Hung-jen. First, Tao-hsin is boldly urging people to achieve enlightenment (*yau-tao 入道*) which can be accomplished in one to five years,\(^{53}\) unlike his Pure Land contemporaries like Tao-ch’o (562–645) who despaired of enlightenment in this life.\(^{54}\) Secondly, Tao-hsin felt that there were legitimate methods or expedient aids (*fang-pien*) which could be used to attain this goal. Thirdly, the key to his teaching was a certain mental calmness (*an-hsin*) and attentiveness (*shou-i pu-hsun*). These ideas will become clearer as we examine the *JTFM* in more detail.

**CONTENTS ANALYSIS**

In translating the *JTFM* I have divided the text into four distinct parts based on clear changes in both style and content. Part I (T. 85.1286c. 22–1287a.28) is a statement of fundamental principles closely supported by scriptural quotations. By contrast, Part II (T.85.1287a.28–1288a.10) raises selected problems in a conversational question-and-answer format. Part III (T.85.1288a.10–1289b.2) constitutes the largest portion of the *JTFM* and finally gets to the matter at hand: viz., it describes in detail “fundamental expedient teachings for calming the mind which attains enlightenment,” as the title had advertised. The shortest section is Part IV (T.85.1289b.2–10), which gives a critique of *Lao tzu* and *Chuang tzu* and of a particular interpretation of the Buddha-nature.

Tao-hsin begins Part I of his *JTFM* with the assertion that based on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* “the mind of all the Buddhas is the First Principle.” Then follows a statement (later echoed by Shen-hsiu\(^{55}\) which appeals to the *Wen shu shuo po jo ching* (“The Perfection of Wisdom Spoken by Mañjuśrī Sūtra”) that “i-hsing san-mei 行三昧 means that the mind which is aware of the Buddha is the Buddha, whereas [the mind which] does false thinking is the ordinary person.” This is the central premise of the *JTFM*: viz., that ordinary people think in a
deluded way (grasping on to objects), but when they develop mindfulness they become identical in their thoughts and actions with true reality (the Buddha). For example, Tao-hsin quotes a lengthy passage from the Mañjuśrī text outlining true thinking which involves an awareness of the unified activity of life (i-hsing san-mei). However, as an expedient device for those who have not yet achieved this state, the text recommends going off by yourself and reciting the Buddha’s name to quiet and focus the mind. Tao-hsin then quotes from the Vimalakīrti Sūtra to the effect that all behavior and actions are the place of enlightenment. He quotes next from a T’ien-t’ai text, the P’u hsien kuan ching, to recommend repentance and meditation on true reality (shih-hsiang 賓相) which eradicates all illusions. To achieve lucidity and serenity, one should constantly nien-fo (“meditate on Buddha”), which Tao-hsin explains according to the Ta p’in ching, a Perfection of Wisdom text. Because the Buddha has no-form, there is no object of meditation but only mindfulness of the nonsubstantiality and interpenetration of all things, which pacifies the mind (an-hsin). Tao-hsin then unites Pure Land, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika thinking in a typical act of Chinese syncretism by asserting that the Pure Land, Buddha-nature, the tathāgatagarbha, nien-fo, nirvāṇa, etc. are identical, while acknowledging that the methods of achieving this are endless.

Having stated his premises and touched briefly on practice, Tao-hsin turns in Part II (Sections C–H) to answer a number of specific questions related mostly to practice. Tao-hsin sets the stage by affirming that true reality (dharma-kāya) is formless and yet contains all forms and so is serene yet diverse. The Ch’an practitioner is to be aware like a mirror, but like a plant he does not grasp nor seek anything in particular. Although this seems simple, it is difficult for humans not to favor or reject particular experiences. Tao-hsin recommends identification with the natural rhythms of things. Some may be able to do this by themselves, others may need a teacher, and some may need three to five years of practice. Those with keen abilities can appreciate the interpenetration of all phenomena, but those less gifted may find it helpful to follow specific practices such as facing toward the West in the manner of Pure Land devotion to Amitābha. In a passage which should interest those who feel wise but lazy, Tao-hsin classifies four kinds of students and allows that those who (1) practice and (2) have understanding but (3) have not yet attained enlightenment are inferior to those who (1) have understanding and (2) enlightenment but (3) do not practice. (Section E)
Part III (Sections I–0) not only discusses practice but also gives lengthy passages actually instructing us on how to meditate properly. This is one of the most remarkable sections of early Ch’an literature not because of its profundity, but because it gives such vivid prescriptions for practice. As Tsung-mi (780–841) noted in his Preface to what was to be the most comprehensive collection of Ch’an writings of his day, the writings of the various houses of Ch’an which he was able to collect “speak mostly of the Principle of Ch’an, while saying little of the practice of Ch’an.” Even Hung-jen’s Hsiu hsin yao lun (“Treatise on the Essentials of Training the Mind”) actually has only a few sections which give detailed descriptions of how to meditate. By contrast, Tao-hsin is specific and well organized. First he gives a method to cultivate the body (hsiu-shen 修身, Section J), then to maintain unified-mindfulness without deviation (shou-i pu-hsun 守一不移, Section K), then to directly contemplate both the body and the mind (chen-kuan shen-hsin 真観身心, Section M), and finally to view the mind (k’an-hsin 看心, Section N) which is neither within nor without and which is none other than Buddha.

In support of his particular approach to meditative practice, Tao-hsin begins by invoking the names of two Chinese Buddhists, T’ien-t’ai Chih-i and Layman Fu, while not mentioning Bodhidharma or any other figure associated with the early Ch’an lineage. In addition, Tao-hsin lists five basic principles which summarize the contents of the JTFM: viz., he wishes to emphasize (1) the purity of the mind and its unity with Buddha, (2) the productivity of the mind in its tranquility, (3) the constancy yet formlessness of the awakening mind, (4) the mutual transparency of one’s body and all other things, and (5) the necessity of maintaining unified-mindfulness without deviation (shou-i pu-hsun). Tao-hsin devotes most of his attention to this last point and it stands as the core of the JTFM.

It is immediately obvious that there is a close affinity between Tao-hsin’s shou-i pu-hsun and Hung-jen’s treatise (Hsiu hsin yao lun) which has as its main teaching the practice of shou-hsin (“maintain awareness of the mind”). Shou-i 守一 first occurs in Taoist literature where it means to maintain unity or to keep to the One. In Lao-tzu 10 we are asked, “Can you keep the spirit and guard unity (shou-i, embrace the One) without departing from them?” Again, in Chuang-tzu XI.39, we are told: “Because I maintain this unity and abide in this harmony I have kept myself alive for 1200 years without my body suffering any
decay.” In very early Buddhist texts sometimes a homonym was used meaning to guard the mind (shou-i 守意), which became used as a translation for dhyāna (Ch’an), samādhi, or smṛti (“mindfulness”).⁵⁹ As a consequence, we are fortunate to be able to read in Part III of the JTFM a detailed description of how this very old and important tradition was reinterpreted and practiced by an early figure in Ch’an Buddhism.

It is in this context that we should see Part IV (Section P) of the JTFM, for here Tao-hsin specifically criticizes Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. Based on the wisdom tradition of Mahāyāna, Tao-hsin rejects any falsely imposed sense of oneness on the world, and any notion of an inner spiritual unity (and even any effort to limit the Buddha-nature to a privileged state enjoyed only by sentient beings). We are not to be monists or pluralists, idealists or empiricists, but are to maintain focused and unified awareness of all phenomena, which are neither within nor without, based on the fact of nonsubstantiality and the interpenetration of all things. How we do this is described with inspiring directness and modesty in Part III of the JTFM.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we may recall that even though the JTFM did not formally invoke the name of Bodhidharma, it seems to have a continuity of themes. This is expressed in the JTFM by its concern with achieving enlightenment (ju-tao) which involves calming the mind (an-hsin) and which is achieved through expedient devices (fang-pien). Thus, until a more comprehensive study of Bodhidharma’s Erh ju ssu hsing is undertaken, we can tentatively conclude that there is a progression of common themes from Bodhidharma to Tao-hsin which lends support to the classic Ch’an lineage which we find articulated for the first time by the disciples of Hung-jen.

On the other hand, Tao-hsin made important innovations which differed radically from the first three Ch’an patriarchs but which were crucial in laying the foundation for the development of later Ch’an. Tao-hsin is the first in the Ch’an lineage to establish a monastery and a community of followers. This not only made Ch’an accessible to the people, but it provided a viable means of survival. The solitary hermit life of Bodhidharma may have helped purify the mind, but it was impractical in China which, unlike India, disapproved of begging for alms. Accordingly, even monasteries had difficulty surviving in China except
those that either had government support or an agrarian base. However, farming, wood-cutting and certain other forms of physical labor violated traditional Buddhist rules and had to be performed by laymen connected with the monastery. The fact that Tao-hsin wrote a treatise on “Bodhisattva precepts” (P’u sa chieh fa) strongly suggests that he was evolving a more practical style of monastic living which suited survival in the Chinese situation and which may have allowed monks themselves to do manual labor. If this is true, he may have been a forerunner of Po-chang Huai-hai in setting forth a special form of Ch’an monastic life with an emphasis on the spiritual value of doing physical work.

Thirdly, Tao-hsin abandoned the notion of an “objectified” or historical Buddha except as an expedient aid for the dull-minded. For example, he interpreted nien-fo not just as “thinking on the Buddha” but “thinking as the Buddha.” Thus, Tao-hsin established the basis for such bold utterances as Lin-chi’s “If you see the Buddha, kill him.” This is expressed less dramatically by Shen-hsiu when he said: “Buddha (fo) is a Sanskrit [word] from the West (India), which means to become enlightened (chüeh).” Accordingly, our task does not end with contemplating the Buddha since this is only an expedient aid in helping our minds become calm and unified so as to realize our own enlightenment or Buddhahood. In this way, Tao-hsin affirmed the necessity of personally actualizing the enlightenment of the Buddha. This confidence in the authenticity of Chinese Buddhist experience represents independence from copying the Indian model of Bodhidharma and is the first sign of the bold self-confidence so typical of later Chinese Ch’an masters.

A fourth way in which Tao-hsin secured a foundation for the further development of Ch’an was through his free adoption of practical techniques (fang-pien) amenable to the disposition of his followers. We have noted how scholars like Sekiguchi and Yin-shun found great similarities between T’ien-t’ai meditation techniques for beginners and the instructions in the JTFM (especially Sections, J, M, N, O). But the practices of Tao-hsin and his followers also bear remarkable resemblances to later Ch’an meditation practices. For example, after visiting Tao-hsin, Hsüan-shuang went away and practiced “collecting his thoughts” (she-nien 聚念). He sat in meditation for long periods of time without lying down to sleep, while fixing his mind on what was immediately in front of him (hsi-nien tsai-ch’ien 聚念左前).

Interestingly enough, however, Tao-hsin is also the first example of someone in the Ch’an lineage using Pure Land meditation devices (Sec-
tions A and G), such as reciting the Buddha's name to purify the mind. Although Hung-jen does not mention this practice, it is attributed to him and Fa-ju and Shen-hsiu by the Chuan fa pao chi.\(^6\) Ui Hakuju has identified a number of Hung-jen's disciples who cultivated this practice: (1) Fa-chih (635–702) and his disciple Chih-wei; (2) Chih-shen (609–702), his disciple Chu-chi (d. in 730's), and his disciple Wu-hsiang (d. ca. 760) who vocally recited the Buddha's name; and (3) Hsüan-shih and his disciples.\(^6\) Based on the Yüan chüeh ching ta shu shih i ch'ao of Tsung-mi (780–841), we also discover that Hsüan-shih developed a school which included the monk Wei of Kuo-chou, Yün-yü of Lang-chou, and a nun named I-ch'eng, all of Szechwan. Although marked by a particular ceremony involving the transference of incense, it was also noted for reciting the name of the Buddha.\(^6\)

What, then, is the nien-fo practice of Tao-shin? He does not focus on invoking the name of Amitābha Buddha in the sense of worship and praise. There certainly is no hint of invoking the name as a means to avail himself of the Other Power of Amitābha and thereby to achieve rebirth in the Pure Land or to obtain the state of non-retrogression. Nor is there the active visualization of the excellent marks of a Buddha used to stabilize the mind and to lead to deeper insight, as suggested by the San-lun Master Chi-tsang (549–623).\(^6\) Rather, nien-fo is a method for realizing the essential oneness of all reality and thereby calming the mind (an-hsin). It involves "self-power" whereby one realizes that the Buddha whose name is called is none other than the thoughts which flow in the mind. Accordingly, we are able to watch the rise and disappearance of each thought, knowing that there is nothing to know, which is the wisdom to know everything (Section E).

Even though Tao-shin advocated nien-fo in a special sense, he obviously had a wide tolerance for others who used it differently, as can be seen in the JTFM (Section G) and in the practices of his descendants. Indeed, the major accomplishment of Tao-shin seems to be the balance that he struck between the negative doctrine of nonsubstantiality and its positive application in meditation, monastic living and his instructions to others. "Those who cultivate the Way and achieve true emptiness (chen-k'ung 華空) do not view emptiness nor non-emptiness. They do not have any views." (Section G) This meant for Tao-shin that no practices were final but all were possible, and he boldly advocated a wide diversity of practices in the royal freedom which has become another characteristic of Ch'an. Accordingly, one can find in Tao-hsin a "special
transmission outside the scriptures” and “sudden enlightenment,” as well as their opposites. He never attacked specific techniques or possibilities, but only the overall approach or understanding (Section H). In essence, however, the true way according to Tao-hsin involved a steadfast but harmonious attentiveness which lucidly and serenely identified with the natural rhythms of things (Section F) and which even the Buddhas could not describe.

NOTES

1 I am indebted to Albert Dalia whose enthusiasm for Tao-hsin first introduced me to his ideas and importance.

2 There is no record that Hui-k’o or Seng-ts’an ever wrote anything. The Hsin hsin ming, 信心銘, which is often attributed to Seng-ts’an, was composed in the eighth century. See Nishitani Keiji and Yanagida Seizan, eds., Zenke goroku II (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1974), pp. 105–112.

3 The Tun-huang manuscripts examined by Hu Shih were Pelliot 3436 and Stein 2054. These were collated by Kim Ku-Kyong 金九經 in 1931 and reprinted in the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (hereafter cited as T.) 85.1283–1290. Yanagida Seizan 柳田聖山 has recently published a critically edited and annotated version with a Japanese translation in Shoki no Zenshi I, Zen no Goroku 2 (Tokyo: 1971), pp. 49–326. Yanagida also used five additional manuscripts, viz., Pelliot 4564, 3294, 3537, and 3703, plus Stein 4272 (= Pelliot 3537). The Ju tao an hsin yao fang pien 仏言常懐扇 constitutes the major portion of the section devoted to Tao-hsin, viz., T. 85.1286c. 22–1289b:10, and Yanagida, Shoki no Zenshi I.186–268. See note 45 below.

4 T.50.606b.

5 We are told that at one point Tao-hsin put his training to good use by liberating the town of Chi-chou which for seventy days had been besieged by bandits and whose springs had run dry. When Tao-hsin entered the town, the water began to flow. Then he had everyone chant the Perfection of Wisdom scriptures, at which point the bandits scattered. See T.50.606b.8–13.

6 See Sections I and J of the Translation below, especially note 42.


8 T.50.600a.

9 T.50.599c.600a.

10 T.50.602c-603b. The date for Shan-fu is from Masunaga Reiḥō, who also lists Yūan-i as another disciple of Ta-hsin. See Masunaga Reiḥō, “Dōshin Kōnin no shiden to sono shūdan sekatsu,” IBK 2.1 (Sept 1953), pp. 271–272.

11 It is the consensus of modern scholars, such as Yanagida, Sekiguchi and Yin-shun, that the Ox-head School was derived from the San-lun and wisdom traditions which evolved during the Southern Dynasties around Nanking. Later it spread to central China, and because of the growing popularity of Lin-chi Ch’an, the Ox-head school began to claim ancestry within this Bodhidharma line. This was done by saying that the Fourth Ch’an Patriarch Tao-hsin was the teacher of Fa-
jung (594–657), who was considered the founder of the Ox-head School. However, there are no historical records to substantiate this theory until it appears in the Ku ching Shan Ta shih Pei-ju written in 752, which is then repeated in the Chodang Chip (952) and the Transmission of the Lamp (1004). See Yanagida Seizan, “Chōgoku Zenshūshi,” in Nishitani Keiji, ed., Zen no rekishi-Chūgoku, Köza Zen III (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1967), pp. 45–47; Sekiguchi Shindai 關口寛大, Zenshū shishōshi Tokyo: Sankibō, 1964), pp. 245–250; and Yin-shun 印順, Chung-kuo Ch'an-tsung shih (Taipei: 1971), pp. 97–99.


13 This practice is implicit in the JTFM, Sections A and G, and is attributed to Hung-jen, Fa-ju and Shen-hsiu by the Chuan fa pao chi. Even though these meditation masters before Hui-neng advocated different methods, Yin-shun concludes that they all shared the practice of reciting the Buddha’s name. See Yin-shun, Chung kuo Ch'an tsung shih, p. 166.

14 Ibid., pp. 43–44, 53–54, and 156–158.

15 T.50.552b.20.

16 The P'u hisen kuan ching, Wu liang i ching, and Lotus Sūtra are quoted in Sections B, C, and D respectively.


18 T.50.552b.20 and c.21–22.


20 T.50.552b.17 and 431c.25.

21 T.50.552b-c.

22 T.50.666b.5 and 552a.5.

23 T.16.497b.5–9.

24 T.48.379b.5

25 See the discussion in the next section, p. 365 below.

26 T.50.666a-c.

27 T.50.552b.20-c.24.

28 Cf. T.50.552b-c which denies a legitimate transmission in the fourth generation after Bodhidharma.

29 Although P'u-chi does not have a lengthy biography, according to the LCSTC he is the successor of Shen-hsiu and, thus, would be the Eighth Patriarch. The pioneering research of Hu Shih is still an excellent source of primary importance. See especially his “Leng-chia Tsung K’ao” (“A Study of the Laṅkāvatāra School”) in Hu Shih Lun Hsüeh Chin Chu (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1935), pp. 198–238.


31 Yanagida Seizan (ibid., p. 27) believes that the lineage was constructed sometime between 649 and 665, which is the time period during which Mizuno Kögen thinks the Chin kang san mei ching (T. 9.365–374) was written in order to synthe-
size the *Erh ju ssu hsing* of Bodhidharma and the doctrine of mindfulness (*shou-hsin*) found in Tao-hsin and Hung-jen. See Mizuno Kōgen, "Bodaidaruma no ninyū shigyō setsu to *Kongōzanmai-kyō*," *IBK* III.2 (March 1955), pp. 621–626.

32 Cf. the *LCSTC* (T 85.1290b.1–4) where Shen-hsien bases himself on the East Mountain School and the *Wen shu shuo po jo ching*.


34 T.85.1291b.c.


36 Yampolsky, *Platform Sutra*, p. 19 n. 48, gives bibliographical references to the diversity of scholarly opinion on the exact date when the *LCSTC* was composed.


38 Yin-shun, *Chung-kuo Chʻan-tsung shih*, p. 52.

39 The *Li tai fa pao chi*, written ca. 780, criticizes the *LCSTC* for including Guṇabhadra in the lineage (T.51.180b.24-c.2).

40 See the discussion by John McRae in an unpublished article on Hung-jen.


42 T.85.1289b.22 ff.

43 One of the Tun-huang editions (Pelliot 3559) of the *Hsiu hsin yao lun* attributed to Hung-jen lists the lineage. It is important to remember that all of this evidence is from the early eighth century, over fifty years after the death of Tao-hsin. The one exception is the stele of Fa-ju (d. 689) written by an unknown author. If this stele is also late, as often happened, the case for the traditional Chʻan lineage loses most of its force. Indeed, the early Chʻan lineage and also the ideas of Tao-hsin outlined in the *LCSTC* (which we are treating as the text of his *JTAM*) may all be products of early eighth century re-interpretation.

44 T.85.1286c.20–21.


46 T.50.551c.6.

47 T.51.458b.18.


49 T.85.1284a.17ff, but especially b.1–6.

50 T.85.1288a.20–22 and 1288b.

51 *Suzuki Daisetsu Zensho* II. 143.

52 T.50.551c.8.

53 T.85.1287b.22.

54 *An-lo-chi*, T. 47 13c, 16c, 17b.
See Sections P and U of John McRae’s unpublished translation of the *Hsiu-hsih yao-lun*.


E.g., see *An pan shou i ching* 安般守意經 (T.15.163–173), one of the earliest Bud dhist texts translated into Chinese (late 2nd century A.D.).


See note 17 above and Yin-shun, *Chung kuo Ch'ān tsung shih*, p. 164.

See note 13 above.

U.S. Original Teachings of Ch'ān Buddhism* [New York: Random, 1969], pp. 229–230), but was conspicuously present in its early practices beginning with Tao-hsin.
The fundamental teachings of mine are [1] the mind of all the Buddhas is the First Principle, based on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra; and [2] *i-hsing san-mei* 一行三昧 means that the mind which is aware of the Buddha is the Buddha, whereas [the mind which] does false thinking is the ordinary person, based on the *Wen shu shuo po jo ching*. The *Wen shu shuo po jo ching* says:

Mañjuśrī asked the World Honored One the meaning of *i-hsing san-mei* 一行三昧. The Buddha replied: ‘Ultimate reality (法界, *dhammadhātu*) has a unified form (*i-hsiang* 一相). Fixing your awareness on ultimate reality is called *i-hsing san-mei*. If sons and daughters of noble families want to enter *i-hsing san-mei*, they should first listen to the Perfection of Wisdom [teaching] and cultivate their practice in terms of what it says. Later they will be able to enter *i-hsing san-mei*, and their awareness will be like ultimate reality: free from retrogression, indestructible, inconceivable, lacking obstructions and without form. Sons and daughters of noble families who want to enter into *i-hsing san-mei* [but cannot], should stay in an enclosure empty [of distractions], and give up all chaotic thoughts. Without grasping onto outward appearances, they should concentrate their minds on a particular Buddha and exclusively recite his name. By properly facing in the direction of the Buddha, having an upright body, and being able to continuously think on one Buddha thought after thought, means that in this contemplation they are able to see all the Buddhas of the past, present and future. Why?

‘Contemplating the measurelessness and boundlessness of the merit of one Buddha is the same as the merit of countless Buddhas [since] they are non-dualistic and inconceivable. The Buddha’s Dharma is without distinctions. Everything conforms to the One True Suchness to achieve the most perfect realization. [Therefore,] everyone will attain unlimited merit and unlimited abilities [by contemplating the merits of one Buddha]. Those who enter *i-hsing*
san-mei in this way exhaustively know ultimate reality and the undifferentiated forms of Buddhas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges.  

Every aspect of the mind and body, [even] lifting your foot and putting it down, always is the place of enlightenment. All of your behavior and actions are enlightenment. 

B. The P'u hsien kuan ching says: “The sea of all karmic hindrances totally arises from false thinking (wang hsiang 妄相). Those who desire to repent should sit upright and contemplate true reality (shih-hsiang 質相).” This is called Repentence according to the First Principle, which eradicates the mind of the three poisons, the grasping mind, and the conceptualizing mind. If one continuously meditates on Buddha thought after thought, suddenly there will be clarity and serenity, and still further not even an object of thought. The Ta p'in ching says: “No object of thought (wu-suo-nien 無所心) means to be thinking on Buddha (nienfo 念佛).”  

Why is it called wu-suo-nien? It means the mind which is “thinking on Buddha” is called thinking on no object (wu-suo-nien). Apart from mind there is no Buddha at all. Apart from Buddha there is no mind at all. Thinking on Buddha is identical to the thinking mind. To seek the mind means to seek for the Buddha.  

Why is this? Consciousness is without form. The Buddha lacks any outer appearance. When you understand this truth, it is identical to calming the mind (an-hsin 安心). If you always are thinking on Buddha, grasping [onto externals] does not arise, [and everything] disappears and is without form, and thinking is impartial without [false] discrimination. To enter into this state, the mind which is thinking on Buddha disappears, and further it is not even necessary to indicate [the mind as Buddha]. When you see this, your mind is none other than the body of the real and true nature of the Tathāgata. It is also called the True Dharma; it is also called Buddha Nature; it is also called the Real Nature or Real Ultimate of the various dharmas; it is also called the Pure Land; it is also called enlightenment, the Diamond Samādhi, and original enlightenment; it is also called the realm of nirvāṇa and wisdom (prajñā). Although the names are innumerable they are all the same One Essence, and do not mean a subject of contemplation nor an object of contemplation.  

When the mind is impartial like this, without fail it is made clear
and pure and always appears in front of you so that the various conditions are not able to become obstructive. Why is this? Because all these phenomena are the body of the One Dharma of the Tathāgata. When one stays in this unified mind, all bondage and illusion spontaneously disappear. Within a single speck of dust are all innumerable realms. Innumerable realms are collected on the tip of a single hair. Because their original nature is suchness (emptiness), there is not any mutual interference. The Hua yen ching says: "There is one volume of scripture [explaining that] 'in a single speck of dust one can see the phenomena of 3000 chiliocosms'." As briefly pointed out, it is impossible to exhaust everything when it comes to [describing the methods for] calming the mind (an-hsin). In this, skillfulness comes from the heart.

II

C. As a brief outline for later generations of disciples who may have doubts, suppose I pose a question [or two]. "If the Dharma Body of the Tathāgata is without [concrete form], why is there a body with [thirty-two major] signs and [eighty minor] marks which appears in the world to teach the Dharma?"

1787b Tao-hsin answers: "Certainly the body of the Dharma Nature of the Tathāgata is serenely pure and completely fulfilled. Every kind of form has completely appeared in it. Yet the body of Dharma Nature gives rise to this without conscious effort (wu-hsin). Like hanging a clear mirror made of [crystal] sphaṭika in a high hall, all of the various images would be reflected in it. A mirror also lacks conscious effort and yet is able to manifest everything.

"The [Nirvāṇa] Sūtra says: 'The Tathāgata who appears in this world to teach the Dharma does so because beings have deluded thinking.' Now if practitioners cultivate their minds and exhaust their defilements, then 'they know the Tathāgata never teaches the Dharma [because the Dharma has no permanent self-nature]. This is [what is meant by] listening perfectly [to the Dharma which the Buddha teaches]." Listening involves all phenomena [as a mirror reflects all forms]. Therefore, the [Wu liang i] ching says: 'Because the capacities of people are unlimited [in their diversity], the Dharma which is taught is unlimited. Because the Dharma which is taught is unlimited, the meaning also is called "unlimited meanings" (wu-liang-i). The unlimited meanings emanate from the One Dharma [i.e., the Bud-
Dha Nature]. This One Dharma then is formless (wu-hsiang 無相). This formlessness is non-form (pu-hsiang 不相). Therefore it is called the Ultimate Form of Reality (shih-hsiang 實相)." This then is tranquil serenity. These [two] authentic statements prove it!

"When you are sitting in meditation, watch carefully to know when your consciousness starts to move. Consciousness is always moving and flowing. According to its coming and going, we must all be aware of it. Use the wisdom of a diamond to control and rule it, since just like a plant there is nothing to know. To know there is nothing to know is the wisdom to know everything. This is the Dharma-gate of One Form of a Bodhisattva."

D. Question: "What kind of a person is a Ch’an Master?"17

Tao-hsin replies: "Someone who is not disturbed either by chaos or serenity is a person with the know-how of good Ch’an practice. When one always dwells in tranquility (chih 止), the mind perishes. But if you are always in a state of discernment (kuan 観), then the mind scatters chaotically.18 The Lotus Sūtra says: ‘The Buddha himself dwells in the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna). The power of meditation (ting 定) and of wisdom (hui 惠) gives remarkable splendour to the dharmas which he has acquired. These he uses to save all beings.’"19

E. [Question:] "How can we be enlightened to the nature of things (fa-hsiang 法相) and our minds attain lucid purity?"

Tao-hsin replies: "Neither by [trying to] meditate on the Buddha, nor by [trying to] grab hold of the mind, nor by seeing the mind, nor by analyzing the mind, nor by reflection, nor by discernment, nor by dispersing confusion, but through identification with the natural rhythms of things (chih-ren-yün 直任運). Don’t force anything to go. Don’t force anything to stay. Finally abiding in the one sole purity, the mind spontaneously becomes lucid and pure.

"Some people can see clearly that the mind is lucid and pure like a bright mirror (ming-ching 明鏡).20 Some need a year [of practice] and then the mind becomes lucid and pure. Others need three or five years and then the mind is lucid and pure. Or some can attain enlightenment by being taught by someone else. Or some attain enlightenment without ever being taught. The [Nirvāṇa] Sūtra says: ‘The nature of the mind of beings is like a pearl which falls into the water. The water is muddy so the pearl becomes hidden. When the water is pure, the pearl is revealed.’"21

"Beings do not awaken to the true nature of their minds which are
originally and everlastingly pure because the Three Jewels [the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha] are slandered, because the unity of the Sangha is broken, and because of the defilements of various wrong views and illusions and the stain of covetousness, anger and delusions. Because the ways in which students attain enlightenment differ, there are distinctions like these [we have listed]. Therefore, we have now briefly pointed out the differences in capacities and conditions [for enlightenment]. Those who are teachers of the people must be very conscious of these differences.

“The Hua yen ching says: ‘The form of the body of Samantabhadra is like empty space. [His actions] are based on Suchness, not on the Buddha Land.”22 When you are enlightened the Buddha Lands are all Suchness (emptiness). This means that you do not rely either on Suchness or on the Lands. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: ‘The length of the body of Bodhisattva Wu-pien-shen is like space.’ It also says: ‘Because it is very radiant, it is like the summer sun.’ It also says: ‘Because the body is boundless, it is like Nirvāṇa.’ It also says: ‘The nature of Great Nirvāṇa is broad and vast.”23

“Therefore, we should know that there are four kinds of students [of Buddhism]. Those who do practice, have understanding, and attain enlightenment are the highest group. Those who do not practice but have understanding and attain enlightenment are the middle upper group. Those who do practice and have understanding but have not attained enlightenment are in the middle lower group. Those who neither practice nor have understanding nor have attained enlightenment are in the lowest group.”

F. Question: “The moment we are going to begin practice, how should we contemplate?”24

Tao-hsin replies: “We must identify with the natural rhythms of things (ren-yün 任運).”

G. It also was asked: “Should we face toward the West25 or not?”

Tao-hsin replied: “If we know our original mind neither is born nor dies but is ultimately pure and is identical to the pure Buddha Land, then it is not necessary to face toward the West. The Hua yen ching says: ‘Unlimited kalpas of time are contained in a single moment. A single moment contains unlimited kalpas.”26 Therefore you should know that a single place [contains] an unlimited quantity of places, and an unlimited quantity of places is in one place.

“The Buddha causes beings who have dull capacities to face toward
the West, but he does not teach people with keen abilities to do so. Bodhisattvas who have profound practice (shen-hsing 深行) enter [the stream of] birth and death (samsāra) in order to save beings, and yet do not [drown in] desire (ai-chien 愛見). If you have the view that 'beings are in samsāra and I am able to save them, and these beings are capable of being saved,' then you are not to be called a Bodhisattva. 'Saving beings' is similar to 'saving the empty sky' (tu-k'ung 度空). How could [the sky] ever have come or gone!

"The Diamond Sūtra says: 'As for an infinite number of beings who have been saved, in fact there are no beings who have been saved.' As a whole, Bodhisattvas of the First Stage at the beginning have the realization that all things are empty. Later on they obtain the realization that all things are not empty, which is identical to the 'wisdom of non-discrimination' (wu-fen-pieh-chih 無分別智). [The Heart Sūtra says:] 'Form is identical to emptiness.' It is not because form is eliminated and then there is emptiness. 'The nature of form is emptiness.'

"All Bodhisattvas think that studying emptiness is identical to enlightenment. Those who have just begun to practice [Buddhism] immediately understand emptiness, but this is only a view of emptiness and is not true emptiness. Those who obtain true emptiness through cultivating the Way, do not see either emptiness nor non-emptiness. They do not have any views at all. You should by all means thoroughly understand the idea that form is emptiness. The activity of the mind of those who are really proficient [in emptiness] will definitely be lucid and pure.

"When you are awakened to the fundamental nature of things, when you completely understand and are clearly discerning, then later on you yourselves will be considered as Masters! Furthermore, inner thoughts and outward behavior must coincide, and there must be no disparity between truth (li 理) and practice (hsing 行). You should sever relationships with written works and spoken explanations (yu-yen 語言). In pursuing the sacred Way [toward enlightenment], by staying alone in a place of tranquility you can realize by yourself the attainment of the Way.

H. "Again there are some people who have not yet understood the ultimate truth, and yet for the sake of fame and wealth guide others. Although they do not know the relative keenness or dullness in the capacities [of their followers], if it appears to them that there is
something exceptional [in their followers] they always give the seal of approval (yin-k’o 印可). Alas, alas! What a great calamity! Or seeing that the mental activities [of their followers] appear to be lucid and pure, they give their seal of approval. These people bring great destruction to the Buddha’s Dharma. They are deceiving themselves and cheat others. Those who are proficient in practice [consider] that having such exceptional [attainments] as these is just an outer appearance but that [true] mindfulness has not yet been attained.

"Those who have truly attained mindfulness are aware and discerning by themselves. Much later their Dharma-eye\textsuperscript{35} will open spontaneously and they can skillfully distinguish non-substantiality from artificiality [i.e., true reality from false appearances]. Some people conclude that the body is empty and the nature of the mind also disappears. These people have nihilistic views. They are the same as heretics and are not disciples of the Buddha. Some consider that the nature of the mind is indestructible. These are people with eternalistic views, and are the same as heretics.

"Now we shall describe the disciples of the Buddha. They do not conclude that the nature of the mind is destroyed. Although they are constantly bringing beings to enlightenment, they do not generate emotional attachment (ai-chien 愛見). They constantly cultivate insight, so that stupidity and wisdom are equalized [for them]. They constantly dwell in meditation, so that there is no difference between clarity and chaos [for them]. They constantly view sentient beings [whom Bodhisattvas have vowed to save], and yet they know the beings have never had permanent existence and ultimately neither come into existence nor pass away.\textsuperscript{37} [True disciples] everywhere manifest form which is not seen nor heard. Completely understanding all things, they have never grasped or rejected anything. They have never transformed (fen 分) themselves [into other bodily forms], and yet their bodies are everywhere in Ultimate Reality."

III

I. In former times, the Meditation Master Chih-ming\textsuperscript{38} advised: The dharma for cultivating the Way must by all means have understanding and practice mutually supporting each other. First you should understand the source of the mind and the various essences and functions [of things], and then the truth (li) will be seen lucidly and purely with complete understanding and discernment without
any doubts. Then afterwards meritorious work can be accomplished. 1000 things comply if you understand but once, whereas a single deception [brings] 10,000 doubts. To miss by the slightest hair-breadth is to err by 1000 li.39

These are not empty words.

The [Kuan] Wu liang shou ching says: “The Ultimate Dimension (dharmakaya 法身) of the various Buddhas penetrates the thoughts of every being. The mind and the Buddha are identical. This mind creates Buddha.”40 You should know that the Buddha is identical to your mind, and that there is no other Buddha outside of your mind.

Briefly, I suggest that overall there are five principles: (1) Know the essence of the mind. The essential nature is pure. The essence is the same as the Buddha. (2) Know the function of the mind. It functions to give rise to the jewel of the Dharma. It is always productive but constantly tranquil. The 10,000 delusions are all like this (i.e., are all Suchness). (3) Constant awakening is unceasing. The awakening mind is always present. The teaching of this awakening is without form. (4) Always view the body as empty and tranquil. Inside and outside [of yourself] are transparent to each other. Your body enters into the center of Ultimate Reality. There never have been any obstacles. (5) Maintain unified-mindfulness without deviation.41 Both movement and stillness constantly remain. Those practitioners are able to clearly see their Buddha Nature and enter into the gate of meditation without delay.

J. When you consider the great many kinds of meditation methods in the various scriptures, it was only Layman Fu42 who advocated “maintain unified-mindfulness without deviation” (shou-i pu-hsun 守一不移). First you cultivate the body and take the body as the basis for close scrutiny.43 This body is a unity of the four elements [of earth, water, fire and air] and the five skandhas [of form, sensation, perception, impulse and consciousness] to which it finally returns since it lacks any permanency and does not have independent existence. Although it has not yet decayed and disappeared, ultimately it is non-substantial (k’ung 空). The Vimalakirti Sutra says: “The body is like a drifting cloud which changes and disappears in an instant.”44

Also, constantly contemplate that your own body is sheer empty space, like a shadow which you can see but can’t grasp. Wisdom arises from the shadow, and ultimately is without location, unmoving and yet responsive to things, changing endlessly. The six sense organs are
born in nonsubstantiality. If the six sense organs are non-substantial, then the six corresponding sense objects are to be understood as a dream. Just as when the eye sees something, there is nothing in the eye.

It is like a mirror\(^\text{45}\) which reflects the image of your face, which you understand fully and most distinctly. In the emptiness [of the mirror] appears the shadow of a form [since] not a single thing exists in the mirror. You should know that the face of a person does not come and enter into the mirror, nor does the mirror go and enter the face of a person.

In this detailed way, we know that the mirror as well as one’s face inherently do not go out nor enter in, do not come nor go, but are identical to the meaning of the Tathāgata (\textit{ju-lai} 如來). Thus, by analyzing this thoroughly [we see that] it is inherently always non-substantial and tranquil in the eye and in the mirror. The mirror reflecting and the eye seeing are both the same.

For this reason, if we take the nose or tongue or another sense organ for comparison, the idea will again be like this. Knowing that the eye is inherently non-substantial, one should understand that all form which the eye sees is “objectified-form” (\textit{t’a-se} 他色).\(^\text{46}\) When the ear hears a sound, know that this is “objectified-sound”. When the nose smells a fragrance, know that this is an “objectified-fragrance”. When the tongue distinguishes a flavor, know that this is an “objectified-flavor”. When the mind considers a thought, know that this is an “objectified-thought”. When the body senses a touch, know that this is an “objectified-touch”. In the same way, when one practices contemplation (\textit{kuan-ch’a} 觀察), know that this is to contemplate non-substantiality (emptiness) and tranquility, so that when you see form understand that this is not a sensation you receive. Not to receive the sensation of a form [means that] form is identical to non-substantiality. Non-substantiality is identical to formlessness (\textit{wu-hsiang} 無相), and formlessness is identical to non-[ambitious] action (\textit{wu-tso} 無作). This is the gate of liberation.\(^\text{47}\) For practitioners who obtain liberation, the customary use of the various sense organs is like this.

Again, weigh carefully the words I speak. Always contemplate the non-substantiality of the six sense organs, which are as serene as if there was no hearing nor seeing. The \textit{I chiao ching} says: “At that time in the middle of the night it was serenely quiet without a sound.”\(^\text{48}\) You should know that the teaching of the Tathāgata always takes
non-substantiality (emptiness) and tranquility as the basis. Always meditate on the non-substantiality and tranquility of the six sense organs as if they were constantly like [the stillness of] the middle of the night. Whatever is seen or heard during the day are phenomena external to the body, while in the body it always is empty (non-substantial) and pure.

K. Those who “maintain unified-mindfulness without deviation” use the eye which is empty and pure to fix the mind on seeing one thing constantly day and night without interruption, exclusively and zealously without moving. When the mind is about to gallop off, a quick hand still gathers it in, like a cord tied to the foot of a bird still controls and holds on to it when it wants to fly. Throughout the whole day seeing has not been abandoned, [disturbance] is eliminated and the mind itself is settled. The Vimalakirti Sutra says: “The mind which is collected (she-hsin 攝心) is the place of enlightenment.”

This is the method of collecting the mind.

The Lotus Sutra says: “For innumerable kalpas of time up to now through eliminating drowsiness and always collecting your thoughts, and by using all the various merits, you are able to attain various meditative states. . . .” The I chiao ching says: “Consider the mind as the lord of the other five sense organs. . . .fixing it in one place there is nothing you cannot do.” That’s it!

The five items spoken of above are all true principles of the Great Vehicle (Mahayana Buddhism). All are based on that which is stated in the scriptures and commentaries and none are false teachings contrary to the truth. This is not the activity of illusion but is the ultimate truth (chiu-ching-i 究意義).

Transcending the Sraavaka stage, one immediately advances quickly along the path of a Bodhisattva. Those who hear [these teachings] should practice and not have any doubts. Like a man who is studying archery, first he shoots with great license, but then he hits the bullseye with a small leeway [of error]. First he hits something big, next he hits something small, then he hits a hair, and then he divides a hair into 100 parts and hits one hundredth of a hair.

Next, the last arrow hits the end of the previous arrow [shot into the air]. A succession of arrows do not allow the [previous] arrows to drop to the ground. It is like a man who practices the Way. Moment after moment (nien-nien 念念) he dwells in his mind. Thought after thought (hsin-hsin 心心) continuously without even a short interval in
awareness (nien 念) he practices correct awareness (cheng-nien 正念) without interruption and correct awareness in the present.\textsuperscript{54}

As the [Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra] says: "Use the arrow of wisdom to hit the three gates of liberation\textsuperscript{55} and by a regular succession of arrows do not allow them to fall to the ground."\textsuperscript{56}

Also, like fire produced by friction, before it is hot [one gets tired] and stops. Although one wants to start a fire, the fire is difficult to get.\textsuperscript{57}

It is also like the wish-granting jewel\textsuperscript{58} which a family had. There was nothing which they wanted that they didn’t get but suddenly their heritage (i.e., the gem) was lost. [Thus,] there never was an instant when their thoughts forgot about it.

It is like a poisoned arrow piercing the flesh. The shaft is out, but the barb is deep inside. In this manner you receive severe pain and there is no instant when you can forget it. Moment after moment it is on your mind. Your state [of contemplation] is to be considered just like this.

L. This teaching is profound and significant. I do not transmit it to unsuitable people. It is not because I am miserly about the Dharma that I do not transmit it to them, but only for fear that the above-mentioned people will not believe but will fall into the error of slandering the Dharma. One must select people in order to avoid taking a chance of speaking hastily [to the wrong persons]. Be careful! Be careful!

Although the sea of the Dharma is unlimited, in actual practice it is contained in a single word. When you get the idea, you can dispense with words, for then even one word is useless.\textsuperscript{59} When you understand completely in this way, you have obtained the mind of the Buddha.

M. When you are first beginning to practice sitting meditation, dwell in a quiet place and directly contemplate your body and mind. You should contemplate the four elements and the five skandhas,\textsuperscript{60} [the six sense organs, viz.,] the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, and [the three poisons of] desire, anger, and delusion, whether they are good or evil, whether they are enemies or allies, whether they are profane or sacred, and so on through all the various items (fa 法) [of existence]. From the very beginning they are non-subsisting and tranquil, neither arising nor disappearing, being equal and non-dual. From the very beginning they have never existed, but ultimately are utterly tranquil. From the very beginning they are totally pure and free.
Without any interval both day and night, whether walking, staying, sitting or lying down, always practice this contemplation. Then instantly you will understand that your own body is like the moon [reflected] in the water, or like an image in a mirror, or like the air schlieren in the hot summer, or like an echo in an empty valley. If you say these exist (yu 有), everywhere you look you are not able to see them. If you say these do not exist (wu 無), then you completely understand that they always are in front of your eyes. The Dharma-body of all the various Buddhas is just like this. This means you should understand that your own body from an unlimited number of ages (kalpas) ago ultimately has never been born, and from the present and forever, there is absolutely nobody who dies.

If you are able to constantly practice this contemplation, then this is repentance in accord with true reality (chen-shih ch’an-hui 真實懺悔). The most extreme forms of evil karma [accumulated during] a thousand or ten thousand kalpas are utterly destroyed spontaneously. Only those with doubt who are not able to develop faith are excluded and are not able to achieve enlightenment. If one develops faith based on this practice, there is no one who cannot achieve entrance into the uncreated correct truth [of reality].

And again, if your mind attaches itself to devious phenomena [when sitting in meditation?], the moment when you realize this occurring then immediately concentrate on [the fact that] the place where it arises ultimately does not come into being. When this mind does begin to attach itself, it does not come from [any place in] the ten directions and when it goes there is no place at which it arrives. Constantly watch any clinging to objectified phenomena, or any conceptualizing, or any false consciousness, or [false] thinking, or scattered ideas. If this chaotic mind does not arise, it means that you calm down those coarse mental activities. If you achieve a calm mind (chu-hsin 住心) and do not have the mind which clings to objectified phenomena, then your mind gradually becomes tranquil and stable and step by step (sui-fen 隨分) eliminates the various passions. Therefore, you finally do not create new [illusions], and it can be said that you are free. When you notice that your mind is becoming tied up with passions or sad and depressed and falling into a mental stupor, then you should immediately shake this off and readjust yourself. Very slowly things will become orderly. Now, having attained this, the mind spontaneously becomes calm and pure, but you must be fiercely
alert as if to save your life (lit., your head). Don’t be negligent. Work hard! Work hard!70

N. When you first begin practicing sitting meditation (tso-ch’ an 坐禪, Jp. zazen) and viewing the mind (k’an-hsin 看心), go off by yourself and sit in one place. First make your body erect and sit correctly. Make your clothes roomy and loosen your belt. Relax your body and loosen your limbs. Massage yourself seven or eight times.71 Expel completely the air in your belly. Through the natural flow you will obtain your true nature, clear and empty [of desire], quiet and pure. The body and mind being harmonized, the spirit is able to be peaceful. Then obscure and mysterious,72 the inner breath is clear and cool. Slowly, slowly, you collect the mind73 and your spiritual path becomes clear and keen.

The state of the mind is lucid and pure. As contemplation becomes increasingly lucid, and inner and outer become empty and pure, the nature of your mind becomes utterly tranquil. The manifestation of the awakened mind74 is utterly tranquil just like this.75

Although the nature [of your awakened mind] has no form, inner constancy always exists. The mysterious spiritual power is never exhausted but always shines clearly. This is called your Buddha-nature. Those who see their Buddha-nature (chien fo-hsing 見佛性) are forever free from [the stream of] birth and death, and are called “people who have transcended the world” (ch’u-shiih-jen 出世人). The Vimalakirti Sūtra says: “Suddenly you regain the original mind.”76 Believe these words!

Those who awaken to their Buddha-nature are called Bodhisattvas. They are also called “people awakened to the Way” (wu-tao-jen 悟道人), “people conscious of the Truth” (shiih-li-jen 識理人), “people who have arrived” (ta-shiih 達士), and “people who have obtained their true nature” (te-hsing-jen 得性人). Therefore the scripture says that “The succession of time (kalpas) is endless for the spirit that becomes colored by a single [true] phrase.”77 This is an expedient aid (fang-pien 便, Skt. upāya) for those who are just beginning to practice. Therefore, you should know that the cultivation of the Way involves [using] expedient aids (fang-pien) and that this is the very place for the awakened mind (sheng-hsin 師心) [to be manifest].

O. Generally, in the practice of giving up attachment to your self,78 you should first of all calm and empty your empty mind in order to cause your mental phenomena to become tranquil and pure. When think-
ing is cast into a settled state, it is mysterious and tranquil and causes the mind not to deviate. When the nature of the mind is tranquil and settled, clinging to conditioned phenomena is immediately cut off. Being elusive and hidden, the completely pure mind is vacant, so that there is a still and peaceful calm. As the breath is exhausted in death [of this present life], you receive no further rebirths but dwell in the utterly pure body of ultimate reality (dharmakāya). But if you produce a mind which loses mindfulness, rebirth is unavoidable. The method [of attaining] the mental state prior to samadhi which we have just described should be like this.

This is our method of cultivation (tso-fa 作法). The basis of our method is no-method (wu-fa 無法). The method of no-method was from the beginning called the method. This method, therefore, is not to be cultivated (wu-tso 無作). Thus, the method of non-cultivation is the method of true reality (chen-shih fa 真實法). This is based on the scripture which says: “Non-substantiality, non-cultivation, non-vowing and non-form is true liberation.” Therefore, based on this interpretation the real method is not produced by cultivation (wu-tso 無作).

As for the method of giving up [attachment to] yourself, it means that while temporarily imagining there is a [real] body, you see the lucid state of your mental condition, and then use this spiritual lucidity to determine things.

IV

P. The Great Master [Tao-hsin] said: “Chung-tzu said that ‘Heaven and earth are one attribute, the 10,000 things are one horse.’ But the Fa chü ching says that ‘One is not to be considered as one, which negates [the distinctions of] the various other numbers. The superficial wisdom that is heard considers one to be one.’ Therefore, Chuang-tzu seems still walled in by the [idea of] Oneness.

“Lao-tzu said: ‘Obscure and mysterious, within it is the essence.’ Although outwardly he denies form, inwardly he still remains fixed on the mind. The Hua yen ching says: ‘Do not be attached to the teaching of non-duality because one and two are non-existent.’ The Vimalakirti Sūtra says: ‘The mind is neither inside nor outside nor inbetween.’ This then is proof! Therefore you should know that Lao-tzu is bound up with [the mistaken idea of] a spiritual essence within.
“The Nirvāṇa Sutra says: ‘All sentient beings have the Buddha-nature.’\textsuperscript{80} There is also the possibility of saying: “How can walls and stones teach the Dharma while not having the Buddha-nature?”\textsuperscript{91}

“So how do you teach the Dharma? The T'ien chin lun says: ‘The Response Buddha and the Transformation Buddha are not the True Buddha, and are not teachers of the [ultimate] Dharma.’ ”\textsuperscript{92}

NOTES

1 I am indebted to Cho-yin Lew and Kenjō Urakami for their invaluable suggestions for improving my translation which I prepared for a graduate seminar at the University of Hawaii. The edition of the text printed in the Taishō Shinshū Daiizōkyō (hereafter abbreviated as T.), Vol. 85, pp. 1286c. 22-1289b.10, has been critically edited by Yanagida Seizan in his Shoki no Zenshi I, Zen no Goroku 2 (Tōkyō: Chikuma Shobō, 1971), pp. 186–268. I have used Yanagida’s edition in translating but for the sake of reference I have noted in the margin the beginning of each new page and column of the Taishō edition. Also, I have divided the text into four main parts and given alphabet letters to smaller subject areas. Although the whole text could have been placed in quotation marks, I have only used them extensively in Parts II and IV where Tao-hsin is clearly indicated as speaking.

2 See the Introduction for a discussion of the relationship between Tao-hsin and the Laṅkāvatāra School in China.

3 Based on T.8.731a.25ff, although slightly re-arranged. This passage from the Wen shu shuo po jo ching was very popular. It was quoted with approval by the T’ien-t’ai founder Chih-i (T.46.11a.29ff), by the Pure Land pioneer Tao-ch’o (T.47. 14c.22–29), and by the Northern Ch’an Master Shen-hsiu when he was asked which scripture he used as his basis (T.85.1290b.2–3). Yampolsky translates i-hsing san-mei as the “samādhi of oneness” (Platform Sutra, p. 136, and esp. n.60), whereas Wing-tsit Chan translates it as “Calmness in which one realizes that all dharmas are the same” (Platform Scriptures (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1963), p.47. Cf. Philosophy East and West 26.1 (Jan. 1976), p.90.

4 I am indebted to Robert Zeuschner for identifying this as a quotation from the Vimalakirti Sūtra (T.14.543b.6). For a lengthy discussion of “the place of enlightenment” (bodhimāṇḍa) see Étienne Lamotte, L’Enseignement de Vimalakirti (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1962), pp. 198–200, n. 105.

5 This probably is in the T’ien-t’ai tradition where one repents of the desires associated with the six sense organs, the six objects of sense, and the six sense consciousnesses. However, as Chih-i outlined in his Shih ch’an po lo mi tz’u ti fa men (T.46.485–486), this is to be approached at three different levels. Initial repentance can develop a second level where one discerns the forms of things, which produces meditation. The third level is the repentance which views all things as birthless (kuan wu-sheng ch’an-hui 観無生懺悔) and is the basis of enlightenment. Cf. the Tun-huang version of the Platform Sutra, Section 22. See the JTFM (Sections J and M) for its implementation.
6 T.9.393b.11. Chih-i (T.46.486a) also quotes this passage. This scripture is important for understanding repentance, and is one of the three basic T'ien-t'ai scriptures. See the recent translation by Yoshirō Tamura and Kōjirō Miyasaka, Murōgi kyō, the Sutra of Innumerable Meanings and Kanfugen-gyō, the Sutra of Meditation on the Bodhisattva Universal-Virtue (Tokyo: Risshō Kōseikai, 1974).

7 Passion, hatred and ignorance.

8 Chiieh-kuan 覺観. See the Ta chih tu lun (T.25.234a-b) where the mental activities of generalizing and refining are seen as capable of good or bad effects on meditation. However, in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (T.14.540a.8) it is considered disturbing to meditation.

9 Nien 念 has a wide diversity of meanings (see Tsuda Sōkichi, Shina Bukkyō no kenkyū [Tōkyō: 1957] pp. 1–52.) such as thinking, remembering, visualizing, or vocally reciting. Here there is an important effort by Tao-hsin to overcome the subject-object duality in thinking. Thus, the phrases nien-fo 念佛 and nien-hsin 念心, which normally are verb-object combinations (“thinking on or invoking the Buddha” and “meditating on the mind”), are transformed into a unified activity. This might be conveyed by “thinking Buddhahood” or “enlightened thinking”. To preserve the Chinese words we could use the phrase “thinking Buddha” as an awkward attempt to build on the English usage which implies absorption in a subject of thought. For example, “thinking airplanes” implies that airplanes are a dimension of a person’s life, different from just thinking about an airplane.

10 This is one of ten images used in the Hua yen ching (T.9.607c). Cf. the discussion of Hui-k’o (T.85.1286a.28ff) where the image of a hair-pore advances to the image of the tip of a hair, to a speck of dust, etc.

11 Fang-ai 訪擬. See the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (T. 14. 546b.27; c.8, 21).

12 According to Yanagida, Shoki no Zenshi I:193ff, this is the end of the paragraph. However, I follow Yin-shun, Chung kuo Ch’an tsung shi, p. 63, who considers the next line to be the conclusion to the paragraph, not the beginning of the next paragraph.


14 Cf. Alex Wayman, “The Mirror-like Knowledge in Mahāyāna Buddhist Literature,” Asiatische Studien: Études Asiatiques XXV (1971), pp. 353–363; and Paul Demiéville, “Le miroir spirituel,” Sinologica (Basel, 1947–1948), pp. 112–137. The metaphor of a mirror which is inherently pure and clear has been used by the Southern School of Sudden Enlightenment in its attack on the Northern School of Ch’an which is (mistakenly?) symbolized by the ideal of “mirror polishing” attributed to Shen-hsiu. (See Sections 6–8 of the Tun-huang edition of the Platform Sūtra.) However, here and in Sections E and J, Tao-hsin uses the metaphor along the lines of Hui-neng of the Southern School and much in the manner of Chuang-tzu: “The Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror. It does not grasp, nor does it expect anything, but reflects without retaining anything.” (Chuang-tzu VII. 32) “The mind
of the sage is tranquil, the reflector of heaven and earth, the mirror of the ten thousand things.’” (*Chuang-tzu* 13.4) Similarly, Seng-chao (d. 414) wrote that: “Wisdom possesses a mirror which probes the deepest subtleties, but there is no active knowing in it.” (T.45.153b) However, there certainly was precedence for using the mirror as a metaphor of something that could be stained. For example, the question is raised in *Lao-tzu* 4:10: “Can you polish your mysterious mirror, and leave no blemish?” Also, the *Awakening of Faith* reports: “The mind of sentient beings is like a mirror. If a mirror is dirty, images do not appear in it.” (T.32.581c.3-4) Cf. note 45 below.


18 T.9.385c.23–26. This is another of the three most important scriptures for T’ien-t’ai, and has been translated into English by Yoshirō Tamura (see note 6 above).

17 This question is not in the fashion of a Zen koan. Rather, it simply asks how a Meditation (Ch’an) Master differs from one who specializes in the Vinaya or scriptures.

18 The balance of inner calm (*chih* 止) and outer discernment (*kuan* 觀) is presented in its classic form by T’ien-t’ai Chih-i (538–597) in his *magnum opus*, the *Mo ho chih kuan* (T.46.1–140).

19 Again showing the influence of T’ien-t’ai, Tao-hsin illustrates the balance of meditation and wisdom with a quotation from the *Lotus Sūtra* (T.9.8a.23–24), the most important of the three T’ien-t’ai scriptures. The combination of *ting-hui* 定惠 rather than *chih-kuan* 止觀 is found in the Tun-huang edition of the *Platform Sūtra*, Section 13. (See Yampolsky, *Platform Sūtra*, p. 135, n. 54, for further discussion and references to Shen-hui.) A passage in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* (T.12.547a and 792c) similar to the *Lotus Sūtra* just quoted prompted Seng-liang in the early sixth century to be the first Chinese to write “see your own nature and become a Buddha” (*chien-hsing ch’eng-fo* 見性成佛, T.37.490c).

20 See above note 14.

21 T.12.617c uses the image, but not the exact quotation.

22 T.9.409b.8–9.

23 T.12.610. Shen-hsiu also quotes this passage (T.85.1290c).

24 *Lin-shih* 臨時 is usually used in Buddhist texts for the moment of death, but the context of the question implies the more general meaning “at the time of’’ or “when the time arrives.” *Kuan-hsing* 見行 is not to be separated into two practices, *kuan* and *hsing*. For example, it is a common compound in T’ien-t’ai works (T.46. 780a.16).

25 That is, should one face toward the Western Pure Land of Amitābha or not? Pure Land devotionalism was a popular form of practice which was meaningful to people in various traditions or “schools” in China. Not only did it appear in later Ch’an, but, as we can see here, Pure Land devotionalism also was practiced in early Ch’an as well. See the “Content Analysis” in the Introduction above.

26 T.9.672a.27.

27 Shen-hsing 深行 is attained by Bodhisattvas of the Eighth Stage according to
the Shih ti ching lun (T.26.179c.13) and is therefore a very high practice just short of Buddhahood.

28 As Nakamura Hajime points out in his Bukkyōgo daijiten (Tōkyō: Shoseki kabushiki kaisha, 1975), p. 15c, ai-chien can have a number of meanings. According to the Ta chih tu lun it can imply the double delusions of thought and of views. On the other hand, we have followed the use found in the Vimalakirti Sūtra (T.14.545a.27–b8) where it is a compound which Lamotte reconstructs as anunayadrstiparyuttihitacitta (L'Enseignement de Vimalakirti [Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, 1962], p. 232), which might be translated as “the mind which is overcome with the view of emotional attachment.”

29 I generally prefer to translate k'ung 空 as “non-substantiality” which conveys the Buddhist meaning, rather than “emptiness” which is a popular but problematical translation. Here I have chosen pithiness and familiarity over precision.

30 Ming-ch'ing 明淨, “lucid and pure”, is a favorite term of Tao-hsin who uses it seven times (Sections E, H, and N; T.85.1287b.18–21, C.28; 1289a.14), and it occurs at least seven more times in the rest of the Leng chia shih tz'u chi.

31 This may be taken as a response to those woe-sayers (such as the Tao-ch'o line of Pure Land devotion and the Three Stages Sect) who denied that it was possible to find enlightened masters in those latter days when true Buddhism was dying (mo-fa 末法).

32 This echoes the thought of Bodhidharma in his Erh ju ssu hsing. The union of li 理 and hsing 行 is a common slogan found in such diverse figures as the Pure Land thinker Shan-tao (T.37.262b.4) and in Chairman Mao.

33 Cf. the perjorative use of this phrase in the biography of Ta-hsin’s contemporary, Fa-ch’ung (T.50.666b.8). A phrase almost identical to Tao-hsin’s occurs in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra (T.16.499b.29–c.1), which shows that the non-reliance on words and letters so championed by Ch’an has a long written tradition, which is also echoed by Chairman Mao, of course.

34 This theme of having faith in your own self-sufficiency found its greatest exponent in Lin-chi (d.866). See Ruth F. Sasaki, The Record of Lin-chi (Kyoto: The Institute for Zen Studies, 1975), pp.10, 16–18, etc.

35 These are two of the five desires (wu-yu 五欲). The other three are desires for sex, sleep, and eating and drinking.

36 One of five eyes mentioned in the Diamond Sūtra, Section 18. The T’ien t’ai ssu chiao i says it occurs in the Special Teaching. “By means of the insight into temporary phenomena from the point of view of non-substantiality, [the Bodhisattva] sees Conventional Truth, opens the Dharma-eye, and perfects the wisdom which knows every possible way to save beings” (T.46.778b.20–21).

37 This idea is based on the Diamond Sūtra, Sec.3 (T.749a.5–11).

38 I.e., T’ien-t’ai Chih-i (538–597).

39 In the T’ang Dynasty, a Chinese li 里 measured roughly a third of a mile. (Ennin’s Diary, trans. by Edwin O. Reischauer [New York: Ronald Press, 1955], p.2,n.4) This quotation cannot be found among Chih-i’s extant writings.

40 T.12.343a.19–21. It is interesting that Tao-hsin omitted one line: “Consequently, when you perceive the Buddha, it is your own mind which is identical to
the thirty-two major signs and eighty minor marks of perfection." On the basis of this line, Shan-tao (T.37.267a.18–b.6) vehemently attacked those like Tao-hsin and Chi-tsang (T.37.243c.25ff) who identified the Buddha (as Dharmakāya) with one's own pure self-nature. These thirty-two and eighty marks clearly indicate to Shan-tao that we are only identifying ourselves with a visual image of Buddha (as Sambhogakāya) through mental projection (piao-hsin 標心), but are not identical to the Buddha.

41 Shou-i pu-hsun 守一不移. This is the core of Tao-hsin's Buddhism. See the "Content Analysis" in the Introduction above for a lengthy discussion.

42 Fu-hsi (497–569). There are scattered references to this eminent layman in the Hsu Kao-eng-chuan (T.50650b, 788a, 875b), and he is mentioned by Hui-ssu and Chan-jan, but no information is given about him or his practice.

43 The body is the first object of contemplation in traditional Buddhist meditational texts such as the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna. Interestingly, it was the first subject upon which Vimalakirti expounded (T.14.539b.13ff). However, as Tao-hsin later says, and as Hung-jen echoes in his work (T.48.377a.21), the body-mind (shen-hsin 身心) is inherently pure and without birth and death, in contrast to the message of its impermanence which is emphasized at this point.

44 T.14.539b.20.

45 The metaphor of the mirror is obviously very popular in Ch'an, but has a very old history. The manner in which Tao-hsin uses the image here is similar to that found in the Pan-chou san mei ching (T.13.899b.20–24 and 905c.18ff), first translated into Chinese in 179 A.D. (T.55.6b). This sūtra served as the basis of the Amitābha cult on Lu Shan in 401 A.D. Cf. note 14 above.

46 Many comparable uses of t'a 他 are discussed by John McRae in a lengthy footnote in his unpublished translation of Hung-jen's Treatise on the Essentials of Training the Mind, p.23,n.20.

47 Based on the Vimalakirti Sūtra, Chapter Nine (especially T.14.551b.7–10) and the Ta chi tu lun (T.25.203c.15) where non-substantiality (emptiness), formlessness and non-action are the three gates of liberation.

48 T.12.1110c.19. This sūtra claims to have been delivered in the quiet of the middle of the night just before the Buddha died. It emphasizes maintaining the rules, having few desires, controlling the body, the sense organs and the mind, and the desirability of secluded meditation.

49 This is similar to a phrase in the Awakening of Faith (T.32.582a.21–22) which reads: "If the mind gallops off, it should be brought back and fixed in correct awareness (cheng-nien 正念). This 'correct awareness' means that whatever is, is Mind Only (wei-hsin 唯心) and that there is no external world of objects."

50 There are portions of this phrase in the sūtra (e.g., T.14.542c.24), but I have not found the exact quotation.


52 T.12.1111a.15 and 20. This becomes frequently quoted by early Ch'an writers, such as Hung-jen (T.48.377c.24–25) and in the Li tai fa pao chi (T.51.193a.11–12). In all these cases, the character pien 辨 ("to understand") appears as pan 他 ("to do"), so I have followed this reading.
53 Wu-lou-yeh 無漏業 is a technical term meaning activity free of defilement (anāsrava-karmañ) which binds people in the cycle of rebirth. Here, however, Tao-hsin uses it more colloquially.

54 Cheng-nien 正念 is part of the Eightfold Path; viz., correct mindfulness. It is also a term that was made popular by the Pure Land tradition referring to the promise of rebirth in the Pure Land based on correctly invoking (cheng-nien) the saving power of Amitābha. Here, however, it derives from the Vimalakīrti tradition (T.14.547c and 554b). Cf. the use of the term in the Awakening of Faith in note 49 above.

55 The three gates of liberation were mentioned above (T.85.1288b.11–12 and note 47).


57 Based on the I chiao ching (T.12.1111c.19–20) in a passage recommending that people develop zeal (ching-chin 精進, Skt. viryapāramitā), one of the Six Perfections in the religious life of a Bodhisattva.

58 Ju-i-chu 如意珠 (Skt. cintāmanī) is a wish-granting gem. This image is also connected with zeal because of the story of Mahadana who lost his cintāmanī in the sea. In order to recover it, he began to scoop up the sea water with such intensity that the Dragon King was afraid that the sea would dry up. Accordingly, he took up the search and found the gem for Mahadana, thereby enabling other beings to be granted their wishes. See Chan-jan’s version (T.46.234a.4–10) and compare the Hsien-yu ching (T.4.410a.9–415b.6).

59 This idea is also contained in the last paragraph of Chapter 26 of Chuang-tzu.

60 Cf. above T.85.1288a.23.

61 These similes are based on the ten similes of wisdom found in the Ta chih tu lun (T.25.101c–105c). Cf. the Vimalakīrti Sūtra (T.14.539b.15ff) and The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, translated by Edward Conze (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 118. English unfortunately lacks a common word for the shimmering water-like mirage caused by heat waves in the air above a hot road in the summer sun, and although the German “schlieren” is now in English usage, it is too general.


63 This is an abridged form of a passage from the Awakening of Faith (T.32. 582a.27–29).

64 Wu-sheng 無生 can be translated in two ways here. As an adjective modifying the word truth it means an uncreated or eternal truth. As a noun it would mean the truth of no-birth or birthlessness.

65 Chiüeh-kuan 創観. See above note 8.

66 See the Awakening of Faith (T.32.577a.13–21) for a list of six coarse aspects of non-enlightenment.

67 Shen-hui attacks the chu-hsin 住心 according to Yanagida, Shoki no Zenshi I:254.
68 Yüan-lü 綠慮 is a term from the Wei-shih tradition referring to the concern for conditioned phenomena by the sixth consciousness.

69 This is perhaps based on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (T.12.845b-c).

70 The charge to work hard is found frequently in Hung-jen’s teaching (T.48.378b.18; c.4.9), as well as in other Ch’an texts.

71 The exact form of massage is not known. Perhaps it involved rocking back and forth, or actual hand massage.

72 The combination of yao 窮 and ming 煉 (meaning dark, murky, hidden and elusive) to describe the activity of the core or essence (ching) 精 of the Tao is found both in Lao-tzu, Chapter 21, and in Chuang-tzu, Chapter 11, line 35 (Harvard-Yenching edition). However, later on in Part IV Tao-hsin makes a point of singling out Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu for criticism.

73 Lien-hsin 騰心 is directly parallel in meaning to she-hsin 瘋心 used earlier (T.85.1288b.20–21) and to shou-hsin 守心 the favorite term of Hung-jen.


75 Cf. this with his earlier instructions to beginners in Section M, and with the practical instructions given by Hung-jen (T.48.379a.5ff) which echo some of the items mentioned by Tao-hsin.

76 T.14.541a.8. This phrase occurs twice in the Platform Sūtra (Tun-huang version), Sections 19 and 30.

77 The exact source of this quote is unclear. The idea of the transforming effect of a single phrase (i-chü 一句) is echoed in Section 29 of the Daijōji edition of the Platform Sūtra where we read that “A single insight (i-po-jo 一瞥) produces the 84,000 wisdoms.” However, the exact quotation is used by Yen-shou (904–975) in his Wan shan t’ung kuei chi (T.48.975c.5–6) where he adds: “When a single good enters the mind, 10,000 generations of thieves are done away with.” In the Tsung-ching-lu (T.48.487c.28) he rephrases the idea: “When the mind is colored by a single [true] phrase, the mind should become the Buddha. When one word of scripture is heard, seven generations are not lost.” A similar phrase appeared before Tao-hsin in the writings of Chih-i (T.46.6c.20; 7a.8, 22–23). Cf. T’an-luan (d. ca. 554) who used the phrase i-fa-chü—法句 (T.40.841b.10) in discussing the condensation of true reality into a single expression. Cf. Sections I and L above.

78 She-shen. See the She-shen Chapter of the Suvarṇaprabhāśa Sūtra (T.16.396c. ff) where the Bodhisattva gives his body to the hungry tigress, or the Medicine King Bodhisattva Chapter in the Lotus Sūtra. The necessity of first being enlightened before practicing such selfless sacrifice is urged in a forged sutra written in China about the time of Tao-hsin entitled the Yao hsing she shen ching (T.85.1414–1415). Thus, Tao-hsin emphasizes that the important thing is to develop an inner attitude of non-attachment to the body (and the mind) based on insight into their non-substantiality.
79 Chu-hsiang 雳想. This evokes the image of casting a molten image or coining money, which in this case implies a unified mind which is focused or fixed in the present with a tranquil awareness of non-substantiality.

80 A similar phrase is used by Hung-jen (T.48.379a.11). Cf. note 72 above.

81 No-method (wu-fa 無法) also suggests the idea of no-dharma (fei-fa 非法) found in the Diamond Sūtra, Section 7 (T.8.749b). Tao-hsin plays one meaning into the other and uses a pattern of argument familiar in Perfection of Wisdom texts.

82 The scriptural source for this is uncertain, although it may be from the P'u sa ying lo pen yeh ching (T.24.1012a.25). Cf. the list of three gates of liberation mentioned above note 47.

83 She-shen 舍身. Rather than selflessly discarding your body for others (see note 78 above), the meaning here seems closer to the development of an inner attitude of selflessness, in which any preoccupation or anxiety about oneself is relinquished. Hung-jen uses the phrase in a similar way (T.48.378b.18), and Ta-chu Hui-hai interprets the First of the Six Perfections of a Bodhisattva in the same way rather than in terms of giving oneself for others. As a consequence, he suggests that all Six Perfections are therefore contained in the First Perfection of giving, since they can all be accomplished once an attitude of selflessness is followed. See The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai, tr. by John Blofeld (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1972), p. 53 (Zoku-zokkyō 2.15.5; or Hsū-Tsang Ching, Vol. 110; p. 422 recto).

84 T'ui-ts'e 推策, which literally means to throw the divination sticks.


86 T.85.1435a.19–20. This text was probably compiled in China. See Mizuno Kōgen, "Gisaku no Hoku kyō ni tsuite,‘‘ Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō, 19 (March, 1961), pp. 11–33.

87 Lao-tzu, Chapter 21. Cf. above (T.85.1289a.13) and Chuang-tzu, Chapter 11, line 35.

88 T.9.610a.22. That is to say, reality is beyond the distinctions of either one or two, or of any quantification.


90 T.12.648b.7–8.

91 The view that inanimate objects share in the true nature of things (symbolized by the Buddha-nature) was clearly advocated by the Ts'ao Tung School of Ch'an. (See the dialogue of Tung Shan translated by Lu K'uan-yü, Ch'an and Zen Teaching, Second Series [Berkeley: Shambala, 1971], pp. 128–129.) In the time of Tao-hsin it was probably an issue of sectarian controversy. (See Kamata Shigeo, Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū [Tokyo: 1965], pp. 461–465.)

92 T.25.784b.19. This scriptural explanation that the ultimate dharma of the True Buddha (= dharmakāya) is not able to be grasped and is not able to be taught. Based on the doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha (trikāya), the Response (or Reward) Buddhas and the Transformation Buddhas (such as Sākyamuni) are only temporary, expedient and partial reflections of true reality, the dharmakāya. Tao-hsin invokes the ineffability of true reality not only to criticize superficial talk about Buddha-nature. Perhaps he is also suggesting that his own teachings are not in any
way to be treated as final or complete statements of the truth, and are much less than even the temporary teachings of the Reward and Transformation Buddhas. This is a modest but clear warning against placing too much importance on words (see Section G and note 33 above), and is an appropriate way to end both the teachings of Tao-hsin and this article.
The Concept of *li nien* ("being free from thinking") in the Northern Line of Ch’an Buddhism

Robert B. Zeuschner

Some of the more interesting problems in the history of the development of early Chinese Ch’an Buddhism surround the conflict between the Southern line of Ho-tsê Shen-hui (670–762) and the Northern line established by Shen-hsiu (605?–796). The details of the dispute are complicated by political considerations as well as possible doctrinal differences, and no attempt will be made to cover all aspects of this problem in this paper. Our topic is a possible doctrinal difference and the question of its legitimacy. So, we will focus upon one of the more important concepts found in the writings of the Northern line of Ch’an,¹ that of *li nien* (離念), for we feel that an analysis of this central idea might be able to provide a rationale for a doctrinal dispute between the two Ch’an lines. Our analysis will also open the possibility that there might have been a misunderstanding of the Northern Ch’an concept of *li nien* on the part of the founder of the Southern line, Ho-tsê Shen-hui.

A common attitude taken towards the Southern line of Shen-hui is that the Southern line instigated the conflict, motivated entirely by political aspirations. That there were political considerations can hardly be doubted. However, this does not confine us to the position that the political motivations were the sole difference. We intend to investigate the possibility that *li nien* might be interpreted as suggesting that the student of Ch’an should attempt to eliminate all thinking from the mind itself by consciously stopping the arising of thoughts. That this was the way the Southern line interpreted the teachings of the Northern line can hardly be doubted. The next question, whether such an interpretation was a forced and deliberate misinterpretation of those teachings, is one which cannot be easily answered. Must one willfully distort *li nien* and wrench it from its contexts in order to arrive at the understanding of the Southern line? This is the basic question to which we shall address ourselves.
PART I: GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Chinese character *li* 霧 (*hanareru* in Japanese) is used quite often in a large number of interrelated passages in the writings of the Northern line of Ch'an. One of the more interesting of those passages is *hsin-t'i li nien* (心體離念), 2 which may be tentatively translated into English as "the mind-itself is free from thinking." As is clear from the Chinese phrase, the character *li* establishes a relationship between "the mind itself" and the process of "thinking."

An interesting problem arises if we note that the contexts in which the Chinese term *li* appears are somewhat ambiguous, and the question arises: what precisely is meant by the expression *hsin-t'i li nien*? The attempt to become clear on this is what we shall address ourselves to in the main body of this paper. When this task is completed we will be in a position to apply our findings to the conflict between the two lines of early Ch'an Buddhism.

To begin with, we find ourselves with two interrelated problems:

(1) What is the most likely way to understand the passage *hsin-t'i li nien*?

(2) What English term or expression seems closest to the original meaning of *li* intended by the authors of the Northern Ch'an writings? Clearly, in order to answer the second question, we must first deal with (1). In order to answer (1), we propose the following steps for establishing the most likely meanings for *li* in the context of the phrase *hsin-t'i li nien*:

(1) Attempt to become clear about all possible meanings for *li*, both as an ordinary Chinese word and as a Buddhist technical term.

(2) Examine typical passages where *li* appears in the writings of the Northern line in order to grasp the context and range of usages.

(3) Attempt to determine if there is any single sense of *li* (say *li_k*) which can be used consistently in all of the passages in question. If one *li_k* can be shown to work in all, or in a significant majority of the passages, it is likely that this particular sense has a strong claim to being the one originally intended by the authors of the passage in question. However, one must recognize that even if such a *li_k* can be shown to exist, it does not provide conclusive proof that the authors of the passage had only this sense in mind in each and every appearance of the term. 3
PART II: THE MEANINGS OF 'LI'

According to the Chinese Buddhist Tradition
Among the standard Buddhist meanings for li are the following: 4

The cutting off of evil or misdeeds [sever, cut off, eradicate, suppress, exterminate, root out, etc.] To shun, abstain from, keep away, keep at a distance; stand aloof; be estranged; remove, abolish, cancel; exclude. Used as a translation for “being free from the world” (Nirvana).
To be exempt from, get rid of, avoid, evade.
Throw away, discard, abandon, give up, renounce, relinquish.
To leave, part from, apart from, abandon;
To leave the impure, abandon the defiling influences of the passions or illusion.
To leave, to be free from desire, or the passions . . .

Non-Buddhist Meanings for ‘Li’
As used in ordinary Chinese, li conveys a number of very similar meanings such as: 5

To leave; to retire; to separate.
Distant from; apart from. To fall into. To meet with. To pass through.
Separation, separate. Part from; come off, become disjoined, digress, get free; become estranged; separate; disconnect, sever, detach; keep apart; alienate; isolate; let go, release, set free.
Separate; part from; fall apart, come off; become disjoined.
Leave, quit; depart; go away from . . .

Sanskrit Terms Translated by ‘Li’
Apparently li was not used to render any single Sanskrit term in general in Chinese Buddhist texts, and thus we can find a large number of Sanskrit terms translated by li in the Chinese Buddhist literature. Among the numerous terms, we might note the following: 6

a-vikṣiptatā; ni-han; nihatya; rahitatva; varjita; vi-kṣip; vikṣipet; viyoga; vivarjita; vi-vṛj; vivarjya; visamyoga; visāra; vṛj; vyapeta;
PART III: SORTING OUT THE POSSIBLE MEANINGS FOR ‘LI’

In order to determine in what manner the mind itself is free from thinking (*hsin-t’i li nien*), we must consider the variety of possible meanings which are ascribable to *li*. As we can see from the previous lists, *li* has a large number of possible definitions. However, these seem to be reducible to five general families of meanings, which we will distinguish into the following five groups:

- **li₁** Given an expression such as “Y is *li* X,” one possible sense suggested by the most common dictionary definitions could be expressed by saying that Y is divided off from X, or that Y is apart from X, or that Y has abandoned X. In other words, some distance has been put between oneself and X. This is the sense in which one would separate himself from bad company which provides a poor atmosphere for spiritual cultivation. Consequently, Y would simply avoid encountering X’s, and there is no implication concerning the existence or non-existence of the X’s.

- **li₂** This *li* would indicate that Y remains while X no longer exists, i.e. that X becomes non-existent for Y, or X has disappeared for Y; Things like X no longer arise within Y according to *li₂*. Consequently, if one were *li₂* anger (or hatred, *dosa*) or *li₂* illusion (*mohā*), this sense would seem to imply that anger no longer arises within Y, or that illusion had been eliminated within Y. This sense of *li* clearly implies that X no longer exists.

- **li₃** A third more complex sense is “Y is independent of X and X is not essentially related to Y.” This suggests that Y is somehow and in some sense “more fundamental than” X, and that X is merely adventitious. Whether X exists or not, Y would remain untouched, untroubled, and unaffected by X. This sense might be best captured by saying that Y transcends X. As with *li₁*, this use of *li* has no implications concerning the non-existence of X, for the claim would amount to the assertion that...
even if X exists, it can have no essential connection or influence upon Y.

li₄ A fourth possible sense for li could include a state of mental detachment which Y takes towards X. This implies that Y is not attached to X (or things like X), that Y can move freely among X’s without being either attracted towards them or repelled by them. Here, li describes an attitude towards X and has no implications concerning the non-existence of X.

li₅ This last possible interpretation of li would mean that “X cannot reach to Y.” It might even be interpreted in a philosophical manner as the claim that Y belongs to an entirely different category than X. This sense of li might be interpreted as a drawing out of the combined positions of li₁ and li₃.

It would seem that the relationship between Y and X might be any one of the above five, and still be the relationship of “Y li X.” It is clear that these five are by no means identical; different relationships are implied depending upon which sense of li is intended. And, differing philosophical consequences can be drawn depending upon which li is adopted in the mind of the reader or translator.

In light of the sense distinguished above, let us see how the sense of the phrase hsin-t’i li nien shifts depending upon which of the five senses of li are adopted:

li₁ The mind itself has abandoned (or rejected) thinking;
The mind itself has separated itself from thinking.

li₂ [In] the mind itself, thinking does not arise;
 [In] the mind itself, there is no thinking.

li₃ The mind itself is fundamentally and essentially independent of thinking;
The mind itself transcends thinking.

li₄ The mind itself is mentally detached from thinking;
The mind itself has an attitude of detachment towards thinking.

li₅ The mind itself is beyond conceptualization;
The mind itself is inconceivable.

Which of these five provides the most likely understanding of the
phrase *hsin-t'i li nien*? The step we must take in order to answer this question is to examine the way the term *li* is used in varying contexts in the writings of the Northern Ch'anj line. This we will do next.

**PART IV: CONCERNING THE USE OF ‘LI’ IN THE NORTHERN CH’AN TEXTS**

We shall begin by making two general observations about the way *li* is used in the existent texts of the Northern Ch'anj line. First, we might notice that *li* is generally used to establish a relationship rather than used in isolation. E.g., the most common use of *li* is in expressions which we might translate “free from” or “liberated from” rather than “freedom” or “liberation.” Secondly, we should call attention to the fact that passages involving *li* in the writings of the Northern line generally take two basic forms;

(A) Y is *li* X;

(B) To be *li* X is to be Z.

We shall proceed with our analysis of *li* by selecting a number of typical passages involving *li*, being careful not to omit any types, and then examine these to see how *li* is employed. Sometimes we shall paraphrase the originals (without distorting them) in order to shorten their length, and in order to reveal their basic structure. Although the total number of appearances of *li* in the writings of the Northern line certainly numbers in the hundreds, the general structure of the passages tends to be quite similar, and often identical. For this reason we do not feel it to be either practical or necessary to provide an exhaustive list of such passages. But we have tried to make the following list comprehensive in the sense that all significant appearances of *li* might be included under one or more of the following fourteen passages.

**Group A:** Y is *li* X.

1. The Buddha-mind is *li* being and non-being 佛心清淨離有離無 (T. 2834, p. 1273c19).
2. The mind itself is *li* thinking 心體離念 (T. 2834, p. 1273c22).
3. The Bodhisattva is *li* the defilements of desire, anger, and false views 是菩薩即離諸貪欲瞋恚邪見 (T. 2834, 1276a2).
4. The mind being *li* attachments, the mind has attained liberation. Form (rupa) being *li* attachments, form has attained liberation. 不思心如心離繫縛 (T. 2834, p. 1277a25).
5. One can be totally *li* all suffering and experience Nirvana 逢能遠離諸苦 (T. 2009, p. 367a4).
6. Control the mind and you will be *li* falsehood and evil 但能攝心離諸邪惡 (T. 2833, p. 1271a11).
7. . . . when the mind is *li* thinking, objective conditions are pure and clear 念境塵淸淨 (T. 2834, p. 1274b3).

8. The Tathagata is forever *li* the worldly and [\*\textit{li}] suffering 永離世間一切諸苦 (T. 2833, p. 1271c5).

9. Not to bring forth the mind of conceptualization and description is to be *li* attachments and fetters, and is the achievement of liberation 不起心思想則離繫縛即得解脫 (T. 2834, p. 1277b19).

**Group B:** To be *li* X is to be Z.

10. That which is *li* thinking is called the ‘essence’ 離念名體 (T. 2834, p. 1274b5).

11. Obtaining *li* arrogance, arrogance does not arise 慢則不生 (T. 2834, 1276c2).

12. To be *li* mind is called ‘Self Awakening.’
   To be *li* form is ‘Awakening Others.’
   To have mind and form both *li* is ‘Awakening Perfected.’
   離心名自覺 離色名覺他 心色俱離 名覺滿滿者 (T. 2839, p. 1291c28).

13. To be *li* thinking is called ‘Intrinsic Awakening’
   To be *li* form is called ‘Initial Awakening.’ 離念名本覺色名始覺 (T. 2839, p. 1292b2).

   *Li* forms, characteristics do not arise 離心名不起 離色相不生 (T. 2839, p. 1292b16).

Statements of the form of \#12, \#13 and \#14 are very common in the writings of the Northern line. The majority of the appearances of *li* are precisely in this kind of construction, where *li* is used with any pair or any triad of Buddhist concepts and technical terms. It ultimately seems to take on the suggestion of a literary convention rather than serving as the reflection of an experiential insight of Ch’an.

**PART V: ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES**

We have distinguished five different ways in which Y can be *li* X. Which of these provides the most likely way of understanding the expression *hsin-t’i* *li* *nien*? To answer this question, we will utilize the method outlined at the beginning of this paper, i.e. examining the various passages involving *li* to see if any one of the *li* previously distinguished “works” in a significant majority of the passages from the Northern texts. We shall use as our key the fourteen passages given on page 10.

Substituting *li* ("apart from," "separated from," etc.) in the typical
passages, we find that it is very clear in all of those passages which speak of being *li* from negative sorts of objects, such as the *kleśas*, illusions, attachments, falsehood, craving, evil, etc.\(^{10}\) It is not clear what it means in the context of mind and form, and in phrase such as “The Buddha-mind is *li* being and non-being” (T. 2834, 1273c19). This passage could be interpreted as saying that both being and non-being are separated from the Buddha, which could imply a ‘third realm’ where the Buddha-mind exists apart from the world of existence and non-existence. However, “separated from” works quite well as long as we interpret the phrase as follows: “The Buddha-mind is separated from [the concepts of] being and non-being.” This sort of interpretation would seem justified within the parameters of Mahāyāna thought. Consequently we may conclude that *li*\(_1\) can be used consistently in the passages to give good sense to them.

*Li*\(_2\) is similar to *li*\(_1\), except it is much stronger than *li*\(_1\) because the object of *li* is understood to be or to become non-existent. Consequently, if *li*\(_2\) can be seen to work well in the passages, it can be preferred over *li*\(_1\) because it will include the senses of *li*\(_1\) as its own additional implications. This way of understanding *li* works very well in those passages involving negative elements, but has the somewhat troublesome consequence that the Bodhisattva becomes one who can never experience anger or passions since those elements are now totally absent from his personality (although, there are some scholars who might well agree that this is exactly the case). *Li*\(_2\) certainly is a convenient way of interpreting a passage like “control the mind and you will be *li* falsehood and evil,” for it becomes, “control the mind and falsehood and evil will no longer exist [within you].” (T. 2833, 1271all). However, we seem forced to adopt the conclusion that the process of thinking must be separated from the mind itself, which implies that the enlightened person simply does not think after he is enlightened. Was the Northern line really arguing that the mind itself is operating in an enlightened manner when all thinking had come to an end?\(^{11}\) This position does not seem inconsistent with some of the various Buddha-nature theories expounded in such texts as the *Nirvāṇa Sutra*, *the Awakening of Faith*, and others which were important within the Northern tradition. If *hsin-t’i* is equated with the Buddha-nature, or with the *Tathāgatagarbha*, this position does not seem unjustified.

*Li* is the interpretation that the mind itself “transcends” thinking, in that the mind itself is the fundamental essence, and thinking is just
adventitious (and perhaps an adventitious defilement). Here the image is that of the original tranquil mind which remains undisturbed whether there is thinking or not. According to this view, even when one's thoughts are disturbed or agitated, the mind itself would be unaffected by this activity since it is not essentially related to thought, and the thought-process cannot affect this fundamental tranquility of mind. The mind itself is thus pure and clear, and independent of tranquility of thinking.

This interpretation of li becomes very troublesome when we try to utilize it in the various sample phrases and passages. For example, it becomes very difficult to understand any passage of an “if . . . then . . .” type of structure. The characteristic of being “more fundamental than” or “independent of” must be true all the time, and not only when something else is first accomplished. For example, consider the passage [if] you control your mind, then you will be li falsehood and evil.” It becomes, “[if] you control your mind, then you [the person, mentally considered] will be ‘more fundamental than and essentially separate from' falsehood and evil” (T. 2833, 1217a). But this interpretation of li would require us to say that we are always essentially separate from falsehood and evil, whether we realize it or not. All passages which speak of achieving the state of separation would become very difficult to understand (since it is already there originally). E.g., what sense is there to saying” . . . when the mind is li thinking, objective conditions are pure and clear” (T. 2834, 1274b3) if the mind is already and forever li thinking? Consequently, although li seems to give good sense within the specific context of hsin-t'i li nien, it becomes rather problematic when we try to substitute this li uniformly in the various other appearances of li in the Northern writings.

Li₄, “an attitude of mental detachment,” sounds rather good in our key phrase hsin-t'i li nien (“the mind itself has an attitude of mental detachment towards thinking”), but seems to be too weak in some of the other passages. For example, “the Bodhisattva is li the defilements of desire, anger, and false views” (T. 2834, 1276a2) would become: “the Bodhisattva has an attitude of mental detachment towards the defilements of desire, anger, and false views.” This seems to imply that false views (moha) might persist as long as the Bodhisattva maintained an attitude of mental detachment towards his false views. But don’t we feel a desire to say that the Bodhisattva has actually eliminated all false views? Can one be a Bodhisattva (on one of the higher bhūni) and still have false views?
There are at least two ways of responding to this objection. The first would be to interpret the meaning as follows: the Bodhisattva learns to utilize language forms (which incorporate false views almost by definition for the Madhyamika, as does the general thinking process), but the Bodhisattva is able to manipulate language without falling into the trap of taking the terms as standing in a one-to-one relationship mapping a world composed of self-existent things (naive realist view), or of self-existent ultimate ‘bits’ (dharmas) (the view ascribed to the Abhidharma schools). In this case the Bodhisattva could be described as being detached from his false views. This analysis is slightly awkward however when we consider that false views would no longer be false views if one were not attached to them. In addition, it would still seem possible for the Bodhisattva to become genuinely angry (dosa) or to be genuinely filled with desire if one were merely cultivating an attitude of nonattachment towards these ‘Three Poisons.’ Is this possible for a Bodhisattva, or is his anger and desire merely upāya, an apparent display of these emotions as an expedient for bringing others to full and complete Enlightenment?

A second way of responding to the objection (that li₄ is too weak for the majority of appearances of li) is to argue that by taking the attitude of non-attachment towards these ‘Three Poisons,’ these destructive states are (indirectly and gradually) removed. Consequently, the attitude of non-attachment could be interpreted as a process which ultimately results in the total elimination of the negative elements.

In addition, when we consider that li is given as a synonym for ‘Awakening’ (chueh 覺) quite often (e.g. T. 2839, 1291c23), one might well feel that the characteristic of non-attachment is one of the defining characteristics of Awakening and Buddhahood. In this kind of context, li₁ and li₂ do not seem as likely as either li₃ or li₄.

A passage from the Northern texts discusses li and the Three Poisons as follows:

If there is li mind, craving does not arise.
If there is li form, anger does not arise.
And if both form and mind are li, folly and ignorance are not manifested.
If there is li mind, one transcends the realm of desire.
If there is li form, one transcends the realm of form.
And if both are li, one transcends the formless realm.
(T. 2839, 1292b4).
This passage makes it clear that this is a state to be achieved through a sequential process, and thus makes very good sense when understood in the li₄ manner. I.e., by progressively cultivating an attitude of detachment, one begins to think in a detached manner—craving does not arise, anger does not arise (since one is now detached from physical forms), and false views are no longer manifested.

However, it seems that there is one very strong difficulty with adopting the li₄ interpretation: the Chinese grammar does not seem to support it. On the interpretation of li₄, hsin-t'ī li nien (心體離念) is understood as a description of how one thinks (or ought to think), i.e. li would be telling us about the proper relationship between the process of thinking and the things thought about (between thinking and the world). But the Chinese construction suggests instead that li is telling us about the relationship between the mind itself and thinking. We seem to have three elements here: (a) the mind itself; (b) thinking; (c) the world. The interpretation of li₄ given above seems to suggest that li is telling us about the relationship between (b) and (c). The Chinese grammatical structure suggests that the relationship is actually between (a) and (b).

Another way that we might understand “X is li Y” in the phrase hsin-t'ī li nien is provided by li₅. Stated briefly, it is the interpretation that the mind itself is inconceivable (acintyā). In other words, li nien is taken as a description of the nature of the mind itself, and would become equivalent to the popular phrase used often in the Northern texts, pu-ssu-i (不思議). We could say that “the mind itself is beyond conceptualization.” In this interpretation, li nien could be paraphrased as “in a totally different category from thinking,” or “beyond the reach of thinking (or thought).” This does provide us with a rather profound interpretation of the various appearances of li, except for those cases involving a “when . . .” or “if . . . then . . .” structure, as with li₃. In addition, this view would seem to involve us in a rather dualistic universe filled with defilements, and having Bodhisattvas who are somehow “beyond the reach of” these defiled things. Some of the other li also seem to border upon a dualistic stance.

**PART VI: WHAT IS THE MOST LIKELY WAY OF INTERPRETING hsin-t'ī li nien?**

As the previous discussion makes clear, it does not seem possible to arrive at a conclusive statement of precisely which li was in the mind of the authors of the Northern texts. However, on the basis of our analysis
of the various implications of the positions, we do seem justified in trying to determine which senses are most likely in view of the available evidence. We can also pursue some of the further implications which would follow if \( li \) were being used in more than one sense by the authors of the writings.

\( Li_2 \) can be seen as a reasonable way of interpreting \( hsin-t’i \) \( li \) \( nien \), in light of the fact that it gives a clear meaning for every appearance of \( li \) and it does not seem to contradict any of the other teachings of the Northern line. We would then interpret \( hsin-t’i \) \( li \) \( nien \) as follows: “[In] the mind itself, thinking does not arise.” We can summarize the reasons which support this interpretation as follows:

1. \( Li_2 \) gives a likely and consistent interpretation to all the various appearances of \( li \) in the Northern writings.
2. No other \( li \) can be used more consistently and more often in the appassages.
3. \( Li_2 \) has the additional value of including \( li_1 \) and its senses.
4. \( Li_2 \) would seem to provide a meaning which is acceptable in light of the ‘pure mind’ theory of Buddha-nature (\( Tath\tilde{a}gatagarbha \)).
5. We know that one interpretation of ‘concentration’ (\( ting \) \( 定 \)) in China did involve suppressing thoughts, and this is consistent with the kinds of criticisms leveled against the Northern line in the

**Platform Scripture** attributed to Hui-neng, and by Shen-hui.

However, in spite of the above points, there seem to be good reasons for supporting \( li_4 \) (“an attitude of mental detachment”) as a suitable way to interpret \( hsin-t’i \) \( li \) \( nien \). \( Li_4 \) is particularly easy to defend if we understand the sense of detachment as something which ultimately eliminates the negative elements, i.e., a process which ultimately results in the removal of the destructive states of mind (the “Three Poisons” for example). In this way, \( li_2 \) would include much of the strength of \( li_4 \). On some occasions we may feel that \( li_4 \) is too weak because it seems to imply that the negative state (of arrogance, hatred, desire, illusion, etc.) could persist even though the attitude of detachment was present. We suggested that this could be solved if we understand the state of non-attachment as producing the gradual extinction or elimination of the negative elements (e.g., being detached from one’s arrogance ultimately eliminates such arrogance). The major difficulty with accepting \( li_4 \) is that the Chinese grammar seems to make such an interpretation rather forced.

To adopt either \( li_3 \) or \( li_5 \) would require us to hold that \( li \) is varying
considerably from one sort of context to another, as pointed out in our previous analysis on pages 134–135. We do not seem to be able to substitute either -li₃ (“The mind itself transcends thinking”) or -li₅ (“The mind itself is beyond conceivability”) into the other passages involving -li. It would seem difficult to document the claim that -li has a rather unique sense only in the context of  hsint’i li nien, but there is no question that it is possible.

The authors of the writings may have used -li either (1) ambiguously (in one sense in one passage, and in a different sense in another place), or (2) unclearly (not really aware that varying that varying senses were involved in different contexts). As for the first possibility, if the authors were using the character ambiguously, then our method of determining which sense of -li gives the best possible meaning in the largest number of cases would not give us any information about any particular case, such as  hsint’i li nien. Instead we would have to restrict ourselves to the few passages which deal only with the notion of -li nien. Unfortunately the remarks concerning -li nien in the texts of Northern Ch’an (during the earliest period) do not seem detailed enough to allow one to come to any real conclusive opinion. And as for (2), if the authors were simply utilizing the concept in an unclear manner, then all attempts to draw out consistent philosophical consequences are bound to fail, because there was no original coherence in the varying usages.

We see no way to rule out either of these two possibilities. Our analysis so far has been inconclusive, and one might argue that it has been inconclusive precisely because the texts themselves are not of the sort to which one can apply the standards of consistency required for a precise philosophical analysis.

So, what may we conclude? Attempting to explicate a precise meaning for  hsint’i li nien, which we tentatively translated as “the mind itself is free from thinking,” we have come to four possible conclusions:

(a) The precise meaning of the phrase is:
    [In] the mind itself, thinking does not arise.

(b) The precise meaning of the phrase is:
    The mind itself is detached while thinking.

(c) The precise meaning of the phrase is unique to that context alone and involves a sense of -li which can be made explicit as: either
    The mind itself transcends thinking,
    or
    The mind itself is inconceivable.
(d) The sense of *li* is ambiguous or unclear, and the passage cannot be made explicit based upon the evidence available. On the evidence available, we do not believe that it is possible to establish that only one of the above possibilities is correct, and that the other three must be wrong. Considering only the various appearances of *li* in the writings of the Northern line, (a) seems to be most strongly indicated. However, we have found no evidence which would rule out (b), (c) or (d).¹⁷

PART VII: ‘LI’ AND THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE TWO CH’AN TRADITIONS

As has become rather obvious by now, the adoption of the sense “does not arise” or “separated from” for *li* would provide a picture of Northern Ch’an doctrines which would seem to at least partly explain some of the criticisms of the Southern line found in the writings of Shenhui, the critical remarks found in the *Platform Scripture*, and in other texts such as the *Lin-chi lu* (*Rinzai roku*).¹³ If the second sense is adopted, then *li nien* can be seen to be similar to the essential concept of the Southern line, that of *wu-nien* (無念).¹⁴ If this were the case, one would have to look elsewhere for possible doctrinal or philosophical differences.

If we recognize that there are several different ways in which the mind itself can be “free from thinking,” we can see that different philosophical consequences do follow from the varying possibilities. Recognizing this, and also noticing that the Northern line applied negative terms to thinking and thought-related activities, we are in a better position to understand that the critic might understand *li* in the first sense which implies that the goal to be pursued is the elimination of thinking from the mind by consciously stopping the arising of thoughts. Such a doctrine can justifiably be called “an obstacle to Bodhi,” as Ho-tsê Shenhui charged so often.¹⁵ The philosophy of the Northern line would be interpreted as the position of those who believed that by consciously making one’s mind blank, eliminating mental activity (“thinking”), one thereby allows the pure and self-illumined mind to shine forth. In other words, by consciously stopping the arising of thought, the mirror-like clarity of the mind is restored and it becomes perfectly reflecting in the same way the pond becomes mirror-like when the waves are stopped. The adventitiously defiling process of thinking¹⁶ is eliminated or “wiped away.”

Whether such an interpretation of the thought of Northern Ch’an was a forced and deliberate misrepresentation is difficult to ascertain. Our
own analysis has tended to show that the texts themselves do not make such an interpretation impossible. The evidence presented above opens the possibility that Shen-hui need not be understood as motivated solely by political aspirations in his criticisms of the Northern line. The Northern line might have intended such a dualistic position, or its position may have been simply misunderstood because of the technical terms which they employed (i.e., *li*).

On the other hand, *li* can also be understood in some other ways which do not have the same consequences as outlined above. If it is taken as simply recommending that an attitude of non-attachment be maintained in the thinking process, e.g., that one think in a *li*-like manner, or that one think without being attached to the objects thought about, or to think without imputing a *svabhāva* (unchanging essential self-existent nature) to the objects which constitute the world, then the picture changes considerably. This would seem to be equivalent to seeing the world as *sūnyatā*. It entirely avoids the dualistic separation between the pure mind and defiling processes of thinking. If this sense is adopted, then we would have to look somewhere other than *li nien* to see if Shen-hui’s attacks were justified.

Adopting possibility (c) also seems to avoid Shen-hui’s criticisms. However, the claim that “the mind itself transcends thinking” could be understood in a rather dualistic sense again, and Shen-hui seems to have had a strong aversion to any formulations of the doctrines which could even be misinterpreted in this way. Shen-hui vigorously attacked all dualisms in the spirit of the *Vajracchedikā* and other Prajñāpāramitā texts.

Possibility (d), that the authors of the texts were not completely clear themselves about the varying senses of *li*, once again makes room for the criticisms offered by the Southern line.

What was the actual position of the Northern tradition? The most sympathetic reading would obviously be (b) or (c), that we must think non-attachedly, or that the true mind cannot be conceptualized. If the Northern line did hold a doctrine like (a) with possible dualistic consequences, it is very unlikely that the dualistic conclusions were explicitly intended. It is possible that the Northern line did intend a view which would justify Shen-hui’s criticisms, however, in light of the later development of the doctrines, this seems very unlikely. Yet the earliest formulations of the teachings of the Northern line does seem to make possible a dualistic view. Ho-tse Shen-hui of the Southern line may well have misinterpreted the teachings of the Northern line on this point, but I do not feel that we must conclude that it was a deliberate misrepresen-
tation. The texts themselves do not contradict such an interpretation, as we have seen.

NOTES

The author would like to express his gratitude and indebtedness to several friends who read previous drafts of this paper and whose suggestions have certainly improved it considerably. I would like to thank Dr. Paul Wienpahl, Dr. David Chappell, and especially Dr. Ronald Burr who carefully and meticulously read all previous drafts, devoting much time to improving both style and content. However, needless to say, the author alone is responsible for all errors, misunderstanding, and difficulties which might be present herein.

1 For our sources, we will draw upon those Northern Ch'an texts preserved in volume 85 of the Taishō collection, and also collected in Ui Hakūju, Zenshūshi kenyū, vol. I, Tokyo, 1940, pp. 419–517, and in Suzuki Daisetz, Suzuki Daisetsu zenshū, vol. III, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 161–235. Because this paper is primarily concerned with the conflict between Shen-hui and the Northern lineage established by Shen-hsiu, we have omitted from consideration those texts which because of colophon and contents seem to be a considerably later development within the Northern line.

2 This expression originally appeared in the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Ta-ch'êng ch'i-hsin lun), T. 1666, vol. 32, p. 576b12. Hakeda translates the passage “the essence of Mind is free from thoughts” (Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith, Columbia, 1967, p. 37). Quotations and paraphrases of this phrase are found throughout the writings of the Northern line. E.g., T. 2834, p. 1273c12, 1274a5, 1274a19, 1274b3–5, T. 2839, p. 1292c23, 1292a26, 1292b1, 1292b14, etc.

3 Although it is very possible that li is used in an unusual and unique sense only in the hsin-t'i li nien passage, and differently everywhere else, it would seem difficult to document this claim. It will be clear that certain of the possible ways of interpreting li can be excluded by the context of the passages, but most often there will be more than one sense of li which is possible for interpreting the passages in question. Therefore, although we will be able to exclude some possible meanings for li, the author does not expect to be able to establish conclusively that one single sense of li must be the one and only correct way to understand li, the only correct possibility.

4 The following definitions of li were basically drawn from two sources: Nakamura Hajime, Bukkyōgo daijiten, 3 vols., Tokyo, 1975, p. 1415a-b; Soothill, Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, Taiwan, 1969, p. 475.

5 These definitions were basically drawn from the following sources: Mathews Chinese-English Dictionary, entry 3902; Nelson's Japanese-English Character Dictionary (entry 5040); Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary, p. 382.

6 This rather long list was compiled from just two sources: Nagao, Index to the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, Tokyo, 1961, p. 264a; Nakamura Hajime, op. cit., p. 1415a-b.

7 The author is indebted to Dr. David Chappell who pointed out that this sense was separable from lia.
The Northern Ch’an texts utilized in this examination are the following:

1. **Ta ch’eng wu sheng fang pien wen** (大乘無生方便門), "Mahāyāna Non-arising Upāya Doctrines," T. 2834;
2. **Kuan hsin lun** (觀心論), “Clear Observation of Mind,” T. 2833;
3. **Ts’an Ch’an wen** (詠頌門詩), “Verses in Praise of Ch’an” [not the original title of the text], T. 2839;
4. **Ta ch’eng wu fang pien—pei tsung** (大乘五方便北宗), “Mahayana Five Upāya—Northern lineage,” not found in the Taishō 85 but collected in Ui, op. cit., pp. 468–515 and in Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 190–235. However, because of the obvious late stage of development of this text, we have purposely not drawn any of our sample passages from it.

The above list is not a complete list of the writings of the Northern line of Ch’an, but the ones omitted do not discuss li nien.

There are exceptions to this, as in the **Ts’an Ch’an wen shih**, where we find expressions such as the following:

Awakening is li, and li is “li thinking.” . . . Forms and mind are both li. The text clearly suggests that li is to be understood as an abbreviation for (or as equivalent to) li nien.

If we substitute the English expression “free from” for li, we would have:

Awakening is freedom. Freedom is [to be] free from thinking.

. . . Forms and mind are both free. (T. 2839 p. 1291c23).

When we examine the kinds of passages in which li appears, we note that most often li is used with definitely negative elements, such as defilements, the Three Poisons of mohā, dosa, and rāga, attachments, suffering (duḥkha), falsehood, evil, arrogance, fetters, etc. It also appears with elements which we might be inclined to call neutral, such as being and non-being, mind, and form. We do not find li used in connection with positive elements like Awakening or Nirvana. Part of the question which we are dealing with in this paper is whether ‘thinking’ ought to be classified with the negative elements, or with the neutral elements (One could also argue that the elements which we have classified as neutral are actually negative as well, in one way or another).

A further complication of this issue concerns the exact nature of this ‘thinking’ (nien 念) for the Northern line. We can easily maintain the position suggested in this interpretation if we assume that by nien the Northern line actually meant Wang nien (妄念). I.e., they are arguing against ‘incorrect’ or ‘wrong’ thinking and not just the general process of thinking. I have found nothing in the Northern texts which would suggest that this is how nien was to be understood, but neither have I found anything which would eliminate this possibility. There are no discussions which clearly distinguish ‘correct thinking’ from ‘incorrect thinking.’ Clearly, a complete analysis of hsin-t’i li-nien would require corresponding analysis of each of the terms involved and not just li.

There are numerous passages in the Northern writings which speak very negatively of thinking, and which would lead us to interpret the thinking process as a defilement in some sense. Some of these passages are translated in footnote 16, related to our discussion of this issue in terms of the conflict between the two lines of Ch’an.

14 I do not want to suggest that the previous discussion of li nien exhausts the meaning of wu-nien ("no-thought") as taught in the lineage of Hui-neng and Shen-hui. However it does seem that at least a portion of what is meant by wu-nien is encompassed by li nien if li is interpreted as "maintaining an attitude of non-attachment."

15 The majority of Shen-hui's criticisms of the Northern line are found in his "Establishing the True and False according to the Southern School of Bodhidharma," and to a lesser extent in his other works. The principal source for Shen-hui's ideas is Hu Shih, Shen hui ho shang i chi, Taiwan, 1971; pp. 133–4, 137, 288 and 289 are places where the criticism is especially strong.

16 There are numerous passages which support the idea that thinking is considered negative and defiling. For example, "The minds of the śrāvakas have thinking and grasping, and they are disturbed and agitated . . ." (Ui, op. cit., p. 460). Consider also, "They have minds of thinking and seeking, and so are unable to know. . ." (Ui, op. cit., p. 462). We see it clearly also in the following longer passage:

To bring forth (to have the arising of) the mind of conceptualization and description is to be fettered and not achieve liberation. Not to bring forth the mind of conceptualization and description is to be free from (li) the attachments and fetters, and is the achievement of liberation. No conceptualization in the mind, mind is Suchness . . . (Ibid., p. 465).

17 It is important to notice that this claim is made in reference to what seem to be the very earliest texts of the Northern line. The Northern texts were continually being revised and rewritten over the course of approximately one hundred years following the death of the founder of the Northern tradition, Shen-hsiu, in 706. We have tried to restrict our discussion to those texts which express the level of thought with which Ho-tse Shen-hui might be reasonably expected to be familiar. According to the biographical entry on Shen-hui given by Tsung-mi (Yuan-chüeh chin ta shu ch'ao, Zoku zokyo 14, 277a), Shen-hui studied under the founder of the Northern line for three years between 697–701. If this is the case, then we might expect that all of Shen-hui's discussions of the teachings of the Northern line were based upon the doctrines of the teachers during this period. He apparently was also familiar with second-hand reports concerning their teachings prior to 732. As we see the Northern texts become longer and more detailed, the temptation to interpret their doctrines dualistically becomes less strong. This is particularly true with what appears to be the final development of the "Five Upāya" series of texts, the Ta ch'eng wu fang pien: pei-tsung, in Ui, op. cit., pp. 468–515. This text carries a colophon dated 787 which places it up to 80 years following Shen-hui's initial encounter with the teachings of the Northern line. In this fully developed text all references which might suggest such a dualistic interpretation are explained in sufficient length and detail to make such an interpretation very unlikely. In fact, some passages from this text sound almost like paraphrases of the teaching of the Southern line of Shen-hui. This raises the interesting question of whether the Northern line might have incorporated portions of the teachings of the South in order to avoid their criticisms (or misinterpretations). This is a topic which I would like to explore more fully at a later date.
Early Hua-yen, Meditation, and Early Ch’an: Some Preliminary Considerations

Robert M. Gimello

Unlike most of the other contributions to this volume, these brief remarks to follow were not prepared by a specialist in early Ch’an, and it cannot be claimed for them that they report on significant new research or break new ground in early Ch’an studies. Rather, they are the observations of one especially interested in the early history of Hua-yen Buddhism in China, for whom the conference from which this volume derives was primarily an opportunity to broach the possibility that a historical and interpretive comparison of early Hua-yen and early Ch’an might shed some light on obscure features of the former tradition. It will be noted that more attention has been given finally to Hua-yen than to Ch’an and that no startling or compelling conclusions have been reached. However, it is hoped that these reflections have at least offered useful suggestions for future inquiry.

A traditional adage well known to scholars, and to adherents, of Buddhism in East Asia has it that for doctrine and theory (chiao 教) one would do well to look especially to the Hua-yen and T’ien-t’ai traditions—the so-called “twin-jewels” (shuang-pi 雙壁) of East Asian Buddhist thought—but that for practice one would do better to look to Ch’an and Pure Land. One suspects, of course, that this adage is of Ch’an or Pure Land origin. It is surely not even-handed in its implications. Buddhism has traditionally held doctrine and theory to be helpful but decidedly dispensable components of the path to liberation, raftlike in their but temporary spiritual utility. Practice, however,—particularly the root practice of meditation—is always and ever necessary to the Buddhist life, as much its end as its means. Therefore, to accord pride of place in doctrine to the former two traditions, while assigning the latter to the van of actual progress on the path, is faint praise indeed for Hua-yen and T’ien-t’ai.

Nor can such a comparison be much more historically accurate than it is equitable. One need think only of the extraordinarily detailed
prescriptions for practice found, for example in the Mo ho chih kuan (摩訶止觀) to know that it does little justice to T’ien-t’ai. In fact, if one were to judge as truly practical in their emphasis only those works which offer precise and meticulous guidance in the actual doing of meditation, then even the T’ung meng chih kuan (童蒙止觀) deserves higher marks than most texts in the Ch’an-pu (禪部) of the Tripitaka. And it is not simply a matter of texts, for both of these T’ien-t’ai works clearly sprang from living religious milieux in which meditation was avidly performed, not just catalogued and described.

However, to defend Hua-yen from the implicit, and occasionally explicit, charge of practical incompetence is not so easy a matter. Even members of its fellow “intellectual” tradition had strong doubts on this count. Thus, the eminent Sung dynasty Buddhist historian, Chih-p’an (志磐, fl. 1270) was moved to pronounce that Hua-yen “merely proclaims empty words” (t’u ch’ang hsü-wen 徒張虛文) and “lacks a path of practical realization” (wu hsü-ch’eng chih tao 無修證之道). Similar, though more generous, views have suggested themselves to modern scholars of Buddhism, to men not likely to have succumbed to mere sectarian polemic. Thus, the late Richard Robinson once wrote of Hua-yen that “this kind of intellectual yoga is a very hard road to samādhi, and in any place or time very few are ready for it.” Typically, the kindest cut scholars seem disposed to inflict on Hua-yen is to call it the “philosophical foundation” of later and more practical forms of Buddhism. Recently this impression of Hua-yen has been still further fostered, whether or not intentionally, in a work given over in good part to the comparison of Hua-yen and Hua-yen-related thought to Hegelian dialectic. Of course, it is not difficult to find reasons for these typical characterizations of Hua-yen. There is no doubt that the full-blown Hua-yen system, as constructed for example in Fa-tsang’s (法藏, 643–712) Wu chiao Chang (五教章), is an intellectual wonder to behold, and much of the rest of the tradition’s literature does abound in the most artful combination and manipulation of abstract concept (e.g. “the concordant compatibility of the subtle and the minute,” [wei-hsi hsiang-jung an-li 微細相容安立]) and fantastical, rarefied imagery (e.g. “the tower of Maitreya” [pi-lu-tsang lou-ko 毗盧藏樓閣] or “the net of Indra” [yin-t’o-lo kang 因陀羅網]). All of this does seem rather far removed from the facticity of the lotus posture, the tactility of the tongue against hard palate, the rhythm of the breath. It seems distant, too, even from the immediacy of a koan or the urgency of the “great doubt” (ta
\textit{i-ch'ing 大疑情}). How, one naturally wonders, did the authors of the characteristic insights of Hua-yen actually employ them? What exactly does one \textit{do}, meditatively that is, with the “six marks” (\textit{liu-hsiang 六相}), “ten arcana” (\textit{shih-hsüan 十玄}), the “four dharma dhātu (\textit{ssu fa-chieh 四法界})? Is it just that Hua-yen entails a particularly cerebral form of meditation? Is it perhaps, as some of Hua-yen’s critics have implied, that the themes of Hua-yen were intended, contrary to general Buddhist norms, as alternatives to meditation? Or was it that the meditative practice of Hua-yen conformed to standard pan-Buddhist patterns while its distinctive features, i.e. its dazzling array of doctrinal motifs, had nothing to do with meditation but were simply philosophical in nature; that they were intended for meditative use no more than were the canons of Dignāga’s logic?

All of these questions are difficult to answer historically or textually, and the fact that the Hua-yen corpus provides so few explicit and extensive references to meditation practice of the sort often found in the so-called “practical” traditions would seem to lend some measure of support to the typical characterizations of the school. Yet there is countervailing evidence; there are aspects of the Hua-yen tradition which when examined thoughtfully do suggest that, contrary to conventional opinion, Hua-yen had in fact a great deal to do with meditation. Let us marshall some of that evidence.

The figure whom the Hua-yen tradition chose to regard as its founder or “first patriarch” and who may actually have had a consequential role to play in its creation—i.e. the Holy Monk Tu-shun (杜順, 557–640)—was renowned in his own day as both a thaumaturge (\textit{kan-t'ung-che 感通者}) and a meditation master (\textit{ch'an-shih 禪師}). Admittedly it is the miracle-worker aspect of his career that looms largest in the biographical and hagiographical tradition concerning him. Yet, essentially the same claim is made with regard to Tu-shun that has been conventionally made throughout Buddhism, viz. that preternatural powers of the sort that enable performance of miracles are acquired just by the practice of meditation. Modern scholars have, it should be noted, frequently voiced doubts that Tu-shun was truly a founder of Hua-yen. However, the philological evidence for this is quite inconclusive\textsuperscript{6} and the most often adduced non-philological reason for such doubts is the alleged improbability of a thaumaturge’s having had anything to do with so intellectually sophisticated a tradition as Hua-yen. But clearly, were it to be applied to the issue at hand, this latter argument would be circular:
Tu-shun could not have been influential in the creation of Hua-yen because he was a meditator and miracle-worker, whereas Hua-yen in turn is “intellectual” just in the sense that its major elements are said not to be classifiable as meditative. But this is patently absurd. Moreover Buddhist history does not want for examples of monks who were at once both skilled, learned thinkers and adepts of meditation. The two accomplishments are by no means mutually exclusive.

The text attributed (questionably) to Tu-shun and later held to be the earliest and the fundamental statement of the basic themes of Hua-yen, is entitled Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men (華嚴法界觀門). The word kuan (觀) in that title and in the body of the text may be legitimately interpreted to have associations with, if not actually to denote, vipaśyanā, i.e. discernment or insight of the kind held classically to be combined with or developed upon the basis of quiescence (śamatha, chih 止). Together these two rubrics can be said to encompass the whole of Buddhist meditation. This being the case, it seems reasonable to assume that the “discernments” (kuan 觀) of the Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men are actually the conceptual protocols of Hua-yen meditation. The text itself says of one such discernment—“the discernment utterly without support” (min-chüeh wu-chi kuan 濟絶無寄觀)—that it is meant “to establish correctly the essence of practice” (cheng-ch'eng hsing-t'ī 正成行體). It is a “practical dharma” (hsing-fa 行法), distinct from the theoretical understanding (chieh 解) offered by the other “discernments” of the work, but as inseparable from them as they are from it. Regardless, then, of its abstruse and “philosophical” tone, the Hua-yen fa-chieh kuan-men is in some sense a meditative text. The question is, in just what sense?

There is also the matter of the so-called “second patriarch” of Hua-yen, Chih-yen (智儼, 602–668). He was best known as an exigete (chiang-chieh-che 講解者)—i.e. as a learned scholar, hermeneut, and theoretician—who had constructed out of the recalcitrant doctrinal material he found in the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha traditions of Mahāyāna thought and in the Avatamsakasūtra the conceptual rudiments of the Hua-yen system. However, the biographies of Chih-yen, notably that by his disciple and successor Fa-tsang, tell us that at certain critical stages of his life Chih-yen found learning, scholarly exegesis, and the theoretical apprehension of Buddhism insufficient. They did not suffice for full understanding of basic Buddhist teachings; much less did they suffice for the necessary translation of understanding into lived experience.
Chih-yen is said to have learned that he had to abandon his purely academic pursuits, at least temporarily, and to resort instead to a long period of intensive meditation (*i-liang yüeh chien she ching-ssu* 一雨月間攝靜思). Only in this way was he able to achieve the “great awakening” (*ta-ch'i* 大啓) that resolved his perplexity and allowed him to begin fashioning the elements of Hua-yen. The object of these meditations and his subsequent awakening was the doctrine of the “six marks,” which Chih-yen had studied to little avail in the *Dasabhūmīvyākhyāna* of Vasubandhu. In that original Indian scripture *cum* commentary the six marks were actually six features of the conduct of a bodhisattva at the sixth stage (*bhūmi*) of his career. In Chih-yen’s interpretation of the passage in question, following upon his meditations and awakening, the “six marks” become not simply features of *bodhisattvacārya*, but universal characteristics of all phenomena, by virtue of which each phenomenon can “comprehend” (*tsung* 聽) all others while yet remaining “discrete” (*pieh* 別), can be the “same” (*t'ung* 同) as all others while yet remaining “different” (*i* 異), can participate in the “formation” (*ch'eng* 成) of a whole while yet functioning in its particularity to “disintegrate” (*huai* 禦) that whole. This is surely one of the most characteristic, and characteristically profound, of Hua-yen doctrines. Moreover, it can be seen to imply all the other conceptual components of the abstruse Hua-yen system (phenomenal interpenetration, universal intercausality, simultaneity, etc.). Nevertheless, tradition traces its formulation precisely to a meditative experience of its author. One can, I think, fairly assume that its continued use by later adherents of the tradition was also within a meditative context.

We know further that among Chih-yen’s twenty or more written works there was one text which we must consider on the basis of its recorded title to have been a kind of manual of meditation—the *Ju-tao ch' an-men pi-yao* (入道禪門祕要). Unfortunately this work is lost, but there are brief sections of Chih-yen’s surviving works in which he does treat of meditation. For example:

**Question:** What is the expedience of the discernment of representation-only (*wei-shih kuan fang-pien* 唯識觀方便) which is expounded in the various teachings? **Answer:** Those wishing to practice this discernment first avail themselves of two spiritual friends—the spiritual friend of understanding (*ch' ieh chih-shih* 解知識) and the spiritual friend of practice (*hsing chih-shih* 行知識). Finding a quiet place and
maintaining the purity of the precepts as they relate to one's own person, one brings his mind to contrition and begs the protection of the Buddhas of the ten directions along with that of all worthy āryas and beneficent gods, then one seats himself in the cross-legged posture, and with the left hand resting on the right and the body erect, one closes his eyes, regulates his breath, rests his tongue against his palate, and focuses his mind on the object of meditation. Then does one come to know that objective appearances, are created by one's own mind, and as this discrimination ceases, the mind becomes stable. Even if it is not yet stable and one's initial exertions do not at first succeed, one continues day and night until the mind is quelled. Then will one achieve samādhi. This is its expediency. If delusory (i.e. Māra-generated) phenomena arise, one goes to the monastery and repents his transgressions. The delusions will gradually diminish and one's doubts will shortly abate as the spiritual friend of understanding determines them to be delusions. If the mind but wills the cutting off of these delusory appearances and works diligently at it, then there will surely be no doubting. Distraction then ceases and the defilements diminish. These are the marks of the discernment's accomplishment.\textsuperscript{11}

This passage is typical of Chih-yen's several brief accounts of particular meditative themes, and it demonstrates the manner in which he incorporated specific doctrines (e.g. representation-only) and the understanding (chien 解) of them into practical meditative experience. Elsewhere in his later writings Chih-yen offers lists of such particular meditative themes and exercises. One such list, surprisingly, makes mention of the practice of "wall gazing" (pi-kuan 壁觀).\textsuperscript{12} Exactly what this practice involved we seem not to know, but it is well known that it was associated particularly with the earliest phases of Ch'an as an element of the Bodhidharma legend. That Chih-yen should have known of it bespeaks his broad acquaintance with a variety of meditative procedures—hardly what one would expect if one had held the conventional view of Hua-yen.

Regarding Fa-tsang, the so-called third patriarch of the tradition, who is often thought of as the least practice-oriented and most speculative of Hua-yen thinkers—even of his work, particularly such latter writings as the Hsiu Hua-yen ao-chih wang-chin huan-yüan kuan 修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀), there is the argument to be made that they too can properly be understood only if seen as having been written within the context and in the service of meditation. When one goes beyond Fa-
tsang, to a consideration of the so-called fourth and fifth “patriarchs” of Hua-yen, the matter becomes even clearer. Both Ch’eng-kuan (澄觀, 738–839?) and Tsung-mi (宗密, 780–841) managed to combine in their lives and thought the overtly practical emphases of the, by then, well established Ch’an traditions with the most subtle and sophisticated Hua-yen dialectic. Indeed, it was a major concern of both men not so much to combine these two kinds of Buddhism as to demonstrate their prior and intrinsic harmony. To Tsung-mi, for example, the unity of Ch’an and “the teachings” was a fact, not a goal.

It would seem, therefore, that all of the points we have made above, as well as a number of others we feel sure could be made upon further research, suggest that there was in fact an important meditative component in early Hua-yen and that the mistaken perception of a divorce between Ch’an and the “teachings,” which Tsung-mi was later to lament, had not occurred in the lives and thought of the early Hua-yen masters. Nevertheless, even though it may be acknowledged that meditation was of the essence of early Hua-yen, when one interrogates the early canons of the tradition to discover just what kind of meditation practice was enjoined, those canons, it must be admitted, yield up very little concrete, descriptive, practical detail. We know that early Hua-yen thinkers meditated, even that meditation was the support and source of their most important doctrinal innovations, but we do not know precisely how they meditated nor (apart from the standard rudiments) what specific meditative regimens they followed. This, of course, is particularly frustrating to those of us who are concerned to treat Hua-yen and other forms of Buddhism, not merely as marvelous systems of religious metaphysics, but also as living religious disciplines. However, such a dearth of practical information is also frustrating even in the interpretation of certain Hua-yen doctrines. One frequently encounters in Hua-yen thought difficult issues which might better be understood if only one knew their true relationship to meditative cultivation. Witness the following passage from the latest work of Chih-yen in which he gives the earliest concerted statement of the key Hua-yen doctrine of “nature-origination” (hsing-ch’i 性起):

The doctrine of nature-origination illustrates that the limits of the dharmadhatu dependent origination of the One Vehicle (i.e. universal intercausality as seen in Hua-yen)—its origin and its ultimate—are divorced from cultivation (li yü hsiu-tsao 離於修造). How so? Because
they are free of marks (li hsing 離相). Origination in the “great understanding” (ta-chieh 大解) and the “great practice” (ta-hsing 大行), in the bodhi-mind free of discrimination, this is called “origination” (ch’i 起). Because it is the very “nature” of dependent origination, it is spoken of as “origination.” But this origination is precisely a non-origination, and so it is really a non-origination which is nature-origination.\textsuperscript{14}

An understanding of this passage—of the whole doctrine of nature-origination—depends at least in part on an understanding of such notions as “divorced from cultivation,” “great practice,” etc. These in turn, one assumes, have some relation to meditation.

It may well be, of course, that scholars will have finally just to accept this situation of relative ignorance regarding the practical dimension of early Hua-yen. However, there are still open to us avenues to possible remedies of it, and they ought to be explored. Two in particular come to mind. The first is a route, essentially, of more careful definition and conceptual clarification. If, despite such indications as have been noted that meditation was essential in early Hua-yen, it should still seem to us that the distinctive characteristics of the tradition have little to do with the realia and practica of meditation, then we ought at least to consider the possibility that the fault lies with our concepts and definitions of meditation. Something of this has been implied in the preceding remarks, but the matter deserves further consideration. It may be, for instance, that in our operative assumptions about Buddhist meditation we have given insufficient attention to the role that intellect and its accoutrements play therein. It has long been recognized by Buddhist scholars that Buddhist meditation differs from other contemplative and “mystical” traditions in being distinctively critical and analytic, wary of ecstasies and the ever-present danger of mistaking mindless transport for genuine achievement. But perhaps we have not fully appreciated the implications of this character of Buddhist meditation. Might it not be both legitimate and desirable, for example, so to define Buddhist meditation that we could assign such things as doctrinal concepts to a place within meditation rather than to such extra-meditational realms as apologetics, polemics, propaedeutics, etc.? A category like “meditative concept,” carefully distinguished from that of conventional concept, could well be useful here, and its introduction into discourse about meditation need not obscure or violate the very important roles played
by non-conceptual or anoetic modes of experience (*samjñāveditanirodha, wu-hsin 無心, wu-nien 無念*, etc.) in certain kinds or stages of meditation. Perhaps such a notion as “meditative concept” would enable us more clearly to conceptualize the manner in which the intellect participates in meditative experience, which participation is perhaps slighted by too ready an identification of all meditation with the transcendance of conceptualization or the abandonment of intellect. Were this suggestion to be accepted and proved feasible, it could serve our immediate purposes by allowing us to view the decidedly intellectual and doctrinal components of Hua-yen, not as theory rather than practice, but as the conceptual dimension of practice—the mind’s practice, as it were. Such a modulation in our view of the nature of meditation would not solve for us the very real problems presented by the simple lack of information concerning the practical side of Hua-yen, but it would permit us to discuss Hua-yen under the rubrics of practice and meditation in ways not so readily available to us under earlier definitions. Furthermore, since these problems of ignorance are not exclusive to the study of Hua-yen, such a revisionary notion of meditation could also serve the study of other traditions and kinds of Buddhism.

The other avenue to a possible partial remedy of our ignorance concerning Hua-yen practice leads directly to early Ch’an. It has been frequently noted (though in Western studies never thoroughly studied) that Hua-yen of some sort and certain varieties of Ch’an consorted with one another even before the period of the conscious syncretism of Ch’eng-kuan and Tsung-mi. Most commonly this relationship is described as one in which particular lineages of early Ch’an were influenced by, or adopted ideas from, Hua-yen, thereafter to “apply” them in their curricula of meditation. The implication has been that the pattern so familiar from later times, of Hua-yen “tinctured” lineages like the Fa-yen (法眼) house, was established rather early (though perhaps not so firmly, if we are to credit Tsung-mi’s strictures against the Ch’an “anti-intellectualism” of his day). If these claims of an early Hua-yen/Ch’an association could be borne out, then perhaps we might have a more solid, less speculative or theoretical, access to early Hua-yen than that which we seem to have now. Although we surely know much less about the practice of early Ch’an than we would wish, it is generally conceded that the literature of those early Ch’an lineages is more obviously and directly related to the particulars of practice (narrowly conceived) than is the literature of early Hua-yen. If that practice-oriented Ch’an
literature, or any goodly portion of it, had indeed been influenced by Hua-yen, then it may serve to bridge the "gap" we seem otherwise to face, i.e. the gap between Hua-yen theory and Hua-yen practice. In other words, it would seem reasonable to expect to find, in the sorts of use to which Ch'an may have put Hua-yen, something of the practical dimension, or at least the practical potential, of the latter. This is not, of course, to say that the Ch'an meditative uses of Hua-yen need necessarily have been identical to those of Hua-yen itself; they may indeed have been quite different. However, the chance of affinity is at least worth pursuing, particularly in light of such specific indications of association as the following (we offer only a sampling).

Shen-hsiu (神秀, 606?-706)—contemporary of Chih-yen and Fa-tsong and presiding figure in the so-called "Northern Lineage" (peitson 北宗) of early T'ang Ch'an, which is sometimes thought to have been the Ch'an lineage most affected by Hua-yen—is known to have written a commentary on the Avatamsakasutra, only a small fragment of which survives. We know also that Shen-hsiu was summoned to the court by Empress Wu sometime between 700 and 702, there to remain for about six years as a sort of "Imperial Chaplain." These, of course, were years during which Fa-tsong was also in the capital under imperial benefaction. There is no record of their ever having met, but it is not unreasonable to postulate that two such eminent prelates who shared an interest in the same scripture might have come to know each other and each other's teachings. Both, it is true, were by then rather old men, but such a mutual recognition, if it had occurred, would have left some impression on the disciples of each.

The fifth of the famous "Five Upāya" (wu fang-pien 五方便), which comprise a teaching found in several texts attributable to Shen-hsiu's lineage if not to the man himself, is based on the Avatamsakasūtra and echoes that scripture's cardinal themes of identity and universal inter-penetration.

P'u-chi (普寂, 675-739), Shen-hsiu's foremost disciple and a younger contemporary of Fa-tsong, studied as a youth under a monk who had assisted Śīksānanda in the second (eighty chüan) translation of the Avatamsakasūtra. Later in life he took up residence at the Hua-yen ssu, south of Ch'ang-an, a temple also associated with certain of the Hua-yen patriarchs. In several of the sources, P'u-chi is given the appellations, "Reverend Hua-yen" (Hua-yen tsun-che 華嚴尊者) and "Hua-yen Bodhisattva" (Hua-yen p'u-sa 華嚴菩薩). One of P'u-chi's disciples, in
turn—a certain Tao-hsüan (道器, 702–760)—was one of the first to bring Hua-yen to Japan, arriving there in 736.¹⁹

Perhaps most significant is the fact that the literature of the Northern Lineage, at least that portion of it which has already been edited and published, abounds in quotations from and paraphrases of the *Avatamsakasūtra*.²⁰ These references could be collated and would then yield a profile of the northern lineage’s understanding of Hua-yen. Of course, this task should ideally wait upon completion of certain others, e.g. the determination of just which texts do belong to the whole corpus of Shen-hsiu and his disciples, and the determination of their chronological sequence. One ought also to take into consideration literature of other of the early lineages, including that which survives in Tibetan. Lest one come to think of the Shen-hsiu lineage as the only tradition to affiliate itself with any sort of Hua-yen, one ought to recall that Ch’eng-kuan seems related in some way to the Ch’an of Tao-hsin (道信, 580–651, the so-called fourth patriarch) and/or the Ch’an of the Oxhead Lineage (牛頭宗),²¹ and that Tsung-mi was avowedly within the Ho-tse (荷澤) lineage of the Northern School’s archenemy, Shen-hui (神會, 670–762). In fact, Tsung-mi goes so far, in his scheme of relating particular Ch’an lineages to particular kinds of doctrine, as to claim that the form of Ch’an with which Hua-yen is most closely related is not that of the Northern School but that of its rival, the Southern School.²² These latter points make it clear that the search for resonances of Hua-yen’s practical identity in early Ch’an will have to go beyond just the Northern School.

That early Ch’an and some sort of Hua-yen were in complex interrelation is, therefore, clear. A question yet to be answered is that of just what sort of Hua-yen was party to these relationships. That question cannot be answered responsibly until all of early Ch’an’s references to the *Avatamsakasūtra* and all of its uses of what appear to be “Hua-yen” themes have been collected and studied; and I, for one, have not yet completed anything like so difficult and time-consuming a task. However, though I have tried to show that it is desirable to search for something of the practice of early Hua-yen in early Ch’an employment of “Hua-yen,” I recognize that one must be alert to the real possibility that the sources may not reward our hopes in just the way we would wish. A cursory perusal, for example, of the Northern Lineage texts assembled, edited, and published by Ui and Suzuki suggests (but does not yet allow us to be certain) that the “Hua-yen” of this line of Ch’an is an independent tradition of the exegesis and exploitation of the *Avatamsakasūtra*,

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one which may well have nothing at all to do with the Hua-yen of what would eventually become the “Hua-yen tsung.” Apart from the occasional use of the “principle/phenomenon” (li-shih 理事) distinction (which seems to have quickly become the common property of early T’ang Buddhism and not to have long remained in the exclusive ownership of such men as Tu-shun, Chih-yen, etc.), there seems to be little evidence of Shen-hsiu or his followers having made use of the better known doctrinal innovations of the precursors of a distinct Hua-yen “school.” There is no mention made, for example, of the “five teachings” (wu-chiao 五教), the “six marks” (liu-hsiang 六相), the “ten meanings of causation” (shih yin-i 十因義), the “ten arcana” (shih-hsüan-men 十玄門), etc.

It may therefore prove to be the case that the study of such Hua-yen as is to be found in early Ch’ an will be simply a reminder to us that the Avatamsakasūtra and its fertile ideas and symbols were never the sole possessions of the so-called “Hua-yen school”; that there were several distinguishable traditions of the use of that scripture. After all, close study of the writings of early “Hua-yen patriarchs” reveals that to some extent they simply used the Avatamsakasūtra as a kind of “foil” against which to develop views whose real and direct antecedents are not so much in that scripture as in the learned traditions of Yogācāra and Tathāgata-garbha thought.

Nevertheless, even if it should prove to be the case (and it is by no means yet proved) that the Hua-yen of early Ch’ an and the Hua-yen which would become the “Hua-yen tsung” are quite different, we will still have learned something useful. We will have been reminded again that such designations as “Hua-yen tsung,” when applied to thinkers and texts of the very early T’ang (i.e. to such contemporaries of the early Ch’ an masters as Tu-shun, Chih-yen, and even Fa-tsang), are anachronistic and therefore misleading. There was really no true “school” or “lineage” of Hua-yen until well into the eighth century. Comparisons of the thought of the precursors of this school (who were, of course, not really its first “patriarchs”) with the writings or recorded words of the early Ch’ an masters (who seem to have seen themselves as a distinct group somewhat earlier than did the forebears of other traditions) will then set the contributions of both back into their own proper historical context. That context, in turn, will have to be viewed as a far more complex and fluid set of relationships than the conventional division of Buddhism into “schools” has led us to assume. And part of that complexity
and fluidity will surely prove to be a closer set of bonds between practical and doctrinal Buddhism than we have previously assumed. Thus, even if the research I have proposed does not eventually show that early Ch’an is literally the “practical expression” of a “theoretical early Hua-yen,” it will nevertheless put both Hua-yen and Ch’an back into a historically more valid context. When they are studied in such a context, it will no longer be necessary, on the basis of polemic claims made in later traditions, to question the genuine Buddhism of either tradition by regarding one as innocent of sophisticated doctrine and the other as having been rendered practically incompetent by an excess of the same. Perhaps, in other words, one can demonstrate, though on firmer historical grounds, the truth of such sane arguments as Tsung-mi’s that doctrine and practice are never really separate but are always in balanced combination in any true Buddhism.

ADDENDUM

Apropos of the aforementioned possibility of the founders of Hua-yen having been critically informed of certain of the teachings of early Ch’an, we offer the following intriguing passage from one of the earlier works of Fa-tsang, the Hua-yen-ching wen-ta (華嚴經問答): 24

Question:
Those who propound the “five gates” (wu-men lun-che 五門論者) adopt the perspective of “essential dependent origination” (yiieh tzu-t’ai yüan-chi 約自體緣起) and therefrom elucidate the principle of “the non-obstructive self-existence of all perfect and brilliant qualities” (ming yüan-ming chü-te wu-ai tzu-tsai i 明圓明具德無礙自在義). How can this be distinguished from “the universal dharma of the one vehicle of the separate teaching” (pieh-chiao i-ch’eng p‘u-fa 別教一乘普法) of Master [Chih-] yen ([智]嚴師)?

Answer:
They are difficult to distinguish. However, there is some small difference of relative expedience (shao yu fang-pien 少有方便). That is to say, those teachers of the “five gates” elucidate the principle of “non-obstructive self-existence” from the perspective of “essence as a fusion of phenomenal characteristics divorced from nature” (yüeh hsiang-yung li-hsing tzu-t’i men 約相融離性自體門). They do not elucidate the principle of “the non-obstruction of suchness” (ju-ju wu-ai i 如如無礙義) from the perspective of the phenomena themselves (yüeh
hsiang-shih 約相事). Therefore, they fall into the category of “the common teaching” (tsai-yü t'ung-chiao fen-ch'i 在於同教分齊). Our teacher (i.e. Chih-yen) has elucidated non-obstruction just from the perspective of the phenomena themselves, and therefore belongs to the category of “the separate teaching” (tang pieh-chiao fen-ch'i 當別教分齊).

Question:
The elucidation of non-obstructive self-existence as in the “essence of the tathāgatagarbha” (ju-lai-tsang tsu-tsaï chung 如來藏自在中), this is a principle of “the mature doctrine” (shu-chiao 熟敎). How then does it fall into the category of “the common teaching”?

Answer:
Because those teachers (i.e. propounders of the “five gates”) do not discriminate categories of doctrine. The principles of the separate teaching of the one vehicle are elucidated only as in the tathāgatagarbha’s phenomenal aspect. This principle (i.e. the principle of non-obstructive self-existence within the essence of the tathagātagarbha) resides only in the tathāgatagarbha’s essence (not its phenomenal aspects). But this principle is common to the whole of the one-vehicle and for this reason it falls into the category of the common teaching.

The relevance of this passage to the problem at hand lies not in its employment of the subtleties of the Hua-yen p’an-chiao (判敎), which would not in any case suffer brief summary, but rather in the likelihood that the “five gates” herein mentioned are in fact the “five upāya” (wu fang-pien 五方便) of Northern Ch’an usage. This is by no means an unreasonable assumption, even though it is not to be held with certainty. What else could the “five gates” be if not the “five upāya”? Furthermore, this probability is grounded not only in terminology but also in substance; recall that the fifth of the “five upāya” has to do precisely with the teaching of “non-obstruction” (wu-ai 無礙), as does the relevant principle of these “five gates.”

If this assumption be correct, then we have evidence of Fa-tsang’s having known enough about a major tradition of early Ch’an to have incorporated it into his p’an-chiao scheme. More interesting still is the judgment he gives of it. It is a curious anticipation of Shen-hui’s later criticism of Shen-hsiu’s tradition, i.e. the charge that Northern Ch’an, being concerned more with the noumenal than the phenomenal, teaches an abstract, quietistic path divorced from phenomena themselves.
Unfortunately, there is no record of a Northern Ch’an reply to this early Hua-yen judgment. Fa-tsang’s comments do, however, lend the weight of further plausibility to the claim that early Ch’an and proto-Hua-yen were part of the same religious milieu and that the study of both of them together may shed light on each.

NOTES

1 One of the most creditable attempts so far at such a defense, in a Western language, is Unno Taitetsu, “The Dimension of Practice in Hua-yen Thought,” Yūki Kyōju shōju kinen Bukkyō shisōshi ronshū 結城教授顕著記念佛教思想論集 (Tokyo: Daizō shuppansha 1964), pp. 51–78.

2 Fo-ts’ung-ch’i (佛祖統紀)—T. 2035:49.292c8–10.


5 Alfonso Verdu, Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought: Studies in Sino-Japanese Mahāyāna Idealism. Center for East Asian Studies Research Publication, No. 8 (Lawrence: The University of Kansas, 1974). By citing this work in this connection, however, I do not wish to imply unqualified criticism of it; it is in many respects an original and stimulating monograph.


7 T. 1883:45.675c23–24.

8 In the Hua-yen-ch’ing ch’u’an-chi (華嚴經傳記)—T. 2073:51.163b18–164a6.

9 Idem—T. 2073:51.163c17.

10 Listed in Ūich’on’s (義天) Sinp’yōn chejong kyōjang ch’ongnomok (新編諸宗教総 總錄)—T. 2184:55.1178b14.


12 Hua-yen k’ung-mu chang (華嚴孔目章)—T. 1870:45.559b1.

13 For the most thorough and recent treatment of the lives and thought of these two figures, who fall outside of the boundaries of “early Hua-yen,” see Kamata Shigeo 織田茂雄, Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū 中國華厳思想史的研究 (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ. Press, 1965) and Shūmitsu kyōgaku no shisōshiteki kenkyū 宗密教學の思想史的研究 (Tokyo: Tokyo Univ. Press, 1975).

14 Hua-yen k’ung-mu chang—T. 1870:45.580c4–8.

15 This fragment, having to do with the question of whether or not inanimate things possess Buddha nature, appears in a Japanese collection of notes on the Awakening of Faith—the Kishinron honso chōshū ki (起信論本疏解集記) by Junkō (順高, 1218–1275), which in turn is found in the Dai-Nihon Bukkyō zenshū (大日本佛教全集), vol. 92, p. 168a. It was discovered by Professor Kamata, who quotes it in his Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū, pp. 473–74.
For thorough studies of Shen-hsiu’s biography based on the primary sources, see Lo Hsiang-lin, *T'ang-tai wen-hua shih* 唐代文化史 (Taipei, 1955), pp. 105–58; and Ui Hakju, *Zenshū shi kenkyū* 祖宗史研究 I (Tokyo, 1939), pp. 269–75. For a discussion of Empress Wu’s patronage of Buddhists, and a sketch of Fa-tsang’s life, see Kamata, *Chūgoku Kegon shisōshi no kenkyū*, pp. 120–34.

17 That is “the gate of perceiving non-difference” (liao wu-i-men 了無異門) or “the path of spontaneous, unimpeded liberation” (tzu-jan wu-ai chieh-t’uo 自然無礙解脫). See Ui, *Zenshū shi kenkyū*, I, pp. 449 & 509.

For a summary of the essentials of P’u-chi’s biography, see Ui, *Zenshū shi kenkyū*, I, pp. 279–83.


The best study so far of such uses of the *Avatamsakasūtra*—indeed, the only concerted treatment of the relationship between Hua-yen and Ch’an—is Takamine Ryōshū 高峯了州, *Kegon to Zen to no tsūro* 華嚴と禅との通路 (Nara, 1956), especially pp. 35–43 & 67–75.


Ch’eng-kuan was the first ever to use the term “tsung” (宗) in connection with Hua-yen. See his *Hua-yen-ching shu* 華嚴經疏 (T1735:35.529b6) and his *Hua-yen-ching su-i shu yen-i ch’ao* 華嚴經疏疏義鈔 (T. 1736:36. 292c8).

24 T. 1873:45.602b23–c3. I have translated this passage relatively freely because the sometimes florid jargon of Hua-yen, exemplified by phrases of this passage, resists literal rendering. Even so, I am not certain that the whole of my translation of this obscure passage is correct. The precise date of this work is not known, but it is surely from the earlier part of Fa-tsang’s career, i.e., from the period prior to about 680 A.D. I owe my acquaintance with it to Kobayashi Jitsugen 小林實玄, “*Kegon zammai kan no kenkyū,*” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 24 (1975), 324–27. Kobayashi himself uses the passage to reveal a stage in the development of Fa-tsang’s own views of meditation.
The Early Ch'an Monastic Rule: Ch'ing kuei and the Shaping of Ch'an Community Life

Martin Collcutt

I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CH'ING-KUEI

If the integrity of the Zen ideal of "looking within and realizing the Buddha" has been kept alive in the ongoing meditative quest of countless generations of seekers after enlightenment and in the "mind to mind" transmission from master to disciple, the cohesion, over the centuries, of Ch'an (Zen) as a distinct school within the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition has been preserved by the framework of Ch'an monastic codes known as Regulations for the Pure Community, or Pure Regulations (ch'ing-kuei, 清規 J. shingi). Here I would like to introduce two of the earliest Ch'an codes and use them to illuminate the early Ch'an monastic life and the sectarian development of Ch'an between the T'ang and Sung dynasties.

Before looking at the origins of the regulations known as ch'ing-kuei we should, perhaps, have some general idea of what they were and why they have been so important in the Ch'an tradition. At the outset we should distinguish ch'ing-kuei from the Buddhist precepts contained in the Śīla and Vinaya. Ch'ing-kuei generally include articles stressing the importance to Ch'an monks and the Ch'an monastic life of the strict observance of the Śīla and Vinaya: both the Mahāyāna and Hinayāna precepts. They also frequently provide detailed prescriptions for the ordination ceremonies at which the precepts were formally taken. Ch'ing-kuei, however, are both broader and narrower in their scope than the prescriptions for the spiritual lives of all Buddhist monks and nuns contained in the Śīla and Vinaya. Compiled by Ch'an leaders to serve as guides to proper monastic practice for succeeding generations of monk-administrators, ch'ing-kuei cover the whole range of activities and organization, economic activities, and buildings and their layout of mature Ch'an monasteries. Likewise, it is through ch'ing-kuei that we can best trace the development of the forms of the Ch'an religious life of meditation, labor, regular community assemblies, and
private meetings between the abbot and individual monks seeking his guidance. And it is from ch'ing-kuei that we learn of the kinds of practical problems facing Ch'an and Zen monk-legislators in their efforts to regulate the community and its relationship with society at large.

Ch'ing-kuei did for the Ch'an schools what the Benedictine and Cistercian rules did for those orders in medieval Europe: gave them their distinctive imprint and provided a source of institutional vitality and continuity. The Saint Benedict of the Ch'an tradition was the T'ang dynasty monk Pai-chang Huai-hai 百丈懷海 (720–814) whose regulations are accepted as the starting point of an independent Ch'an monastic tradition. Moreover, it is no accident that the most important and comprehensive surviving ch'ing-kuei were compiled in the Northern and Southern Sung dynasties when Ch'an had assumed a dominant position in Chinese Buddhist circles. Ch'ing-kuei were at once the source and product of this sectarian maturity and independence.

The importance of ch'ing-kuei in the formation of the characteristic Ch'an monastic life is further emphasized by the fact that many leading Chinese and Japanese Ch'an masters devoted considerable energy to their compilation, recovery, explication, and enforcement. Subsequent generations of Ch'an monks have accorded the highest respect to these legislative precedents. In the Rinzai 臨濟 tradition, for instance, Pai-chang, as the first codifier, occupies a place in the Ch'an pantheon alongside Bodhidharma and the Sixth Patriarch. Ch'an monks of the Sung dynasty like Yang-i 楊億 and Tsung-tsê 宗 детск strove to revive and augment the pioneering activity of Pai-chang. In transmitting Sung dynasty Ch'an practices to Japan, the Japanese monks Yôsai, 榮西 Dôgen 道元, and Bennen 弁円 Enni 円爾 (Shôitsu) as well as the Chinese emigré monks Lan-ch'i Tao-lung 蘭溪道隆 and Wuhsüeh Tsu-Yüan 無學祖元 all stressed the importance of ch'ing-kuei as the proper vehicle for a full and authentic transmission. They sought to recreate in Japan a mirror image of the Chinese practice of Ch'an monastic life by applying Chinese regulations, undiluted wherever possible, or by compiling new codes, based on Chinese ch'ing-kuei, to accord with the different social circumstances in Japan or to meet the special needs of a particular monastery or school. The transmission of Chinese Ch'an practice to medieval Japan was successful precisely because it was based on written regulations and not simply on personal observation and hearsay.
Of course Yang-i, Dōgen, and other Ch'an legislators did not see themselves as innovators. Their avowed aim was always to restate the essentials of Ch'an monastic practice, to root out abuses, and to return to the ideals of Pai-chang. Unwittingly, however, each restatement of the tradition sanctified recent practices born of changing religious, social and political conditions. Although the major Chinese and Japanese codes all obviously describe the same basic tradition, each code clearly reflects significant changes in the character of the institution. Ch'ing-kuei thus provide a unique source for tracing the institutional development of Ch'an after the T'ang dynasty.

II. THE COMPOSITION AND TRANSMISSION OF MAJOR CH'AN CODES

The accompanying table (fig. 1) is based on an article by Professor Imaeda Aishin of Tokyo University entitled “Shingi no denraito rufu” (The Transmission and Diffusion of Ch'ing-kuei).1 The table gives the titles of major Chinese and Japanese codes, dates of composition where known and, in the case of Chinese codes, the approximate date of transmission to Japan. It is immediately evident that there was a substantial amount of codification and recodification, with most of the activity occurring between the early twelfth century and the late fourteenth, and with only a minimal time lag between the compilation of Chinese codes and their introduction into Japanese Zen monasteries. For a detailed survey of the ch'ing-kuei tradition I refer the reader to Professor Imaeda’s article. In this section I shall simply comment briefly on the significance of some of the major early codes.

The most famous Ch'an code is probably the so-called Pai-chang Ch'ing-kuei (Hajō shingi). Unfortunately, the code has not survived and there is even some doubt as to whether it ever existed. The nearest we can get to it is the Ch'an men kuei shih 禪門規式 included as part of the biographical entry on Pai-chang in the Ching te ch'uan teng lu 景德傳燈錄. The most important Chinese code is undoubtedly the Ch'an yuan ch'ing kuei 禪苑清規 compiled by Tsung-tsê in 1103. The importance of this code rests on the facts that it is the oldest surviving full-scale Ch'an monastic code (ten fascicles in the Zoku-zōkyō edition); that it synthesized existing, scattered regulations; that it provides an extremely detailed picture of all aspects of the life of the large Northern Sung dynasty Ch'an monastery; that it was widely used in its own day;
and that it served as the model for subsequent Chinese and Japanese
codes. I shall examine the *Ch'an men kuei shih* and *Ch'an yüan ch'ing-
kuei* in greater detail in the following section.
The *Ju chung jih yung ch'ing kuei* 入衆日用清規,¹ as the name implies, is a brief digest or primer intended to introduce novices to the daily life and proper attitude of mind of the Ch'an Buddhist monk. This introductory code of regulations was also appropriate to the new Zen monasteries that began to appear in Japan during the thirteenth century and seems to have been widely used there. According to Imaeda Aishin and other scholars both the *Chiao ting ch'ing kuei* 校定清規² and the *Ch'an lin pei yung ch'ing kuei* 禪林備用清規³ were attempts to correct abuses and standardize monastic practice by synthesizing surviving *ch'ing-kuei* regulations with current practice of the Southern Sung and early Yüan dynasties. They are said to show a significantly more formalistic and secular bent than the *Ch'an-yüan* code, with their emphasis shifting from concern for strict monastic practice centering on meditation to interest in ceremonies and prayers for court intentions.

This secular trend reached a peak in the *Ch'ih hsiu Pai chang ch'ing kuei* 勅集百丈清規,⁴ commissioned by the Yüan court and intended as the definitive Ch'an monastic code to be used in the official monasteries of the Five Mountains (*wu-shan* 五山) system. Because of the name Pai-chang in its title this code is sometimes referred to as the Pai-chang code with the implication that it contains or reflects Pai-chang's original regulations. This is a serious error. The code was compiled more than five hundred years after Pai-chang's death in very different religious and social conditions and without reference to any documentary form of an original Pai-chang code. The *Ch'ih hsiu Pai chang* code can bear little, if anything, of the direct imprint of Pai-chang.

The *Huan chu an* 幻住庵 and *Ts'un ssü ch'ing kuei* 村寺清規 are brief house codes compiled for smaller monasteries. Professor Yanagida Seizan has suggested that the *Huan chu an* code was influential in Japan and may well have served as the inspiration for Musô Soseki's house code for Rinsenji, the *Rinsen kakun* 際川家訓. By the Yüan dynasty the idea of compiling codes with the title "Pure Regulations" had spread to other branches of Buddhism, as evidenced by the appearance of the *Lü yüan* 律苑 and *Chiao yuan ch'ing kuei* 教苑清規.⁵ We can perhaps see this as an indication that revitalization and consolidation of Ch'an Buddhism in the Sung and Yüan dynasties, based in part on the enforcement of *ch'ing-kuei*, prompted similar reform efforts in other areas of Chinese Buddhism.

Looking at the transmission of Ch'an codes to Japan, we see that the latest Chinese codes were introduced to Japan shortly after their com-
pilation, sometimes within a decade. Bringing the newest ch'ing-kuei from China was as important to Japanese Zen pioneers as obtaining copies of doctrinal texts. Although all Chinese ch'ing-kuei were probably reprinted and lectured upon in Japan, two were particularly important in the development of the Zen schools in Japan: the Ch''an-yüan and the Ch'i'h hsiu Pai chang ch'ing kuei.

The Ch'anjüan code provided the foundations for the first century of institutional development of Zen in Japan. It was cited by Yōsai and Dōgen. Many of Dōgen's own regulations were based directly upon it. Shōitsu, founder of Tōukuji 東福寺, is also said to have brought a copy of the Ch'anjüan code back to Japan and to have lectured on it. Emigré monks like Lan-ch'i Tao-lung had been trained under its regulations in China and stressed its importance in the establishment of true Zen monastic practice in Japan.9

The Ch'i'h hsiu Pai chang ch'ing kuei served as the basic code for the centralized, politically regulated network of some three hundred official Zen monasteries known as the Five Mountains (gozan 五山) system that developed during the fourteenth century in Japan on the lines of the Southern Sung dynasty wu-shan system. The ceremonial, state-oriented tone of the Ch'i'h hsiu code was in keeping with the official, politically oriented character of the gozan monasteries.10

Of Zen codes compiled in Japan, most were shorter than the major Chinese codes. In general they called upon the authority of Pai-chang and Chinese ch'ing-kuei while addressing themselves to problems arising from the promotion of Zen monastic life in a new environment. Of Japanese monks, Dōgen was the most active codifier. The Eihei shingi 永平清規,11 contains detailed “Regulations for Monastery Cooks” (Tonzo kyōkun 典座教訓), “Procedures for Serving Meals” (Fushuku hanpō 赴粥仮法), “Regulations for the Reading Room” (Shuryō shingi 衆寮清規), “Respect for Senior Monks” (Taidai kohō 對大已法) and “Guidance in the Pursuit of the Way” (Bendō-hō 辯道法). In addition, many sections of Dōgen's Shōbō Genzō 正法眼藏 are devoted to laying down the norms of monastic life. Keizan Jōkin 堅山紹瑾 was one of the third generation leaders of the Sōtō 曹洞 line after Dōgen, and one of those responsible for shifting from Dogen's rather exclusive attitude of offering guidance only to those who actively sought him out and entered his community as monks to an active proselytizing effort to spread Zen teachings among warriors and peasants in northern Japan. In the Keizan shingi 堅山清規12 we can detect both the desire to be faithful to
Dōgen’s regulations, and the Chinese traditions on which they drew, and the impulse to accommodate traditional Zen practices with popular Buddhist devotional activities in order to secure conversions. This change of direction was critical to the later development of Sōtō Zen in Japan.

Of Japanese Rinzai codes, those for Jōrakuji 常樂寺 and Kenchōji 建長寺, the first Japanese Zen monasteries in the pure Sung Ch’an style, were drawn up by Lan-ch’i Tao-lung and placed great emphasis on un-remitting zazen 坐禅 as the central activity of monastic life. The Taikan shingi 大鑑清規, 13 a simplified code, was compiled by Ch’ing-cho Cheng-ch’eng 清拙正澄, another emigré monk, especially to meet the needs of a new generation of monks and monasteries in Japan. Of the other codes listed, the Rinsen kakun 14 was written by Musō 夢窓 for his small community at Rinsenji. Muso has acquired a reputation as a prelate who became too deeply involved in political and cultural interests for the good of his Zen. This code shows him in another light: as a stern Zen master and conscientious administrator.

III. THE PUZZLE OF THE PAI CHANG CH’ING KUEI

It is frequently stated that the actual code of monastic regulations compiled by Pai-chang in the T’ang dynasty survived until at least the Sung dynasty, when it was used as the basis for the Ch’an yüan and other ch’ing-kuei, and was then lost. Recently, however, some Japanese scholars, especially Kondō Ryōichi in his article “Hajō shingi no seiritsu to sono genkei” (The Establishment of the Pai-chang code and its Original Form), 15 have begun to ask whether such a document as an original Pai-chang code ever existed. Kondō, for instance, argues that:
(1) There is no mention of a Pai chang ch’ing kuei in the Ch’an yüan ch’ing kuei (1103), although this important code claims to incorporate the essence of the regulations of Pai-chang. The Ch’an-yüan code does contain a section entitled “Eulogy on the Rules of Pai Chang” (Pai chang kuei sheng sung 百丈規絳頌). The rules listed in this section, however, are not a code traceable all the way back to Pai-chang himself but part of a section from the Ching tê Ch’uan teng lu (1004) dealing with the biography of Pai-chang and given the title Ch’an men kuei shih. To these regulations he found in the Ch’uan teng lu, Tsung-tsê, compiler of the Ch’an yüan code, added his own verse commentary and included the product as part of his own much more comprehensive code.
(2) Although the *Ch’an men kuei shih* claims to provide the essence of Pai-chang’s rules, it makes no mention of any earlier documentary form of Pai-chang code, nor does the expression “ch’ing-kuei” appear.

(3) The brief *Ch’an men kuei shih* (1004) and the short biography of Pai-chang in the contemporary *Sung kao sêng ch’uan* 宋高僧傳 are the closest that we are able to get to the documentary origins of the elusive Pai-chang code. They also contain some of the earliest references to Pai-chang as codifier.

(4) Kondō Ryōichi also states that he has been unable to find any mention of a Pai-chang code in the Buddhist printed literature of the T’ang and Five dynasties period. Moreover, he argues that in the writings of Pai-chang’s contemporaries and disciples there seems to be neither mention of a *Pai chang ch’ing kuei* nor even of Pai-chang having compiled any regulations. Even Pai-chang’s memorial inscription composed in the year of his death (814) makes no mention of either a full scale code or of any individual regulations. Kondō argues that this contemporary silence is remarkable in view of Pai-chang’s subsequent reputation, and in the light of the importance in Ch’an monastic tradition of Pai-chang’s rule to the sectarian independence of Ch’an. Had Pai-chang been the codifier and architect of independence that he was later believed to be, it is inconceivable that his contemporaries and disciples would not have regarded this as one of his most noteworthy achievements and left some mention of the rules in question.

Before concluding that Pai-chang did not play the role of father of the Ch’an monastic rule and architect of Ch’an independence, however, we should perhaps remind ourselves that the attribution of the first Ch’an rule to Pai-chang by the *Ch’an men kuei shih*, which was compiled a little less than two centuries after his death, was very confident. It is possible that some regulations committed orally to his disciples and passed on in scattered manuscripts were salvaged and brought to the attention of Yang-i.

On the other hand, it is also important to note that even if Pai-chang was a codifier, he was certainly not the first Ch’an community legislator. A distinctive Ch’an community life was taking shape in the centuries prior to Pai-chang. The monks Tao-hsin 道信 (580–651) and Hung-jen 弘忍 (601–674), who were later given the titles of fourth and fifth Ch’an patriarchs, attracted large numbers of followers to their mountain retreats. To secure simple subsistence and maintain order, they were obliged to lay the foundations for a simple Ch’an monastic life based on
communal meditation and manual labor. Although Pai-chang may have added his stamp, or merely lent his name, to this developing corpus, he cannot be said to have initiated it. But, if Pai-chang did so much less than is commonly attributed to him, why is it that his name has been given such prominence in the Ch'an monastic tradition? Although there is no certain answer to this problem, we might speculate that, since Pai-chang was squarely in the Hui-neng succession, making him the father of Ch'an monastic life was a means of buttressing the claims to precedence of the Hui-neng line.

Leaving the Pai-chang puzzle unresolved, let us turn now to examine the Ch'an men kuei shih in more detail.

IV. THE CH'AN MEN KUEI SHIH

One of the earliest coherent descriptions of the Ch'an monastic life and rule still extant is this short section from the Ching te Ch'uan teng lu of 1004 which claims to give the essence of Pai-chang's regulations. Although we cannot tell exactly when the practices it describes crystalized, it does reveal the basic pattern of Ch'an monastic life that had taken shape between the T'ang and the Northern Sung dynasties. The Ch'an men kuei shih opens with a declaration of Ch'an independence:

Master Pai-chang felt that after the founding by the first Patriarch, Bodhidharma, from the time of sixth Patriarch, Hui-neng, and then on, members of the Ch'an school mostly resided in Lü sect monasteries where, although they had their own separate compounds, they did not act in accord with rules of their own on such matters as the exposition of Ch'an teachings by the abbot or the transmission of leadership. Because he was always concerned with this deficiency Pai-chang said: "It is my desire that the Way of our founders should spread and enlighten people in the hope of its lasting into the future. Why should our school follow the practice of Hinayana regulations?" One of his disciples said in interjection: "But there exist such Mahayana regulations as those included in the Yoga-śāstra (Yü ch'ieh lun 瑜伽論) and the Necklace sūtra (P'u-sa ying-lo-ching 菩薩璎珞經). Why not rely on them and follow them?" The Master replied: "What our school believes should not be bound either by Hinayana or Mahayana. Neither should it arbitrarily differ from them. Our aim should be to take a broad view and synthesize it at the middle ground in establish-
ing the regulations and making sure of their being appropriate for our needs. Thereupon the Master initiated the idea of establishing Ch'an monasteries separately.

This opening section raises two interesting issues: the Ch'an attitude to the Vinaya and the question of the early Ch'an relationship with the Lü school.

On the question of the Vinaya we can detect both an emphasis on the importance of the precepts and regulations for monastic life, and an eclectic attitude towards them. Ch'an monks should pay heed to both the Hinayana and Mahayana regulations while developing their own practices. This reassertion of the importance of personal and monastic discipline was an important factor in the emergence of Ch'an as the dominant branch of Chinese Buddhism in the Sung dynasty and in its appeal to Japanese monks like Yōsai and Dōgen who had come to China initially in the hope of finding the means of reforming Japanese monastic practice in which the observance of the Vinaya and monastic discipline was sadly neglected.

With regard to the relationship between early Ch'an and the Lü school, Professor Shiina Hiroo, in an article entitled “Shotō Zenja no Ritsuin kyojū ni tsuite” (On the residence of Early Ch'an followers in Lü Compounds), 18 argues that it is unlikely that the first generations of Ch'an adepts made much use of Lü monasteries. When settled Ch'an communities appeared in the fourth and fifth generations records suggest that they were independent of other branches of Buddhism and established in remote areas. In the seventh and eighth centuries there is evidence of Ch'an monks using Lü compounds but, according to Shiina, these were mainly monks of the Northern school who made use of the great monasteries in the capital as bases from which to spread their teachings. Monks of the Southern school, Shiina argues, including Huineng and Pai-chang, had always tended to build their own independent retreats, and this in turn stimulated a feeling of need for regulations appropriate to Ch'an monastic life. If those who are referred to by the Chan men kuei shih as “living in Lü compounds” were mainly monks of the Northern line their independence and freedom of activity were naturally limited. In this sense, Shiina suggests, the importance attached by the Ch'an men kuei shih to the compilation of regulations by Pai-chang can be interpreted not simply as an expression of Zen independence from other sects but also as a declaration of independence by the
Southern school against the practices of the Northern school, which had tied its fortunes to those of the great monasteries of the capital and their aristocratic patrons.

The *Ch'an men kuei shih* goes on to discuss the authority of the abbot as the vehicle of the true Ch'an transmission and stresses that, with this living embodiment of the Ch'an patriarchs as their guide, the monks need not build a Buddha Hall: that a Dharma, or Preaching Hall will be sufficient.

Those gifted with insight into the Way and possessing spiritual power that commands respect are to be given the title of Elder (chang-lao 長老), just as in India virtuous and experienced disciples of the Buddha were entitled Subhūti. As the "Master of Instruction" (*hua-chu* 化主), the Elder occupies a small room called the "ten foot square" (*fang-chang* 方丈). This is the same as Vimalakīrti's room, not a private chamber. Not to construct a Buddha Hall but only to erect a Dharma Hall (*fa-t'ang* 法堂) is to demonstrate the way in which the Buddha and the Ch'an patriarchs transmit to the Master of the present generation his exalted position.

The words *fang-chang*, an abbreviation for "a room of ten square (*fang*) feet (*chang*), were originally used in reference to the small hut in which the devout and learned layman Vimalakīrti, a follower of the Buddha Śākyamuni, feigned sickness as a means of attracting visitors with whom he would debate the problem of the "disease of existence." *Vimalakīrti's "silence like a clap of thunder"* during his famous debate with Mañjuśrī, Bodhisattva of transcendent wisdom, had a particularly potent appeal to Ch'an followers. By the T'ang dynasty the term *fang-chang*, with its rich associations, was being applied to the abbot's quarters of the Ch'an monastery, heightening the image of the abbot as a source of transcendent wisdom.

This passage from the *Ch'an men kuei shih* also makes it clear that in pre-Sung Ch'an monasteries the Dharma Hall, in which the abbot lectured and engaged the community in debate, was the central building. The rejection of the Buddha Hall, traditionally one of the most prominent buildings in Chinese Buddhist monasteries, and one that was eventually incorporated into the characteristic Ch'an monastic layout, almost certainly derived from fears that the frequent use of a building intended for prayers and ceremonial functions would encourage exces-
sive dependence on faith as a means to salvation, detract from the energetic practice of meditation, and tie the community too closely to secular patrons by providing a setting for the frequent performance of memorial services for lay intentions. This rejection of the Buddha Hall is in keeping with the iconoclastic strand in Ch’an thought that is perhaps most graphically illustrated in the anecdote about the monk from Tan-hsia 丹霞 who burned a wooden statue of the Buddha to warm himself in winter.

The Ch’an men kuei shih places great emphasis on the ordered, communal, meditation-centered life of the Monks’ Hall for all monks. It provides a clear description of the layout and organization of the characteristic Ch’an Monks’ Hall and stresses its central place, together with the Dharma Hall, in Ch’an monastic life:

Irrespective of their numbers or of their social status, those who have been permitted to enter the community to study should all reside in the Monks’ Hall (seng-t’ang 僧堂) arranged strictly according to the number of summers since their ordination. Meditation platforms should be built [along the sides of the hall] and a stand provided for each monk to hang his robes and personal belongings. When resting monks should lay their headrests at an angle on the lip of the platform and lie down on their right sides with their hands supporting their heads in the posture of the Buddha reclining. They rest only briefly even though meditation sessions have been long. This should not be thought of as sleep but as reclining meditation. Thus [while resting] they still retain [in their spiritual observance] the four proprieties in walking, stopping, sitting, and lying down.

According to the Ch’an men kuei shih the principal components of Ch’an practice in the pre-Sung monastic life were meditation, where monks were free to set their own pace, private visits to the abbot’s chamber for guidance, and public discussion between the abbot and the members of the community at frequent and regular assemblies in the Dharma Hall:

With the exception of regular assemblies and visits by individual monks who enter the Elder’s chamber to ask for instructions, the learners should be left to their own diligence in their pursuit of practice and instruction. The community of the whole monastery should gather in the Dharma Hall for the morning and evening dis-
cussions. On these occasions the Elder “enters the hall and ascends his seat.” The monastery officers as well as the ordinary monks stand in files and listen attentively to the discussion. For some of them to raise questions and for the master to answer, which invigorates and clarifies the essence of Ch’an teachings, is to show how to live in accord with the Dharma.

In early Ch’an communities these Dharma Hall encounters seem to have been lively, free-wheeled intellectual encounters. During the Sung dynasty, however, the assemblies were reduced in number and diluted in content, being transformed into set lectures by the abbot or senior monks.

The next section of the Ch’an men kuei shih continues the theme of communal equality by emphasizing the importance of equality in sharing out food and in contributing to the labor and organization needed to sustain the community:

Vegetarian congee meals should be taken equally by all at appropriate times twice a day. Insistence on frugality demonstrates how the Dharma and food complement each other in function. Carrying out the practice of labor (pu-ch’ing 普請) by all members of the community is to equalize efforts among high and low. Establish ten offices known by the name of “housekeeping units.” Have one head monk for each unit to supervise many others. Each, as he is ordered, is to take charge of his respective duties. The monk in charge of the rice is listed as the Rice Steward, the monk in charge of the vegetable dishes is listed as the Vegetable Steward and all other officers likewise.

The Ch’an community life envisaged by these regulations was simple and austere, with strict enforcement of the Vinaya ideal of only two daily meals and the maintenance of the Ch’an ideal of manual labor for all members of the community from the abbot down. We are reminded here of the phrase attributed to Pai-chang: “a day without work should be a day without food.” As with the monastic rule, the practice of labor seems to predate Pai-chang and go back at least to the third and fourth generation and the origins of settled Ch’an community life. The prohibition against the third meal was relaxed in the Southern Sung dynasty and the practice of communal labor became increasingly fossilized as Zen communities became more dependent on lay patrons.
This section also provides one of the first documentary glimpses of the Ch'an monastic bureaucracy. Although ten “offices” are mentioned by the *Ch' an men kuei shih*, only the names of three or four are provided in the text. Through later *ch' ing-kuei* we can watch Ch’ an monastic bureaucracy grow and see how these ten officers were divided into two ranks, stewards and prefects, assisted by sub-prefects, who supervised the administrative, religious, and ceremonial functions of the monastery. We can assume that by the time the *Ch’ an men kuei shih* was written the principles of annual rotation for officers and the return of former officers to the communal Monks’ Hall, rather than setting up private retreats, were firmly established.

The *Ch’ an men kuei shih* closes with the admonition that for those who disturbed the harmony of the community, broke the regulations, or neglected the precepts punishment should be swift and severe:

If there should be someone who falsely claims an official title, who falsely acts like an officer, thus confusing the good members, or who otherwise causes quarrels and disputes he should be disciplined at the Hall by the Registrar (*Wei-no* 维那) who should remove the offender’s belongings from his place and expel him from the monastery. This is to maintain the tranquility among the good members. When a monk is guilty of a major breach of the regulations, he should, as a mark of his disgrace, be beaten with the Master’s stick; have his robes, bowl, and other belongings burned before the assembled community; and then be expelled through a side gate.

The thorough enforcement of this disciplinary provision is based on four good reasons:

1. The community of pure members is not to be sullied, so that reverence and faithfulness will grow. (When a man’s three actions are not good he should not be permitted to live with the community. Those who according to the regulations (*l iü*) would be appropriately dealt with by the “law of silence” should be expelled from the monastery so that, with the community of good members having become tranquil, reverence and faithfulness will grow.)

2. The image of the monk is not brought into disrepute, so that Buddhist precepts will be followed. (Punishments should be appropriately enforced. If a transgressor is allowed to keep his Ch’ an robe and wear it, the community will inevitably regret [its misplaced leniency].)
(3) The civil authorities are not to be bothered, so that litigation will be avoided.
(4) Domestic concerns of the monastery are not to be leaked to the outside world, so that the fabric of the sect will be kept intact. (When monks from all directions come to live together, who can distinguish which ones are virtuous and which mundane? Even in the Buddha's own day there were six bad monks. In our own less fortunate generation it is surely too much to expect their complete absence. Some monks upon seeing one of their companions doing something wrong would blindly follow his example or engage in sarcasm. It is not even realized that in letting monks go lightly and the Dharma be infringed upon, the harm is very great. Today, even in those Ch'an monasteries which have relatively little difficulty in enforcement, they should follow the community regulations laid down by Pai-chang and settle matters after due consideration. They should also make regulations to prevent abuses [as if the monks] did not seem to be virtuous people. Rather have detailed rules so that no one will violate them. Do not have violations without having disciplinary teaching. One should think of the contribution made by Ch'an master Pai-chang in protecting the Dharma. How great it has been!

V. THE CH'AN YUAN CH'ING-KUEI: CH'AN MONASTIC LIFE IN THE NORTHERN SUNG DYNASTY

Important as it is, the Ch'an men kuei shih provides only a brief and tantalizing glimpse of early Ch'an monastic activity. For a more comprehensive picture, at a later state of development, we have to turn to the earliest surviving full-scale ch'ing-kuei, the Ch'an yuan ch'ing kuei compiled by Tsung-tse in 1103 and widely used in Northern and early Southern Sung monasteries.

The more than seventy sections of the code open with the statement that "The practice of Zen begins with the precepts." The code then proceeds to deal with entry to the monastery, registration, etiquette on meeting the abbot, duties of the various monastic officers, conduct of tea ceremonies, funeral services, and meditation. It closes with a commentary on the Ch'an men kuei shih. The Ch'an-yuan code provides invaluable information on almost every aspect of life in the large Northern Sung monastery. Unfortunately, detailed analysis of the code is beyond the scope of this short article. Here I can do no more than point
out some changes that had taken place in Ch’an monastic life in the
century since the composition of the *Ch’an men kuei shih*. We can group
these changes under the headings religious life, institutional develop-
ment, and economic activity.

(a) *The Religious Life*

As we have seen, the principal components of the Ch’an religious life
mentioned in the *Ch’an men kuei shih* were meditation, private inter-
views, public assemblies, and communal manual labor.

The *Ch’an men kuei shih* did not specify times for meditation, leaving
it to the assiduity of the individual. This could be interpreted to mean
that meditation was not emphasized. It is equally likely, however, that
monks were still sufficiently dedicated in their practice for it not to be
a matter of special comment. The *Ch’an yilan ch’ing kuei*, likewise, does
not lay down set times for meditation. During the Southern Sung dy-
nasty, however, it was stipulated that communal meditation sessions
should be held four times daily; at dawn, dusk, late evening, and mid-
night. The term “four hours” or “fours periods” of meditation first
appears in a Ch’an ch’ing-kuei in the *Ch’an lin pei yung* code compiled
in 1311. That this practice had been established well before this code
was compiled is clear from the fact that both Yōsai and Dōgen, who
were in China a century earlier, used the expression shiji no zazen (“four
hour’s meditation”) in their writings and accepted the practice as tra-
ditionally sanctioned. Although “four hour’s meditation” remained
the ideal, by the fourteenth century in many Chinese and Japanese Zen
monasteries only three daily sessions of meditation were being held, with
prayers or sutra reading substituted for one of the hours. In the *Rinsen
kakun* (1339), for instance, Musō Soseki lamented the fact that since the
Mongol invasion threat to Japan, when the energies of all temples and
shrines had been harnessed in a frenzied prayer effort for national sur-
vival, time devoted to *zazen* had been reduced to only three “hours.”

On the subject of assemblies in the Dharma Hall, the *Ch’an men kuei
shih* stressed that they were to be held frequently. It is possible, though
by no means certain, that daily assemblies were held in early Ch’an com-
munities. By the time the Ch’an-yüan code was compiled assemblies
were being held twelve times each month. The “great assemblies” were
normally held in the Dharma Hall on the mornings of the first, fifth,
tenth, fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth days of each month. A si-
miliar number of evening assemblies, known as "small assemblies" were held in the abbot's chamber at his convenience. In the Northern Sung dynasty they were normally held on the third, eighth, thirteenth, eighteenth, twenty-third and twenty-eighth days of each month: i.e. the threes and eights. If the abbot were busy or indisposed the assembly would be "released." From later ch'ing-kuei we learn that by the Yüan dynasty morning and evening assemblies were being held much less frequently, with evening assemblies, for instance, being held three times a month on the three eights: the eighth, eighteenth and twenty-eighth days.

There seems to have been a similar reduction over time in the emphasis on the value of labor as an integral part of the Ch'an religious life. The Ch'an work ethic still finds expression in the Ch'an-yüan code. In the section describing the duties of the Wei-no (Registrar) the code states that except for monks charged with guarding the Monks' Hall and Reading Room, all monks must engage in manual labor. The abbot is excused if he is unwell, or has official guests. Otherwise he too should share in labor with the community. Labor in the Ch'an-yüan code was probably stressed as a religious value—conducive to enlightenment—rather than as a strict economic necessity. By the Sung dynasty most Ch'an monasteries were integrated with the local secular economy and dependent for survival not on the labor of the community but on donations from wealthy patrons, rents from lands farmed by tenant cultivators, and income from the sale of lumber or milled monastery produce. Although no longer strictly vital to the economic life of the monastery, the ideal of labor was still very much alive in the Northern Sung dynasty. In later centuries, judging from subsequent ch'ing-kuei, it was increasingly neglected. In Japan it was stressed by Dōgen but figured less prominently in the writings of monks of the gozan schools.

(b) Institutional Development

Major changes were also taking place in the institutional life of the Ch'an monastery during the Sung dynasty. There was, for instance, considerable growth in scale and organizational complexity. If we compare the Ch'an men kuei shih and the Ch'an-yüan codes we find that, whereas the former mentions only half a dozen or so buildings, the latter code describes nearly thirty. And where the Ch'an men kuei shih talked simply of ten offices, the Ch'an-yüan code describes a complex
monastic bureaucracy with the abbot assisted by two ranks of senior monk-officials, with five or six monks in each rank, and these in turn assisted by more than a score of sub-prefects.

(c) Economic Life

The accepted model for the economic activity of Ch’an communities in the T’ang dynasty is of isolated groups of Ch’an devotees supporting themselves mainly by self-sufficient agriculture that drew on the labor of the whole community, supplemented by mendicancy. T’ang dynasty Ch’an centers are thus thought to have differed from most other kinds of Buddhist monasteries which relied on income from rented lands, money-lending, grain and oil processing, and the sale of lumber, as well as donations from wealthy patrons. During the course of ninth century, however, according to Kondō Ryōichi in his article “Tōdai Zenshū no keizai kiban” (The economic basis of The T’ang dynasty Ch’an school), the typical Ch’an monastic economy began to shift from self-sufficiency in the direction of greater dependence on wealthy patrons, who provided not only cash donations but even gifts of estates with tenants attached, and of greater integration with the local secular economy. The Ch’an-yuán code provides an indication of the extent to which these changes had gone by the early twelfth century. It describes in detail the duties of several monk officials responsible for economic matters who had had no place in the simpler T’ang dynasty Ch’an administrative structure. These included the Chien-yuán 監院, or Bursar, who exercised general supervision over monastery finances; the Hua-chu who acted as a fund raiser for the monastery with local lay support groups; the Chung-chu 莊主, or Estate Overseer, who supervised the administration and collection of rents and taxes on monastery domains. From the attention given by the code to the duties of these officers it is clear that by the Northern Sung dynasty Ch’an monasteries had moved from isolated self-sufficiency to dependence upon patronage, tenancy, and integration with the local economy.

VI. CONCLUSION:

The aim of this paper has been to introduce Ch’an monastic codes and use them to throw light on early Ch’an community life. What do they reveal? As far as T’ang dynasty Ch’an is concerned, ch’ing-kuei provide insights rather than a comprehensive description. The loss, or
non-existence, of Pai-ch’ang’s regulations, or of any other Ch’an code
dating from the T’ang dynasty, prevents us from building up a reliable,
detailed picture of the life of the earliest Ch’an communities. This can
be done only by piecing together scraps of information from other
contemporary sources. Although the Ch’an men kuei shih provides a
vivid picture of a distinctive Ch’an monastic life, and claims to be in
accord with the ideals of Pai-chang, we must remember that it is a later
compilation which may contain post-T’ang as well as T’ang features. Ch’ing-kuei really come into their own as sources of information
about Ch’an from the Northern Sung dynasty on. By careful compari-
son of Sung and Yüan codes we can trace, in considerable detail, the
changing patterns of Ch’an monastic life and practice in Japan as well
as China. From the Ch’an yuan ch’ing kuei, for instance, the larger
Ch’an monasteries of the Northern Sung dynasty emerge as institution-
ally and economically sophisticated communities whose energies were
still very much directed towards the stern practice of Zen. From later
codes we can see how this delicate balance between institutional
maturity and religious integrity and enthusiasm tended to slip in the
direction of formalization and secularization as leading Ch’an and Zen
monasteries were brought within the network of official organs of state.

NOTES

1 Imaeda Aishin, “Shingi no denrai to rufu,” Chüsei Zenshū-shi no kenkyū
2 Taishō shinshū daizōkyō, Vol. 51, 250.
3 Dai-Nihon zoku-zōkyō, 2-16-5. See also Kagamishima Genryū, et. al., eds.,
4 Dai-Nihon zoku-zōkyō, 2-16-5. Also in Kokuyaku Zenshū sōsho, Series 2, Vol. 5.
5 Dai-Nihon zoku-zōkyō, 2-17-1.
6 Dai-Nihon zoku-zōkyō, 2-17-1.
7 Dai-Nihon zoku-zōkyō, 2-16-3.
9 Imaeda, “Shingi no denrai to rufu.”
10 Ibid.
2, 295-367.
14 Kokuyaku Zenshū sōsho, Vol. 5.
15 Kondō Ryōichi, “Hajō shingi no seiritsu to sono genkei,” Hokkaidō Komazawa

This is a complete translation, broken only by my commentary, of the text in *Daizōkyō*, Vol. 51, p. 250–1. I would like to express my thanks to Professor James T.C. Liu of Princeton University for commenting on and improving parts of the translation. Remaining blemishes are the responsibility of the author.


For a detailed commentary on this code see Kagamishina et. al., eds., *Yakuchū Zen’on shingi*.

The "Recorded Sayings" Texts of Chinese Ch'än Buddhism

Yanagida Seizan
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1. THE WORD YÜ-LU OR "RECORDED SAYINGS"

The use of the word yü-lu 言語 (“recorded sayings”) as a general name for the literature of Ch'än (Zen) Buddhism is relatively new. The first appearance of the term is at the end of the biography of Huang-po Hsi-yün 黃檗希運 (d. ca. 850) in the Sung kao seng chuan 宋高僧傳 (“Biographies of Eminent Monks [compiled during the] Sung Dynasty”), fascicle 20, which says that Huang-po's "recorded sayings were in circulation throughout the world" (i.e., China).¹ The same statement is made about Chao-chou Ts'ung-shen 趙州從諡 (778-897) in another section of the same work.² In the Tsu-t'ang chi 祖堂集 (“Collection of the Patriarchal Hall”), which is older than the Sung kao-seng chuan (952 versus 967), we find the words hsing-lu 行錄 (“record of actions”), hsing-chuang 行狀 (“outline of actions”), and pieh-lu 別錄 (“separate record”), but not the word yü-lu itself. Thus the earliest Ch'än texts belonging to the "recorded sayings" genre were not actually called recorded sayings, but had other slightly different titles. Examples of such works will occur in the pages that follow.

Paradoxically, the word "recorded sayings" does occur in the title of an early text that does not belong to this genre of Ch'än literature. This is the Pei shan san hsüan yü lu 北山參玄語錄 (“Recorded Sayings of Pei-shan on the Three Mysteries”), a text of ten fascicles in length written by Shen-ch'ing 神淸 of Hui-i Temple in Tzu-chou 梓州慧義寺 in modern Szechuan. This work, still extant under the shorter name Pei shan lu 北山錄 (“Records of Pei-shan”), is said to have been favored reading material of Confucian scholars, Buddhist monks, and Taoist priests because of its comprehensive treatment of the three religious philosophies of China.³ However, it is different in form from the recorded sayings of the Ch'än School in that it was written by Shen-ch'ing himself (Shen-ch'ing's total literary output is reported to have been over 100 fascicles) rather than by some third-person scribe.
Shen-ch’ing did have contact with the Chinese Ch’an School, having studied it in Chien-nan 劍南, Szechuan during the latter half of the eighth century. At the time students of the Fifth Patriarch Hung-jen 弘忍 (601–674) flourished there, one of whom (Wu-chu 無住, 714–774, author of the Li tai fa pao chi 歷代法寶記, or “Record of the [transmission of the] Dharma-treasure throughout the Generations”) was the target of criticism in Shen-ch’ing’s book. However, all this came before the formation of the “recorded sayings” genre of Ch’an texts.

Finally, there is one other text often listed as a forerunner of the “recorded sayings” texts. This is the Sung-ch’i yü-lu 宋齊語錄 (“Recorded Sayings of the Sung and Ch’i [Dynasties]”), a text in one fascicle by K’ou Szu-shang 孔思尙. The title of this book is known from the T’ang shu i wen chih 唐書藝文志 (“Annals of Art and Literature in the [New] Documents of the T’ang Dynasty”). Nothing is known of its contents.4

2. THE TEACHING OF MA-TSU TAO-I AND THE “RECORDED SAYINGS” GENRE

A “recorded sayings” text in Ch’an literature is typically an anthology of the words and deeds of a given Ch’an Master. It consists of dialogues between the Master and his students, which generally develop out of the students’ individual problems and questions about their own practice of Buddhist spiritual training. In addition, these texts contain a special style of oral teaching prefaced by the formula that the Master had “entered the hall” (shang-t’ang 上堂) to give a lecture. Finally, poetry or short essays written by the Master or his students may also be included, with or without criticism. The contents of these “recorded sayings” all display a characteristic similarity in style and content that can only be appreciated by reading widely in the texts themselves.

The emergence of this genre of literature is an event that occurred only after the life of Ma-tsu Tao-i 馬祖道一 (709–788) and that bears a very close relationship to the subsequent development of Ma-tsu’s lineage.5 In fact, the “recorded sayings” texts—a sizeable number of which appeared at about the same time—developed only because the members of Ma-tsu’s lineage broke with previous Buddhist tradition and entered directly in among the people. Their teachings could not be held within the confines of traditional Buddhist literary form, but demanded a new method of expression to match their new content. Let us then examine the teachings of Ma-tsu’s school.

Tsung-mi 宗密 (780–841) defines the teachings of the Hung-chou
School (as he calls it) which started with Ma-tsu as holding that all human mental and physical activity—even those so inconsequential as pointing a finger or moving an eye—are functions of the Buddha-nature, that aspect of all living beings which is inherently enlightened. Conversely, that within human beings which is able to speak and act is none other than the Buddha-nature. Ma-tsu did in fact say “If you wish to understand the mind, (then realize that) that which talks is your mind. This mind is called Buddha, it is called the true dharmakāya form of the Buddha, it is called Tao 道 (the Way or Enlightenment).”

To Ma-tsu, the Tao is not some far-off ideal. Our very words are its activities, its functioning. He says that the Tao does not need to be cultivated, but that one should just refrain from sullying it. The spirit of these words is carried on in Ta-chu Hui-hai’s 大珠慧海 Tun wu yao men 頓悟要門 (“The Essential Teachings of Sudden Enlightenment”) and Po-jang Huai-hai’s 百丈懷海 (720–814) Po jang kuang lu 百丈廣錄 (“The Extended Record of Po-jang”).

Ma-tsu’s position is that the ordinary mind is the Tao. This position precludes any attachment to the traditional Buddhist religious practices of meditation and scriptural exegesis. Rather than a pre-conceived course of mental exercises and study, what is needed is some kind of effort directly related to the words and actions of daily life. The student must understand that the day-in and day-out activities of the ordinary mind are the activities of a Buddha. In this quest he is guided by the Ch’an Master, whose behavior exemplifies the functioning of mind as Buddha. In such a milieu each of the individual actions and utterances of a great teacher constitute an expression of Truth and become considered important models of behavior by his students.

This attention to the Master’s actions as the models of enlightened behavior led directly to the development of the “recorded sayings” genre. The process was as follows: The greater the number of disciples that surrounded a great teacher became, the smaller each student’s opportunities for individual instruction. Hence moments of direct contact with the teacher became prized experiences for the disciples involved, some of whom soon began making secret notes of the events. Eventually certain monks prone to such activity started making anthologies of the teacher’s words and actions based on what they heard from other students in addition to their own experience. This was a perfectly natural development.

This practice soon led to criticism from the Ch’an Masters themselves.
Lin-chi I-hsuan 隆起義玄 (d. 867), the “founder” of the Lin-chi (Rinzai in Japanese pronunciation) School, heartily disparaged students who “revere the words of some decrepit old man as being the ‘profound truth’ writing them down in a big notebook, which they then wrap up in numerous covers and not let anyone else see.” This criticism may be viewed as a warning against isolating the words of Ch’an Masters from the situations in which they were uttered and the individual students (with their individual problems) to whom they were addressed. It is a criticism against taking those words as generalized, ossified truths.

We should note, however, that although Lin-chi uses the pejorative term “decrepit old man” (ssu-lau han 死老漢) he obviously respects several men as his religious seniors: Ma-ku 麻谷, T’an-hsia 丹霞 (738–823), Tao-i, Lu-shan 廬山, Shih-kung 石荘, et al. It is noteworthy that all of these men are in the lineage of Ma-tsú Tao-i. Each of their teachings—while not necessarily contained in a complete recorded sayings text of its own—must have been in wide circulation at the time, perhaps only in the form of brief sayings, phrases, or poems (chieh 偈, Sanskrit: gatha). For example, Lin-chi’s “Someone (Huai-jang) has said ‘If you say it’s like any single thing then you’re off the mark’” is in itself a nuclear or fragmentary form of Huai-jang’s recorded sayings. Hence even in spite of a critical attitude towards some of the compilers of the “recorded sayings” texts, the various teachers of Chinese Ch’an Buddhism referred to such material out of their own interests and used it in the elucidation of their own teachings by means of quotation, comment, and criticism.

The activities of students and masters alike soon led to the creation of a considerable body of literature written in the Ch’an style. The difference between this material and the works of traditional Buddhism was not lost upon the contemporary Chinese. For example, take the following comments by Tsung-mi on the important distinction between “doctrinal Buddhism” (chiao 教) and Ch’an. These are found in his Ch’an yuan chu ch’uan chi tu hsü 要論諸詮集都序 (“General Introduction to a Compendium of the Interpretations of the Fundamentals of Ch’an”):

“Doctrinal Buddhism” consists of the sūtras and sastras left to us by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, while “Ch’an” refers to the sayings and gathas of our own spiritual compatriots.

In contrast to “doctrinal Buddhism,” which covers all the living
beings in the entire universe, the *gathas* of Ch'an are very concise and effective in teaching one sort of person in (China).\(^9\)

For example, the *Hsieh kao seng chuan* 徽高僧傳 ("Extended Biographies of Eminent Monks") reports the existence of a record of Bodhidharma's teachings.\(^10\) Such a record would have been valued, not as a repository of generalized religious statements, but as a record of oral instructions uttered in different specific situations. Such a record would constitute a "handle" by which its readers could grasp the truth.

3. A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BUDDHIST SCRIPTURES

After Ma-tsu, Chinese Ch'an departed from the bibliographic study of Buddhist scriptures and focused upon the words and actions of daily human activities. As a result, the records of those words and actions assumed the status of scripture. Or rather, there occurred a change in the very conception of the scriptures themselves. Rather than the recorded sayings texts of Chinese teachers being granted a status equal to that of the translations of Indian *sūtras*, the *sūtras* came to be regarded as the Buddha's "recorded sayings." The famous motto "Do not rely on words!" (*pu li wen-tzu* 不立文字) is not a blanket renunciation of the scriptures, but implies a methodological distinction between Ch'an and the traditional emphasis on written commentaries. Bodhidharma, of course, had described his own position as "becoming enlightened to the truth on the basis of the teaching."\(^11\) However, this is not a reference to the "doctrinal Buddhism" described above, but to Bodhidharma's innovative conception of the Buddha's scriptures as the transcripts of oral instruction. This new approach to the scriptures is further exemplified by the *Pao lin chuan* 寶林傳 ("The Transmission of Pao-lin [Temple]") which includes the entire text of the *Ssu shih erh chang ching* 四十二章經 ("Sūtra in Forty-two Sections") at its beginning. A *sūtra* (albeit one of Chinese origin) thus plays the part of the oral teachings of the Buddha.\(^12\)

The attitude which led to this reverence for the oral records of one's predecessors is one which favors individual facts or incidents over abstract generalities. The earliest genre of Ch'an literature—a group of works known as the "transmission of the lamp" histories (ch'uan-teng shih 傳燈史 or, more simply, teng-shih 燈史)—generally consists of the biographies of the earlier Patriarchs and successive Masters. This is fully in accordance with the predisposition toward personalized, "incidental" expressions of the truth, the concrete rather than the abstract. Earlier,
during the Six Dynasties Period, Chinese scholars attempted to systematize Buddhist doctrine by means of a comprehensive analysis of the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna scriptures. Motivated by Chinese intellectual needs, this analytic endeavor (known as “dividing the doctrine,” or p'’an-chiao 判教) eventually resulted in the categorization of the entire range of Buddhist thought along inductive and deductive lines. The biographical emphasis of the “transmission of the lamp” histories and the contents of the various “recorded sayings” texts belie a profound disinterest in the ideological emphasis of such earlier doctrinal systems.

Of course, even in the p’an-chiao literature there are systems which emphasize the differing abilities of Buddhist trainees to respond to different doctrines rather than upon the doctrines themselves. Nevertheless, since there are a multitude of differences in human ability, it soon becomes necessary to consider concrete examples of Buddhist teaching in reference to different individuals. In harmony with the proclivity of the Chinese people for things down-to-earth, Chinese Buddhism moved from an emphasis on the abstract to an emphasis on the particular. This eventually resulted in an unlimited acceptance of innumerable individual, particular events as representative of something inexpressible in abstract terms.

A great number of passages in the “recorded sayings” texts are prefaced by the words “someone in the past has said” (ku-jen yün 古人云) or “a past worthy has said” (ku-ten yün 古德云). This indicates the general interest shared by these texts in the sayings of earlier masters as precedents or examples, rather than as the logical basis for some religious position. This is the intellectual background of the development from traditional Buddhist scriptures to the “recorded sayings” of Ch’an.

The dialogues of Ch’ān did not take place for the purpose of making statements of religious doctrine, but as a means of addressing the very real and immediate problems of Buddhist spiritual practice as they occurred within the lives of the trainees. The relationship between doctrinal understanding and true insight is a frequent topic in the annals of Ch’ān. Take, for example, the treatment of the “head monk” or “lecture master” (tso-chu 座主), a character that appears quite frequently. Sometimes the head monk appears only as a foil for the Ch’ān Master, but more often he is the symbol of someone who has become paralyzed and religiously impotent by his dependence on some pre-determined religious position.

Another example may be found in the sermons of Yuan-Wu K’t-o-chin
4. On Some of the Early Products of Ma-ts'u's Lineage

I have mentioned elsewhere that the act of compiling Ma-ts'u's sayings by some of his disciples was criticized by some of his other disciples. Nevertheless, the literarily motivated group left a massive record of their master's teachings. It is also very significant that so many of Ma-ts'u's disciples left behind their own "recorded sayings." These include Ta-chu Hui-hai's Tun wu yao men, Po-jang Huai-hai's Po jang kuang lu (also known as the Po jang yao chueh 百丈要決 "The Essential Oral Teaching of Po-jang"), Nan-ch'uan P'u-yuan's 南泉普願 (745–834) Nan ch'uan yü yao 南泉語要 ("The Essential Sayings of Nan-ch'uan"), and Layman P'ang's P'ang chü shih chieh sung chi 龍居士偈頌集 ("A Collection of Verses by Layman P'ang").

There is evidence that corroborates the early provenance of these works. A part of Nan-ch'uan's "Essential Sayings" may be found in fascicle twenty-eight of the Ch'uan-teng lu 灯錄 ("Records of the Transmission of the Lamp"). The present text goes back as far as the Ku tsun su yü yao 古尊宿語要 ("Essential Sayings of Ancient Worthies") of the Southern Sung Dynasty, but its origins are presumably much older. Po-jang's work is listed in Enchin's 丹珍 (814–891) catalogues of material brought back to Japan from China as the Po jang ho shang yao chueh 百丈和尚要決 ("The Essential Oral Teachings of the Monk
Po-jang”).\(^{18}\) Ennin’s 丹仁 (792–862) similar catalogue lists an additional title of an undoubtedly similar work, the Kan ch’uan ho shang yü pen 甘泉和尚語本 (“The Book of Sayings of the Monk Kan-ch’uan”).\(^{19}\) It was very unusual for such material from Ma-tsu’s lineage to have been brought back to Japan from China at the beginning of the ninth-century.

Finally, in the possession of the Kanazawa Bunko 金澤文庫 is a work known as the Ming chou ta mei shan fa ch’ang ch’an shih yü lu 明州大梅山法常禪師語錄 (“Recorded Sayings of Ch’an Master Fa-ch’ang of Ta-mei Mountain in Ming-chou”), previously introduced by SEKI Kiyoshi 金澤文庫.\(^{20}\) Although this text has not yet been studied in detail, it seems to be the oldest of the extant “recorded sayings” texts of the Ma-tsu lineage. I will comment briefly on it below.

At this point it may be convenient to mention that the Kanazawa Bunko also possesses copies of various other Ch’an works from the T’ang Dynasty. These include a great deal of material from outside the Ma-tsu lineage, such as the Wu hsing lun 悟性論 (“Treatise on Becoming Enlightened to the [Buddha-] nature”), the Kuan hsin lun 觀心論 (“Treatise on the Contemplation of Mind”), the Liu tsu t’an ching 六祖坛經 (“The Platform Sūtra of the Sixth Patriarch”), and the Hsieh mo lun 血脈論 (“Treatise on Genealogies”).\(^{21}\) Another work, the Hsiang yen sung ch’i shih shou 香嚴頌七十首 (“Seventy Verses by Hsiang-yen”), which has not previously been introduced to the academic community, would seem to come directly from Ma-tsu’s school. Hsiang-yen’s verses are mentioned along with those of another disciple of Ma-tsu’s, Layman P’ang, in the T’ang shu i wen chih.\(^{22}\) Hsiang-yen is often lauded along with T’ung-shan 洞山 (807–862) as one of the “two Bodhisattvas of Pai-ya 白崖 and Hsin-feng 新豐”\(^{23}\) His works certainly deserve further study. The value of the Kanazawa Bunko manuscript is increased by the fact that it contains some material not found in such works as the Tsu t’ang chi, the Tsung-ching lu 宗鏡錄 (“Records of the Mirror of Truth”),\(^{24}\) and the Ch’uan teng lu.

5. THE CH’AN “ENCOUNTER”

In all likelihood the very concept of recording the words of an “encounter” (chi-yuan 機緣)\(^{25}\) between master and disciple started with Ma-tsu. Who were the disciples who inherited this legacy? Ma-tsu’s epitaph lists the following eleven disciples: Hui-hai, Chih-tsang 智藏, Hao-ying 高英, Chih-hsien 志賢, Chin-t’ung 智通, Tao-wu 道悟, Huai-
hui 懷暉, Wei-k’uan 惟寛, Chih-kuang 智廣, Ch’ung-t’ai 崇台, and Hui-yun 惠雲.26 Po-jang and Nan-ch’uan are conspicuously absent from this list, although the epitaph for the former tries to explain away his omission.27 In addition, the biographical inscriptions for Yen-kuan Ch’i-an 鹽官齊安 (d. 842) and O-hu Ta-i 鵝湖大義 (d. 818) claim that these men were also Ma-tsu’s disciples.28 Hence the list of eleven disciples found in Ma-tsu’s epitaph is not complete. On the contrary, all those men who left some kind of oral record or are remembered in some classic Ch’an may be said to represent a new development that starts with Ma-tsu. In this sense, they are all Ma-tsu’s disciples.

These encounters display a great degree of fluidity within the literature of Ch’an. For example, the Ch’uan teng lu depicts Hsi-t’ang Chih-tsang 西堂智藏 and Po-jang Huai-hai as Ma-tsu’s two most able disciples. However, the Sung and Ming editions of the text differ in content, the latter adding Nan-ch’uan to the equation. The Ming text depicts Nan-ch’uan as the most able of the three by means of the famous encounter known as “Ma-tsu playing with the moon” (Ma-tsu wan-yueh 馬祖翫月).29 In fact, Hsi-t’ang was originally a student of Ching-shan Fa-ch’in 徑山法欽 (714-792) of the Niu-t’ou (Oxhead) School 牛頭宗. His name Hsi-t’ang (meaning “Western Hall”) implies outsider treatment, but he was apparently considered a representative of Ma-tsu’s school from a very early time. The great poet Li Shang-yin’s 李商隱 (812?-858?) T’ang tzu chou hui i ching she nan ch’an yuan ssu cheng t’ang pei ming 唐梓州慧義禪舍南禪院四證堂碑銘 (“Inscription for the ‘Four Likenesses Hall’ at Nan-ch’an-yuan of Hui-i Temple in Tzu-chou, China”) reports that the building in question enshrined paintings of the Great Masters Wu-hsiang of Ching-(chung Temple) in I-chou 益州靜(衆寺)無相 (684-762), Wu-chu of Pao-t’ang (Temple) 保唐(寺)無住 (714-774), (Ma-tsu) Tao-i of Hung-chou, and Hsi-t’ang Chih-tsang.30 Here Hsi-t’ang is treated as an equal of Ma-tsu and two other men of great historical significance. For the Ch’uan teng lu to treat him as a student of Ma-tsu’s implies a deliberate assault upon his status within Ch’an. The addition of Nan-ch’uan and his favorable treatment by the Yuan version of the Ch’uan teng lu is an even later development.

By comparing different versions of the same encounter we can, of course, strive for historical judgments concerning the people and events involved. For example, what was the relationship between Ma-tsu and Hsi-t’ang? How about Nan-ch’uan? It is more important, however, that we understand the fundamental reality of the “encounter” itself, which
is defined by its very fluidity. The “encounter” originated in the “transmission of the lamp” texts’ collective interest in biographical events, but soon outgrew its origins to become an important medium of religious teaching and dialogue. The fluid treatment of “encounters” within the “recorded sayings” literature points to a state of religious vitality, a policy of constant reappraisal of the meaning of Buddhism that typified the Ch’ an School of the day. This attitude of the “recorded sayings” texts is not just an extension of the biographical emphasis of the “transmission of the lamp” texts, but one that is, in fact, completely new. The survival of the various “encounters” and “recorded sayings” of Ma-tsu’s students reveals the vigorous, innovative nature of Ch’ an Buddhism practiced by this school.

In the pages below I would like to consider certain aspects of form pertaining to some of the major “recorded sayings” texts of the Ma-tsu lineage.

6. THE ESSENTIAL TEACHING OF SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT

The first text to take under consideration is Ta-chu Hui-hai’s Tun wu yao men 頓悟要門 (“The Essential Teaching of Sudden Enlightenment”), which was first published by a monk named Miao-hsieh 妙葉 in the year 1374. This text is in two parts: the first fascicle was discovered by Miao-hsieh, while the second is a composite of material taken by him from the Ch’ uan teng lu. Miao-hsieh tells us nothing about the origins of the manuscript he found. It is unquestionably the older part of the text; an interesting variant form of its opening passage will be introduced below. The second fascicle, though taken directly from the Ch’ uan teng lu, consists of material also found in the Tsu t’ang chi and the Tsung ching lu and thus of an early provenance. As I have pointed out in an earlier paper, there are passages attributed to Hui-hai in the Tsung ching lu that do not coincide with anything in the Tun wu yao men. Hence there must have been several versions of Hui-hai’s “recorded sayings” extant at the beginning of the Sung.

According to the account contained in the Tun wu yao men Hui-hai studied under Ma-tsu for six years and then returned to his ancestral home to care for his aged preceptor. During this time he concealed his identity by acting as if he were an imbecile, but did go to the effort of writing the Tun wu ju tao yao men lun 頓悟入道要門論 (“Treatise on the Essential Teaching of Suddenly Entering into Enlightenment”) in one
fascicle. This received Ma-tsu’s praise when it was shown to him by one Shih-chih Hsuan-yen 師姪玄晏. Since this account is found in the early Sung Dynasty version of the Ch’uan teng lu, we know that some treatise or oral record of Hui-hai’s was in circulation at that time. Actually, the same name occurs at the end of Po-jang’s recorded sayings, when a student asks “What is the Mahāyāna teaching of suddenly entering into enlightenment?” Apparently this was a theme of general interest among the members of Ma-tsu’s following.

In considering this text we dare not overlook the existence of a variant manuscript in the possession of the Kanazawa Bunko. The beginning of this manuscript differs considerably from the usual version by the addition of the following preface:

Treatise of the Essential Teaching of Suddenly Entering into Enlightenment
Printed at Chien-an 建安 by Wei-hsin 魏信
Written by the T’ang Dynasty Monk Hui-hai

Those who undertake Buddhist spiritual training must realize that the functions of meditation and wisdom constitute the essential principle of transcending this world. Those who do not train vigorously in these are truly fools. How could the wonderful Way (i.e., enlightenment) have many gates (i.e., teachings)? If you realize the one, a thousand follow. If you are mistaken as to the one, then you (suffer) ten thousand delusions. What could be better than the teaching of sudden enlightenment in transcending the three worlds? I will tell you only that form is the same as non-substantiality (k’ung 空, śunyatā), that ordinary people are the same as sages. When I say “non-substantiality” I am not postulating some “non-substantiality” that I call “non-substantiality.” When I say “sage” I am not postulating some “sage” that I call “sage.” The experience of meditation (ting 定, samādhi) and the realization of purity are to be considered in the same way. All of these are based upon the principle of non-duality, but then there is no such “non-duality.”

In my opinion, most Buddhists today have fallen into dualistic misconceptions, cannot distinguish right from wrong, and consequently are trapped in the never-ending cycle of birth and death.

I have compiled this treatise in order to bring about the salvation
of those who are ready for it, to have those with attachments develop the desire to dedicate themselves to others, and to make those with false views take refuge in the truths of Buddhism.

This treatise is not to be distributed among the unfaithful. It should be transmitted only to persons of definite promise. This is not because of any reluctance to spread Buddhism, but due to the fear that if those of shallow wisdom heard this teaching they would commit a transgression by defaming it. This selectivity must prevail—do not become lax. If a person is not ready for this teaching, then do not transmit it even for a thousand gold coins, or even if he is your own flesh and blood! If the person is ready, then transmit it immediately!

This (text) must be explained orally by a teacher so that there are no mistakes. [Here occur five illegible characters]. . . then it will be useless. If there is the slightest error, then it is equivalent to a miss of a thousand li. These words are not false.

This preface is attributed to Hui-hai himself, probably spuriously. As is well known, the Tun wu yao men begins with an excellent laudatory verse which makes the above preface superfluous. In particular, the part starting with the words “I have compiled this treatise in order to bring about the salvation...” is clearly a circuitous addition made by some unknown later person. However, after Hui-hai’s death such a treatise, preface included, was probably considered to be entirely of his authorship and “wrapped up in several layers of covers and cared for secretly.”

According to NÒTOMI Jôtèn 納富常天 of the Kanazawa Bunko, all the Ch’an texts owned by that archives were in the hand of Ken’a Shōnin 劍阿上人 (1261–1338), the second abbot of Shōmyōji 稱名寺 in Kana-
zawa. Hence the Kanazawa Bunko manuscript is older than that discovered and published in China by Miao-hsieh. The words “published by Wei-hsin in Chien-an” on the Kanazawa Bunko manuscript indicate that the text had been published at least once before Miao-hsieh undertook the task. Although there are missing pages in the Kanazawa Bunko manuscript, its length (thirty-seven sheets of fourteen lines, seventeen characters to a line) generally corresponds to the first fascicle of Miao-hsieh’s text. It is virtually certain that the text Miao-hsieh discovered and eventually published was none other than the edition that formed the basis for the Kanazawa Bunko text as well, the printed edition published by Wei-hsin.

Even though the Tun wu yao men comes to us through relatively late sources, the content of the text is quite old. It may appropriately be considered the teaching of one of Ma-tsu’s disciples. Much of the text discusses themes common to the Northern School of Ch’an (pei-tsung 北宗) and its opponent Shen-hui 神會 (670–762), themes that antedate the Ma tsu yü lu 馬祖語錄 (“The Recorded Sayings of Ma-tsu”) in the Susu chia yü lu 四家語錄 (“The Recorded Sayings of the Four Teachers”). Of particular interest is the fact that, while being in question and answer form, the Tun wu yao men is obviously a literary creation that treats its material extremely logically, rather than a spontaneous oral record. It is quite noteworthy that this, the first written product of Ma-tsu’s school, has been preserved for us to read today.

7. THE RECORDED SAYING OF FA-CH’ANG

The Ming cho ta mei shan fa ch’ang ch’an shih yü lu was compiled by Fa-ch’ang’s student Hui-pao 懷寶. Fa-ch’ang was born into the Cheng 鄭 family of Hsiang-yang 襄陽. While studying under Ma-tsu in Chiang-hsi 江西 he became enlightened upon hearing the words “the mind is the Buddha” (chi hsin chi fo 即心即佛). He subsequently became a hermit at a former residence of Mei Tzu-ch’en 梅子真 in K’uai-chi 賢嵇, where he spent the rest of his life. After several dialogues with students of Ma-tsu’s who came to visit him (also found in the Tsu t’ang chi and the Ch’uan teng lu) come five rather long sermons (shang-t’ang). At the end of the text is the famous story of his death, a last verse, and a eulogy by Ch’an Master Chih-chueh 智覺禪師, also known as Yen-shou 延壽 (904–975). The most significant part of the text is obviously the section containing the five sermons, which are unknown elsewhere except for one quote in Yen-shou’s Tsung ching lu. It is clear from Yen-shou’s
eulogy and inclusion of the sermon in the *Tsung ching lu* that he was very deeply impressed with Fa-ch’ang. There is no doubt that this impression was gained through reading the elder figure’s “recorded sayings.” Since they constitute a valid indicator of the religious philosophy of Ma-tsu’s lineage, Fa-ch’ang’s “recorded sayings” are eminently worthy of further study.

8. FROM PRIVATE NOTES TO PRINTED CLASSICS

Fundamentally, the teachings and encounters which make up the content of the “recorded sayings” text are not just written records. Their vitality lies in their being repeatedly discussed and criticized by practicing Buddhists. Gradually, as such living material circulates as part of an oral tradition the opinions of the participants in that oral tradition are added on. In spite of the words “wrapped up in several layers of covers, showing to no one else,” in the last analysis these anecdotes and sayings were written down with other people in mind. Those in possession of such records would inevitably speak of them, distributing transcripts of the words of the various teachers for all the world to read and evaluate. Eventually the evaluation would creep into the original text, so that the “recorded sayings” genre constantly underwent a fluid process of development. At the same time as the genre developed fluidly, the very breadth of its dissemination—aided by the inception of woodblock printing—caused it to become fixed as classical literature. These two processes, fluid change through constant reappraisal and the assumption of classical status, were both the function of the popularity of this new brand of Buddhism and were not mutually contradictory.

In general, the T’ang Dynasty Ch’an texts available today were edited during the Five Dynasties Period and the early Sung Dynasty. As was mentioned above, the very word “recorded saying” (*yü-lu* 言錄) appeared for the first time in a Sung Dynasty work, the *Sung kao seng chuan*. The fact that these texts were being edited (not only read and re-copied) at this time implies that Chinese Ch’an Buddhism had developed a new and wider perspective. That is, rather than focusing narrowly on individual encounters and verses, the followers of Ch’an were able to contemplate the special characteristics of this body of material as a whole. To those with such a broad viewpoint, the annals of the earlier masters of Ch’an assumed the status of classical literature. It was in just this milieu that the *Tsu t’ang chi*, *Ch’uan teng lu*, *Tsung ching lu*, and *Sung kao seng chuan* all appeared. Although a bit different, the *I ch’u liu t’ieh*
I-ch’u makes very frequent reference to the Pao lin chüan, not only because he considered it rare, but because of the appeal of this new style of Buddhism. The Tsung ch’ing lu in particular pays great attention to the relationship between Buddhist doctrine and the “encounter” in Ch’an, but all of the above works devote their attentions to the question of how to evaluate the new kind of Buddhism that grew up after Matsu.

The impulse to contemplate the newly-established Ch’an tradition was strongest just at the beginning of the Sung Dynasty, when the turmoil of the late T’ang and Five Dynasties Periods had ended. Significantly, the movement to re-edit and re-publish the T’ang “recorded sayings” texts started in the area of Chiang-nan 江南, which had survived this chaotic time in relative peace. Due to the relative peace of the Wu-yueh 吳越 and Southern T’ang 南唐 regimes, this area was able to preserve much of its Buddhism unaltered and became the breeding ground for the Buddhist revival of the early Sung. The nucleus of this movement was the Fa-yen School 法眼宗, the efforts of which are symbolized by Yen-shou’s Tsung ch’ing lu and Tao-yuan’s 道原 Ch’uan teng lu. The earlier Tsu t’ang chi also came from a splinter group within this School.

One of the Fa-yen School’s well-known accomplishments was the restoration of T’ien-t’ai-shan 天台山, but its activities on Lu-shan 嘯山 were perhaps even more important. The origins of the Chao chou yü lu, the wide circulation of which is mentioned in the Sung kao seng chüan, are closely tied to the activities on Lu-shan. The present text (in three fascicles) was re-edited in the Ming Dynasty, but at the end of each fascicle we find the statement that the text had been thoroughly checked by “the monk Ch’eng-shih, the chief monk of Hsi-hsien pao-chueh ch’an-yuan 杰賢寶覺禪院 on Lu-shan, who has received transmission of the teaching and a bequest of the purple robe.”40 Hsi-hsien Ch’eng-shih 杰賢澄謹 (?–991–?) was a contemporary of Yen-shou and Tao-yuan. He was a disciple of Po-jang Tao-ch’ang 百丈道常, who was in turn a disciple of Fa-yen Wen-i 法眼文益 (885–958), after whom the Fa-yen School is named. The statement that Ch’eng-shih had “received transmission of the law and a bequest of the purple robe” indicates the prestigious nature of the Fa-yen School during the early Sung.

Although we do not know the specific reason for which Ch’eng-shin proofread the Chao chou yü lu, we do know that he was a very well-read monk. One source says that later in life he read the entire Buddhist canon three times. Not only this—considering it disrespectful to read the
scriptures sitting down, he intoned them all while standing up! We may note that the highlights of Chao-chou’s life are given at the beginning of his “recorded sayings” using the dating system of the Southern T’ang Dynasty. We may easily imagine that Chao-chou’s disciples moved South to escape the war and strife going on in the North and that Ch’eng-shih checked over their compilation of their master’s teachings because of some problems with the text.

Ch’eng-shih was also the first teacher of Huang-lung Hui-nan 黃龍慧南 (1002–1069), after whom the Huang-lung School is named. The emergence of the Huang-lung School was directly related to the success of the earlier Fa-yen School. Huang-lung himself resided at Kuei-tsung ssu 歸宗寺 on Lu-shan for a time, and it is noteworthy that this famous mountain—formerly a center of the Fa-yen School—was the center of his School’s development. In terms of the present study, it is especially significant that Huang-lung was personally involved in the compilation of the Ssu chia yü lu.

We have mentioned above that the dissemination of the Chao chou yü-lu was closely tied to the activities on Lu-shan. Another such work was the Fen yang wu teh ch’an shih yü lu 汾陽無德禪師語錄 (“The Recorded Sayings of Ch’ an Master Wu-teh of Fen-yang”). This was first written and published about the same time as the Ch’uan teng lu (which was published in 1002). The same person, Yang-i 楊億, wrote prefaces for both works. In fact, Wu-teh’s “recorded sayings” contains a sermon in which he expresses his joy at having earlier sayings of his included in the Ch’uan teng lu during his own lifetime. The book of Wu-teh’s teachings was reissued at K’ai-yuan ssu in Hung-chou in the year 1101 under the textual supervision of one Yuan-chi 丹璽, who is described as the chief monk of a Ch’an temple on Lu-shan. He is said to have “received transmission of the teaching,” probably in the Fa-yen or perhaps the Huang-lung School. Just as the Chao chou yü lu, the Fen yang wu teh ch’ an shih yü lu was probably brought to Lu-shan in the flight from the turmoil and strife going on in North China prior to the establishment of the Sung Dynasty.

It is clear that a great number of the oral records of T’ang Dynasty Ch’an Masters were edited and republished during the early part of the Sung Dynasty. A contemporary work, Chueh-fan Hui-hung’s 覺範慧洪 (1071–1158) Shih men wen tzu ch’ an 石門文字禪 (“Ch’an Words from the Stone Gate”), specifically affirms that this was the case.

Many of the men involved in these re-publication efforts were men of
the Huang-lung School. No doubt spurred on by the efforts of Yen-
shou and Tao-yuan of the Fa-yen School, these men were responsible
for the dissemination and wide establishment of a new genre of reli-
gious literature. Because they were qualitatively different from the
"transmission of the lamp" histories, the emergence of these "recorded
sayings" texts as a fully matured literary genre signals a new point of
development in the history of Ch'an. No longer content to be cir-
cumscribed by the narrow limits of individual "encounters" as found in
the "transmission of the lamp" histories, Ch'an thus enters the dawn of
the age of the kung-an 公案 or "precedent" anthologies. The Fen yang
yü lu had in fact contained a set of three hundred such "precedents of
former sages" that formed the vanguard of the works that were to come.
The study of these anthologies—the Wu men kuan 無門關 ("The Barrier-
gate of Wu-men"), the Pi yen lu 碧巖録 ("The Blue Cliff Records"),
etc.—must be left for another occasion.

NOTES

Translator's note: The Japanese original of this article appeared in Indogaku bokyōgaku kenkyū 印度學佛敎學硏究 (IBK) 18:1, Dec., 1969, under the title "Zenshata goroku no keisei" 禪宗語錄の形成. The text has been rearranged and supplemented with a substantial amount of explanatory material deemed necessary for presenta-
tion in English. The translator has attempted to state Professor Yanagida's ideas without alteration or addition, but the reader should be aware that many of the con-
cluding statements found in the Enlish version are only implied, rather than ex-
pressly stated, in the Japanese. Almost all the notes have been added by the trans-
lator, a few having been taken from the body of the Japanese text. The translator
would like to thank Carl Bielefeldt, who was in Japan at the time of this project, for
confering with Professor Yanagida on several critical matters and for making
various helpful suggestions of his own.

1 T50.842c.
2 T50.775c. This reads "His 'recorded sayings' received wide circulation and an
honored reputation." This is in fascicle 11.
3 T50.741a. This is in fascicle 6. Shen-ch'ing took the name Pei-shan or "North
Mountain" from his place of residence on Ch'ang-p'ing-shan 長平山 to the north of
Ch'i-ch'eng 鄰城 in Szechuan.
4 K'ou Szu-shang's biography is unknown. Professor Yanagida referred to the
T'ang shu ching chi i wen ho chih 唐書經籍藝文合志, p. 83b of the historical material
in the second section (T-ju shih-lu, tsu-shih lei 乙部史録, 雜史類).
5 See Professor Yanagida's article on Ma-tsu, "Basozen no shomondai" 馬祖禅の
6 Quoted in the Tsung ching lu 宗鏡録, fascicle 14, T48.492a. For Tsung-mi's in-


8 The list of Lin-chi's religious seniors occurs at T47.501b and Yanagida, *op. cit.*, pp. 153–4. The quotation ascribed to Huai-jang is at T47.503a and Yanagida, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

9 T48.399a.

10 T50.551c.

11 Also T50.551c. The Chinese is *ch'ieh-chiao wu-tsung* 藉教悟宗. See Professor Yanagida's *Daruma no goroku* [nin'yū shigyō ron], 連摩的語録 [二入四行論], Zen no goroku, 1 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1969), p. 31.

12 The *Pao-lin chuan* was compiled in 801 by Chih-chū 智炬 (also known as Hui-chū 惰炬). Of its original 10 fascicles, only 1–6 and 8 are still extant. It has been published in 1935 in China and 1959 by Hanazono College (under Professor Yanagida's direction) in Kyoto, Japan, but these editions have become very rare. The *Pao lin chuan* set the tone for all the “transmission of the lamp” histories to follow. See Professor Yanagida's “Zenseki kaidai” 師承解題, no. 92, in NISHITANI Keiji and YANAGIDA Seizan, eds., *Zenke goroku* 禪家語録, II, Sekai koten bungaku zenshū 世界古典文學全集, 36b (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1976), p. 469.

13 See the *Yuan wu yu lu* 邁悟語録, fascicle 14, T47.777a.

14 While these stories are referred to briefly at T47.777a, they are obviously known from other sources as well. The section on Kāṇādeva (Chia-no-t' i-po; 伽那提婆) in the *Ch'uan teng lu* has Nāgārjuna throwing a needle into a water-filled bowl in front of Kāṇādeva, stepping up to him, and then “manifesting” an image of the moon. (T51.211b). The other stories mentioned by Yuan-wu do not occur in what would seem to be their obvious places in the *Ch'uan teng lu* nor in the later *Ch'uan fa cheng tsung chi* 傳法正宗記 (“Records of the Transmission of the Dharma in the Orthodox School”) by Fo-jih Ch'i-sung 佛月契嵩 (1007–1072). The latter has the Kāṇādeva stories at T51.727c.

15 The *Tun wu yao men* occurs at ZZK 2, 15, 5. Also see HIRANO Shūjō's 平野宗窈 *Tongo yōmon* 頓悟要門, Zen no goroku, 6 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1970). The *Po jang kuang-lu* may be found at ZZK 2, 24, 5, while the *Nan ch' uan yü yao* is at ZZK, 2, 23, 2. Layman P’ang’s collection of poetry comprises fascicles 2 and 3 of the *P’ang chü shih yu lu* 瞳居士語録 (“The Recorded Sayings of Layman P’ang”), ZZK 2, 25, 1. Also consult the authoritative Japanese translation by Professor IRIYA Yoshitaka 入矢義高, *Hōkoji goroku* 瞳居士語録, Zen no goroku, 7 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1973).

16 T51.445a–446b.

17 A Ming Dynasty recension of the anthology mentioned here may be found in the extended canon, ZZK 2, 23, under the title *Kutsun su yū lu* 古尊宿語録 (“Re-
corded Sayings of Ancient Worthies’). It is convenient to use the more readable reprint in the *Ch'an tsung chi ch'eng* 禪宗集成 (Taipei: I-wen yin-shu-kuan yin-hang, 1968), vol. 11–12. A better edition of the text, edited by the great Muchaku Dōchū 無著道忠 (1653–1744), has been published under Professor Yanagida’s direction under the original title, *Kutsun su yu yao*, (Kyoto: Chung-wen ch’u-pan she, 1973).

18 See T55.1095a, T55.1101a, and T55.1106c. The titles of these catalogues are omitted in the interest of brevity.

19 T55.1084b.

20 Reference unavailable at present.

21 The *Wu hsing lun* is attributed to Bodhidharma and contained in the *Shao shih liu men* 少室六門 (“The Six Works of Shao-shih,” *Shao-shih* referring to Sung-shan 唐山, the site of Bodhidharma’s legendary residence, Shao-lin ssu 少林寺), T48.370c–373b. Its true author is unknown, but was probably a member of the Northern School of some related mid-T’ang group. The *Kuan hsin lun* is also contained in the *Shao shih liu-men* under the title *P’o hsiang lun* 破性論 (“Treatise on the Destruction of Characteristics”), T48.366c–369c. However, it was written by Shen-hsiu 神秀 (606?–706), the preeminent figure of the Northern School. The *Liu tsu t’an ching* is so well-known that it needs no introduction here. The reader is urged to refer to Professor Yampolsky’s masterful translation and study, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). The *Hsieh mo lun* also occurs in the *Shao shih liu men*, T48.373b–376b, but is thought to be a product of the Niu-t’ou 牛頭 (“Oxhead”) School. See Professor Yanagida’s comments on this work in his monumental *Shoki zenshū shisho no kenkyū* 初期禪宗史書の研究 (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1967), pp. 143, 173, and 181.

22 See the listing of the *Chih hsien chieh sung i chuan* 智閑偈頌一卷 (“Verses by Chih-Hsien in One Fascicle”) in the *T'ang shu ching chi i wen ho chih* section on Buddhism (*Tao-chia [shih-chia] lei, fa-chia lei* 道家 (家家) 類, 法家類), p. 208.

23 See the preface by Chi’i-shih 齊己 to the verses by Lung-ya Chü-tun 龍牙窮遁 in the *Ch' an men chu tsu shih chieh sung* 禪門諸祖師偈頌 (*Poetry of the Masters of Chan’*), ZZK 2, 21, 5, or *Ch‘an tsung chi ch’eng*, vol. 9, p. 6089a.

24 The *Ts’u-t'ang chi* was compiled in 952 by two disciples of Ching-hsiu Wen-teng 靜修文俊 named Ching 靜 and Chün 均. Being 52 years older than the *Ch’uan teng lu* and containing a great deal of material not found in that work, the *Ts’u t’ang chi* is an extremely valuable text. Knowledge of it is unattested in Chinese literature after the twelfth century, but it has been preserved in Korea, where it is known under the pronunciation *Chodangjip*. It contains sections on several Korean monks and has been considered by some to have been compiled in Korea, but Professor Yanagida feels it is of Chinese origin. It has been reprinted under his direction (Kyoto: Chung-wen ch’u-pan she, 1972). See his *Zenseki kaidai*, no. 292, pp. 507–8. The *Tsung ching lu* (Japanese pronunciation: *Sugyōroku*) is a massive collection of quotations from Ch’an Masters compiled in 961 by Yung-ming Yan-shou 永明延壽 (904–976), an important figure in the Fa-yen School 法眼宗 of Ch’an who was also known for his *T’ien-t’ai* 天台 and Pure Land 淨土 studies and practices. Yan-shou wanted to document the identity of Ch’an and doctrinal Buddhism (*chia-ch’ an i-chih 救禪一致*), a goal which fortunately led to the preservation of a great deal of contemporary material. T48.415ff.
The usage of the word *chi-yuan* in the Ch'an School is defined as the teacher's activity of responding to the needs (*yuan, "conditions") of the student (*chi*) (according to Uui's *Bukkyō jiten*), or more simply the perfect meeting of teacher and student (according to the *Zengaku jiten*). Professor Yanagida's reaction to the choice of "encounter" as an English equivalent was said to be positive.

See the *T'ang ku hung chou k'ai yuan ssu shih men tao i ch'an shih t'a ming* 唐古洪州開元寺石門道一禪師塔銘 (Ch'uan t'ang wen 全唐文 501) by Ch'uan Teh-yü 楊德興 (759–818).

See the *Hung chou po jang shan ku huai hai ch'an shih t'a ming* 洪州百丈山故懷海禪師塔銘 (Ch'uang t'ang wen 466) by Ch'en Hsü 陳誥.

References unavailable at this time.

*Ch'uan t'ang wen*, fascicle 780.

That is, the entry on Hui-hai in fascicle 6, T51.249b–250c, and his oral teachings in fascicle 28, the *Yueh chou ta chu hui ho shang yü* 越州大珠慧海和尚語, T.51 440c–444b.

References unavailable at present.

*ZZK* 2, 24, 5 or *Ch'an tsung chi ch'eng*, vol. 13, p. 8971a.

This place-name corresponds to either Ou-hsien 備縣 in Fukkien (according to T'ang Dynasty usage) or I-ch'eng-hsien 儀徵縣 in Kiangsu (according to early Sung usage).

Reference unavailable at this time.

The *Ssu chia yü lu* contains the oral teachings of Ma-tsu, Po-jang, Huang-po Hsi-yun, and Lin-chi. It was published in China some time during the early seventeenth century and in Japan in 1648. The present text (*ZZK* 2, 24) thus dates from the seventeenth century, but it is known from other sources that Huang-lung Hui-nan edited the text in the early Sung. (This fact is discussed below.) See Professor Yanagida's *Zenseki kaidai*, no. 14, p. 447, as well as the modern edition done under his direction (Kyoto: Chung-wen ch'u-pan she, 1974).

See T51.254c (*Ch'uan t'ang lu*) and p. 286 in the *Tsu t'ang chi*.

Reference unavailable at this time.

The Japanese article misprints the last character of this title. The text is unavailable in any modern edition of the canon. It is twenty-four fascicles in length, being an explanation of Buddhist doctrines, traditions, etc., organized according to fifty major and forty minor subject headings. The title is based on that of an earlier work by the poet Po-Chü-i 白居易 (772–846) which was devoted to the explanation of a great number of current sayings and poetic usages. It has been translated loosely as "six documents," but this does not refer to any hexapartite division in the text itself. The title is apparently based upon a type of question in the T'ang civil service examination in which one was supposed to fill in three blank characters in a single line of a classical text. See the *Tz'u hai* entry on *Po k'ou liu t'ieh* 白孔六帖 (vol. 2, p. 2010).

The *Chao chou yü lu*, or *Chao chou lu* as it is often called, may be found at ZZK 2, 23. Ch'eng-shih's text was reprinted sometime between 1131 and 1162. For the reference to him quoted in this article see, for example, AKIZUKI Ryūmin 秋月隆珉, *Jōshūroku* 超州錄, Zen no goroku 11 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1971), p. 190.
See T47.594ff, ZZK 2,25, 1, or the *Ch' an tsung chi ch' eng*, vol. 14, p. 924ff.

The *Zenseki mokuroku* (禅籍目錄) published by Komazawa University (Tokyo: Nihon bussho kankōkai, 1962) lists Tzu-ming Ch’u-yuan 慈明楚円 as the editor of this text. Judging from the terms used, Yuan-chi was in charge of textual accuracy and Ch’u-yuan was in charge of the project as a whole. Yuan-chi held the post of *hsiao-k’an* 校勘 and is referred to as *Lu-shan yuan-t’ung ch’ung-sheng ch’ an-yuan chu-ch’ih ch’ uan-fa pi-ch’iu yuan-chi* 廬山円通崇勝院住持佛法比丘円璽 (“The bhikkhu Yuan-chi, who has received transmission of the Dharma and is the resident monk of Yuan-t’ung ch’ung-sheng ch’an-yuan on Lu-shan”). His biography is unknown. Ch’u-yuan (987–1040) was a disciple of Wu-teh’s and the teacher of Huang-lung Hui-nan and Yang-chih Fang-hui 楊岐方會 (996–1049), who stand at the head of the two most important lineages in the later Ch’an School.

This is in the Ming Dynasty extended canon (*Ta-ming hsu t’sang ching* 大明續藏經) 57.1–6. The specific reference is unavailable at present.
Lin-chi on "Language-Dependence,"
An Interpretive Analysis

Ronald L. Burr

This essay is concerned with the recorded sayings (lu 錄) of Lin-chi I-hsüan 臨濟義玄 (d. 866), the great T'ang dynasty master of Ch' an Buddhism and father of the sect of Ch'an Buddhism which bears his name. This is a philosophical piece and is not, then, merely historical, exiģetical, or philological in character. Nor, however, is there claimed to emerge herein any exact view of Lin-chi, much less any exact intention of his (such claims are difficult to make on the behalf of Ch'an masters). Moreover, no general claim about Lin-chi and philosophy is suggested either; i.e., what is said below includes no assumption as to whether or not Lin-chi was a philosopher in any Eastern or Western sense.

Lin-chi's sayings were therapeutic. They were meant, by his own admission, to untie "knots" (Lin-chi's own word, see below) in the understanding. These knots are possibly universal to everyone's understanding, possibly not. However, on the interpretation below, Lin-chi, noticed a particular sort of knot which can be the result of meta-linguistic views, e.g., views of the basis of language. The method used in this paper, at least initially, is clearly much different than Lin-chi's method. I try to clarify and sometimes argue for what Lin-chi says in order that philosophers may appreciate the impact of these sayings. No doubt philosophical clarification and understanding, if it occurs, is not enough to put one of the mind of Lin-chi. For that, one must be entirely free of the habits, dispositions, attitudes, etc., engendered by the particular meta-linguistic view which emerges and is criticized below as well as, undoubtedly, becoming free of habits, dispositions, attitudes, etc., engendered by other views, other conditions, and possibly other phenomena.

The particular problem (knot) dealt with herein has to do with some passages in Lin-chi's lu which could be construed as bearing on the following questions: What is the relationship between language and the world? Upon which side (language or the world) does dependency for significance lie—does language depend on the way the world is for its
significance or is it impossible to go beyond language to justify the latter's meaningfulness? This second question has an ontological relative as follows. Are language and its significance the way they are because of the way the world is, i.e., because of the nature of the world and of the particular things in the world; or is the nature of the world the way it is because of the way language is, and because of the fact (if it is a fact) that the significance of language cannot be sought beyond the divisions and functions of language itself? If the latter, what, then, would be the ontological status of the Buddhist teachings—the Dharma—taught by Lin-chi; does the name Dharma refer to anything whatsoever which is non-language-dependent? There also arises some discussion of an important issue, about which little is settled herein, regarding the connection between the language/world-view which develops and the nature of self.

Those familiar with Ch'an-literature will have already noticed problems and will find the latter area extremely problematic. Clearly the Ch'an-master Lin-chi, qua Ch'an-master, would have made no distinction allowing any such separation as that between language and the world, or worse yet, between language, world and the mind. As is the case with certain twentieth century 'language-philosophers' who considered their work to be therapeutic, Lin-chi sometimes began apparently with the distinctions and attitudes engendered by meta-linguistic views, etc., of the person(s) supposedly needing the therapy.

From the beginning there is something wrong with the questions asked. But one must remember they are not Lin-chi's questions. It is important to recognize that his consideration of the question of the relationship between language and the world must in the end be seen as part of a therapy. This is something one learns much more clearly from Lin-chi than from his twentieth century Western counterparts. One must work through the problems attendant with attempts to answer the question in certain (ordinary) ways. Then, if the insights brought out below are correct, one may begin to understand the pitfalls of considering the working of language as amounting to a certain relationship between language and the world. Unlike the untying of literal knots, the untying of these metaphorical 'knots' in the understanding sometimes begins with tying them tighter.

Some qualification may be necessary about certain terms which have emerged so far. What I have been referring to as "language" is a phrase I shall be translating as "elements of language," which most of the
time is literally "names and phrases" (ming chü 名句). The first of these characters (ming), when it occurs alone, will be translated as "general terms(s)," unless it refers specifically to a proper name. The phrase "ming chü" seems to be used rather simply by Lin-chi to refer to portions of (e.g., expressions in) both the common parlance and the language found in the Buddhist texts; when he speaks of thinking, it seems to be of the same common language phenomena just mentioned—only to oneself.

When I say we are dealing initially with a relationship between language and the world, by "the world" I mean to suggest ordinary sorts of things, such as trees, rocks, and also (at the beginning, and in the language of the problem) 'inner' sorts of 'things' such as joy and sadness. Also, whatever general reality one may believe to be in the world is intended to be included in this discussion of the relationship between elements of language and whatever sorts of things-in-general those elements are often thought to refer to.

When questioning in which way the dependency for significance lies, toward language or toward the world, the Chinese character being translated as "dependent (ency)") is i 依. I have already given an alternate version of this question. Sometimes it seems helpful to speak in this manner: if the 'dependency' in question here is one of language being dependent on the world for its significance, then we could somehow 'read' our expressions of distinctions 'off the world'. Finally, when referring to the ontological version of the question under discussion here, I generally use "ontology" to refer to what gets said about what there is. And when, in this version of the question, I speak of "the way the world is" and "the way that language is," I am thinking of the traditional philosophical notion of the nature of a thing. 2 When the Dharma is discussed as an example of the impact of Lin-chi's sayings on these questions, this Dharma is considered to be Buddhist teachings in general. In this vein, some authors claim Dharma, in this sense, refers to Buddha-truth and/or reality—ontology and epistemology being perfectly blended here. When capitalized below, "Dharma" (fa 法) will be restricted to this sense.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD

Is there such a thing as a Buddha, an awakened one? If not a factual question, this is an ontological question about the foundation of the nature of that which is the subject of much Buddhist discourse. It is a
question to which we shall surely want to turn eventually. However, I think that there is much agreement in the twentieth century that questions of this ontological sort are more manageable, or at least an ontological issue often is illumined, by examining key expressions in the question within the surroundings of their common linguistic context. Furthermore, this is a general approach to ontology which I believe helps clarify, for philosophers, a sort of knot which can develop in the understanding of certain individuals. Oddly, this approach approximates methods of Ch’àn-master Lin-chi.

Used as an example of this language-approach, the question just mentioned would be approached as follows. What do Buddhists mean when they speak of “awakening?” More language-oriented yet, for Buddhists, what is the meaning of the word “awakening?” The obvious (but ultimately unacceptable) reply to this question is that the word gets its meaning by virtue of its referring to, applying to, or perhaps naming, an ‘inner state’. Certainly it has been more the exception than the rule, prior to the twentieth century, for anyone to reflect on the nature of meaning and postulate any meaning-theory other than that words get their meanings by referring to, or standing for, things in a broad sense—“X” means X and things like it.

However, in the twentieth century other theories have emerged, for example that of J. Austin, to cite one among many. Austin’s theory of performatives, which is too well known to require elaboration, sees the significance of some utterances to lie in their functions as actions rather than in their functions of putatively referring to one or other form of actuality.

Returning now to the significance of the name The Awakened One, Buddha, we find that the ninth century Ch’àn-monk Lin-chi denied that there was anything to which this name refers. He was not, of course, denying that there was a person who was the founder of Buddhism. Rather, what Lin-chi denied was that there was any single thing in actuality, such as, for example, an ‘inner’ state of mind, belonging to that man and which was also the referent, hence the meaning, of the word “awakening.” This will become quite clear below.

In Lin-chi’s recorded sayings, we see Buddha or Buddhas (and Patriarchs) referred to as “elements of language” at their very “foundation” (ti 底). How, then, would one account for the meanings of these elements of language? Lin-chi can be seen as doing this much in the manner of Austin. Though certainly not intentionally setting forth a
theory of meaning, he claims these linguistic expressions are ones of “veneration-bondage” (shang hsi 賛繫). Lin-chi is clear that these words (e.g., “The Awakened One”) have no function of referring to a state of awakening—when we speak of an awakened one, as far as he is concerned, we are performing an act of veneration. And it is solely from this act of veneration that the significance of such phrases derives. However, this does not empty Lin-chi’s medicine bag.

Of course, performative speech-acts, such as this one of veneration, constitute but a single instance of the many functions of language which have been remarked upon in the twentieth century. In addition, some still will undoubtedly hold that certain elements of language just do have the sole function of referring to objects in the world and, further, that the ways those objects are spoken about solely depend upon the natures of the objects (a standard ontological view). The true test, on this view, of the intelligibility of what is said about objects in the world requires only the careful inspection (or introspection, if the ‘object’ is ‘inner’) of the object allegedly referred to. Perhaps Lin-chi was pointing out a mistaken apprehension that, in the foregoing manner, “awakening” refers to a state of mind; but, a traditionalist might challenge, “Certainly not all elements of language are bound up with performative functions. Surely many elements of language just straightforwardly, and solely, refer to objects and depend on those objects for the measure of their intelligibility.” What develops below will be in direct opposition to this general view on the relationship of language to the world, though it will take awhile (until the emergence herein of his notion of dependency) to bring out the universality of Lin-chi’s opposition to such a view. I will devote the next few pages to furthering this task.

Lin-chi speaks as though all things (chu fa) in this world (or any other world, for that matter) have no nature of their own (wu tzü hsing), nor do they have any (causally) produced nature (wu sheng hsing). Why is this? And what, then, would there be, so to speak, to ‘guarantee’ the significance of language? Lin-chi continues his statement relevant to the nature of all things by saying that both names (general terms) and elements of language (ming tzu) are “empty” (k’ung). This indicates the possibility of objective, in-the-world referents being called into question in some way (a way we shall soon investigate). By counseling that the elements of language are empty, Lin-chi surely cannot to advantage be taken as saying that there is not significance to language at
all. If so, his saying this would have to be understood in language while at the same time he would be denying the basis for such understanding. Instead, Lin-chi’s statement is more profitably seen as denying a certain view of the relationship between language and the world, of the relationship between language and what elements of language are often thought to mean.

Again, the ‘common view’ is that things in the world are a certain way by their very extra-linguistic natures and that somehow language reflects those natures. So that if we can glean anything at all from language, on the ‘common view’ what we glean will be something of the reflection of the natures of the things in the world. Lin-chi’s sayings show that he acknowledges this common view; they do so, in one way, by showing his awareness of the readiness of (reflective) language speakers to extend their recognition to general terms and subsequently “take them for reality.”9 Understanding Lin-chi’s diagnosis here will aid the understanding of his counsel against holding this view.

What does this “take them for” (wei) mean here? Surely it would be absurd to interpret Lin-chi as supposing that many common language-speakers (when reflective) take elements of language as though those elements were the sole reality in the world. There are two other, more satisfying readings of this passage. We can see him saying that many of us act as though our concepts were ‘read off the world’, that many take elements of language as though they were direct representations somehow actively generated off the world. (This possibility is examined in detail below.) Secondly, is it perhaps as though labels, concepts, or again general terms, somehow independently of the world actively transmit the realities of the world to language-speakers: “I am a tree, green, brown and solid; I, a rock, substantial; I, hunger, uncomfortable; I, understanding, immutable;” etc.? If so, for the Western reader, this latter might be construed as a form of Platonism.10

It is this latter position that Lin-chi advantageously can be seen as attempting to deflate when he outlines an analogy of language as wearing apparel (衣). Lin-chi uses this analogy in such a way that we may be struck by the resemblance of elements of language to articles of apparel in the following important aspect. Neither, of themselves, are active. Speaking of elements of language but calling them (articles of) apparel, he counsels us not to give recognition to apparel,11 meaning that we should not recognize apparel (elements of language) as reality
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(in the manner suggested in the paragraph immediately above). "Apparel is not capable of acting;" he says, "[it is] man [who] is capable of donning apparel."12 衣不能動，人能著衣。Again, the apparel, the elements of language he is speaking of here are the elements putatively denoting traditional Buddhist entities.13 But we are slowly moving toward an attempt, by Lin-chi, to weaken a more universal thesis regarding the relationship of the whole of language to the world in general; for a more universal statement of the dependency of the nature of the things in the world upon the elements of language will soon emerge. The counter-thesis, the view being questioned, will subsequently be seen to be related to a particular sort of knot in the understanding of certain individuals.

FOUR DEPENDENCIES
If this last suggestion of Lin-chi’s is the case, that:
(A) language is not of itself active,
then either:
(D1) language is dependent upon the world for its significance (i.e., ‘the world’ somehow issues forth in categorical divisions, and divulges the correct ways in which language is to represent it);
or:
(D2) the view of the categorical-nature of the world which we have is dependent on language.

Contrary to (D1), we have seen a case above in which Lin-chi’s sayings anticipate a contemporary negation of a linguistic view in which all language gets its significance by virtue of referring to, standing for, etc., real things in the world (or by virtue of standing for anything, for that matter). But this information, if true, is not enough to establish the truth of (D2). A true, universal denial of (D1) is necessary to establish (D2). Such a denial, for purposes of partially matching language with some of Lin-chi’s sayings, might take the form of the following thesis:
(B) No linguistic categorizations issue forth from the world.14
This thesis denies that language-speakers can ‘read off of the world’ the distinctions, categorizations, natures, essences, etc., by means of which they understand the world, or understand each other’s statements about the world. For this thesis denies that anything ‘stands out’ from, or as, the world, by way of categorization, and which could be ‘read off’ the world.
Lin-chi’s sayings support a denial very much, if not exactly, like (B). A small amount of background is necessary to an understanding of this.

During the long history of Buddhist philosophy, metaphysics (both as ontology and metaphysical cosmology) has periodically surged in interest among Buddhist adherents and then fallen from favor, often through attacks by other adherents. A similar background surrounds a general Buddhist conception of metaphysical cosmology, the threefold world\textsuperscript{15} (\textit{san chiai} 三界, Skt. \textit{triloka}), the first and second ("fold") of which would include the world as common sense has it. It seems clear that all the categories of existence are meant to be included, in most general terms, in this metaphysical cosmology.

At some point\textsuperscript{16} the triplicity of this division of the world began to lose favor among Mahāyānists of ‘mind-only’ persuasion. Sympathy for this persuasion can be seen in Lin-chi’s sayings. This threefold world-conception was also included in language-oriented controversy in \textit{prajñāpāramitā}-literature and the Mādhyamikā. Some of Lin-chi’s advice concerning the threefold world resembles the latter in this respect, i.e., of being linguistically oriented. And here (in Lin-chi’s \textit{lu}) negative advice can be found similar to statement (B) above. Lin-chi’s statements on the matter arose because some of his monks were taking the threefold world-conception, with its inclusion of the common-sense world-conception, quite seriously. For that matter, Lin-chi himself may have accepted this metaphysical cosmology as being just as good as any other such cosmology. We shall see that he treated it merely as he would any one among many linguistic constructions.

Lin-chi says of the threefold world-cosmology, with all its included categorizations:

The threefold-world does not say on its own "I am the threefold-world." Rather it is you followers of the Way right before my eyes, [you] who are clearly discerning phenomena, weighing and measuring the world, who create the term "threefold-world." 三界不自道，我是三界。還是道流，目前靈靈地照燭萬般，酌度世界底人，與三界安名.\textsuperscript{17}

We can gather from Lin-chi’s remarks that whatever categorizations are encompassed by the threefold-cosmology are not issued forth from the world to subsequently be ‘read off’ of it. Rather the language-
speaker(s) "weighing and measuring" the world into categories create(s) the statements which put thus and so nature(s) on 'the world'.

If this suggestion of Lin-chi's is correctly interpreted above, and if it is the case, what remains as an explanation of the relationship of language to the natures of things in the world? The only other alternative explanation would seem to be the (D₂) alternative. The way the world is as expressed in the way we ordinarily speak—and as further expressed in Buddhist metaphysical cosmology—is a function of the language spoken and not the other way around. In this sense, the natures of the things in the world are dependent on language. Of course, the Ch'an-master Lin-chi was not interested in drawing out such a conclusion. Again, a mere philosophical understanding would not achieve his practical results anyway.

However, there is more to be said. For one thing, the nature of a third 'dependency' is divulged in the foregoing quotation. From proposition (A), with which we began this section, combined with an assumed falsity of proposition (D₁) by means of a philosophical interpretation of part of Lin-chi's saying about the threefold world, it is clear that language is dependent upon something, but something other than 'the world'. The last quotation cited allows the philosophical construal that language is dependent upon (the minds of) ordinary language-speakers "weighing and measuring the world." Stated as a further dependency:

(D₃) The significance of language is dependent on the minds (in some sense) of persons.

I would like to delay any further discussion of (D₃)—as well as any discussion of the best interpretation, based on Lin-chi's sayings, of in what sense "minds" is used in (D₃). It was necessary to draw out this third dependency at this point in order to advance in the investigation. But I shall return to these important considerations in the section below on the subject of 'the self'. Right now, one further ramification of Lin-chi's sayings on language-dependence deserves attention.

The particular ramification of dependence to which I now turn is actually much more at the heart of Lin-chi's teachings, since it lies in the subject-area of "genuine [Ch’an-] insight" (see below). In at least one context, Lin-chi is fairly clear that this insight is very like a genuine (i.e., affective) awakening to the fact (for him) with which I began the body of this essay. This fact was interpreted above as follows—that there is no sort of mental state which is the meaning of the expression "budd-
ha(hood)" such that an instance of that sort of state is possible for individuals to experience in order to entirely know the expression’s meaning. If this is the case, awakening is not an awakening to something—e.g., to a state of mind upon which the word “awakening” depends for its meaning—but rather is awakening from something, is becoming affectively “nondependent.” As Lin-chi says,

If one awakens non-dependence, buddha(hood) is also [seen to be] non-acquired. If one gets insight such as this, it is genuine insight. 若悟，無依，佛亦無得。若如是見得者，是真正見解。

Students of Ch’an, it would seem, are directed toward an awakening from an illusion that they lack some state of buddha(hood), an illusion because of which, in Lin-chi’s words, “... their Tao-eye is veiled (screened) and they are not able to clearly [freely] discern.” 障其道眼，不得分明。What is more, this illusion causes a degree of discomfort. Ch’an students, continues Lin-chi, are “discomfited by the restraint of general terms—such as ‘ordinary [person]’ and ‘saintly [person]’...” 被他凡聖名礙。This again undoubtedly is because of the accompanying belief that ordinary folk lack something which the ‘saintly’ have, e.g., buddha(hood). What is emerging here is a recognition by Lin-chi of a discomfiting dependency upon an illusion, which he clearly connects with some elements of language.

What is the connection in this (fourth) dependency between elements of language and the personal dependency of certain individuals? Surely it is not the case that the general use of language by everyone in an everyday manner has the binding effect of which Lin-chi speaks. If it were the case, then Ch’an-masters, contrary to these very sayings of Lin-chi, could not be considered as being free of the effects of this dependency while they, at the same time, persist in using the ordinary language of the day. No, however much language might be structured so as to lend itself to misuse, it must be precisely some other aspect of its use, and not merely the ordinary use of language in general which is responsible for this dependency Lin-chi identifies. Philosophically, Lin-chi can be seen as expressing this very insight. Using as an example the language of the entire twelve divisions of Buddhist teachings, he says,

Students who do not understand [the nature of these teachings]
Thus, for Lin-chi, it is the “ideas,” understanding, or interpretation of language which some individuals “generate” on their own which further leads to their dependency and discomfort.

What is the nature and objective of this interpretation-generating activity to which certain individuals may be prone? Let us begin with its nature. Lin-chi characterizes his students in the following manner: that when they encounter elements of language (for example, we might surely suppose, the language of the Buddhist teachings), they “... search the heavens, search the earth, inquire of their neighbors, and remain quite flustered.”

The language-connected activity which Lin-chi sees in his students is harried searching of heaven and earth, and inquiring of one’s neighbors—an activity which, he claims, remains unsatisfied as to its goal.

What is the goal or objective of this search? Presumably (as already pointed out) it is not simply the correct, ordinary use of their language with regard to such concepts as buddhahood or saintly people. Surely we can assume that they understand their language sufficiently in this regard. If not, they could simply consult the relevant literature armed with grammars and dictionaries. No, in this language-connected effort, they wish to discover some entity to which words like “buddhahood” (“freedom-producing awakening”) refer. They want to ‘get something’ which they can ‘grasp’, perhaps experience in some unchanging real state, so as to ‘really’ know what the expression means, as they believe the Ch’an master does. Of course, Lin-chi sees this simply as a diversion, a seeking after illusory entities. He observes,

“... Sidetracked, waveringly, you study Ch’an, study the Tao, and acknowledge elements of language. You seek buddha[hood], seek patriarch[hood], seek a [Ch’an] master—and [in doing these] you assume and conjecture. 擔傍家波波地，學禪學道，認名認句，求佛求求善知識意度.”

This fourth dependency, then, comes as a result of assumptions and conjecture, as a result (we may interpret) of proposing entities or states of mind which correspond to and give meaning to some of the expressions these individuals hear and/or read.
While there is not much in the way of evidence to further this point, additional inferences can easily be based upon the foundation provided above, that is, upon our philosophical formulations of Lin-chi (A), (B), (D2), and (D3). If one assumes these propositions to be true, he will be able to suggest no rational basis upon which one who fully understood and agreed with those propositions would be motivated to seek dependently after conjectured entities and/or states of mind in order to give meaning to what he has heard or read (presumably regarding the Dharma). If these propositions were true, it would be irrational to expect to find categorically pre-divided ‘entities’ in ‘the world’ or in ‘the mind’ which divulge their true meanings (meanings which, supposedly, elements of language merely represent).

This fourth dependency may now be formulated as follows:

(D4) Some persons are non-free in at least this respect—that they are dependent upon an illusory conception of the relationship of language to the world.

“Illusory conception” here means precisely any view of language which lends itself to searching for entities and/or states of mind which putatively will serve as meanings of linguistic expressions. This would be a conception of language lending itself to seeking after illusions, since the truth of propositions (A), (B), (D2), and (D3)—which collectively undermine the possible existence of such entities/states of mind—is assumed here. Given this assumption, an example of one such “illusory conception” would be that encountered at the beginning of this section and formulated as (D1).

There may be other sorts of dependency which are brought to our attention as a result of Lin-chi’s sayings. However, I believe (A), (B), and (D2)-(D4)—with the helpful explanatory device of (D1)—constitute a bare bones analysis of a general problem-area—language-dependency. Bluntly, and summarily stated, this dependency is of: 1) natures of things in the world on language; and 2) some speakers on a meta-linguistic view contrary to 1). This problem-area arises as the result of critically examining the diagnosis of a ‘dis-ease’ which Lin-chi attempts to alleviate in his lu.

AN EFFECT OF LANGUAGE-DEPENDENT ONTOLOGY

As an example of the effect of language-dependent ontology, one may consider philosophically the connection of this ontology with some of Lin-chi’s sayings on the central notion of Dharma. The notion is cen-
tral because it is generally thought to refer to what the masters (or Buddhists in general) have to teach, i.e., what is conveyed from master to student, by virtue of which the student eventually becomes a master.

The problem, in one light, is this: what does the word “Dharma” mean? If the language-view outlined in the preceding section is correct, one would not pursue this inquiry by searching for some entity, e.g., some inner state of awakening, to which the expression supposedly refers. On that language-view, there is an awakening—but it is an awakening from precisely the propensity to conduct such a search. If this view is correct, there is in that sense no Dharma, no entity in reality, upon which the word “Dharma” depends for its significance. One can philosophically see many of Lin-chi’s sayings as specifically supporting just such a point.

In this regard, Lin-chi addresses both the traditional Buddha-Dharma and his own Dharma. On the traditional version, he remarks:

Both within and without the world, neither Buddha nor Dharma appear before one, nor could have ever disappeared. If they exist [at all], all are simply names, words and contextual expressions. 世與出世，無佛無法，亦不現前，亦不曾失。設有者，皆是名言章句。28

Here Lin-chi is not being critical of the Buddhism which came before him. Nor is he stating that the Buddha-Dharma was originally promulgated other than in keeping with his own remarks. Rather he sees students misusing this Dharma, the linguistic expressions of which are, he says, “unestablished superimpositions (施設 Skt. prajñapti).” However, these expressions, which originally were intended as a “medicine for illness,” 槤病 “attract little children,” 接印小兒 he says.29

Of course, he does not mean “little children” literally. Rather he suggests individuals possessed of a certain naivete or simple-mindedness. It is easy to understand, based upon this last quotation, just where this particular ‘simple-mindedness’ lies. The Dharma, Lin-chi makes clear, consists simply of elements of language. But linguistically naive persons subject these elements of language to the semantic interpretation discussed in the previous section and labeled (D1). Subsequently they search their minds and elsewhere in an empirical manner, seeking Buddha(hood) and Dharma. Under the interpretation of Lin-chi in the last section, he is one who sees through this (D1) semantico-ontological theory.
Regarding his own Dharma, he claims,

This mountain monk’s sayings are all timely medicine for illness and are directed toward its cure. Universally, there is no real Dharma. 山僧說處，皆是一期藥病相治，總無實法。31

Since he understood that there is no real Dharma, Lin-chi also understood that his own teachings could not constitute any real Dharma either. What is it that his teachings do, then, if not point to (represent) some Reality/Truth? Again, he says,

This mountain monk has not one Dharma to give to man; [I] just cure illness and untie knots (release bonds). 山僧無一法與人，祇是治病解縛。32

A consistent interpretation of Lin-chi at this point would see the “knots” which he unites as knots in the understanding of some individuals resulting from the naive propensity discussed above. It was said that some ‘simple-minded’ students empirically search their minds and elsewhere for such entities or states as Buddha(hood) and Dharma — e.g., entities which may be thought to remain constant as some believe the meaning of an identical word must remain constant. Having himself seen through the (D1) semantico-ontological theory, Lin-chi’s teachings can be seen simply as timely, appropriate ‘medicine’ to cure them of their ‘dis-easeful’ seeking. For Lin-chi, as we have seen, since neither of these supposed ‘entities/states’ appear, i.e., manifest themselves as Buddha(hood) or Dharma, neither could ever disappear, and there is nothing such as this to be sought after.

ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF MIND OR MINDS TO LANGUAGE-DEPENDENCE

In what way is (D3) the case? That is, in what manner is language dependent for its significance upon minds of persons?

One possible answer to this question can be eliminated immediately. Lin-chi surely may not be interpreted in such a way that language is thought to be dependent upon minds of persons in the sense that meanings for general terms are to be sought for in constant mental states (ideas, notions, etc.). This would be inconsistent with the interpretation of Lin-chi proposed above as well as with the general tradition of Buddhism with which he was in sympathy. In addition, there appears to be no hint of evidence in the lu in favor of it.

That possibility having been eliminated, there remains an interesting
problem. \(D_3\) is formulated in such a way as to suggest a dichotomous (or pluralistic) state of affairs wherein there is a world which is separate from language—and both are separate from mind or minds, the latter of which is more basic than the previous two. This state of affairs would be problematic in at least two ways. First, it seems quite strange to think of language and mind(s) as not being part of the world. Secondly, Ch'an Buddhism is a sect which is notoriously opposed to any view suggesting an ultimate dichotomy.

The second of these two reasons rather includes the first. Given the second, it would seem quite strange—to Lin-chi as well—for there to be any ultimate separation (pluralism) obtaining among mind(s), language, and the world. Of course, the way in which such a pluralism fails to obtain, given the above analysis, is central to the issue of this section. However, one preliminary point bears noticing. Lin-chi's 'medicine' or 'treatment' (as interpreted above) is proffered in the idiom and for the understanding of those afflicted with the 'dis-ease' it is meant to cure. Their questions and their dis-ease suggest that they are the ones who are compounding entities—such as sacred sayings, exalted states, and the mind that is conscious of such states. Part of the problem just mentioned is that Lin-chi was offering his teachings in the very language understood by those students and which originally lent itself to their pluralistic views.

Further complicating the problem here, it seems obvious that the concept of language, as is our ontology, may be (and perhaps is) dependent on language for its foundation and scope. And, as well, in the same manner in which language is dependent for its nature and foundation upon mind or minds, so the concept (and, in keeping with the above, the nature) of the mind is dependent on language and on mind. There is nothing contradictory about these 'meta-discoveries' although the latter may at least seem paradoxical.

On one side of this paradox it is clear that Lin-chi denies any ultimate, separate, mind. He says, in his primary context of treating students' problems, "The one-mind is already non-existent; you are free in every circumstance." ー心旣無，隨處解脫. 33 Yet, on the other side, there surely remain, even after Linchi's Ch'an-treatment of an illness, some interesting questions regarding the relationship of language to mind(s)—language has not sprung full-formed in a vacuum nor is there a mind (for Lin-chi), the nature of which is independent of the ways in which we speak and think about it.
Unfortunately, one cannot find any evidence in Lin-chi's *lu* capable of being interpreted as relevant to the question with which this section was begun. That is, I find no evidence which could be interpreted as addressing any of the following questions on the role mind plays in the foundation of language. Are elements of language (and the ensuing ontology dependent on them) themselves dependent in the sense of being 'projected' on the world by each individual mind? If so, in what sense; and how would we account for agreement, hence intelligibility, in language forms? Are we to account for such agreement by claiming universal conditions of mind in general, i.e., by claiming a contingent, inductive, psychological fact that all minds (so far) happen to have limited the world in similar (material object, inner state, substance/quality, causally related, etc.) ways?

Or is mind (are minds) involved in the founding of language by virtue of there having been sufficiently universal agreement in judgments for language to 'get started' and continue by virtue of being conventional? Not conventional, perhaps, in the sense of resulting from a vote (at a convention) on the way we will all use the elements of language. Perhaps conventional rather in the sense of being based on general, tacit consent, on a practice of using those elements of language in these and these ways, and not in others? On this latter view, while it is a contingent fact that there is language at all, there remain language-forms which a speaker necessarily must be in agreement with in order to be using language correctly and to be understood.

Or is there some other sense in which language is dependent on mind or minds? Again, I see no evidence which would support interpreting Lin-chi's sayings as being on any side of this issue.

However, I believe there are others of Lin-chi's sayings which at least suggest interesting areas for our consideration which are germane to the general area of the question under consideration. Consider, for example, the following advice of Lin-chi:

If you want to be free of life-and-death, to undress or dress in freedom, then instantaneously be acquainted with the man right now listening to the teaching. [This one has] no form, no characteristic, no cause, no origin, no dwelling place—[yet is] lively and diverse. This one is the foundation of all sorts of activities; [yet] the place of this activity is no place. Search for it and it is more and more remote; seek after this and it is more and more cunning. When you speak of this,
call it “mysterious.” 若欲得，生死去住，脫著自由，即今識取聽法底人。無形無相，無根無本，無住處，活癢發地，應是萬種施設，用處祇是無處。所以，覓著轉遠，求之轉乖，號之爲秘密。34

Here there is a (perhaps aspect of) mind (the ‘man’) described but not in empirical terms, active but not experienced by virtue of its empirical form, characteristics, cause, position, etc.

No experiential qualifications or characterizations apply to this ‘man’; yet, as Lin-chi says elsewhere, if left on its own to “adorn” (literally, “dress”), that is, to categorize and characterize, all things immediately can become characterized.

This you, the one now present and listening to the teaching, what will you do to cultivate this, to give evidence for this, to adorn (dress) this? It is not a thing to be cultivated, is not a thing capable of being adorned. [Yet] if it is allowed to adorn, all things immediately can be adorned. Do not be confused. 若欲得，生死去住，脫著自由，即今識取聽法底人。無形無相，無根無本，無住處，活癢發地，應是萬種施設，用處祇是無處。所以，覓著轉遠，求之轉乖，號之爲秘密。34

For the philosophical Westerner, we seem to have here, as in Lin-chi’s “mysterious” ‘man’, an aspect of mind which makes possible the multifariously natured world as we have it but which itself is not an empirical part of the world.

Unfortunately, I see no evidence in these lu to warrant further interpretation of what the relationship might be between this ‘mind’ (as philosophically construed above) and the dependence of language on mind or minds. Nor is there evidence on either side of the question whether the ‘man’, speculatively brought out above, is ‘active’ by means of forms which are psychological/contingent or conventional/necessary. Does ‘it’ adorn with its own contingent, psychological forms? Or does it adorn with language-forms, which we could discover, perhaps, only by asking transcendental questions (of the form “What makes such and such possible?”)? Or is some entirely other consideration appropriate here?

Whichever of these (or if none) is the case, these speculations are based on an interpretation of Lin-chi’s sayings which undoubtedly is not the only possible interpretation. Whatever way in which one attempts to read Lin-chi, there likely will remain aspects of his ‘medicine’ which defy comparison with Western methods. For example, it is truly a mar-
velous ‘mind’ of Lin-chi which is free to either dress or undress, to either adorn or not adorn. For another, Lin-chi says that the more you search, the more this ‘mind’ retreats; yet he counsels his students to become instantaneously aware of this ‘mind’.

NOTES

An earlier, shorter version of this paper was read at the workshop on “Early History of Ch’an in China and Tibet,” July, 1976, in San Francisco. I would like to thank the participants of that workshop for their stimulating comments on that occasion. Upon presenting a longer draft to the membership present at the 1976 Workshop of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association’s Eastern meeting), I was made aware of a few changes which needed to be made. I would also like to thank those who pointed out inadequacies to me at that time.

1 It is likely that interesting and admirable historical and philological research will continue to be done in the area surrounding Lin-chi’s lu. However, the ‘state of the art’ has already progressed nicely. I am thinking at least of Prof. Yanagida’s collated text, his Japanese translation, and his commentary in notes, which I have utilized in producing the translations which follow. These are all included in Yanagida Seizan, Lin-chi lu (Rinzai Roku) (Kyoto: Kichūdō, 1959).

Another which should not go unmentioned, and which I have also referred to in translating from Lin-chi, is Paul Demièville, Entretiens de Lin-tsi (Paris: Fagard, 1972).

I am relying herein on (what I consider) the fact that however much more interesting historical and philological work will appear in the future, the ‘state of the art’ in Lin-chi studies is at present sufficient for at least one author to lay those other considerations aside and make an attempt at philosophy, for the Western reader, with what already exists—provided “philosophy” be broad enough here to include ‘philosophical therapy’.

Furthermore, I have not chosen, for support of points herein, quotations which were isolated instances. I cannot think of a particular saying of Lin-chi utilized below which does not have at least one companion as to content. I have not bothered, however, to compound these citations on each point—a laborious task which would have made an already lengthy paper cumbersome. If any reader would like to write me for additional supporting quotations for any specific point, I will do my best to supply them.

2 I do not find the difference between the western philosophical concept of nature and the Chinese Buddhist concept of nature (hsing 性) problematic enough in the following context to warrant lengthy analysis herein—though this is an interesting subject for research.

3 Readers of twentieth century philosophy will immediately notice this to be an extremely controversial theory of meaning which some would say implies the existence of a private language. I do not wish to become embroiled in this controversy

4 *How To Do Things With Words* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), throughout. Although Austin eventually abandons his “constative/performative” distinction in favor of the “locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary speech act” distinction, the former is entirely adequate for this point-made-in-passing regarding Lin-chi. An Austinian interpretation of Lin-chi’s point, in terms of the latter threefold distinction, might run as follows. In performing the locutionary act of saying, “That man is awakened,” devotees are (or have been in the past) performing an illocutionary act of revering or venerating. By performing this illocutionary act of venerating, the devotee may expect to succeed in furthering himself spiritually or expect to convince others about the worthiness of the person venerated. Of course, all this need not happen consciously in every or even in any instance. The point is that many may be confused and think that the illocutionary act is one of ascribing a state of mind.

5 See, e.g., Yanagida, p. 113.

6 Ibid.

7 Yanagida, p. 94. “All things of the world or out of the world are nothing [in the respect of] self-nature (Skt. svabhāva) and nothing [in the respect of] nature-brought-about.” 世出世諸法，皆無自性，亦無生性. No self-nature is a standard Buddhist view. No produced-nature resembles Mādhyamika thinking.

8 Ibid., “There are just empty names; elements of language as well are empty.” 但有空名，名字亦空.

9 Loosely, “You readily give recognition to those barriers, names (general terms), and take them as reality.” 你祇見他閑名為實. Ibid.

10 Alternatively, from a more traditional Chinese point of view, this phenomenon could be construed as some form of word-magic. Cf., C. Hansen, “Ancient Chinese Theories of Language,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 2 (1975), p. 246, “Words are seen as exercising a kind of psychological compulsion on the hearer. The word does not just mean ‘I approve of X, do likewise.’ Its use is approval and causally efficacious in getting the hearer to do likewise. This belief in the power of words over human nature was easily enough extended to include Nature writ large and formed the basis in the belief in word magic that is supposedly characteristic of Chinese thought.”


12 Ibid.

13 “… The apparel [element of language] of purity, the apparel of the birthless, the apparel of bodhi (awakening), the apparel of nirvāṇa, the apparel of patriarch, the apparel of Buddha.” 有箇淸淨衣，有箇無生衣，菩提衣，涅槃衣，有祖衣，有佛衣. Ibid.

14 “The world” here would have to encompass everything except the subject, the I, which apprehends world; thereby, ‘inner states’ such as fear, discomfort, etc., would be considered as part of the world. This appears to entail a self/world duality. The discussion below on self will throw light on this topic.

15 Into the worlds of: (1) sensual desire, (2) forms, and (3) formlessness.

16 At least from the time of the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*.  }
It has been suggested that this “veiled Tao-eye” is better referred to as a delusion rather than an illusion. One reason is that ordinary English more customarily allows “delude oneself” than does it allow any analogous verb-object form with a verb related to “illusion.” However, the perusal of a number of dictionaries shows the verb “illude” merely to be rare, shows that there are usages in which clearly a person is responsible for his own illusion, and also shows that “illusion” and “delusion” are nearly synonomous in the sense used in my text. I prefer “illusion” because of the availability of the noun “disillusionment” for use in partially construing “awakening” in Ch’an Buddhism.

I do not mean to sound as though this dependency-phenomenon is restricted to but a few cases. Lin-chi says, “Not yet has the sort [of student] appeared [before me] who was [already] unified and singularly free.” 未有一箇獨脱出来底。Ibid., p. 110. I simply see no reason at present to become embroiled in the issue of how universally this particular malady occurs, if it occurs.

Lin-chi goes on to say about these “dependencies relied upon” that “...[doing this] they fall into causation, etc. ...” 皆是依倚，落在因Ibid.

My translation is intended to follow Yanagida’s Japanese translation, ibid., and to be in keeping with his notes on the passage, ibid., p. 53.

The effects are widespread. We have seen, herein, a number of them. To name a few concepts which have been affected, there are: buddha (hood), patriarch(hood), the distinction between ordinary people and saintly people, the threefold world, and the twelve divisions of the Buddhist teachings. Elsewhere, karma and nirvāṇa (to name just two which come to mind) also feel the sweeping effects of this language-dependent ontology.

The criteria for correctly identifying the latter sort of awakening, then, will lead far beyond someone’s attempting to identify by introspection an inner state known as ‘the Dharma’, ‘Truth’, ‘Reality’, etc. It is likely that the meaning of the word “awakening” is bound up with such criteria. Please see my previously cited article “...Philosophy of Mysticism” in this regard. It is too long a story to begin in this context.

Yanagida, p. 148. The last, four-character phrase of this quotation may be taken as idiomatic for “elements of language,” the phrase by which we have been translating the first and last of the four characters, “names and phrases.”

Yanagida points out that the saying “not one Dharma to give to men” is also used by Té-shan Hsüan-chien 德山宜鑑 in the Ching tē ch‘uan teng lu (The Transmission
of the Lamp). One may see the phrase in the Taiwan edition of that work, *Chüan* 15, p. 92.

33 Yanagida, p. 48.
34 Ibid., p. 72.
35 Ibid., p. 86.
There is a little known and even less understood—especially among English-speaking scholars—tradition in the Ch'an heritage: the use of black and white circles as means for triggering enlightenment. In a tradition that distrusts words, such Ch'an diagrams would appear to be the better carrier of esoteric meanings. A picture does, at times, speak better than a thousand words. The *I Ching* 易經 ("Book of Changes") has long recognized this principle. It says that the sages created the *I Ching*'s basic ideograms, *hsiang 象*, to convey the mystery of change in the universe . . . and appended remarks to them to bring out their fuller meanings. Words are seen as secondary to the forms of the trigrams. A later commentator, Wang Pi 王弼, the Neo-Taoist, went one step further and said: Once the meaning (*i 意*) or the principle (*li 理*) behind the forms is grasped, one can even forsake the forms themselves.¹ Truth is ultimately ineffable and therefore even the use of diagrams should be seen as a means. The Buddhist would hardly disagree. *Paramartha*, the highest truth, is beyond words and concepts. Discourses in words or in diagrams are ultimately skillful means, *upaya*.

Because of this concurrence in outlook, the Ch'an tradition in China slowly adopted a skillful use of diagrams in the transmission of its teachings. Chinese Buddhist interest in the *I Ching* probably began at an early date. The monk T'an-ch'ien, studied earlier in this volume, demonstrated a mastery of this classic at an early age.² A revival of *I Ching* scholarship in the T'ang period is said to occur under the monk I-hsing —行 (683–727).³ I-hsing was a pupil of Subhakarasimha and an aide in the translation of *Mantrayāna* texts under this Indian master. Apparently I-hsing produced some kind of diagram or diagrammatical arrangements, *t'u 圖*, of the hexagrams in the *I Ching*. Unfortunately whatever diagrams I-hsing might have produced have been lost, but it would not be amiss or speculative to suggest that he probably learned the art of distilling esoteric messages of the Buddha-Dharma into simple diagrams from the Indian Tantric tradition.
yantra or the mandala as the carrier of its hidden teachings. In these forms and diagrams, the structure of the mind and the geography of the universe are depicted. Meditation upon the forms would lead to an interiorization of the archetypal patterns and thereby finally to liberation. The Chinese Ch’an tradition acquired this art also and created its own set of sinitic mandalas.

The earliest known case of Ch’an diagrams that has survived to this day is the work of Tsung-mi 宗密 (780–841), a patriarch of both the Hua-yen and the Ho-tse 河澤 (Shen-hui 神會) Ch’an tradition. Tsung-mi’s teacher, Ch’eng-kuan 澄觀 (738–839?), the fourth patriarch of the Hua-yen 華嚴 school, already made explicit references to the parallels seen between the Hua-yen philosophy and the I Ching.\(^4\) The implicit use of the I Ching for the formation of the Hua-yen philosophy was made previously by Fa-tsang 法藏 (643–720), the historic founder and third patriarch of the school.\(^5\) Since I have already dealt with these aspects elsewhere, I will only make passing references to them in the following study of a later and a somewhat different use of diagrams in Ts’ao-tung (Japanese: Sōtō 曹洞) Ch’an.\(^6\)

The Ts’ao-tung Ch’an diagrams are called Ts’ao-shan wu-wei t’u or Diagrams of the Five Positions attributed to Master Ts’ao-shan Pen-chi 曹山本寂 (840–910).\(^7\) They are created by Ts’ao-shan to explain the wu-wei 五位 (Five Positions) doctrine taught by his master, Tung-shan Liang-chieh 洞山良价 (807–869). Ts’ao-shan and Tung-shan were the co-founders of Ts’ao-tung Ch’an which was named after the mountain sites where they taught. Traditional Ts’ao-tung scholarship believes that the diagram, the wu-wei doctrine and Ts’ao-shan’s explanations are symmetrical, that there are no discrepancies between the component parts of “Ts’ao-shan / Wu-wei / T’u”. Sectarian exegeses of the diagrams presume this symmetry and often rely on commentaries from a later period. The major aim of this paper is to introduce the diagrams and their philosophy and furthermore to show that the component parts of “Ts’ao-shan / Wu-wei / T’u” came together through a series of syntheses. The common elements shared by the three notwithstanding, there were innate tensions between them that led to divergent interpretations. Historical innovations, developments and, possibly, corruptions explain the confused scholarship on this tradition and its relative neglect and mistrust by large sectors of the Ts’ao-tung followings. Because of the accumulated load of later traditions upon what I assume to be the more pristine messages of the diagrams, it would be best, in
attempting to disentangle the various strata, to begin with the accepted
legends of its origin in enlightened naivété, and, only then, to trace its
unfolding in a logico-chronological order. Some of the more technical
problems will be assigned to footnotes in order that the discussion be
kept fairly readable.

1. THE 'WU-WEI' PHILOSOPHY OF TUNG-SHAN

The Wu-wei-t'u was thought to be a diagram commentary on the
wu-wei philosophy of Tung-shan. Wu-wei 五位 means "five positions"
or in the verb form "five position-ings." The English translation of
Dumoulin's book, A History of Zen Buddhism, has called it "five
ranks," but this is misunderstanding the original intentions of the
diagrams or the philosophy. Wei 位 is the traditional Chinese cosmolo-
gical and calenderological idea for "space," just as shih 時 would
correspond to the notion of "time". Since Chinese did not have abstract
ideas of Time and Space in manners similar to the West, wei and shih
should be seen preferably in terms of astrological categories, i.e. the
positions of the stars and the phases of the moon. Wei also had socio-
cosmic functions. A person should occupy a "proper position," cheng-
wei 正位 and should be given a "proper title," cheng-ming 正名. The
latter was a philosophical position held by Confucians concerning the
ideal polity (usually rendered as "rectification of names": the father
should be a father, a son should behave like a son, etc.). In the more
metaphysical usage, "occupying a proper position" can imply taking a
proper orientation toward reality. Because there are superior and in-
ferior positions, usually coordinated with yang (superiority) and yin
(inferiority), and because there is in China the ideal of finding the per-
fected harmony between such major and minor positionings, one can
speak of taking a stand in and of the major and the minor position. A
feminine element in a lower position is occupying, in that sense, her
proper position, cheng-wei. The opposite of a "proper position" is a
"biased position," p'ien-wei 偏位. The "bias" can be due to misposi-
tioning, i.e. the superior taking an inferior position, or due to the innate
inferiority of the position, i.e. the yin element in the peripheral po-
sition—proper for her but peripheral nonetheless. These also apply to
the proper/improper positions of yin-yang in I Ching hexagrams.

The wu-wei philosophy of Tung-shan pertains to such "positionings,"
and the full name for it is wu-wei p'ien-cheng 五位偏正, the five pos-
tionings in terms of (different) proper and biased arrangements.
Tradition says that this philosophy originated with Tung-shan, although one legend reports that Tung-shan admitted of receiving it from Yüeh-shan 樂山 (745–828) who at one time studied under Ma-tsu 馬祖 (709–788). The *wu-wei* philosophy was and is regarded as “secret teachings” and the *wu-wei-t‘u*, along with other esoteric diagrams in the Tung-shan tradition are still supposedly being passed down in Japanese Sōtō Zen from masters to their inner circles of disciples. The secret transmission goes back to the legendary transmission of the *wu-wei* philosophy from Tung-shan to Ts’ao-shan. The story goes that when the latter finally decided to leave his master, he was told to return at midnight. At midnight, the *wu-wei* philosophy was transmitted to him. The *Hsien-chüeh* 顯訣 was compiled by his disciple Hui-hsia 惇霞 and the third-generation student Kuang-hui 廣輝 commented on it such that the existence of this teaching was made public.9 Like the transmission of the Dharma from mind to mind through the Ch’an patriarchs, this secret teaching in Ts’ao-tung Ch’an defies historical verification for it had not been intended to be objective or publicly knowable. There have been sceptics now and in the past, within and without the Ts’ao-tung tradition, who questioned the alleged origin of the *wu-wei* philosophy. The *wu-wei* philosophy is not evident in the public and private teachings of Tung-shan’s teaching as recorded in his *Yü-lu* 語錄, and some versions of this *wu-wei* philosophy are too sophisticated to be dated back to Tung-shan himself. However, the *wu-wei* philosophy was associated always with Tung-shan by name and it is not impossible that the germs of that philosophy had their roots in this mid-ninth-century figure. One might feel that the overt *I Ching* philosophy in the *wu-wei* ideology should be dated to Sung when a new era of *I Ching* speculation surfaced and became public.10 The more elaborate of the *wu-wei* philosophy does have this “Neo-Confucian air” as one critical commentator within the tradition charged. However, like the *T’ai-chi-t‘u* 太極圖 (Diagram of the Great Ultimate), the *wu-wei-t‘u* too might have an invisible root leading back to the T’ang era and to Buddhoh-Taoist circles. It is not inconceivable that the *wu-wei* p’ien-cheng philosophy had its roots in T’ang, for another Ch’an treatise, the *Ts’an t‘ung ch‘i* 参同契 attributed to Shih-t’ou 石斗和上 (d. 790), was clearly built upon the *I Ching* and made explicit use of the (p’ien-cheng) hui-hu (偏正) 回互 paradigms.11 At this stage, it would be advisable to accept the legendary beginnings and then to isolate out the more primitive from the more differentiated versions of the same philosophy.
The teachings of the *wu-wei* philosophy are found in three key texts attributed to Tung-shan and often appended to the *Yu-lu* of either Tung-shan or Ts'ao-shan as independent treatises. They are

1. **Tung shan wu wei hsien chieh** 洞山五位顯訣
   (Exoteric Verses explaining the [esoteric] Five Positions) henceforth abbreviated as *Exoteric Verses*; this seems to be the simplest of the three treatises.\(^1\)

2. **Tung shan wu wei sung (sui wei sung)** 同山五位頌 (逐位頌)
   (Verses on the Five Positions), henceforth—to avoid confusion—referred to as *Three lined Verses*, because the verses are in three lines to each position; this seems to be fairly intricate especially due to the hidden meanings of the verses.\(^2\)

3. **Pao chien san mei ke** 寶鏡三味歌
   (Samādhi Song of the Treasure or Jewelled Mirror), henceforth referred to as *Samādhi Song*; this is the *locus classicus* of the *wu-wei* philosophy and much cited in any explanation of the *wu-wei* philosophy. However, this is also the most sophisticated and is suspected to be a later-day summation of the simpler *wu-wei* philosophy.\(^3\)

Although it is not impossible that the genius of Tung-shan might have created the *Samādhi Song* and only later generations of lesser minds came finally to understand the message, in our ‘logical’ (perhaps more than ‘chronological’) search for the seeds of the *wu-wei* philosophy, we would place this item last. Having stated that, we also have to begin our discussion with it because it is also the most structured of the three.

The mystery of the *wu-wei* is supposed to be hidden in these six lines found in the midst of this short treatise:

```
如如變象 像正入天六味
如如盡成 金剛草成三

Six lines in [the hexagram] *chung-li* (double [trigram] *li*) *P'ien-cheng* (the proper and the biased) *hui-hu* (interchange) Pile [them] up and there are three (patterns) When the transformations are completed, there are five (patterns) It is like the *chih* grass with [five] tastes (And) the (form of the) *vajra* (diamond rod).
```

To the uninitiated, these six lines are a mystery. Even among the in-
iated and the scholars of this tradition, the exact meaning of the lines is far from clear. Some consensus does exist, and I will report it as it is. The chung-li hexagram refers to this hexagram in the I Ching:

```
[3 3 3 3 3 3]
```

Basically this is a duplicate of the li trigram, i.e. [3 3 3 3 3 3]. The hexagram has six lines, and traditionally they are counted from the bottom up (as marked in above diagram). The yin and the yang lines, that is, the broken and the unbroken lines, go through a dialectical interchange in the six positions (line-positions) that they occupy. The Samādhi Song hints that elements of these changing yin-yang combinations can be "heaped" one upon another (in some fashion) to produce three new patterns. Then, when the yin-yang changes are exhausted, that is, when the momentum of Change implied in the hexagram is finally let to evolve to a state where there are no more hui-hu ("exchanges") possible (between yin and yang), then there would have been a total of five patterns. These five patterns are then supposed to be the wu-wei at the heart of the Tung-shan's esoteric teaching.\(^{15}\)

The chih grass is said to have five tastes, although in essence it is only one plant. The poetic reference to it is to underline the integrity of the chung-li hexagram: the union of the five evolutions from the one hexagram. The vajra, perhaps the most powerful of Buddhist paraphernalia, is like this:

```
[3 3 3 3 3 3]
```

It is shaped in such a way that the middle is shorter than the two ends. And this is—and I like this interpretation more than others\(^{16}\)—a subtle reference back to the li trigram [3 3 3 3 3 3]: the two yang ends enclosing the "shorter" (that is, weaker, broken) yin line in the middle.

Even if we do not know what Tung-shan was aiming at and are not sure how and why the five positions should be derived from the chung-li hexagram or what these have to do with Ch’an enlightenment and Buddhisthood, we can at this stage appreciate the ingenuity of these six mysterious lines. One classical evolution of the five patterns from the hexagram is based on this philosophy. Lines 2, 3, 4 and 5 are chosen as the "changeable hidden patterns." This, in one sense, is a logical choice,
for lines 1 and 6 (the bottom and the top lines) are sometimes considered as the “beginning” and the “end” of the hexagram, and in that sense they are the temporal (shih 時) lines more than the spatial (wei 位) lines. The sequence of metamorphosis according to the internal dynamism of this hexagram is then as follows: lines 2, 3 and 4 produce one trigram; lines 3, 4 and 5 another; piling these two on top of one another (as dictated by the Samādhi Song) will generate two hexagrams; together with the original chung-li hexagram, a total of five patterns, exhausting the combinations, are then set down:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>三 三 重離</th>
<th>重離</th>
<th>sun</th>
<th>sun</th>
<th>tui</th>
<th>ta-kuo</th>
<th>chung-fu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>三 三 順</td>
<td>順</td>
<td>大過</td>
<td>大過</td>
<td>大過</td>
<td>大過</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are the wu-wei. And in that complicated I Ching commentary philosophy (that I would spare the reader), the various patterns can be said to reflect a cosmo-psychic state. All I Ching hexagrams and trigrams have such spiritual functions, and an endless pious commentary on these can be produced for the devotee.

Because Tung-shan’s Samadhi Song never dictated how the transformations of the inner yin-yang powers should be processed, there are other versions possible. To me, a much more sensible one is the following. By selecting lines 1 and 2 or 2 and 3 (which is identical with 4 and 5, 5 and 6) in the hexagram, the basic bi-grams of “lesser yin” — 小陰 and “lesser yang” — 少陽 are evolved. Adding to these two bi-grams the yin and the yang options, the four basic sets of trigrams evolve:

| 三 三 離 | 離 | 離 | 離 | 離 | 離 | 離 |

Since the li trigram is already in chung-li, only the three new forms on the right are considered to be three produced by the “piling up”. These three and the earlier two are then considered to be the “five” patterns mentioned in the poem. Changing the appropriate lines in the above four trigrams (from yang to yin), all four can end up being this trigram 三 三 坤. At this time, the dynamic powers buried in the original hexagram are exhausted. The evolution ends. The pattern is “dead” or finalized, and the hui-hu (yin-yang) interchange process comes to an end.

Like much of I Ching philosophy in the past and in our days, such transformations (i 易, change) carry with them an innate charm and an addict of the I Ching can find infinite patterns in the simple binary combinations and transformations in this ancient classic. The sceptic
might wonder what such “language (or sign) game” has to do with gaining liberation. The insider who feels himself transformed by these Chinese yantras perhaps feels no need to answer, However, there had been a long tradition of sceptics within the Ts’ao-tung tradition, who, though fully recognizing the authority of these wu-wei mysteries, found their contemporaries so steeped in the “scholasticism” and so divided by opinions that they forsook this sacred tradition. Dōgen 道元 in Japan for one did not subscribe to it and the wu-wei philosophy has generally fallen into ill repute and is ignored. Few of us would associate Ts’ao-sung Ch’an (Sōtō Zen) with this intellectualist enterprise, but there is no doubt that the wu-wei philosophy was at one time a living ‘rational’ part of this Ch’an tradition. In a way, the anti-intellectualism of Ch’an is representative of the later Ch’an iconoclasts. The early Ch’an mystics often did not rule out the intellectual enterprise in one stroke. In the following section, I will try to find the golden mean and perhaps revive the “better” intentions of the wu-wei philosophy, with a minimal of later scholasticism.

Why is the double li hexagram chosen? This question is important because the choice by Tung-shan could not have been accidental. The trigram li has always been regarded with awe, because along with the trigram kan 离, it makes up the two most stable yin-yang combinations possible. Kan and li are the ruling dynamic forces in the universe as it is operating now (hao-t’ien 後天, natura naturata.) They occupy the key top and bottom positions in the circle known as the Diagram of the Later Heaven, also produced in the Sung period out of inspirations existent already in Han I Ching scholarship. The pure yang 离 and the pure yin 离 trigrams are actually less important in the on-going operation of change because they are “dead” and “unchangeable” as pure types. They belong to the primordial universe (hsien-t’ien 先天, natura natura) and to the Diagram of the Former Heaven—a static diagram. That Ts’ao-tung Ch’an should have chosen li, one of the two key trigrams, seems logical. The question remains: Why li and not kan?

Various explanations have been offered, but the best one in my opinion is that li 離 is the trigram for the mind, hsin 心 and enlightenment, ming 明. For a Buddhist tradition that emphasized “pointing to the mind of men (such that in) seeing their (buddha-) nature they would be enlightened,” the choice of the trigram li could not be better. Perhaps, there is another hidden reason which, as far as I know, has not been noted before. Li 離 means literally “departure from,” “freedom from,”
etc., and the concept of *li-nien* 離念—its root being in the *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* 大乘起信論—had been central in the formative years of the Ch’ān tradition, as Zeuschner’s essay above has shown.\(^{21}\) That the Ts’ao-tung Ch’ān tradition actually played on the *double entendre* of the trigram *li* and the literal meanings of *li* will be demonstrated later in this essay. Finally, the *li* trigram is an appropriate picture of the mind and may even hold the key to better understanding the Ts’ao-tung Ch’ān tradition that had been derided by Lin-chi opponents in the past and now. The Ts’ao-tung concept of *mind* is not that of a passive mind, but a passive mind in dynamic function. The central line in the trigram *li* is passive (*yin*) and this is the ruling *cheng-wei* in the trigram. However, out of this passive core evolves the dynamic total *li* trigram with active (*yang*) lines above and below. The *li* trigram in fact is the trigram for the element fire 火\(^{22}\). The message then seems to be: at the heart of the most dynamic functionings of the mind is the passive core. Capture this passive core and utilize its dynamic possibility and the world is in your hand. This message, I think, is not incongruent with the philosophy of meditation as a whole and with the Ch’ān meditative philosophy especially. The condemnation of Ts’ao-tung Ch’ān as “quietistic” by the “dynamic” *kung-an* Ch’ān tradition is unjust.\(^{23}\) A more sympathetic understanding of the Ts’ao-tung psychology would permit us to see the hidden meaning in T’ien-t’ung’s 天童 (1091–1157) acceptance of Ta-hui’s 大慧 (1089–1163) polemical characterization of Ts’ao-tung Ch’ān as *mo-chiao-ch’ān* 默照禪 (Japanese: *mokushōzen*), the Ch’ān of Silent Illumination. Indeed, it is the Ch’ān of Silent Illumination: the silent passivity belongs to the core of the mind, but the active illumination is the *yang* function of this same mind. Within fire (*yang*) is the *yin* element.\(^{24}\)

If the choice of a native symbol, the *li* trigram, to represent a Buddhist insight originated from India, is judged valid and creative, we can go on to ask: What is the philosophy behind the *wu-wei* positionings? In what sense was it too a subtle and legitimate synthesis of Indian Buddhist thought and Chinese native cosmology? For that answer, we will turn to the *Exoteric Verses* translated below:

```
是就正
圆偏位
偏得偏
```

(In) the Proper Position but there is Bias (still). Relying on the Biased, understanding is (still) possible. Thus are perfected two meanings.

Although the Biased Position is biased. Yet still are perfected the two meanings. Amidst (worldly) conditions, understanding is possible. Thus is there, within words, the non-word.

Or there are (those) coming from amidst the Proper Position: (Here), within the non-word, are words.

Or there are (those) coming from amidst the Biased Position: (Here), within words, there is non-word.

Or there are (those) coming from Both Positions: Here you do not say "there are words" or "there are no words". The message is elliptic, but at least these "exoteric" verses give some idea to the "esoteric" meanings of the *wu-wei*. There are two clues. The reference to the use and non-use of words points to (Indian) Madhyamika dialectics. The reference to the proper and the biased position points to what I would relabel as the "major" and the "minor" perspective on reality, and they can, with some care, be associated with the perspective of the Two Truths, the supramundane and the mundane, the locus of wisdom and of compassion. The final goal in the progres-
ision of the five positions (that one can take vis à vis reality) is definitely
the harmonization of the proper and the biased perspective, that is, to
wit, “seeing things from both sides” in such a way that all imperfections
vanish and even the distinction between word and silence—nay, even
the dialectical paradoxes of words-in-silence or silence-in-words—is
transcended. I will paraphrase the wu-wei liberally, in categories more
familiar to the Buddhist scholar steeped in the Indian perspective, and
show again how the Chinese cosmology had not betrayed the message
of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamika:

Proper Position: One might have attained the “proper perspective”
of seeing universal emptiness (śūnyatā) but in being fixated with this
transcendental norm, one unknowingly allows nihilistic “bias to exist
still.” All discursive knowledge depends on mundane logic, and
therefore one must “rely on the biased (lower knowledge),” for it too,
properly used, “can make understanding possible.” In short, perfect
understandings can be gained from both perspectives: the universal
emptiness and the secular particulars.

Biased Position: Although one may still be in samsāra and not fully
enlightened, yet the two paths of enlightenment—through the partic-
ular realities and through universal emptiness—have not been ex-
cluded. By understanding the limitations of our conditioned existence
through the very tools provided by its mundane discursive logic,
higher prajñā can be made available. In that case, the use of language
or of words should be such that the ineffable truth be contained.

note: The above two positions are approaching Truth from two in-
dependent arenas; in the next two positions, we find attempts
to synthesize two sides of the same truth-perspective.

Coming (toward Final Enlightenment) from the Proper Position: If you
approach Truth from the Absolute side, silence—the domain of the
ineffable—alone is instructive. Coming (toward Final Enlightenment)
from the Biased Position: In the realm of the Relative, relative words
must be used again to evoke the Absolute Silence.

Coming (toward Final Enlightenment) from Both Sides: Even the dis-
tinction between the Absolute and the Relative, silence and the word,
nirvāṇa and samsāra has to be abandoned. See it as it is, tathatā. The
unitive vision will dominate.

Interpreted in this way, the wu-wei philosophy can be seen as the trans-
formation of the Madhyamika dialectics into a yin-yang, or “host-client”
(pin-chu 賢主), dialectics. The only nominal difference is that the Chinese
scheme assumes that the perfect reality, harmonizing the yin and the yang, should be “approached” through the major (host) as well as the minor (client) perspective. The union of samsāra and nirvāna is best “seen” when a person zigzags through the samsaric and the nirvanic “position” until he spiritually comprehends both in his being. At that final harmonizing stage, he attains the wholesome insight.

The Exoteric Verses paraphrased above, when compared with the Samādhi Song, is clearly much simpler and to the point. The five positions given in the Verses are also fairly simple. However, traditionally, the wu-wei are not aligned to these five in the Verses but to a more elaborate set of five found in the Three-lined Verses. The two sets are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exoteric Verses (simple)</th>
<th>wu wei</th>
<th>Three-lined Verses (involved)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proper</td>
<td>正</td>
<td>1 Bias within Propriety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased</td>
<td>偏</td>
<td>2 Propriety within Bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming from Proper</td>
<td>正中來</td>
<td>3 Coming from Proper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming from Biased</td>
<td>偏中來</td>
<td>4 Approaching from Bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coming from Both</td>
<td>兼帶來</td>
<td>5 Arriving amid Both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly the latter set is more intricate and more dialectical in structure. It begins the series not with a relatively pure set of the “proper” and the “biased” but with a more complex one already involving a combination. Furthermore, instead of using the one term, lai 來, “come,” for the last three stages, the Three-lined Verses uses a progressive set of lai 來 “come,” chih 至 “approach,” and tao 到 “arive.” The verses used to describe this more dynamic set are also more complicated. (They are excluded in the present study because of space and the innate difficulties in the language.) I share Ui’s opinion that the Three-lined Verses were produced at a later date, and think that in introducing the lai-chih-tao sequence, it incorporated a temporal (shih 時) element that was absent in the original’s relatively pure spatial (wei 位) philosophy. This temporal element is in my opinion technically difficult to convey through diagrams, and departs from the simpler understanding of wu-wei in Ts’ao-shan’s commentary.

2. THE ORIGIN OF THE WU-WEI-T’U: TS’AO-SHAN’S UNDERSTANDING

If the wu-wei philosophy has always been associated with Tung-shan,
the actual diagrams have always been thought to have been created by Ts’ao-shan. However, to be exact, Ts’ao-shan created the *wu-hsiang*, 五相 the five “forms,” a set of five circles, but they have always been thought to be depicting the *wu-wei* and thus traditionally considered to be the *wu-wei-t’u*. For the sake of historical clarity, we should separate out the *wu-hsiang* and the later assumption of it as *wu-wei-t’u*. Not only might the *wu-hsiang* not be originally affiliated with the *wu-wei* scheme in the *Exoteric Verses* and the *Three-lined Verses*, it is also technically very difficult to see how they are representations of the elusive *I Ching* trigrams and hexagrams derived from the *Samādhi Song*.27 If we look at the *Yü-lu* of Ta’so-shan, we find few of the *I Ching* elements but instead, a still different set of *wu-wei*—and all these in one and only one passage in his collected sayings.28 The passage is translated below. The reader would note a new element: the alignment of the *wu-wei* with the *chün-ch’ en* 君臣 (Lord and Vassal, a virtual synonym of host and client, *pin- chu* 賓主) scheme. This new alignment apparently originated with Ts’ao-shan.

A monk asked concerning the *wu-wei* chün-ch’ en (the Five Positions of Lord and Vassal). The master explained, “The proper position is the empty realm, where there is originally nothing. The biased position is the realm of forms [rūpadhātu], full of myriad things. Bias-within-propriety is ‘turning one’s back to the (universal) principle (li 理) in accommodation to (particular) facts (shih 事).’ Propriety-within-bias is ‘abandoning the particulars and (re) entering into the universal.’ Carrying both (options; chien-tai 悉帶) is ‘responding mysteriously to myriad conditioned (existence) without falling into (such) particulars’ (in a state of) being ‘neither impure nor pure, proper nor biased’; this is called the vacuous, dark Great Way, the true principle of nonabiding [i.e. nirvāṇa as non-abiding]. I follow former superior masters29 who proposed this position. It is most mysterious and should be well comprehended. Now, the Lord represents the proper and the Vassal the biased. Lord-facing-vassal is bias-within-propriety. Vassal-facing-lord is propriety-within-bias.30 Harmony of Lord and Vassal is ‘carrying both.’ ”

The monk: “What is Lord?”

The master: “Mysterious virtue filling the universe.
  Lofty understanding spanning the void.”

Question: “What is Vassal?”
The master: “Spirited activity spreading the Way of the Lord. True wisdom benefiting all sentient kind.”

“Question: “What is Vassal-facing-lord?”

The master: “Without falling into particulars (Vassal) looks up steadily at the Lord’s countenance.”

Question: “What is Lord-facing-vassal?”

The master: “Mysterious countenance immobile (His) light shines with no bias (p’ien 偏).”

Question: “What is Harmony of Lord and Vassal?”

The master: “Inner and outer fused Superior and inferior harmonized.”

The master further noted that the talk about Lord and Vassal, proper and biased is for the purpose of not violating the Mean (Middle Path). “The Vassal addressing the Lord avoids improper language. This is the essence of my teaching.”

The master then composed the verse:

Student should first understand the principle. Don’t confuse the True Essence with the stubbornly-adhered-to Void. Know the enlightened essence and you know the many fallacies. Your power depends on meeting all conditions without harming the Mean. Teach and speak directly, nothing can burn (the Truth). In your hidden actions, be one with the sages of old Selfless, but active, transcend the deviant ways Selfless and actionless, attain the final goal.

The master then created the wu-hsiang. [I will use here one version of the five circles and suspend discussion on variants at the moment.]

The white-clothed (layman or literatus) should revere forms (or, ministers).

This matter is nothing to be surprised at.

The (military) well-gowned (officials) with illustrious lineage
No need to lower their noses (or, bodies).
Chaos hides principle (li) and fact (shin).
Imperial order leaves (li) behind the light (or, is hard to understand).
Authorative voice is unknown to the king (or [Buddha as] the king with the Lion’s Roar is not yet enlightened).
Can Maitreya be awake?

Ts’ao-shan’s prose explanation of the *wuwei chun-ch’ên* was fairly
intelligible even in translation. The first section aligns Lord with Emptiness, Vassal with phenomenal particulars. The Lord looking up to the Vassal means that the universal is corrupted by the particular. To counteract this, the Vassal should in reverence look up to the Lord, that is, abandon once more the particular in preference for the whole. The Lord and Vassal in harmony produces the union of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, form and emptiness. The Middle Path is attained. One finds the non-abiding nirvāṇa ("nirvāṇa as not grasping onto anything as the absolute"). Put another way, the Lord is wisdom and the Vassal is compassion. The Lord needs the Vassal and the Vassal needs the Lord. Śūnyatā and upaya, prajñā and karuṇa, must complement one another. The bodhisattva acts in the world and when action ceases, he rejoins the nirvanic cool. Nothing in Ts’ao-shan’s explanation requires a knowledge of the I Ching. The wu-wei is simply the art of shifting one’s perspective in order to attain the perfect vision.

With the wu-hsia̍ng and the accompanying verses, there arrive greater difficulties. The diagrams are mysterious and the verses are even more so. What is perhaps most peculiar are the appearances of the word li (the same word as the basic trigram analyzed before) in three of the five verses (depending on editions)! Verse number 3 talks about “ice amidst burning flame”—a subtle reference to the li trigram: 三三. Since Chinese poets are good jugglers of words, these overt and covert appearances of li must somehow point back to the trigram li of the I Ching and therefore to some trigram mysticism originating in Tung-shan. (It is strange that li is absent in the first verse, although there might be a reason for it.48)

The wu-hsia̍ng verses have received detailed commentary but I will attempt a simple explanation correlating the verses to the five circular diagrams and to the chūn-ch’en explanations that went before. This is apparently the earliest correlation, followed by Kuang-hui 廣輝; the wu-wei was then wu-men 五門 and the wu-hsia̍ng was also wu-p’ien 五篇.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lord</th>
<th>Proper</th>
<th>〇</th>
<th>三三</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vassal</td>
<td>Biased</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>三三</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord-face-Vassal</td>
<td>Bias-in-Propriety</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>三三</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassal-face-Lord</td>
<td>Propiety-in-Bias</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>三三</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord-Vassal Harmony</td>
<td>“Carrying Both”</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>三三</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth column has been added to show what a naive transcription
of the wu-hsiang into the I Ching diagrams would be like.\textsuperscript{49} It should be noted that because of the central position given by Ts’ao-tung Ch’an to the yin in li, the Lord or the Proper position is traditionally associated with yin and not the usual yang, i.e. with black and not white.\textsuperscript{50}

1:  
\textbf{正位 君}  
The Proper Position: Lord (black, yin) above and Vassal (white, yang) below—propriety is in the major position. 
The verse says in effect: “The common people naturally worship phenomenal forms, but [in one version] the Lord with wisdom would know better how to dispense with common discursive language and stop listening to words” ['drop nose’ may be a pun; the Chinese for “not able to smell” is the same for “not listening/heeding” 不聞].

2:  
\textbf{偏位 臣}  
The Biased Position: Bias (white) in the superior position, a reverse of the above—Vassal on top of Lord. 
The verse may be saying, “During initial enlightenment [both early hours and dawn refer to light and awakening], one must recognize the dialectics of proper and biased position and lord-vassal dynamics. The initiate, however, is apparently fixated with nirvāṇa (represented by Maitreya’s Tuṣita heaven) and is not ready to leave that Hinayāna goal behind (“not yet departing” from it.)\textsuperscript{51} This orientation is biased. In order to correct it, the person is recalled to the opposite pattern: black-on-white (“black chicken on snow”)."

3:  
\textbf{正中却偏位 君視臣}  
The Bias-in-Propriety Position: Lord-faces-Vassal or black being encircled by white; the particulars have an upper hand. 
The verse begins with the li trigram (“ice within fire”) and is followed by three other impossible paradoxes. The paradoxes point to the paradox of nirvāṇa is in samsāra, with the focus being given to particulars (“fire, willow, ox, horse”). What is needed as a corrective is the countervision: samsāra is (in) nirvāṇa.\textsuperscript{52}

4:  
\textbf{偏中却正位 臣視君}  
The Propriety-in-Bias Position: Vassal-faces-Lord or the particulars being absorbed into a universal emptiness. 
The verse depicts the next spiritual ascent. The person has attained preliminary enlightenment (“imperial palace is gained”) but in the exuberance of the moment, the person forgets to return as a bodhisattva to the sentient world (“white rabbit fails to leave [behind
its home, the moon, symbol of enlightenment and represented here by the white circle[)".\(^{53}\) If he has taken up the bodhisattvic career, then ‘effortlessly’ he can save by not-saving.\(^{54}\) Since he has not taken that step, the “tally of no-effort” has not been won. But it is not too late; the Buddha can and should rejoin the samsaric path of men and the spirits.

Note: this corrective in 4 should not be confused with a similar but lower reminder in 2.
5. • 相兼帶來位 君臣道合
The verse affirms the use of a black circle (“chaos” is dark and “li ming” leaves behind the light). The person has abandoned his home in nirvāṇa and learns to abide everywhere (nonabiding nirvāṇa). The last two lines might be Ch’an irony: either they are saying that the achievement is beyond kingly but not Maitreya comprehension or they can be translated to read “The king is not enlightened and Maitreya is still asleep.” That is, abandon ‘enlightenment’ itself!

If the above exegesis seems plausible, it is in part because the language of the poem is such that there is certain leeway given to me the commentator. A critical examination would raise questions. For example, why should Lord be associated with yin superiority in 1 but with a blank yang circle in 4? Pandora’s box is opened once a person investigates all the minor details, and the question of whether my simple alignment of the three elements—the wu-wei, the chūn-ch’ en and the wu-hsing—does not assume a symmetry that never existed becomes very real. Furthermore, there is the difficult issue of variant circles.

3. A SERIES OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
a. Variants of the ‘Wu-hsing’
The five circles we used above is only one version in the Taishō. Even just the Taishō has a second version □ □ ○ ○ □\(^{55}\) in which both circles three and four are blank. There are many more variants, some created by redactors who were, in my opinion, too clever for their own good. For example, one version produced this sequence instead □ ○ ○ □ ○ □\(^{56}\) using the “crescent-moon” motif taken possibly from Tsung-mi. Others were forced by the later doctrinaire alignment of the circles with trigrams to produce a “one-third/two-thirds” division like this pair for 1 and 2: □ --- and□ ---.\(^{57}\) Still others had a good point,\(^{58}\) for example,
this  for the fifth circle, as we will see later. The basic options in the more authentic transmissions are these two versions for the fourth circle found in two Sung texts:

- in Sung monk, P’u-chi compiled 五燈會元. 
- in Sung monk Chih-chao 嶽嚴智昭 compiled 人天目 (also Hui-hung 普濟 僧寶傳)

Dumoulin uses the latter in his book on Zen Buddhism, and it is not difficult to see how, if this is the original figure, it could have been corrupted into a blank circle in the copying process: the broader outline was “mistaken” as a simple thin line, and the circle was thus simplified. It is more difficult to explain the reverse corruption of  into . However, finding the right version is more complicated than this, because a whole set of structural relationships has to be considered.

In favour of the blank fourth circle: The poem accompanying the 五象 is the closest circumstantial support there is. The fourth verse supports the use of a blank circle. The fourth stage is “pure enlightenment” or wisdom without compassion, i.e. emptiness. And the rabbit that lives in the moon (according to Chinese folklore) fails to leave behind this circle-moon and its light. The white circle is a good antithesis to the fifth black circle that represents “chaos” and “departure from light” as well as the “unknowing” king and the “yet unawaken?” Maitreya. Structurally, this would mean pitting circle 4 against circle 5, just as circle 1 and circle 2 are set up as opposites. In this case, circle 3 (the hidden li trigram circle:  is given the key position of being the stabilizing core to the five circles. This is in agreement with one authoritative later rearrangement of the five in terms of the Five Elements:59

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

And if we want to toy with I Ching dialectics, we can have the following evolution of the “three” and the “five” according to the Samādhi Song: From li come (a) and (b), which when piled up, produce (c); (c) transforms itself into (d) and the full yang (d) topples back into its opposite (e).

(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  
This evolution of the “three” and the “five” provides a much better symmetry to the circles’ structures, but it is not the traditional set used.

In favour of the black-encircling-white version: If we align the *wu-hsiang* to anything beyond the accompanying verses, then we have to have circles 1 and 2 in tension, circles 3 and 4 in tension, with the resolution in circle 5, where Lord and Vassal are in harmony and the proper and the biased are being “carried simultaneously.” Then, since the third circle is *li*, the fourth has to be *kan* (〇 ≡). A Hegelian mind would appreciate the dialectics: thesis and antithesis produce a preliminary synthesis (circle three) which in term generates its own antithesis (circle four) leading to the final perfect synthesis (circle five). The following is a simple commentary diagram of my own:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Circle 1</th>
<th>Circle 2</th>
<th>Circle 3</th>
<th>Circle 4</th>
<th>Circle 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mundane world</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is seen as</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>infinity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empty; Ultimate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth as real</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Black/concrete)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute reality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seen in phenomenal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>〇</td>
<td>〇</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emptiness; nirvana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is (in) saṃsāra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phenomenal particulars seen imbedded in the universal reality; saṃsāra is (in) nirvana.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structurally, the first two opposites and the next two opposites both point to the final synthesis. Put the pairs together 〇 + 〇 or 〇 + 〇 and the result is the fifth black 〇 circle. Clearly the second set is a more complex combination of opposites.

If that is the case, a review of the fifth circle is necessary. It is not really then a black circle, but a black-on-white circle except the perfectly overlapping white is invisible. This nuance is not lost to a commentator who created this circle 〇 to preserve the intention:

Traditionally, the fifth circle is depicted as black. However, since the previous four circles use black and white to depict the proper and
the biased, then the fifth should represent the “carrying both.” Why then was the black circle used? If it is purely black, the meaning of “carrying both” would be lost. So I borrow from the ancients and produce this criss-crossing circle ☐ to convey this (coincidence of opposites).\footnote{61}

Which then is the authentic circle? The blank or the white-in-black?

The tentative answer would be: if the circles were wu-hsiang circles the meaning of which was explained in the poems, the blank fourth and the black fifth made perfect sense as they are. If the circles were meant to be wu-wei-t’u, then the second option is the more logical one. Perhaps this answer shows how wu-hsiang were at one time independent of wu-wei. If my simple alignment earlier already poses insolvable problems, the traditional and more complicated alignment has even more problems.

b. Variants in English Translations

One traditional alignment of the wu-wei, the chün-ch’en and the wu-hsiang adds a different twist to the order and the meaning involved. The following is from Dumoulin, who translated cheng (“proper”) with “Absolute” and p’ien (“biased”) with “Relative”:

The Absolute within the relative
The relative within the Absolute
The Absolute alone
The relative-phenomenal alone
The Absolute and the relative

\begin{align*}
\text{𝐜𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐬-𝐜𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠} & : \text{The Lord sees the Vassal} \\
\text{;</chr>esɔːs-kroʊzɛŋ} & : \text{The Vassal turns toward the Lord} \\
\text{stay} & : \text{The Lord (alone)} \\
\text{ലি} & : \text{The Vassal (alone)} \\
\text{私たち} & : \text{The Lord and Vassal in union}\footnote{62}
\end{align*}

Other problems aside, a philological problem is whether cheng-chung-p’ien 正道偏 is “bias within propriety, (relative within the Absolute)” or its reverse “propriety within bias, (the Absolute within the relative).” The issue involves the word chung中(lit. “middle”) and whether it is to be taken as a preposition denoting the location (“in the middle of”) i.e. the relative within the Absolute, or as a verb pertaining to the action of propriety/the Absolute (the proper/the absolute “centering itself”) upon the biased/the relative. The Chinese ambivalence becomes polar opposites in English. Even with the help of the chün-ch’en parallel, it is not easy to decide which would be the more proper reading. (I follow the lead from the Exoteric Verses, i.e. 正位卻偏 \rightarrow 正中偏.) With the greater possibility for mutual illumination through cross-references, the more problems there are also demanding solution. Since it is not possible to
deal with the full tradition of accumulated wisdom (and folly), I will limit myself to focusing on the diagrams and their historical fate.

4. THE ROOT OF THE "WU-HSIANG" CIRCLES

Generally, it is said that Ts’ao-shan’s circles were indebted to the ones used by Tsung-mi. The following is a brief summary of certain circles used by Tsung-mi to explain samsāra (object-realm), the ālayavijñāna (subject-consciousness), the structure of enlightenment and delusion in the latter and how to recover the original enlightenment (pen-chūeh 本覺) in the Mind.63

![Diagram of samsāra cycles]

The gate of samsāra: impurity (black) in phenomena’s basic emptiness (white) qua purity (white standing for suchness, tathatā).

Corresponding human consciousness: the ālayavijñāna in the form of a li-kan circle—li (black sandwiched by white; yang-yin-yang) on the left and kan (the reverse; yin-yang-yin) to the right.

Two aspects of the ālayavijñāna: the enlightenable half (left) and the deluded half (right).

A series of ten circles from “crescent” to “full moon” depicting the spectrum between enlightenment (“moon” white) and nonenlightenment (black; total eclipse).

It would not be difficult to see the archetypes of the wu-hsiang in the above, even if the philosophy behind the use of similar diagrams may not be identical. However, I would insist that Tsung-mi was not concerned with wei (position) but was concerned, in the crescent-moon series, with shih (time; development). Therefore, Tsung-mi’s semicircles were cut in a vertical axis and Ts’ao-shan’s were horizontally divided. The vertical axis permits the logical use of the crescent-phases, ie. 〇 → 〇 → 〇. In this sense, Ts’ao-shan was very different from Tsung-mi. As we have seen, the ‘earlier’ wu-wei philosophy was less concerned with sequence of events, only with the immediate Madhyamika dialectics of opposites. It is in the ‘later’ wu-wei philosophy (repre-
sented by the *Three-lined Verses*) that the temporal sequence of *lai* → *chih* → *tao* was proposed, displacing thereby the simpler trio of *lai* 來 and even the ‘static’ “carrying both” 載帶.64 I would suggest, therefore, that the *wu-wei* philosophy was actually ‘corrupted’ by imitators of Tsung-mi’s use of a temporal sequence, and that the *wu-hsiang* circles were later forced to serve a different function for which they were not intended. One clear result of this trend can be seen in the use of ‘up-and-down’ crescents ☐ ☐ in some commentaries, which, structurally speaking, is questionable.

If the left/right division of a circle did not come from Tsung-mi, it would be profitable to look for another avenue of inspiration. I would suggest that Lin-chi I-hsuan’s theory of “Four Modes of Host Client Relationships” 四賓主 could have influenced Ts’ao-shan’s contribution of *chün-ch’en* *wu-wei* 君臣五位. Host-client is virtually a synonym for *chün-ch’en*, Lord and Vassal. Even the notion of “seeing, confronting” in Lin-chi’s paradigm echoes Ts’ao-shan’s idea of “facing, looking up.” (Later, Lin-chi’ Ch’an adopted Ts’ao-shan’s use of *chung*, i.e. 賓中主 etc.!!)

**Lin-chi**

Client confronts host 賓見主  
Host confronts client 主見賓  
Host confronts host 主見主  
Client confronts client 賓見賓

**Ts’ao-shan**

Vassal faces Lord 臣向君  
Lord faces Vassal 君向臣/視臣  
Lord and Vassal in Harmony 君臣道合

And the dialectics are similar. In the Lin-chi sequence, a novice comes to see his master but in his unawakened state, it is a case of a supplicant confronting his host. A turn-about is to occur. The novice may be able to eliminate his lesser self (client) and find a Higher-Self position (as host). Then in seeing his master again, it will be a case of “mind meeting mind” on par with one another—host meets host at last. (Egoists who never see eye to eye constitute client confronting client.)65 Since client and host are “positions” (wei) in a concrete social sense, and since host should be above (superior) and client below (inferior), it would not be too hard to envision the production of the *wu-hsiang* circles based, not so much on Tsung-mi, but on Lin-chi’s insights or equivalents.66

If that is the case, the *wu-hsiang* circles, in form inspired by Tsung-mi, in substance by host-client dialectics, were never meant to be the pictorial depictions of the *wu-wei* scheme found in the *Samādhi Song.*
Except for a mystique surrounding the *li* 離 trigram for the mind, the *wu-hsiang* circles were not heavily reliant on the intricate I Ching changes. It is only much later that these various themes in Ts’ao-tung Ch’an were brought together and we have then this supposedly logical, but in fact highly problematical, alignment of the adjuncts making up the full *Wu-wei-t’u* philosophy:

**TRADITIONAL CORRELATIONS: *Wu-wei-t’u***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ts’ao-shan wu-wei-t’u</th>
<th>Ts’ao-shan chün-ch’en</th>
<th>Tung-shan wu-wei</th>
<th>Alleged I Ching patterns (2 sets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lord faces Vassal</td>
<td>“Back turned toward principle while accommodating to facts.”</td>
<td>Bias within Propriety</td>
<td>正中偏</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassal faces Lord</td>
<td>“Abandoning the particular and entering into the universal.”</td>
<td>Propriety within Bias</td>
<td>偏中正</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Alone</td>
<td>“Emptiness.” “Mysterious wisdom filling the universe. . . .”</td>
<td>Coming from Propriety</td>
<td>正中來</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vassal Alone</td>
<td>“Myriad things.” “Spirited activity spreading the Way. . . .”</td>
<td>Approaching from Bias</td>
<td>偏中至</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord-Vassal Union</td>
<td>“Responding to myriad conditions . . . without falling into particulars.”</td>
<td>Arriving amidst Both</td>
<td>兼中到</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the influence of a redaction in Sung, one of the *wu-wei* terms (*p’ien-chung-chih* 偏中止) had also been rephrased as “Approaching amidst both” (*chien-chung-chih* 兼中至), and the corresponding circle was given as blank. The unfolding of the *wu-wei* philosophy and the circles in the later period, however, would require a later study.

5. **CONCLUSION: THE EARLY TS’AO-TUNG CH’AN DIAGRAMS**

By the eighth century, the Ch’an tradition in China had become an
established tradition. In rejecting Indian scriptural authority, Ch’an could experiment with insights drawn from the native traditions. In this new atmosphere, Taoist elements, for some time regarded with suspicion, were revived within the Ch’an circle. In Ts’ao-tung Ch’an, there was probably an early mystification of the trigram li as the symbol of the mind and perhaps a simple form of the wu-wei or five-positions philosophy was transmitted from Tung-shan to Ts’ao-shan. However, far from being just native Chinese speculations, these ideas were also carriers of the basic insights of Madhyamika dialectics.

Following the footsteps of Tsung-mi, Ts’ao-shan created his own set of wu-hsiang circles, originally fairly independent of the wu-wei philosophy. He probably used a blank circle for the fourth diagram and the set was fairly well explained by the accompanying verses. However, later association with other schemes necessitated perhaps the redrawing of the fourth into the white-in-black version. Because Ts’ao-shan had already alluded to the li trigram in the verses, the momentum to create a perfect correlation with other schemes was then set up. There are different ways to align the wu-hsiang to the chun-ch’en series and to the fuller wu-wei progression. My own preferences have been to follow the line of direct correlations, but the traditional ways of alignment are more elaborate. Dumoulin’s set given earlier, however, is still ‘static’ compared with the fuller ‘final’ set listed above. The final set incorporated the dynamic temporal (shih) concern traceable to the Three-lined Verses. In the end, the fivefold evolutions from the hexagram chung-li were also brought into the picture, and the Samādhi Song became indispensable as the proper interpreter of the wu-wei-t’u philosophy. However, since there were innate discrepancies between the simpler wu-hsiang structures and the Samādhi Song, the resultant tension led to redactions, developments and perhaps corruptions of the earlier scheme.
DIAGRAM SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE Wu-wei-t’u IDEOLOGY
I Ching

Hua-yen Tsung-mi  
li trigram chosen for mind
Tung-shan  
some form of wu-wei philosophy

Lin-chi’s pen-chu  
Ts’ao-shan’s wu-hsiang hidden  
with li 離 motifs
direct verse commentary

三世慧霞 Hui-hsia  
first synthesis with a white-in-black fourth circle 〇
三世廣輝 Kuang-hui

Verses ed. by Korean  
hui-nian

Samadhi Song  
and speculations

first synthesis and totalistic correlations

full I Ching transformative sequence

further innovations
esp. 慧洪 Hui-hung
元賢 Yuan-hsien
大慧 Ta-hui

critical review of tradition by Japanese monk Siza Kuza (?)
省燈首座 in his 偏正五位圖說 through insight gained 延文
三年戊戌十二月十八日 c.a. 1358 (see Zenshu, p. 252b)
NOTES

1 On Wang Pi’s relationship with Buddhism, see T’ang Yung-t’ung, Wang jih tsa kao 往日雜稿 (Peking, 1975).
2 See pp.65–87. above.
3 Osabe Kazuo 長部和雄, Ichigyō zenshi no kenkyū 一行禅師の研究 (Kobe: Kobe Commercial Uni., 1963).
4 See my “The Significance of Tsung-mi in Late T’ang Intellectual History” (manuscript, 1976).
6 Brief treatment of the diagrams can be found in Heinrich Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism (New York: Random House, 1959; Boston: Beacon, 1963), pp. 112–118.
7 A concise treatment is in Mochizuki Shinkō, 望月信亨 Bukkyō Daijiten 佛教大辞典, IV, p. 3867.
8 A philosophical correlation, not always critical, is that of Chang Chung-yüan, Original Teachings of Ch’ an Buddhism (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 46–53. Diagrams not included. The tradition of wu-wei scholarship has been collected in vol. XIV of Sōdo shō Zenshu 曹洞宗全書 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1930; reissue, 1972), henceforth abbreviated as Zenshu. The most important piece—Pi’ en cheng wu wei t’u-shuo 省繪圖說 、聖宗諸難『偏正五位圖說』(pp. 250–277)—forms the basis for this study.
9 Zenshu, pp. 251–52; Ui Hakuju, 宇井伯壽 Zenshūshi kenkyū III 禪宗史研究 pp. 253ff.
10 See Imai Usaburō 今井宇三郎, Sōdo Eki gaku no kenkyū 宋代易学の研究 (Tokyo Meiji, 1958).
11 From said text: 門門一切境、回互不回互、回而更相涉、不爾依位住。
12 In Ts’ ao shan Yü lu in Taishō Daizōkyō (henceforth T.) 47, no. 1987 A and B [two editions], pp. 531bc or 541c–42b.
13 In Tung shan Yü lu of T. 47, no. 1986B only, p. 525c and not in Japanese edition (1986A); also in Ts’ ao shan Yü lu as appendix, ibid., pp. 532c–33b or 542bc.
14 On pp. 515ab or pp. 525c–26a, in Tung shan Yü lu.
15 Ibid., p. 515a or p. 526a.
16 Others simply took it as a symbol of wisdom; see Zenshu, p. 32b.
17 This is the sequence used by Mochizuki, op. cit., p. 3867.
19 On a history of I Ching scholarship in English, see Douglass Alan White, “Interpretation of the Central Concept of the I Ching During the Han, Sung and Ming Dynasties,” (Harvard doctoral dissertation, 1976); on the Buddhist use, see Alfonso Verdu, Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought (Kansas: University of Kansas, 1975).
20 Thus the popular yin-yang circle ☈, a tenth century creation, was originally the li-kan circle used by Tsung-mi to depict the alayavijñāna; see p. 250 below. Schuyler Cammann is one American scholar who has worked on the tradition of
diagrams, see for example his "The Magic Square of Three in Old Chinese Philosophy and Religion," *History of Religions*, 1, no. 1 (1961) and other essays.

21 See pp. 131 above. Chung-li might even imply a double negation: abandoning even the desire to abandon.

22 Kan is water; it even looks like the old water pictogram 王.

23 No less than Lin-chi said, "Quiet the mind in samadhi; fix the mind in passive contemplation; arouse the mind to reflect outward; gather the mind to verify inward."

24 Short account in Dumoulin, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

25 T. 47, p. 531bc or pp. 541c–42b; commentaries left out, and in order to underline the *wu-wei*, I have taken slight liberty with the first lines. Final section not translated; it deals with how one should deal with the whole nature of language.

26 T. 47, p. 525c, p. 532c or p. 642bc.

27 *Zenshu*, p. 251b already noted this.

28 T. 47, p. 527a or pp. 536c–37a.

29 *Hsien-te* 先德, perhaps referring to Tung-shan.

30 The order of these last two sentences has been reversed by me for symmetry's sake.

31 Two versions exist: Lord Vassal 向臣 or looks at Vassal 視臣. Chinese etiquette dictates that superiors should not be stared at by inferiors even if the latter is facing the former.

32 Reference here unclear, perhaps it pertains to pre-enlightenment use of language or to student's attitude to the master.

33 Literally, *tsung* 宗 or 'school'—sectarian consciousness existed then.

34 "Stubborn void" is nihilism, blindly holding onto the emptiness idea.

35 I am using T. 47, no. 1987A.

36 "White-clothed" is the traditional Buddhist term for laymen, but it can also mean "scholar, literati"—if so, there might be a contrast with the "military" headwear in the third line. *Hsiang* may be philosophical *lakṣaṇa* or phenomena in general, or it might be an abbreviation for ministers or even, as one Japanese commentary has it, prime minister.

37 Literally this means "No use to talk".

38 T.47, no. 1987B has "nose" which may be a pun (i.e. 不聞) but no. 1987B has "po" (the physical soul) which actually reads better.

39 Literally, "proper position" as discussed in the *wu-wei*.

40 Literally, "Illustrious (bright) propriety (justice) resides with the (ideal) lord and fief (relationship);" I also chose the almost improper reading, matching "dawn" with "early hour" on the (Ch'an) assumption (supported by some commentaries) that this has to be talking about initial enlightenment (*ming*, "dawn" is the word for enlightenment). I must confess and I think the reader would recognize that we are dealing with "mystery poems", the meaning of which is as obvious as it is not obvious—and variant translations are possible. And the commentaries are sheer arabesque.

41 One commentary traced this to some alleged *mantra* in the four-divisioned *pratimokṣa* of the Mahāsanghika?!

42 Depending on two readings of 靜; I prefer pacified.
On moon and rabbit, see later discussion on the word li in the poem.

_T‘ien_ is Chinese "Heaven" but the path of gods in Buddhism.

Chaos in the Taoist sense of the unformed _potentia materia_ before all things came into existence, prior even to differentiation of _li_ and _shih._

Variant; I prefer _li-ming_ 離明 for reasons discussed later.

Can also read "alert/wise" since the Chinese 智 can mean (a)awaken or (b) alert or (c)with wisdom.

The first verse sets the stage for the dialectics to work themselves out; it would not be difficult to introduce _li_ in the fourth line.

The transcription should be self-evident except perhaps for _li_ as (六) ; but _li_ is so depicted (cf. the _yin-yang/li-kan_ circle (九) ). Some clever commentators want a more literal representation (八) - (六) .

The proper position in the trigram _li_ is the _yin_ line in the center.

The Hinayana dualism of _nirvāna_ and _samsāra_ is conveyed by the two semi-circles: (八), whereas the higher syntheses use concentrate circles (六) .

See Chang Chung-yüan, _op. cit._, for a discussion of this selective focus on the particular.

The moon is a common Ch'an symbol of enlightenment to be meditated upon.

"The bodhisattva saves sentient beings; but there is no bodhisattva, no act of saving and no sentient beings."

_T._ 47, no. 1987B.

_Zenshu_, pp. 290ab, rearranged to fit the sequence of the verses.

_Zenshu_, pp. 542b-544b.

_Zengaku Jiten_ 神學辭典 (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1934) gives this (八) for the fifth.

For easy reference, see _Bukkyō Daijiten_, p. 3867. This arrangement was influenced by the Neo-Confucian _T'ai-chi-tu_ and is usually considered by critical scholars to be a corruption, yet it does have a good case. See an even more Neo-Confucian version in _Zenshu_, p. 447a.

Compare this naive reading of mine with the detailed commentaries in the _Zenshu._

_Zenshu_, p. 588.

Dumoulin, _op. cit._

Much abbreviated from _T._

Down to Kuang-hui 康煥 it appears that _chien-chung-tao_ 前中道 was not in use. If so, the _shih_ scheme came after this third-generation Ts'ao-shan figure; see _Ui Hakuju_, _op. cit._, pp. 263–65, on 逐位頌.

Chang Chung-yuan, _op. cit._, pp. 95–97.

Corruption began with Yüan-Hsien 元賢 or Hui-hung 惠洪.

See Introduction above, pp.

For numerous examples, see _Zenshu._

The present study is an extension of my interest in the influence of the I Ching on late T'ang Buddhist thought begun in my Ph. D. thesis; time and energy do not permit me to look into all aspects of the early Ts'ao-tung tradition.
The Ambiguity of the Buddha-nature Concept In India and China

Andrew Rawlinson

This paper has three aims. First, to demonstrate the irreducible ambiguity of what we may very generally call the Buddha’s real or essential nature (as we find it in certain Mahāyāna texts). Secondly, to give an explanation of how this ambiguity arose within the Mahāyāna. Thirdly, to see how the Chinese handled this ambiguity. Since my argument takes some time to unfold, I give a summary straightaway without supporting evidence.

The concept of the Buddha’s real or essential nature is referred to by (or better: rests upon) many different Sanskrit terms - e.g. (tathāgata-) dhātu, (buddha-)gotra, (tathāgata-)garbha, dharmatā, dharma-kāya, buddhatā. Other terms that are closely related are Tathatā, āsraya, prakṛti, prabhāsvara-citta, dharma-dhātu, buddha-jñāna¹. So when we speak of the Buddha-nature (which is how I will abbreviate the more cumbersome ‘the Buddha’s real or essential nature’ from now on), we are tacitly drawing upon some or all of these terms, which have their own ramifications and interrelations, of course. This is a very complex situation and I want to try and clarify it by approaching it from two angles. First, historically, I want to propose that Buddhism in India always had within it three strands which tended to view and understand the Dharma from their own standpoint; these strands are those of śīla, samādhi and prajñā (see p. 262 for details). Secondly, conceptually, I propose a number of what may be called conceptual nets or images (e.g. withinness, foundation, nature/being—see p. 263 for details) that can be applied to the concept of the Buddha-nature, and which (a) tend to hang together as a group, but in addition (b) each of the conceptual nets to a large extent determines the sort of terminology that is used when speaking of the Buddha-nature. Part of my argument is that works like the RGV (and to a lesser degree, the ŚMS) represent a systematization of the different terms (and hence, tacitly, the conceptual nets that give rise to these terms) that were available at the time that the Mahāyāna was growing to maturity.² This period of the Mahāyāna is usually referred to as the
third turning of the Dharma-cakra; it involved a fundamental shift in
the axis of Buddhism which led to a bhedābheda philosophy (i.e. the
Absolute is both distinct and non-distinct from its attributes). Finally,
we look at what the Chinese made of all this. They settled on the term
fo hsing 佛性 to mean ‘Buddha-nature’, but we find that hsing is used to
translate different Sanskrit terms (e.g. prakṛti, gotra, bhāva—see p. 267
for details), and that these Sanskrit terms are themselves translated by
other words than hsing (e.g. i′ 體, shen 身, chen 真, shih 實). In other
words, the inherent ambiguities in the Sanskrit terminology are replaced
by inherent ambiguities in the Chinese terminology. In addition, be-
cause garbha (which nearly always means ‘embryo’ in Sanskrit) is
translated by ts′ang 胎, (= ‘womb’; lit. ‘storehouse’), a certain vacuum
was created in the Chinese vocabulary which the terms fo hsing and fo
hsin 佛心 (= buddha-citta) neatly filled.

To begin with, we shall give the briefest possible account of those
parts of the RGV which are relevant to our purpose. All we need to show
is that the tathāgata-garbha is spoken of in two different ways.

(a) “Suchness that is associated with pollution (samalā tathatā) is said
to be the element unreleased from the sheath of defilements, the tathā-
gata-garbha (dhātur avinirmukta-kleśa-kośas tathāgata-garbha); but
suchness that is not associated with pollution (nirmalā tathatā) is said
to be this same [element] (sa eva) having the mark of the transmutation
of the basis at the Buddha-stage (buddha-bhūmāv āśraya-parivṛtti³-lak-
ṣaṇo), the Dharma-kāya of the Tathāgata” (RGVV 21.8; Tak 187).

(b) On the other hand, a distinction between a pure and an impure
state is not made in other parts of the RGV.

(i) “paramārtha is a synonym (adhivacana) for sattva-dhātu, which
is a synonym for tathāgata-garbha, which is a synonym for dharma-
kāya” (RGVV 2.11; Tak 143).

(ii) “The jina-garbha⁴ is always undefiled in its essential nature
(prakṛty-asamkliṣṭa)” (RGV 26.20; Tak 200).

(iii) “This immaculate element, which in its essential nature is
thought, is all-pervading (citta-prakṛti-vāimalya-dhātuḥ⁵ sarvatra-gaḥ)”
(RGV 41.8; Tak 233).

(iv) “The tathāgata-dhatu cannot be changed (avikāra) by defile-
ment or purification” (RGVV 41.18; Tak 234).

The solution to this paradox is simply that “suchness that is asso-
ciated with pollution is at one and the same time pure and defiled—this
is unthinkable (acintya)” (RGVV 21.17; Tak 188); similarly, “suchness
that is not associated with pollution, though not defiled before, is yet purified afterwards—this is also unthinkable” (RGV 22.5; Tak 188). This is typical bhedābheda (see p. 265).

A further ramification of this bhedābheda position is that the Dharma-kāya has qualities. Thus we read at ŚMS 98: “The Dharma-kāya of the Tathāgata . . . is beginningless, uncreate, unborn, undying, free from death; permanent, steadfast, calm, eternal; intrinsically pure, free from all the defilement-store; and accompanied by Buddha natures (buddha-dharma) more numerous than the sands of the Ganges, which are non-discrete, inseparable from wisdom and unthinkable.” As Ruegg comments (p. 347), this theory is remarkable because whereas a connection between the rūpa-kāya and its attributes is easily understandable, a connection between the Dharma-kāya and its qualities is “certainly more unusual.” The question we need to ask, therefore, is: how did this theory arise? We shall return to this presently (p. 264).

But first I want to give a typical example of the intertwining of concepts that we find in the RGV (before going on to show that (a) this intertwining was the result of the merging of the three strands of Buddhism already referred to, and (b) that the bhedābheda logic of the RGV is an attempt to harmonize these concepts). The passage that follows is a summary of RGVV 41.6–42.4; Tak 233–5 (I have given only those parts that are relevant to this paper): The tathāgata-dhātu, which in its essential nature is thought (cittapraṇāti-vānāyā), is all-pervading—it is like space, the same (sama) and undifferentiated (nirviśisṭa); the Dharma-kāya and the sattva-dhātu are not different (nānya); the tathāgata-dhātu cannot be changed by defilement or purification; in spite of its adventitious faults (doṣāgantuka-yogā) and because of the virtues/qualities that are essential to its nature (guṇa-praṇāti-yogā), the nature of Dharma (dharmatā) remains unchanged (avikārita) before and after [purification]; in the perfectly pure state [which is that of the Buddha, the culmination of pure virtue (guṇa-viśuddhi-nīṣṭhā)], the tathāgata-dhātu, because of its essential nature (prakṛti-yogā) which is to do with [instr.] unthinkable Buddha-dharmas that are nondiscrete, inseparable from wisdom (amukta-jñā) and far greater in number than the sands of the Ganges . . . is like space.

We can see here that tathāgata-dhātu, citta-praṇāti-vānāya and Dharma-kāya are all equated, and that Dharma-kāya = sattva-dhātu. Moreover, tathāgata-dhātu is prakṛti-guṇa [cf. prakṛti-vānāya]-which obviously elides with acintya-buddha-dharma—and also like space, nir-
viśiṣṭa and avikāra.⁸⁹ I do not think it is necessary to emphasize the extreme fluidity and complexity of the RGV any further, and I now want to try and sieve out the basic ingredients that make it up.

THE THREE STRANDS IN BUDDHISM

First, historically, I want to flesh out the statement I made in the first paragraph, that Buddhism has three strands.

1. Śīla. This covers the concepts of purity, merit, achievement by merit; faith, worship, glory. The most obvious Sanskrit terms are viṣuddha, puṇya, guṇa, (buddha-)dharma, vipāka, kuśala-mūla, ratna, pūjā, śraddhā. This strand is primarily concerned with praise of the Buddha and his attributes, and explaining the effect they have (for example, buddha-kṣetra is a śīla concept¹⁰). It is almost exclusively in this context that the terms -samanvagata, -sahita, -upeta, -alamkṛta, etc. (-endowed with’, ‘adorned with’) are used.

2. Samādhi. From the outset, this strand is ambiguous between
   (a) what citta is—and this is itself ambiguous between
      (i) citta in itself: prabhāsvara-citta, bodhicitta
      (ii) citta as a basis for all forms of consciousness: mūlavijñāna, āśraya, bija.¹¹
   (b) manifestations of citta: rddhi, vikurvāna, nirmāna, anubhāva, adhiṣṭhāna, etc.

   The philosophical version of the samādhi strand is Yogācāra. I would maintain that the ambiguity between (a) (i) and (a) (ii) is irreducible and explains the difference between citta-mātra (i.e. everything is citta) and viññapti-mātra (i.e. everything is a false representation imposed on citta).

3. Prajñā. Being, reality; prajñā-pāramitā, buddha-jñāna; (and two secondary concepts that are important in the context of the Buddha-nature): anupalambha and samatā.¹²

I see these three strands as having an inherent tendency to independence, though by the very nature of the case they influence each other all the time. Mainstream Mahayana is, in fact, an amalgam of these three, and only exists because it has amalgamated them. And at least two ways in which this amalgamation/harmonization was attempted were (a) via the concept of the Buddha’s bodies, and (b) the notion of the Buddha’s nature (→ buddha-dhātu, -gotra, -garbha, -tā). The first takes an undifferentiated absolute and splits it up so that it includes everything; the second takes an inner pure essence and expands it to include everything.¹³
Secondly, conceptually, I have found it helpful to break up the notion of the Buddha-nature into the following conceptual nets:

- withinness → inside/hidden/pervades
- foundation → supports
- nature/being → consists in/constituted by
- attribute/property → possesses/endowed with
- state/level → attains/abides at/enters into
- sphere/realm → ditto
- range → reaches/extends

My point is that (a) all these are found in the RGV (i.e. statements about the Buddha-nature are made using all of these basic images); (b) it is not immediately obvious how they are to be related to each other (e.g. (i) just because there is an innate purity within does not necessarily mean that it is the support of that which is not pure; (ii) the Buddha’s range (viśaya) may or may not be an aspect of his nature); (c) part of the uncertainty of the Chinese translations of the Sanskrit terms (which we discuss p. 266) can be explained by the inherent tension (or ambiguity) in the concept of the Buddha’s nature.

But before looking at the Chinese evidence, I want to establish the importance of the śīla strand in the tathāgata-garbha sutras generally, and the RGV and ŚMS in particular.

First, it is obvious that all tathāgata-garbha sutras are concerned with removing kleśa, which is typical śīla-vāda, rather than vikalpa (samādhi-vāda) or avidyā (prajñā-vāda). The nine illustrations of the Tathāgata-garbha-sūtra itself are enough to establish this.

Secondly, the literary setting of both the RGV and ŚMS are typical of buddha-pūjā texts. The very first section of the ŚMS is entitled ‘Praise of the Infinite Merit of the Tathāgata’ and consists of a glorification of the Buddha that would not be out of place in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka. Similarly, both the ŚMS and RGV end with more praise of the Buddha. The ŚMS in fact praises his merit again, while the opening verses of ch. 5 of the RGV are: “The buddha-dhātu, the buddha-bodhi, the Buddha dharmas and the Buddha’s acts are unthinkable even to pure beings, being the [exclusive] sphere (gocara) of the Leaders. But the wise one, his intellect (buddhi) intent on the [exclusive] range (viśaya) of the Jinas, becomes a receptacle of the multitude of virtues (guṇa) [of the Buddhas], and because of his eagerness for these unthinkable virtues, he surpasses the abundance of merit (puṇya) of all beings” (RGV 115.3; Tak 380).
Thirdly, the tathāgata-garbha sutras see the antidote to kleśa as punya or kuśala-mūla, the culmination of which is often expressed in terms of acquiring the buddha-guṇa/-dharmanas. Thus ŚMS 69 says: “There is no end or limit to the merits of embracing the saddharma25. . . the embrace of the saddharmas will perfect all the innumerable Buddha-dharmanas.” In this connection it is worth noting (i) the Lokottaravādin thesis that the Buddha’s body is limitless in three ways: 1. in measure [i.e. size], 2. in number, 3. in cause—i.e. in the kuśala-mūla which serve as causes for the dharmanas that constitute a Buddha;26 (ii) that according to Sthiramati, some explain gotra as having the own-being of wholesome roots (ke cit tac ca gotraṃ kuśala-mūla-svabhāvam iti varṇayanti).27 And I would stress not merely the link between punya/kuśala-mūla and gotra/buddha-dharma, but in particular the fact that the former produces the latter. This is pure Śīla-vāda.

Indeed, the influence of the buddha-guṇa concept was so strong that it even affected the conception of the Dharma-kāya28 which is said to be accompanied by unthinkable Buddha-dharmanas. Now of course it is possible to rationalize the seeming contradiction between (a) the Dharma-kāya is undifferentiated29 and (b) the Dharma-kāya possesses properties (i.e. the Buddha-dharmanas), by making the concept of the Dharma-kāya essentially paradoxical.30 But we may also explain the insistence of the RGV and ŚMS that the Absolute (whether the Dharma-kāya or the Buddha) has properties as the result of the interaction between the śīla strand (which is based on acintya-buddha-guṇa) and the prajñā strand (which says that paramārtha is beyond all attributes);31,32 and further, I would maintain that the paradoxical nature of the Dharma-kāya (or equivalent concept) was engendered by this interaction. In addition, of course, the samādhi strand supplied the prakṛti-prabhāsva-citta concept.33 The result was a multivalent image that covered the whole range of Mahayana ideas (see the conceptual map—‘Some Basic Notions Relevant to the Buddha-nature Concept’—p. 269).

THE SHIFT IN EMPHASIS IN THE MAHAYANA

There is one more factor that we must take into account before seeing how the Chinese understood the idea of the Buddha’s nature, and that is that the Mahayana during the time of the composition of the tathāgata-garbha sutras was shifting on its axis—i.e. it was asking different questions and it needed different concepts in order to answer them.34 I want to approach this third turning of the wheel of the
Dharma by asking why it is that, when the old vyākaraṇas have the Buddha predicting that beings will become Buddhas, and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka has the Buddha saying ‘You will become Buddhas’ (e.g. ch. ii, 42.9, 43.2, 54.18, 56.16, 58.12 (Wogihara and Tsuchida ed.)), we never find these phrases in the tathāgata-garbha sutras, but only ‘Beings are [or: possess] tathāgata-garbhas.’

The answer to this question is given in the schema below. After the heading śīla, samādhi or prajñā are two questions: the first is what might be called the traditional Buddhist approach, the second is the new question that the new form of Buddhism was asking.

śīla  What is the Buddha? → How does the Buddha work?

samādhi  What is enlightenment? → How is enlightenment attained?
(or: How do we know that such-and-such is enlightenment?)

prajñā  What is wisdom/ignorance? → How does wisdom/ignorance arise?

The second set of questions can be summed up by the general question: How does the Buddha/enlightenment/wisdom [ignorance] manifest itself? And the general answer to it (i.e. a bhedābheda philosophy) required the concept of a pure object which can be transformed in two directions: its purity can give rise to impurity, and its impurity can be purified. What I want to emphasize here is that because of the ambiguity inherent in the samādhi strand of Buddhism (i.e. (a) (i) pure citta (a) (ii) citta as foundation (b) rddhi etc. as manifestations of citta—see p. 262), you cannot have the citta-mātra concept (i.e. everything is citta) without also having the ‘X can be transformed into Y’ concept, and this concept automatically raises the question ‘What is the relation between X and Y?’ (where X and Y are Absolute and non-absolute respectively (or vice versa)).

This concept of the transformation of a pure object is the axis on which the whole movement known as the third turning of the wheel of the Dharma balances, and it has two important consequences: a bhedābheda philosophy, and an absolutist terminology. I want briefly to give examples of each.

bhedābheda
‘Laṅka 199 says: “Because the own-being of form cannot be grasped (rūpa-svabhāva-lakṣaṇa-grahanābhāvād), [form] is both seen [as existing] and not seen [as it really is], and is both graspable [as an appearance]
and not graspable [as a reality]. . . all existences both exist and do not exist (sarva-bhāvā na bhāvā nābhāvāh).’’ Clearly, the Madhyamikas could not say this without radically altering their terminology.43,44

Absolutist terminology45

(a) the prakṛti-prabhāsva-citta is a real pure citta.46

(b) the interpretation of the term agotra. At Lanka 63 we have a list of five gotras: (i) those who belong to the Śrāvaka-yāna (ii) those who belong to the Pratyekabuddha-yāna (iii) those who belong to the Tathāgata-yāna (iv) those who are indeterminate (aniyata) (v) those who are agotra. The first three are straightforward, and (iv) refers to those who choose which of these three they will use. It is the class of agotra which is odd, especially as it consists of two groups, both of which are called Ichchāntika: (α) those who have forsaken all wholesome roots (kuśalalāśa) by vilifying the Buddha-dharma. . . they will not enter Nirvana (β) the Bodhisattvas who have taken a vow not to enter Nirvana before other beings. And it is said that whereas the Bodhisattvas will never enter Nirvana because they know that all dharmas are in Nirvana from the very beginning (ādi-parinirvṛta), the other Ichchāntikas do enter Nirvana because they might be influenced by the Tathāgata’s sustaining power—for the Tathāgatas never abandon beings.

How is it that these two quite different groups are called agotra/Icchāntika? The clue is to be found at Asta 18 where it says that the Bodhisattva is without trace (apada), which is glossed by Haribhadra as apratiṣṭha (unsupported) and agotra.47 This is straight śūnyatāvāda: there is no Bodhisattva, he has no gotra and he follows no yāna.48 So whereas the original sense in the Prajñāpāramitā literature was that there was no gotra to have, the later absolutistic trend sees agotra as a genuine lack.

CONCEPTUAL AMBIGUITIES AND THE CHINESE TRANSLATIONS

So far we have tried to show (a) that the Mahayana in general, and the tathāgata-garbha sutras in particular, is an amalgam of three strands in Buddhism, each of which has its own internal logic and which is potentially capable of standing on its own (i.e. each one can in principle absorb the others)49; (b) that the specific concept of the Buddha’s nature can be approached from a number of angles—or, to put it another way, can be subsumed under a number of higher order concepts (e.g. within-
ness, foundation etc.—see p. 263); (c) that in any case, Buddhism, at the time of the composition of the tathāgata-garbha sutras (say 250 A.D.), was undergoing a radical change in direction in order that it might handle the question ‘How does the Absolute manifest itself?’ (which question automatically raises another, namely ‘What is the relation between the Absolute and the non-absolute?’). I now want to go on to show (d) the ambiguity in the Sanskrit terms used to refer to the Buddha’s nature, and (e) the ambiguities in the Chinese translations of these terms—i.e. the Chinese picked up a different set of ambiguities. My general point here is that the concept of the Buddha’s nature, by virtue of (a) to (c) above, was capable of further expansion and the Chinese provided it.

First, everyone knows that *garbha* can mean both ‘embryo’ and ‘womb’, and that the Tibetans took the first meaning (śīn po) and the Chinese the second (ts’ang).\(^{50}\) *Ts’ang* is also used to translate *ālāya* in the compound *ālāya-vijñāna*, and tathāgata-garbha and *ālāya-vijñāna* are equated by the *Laṅka* and other texts. This equation could clearly have influenced the Chinese translators.\(^{51}\)

In a similar way, *dhātu* = 1. ‘element of X’, and 2. ‘realm of which X is an element’. Now since traditional Buddhism always taught that that which makes up a compounded entity is more real than the entity itself, I think it is reasonable to presume that *dhātu* in the sense of ‘element’ tended to have a connotation of ‘essential element’, while *dhātu* in the sense of ‘realm’ tended to have a connotation of ‘essential (i.e. real/ultimate) realm’. As we shall see later, the Chinese sometimes use *chāi* 界 = ‘boundary’ and sometimes *hsing* 性 = ‘nature’ for *dhātu* (and even translate *dharma-dhātu* using chāi on one occasion and *hsing* on another), whereas the Tibetans use either *dbyiṅs* = ‘space, expanse, sphere’ or *khams* = *loka*\(^{52}\) (but use only the former for *dharma-dhātu* and only the latter for *sattva-dhātu*). Clearly, the ambiguity of the term presented great difficulties of translation, sometimes insuperable.\(^{53,54,55}\)

If we now turn to the Chinese translations of these terms, we find the following:

1. *fo hsing* 佛性 is used to translate both *buddha-dhātu* and *buddhatā/ tvā*.\(^{56}\)

2. But *hsing* is also used to translate *prakṛti*\(^{57}\), *gotra*\(^{58}\), *bhāva*\(^{59}\), *svabhāva*\(^{60}\) - *dharma* (ifc)\(^{61}\) - *tā/ tva*.\(^{62}\)

3. Other words used to translate *dhātu* are *chāi* 界\(^{63}\) and *ti* 頂\(^{64}\).
4. Just as *hsing* is used to translate -\(t\ddot{a}\)/-\(tva\), so other words having the sense ‘real nature’ or the like seem to have a similar usage on occasion—e.g. *t’ai* 性 \(^{65}\) and *shen* 身 \(^{66}\).

The general conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is:

(a) that a number of Chinese terms meaning ‘real nature’ (e.g. *hsing* 性 \(t\ddot{a}\), 聲 *shen* 身, *shih* 實) were used in a blanket way to deal with a number of Sanskrit terms, some of which definitely mean ‘real nature’ (e.g. *prakṛti*, *bhāva*, *svabhāva*), some of which definitely do not (e.g. *gotra*), and some of which are ambiguous (e.g. *dhātu*

(b) and in addition, *hsing* (definitely), *t’ai* (probably) and *shen* (possibly\(^{67}\)) are used to translate -\(t\ddot{a}\)/-\(tva\), thus creating added confusion (or richness, depending on how you look at it).

So when we look at the Chinese translations for *buddhat\ddot{a}\)/-\(tva\), we find:

(i) in the *RGV*, *buddha-dhātu* = *fo hsing* 佛性; *buddhatva* = *fo shen* 佛身\(^{68}\) or *fo t’ai* 佛體\(^{69,70}\)

(ii) in the *Laṅka*, *buddhatva* = *fo t’ai hsing* 佛體性 and *fo t’ai* \(^{71}\)

(iii) the later translators of the *Aṣṭa* use *fo hsing* to translate *buddhatva*\(^{72}\).

This overlap is not so difficult to understand when we remember that *fa hsing* 法性 = *dharmatā* and *dharma-dhātu*, and *fa shen* 法身 = *dharmatā* and *dharma-kāya*; so it is easy for *fo hsing* 佛性/*fo shen* 佛身 to = *buddhatā/buddha-dhātu/buddha-kāya*. Some of the ramifications of these combined Sanskrit/Chinese ambiguities are given on the accompanying Ambiguity Map.

So we may conclude

(a) that the Chinese were interpreting heavily in their translations

(b) but this was practically unavoidable given the ambiguity that was inherent in the Sanskrit terms anyway

(c) and more importantly, the Chinese have divided up the overlapping conceptual nets mentioned on p. 263 differently from the Indians—which is the same as saying that the Chinese have *elided* different concepts from the Indians. The most important of these elisions are (i) understanding *garbha* in the sense of ‘womb’ (*ts’an*) rather than ‘embryo’ (ii) *tzu hsing* 自性 = *tzu hsin* 自心\(^{73}\) = *fo hsing* 佛性 = *fo hsin* 佛心\(^{74}\) (i.e. *svabhāva* = *svacitta* = *buddha-dhātu/buddhatā* = *buddhacitta*).\(^{75,76}\)

It would therefore be misleading to say that the Chinese have misinterpreted or even changed the Buddha-nature concept. What they have
done is to draw out some of its ramifications—i.e. make explicit what was implicit.

**SOME BASIC MAHĀYĀNA NOTIONS RELEVANT TO THE BUDDHA NATURE CONCEPT:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PURE</th>
<th>SAMENESS</th>
<th>SUCHNESS</th>
<th>PERFECT WISDOM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>viśuddha</td>
<td>samatā</td>
<td>tathatā</td>
<td>prajñāpāramitā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BRIGHTLY SHINING**

prabhāsvara

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JEWEL</th>
<th>BUDDHAHOOD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ratna</td>
<td>buddhatā/buddhatvā</td>
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**MIND/THOUGHT**

citta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUGHT OF ENLIGHTENMENT</th>
<th>DHARMA BODY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bodhicitta</td>
<td>dharma-kāya</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEED</th>
<th>EMBRYONIC TATHAGATA</th>
<th>DHARMA ELEMENT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bija</td>
<td>tathagāta-garbha</td>
<td>dharma-dhātu</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAMILY</th>
<th>TATHAGATA ELEMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gotra</td>
<td>tathāgata-dhātu</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STORE CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>BUDDHA KNOWLEDGE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ālaya-vijñāna</td>
<td>buddha-jñāna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AMBIGUITY MAP

LS = Laṅkāvatāra sūtra
S = Sung (Guṇabhadra 443)
W = Wei (Bodhiruci 513)
T = T'ang (Śikṣānanda 700)

MSA = Chinese tr. of Mahāyāna-Śūtrālaṃkāra

`t`i hsing  
体性

= ātmakatva LS(T)  

shih t`i shen  
實体身

= svābhāvika-kāya LS(S)  

(= solid, essential, real, true;

fa hsing fo  
性

(= body, essentials of, substance of;

= śarira, artha in LS)

= dharmatā-buddha LS(T)  

= svābhāvika-kāya MSA

shih hsing che  
實性者

fo shen  
佛身

fo ti  
佛地

fo t`i  
佛体

fo hsing  
佛性

(= bhūtatā MSA)  

(= buddhatva (MSA))

(= buddhatā/

bhāva LS  
本性

gotra  
chung tzu

bijā LS(WT)  
chung 種

pen hsing  
dhātu LS RIGS

dhātu-gotra

Buddha-  
Buddhatā-

pen  
本

buddha-dhātu

bhūmi  
Buddhatra

a  
本

[Daśabhūmika]  
[= ore-mine]

ākara  
自性

tzu t`i  
自体

tzu hsing  
= bhūtātmam LS (WT)

hong hsin  
性心

citta-svabhāva  
hsin tzu hsing

tzu hsing

ratnākara(MSA)  
hsin 心

hṛdaya snin-po  
[= Ch‘an]

= Ch‘an

心自性

自性
gocara  
性

garbha  
ghṛita

dhātu  
性

jñāna  
藏

garbha  
ts‘ang

bhāja  
藏

viṣaya  
dhātu

ālaya(-vijñāna)  
DBYINS KHAMS

ch’ai (fo) ching

ch’ai  
SNIN-PO

hṛdaya-hsin  
心

citta

藏 識  
(= loka)

(= boundary, limit)}
NOTES

1 A useful classification of synonyms for gotra is given by Tak, pp. 21-2: dhātu, hetu, bija; pada, āśraya, māla, sthāna; nidāna; svabhāva, prakṛti, dharma; sāra; nidhi, nidhāna, ākara; yoni, garbha; vamśa; parigraha.

2 Say 250–450 A.D. We may tentatively date the relevant texts as follows: ŚMS, c. 250 (ŚMS 1–2); Avatāmsaka, c. 200–400 (ŚMS 1; one section of it, the Tathāgatopatti-sambhava-nirdeśa, was translated by Dharmarakṣa in the late third century (Tak 35)); Laṅka, c. 350 (ŚMS 1); RGV, c. 425 (Tak 61; the basic verses of the RGV itself, however, must be earlier (Tak 9–19)).

3 here āśraya = dhātu. Tak translates -parivṛtti as ‘perfect manifestation’ which is reasonable in the light of his discussion pp. 41–4; see also Ruegg 421ff.

4 The subject is omitted, but is clearly jina-garbha in v. 45 as Tak 200, n. 10 suggests.

5 Ch. here has tzu hsing wu kou hsin 自性無垢心 = prakṛti-vaimalya-citta; i.e. it omits dhātu, almost certainly because dhātu = hsin 性 and the proximity of tzu hsing 性 (= prakṛti) and hsing (= dhātu) jars somewhat. A similar instance occurs at Laṅka 68.1 where the phrase tathāgata-garbha-hṛdaya is translated in the Tib. as de-bzin gšegs-pa rnam-kyi sñin-po = tathagata-garbha, again because sñin-po is used to translate both garbha and hṛdaya. Both these are good examples of the inherent structure of a concept affecting the linguistic forms that are used to express that concept.

6 I have adopted Tak’s translation of amukta-jñā as ‘inseparable from wisdom’ (see Tak 235, n. 262; amukta-jñā is a shortened form of avinirmukta-jñāna). The term is discussed at ŚMS 49–52, Ruegg 357–361, L. Schmithausen, ‘Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotra-vibhāga,’ Wienes Zeit. für die Kunde Sudasiens, xv, 1971, pp. 131–2. This is a complex issue which I cannot discuss in detail here, but there are two separate (though related) problems: 1. what does the (a) mukta part of the compound mean? 2. What is described by the term amukta-jñā (and the term that usually accompanies it, avinirbhāga)? We need to tackle both of these if we are to understand how it is that some traditions have the negative form (amukta-jñā) while others have mukta-jñā (in the same passage—see ŚMS and Ruegg (op. cit.) for details).

1) mukta can mean ‘liberated’ or ‘separated’, and the Tib. and Ch. translations reflect this ambiguity (bral ba and grol ba; t'o 脫 and li 離).

2) amukta-jñā is attributed to (i) the Buddha dharmas that accompany the Dharma-kāya (ŚMS, quoted at RGVV 73.3; Tak 292) (ii) the Dharma-kāya itself (the Anūnatvā-pūrṇatva-nirdeśa-parivarta, quoted at RGVV 3.5; Tak 144 (actually the Dharma-kāya is said to be avinirbhāga-dharmā avinirmukta-jñāna-guno)). But at RGVV 76.9; Tak 301, whereas the Sanskrit says that sarva-kleṣa-kośa is mukta-jñā and the Buddha dharmas are amukta-jñā, the Tib. and Bodhiruci Ch. translations have amukta-jñā and mukta-jñā respectively. (A similar inversion in two Tibetan texts is noted by Ruegg 359).

To anticipate my argument somewhat, I would say that this double confusion is caused by the ambiguous logic that results when the praṇā strand elides with the śīla strand (see p. 262 for these two). praṇā tends towards the concept of [buddha-]
jnāna which is undifferentiated in itself but appears to be differentiated to beings; the reality is the Dharma-kāya. śīla tends towards the concept of buddha-guṇa dharmāh which are differentiated (by definition, since they are attributes of the Buddha) but not distinct from him; i.e. the attributes are real (and it is, to some extent, open as to what they are attributes of—i.e. the Buddha or Dharma-kāya or whatever is defined by the attributes, a complete inversion of the prajñā logic where the Absolute is beyond definition). So whereas the śīla strand will want to insist that the buddha-dharmāh are not separate from the Absolute or absolute knowledge (jnāna [= buddha-jnāna—here understood as an attribute itself, of course]), the prajñā strand (at the time of the composition of the tathāgata-garbha sutras, and bearing in mind the shift in emphasis discussed on p. 264) is caught between saying that they are separate (because the Absolute is beyond attributes) and that they are not (because since there are no distinctions at the absolute level, there is no dharma that is not of the same nature as the Buddha—see Aṣṭa 307, quoted in n. 12). Hence when the śīla and the prajñā strands come together, anything becomes possible and the disagreements over the use and meaning of (A) mukta jnā are only to be expected. My point here is that this ambiguity is (a) irreducible, and (b) necessary for the development of the tathāgata-garbha concept.

7 N. B. the inherent ambiguity in the term dhātu which means ‘element’ in tathāgata-dhātu but ‘world’ in sattva-dhātu (see p. 267).

8 Cf. RGV 53.10; Tak 256: “The tathāgata-dhātu is unchangeable (ananyathāta) because of its indestructible dharmas (akṣaya-dharma-yogato).” [It is quite important not to translate “... because it is endowed with [indestructible dharmas]” as Tak does, for as we shall see (p. 262), the concept of being-endowed-with is a śīla strand concept and I think it is no accident that the RGV suppresses this terminology for the most part.] Later (RGV V 54.12; Tak 258), the Anūnatvāpūryatva-nirdeśa-parisarta is quoted to the effect that the Dharma-kāya is permanent (nitya) and this unchangeability (ananyava) is on account of its indestructible dharmas (dharmāk-ṣaya-dharmatayā).

9 Hence it is no surprise to read at RGV 80.7; Tak 314 that Buddhahood is constituted by (prabhāvita) dharmas [= śukla-dharma in v. 4; buddha-dharma in v. 5]. See n. 37 for prabhāvita.


12 Viz. (i) Aṣṭa 307: “Because he is not born is Subhūti born of (ānujāta) the Tathāgata. He is born of the Tathāgata’s suchness (tathatā). As that has neither come nor gone, so also the suchness of Subhūti has neither come nor gone... because the suchness of the Tathāgata is the suchness of all dharmas and they are both the suchness of Subhūti.”

(ii) Aṣṭa 200: “The skandhas are neither permanent nor impermanent, neither bound nor freed—they are absolutely pure.”

(i) gives us the sequence śūnyatā → samatā → tathatā; (ii) gives us śūnyatā → samatā → suddhatā.

13 A natural consequence of regarding the Mahayana as an amalgam of these
three strands is the abandonment of the idea of the Mahayana as a unified entity that everyone in it saw in the same way. I have argued elsewhere (“The Position of the Aṣṭasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitā in the Development of Early Mahayana,” in Prajñāpāramitā and Related systems (Festschrift for Edward Conze), Berkeley, 1977) that there may have been different groups of Buddhists evolving in their own way what we now regard as seminal Mahayana concepts. Thus when Ruegg (p. 472), commenting on Jātaka i. 16 (ed. V. Fausboll, Pali Text Society, 1962 (reprint))—where Dipaṅkara predicts the Brahmin Sumedha to Buddhahood as Gautama and says that he (Sumedha) is a buddha-bija—says: “If it were possible to interpret this text in the light of the teachings we have so far studied [i.e. the tathāgata-garbha texts], one could suppose that it testifies to the existence, in a work transmitted by the Theravādins, of a theory of a basic spiritual capability that allows beings to attain enlightenment; but the Theravādins do not seem to admit this doctrine, and—unless we see in it the existence of a notion almost unknown to Pali writings—we have to conclude that it is only a particular form of the usual vyākaraṇa”, we have no need to follow him once we ditch the wholly gratuitous assumption that what is in the Pali canon is all Theravādin orthodoxy and must be because the Mahayana did not arise until after its completion.

14 e.g. the nine similes from the Tathāgata-garbha-sūtra quoted in the RGV 59.16 ff; Tak 268ff. Verse. 97 says: the element (dhātu) abides in beings (sattvēṣu).

15 e.g. dhātu = āśraya. RGV 72.13; Tak 291: the element (dhātu) is the basis (āśraya) of all dharmanas. [This is, in fact, a quotation from the Abhidharma-sūtra. N. B. Tak 290, n. 175 where he notes that in the quotation of this verse in Sthiramati’s bhāṣya on Vasubandhu’s Trinśikā, dhātu is translated by chiai 代替 instead of hsing 性 (as it is in the RGV), and dhātu/chiai is applied to the ālaya-vijñāna (see p. 267).] This passage is expanded by a quotation from the ŠMS (RGV 73.2; Tak 292).

16 e.g. RGV 60.16; Tak 270: the Lord with his Buddha-eye perceives his own nature (svadharmanā) even in those who are in the lowest world. Cf. RGV 10.4; Tak 161 and RGV 10.9; Tak 162 (on this last see de Jong p. 41).

17 i.e. buddha-guṇa, buddha-dharmāḥ.

18 e.g. buddha-bhūmi.

19 e.g. dharma-dhātu.

20 e.g. buddha-viṣaya.

21 Similarly ŠMS 89: “When all the defilements (kleśa) are eliminated, one obtains the unthinkable Buddha dharmanas exceeding the sands of the Ganges. Then, as a Tathāgata, one gains the unhindered understanding of all dharmas, is omniscient and all-seeing, free from all faults (doṣa) and is adorned with all virtues (guṇa).” Cf. the quotation from the ŠMS given on p. 261. I would suggest that the Dharmakāya concept has been elided with this more traditional, and indeed conventional, glorification of the Buddha and the buddha-guṇa-dharmāḥ.

22 Here ananta-buddha-guṇa is equivalent to acintya-buddha-guṇa. The change in emphasis in the use of the term acintya in the Mahayana is interesting. In the Mādhyamika it means ‘neither X nor not-X’, whereas for the tathāgata-garbha sutras (as well as in Yogācāra texts) it means ‘both X and not-X’. We shall return to this shift in emphasis later (p. 264).

23 buddha-sattvār; Ch. follows this, but Tib. has dag-pa’i sems = 'suddha-cittair.
This quotation raises the interesting question of the conceptual ramifications of the Buddha’s range/sphere (viśaya/gocara). It is intimately connected with his knowledge, and we read right at the beginning of the RGV (referring to the meaning of dhātu): ‘The meaning [belongs to] the [exclusive] sphere (gocara) and range (viśaya) of the Tathāgata; it cannot be rightly known (na sakyam jñātum), seen or investigated by the wisdom (svaprajñā; i.e. the wisdom that they have produced for themselves) that belongs to all the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas (RGV 2.8; Tak 143 (and see de Jong p. 40)). This is simply a version of a stereotyped phrase (cf. Saddharma-puṇḍarika ch. 2, vv. 1–2; Raśtrapāla-parippṛcchā (Vaidya ed.) 121.25–122.4; Suvārṇa-prabhāsa ch. 2, v. 24), and buddha-viśaya-gocara nearly always occurs in the context of buddha-jñāna (see my article “The Position of the Asāsāhasrikā” (details n. 13) where I also quote passages to the effect that the buddha-guṇa-dharmah are infinite or unlimited and cannot be known by all beings (na sakyam jñātum sarva-satvaiḥ). N. B. the obvious tendency here: to regard the buddha-jñāna as an attribute/virtue (= buddha-guṇa-dharma) for no other reason than that it is spoken of in the same way and using the same cliché as the buddha-guṇa-dharma—a very powerful influence in the transmission of oral literature).

I would suggest that as a consequence of this connection between viśaya/gocara and jñāna (tathāgata-viśaya = tathāgata-jñāna at Suvikrāntavikrāmiparippṛcchā 4a), the concept of the Buddha’s range/sphere spreads itself in two directions:

(a) the extent of what is known
(b) the objects that are known (i.e. that which is included within the range/sphere).

(a) lends itself easily to expression in terms of pervasion/irradiation—see especially RGV 26.1–6; Tak 197. And as Tak points out (p. 35), this is the essential message of the Āṭamatāsaka (quoted at RGV 22.10; Tak 189 to the effect that there is no being who is not completely pervaded by the tathāgata-jñāna (tathāgata-jñānam na sakalam anupraviṣṭam; lit. into which the tathāgata-jñāna does not completely penetrate’)). (Incidentally, buddha-viśaya was probably an essential element in the development of the buddha-kṣetra concept.)

(b) is aided by the general (i.e. non-sectarian) psychological teaching that each indriya has its range (viśaya)—i.e. śaṭda for the ear etc.—and interestingly, these viśaya are called the guṇa of the five elements (= dhātu or mahā-bhūta?). Śāda, of course, is an object. Viṣaya is translated as ‘sense objects’ by Conze at Ratnaguṇa-samceyagāthā xv 8, and Suzuki often translates the singular by ‘objective world’ or ‘external world’ in the Lankā. The Chinese translations reflect the ambiguity in viṣaya that we have noted: they use ching 境 = gati = state, condition; chiai 界 = dhātu = boundary, limit (though dhātu is itself ambiguous in an exactly analogous way to viṣaya—see p. 267); and li 前 = bala = strength, power (see Rahder’s Glossary to the Dasaḥbhūmika). Similarly, Tib. yul = (a) a sphere, region, whether physical or metaphysical; (b) the object or objects of perception by means of the senses (Das’ Dictionary).

Hence when RGV 26.16 (Tak 199) refers to the tathāgata-dhātu as parama-tattva-jñāna-viṣaya, although the traditional interpretation would be [the tathāgata-dhātu] which is the range of knowledge of supreme reality’, we cannot rule out the possibility that it means ‘. . . which is the object of the knowledge of supreme reality.’ (Cf. below, p. 265, where we mention the ‘pure object’ of the Yogācāra school).
N. B. that this passage is quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (p. 42 of the Bendall ed.) which does not mention the tathāgata-garbha either here or in its quotation from the Tathāgata-koṣa-sūtra (= Tathāgata-garbha-sūtra) on p. 171 i.e. it appears to treat these texts as buddha-pūjā sutras (perversely, no doubt, but significantly).

Bareau, Les Sectes Buddhiqes, p. 59, quoted at ŚMS 62, n. 13. The dharmas that constitute a Buddha are, of course, one definition of the term dharma-kāya (see Siddhi ii, p. 767). What we have here is a basic concept—namely, that the Buddha is constituted by certain attributes (that cannot be completely known by anyone other than a Buddha)—which has been taken up by two quite different sects (i.e. the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sarvāstivādins). What I am suggesting here, and throughout this paper, is that the inherent logic of this concept (which is implicit) dictates the explicit philosophical statements that encapsulate it.

27 Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā 4.13 (Yamaguchi ed. p. 188), quoted in Ruegg 99. Shihamatī also says that others say that gotra is the capacity of citta in its seed form (citta-bija-śakti); that this is what the compound means is confirmed by Yaśomitra’s equivalent statement—bijam sāmarthyaṃ cetasato gotrani iti—in his Adhidharmaśārayākhyā, quoted at Ruegg 461). N. B. the bringing together of the Śīla and samādhi strands here (i.e. gotra = kuśala-mūla-svabhāva and gotra = citta-bija-śakti respectively).

28 possibly via the idea that the Dharma-kāya is the sum of the perfectly pure dharmas of the Buddha (see n. 26).

29 see E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 232–3.

30 see, for example, ŚMS 97, n. 80 where cessation of suffering = Dharma-kāya = asamskṛta-nirvāṇa, and buddha-dharmāḥ = tathāgata-garbha = saṃskṛta-nirvāṇa. Despite Wayman’s heroic efforts to explain this passage, it remains almost totally opaque and strikes me as the very epitome of a bad welding job.

31 e.g. E. Conze, Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom, London, 1968 (2nd ed.), no. 98 (= Śatasāhasrikā LIII, f. 279–83—in ms. only). N. B. that neither the RGV nor the ŚMS contain a single passage in which this position (i.e. paramārtha is beyond all attributes) is unequivocally stated—the nearest is ŚMS 98 (quoted p. 261).

32 Another way of putting this point is to say that the attribution of qualities to the Dharma-kāya may be an imposition of one conceptual net (that of property) on another (that of being), which are, of course, Śīla and prajñā concepts respectively.

33 already known from Aṣṭa 5 (and, significantly, all the Chinese translations contain this passage).

34 and these concepts were bound to influence the Chinese translators, of course.

35 See Ruegg 507–13 for an able discussion of the term tathāgata-garbha (and he also gives all the relevant references to the RGV). In fact, we cannot definitely decide whether the phrase sarva-sattvāś tathāgata-garbhāḥ means ‘all beings are tathāgata-garbhas’ or ‘all beings possess tathāgata-garbhas’. The Tibetans add the particle can in their translation, thus interpreting the compound as a bahuvrīhi (i.e. ‘all beings possess tathāgata-garbhas’), while the Chinese use chih 之 (Tak 196, n. 1) or yu 你 (Tak 286, n. 140), the first of which could be taken as interpreting tathagata-garbha as a tatpurusa, and the second as a bahuvrīhi. Once again we see the subconscious influence of different conceptual images: ‘all beings are tathāgata-garbhas’
uses the nature/being image, while ‘all beings possess tathāgata-garbhas’ uses the attribute/property image. Clearly, this ambiguity rests purely on the fact that Sanskrit has different kinds of noun compounds whereas Tibetan and Chinese do not—they therefore had to make a decision about the meaning of tathāgata-garbha, while the Indians did not.

36 I am here somewhat perversely taking the Madhyamikas as traditionalists (along the lines suggested by A. K. Warder, “Was Nāgārjuna a Mahayanist?” in M. Sprung, *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*). Of course, the prāṇāpāramitā sutras (which I take as the basis of Nāgārjuna) changed the Hinayana (see E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, p. 14 for a five-fold contrast with the Abhidharma), but all this follows inevitably and immediately as a result of subjecting the Buddha’s pragmatic analyses to strict philosophical scrutiny. We may say, then, that Hinayana Buddhism (at least as found in the Pali canon) never actually asked the question ‘What is the ultimate basis on which [e.g.] the pratitya-samutpāda is founded?’ until the Abhidharma school was well-established; and when they did ask it, Nāgārjuna’s famous statement ‘We call pratitya-samutpāda “emptiness”’ (*Mūla-mādhyamakārikā* ch. 24, v. 18) is the answer. This switch from fully-fledged pragmatism to pure philosophical consistency, however, does not affect our argument here. See also n. 40.

37 Incidentally, I would back up the importance of this general concept of manifestation by two seemingly unrelated linguistic points:

(a) in the *Laṅka* pāo 資 (＝ recompense, reward; one of the translations of saṃbhoga[kāya] (e.g. *Mahāvyutpatti* 117)) is used to translate both (i) vipāka (= maturation), and (ii) niṣyanda (= outcome) in the phrase dharmatā-niṣyanda-buddha (see LSI 159a, 99a). Now both vipāka and niṣyanda are included in the five phala (*Mahāvyutpatti* 2272) so they are both something attained, but (i) vipāka-kāya = rūpa-kāya according to Siddhi ii, p. 768, and (ii) in dharmatā-niṣyanda-buddha, niṣyanda has the sense of ‘issuing forth’. This facing-two-ways aspect of manifestation (i.e. ‘X becomes Y’ applies equally from the mundane to the transcendental and vice versa) is an essential element of the third turning of the Dharma-cakra.

(b) the ambiguity (i.e. the not-worked-outness) of the term prabhāvita (discussed by Ruegg, p. 350), which = (i) constituted by (＝ nature/being) (ii) derived from (＝ sphere/realm) (iii) impregnated by (＝ withinness).

38 e.g. *Saṃdhinirmocana* vii. 6: *paramārtha = viśuddhālambana*.

39 e.g. *Laṅka* 268: *citta* is the source (yoni) of the triple world.

40 N. B. that both the Theravāda and the Madhyamika avoid this question: Theravāda because (a) saṃsāra is not derived from Nirvana, and (b) Nirvana is not the result of following the path (because then it would be caused and hence saṃskṛta); Madhyamika because the śāyātāvāda allows no meaning to the concept of a real individual of any kind, so the question itself is meaningless.

41 Incidentally, I would characterize tantra as infinite transformation, and Mahāmudrā and Ch’ān as zero transformation.

42 of which the Yogācārins are the established philosophical school; but the tathāgata-garbha sutras (and the *Avatamsaka*) are also clearly in the mainstream of this movement.

43 In fact, the main difference between the Madhyamikas and the Yogācārins is that the former say ‘We are only going to talk about what is real’, while the latter say
'We are going to talk about everything' (and so have to explain how every thing is related). (Cf. (i) Candrakirti (quoting the Rattvali): in reality (tatttavas) a reflected image is nothing at all (Prasannapada XVIII, p. 345 of de la Vallette Poussin ed.); (ii) Asanga: images seen in dhyana are like those reflected in a mirror—they are neither the object itself, nor are they distinct from the object (Mahayanasamgraha ii. 6–8)). This difference between the two schools is exemplified by the fact that the Madyamikas talk in terms of dharmas whereas the Yogacarins talk in terms of vastu (N.B. = 'object' and 'reality'). [And, interestingly, tantra tends to talk in terms of the world (jagat); there is an obvious progression here.] Clearly, Ch'an rests on this vastu ambiguity and uses the third-turning-of-the-wheel-of-the-Dharma terminology.

44 The term sarvakara-varopeta-sunya = 'emptiness furnished with the best of all modes' (i.e. the six paramitas) may also be an instance of bheda bheda, though it does occur at Asta 370 (see also Ruegg 351–7).

45 This terminology can always run back to the sunyatavada if it wishes—e.g. RGVV 73.15; Tak 302 (quoting the SMS): The knowledge of the tathagata-garbha is just this [this] knowledge of the emptiness of the Tathagatas.

46 e.g. Lankka 358–9 (Sagathakam), vv. 750–6. Contrast with this (i) Asta 5 where prakrii-prabhavatara-citta = bodhicitta = acitta; (ii) Suraangamasamadhisutra (p. 199 of Lamotte's translation) which says that citta is undifferentiated (nirvishista) and the same (sama) in all beings.

47 see Ruegg 77.

48 Cf. Lankka 65: 'Three vehicles, one vehicle, no vehicle (ayana)—I speak of these for the sake of the stupid and the wise.'

49 e.g. Suraangamasamadhisutra, p. 167: 'A Bodhisattva who has obtained the Suraangamasamadhi has no more dharmas to learn because he has already conquered all samadhis and all merits (punya).’ Here prajna (= dharmas) has absorbed samadhi and sila (= punya).

50 I have made a number of connections of this kind on the accompanying Ambiguity Map which is intended more as a stimulation to conceptual analysis than as a summary of the extreme complexity of the interrelations of the Sanskrit and Chinese terms.

51 Moreover, this equation can be seen as a further development in the Buddhist conception of citta which (a) as that which is pure and stained from without, lends itself to the withinness image, and (b) as mula-vijnana, lends itself to the foundation image, and now (c) as the alaya-vijnana which is like the sea—disturbed at the surface but calm in its depths (Lanka 220–1)—combines the two (with an admixture of the range (visaya) image). Later, tantra completed this concept by asserting that bodhicitta = buddhatwa, while Ch'an asserted that one's own mind (= sva-citta = tsu hsin 自心 ) = buddha-citta (= fo hsin 佛心) (see Yampolsky p. 180 (section 52)).

52 khams is used as an equivalent of dhatu in all its senses—see Das' Dictionary p. 140.

53 See also Tak 290, n. 175. In the RGV, dhatu in the compounds tathagata-dhatu or buddha-dhatu is translated by khams or siin-po.

54 As an example of a misleading translation how about jina-dhatu [in the sense of 'relics'] = jia lai ts'ang 如來藏 (LSI 73a)?

55 It is also worth mentioning that the original meaning of gotra was 'enclosure for
cattle' [go = cow], and hence came to mean 'that which is enclosed' (i.e. a herd → family, lineage).

66 But the two are never confused in the RGV, and it may be that fo hsin = buddhatā only in texts that do not mention buddha-dhātu. Examples of fo hsin = buddha-dhātu are given at Tak 199 n. 6, 235 n. 265, 305 n. 6. For fo hsin = buddhatā see p. 268.

67 Tak 239 n. 295; LSI 111b, 303a; MSAI 221 (of Chinese section). prakṛti usually = tzu hsin 自性 or pen hsin 本性.

68 LSI 65a; also used are chung hsin 種性 (chung is also used to translate bija) and chen ju hsin 了知性 (chen ju = tathatā, but at Mahāvyutpatti 1709 tathatā = chen ju and chen hsin) which is used to translate dhātu (Tak 235 n. 263) and prakṛti (Tak 239 n. 295) in the RGV. N. B. that hsin 姓 = clan (= go? ) is used in the Tunhuang version of the Platform Sutra instead of the usual hsin 性.

69 LSI 129a.

60 MSAI 221 (of Chinese section). The usual translation is tzu hsin 自性 (also used to translate prakṛti). [N. B. that some of the instances of hsin k'ung 性空 given at LSI 169b probably = svabhāva-sānyatā and not simply sānyatā.]

61 Tak 224 n. 184. -dharmaṭva is also translated by hsin (Tak 353 n. 24).

62 dharmaṭa = fa hsin 法性 (Rahder's Glossary to the Daśabhūmika p. 83; Tak 294 n. 6, 295 n. 7). However, dharma-dhātu = fa hsin (Rahder 84), and at Mahāvyutpatti 514 dharma-dhātu = fa hsin and fa chiai 法界; cf. Tak 161 n. 41. It is also interesting to note that -dharma in the compound paramārtha-dhātu is translated by fa hsin (Tak 199 n. 3); and dharma-buddha = fa hsin fo 法性佛 (LSI 293b). It may be that dharmaṭa is being interpreted as dharma-dhātu. Of course, this use of hsin = -tā explains the translation of buddhatā by fo hsin 佛性.

63 Tak 170 n. 45; viz. also Tak 290 n. 175 and previous note.

64 Tak 325 n. 95. t'i also = bhāva (Tak 217 n. 130) or svabhāva (Tak 199 n. 8; but usually svabhāva = tzu t'i 自體).

65 asaṃskṛtva = wu wei t'i 無為體 (Tak 156 n. 11); dharmaṭa = fa t'i 法體 (Tak 268 n. 3 and 295 n. 9). Cf. also Tak 234 n. 260.

66 dharmaṭa = fa shen 法身 (Tak 266 n. 515). Normally, of course, fa shen = dharma-kāya, and we cannot really decide if fa shen here is interpretative (dharmaṭa = dharma-kāya anyway) or a genuine translation. See below for buddhatva = fo shen 佛身.

67 see next note.

68 RGV 89.6 = T 1611 843c28; RGV 58.20 = T1611 836c17; RGV 80.7 = T1611 841b9. Cf. jinatva = ju lai shen 如來身 RGV 81.8 = T1611 841c3 (N. B. that jinatva definitely = buddha-dhātu here).

69 RGV 56.9 = T1611 835c17. Cf. tathāgatavāja = ju lai t'i 如來身 RGVV 71.17 = T1611 838c26. Tak 155 n. 4 (= RGV 7.9) gives fo shen 佛身 as the translation of buddhatva but T1611 813b19 and the parallel passage 822b20 have fo t'i 佛體.

70 but t'i = dhātu as well as -tā/-tva (see n. 64).

71 LSI 125.

72 Aṣṭa 401 = T220-4 (by Hsuan-tsang) 840c2 = T228 (by Dānapāla) 654c21; at Aṣṭa 278 tathāgatavāja = ju lai hsin 如來身 at T220-4 818a15 = T220-5 (also by Hsuan-tsang, from a different Sankrit original) 895b27. Hsuan-tsang translated in
660 and Dānapāla in 895. I am indebted to my colleague Stewart McFarlane for looking up these references for me.

73 Yampolsky, Chinese text p. 14 line 4 (= section 31). Also in this section chen ju 真如 (= tathatā) = pen hsing 本性 (= prakṛti) (Yampolsky p. 13 line 12).

74 see Yampolsky, Chinese text p. 28 lines 2–5 (= section 52).

75 This particular multiple equation, which is elementary in Ch’an, is not made in any pre-tantric text to my knowledge. Though the Laṅka speaks of svabhāva and svacittā on nearly every page, svabhāva is taken in its traditional philosophical sense of ‘own being’ and this is applied to dharmas not oneself; similarly, svacitta = cittamātra (i.e. a quasi-cosmological concept—though cosmology and psychology are ultimately equivalent, of course—which justifies Suzuki’s translation ‘Mind itself’ rather than ‘one’s own mind’). It is true that the tathāgata-garbha sutras equate prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta with buddha-dhātu, but they do not make the obvious step and include buddha-citta as well. Thus RGVV 71.7; Tak 287 says that citta is prakṛti-prabhāsvara and is called tathatā, and this [sa = tathatā as the Chinese (T1611 838c14) makes clear; Tak’s translation of sa as ‘this very Mind’ is an unnecessary gloss] is called Tathāgata when it is purified from all accidental defilements. One could argue that here prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta = tathāgata, but this equation is only made via the link of each with tathatā, whereas in Ch’an this link is often omitted.

76 We may go even further and suggest that since garbha = ts’ang 賽 had removed, as it were, an important element in the withinness aspect of the Buddha-nature, fo hsin 佛心 was a natural candidate to fill the gap (and conversely, since the Indians did not have a gap to fill, there was no particular need for them to formulate a buddha-citta concept).
The Problem of Desire and Emotions
In Taoism and Ch’an

John Visvader and William C. Doub

“...perhaps we have more to learn from (the Chinese) in both material ecology and personal self-discipline. Buddhism as well as Confucianism taught them that unease and disorder are rooted in human desires, ...” John K. Fairbank, The New York Review of Books, May 12, 1977.

That there is a great deal of similarity between Taoism and Buddhism as it developed in China is admitted freely by almost everyone, and that each of these schools had direct influence on the other is hardly to be denied. One observer has gone so far as to suggest that “The true inheritors of the thought and spirit of Chuang Tzu are the Chinese Zen Buddhists of the T’ang period.”¹ A common suggestion about the relation of the two schools is to picture Ch’an Buddhism as the fruit obtained from planting the seed of Indian Buddhism in Taoist soil. Some Taoists have even regarded the Buddha as none other than Lao Tzu himself, or as his disciple, and speculated that after Lao Tzu disappeared to the west, he went as far as India and reformulated his doctrine in accord with the conditions he found there.² Many doctrines are so similar that historian-scholars would be hard put to determine whether they developed independently or were borrowed, and if they were borrowed, who the borrower and lender might be.

Despite all of this, there are also very obvious and dramatic differences between these schools, especially if the full scope of both Taoism and Chinese Buddhism are examined. For this reason, we have decided to examine one area of concern that seems to be central for both schools, the problem of limiting or transforming the desires and the emotions. In our discussion, we will limit ourselves on the Taoist side to what might be called philosophical Taoism and on the Ch’an side to writings originating during the T’ang period. In order to skirt the issue of whether or not there is a clear distinction between Taoist philosophy and Taoist religion, we will define extensionally the Taoism with which we
are concerned to be that contained in such largely pre-Han works as the *Tao Te Ching*, the *Chuang Tzu*, and the *Lih Tzu* and in the works of some of the more or less Taoist writers, such as Wang Pi 王弼 and Hsi K'ang, 楚康 of the period approximately A.D. 200–350. For Ch'an, we have decided to limit our discussion mainly to those works that are of Chinese origin. Since we are more familiar with Taoism and since there seems to be a greater variety of positions to contend with in that school, the problems concerning desires and emotions are first examined with respect to Taoism and then compared with the views of the Ch'an school.

There are some very general problems concerning the role of desires and emotions in these two philosophies which will not enter the scope of this paper but which deserve to be mentioned to help put the problems to be discussed in perspective. Both Buddhists and Taoists speak of having no or few desires and say that desiring is the cause of both disharmony and suffering. Yet, for the Buddhists, wanting to get rid of desire is also a desire, which should also be gotten rid of. There is thus the problem in Buddhism of using desire to get rid of desire with skillful means (*upāya*) until that desire can be gotten rid of in the proper way. Much of the tone of the Ch'an texts consists of attempts to make the student put down what at some other time he has been encouraged to pick up. Because of this sort of general problem about desire, Buddhism often tries to swallow itself and ultimately cannot take seriously its own injunctions concerning the desires and emotions and the distinctions they needfully generate. The Taoists also have a general problem concerning the desires and the emotions. On their own grounds, both because of the notion of the all-embracing character of the Tao and because of the arguments concerning the relativity of distinctions, they cannot justify those statements recommending freedom from desire. Such statements lead to distinctions between preferred and problematic states of being as well as to distinctions between natural and artificial desires. The Taoist, like the Buddhist, must produce an artificial desire to be without desire. Ultimately the Taoist must, as Kuo Hsiang 郭象 suggested, abandon the distinction between the natural and the artificial.

Aside from these paradoxical consequences of holding general doctrines concerning the elimination of desire, there are other problems of a more concrete kind involving the recommendation to eliminate desires. The first problem with which we will be concerned has to do with understanding the sort of thing that is meant by desire and thus what it would
mean to have no desires. A related problem, but different enough to merit particular concern, is the relation between the desires and the emotions.

Even though it is clear in general what the sage of the Taoists is to be like, the details of his emotional life seem to be described in many ways. Much of the conception of the Taoist sage develops as a direct contrast either to the Confucian superior person (chün-tzu 君子) or the ordinary, narrow-minded ‘sparrow-like’ person. The sage is as broad as the Tao and as impartial as nature; he does by not doing (wu wei 無為) and by drawing things out by the power of his te 德 to their own natural and inherent perfection. He is not bothered by the ordinary worries of common people; the distinctions between good and evil, useful and useless, success and failure are merely andro-centric or ego-centric concerns. He has, in a sense, an eagle’s-eye view of the human and natural realms. But as to the precise state of his emotions, he is sometimes described as “having no desires,” “having few desires,” “allowing his feelings to have their way,” and “not letting his feelings get at him.”

In the Lao Tzu there seem to be several different attitudes concerning desires. The only place in which having few desires is discussed, is in relation to the people and the correct way of governing them:

Therefore cause the following to be adhered to:
Manifest the simple and hold to the primitive,
Lessen the personal and reduce desires. (Chap. 19)

Almost every other reference is to having no desires, and most of these cases concern the sage (Chaps. 37, 57, 64), although in one case the people are referred to as being “kept free from desire” (Chap. 3) and another case in which the Great Tao “always has no desire” (Chap. 34). There are several cases in which the error of having lavish desires is mentioned (Chaps. 44 and 46), and in these cases a general reference seems to be understood. The sage is also said not to have any “fixed mind” (Chap. 49), any personal interests (Chap. 7), any subjective viewpoints, nor any attachments (Chap. 26), and to be impartial and all-embracing (Chap. 16). The distinction here seems to be between having no desires and having few, and a case could be made out for saying that the sage has no desires and keeps the people governed by causing them to have few desires. There does seem to be a suggestion of elitism in the Lao Tzu, and no suggestion that everyone should, although anyone
might, obtain the characteristics of a sage. The sage is the axis of the Tao for the people, and by his own clarity and harmony he is able to clarify and harmonize the people. If there is to be a difference between the sage and the people, there would be no reason to think that the emotionality or range of desires should be the same in both cases, or that the people would be expected to achieve the cosmic impartiality of the sage. Yet there is no indication that this difference between the sage and the people reflects any difference in value or merit in any purely evaluative sense. The sage is the servant of the people but is neither higher nor lower than they—they merely have different roles to play.

Whether or not this is a useful way of understanding the Lao Tzu, we still have to make some sense out of saying that the sage has no desires. It is usually difficult to know what is meant by saying that someone has no desires; there is almost always an implied contrast to such a statement that makes it clear that the person has no desires of a certain kind. The word is used in many languages in both a very general and in a particular sense. It forms part of the vocabulary of most teleological explanations of behavior, and though some philosophers reify desires into some sort of mental causal entities, it often means no more to attribute a desire to someone than to say that the person’s action was intentional or motivated. In this sense it would be hard to understand how a person could do anything without having any desires at all. This would be equivalent to saying that a person did not have any motivation or never performed a purposive or intentional action. “Desire” is often used in a particular sense to designate a particular feeling, or strong inclination or passion, or even a specific kind of motivation. Some philosophies, for example Buddhism, use “desire” in a technical sense so that when it is said that someone “has no desires,” it is generally understood what is meant. The Taoists, having little in the way of a technical vocabulary or a systematic philosophy make it necessary for us to examine the contexts in which such “non-desiring statements” appear. What we shall find is that there are a variety of different attitudes towards the desires and emotions, sometimes giving us the feeling that Taoism is only a conglomeration of many loosely woven traditions and philosophies, hardly constituting a systematic philosophy in the sense that Buddhism does. This fact has even led some to wonder, without meaning to be completely facetious, whether there was such a thing as Taoism.

We shall understand, then, in our investigation of the meaning of
“having no desires,” that such statements are made in the particular and
not in the general sense. We shall look for the kinds of desires that are
rejected, the kinds of things that are not to be desired and the style of
dealing with both rejected and accepted desires.
A school of thought that often seems to leave its imprint on Taoist
texts is the school of limited ch'i 氣 in which one was thought to have
a limited amount of initial ch'i and had to guard its use by having few
desires and performing few actions. Its slogan was to “keep your
apertures shut,” and its views are found in various Taoist works as shown
by the following passage in the Chuang Tzu:

Let there be no seeing, no hearing; enfold the spirit in quietude and
the body will right itself. Be still, be pure, do not labor your body, do
not churn up your essence, and then you can live a long life. When
the eye sees nothing, the ear hears nothing, and the mind knows
nothing, then your spirit will protect the body, and the body will
enjoy long life.¹⁰

Here it would seem that only those desires that lead to the minimal
maintenance of physical existence would be allowable; this would repre-
sent an extreme position of quietism and the most literal understanding
of having no desires. Even this position seems to advocate the desire
for long life and the consequent desire to have no or few desires. While
the Lao Tzu does say “block the openings, shut the doors” (Chaps. 52,
56) and describes the sage as “desiring not to desire” (Chap. 64), it does
not seem that this kind of quietude is advocated. The sage in the Lao Tzu
is involved in the governing of the world and his practice of wu wei is
not a withdrawal from the concourse of life, but is rather an acting in the
world in such a way that does not go against the grain of anything’s
nature.

Most of the contexts in which desires are discussed in the Lao Tzu
are related to discussions in which unnecessary, artificial, or excessive
desires are being criticized. The people are led away from their simpli-
city (p'u 桧) by moral standards which describe the way they ought to be
and to act, and by valuing things that are hard to get or far removed
from their lives. To the statement in Chap. 57 which says “The sage
is free from desire and the people of themselves will become simple,”
Wang Pi comments, “All of these (activities of the sage, including
being free from desire) are a matter of adhering to what is basic (pen
and having nothing to do with what is superficial (mo 末).”¹¹ Ho-shang Kung 河上公 interprets the non-desiring in this passage as getting rid of the elegant and ornamental in all things.¹² In this sense, if “desire” is taken to mean desire for the artificial or extraneous, then the sage, and even the people, can be said to be without desire if they live close to their natures in a simple way. We are not told what the people might desire, but presumably they include those things which will allow them to be content and happy and to live in the kind of ideal community described in Chap. 80. More positive descriptions are given of the state of mind of the sage in terms of the way he acts or doesn’t act, his concern for the people, his impartiality, and his wisdom of no-knowledge. Whether he has the same desires as the people in following his nature and whether his life would be lived in the same manner is not clear, though we might expect that that kind of impartiality and detachment would be difficult for the ordinary person to obtain.

Some of the later so-called Neo-Taoist thinkers such as Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang criticized Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu because they portrayed the sage as having the desire not to have desires. Confucius, who was, in their view, a real sage, never spoke of desiring not to have desires because he was beyond such a state of desire. Ku Huan 顧歡 says in this connection:

Not even to have desire for the state of non-desire: this is the constant quality of the sage. To have desire for this state of non-desire: this is the distinguishing quality of the worthy. By being equally lacking in both kinds of desire, one becomes wholly ‘empty’ and thereby may be called a sage. By having one (kind of desire only) while lacking the other, one can always enter a state of ‘vacuity’ and thereby be called a worthy. The worthy, from the point of view of ‘having’ something, does not have any desire for having desire; but from the point of view of ‘not having,’ he does have desire for not having desire. His ‘vacuity’ is not complete, so how can it be described otherwise than as something ‘frequent’?¹³

This can be understood in two different ways. Either a sage is to have no desires at all and thus his having the desire to have no desires means he cannot be desireless, or, as is probable, the sage is one who has recovered his nature and only has those desires which fit his nature. To have the desire to have no desires indicates that the would-be sage has
extraneous desires and has not yet recovered his nature and wishes to do so.

In opposition to Ho Yen 何景, who held that the sage did not feel emotions, Wang Pi declared that

... where the sage is vitally superior to other men is in his spirit-like intelligence, but where he is like other men is in his having the five emotions. Being superior in his spirit-like intelligence, he is able to identify himself with the harmonious whole, so that he is imbued with non-being (wu 無); but being like others in his five emotions, he cannot but react to things with emotion. The emotions of the sage are such that though he reacts to things, he is not ensnared by them. It is a great error, consequently, to say that because he is not ensnared by things, he therefore has no (emotional) reactions to them.¹⁴

Wang Pi's position seems to be that the sage has no desires yet has the five emotions, a view which, as the connection between emotions and desires is very close conceptually, would be problematic if we took desire in the general sense. Emotions are usually thought of as embodying or causing desires. To be very angry or very sad implies certain kinds of behavior and a desire to do or say certain kinds of things. If we take desire in a particular sense, then we can say that the sage has no desires that are artificial, but has those which are natural and also possesses the emotions which are natural. The sage thus has the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure, and hatred, and shares these with the ordinary person. The only difference between the sage and the ordinary person is that the sage has "spirit-like intelligence" and is "not ensnared by things." One question that arises here concerns the relationship between the naturalness of desires and "not being ensnared by things." Do they imply each other, does accomplishment of one cause the other to be also present, or can they be separated in practice? The Lao Tzu recommends the elimination of extraneous or artificial desires on the part of both sages and populace; does this mean that the populace will also cease to be ensnared by things and thus become sages or will the naturalness of their desires also allow them to be ensnared by things? The issue that is at stake here is whether or not the Taoists, like the Buddhists, are prepared to make a sharp distinction between the sage and the ordinary person. Although the Buddhists ultimately declare that there is no difference between samsara and nirvana, this statement comes at a later part
of their dialectic in which they are concerned about removing a distinction which they felt was practically important. The statement is aimed at particular practitioners who need to realize that the mind of everyday life is the true Buddha-mind. The distinction in general between those who are enlightened and those who are not remains a fundamentally important qualitative distinction. The goal of the Buddhists is that everyone should be freed from the realm of desire and karma no matter how many life-times it takes. Do the Taoists expect everyone to become sages? As suggested earlier, the answer would be in the negative. The Taoists are very soft-sell concerning their recommendations. Wang Pi says: “I do not force other people to follow my teaching, but by means of naturalness I show where its ultimate principles lead. Comply with them and you will surely succeed; oppose them and you will surely fail.”\(^{15}\)

To reduce one’s desires is fine, and to get rid of artificial desires is also fine, as is ceasing to be ensnared by things. They seem to lie on a continuum—achieving one becomes a natural doorway to the other. To reduce desires is not seen as the first step to becoming a sage, although it may be. It is a step away from the complexity that leads one into a self-defeating and unnecessary struggle with the world. Ultimately the Taoists are at least logically committed to the position that living in complexity is also fine: one could not get outside the great circle of the Tao no matter what one did, and there are many ways in which one can be in accord with the Tao. Just whether having gotten rid of artificial desires or finding one’s natural self is extensionally equivalent to not being ensnared by things is of course dependent on one’s view of the natural self. For the Taoists they would seem not to be, while for the Buddhists, who have developed a theory of the self, they would seem to coincide.

Wang Pi speaks of acting with naturalness (tzu-jan 自然) which he interprets as doing the right thing in the right situation. Speaking of the phrase in the *Lao Tzu* (Chap. 25) that the Tao imitates the natural, he says it means” . . . that in square situations it is square, and in round situations it is round.”\(^{16}\) In politics this doctrine meant that one should be open to situations as they developed and not be restricted by traditional solutions. In personal life it came to be understood to mean, especially by some of the members of the group called the Seven Worthies of the Bamboo Grove, not being restricted by the principle of right and wrong, and being spontaneous and direct in the expression of one’s emotions. An excerpt from Hsi K’ang’s, “Discussion of Getting Rid of
Selfishness (*Shih ssu Lun* 評私論)" is included here as a clear statement of this treatment of the emotions:

The heart-minds (*hsin* 心) of those who are called superior people are not involved in right and wrong. . . . When one’s vital force (*ch’i* 氣) is tranquil and one’s spirit is empty, one’s heart-mind does not remain prideful. When one’s body is clear and one’s heart-mind is free, one’s emotions are not attached to things which are desirable. . . . When one’s emotions are not attached to things which are desirable, one is able to judge what is valuable and what is worthless and thus be able to adapt to the patterns by which things function. When one adapts harmoniously to the patterns by which things function, one will not go against the Great Tao. When one transcends names and lets one’s heart-mind be free, one will not be involved in right and wrong. This is why that in speaking of the superior person, it is his not being involved that is considered exceptional. As for inferior people, it is their concealing of their emotions which is considered mistaken and their going against the Tao which is considered a shortcoming. Why is this so? It is because their worst faults are their concealing of their emotions and their arrogance and greed and because the steadfast behavior of the superior person consists in having an empty heart-mind and not being involved. . . . The heart-mind of the superior person is totally free. . . . His emotions are obvious (i.e., out in the open) and he is uninvolved. He does not discuss whether or not something is right before he acts. . . . He lets his heart-mind spontaneously do whatever it wants and yet his heart-mind and what is right are in agreement. . . . As long as a person is open about what is very important to him, it cannot be said that he is not impartial, even if he wants to praise what is good and his emotions are not in accord with the Tao. Now if a person holds to the principle that it is necessary to be impartial and in this way manages to bring his selfish emotions into line, then, even if he has an innate nature which is good, he will still be selfish.

To be natural in the sense described by Hsi K’ang is to act spontaneously on one’s feelings without judgment, evaluation, or self-consciousness. Whether one’s actions or feelings are in accord with the Tao does not seem to be important; what is important is the straightforwardness of one’s actions and the unhindered expression of one’s feelings. This
requires a detachment from the opinions of others and in some sense from things and affairs. That it also takes some courage as well is attested to by the fact that Hsi K'ang was assassinated because of his views and actions. This kind of spontaneous and at times—at least according to many of the stories about the Seven Worthies—whimsical behavior provides another interpretation of having no desires. If one emphasizes the cognitive aspect of desiring and striving, this kind of "natural action" would be spontaneous and minimally goal oriented. Any purposiveness that the action contained would not be due to the conscious, deliberative faculties but would be based on other layers of the personality. Thus if desire is understood in the light of planning, scheming, and imagination, these actions would not be based on desire. This kind of action is also one understanding of the meaning of everything being accomplished by non-action (wu wei erh wu bu wei 無為而無不為), which is an important though puzzling concept of Taoism and which resembles the concept in Ch'an of acting with no-mind (wu-hsin 無心) or no-thought (wu-nien 無念). Huang Po 黃檗, in describing detachment, explains the necessity of putting an end to conceptual thinking:

Why do they not copy me by letting each thought go as though it were a piece of rotten wood, a stone, or the cold ashes of a dead fire? Or else, by just making whatever slight response is suited to each occasion? If you do not act thus, when you reach the end of your days here, you will be tortured by Yama.\textsuperscript{20}

The Buddhist Tao-wu 道悟, who studied with Ma-tsu 馬祖 and Shih-t'ou 石頭, speaks of spontaneous action in a very similar manner to Hsi K'ang.

Give rein to your innate nature and its transcendental roamings. Act according to the exegencies of circumstances in perfect freedom and without any attachment. Just do nothing else but follow the dictates of your ordinary heart-mind.\textsuperscript{21}

A point to be observed about the similarity of these concepts is that Tao-wu was speaking to his student Lung-t'an who had just become enlightened. From the Ch'an point of view, this spontaneity and following of one's innate nature came only when one had become enlightened, or, in other words, when one had realized what one's innate nature was. To act
in this way before one’s enlightenment is to embrace a kind of pseudo-spontaneity. Merely because one does not deliberate before one acts does not mean that one’s actions come from the original mind; there are all sorts of other levels of one’s mind that can produce this kind of behavior. The movement in the United States which came to be known as “beat Zen” is an example of the embracing of this kind of pseudo-spontaneity. There are many kinds of emptiness to be achieved and at times the romantic urge to achieve a mythical bygone innocence will take the cultivated absence of conscience for the emptiness of mystic detachment. One can be just as ensnared by whimsicalness as by things or opinions. Although Hsi K’ang mentions the tranquility of the vital force and the emptiness of the spirit in connection with letting one’s “heart-mind be free,” numerous stories describing the flamboyant and bizarre actions of some of the Seven Worthies suggest that their spontaneity was often a bit cultivated and artificial.22 Although a Ch’an Buddhist might say that they had embraced the wrong kind of emptiness, from the Taoist point of view, if the Seven Worthies were guilty of anything, it would only be of trying to adopt a style or mode of being a Taoist.

Both the Ch’an Buddhists and the Taoists share the strain of optimism about human nature which runs through much of Chinese philosophy. In contrast to most of the European tradition which takes a pessimistic view of human nature “in the raw” and feels that civilization is necessary to blunt the fangs of the human wolf, Taoism feels it is civilization or rather over-civilization that produces such fangs. The constant quest in Chinese philosophy is to find the means of returning a person to the state of rapport with themselves and others and the entire universe. In such a state of balance one would not have to worry about one’s emotions and desires as they would naturally seek and achieve their own levels and objects. Both schools try to steer between the two dangers of individual action, which consist on the one hand of repression of the emotions and on the other of complete license, by allowing license after having achieved a certain state of balance and clarity. In a sense, this resembles the agapè ethic of St. Augustine, which was stated as, “Love God and do as you please.” The gateway to doing as you please or letting your “heart-mind be free” is detachment.

As we have seen in the Lao Tzu, there is a suggestion that the people can be left to do as they wish once they have returned, with the help of the sage, to their primal simplicity. They become detached from or no longer have artificial or lavish desires. The sage’s detachment may
be broader and in a sense more complete. The attitude of the *Chuang Tzu* is much closer to the Buddhists concerning the kind of detachment involved, and the Taoist sage and the enlightened person of the Buddhists overlap in many of their described characteristics. The detachment is not merely from certain things or certain emotions but from things and emotions in general. The *Chuang Tzu* says:

In the case of the emotions, it is best to let them follow where they will. By going along with things, you avoid becoming separated from them. By letting the emotions follow as they will, you avoid fatigue. And when there is no separation or fatigue, then you need not seek any outward adornment or depend upon the body. And when you no longer seek outward adornment or depend upon the body, you have in fact ceased to depend upon any material thing.23

With regard to whether a man can be without feelings (*ch’ing* 情) or not, *Chuang Tzu* tells Hui Tzu that he can. Hui Tzu objects:

“But if you’ve already called him a man, how can he be have no feelings?”

*Chuang Tzu*: “That’s not what I mean by feelings. When I talk about having no feelings, I mean that man doesn’t allow likes and dislikes to get in and do him harm. He just lets things be the way they are and doesn’t try to help life along.”24

In a parallel passage, the Ch’an Buddhist Huai Hai tells one of his students about feelings.

And now with regard to mortality and Buddhahood together with all things whether in the category of being or non-being, you need only have a mind which does not deliberately select and reject, and to have no thought about having no deliberate mind. This is what is designated as having no feeling and having the Buddha-nature. To not be chained to feeling is what is meant by being without feeling. It does not mean not having any feeling at all, like a piece of wood or stone, like the empty air or a yellow flower and the green bamboo.25

The Taoist “Perfect Man uses his mind like a mirror—going after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing,”26 and is thus
able to join in the “cheeping and chirping” or take part in the “great submission.” 27 One’s action takes place in the everyday world of events and things, though one is detached from clinging:

As I see it, there is nothing complicated. Just in an ordinary way, wear your robes and eat your food, and having no special tasks, pass your time. From everywhere you have come here; all of you eagerly seek the Buddha, the Dharma, and deliverance; you seek escape from the Three Worlds. You foolish people, if you want to get out of the Three Worlds, where can you then go? 28

By realizing that, though you eat the whole day through, no single grain has passed your lips; and that a day’s journey has not taken you a single step forward—also by uniformly abstaining from such notions as ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Do not permit the events of your daily lives to bind you, but never withdraw yourselves from them. Only by acting thus can you earn the title of ‘A Liberated One.’ 29

A Vinaya Master named Yuan once came and asked (Hui Hai) “Do you make efforts in your practice of the Way, Master?”

M: “Yes, I do.”
Q: “How?”
M: “When hungry, I eat; when tired, I sleep.”
Q: “And does everybody make the same efforts as you do master?”
M: “Not in the same way.”
Q: “Why not?”
M: “When they are eating, they think of a hundred kinds of necessities, and when they are going to go to sleep they ponder over affairs of a thousand different kinds. That is how they differ from me.” 30

Despite this congruence between the Ch’ an Buddhists and some of the Taoists in their manner of handling the emotions, there is a different tonality in approach and practice in obtaining the state of detachment and impartiality. If both schools steer a course between the extremes of repression of the emotions and complete license, it might be said, though of course with some exaggeration, that each school approaches detachment through one of the extremes. The Taoists, at least the ones we have chosen to examine, emphasize freedom, uniqueness, and individuality. The individual is to let go of distinctions and judgments,
follow the Tao, and travel the bird-like path. One can begin by following one's feelings, for this requires a detachment which grows broader and becomes the "great detachment." If one can truly become his own unique self, then he will be in closest rapport with the Tao. Taoist impartiality comes from the belief that there are only unique, individual things in the world, each of which is the measure of itself alone and is unable to judge any other thing by its own private standards. All things are also worth the same and cannot, even on their own grounds, assume a privileged position. Desires and emotions are only problematic when they lead one out of oneself in order to imitate some alleged abstract commonality of things. Such over-extension of oneself leaves one without the support of the Tao; one loses one's innate powers (te 德), which are the gift of the Tao, and as a result one becomes dependent upon things. Despite much speculation to the contrary, the philosophical Taoists seem to have little to say concerning such specific disciplines as meditation and yoga. If there is a practice mentioned by Taoists like Chuang Tzu, it consists of the practice of forgetting—of forgetting distinctions, judgments, and measures for oneself and others.

Much of this apparently changes as philosophical Taoism and various religious elements merge (if that is the way it actually happened), and Taoism becomes associated with a monastic system. But here again the openness of Taoism asserts itself, allowing such things as sexual techniques, alchemy, magic, spiritualism, scholarship, fortune-telling and the great detachment to gather under the same roof.

Ch'an, deriving its unique tonality from its playfulness, iconoclasm, paradox, and nominalism, still presupposes a firm foundation of traditional Buddhist theory and practice. One is encouraged to practice the Triple Discipline even though the tradition of the Chinese masters is to finally convince the student that his discipline is to be regarded as a final obstacle in the way of, rather than as a bridge to, enlightenment. "Desire" is used as a technical term and means the way a person mistakenly clings to phenomena in order to support the existence of a false self. It is through ignorance (wu ming 無明) that one misperceives the nature of oneself and objects. Through the opening of the mind's eye one perceives the nature of reality and becomes free of clinging or desire. Since in Ch'an an adept usually begins with a strong dose of method and technique, it is important at some point to get rid of the student's very attachment to the method and theory with which he has begun. The
student must be pried off the raft of Buddhism after he has scrambled aboard.

The Three Vehicles and the Twelve Divisions of the Teachings are all dirty old paper for cleaning up messes. The Buddha is an illusory phantom. The patriarchs are old monks. You yourselves, are you not born of a mother? If you seek the Buddha, you will be caught by the Buddha-Mara; if you seek the patriarchs, you will be bound by the patriarch-Mara. Whatever you are seeking, all becomes suffering. It is better to have nothing further to seek.33

Ch’an developed a practice of certification of the state of mind achieved by the disciple which tends to create a uniform tradition concerning legitimate and illegitimate experiences. It also sustains the distinctions between the enlightened state and the non-enlightened state—a distinction which does not hold very clearly in the Taoist tradition. Despite some Buddhist treatment of the Taoist word ming 明 as if it were a synonym for one of the Chinese terms Ch’an used for enlightenment, wu 悟, the Taoists do not use ming this way themselves. It is used more as Graham suggests as “throwing things open to the light,”34 and means being able to see the laws of things. The Taoists also do not try to funnel their students towards a carefully defined state of mind, so that in a sense there are many more ways of being a Taoist than there are ways of being a Ch’an Buddhist.

NOTES


2 For the most complete treatment of this Hua-hu 化胡 tradition about Lao Tzu converting foreigners, see the last chapter of Erik Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China (Leiden: Brill, 1959).


4 For ‘sparrow-like’ person, see A Concordance to Chuang Tzu, Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Seres, Supplement No. 20 (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-

5 Although in his commentary Wang Pi makes it explicit that it is the people who are meant here, the text of the Lao Tzu itself does not, and it seems uncertain to us.

6 It does not seem necessary to give references other than chapters for the Lao Tzu. All translations are our own unless otherwise noted. However, in most cases in which we refer to a translation, we have made a few changes.

7 Or at least, compared to Buddhism, this would probably be true of such texts as the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu, although it may well not be true of the later so-called religious Taoism. For some discussion and quite a few references to studies of the questions of terminology and the philosophical or religious nature of early Taoism, see N. J. Girardot, "Myth and Meaning in the Tao Te Ching: Chapters 25 and 42," History of Religions, 16, No. 4 (May, 1977), pp. 295–296.

8 N. Sivin has recently made such a suggestion. See his article cited in n. 3 above.


17 The term for "free," jen 任, might also be translated "to let it alone" or "to let it do whatever it wants."

18 "Impartial (kung 公)" is the approximate antonym in this essay of "selfishness (ssu 私)."


22 For most of these stories, see Richard B. Mather, trans., Shih shuo Hsin yü: A New Account of Tales of the World, by Liu I-ch’ing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976).


30 Hui Hai 懐海, John Blofeld, trans., The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai on Sudden Illumination (London: Rider and Co., 1962), p. 95–96. We have been unable to identify the Chinese text from which this is translated.

31 Note the following, which might be thought of as a kind of variation of this idea, suggested by Anna Seidel. “Even Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advocated the reduction of desires, and that too was a kind of reversal of the Tao, since it meant the negation of what the individual naturally wanted to do.” “The Bellagio Conference on Taoist Studies,” History of Religions, 9. Nos. 2 & 3 (Nov., 1969/Feb., 1970), p. 110.

32 For example, by K. Schipper. See Ibid., p. 108.

33 Lin chi lu, op. cit., p. 499C.20–24; Demiéville, Entretiens, op. cit., p. 103; and Schloegl, The Zen Teaching, op. cit., p. 38.

The Pure and the Impure: The Mencian Problematik in Chinese Buddhism

Whalen W. Lai

In the study of comparative religion, one learns to be sensitive to the problem involved in re-presenting another tradition. Have we present its vision faithfully? Have we asked even the right questions? Have we not imposed our framework upon it, merely by trying to understand it in another language? Can we ever understand one another fully? The hermeneutics can get hopelessly involved. Perhaps there is no need to despair, for it is good that we do not understand each other fully. A monologue with an identical mind can be boring. It is even fortunate that we may not fully understand, for then we can always find something new and more to learn or to un-learn about one another.

The history of religions, too, would have suffered from too perfect an understanding. The Christian faith would be much poorer if Yahweh had not been ‘rationally’ aligned with ontos. It is true that theologians might not have asked the right questions—God is always more than the Unmoved Mover. However, theologians have asked legitimate questions—God cannot be less than the Unmoved Mover. So too, Chinese Buddhism or sinitic Mahāyāna had asked certain questions of the Buddha-Dharma that might, at first glance, be somewhat alien to the Indian. However, these legitimate questions had precisely nurtured the growth of the faith in China. Thus in ignorance we ask; in wisdom the answers are given. We knock at the gate of Truth, and the Truth that transcends and transforms cultural limits, opens up a new vista unseen before.¹ In this essay, I will look into the survival of a Classical Chinese concern in sinitic Mahāyāna self-reflection, the Mencian concern (or problematik) dealing with the problem of human nature, hsing 性. Is human nature good 善 or evil 惡? Translated into the more mystical vocabulary of the Buddhist, the question becomes the perennial sinitic Mahāyāna controversy over: Is the mind ultimately pure 淨 or ultimately impure 染?

The history of Chinese Buddhist thought can be reviewed in terms of this basic question. In an early classic, Busshō no kenkyū 佛性の研究
(1934)² by Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定, the whole history of the doctrine of Buddha-nature was recaptured, beginning with India, passing onto China and concluding with Japan. It is very difficult not to accept this retrospective history once the reader accepts the basic premise spelled out in the introduction: that the doctrine of Buddha-nature is the heart and soul of Mahāyāna. And yet the irony is that, not till very recently,³ few Western scholars of the Mahāyāna tradition would think of the issue of Buddha-nature as the “one thread” passing through all Buddhist traditions.⁴ The reason why Far Eastern Buddhists can see this “thread” is due to the fact that the doctrine of universal Buddha-nature had become a definitive dogma for Mahāyāna in the Far East. Thus, to cite an illuminating incidence, the Fa-hsiang 法相 school based upon the Indian Mahāyāna lineage of Yogācāra 像迦 scholarship represented by Dharmapala has had the curious (to the Indian, perhaps incomprehensible) fate of being denounced as crypto-Hinayāna because it held onto the idea of pañcagotra 五種性 (five types of men with different seeds), among which is the icchantika 一闡提 (beings destitute of the seed of enlightenment, i.e. Buddha-nature). Yet, objectively speaking, the pañcagotra and the icchantika doctrine are found clearly in authentic Mahāyāna works. What happened in the Far East then is that one sūtra, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, had exerted exceptional influence in its Buddhist circles. The “Mencian problematik” (inherited from pre-Buddhist times) had helped to define the Mahāyāna identity to such an extent that from this new credal perspective, all past traditions were reviewed and sometimes judged. This, in one sense, is comparable to the Christian theological review of the Hebraic tradition, in that a new perspective forced the ‘Old Testament’ to be so redefined (as prophecies pointing to the ‘New Covenant’). Mature sinitic Mahāyāna also redefined the telos of the Buddha-Dharma, finding, of course, the goal of Ekayāna in the individual schools in Chinese Buddhism.

My intention below is to trace the legacy of the Mencian problematik, primarily from the Chinese side and noting only in passing Indian parallels to it. My intention is not to defend philosophically the sinitic thesis; Tokiwa has done that admirably and ‘subjectively’. I want to depict in broad outlines how the Mencian thesis had informed the history and direction of Chinese Buddhist thought. The general survey below focuses on key Buddhist controversies in China, leading to the famous Ch’an debate between the northern and the southern school
(and somewhat beyond that). The survey is based in part on more specific studies I made.\(^5\)

1. THE MENCIAN PROBLEMATIK: THE CLASSICAL OPTIONS

Confucians are generally not ontological thinkers, but the issue of human nature, *hsing*, perhaps figured as their one ontological concern.\(^6\) Confucius was not known to discourse much on *hsing*, but the *hsing* issue crystallized some time later among the Confucians (and not, at first and not for some time, among the Taoists).\(^7\) The classical debate was first between Kao-tzu and Mencius, and then between Mencians and Hsun-tzu.

Kao-tzu had an ‘organic’ view of *hsing*, aligning the term with a root-word, *sheng* 生, denoting life. *Hsing* is simply what pertains to life such that food and sex are *hsing*. Kao-tzu held that “human nature is neither predisposed to good nor to evil, just as water is neither disposed to flow east or west.” His was the neutralist position. Mencius, on the other hand, offered a more socio-ethical definition of *hsing*. There are natural bends to nature just as willows have certain grains and water the tendency to flow downward. For Mencius, the natural tendencies are good. All men naturally have the “mind of commiseration”; instinctively we would run ahead to save a falling child by the edge of a well. One needs only to nurture this innate beginning of good and, if successfully done, and in good time, one might become ethically in tune to the universe.\(^8\)

Hsun-tzu came later and ridiculed the Mencian ideals of “the whole street full of sages” and staked his claim on the famous lines: “The nature of man is evil; his goodness is acquired.” Men incline toward evil and without acquiring learning and decorum from without (instead of from within) through the institutions and norms established by the extraordinary sages, chaos would reign.\(^9\) Confucians have been split ever since between the realist Hsun-tzu who argued for external control and the idealist Mencius who proposed a natural unfolding of the innate good in man. The Taoist had generally avoided the issue of *hsing*, but its concept of a transcendental mind (*hsü-ming* ling-chüeh hsien 虛明靈覺心)\(^10\) comes close to a mystical notion of the nature of man as being beyond the mundane ‘good’ and ‘evil’ distinctions. The classical positions can be summarized as follows:
Kao-tzu  Hsing is neutral, malleable.
Mencius  Hsing is good, seminal, to be nurtured from within.
Hsun-tzu  Hsing is evil, malleable for good by external norms.

Related but distinct from this concern with hsing, was the issue of mind, hsin 心. There is close alliance between hsin and hsing in Mencius, for whom the completion of the one leads to the other. Hsun-tzu apparently inherited the idea of a rational-cognitive mind from the Mohist as well as the mystical mind from Chuang-tzu. He spoke of two sides to the mind, the jen-hsin 人心 pertaining to selfish man and the tao-hsin 道心 pertaining to the impartial Tao. The active mind, when calmed, can be detached, alert and ethically discriminative (choosing the good). Neither Mencius nor Hsun-tzu talked in radical terms concerning human nature. Mencius admitted of the beginning of good, not de facto good. Hsun-tzu acknowledged only inclinations to evil, not radical, incorrigible evil (like Pauline Christianity). Both believed in the perfectability of the human character in liberal or restricted numbers.

The Mencian problematik—by which I mean the whole range of options—became a lasting heritage, vis a vis which the later thinkers, Confucian or Buddhist, had to take a stand.

2. THE REDEFINITION OF THE ISSUE IN HAN YIN-YANG PHILOSOPHY

Doctrines of a universal sort were somewhat put aside in the more down-to-earth and administration-inclined or -related philosphies of the Han dynasty. In the new yin-yang outlook, the issue of human nature was redefined both quantitatively (how much good yang element and how much greedy yin element in man and in the more yin-inclined woman) and in terms of a psychological sequence. “By birth (sheng 生), man is passive; this is his heaven-endowed nature (hsing 性). In responding to external things, man becomes active [and grasping]; this is the desiring aspect of his nature.” This formula from the chapter on music in the Li-chi is the classical Han formula. Hsing is yang, is good, is associated with mind; yin dominates in the other sphere of ch'ing, feelings, and of nien 念 (thoughts, concepts) and lü 虑 (reflections, also implying [mental] burdens). Liu Hsiang 劉向 had a ‘deviant’ alignment for he put yin as the passive origin and yang as the active consequence;
he also questioned the simple alignment of good and evil with yin and yang, 隱陽 hsing and ch'ing 性情。11

Since the ideal of government was sometimes thought to be an imitation of the impartial heaven, there arose a dominant theory that the sages (sheng 聖), like Confucius, are without feelings 聖人無情, for feeling drags the sage-composure down to the vicissitude of common people. Yen Hui 顏回 being a virtuous one (hsien 賢) shed tears but Confucius was, like the gods defined in terms of “divine impassivity,”12 immune to such human reactions. That ideal of supermen free from sentiency (‘feeling”) actually anticipated the ‘Hinayanist’ notion of the Buddha as being above ‘sentiency’ and dwelling in a dispassionate ‘nirvāṇa-cool’.13 There were, however, rebel thinkers. Wang Pi, probably inheriting from Liu Hsiang, opposed Ho Yen’s thesis of the “impassive sage” and depicted the sage (Confucius) showing emotions (‘crying over his disciple’s death’) without however being burdened down (lei 累) by his “natural show of sentiments.” Sages respond (yin 唯) to things (wu 物) without really being affected by them.14 In this, Wang Pi set up the paradigm for much of the early understanding of the Mahāyāna bodhisattva, who too was “in but not of the world.”

The transition from Neo-Taoism to Buddhism, however, might have hinged on a crucial hsing difference. Kuo Hsiang, commenting on the Chuang tzu, defined freedom (hsiao-yao 消遙) in terms of even common men living in tune to the cosmic Tao by fulfilling their allotted nature (hsing).15 For so doing, Kuo Hsiang has sometimes been condemned as preaching fatalism, when in actual fact, he might have permitted both “the roc” (the great man with great freedom) and “the cicada” (the smaller guy to whose lot most of us probably belong) to attain union with the Tao. At any rate, it appears that some followers of Kuo Hsiang took too literal a view of “freedom as living with one’s hsing” and were not prepared when the monk Chih Tun, passing by these discusants at the White Horse temple, raised a simple question: “If, indeed, freedom is nothing more than living out one’s hsing, then would not the evil monarchs of the past, who merely indulged their natural impulses, be considered to reach hsiao-yao too?”16 A Neo-Confucian in the post-Buddhist period would have given a good retort to Chih Tun, but apparently the poverty of philosophy among those contemporaries of Chih Tun prevented a good answer. We may take this incidence as the watershed between the classical (Confucian) understanding of man
and the medieval (Buddhist) conception. The Buddhists would seek for a ‘higher’ self as well as a ‘higher’ li principle, transcending the human and the natural world of the Confucians and the Taoists. Above all, the category describing the hsin changed from the Mencian ‘good vs. evil’ and the Han ‘passive vs. active’ to the new concern: the ‘pure vs. impure’ dichotomy.

3. THE DISCOVERY OF THE ‘FO-HSING’ BODHISATTVAPRATIBODHINISH'TA CONCEPTION

Soon after the time of Chih Tun, Tao-sheng discovered, for subsequent Chinese Buddhist history, the doctrine of universal buddha-nature. Before tracing that development, an outline of the anatman doctrine in early Buddhist thought in India is called for.

Gautama the Buddha is said to have proposed a doctrine of no-self or “absence of any lasting substance.” In that sense, the ontological issue of hsin should have been blackballed at an early date in Buddhist reflection. All realities (within saṃsāra) are of the nature of suffering, impermanence and without self. The five heaps (skandhas) making up our being are generally negatively defined as being defiled by burning passion for life. Much of Buddhist meditation was then directed at cleansing the six faculties (the senses and the mind). This being the case, Buddhism should have supported a theory of “existential impurity” that Hsun-tzu would be sympathetic toward.

When Mahāyāna crystallized, a major set of sūtras—the prajñāpāramitā corpus—went on to denounce any conception of self-nature (svabhāva). It, too, would not have supported a notion of hsin, except the notion of a general emptiness (k’ung-hsin, śāntipāramitā空性) prevailing over all things empty of nature (hsing-k’ung性空). In denouncing conceptual opposites, the emptiness philosophy would not support a Mencian-like idea of a “pure self.” However, a later set of Mahāyāna sūtras, now identified as the tathāgatagarbha corpus, set a new positive tone and proposed a doctrine of an innately pure mind, buddha-nature, buddha-seed, embryonic buddhas, etc. The possibility of reinstating an atman-like concept of an enlightenment essence in all beings, drawn from and identical with the cosmic wisdom of the transmundane Buddha, emerged in Mahāyāna soteriology. This development permits an optimistic evaluation of human potentials.

Around the same time, another set of Mahāyāna works, associated with the Yogācāra tradition, delved into the deeper aspects of human consciousnesses. It uncovered the ālayavijñāna, storehouse conscious-
ness. Generally, this innermost store of ideations can be considered to be neutral, being a reservoir of good and bad seeds (bijas) conducive to delusion/enlightenment. However, as it is, the human consciousness is polluted until and unless it is purified and nirvāṇa-oriented. Although it is oversimplifying to list the Yogācāras' supposed stand on whether the mind is pure or impure in the following manner, yet to do so (1) introduces the strength of the Mencian problematik as the Chinese Buddhists generally saw it; (2) underlines the fact that the options were there in India—even if Indian Buddhists themselves never saw the issues in such a clear light; and (3) shows that the Chinese had cleverly explored or exploited such latent tensions in India. It is not the intention here to deal fully with the Indian contributions. The possible Chinese parallels are added in the right column for reference.\(^2\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theravāda</th>
<th>The faculties are polluted and impure as they are; they may be purified in time.</th>
<th>Alliable to Hsun-tzu: evil nature can be eradicated.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tathāgata-garbha</td>
<td>The mind is essentially pure but accidentally defiled.</td>
<td>Closest to Mencius: essential goodness needs only a recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogācāra</td>
<td>The ālayavijñāna is existentially impure, but seeds of purity may exist.</td>
<td>In its analytical aspect, amenable to yin-yang quantitative analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śūnyavāda</td>
<td>All things are empty in nature; even the mind or consciousness is empty.</td>
<td>Perhaps paralleled by Chung-tzu, especially on the concept of no-mind.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the Indian Buddhists would accept or at least never repudiate the doctrine of anātman.

Chinese Buddhists accepted, after Tao-sheng, a doctrine of universal Buddha-nature on the basis of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. There was already current in Chinese Buddhist circles prior to Tao-sheng the doctrine of the immortality of the soul 神不滅. The soul, *shen*, was seen both as the agent of transmigration and as the divine spark leading to nirvanic bliss. (Logically speaking, aside from being heretical, this ātman notion so conceived contains inner contradictions.) The discovery
of the fo-hsing 佛性 concept solved the problem somewhat. Tao-sheng made a distinction between the absence of a self in nirvāṇa 無生滅我 and the transcendental existence of a buddha-nature self 有佛性我, a mahā-atman that the sūtra itself proposed. The latter, though permanent and blissful, etc. 常我淨樂, was also cautiously defined as being “neither being nor non-being” 既非非有.21 One must see part of the reason for the popularity of this doctrine of universal buddha-nature in the unconscious Mencian humanism that “every man can be Yao and Shun” 人人皆可為堯舜 and in the ingenious manner in which Dharmakṣema gave the Chinese the ‘perfectly’ smooth line: chung-sheng chieh-yu fo-hsing 衆生皆有佛性. The etymological sheng 生-hsing 性 connection was made (a la Kao-tzū) and a complex and ambiguous Indian idea (as Rawlinson has shown above22) attained a clarity in Chinese that was seldom questioned.

One of the basic ambiguities in the fo-hsing concept was responsible for the “subitist vs. gradualist enlightenment” debate. On the one hand, buddha-nature was defined as the “seed leading to enlightenment”; the suggestion there is that it is not yet enlightenment de facto. As a seed, this basic cause (cheng-yin 正因) requires conditioned causes (yūn-yin 綠因: conditions, pratyaya) like [knowledge of] the nidanas or fulfillments of the six pāramitās, before it can flower into the result (kuo 果), namely, buddhahood or nirvāṇa. If it relies on additional conditions, it would appear that the gradualists have a case. On the other hand, there are repeated references to the fact that the fo-hsing is identical with tathatā, suchness, Dharmakāya, law-body, etc., so the subitist can have a strong case. After all, in the not-two (advaya) absolute, sentient beings and the Buddha are “not-two.” Furthermore, because the seed-cause is a material cause (in the Aristotelean sense), it subsists unchanged as it attains enlightenment and therefore qualifies to be designated as “essential buddha-nature” (and not just potential buddha-nature).23 The heart of the matter is that the causative thinking exemplified by the Buddhist tradition represented a philosophy of progress or (to wit) process philosophy. The translation of this dynamic causative philosophy into a sinitic ontology of essence (hsing understood as being, ontos) necessarily creates logical problems. Already in his own life-time, Tao-sheng proposed “sudden enlightenment” 但 because the ‘ontologization’ of Indian thought was not complete, Tao-sheng was defeated by the ‘gradualist’ Hui-kuan 慈觀. However, the seed of the future Ch’ an split was sown. In time, the refinement of thinking and
of concepts provides the necessary conditions for the controversy to be relit in the eighth century.

The rest of this essay is devoted to a survey of major controversies, some legendary, (that is, retrojected), others ideologically real but polemical (like the Ch’an debate in the Platform Sūtra) and still others historical but with little impact (like the Sung T’ien-t’ai case). The cases serve to demonstrate the overriding concern for the “pure vs. impure” paradigm among the Chinese, and even if such labels misled, they were real enough to precipitate real or legendary schisms. There is a general progression in time toward sharper and more refined conflicts. To highlight this, the following table shows the key points involved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICTS</th>
<th>ISSUE</th>
<th>KEY FIGURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (legendary)</td>
<td>Mahāyāna meditation on principle or true nature defeated ‘Hinayāna’ meditation on samsaric impurities.</td>
<td>Bodhidharma vs. Seng-ch’ou or Hui-k’o vs. Tao-ho in Ch’an legend or history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (scholastic)</td>
<td>Controversy around the issue whether the ālayavijañāna is pure, impure or both.</td>
<td>The early Yogācāra schools in China (plus later Fa-hsiang).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (doctrinal)</td>
<td>Tension surfaced between a concept of a dialectic and holistic mind and a concept of a dynamic and pure mind.</td>
<td>T’ien-t’ai’s Madhyamika vs. the new Hua-yen “Mind Only” idealism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (definitive)</td>
<td>Doctrine of universal buddha-nature defeats supporters of the icchāntika doctrine.</td>
<td>Hua-yen against Fa-hsiang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (climatic)</td>
<td>Fine doctrinal points hidden in the polemics in the Platform Sūtra.</td>
<td>Hui-neng vs. Shen-hsiu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (historic)</td>
<td>Orthodox T’ien-t’ai confronted Hua-yen influence within itself.</td>
<td>Chih-li vs. the heretical group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. BODHIDHARMA CH’AN AND CONFLICTS WITH HINAYANA PESSIMISM

Early Ch’an history is clouded with myths which function to delineate the supremacy of the new meditation technique of Bodhidharma. The essay “On Two Entrances and Four Practices” 二入四行 is still believed by many Ch’an scholars to represent the teaching of Bodhidharma. The entrance by the transcendental principle is described as follows:

Entrance by Principle is the recognition of the Way in the sūtras and confidence in the possession of the chen-hsing 真性 (true nature) by all beings, which, being hidden by external delusions, is not directly seen (for what it is). Abandon the false, abide by the true, practice wall-meditation: the distinction between self and object, the high and the low (i.e. two) truths will disappear.24

The “true-nature” hidden by delusion seems to recall the tathāgatagarbha (synonym of buddha-nature) that too is covered by defilements. Perhaps this was one new element in the early Ch’an tradition, for we also read in a letter by Hui-k’o, the direct disciple of Bodhidharma:

From the beginning, men have been deluded about the nature of the mani-pearl and confused it with mere rubble [that covers it]. Awaken yourself now immediately to its existence and you will see that ignorance and enlightenment are the same and all realities, as they are, immediately are suchness itself . . . [and] the ‘I’ and the ‘Buddha’ are not two.25

The mani-pearl may be a metaphor to describe the hidden tathāgata-garbha behind the rubble. Put into water, this pearl is supposed to be able to purify the liquid. In this sense, the early Ch’an tradition subscribed to a doctrine of a “true nature” that transcended and transformed all relativities.

In Ch’an legend, the meditative master Seng-ch’ou and the followers of Tao-ho were depicted as the ‘villains’. Seng-ch’ou was famous probably for his Hinayanist ‘corpse meditation’ for even beasts were awed by this death-contemplation. Ch’ou practised the fourfold mindfulness according to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.

A youth of a good family . . . should contemplate on his body from head to toe as being nothing more than hair, nail, tooth, impurities,
filth, skin, flesh, muscles etc . . . (realizing) that the skeleton is produced by causes (made up of various separate bones linked to each other). . . (so that he may) sever the three (human) desires for (physical) form, beauty and contact . . . .

Compared with the more intuitive, anti-analytical and transcendental meditation upon the true self, Ch'ou's technique apparently was still fixated with phenomenal, samsaric, causative particulars. Actually, more advanced meditation taught by Seng Ch'ou might not be that different from Bodhidharma's.27 However, the Ch'an history dissociated Ch'an from Ch'ou's circle. Tao-ho, another yogin, was depicted also as denouncing Hui-k'o's new teachings and even plotted his death many times over. True or not, these legends set the tone of the alleged conflict: on the one hand, a Mencian (or Chuang-tzu-type of) "intuitive mind" awaiting recovery while, on the other hand, Seng-ch'ou's reliance on rational externals and Hsun-tzu-type of analytism.

5. HUI-SSU'S MAHAYANA 'CHIH-KUAN' AND THE CH'ENG-SHIH 'HINAYANISTS'28

The T'ien-t'ai tradition depicts a comparable conflict between the emerging T'ien-t'ai school and the established Ch'eng-shih 成實 (論) (Tattvasiddhi, a treatise by Harivarman) schoolmen in the south. Hui-ssu was similarly persecuted and even poisoned, but being a great yogin, he dispelled the poison from his body. He realized then:

My present ailments are all due to karma, which has its source in the mind. There is originally no external realm. Turning inward, look into the source of this mind. Realize that there actually is (even) no karma to grasp hold of and that the body itself is just cloud and shadow. There is only external form. There is no inner substance.

With this perhaps Hui-ssu discovered the T'ien-t'ai concept of the Mind. From the new perspective (see section 7 below), T'ien-t'ai (and a contemporary school, San-lun 三論) denounced the Ch'eng-shih masters as being 'pro-Hinayanist'. The conflict here had many facets, but I will dwell on their differences concerning Buddha-nature.

Although the doctrine of Buddha-nature was not present in the Lotus Sutra,29 the T'ien-t'ai school accepted it as scriptural and held to the idea that Buddha-nature is pen-yu 本有 "originally present (in man)."
Buddha-nature is a de facto reality. The Ch'eng-shih masters were alleged then to have an inferior idea of man having only a de jure possession of buddha-nature 當有, the seed of enlightenment being only of an acquired status, shih-yu 始有. Indeed, the Ch'eng shih lun itself did not mention the buddha-nature doctrine, but then almost all the Ch'eng-shih masters were also masters of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra. They all could not have fallen into this inferior camp of "incipientist" and "gradualist."

Perhaps what actually happened then was that the distinction was finally made, for the first time, between the logic of incipiency and the logic of de facto possession. The terms, pen 本 and shih 始, came into vogue in the late Six Dynasties period and somehow found their way into Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna. The undifferentiated 'process' philosophy of cause-condition-effect was redefined 'ontologically'. As a consequence of the sharpening of the irreconcilable categories pen and shih, the earlier spokesmen for buddha-nature were grouped under the 'inferior' category of incipientists. Buddha-nature was further defined a-causatively by Hui-yüan 慧遠 and by Chi-tsang 吉藏. There was then a new class of buddha-nature beyond the old "three-cause, five-result" (三因五果) category: the new fei-yin-fei-kuo (neither cause nor effect) fo-shing 非因非果佛性. This transcendental buddha-nature was also known in some circles as the principle (li) fo-hsing as distinct from the 'older' practice-oriented (hsing行) fo-hsing. (Li-hsing are the words used in Budhidharma's treatise cited earlier.) How and when this re-conceptualization occurred is still not clear. 31 The Ratnāgotravibhāga might have something to do with it.

The result is that, in the Sui period, it was no longer orthodox just to hold onto a doctrine of universal buddha-nature. It was also necessary to define more exactly what the nature of this buddha-nature was. The supposedly more muddled thinkers of a previous era, the Ch'eng-shih masters, were disowned. However, the pen-shih dichotomy only pointed toward a more Either/Or controversy to come.

6. THE 'ĀLAYAVIJNĀNA: IS IT PURE, IMPURE, DELUDED OR MIXED?

The pervasiveness of the buddha-nature doctrine was such that I suspect, when the Yogācāra philosophy was made known to the Chinese in the late sixth century, the natural question of whether the ālayavijnāna was or was not the (pure) buddha-nature surfaced. As a result, traditionally the various Yogācāra schools in China were classified in terms of
this central question: Is the ālayavijñāna pure or not? Now, it is entirely possible to classify the world’s religions in theocentric terms like theism, monotheism, atheism, pantheism and polytheism etc., and it is too often done. The classification is not illegitimate but it tells you more about the classifier than about the classified. Similarly, in so labelling the various Yogācāra schools in China on the pure-impure spectrum, the Chinese might not face up to the challenge of the new philosophy as such. The ontological status of the ālayavijñāna is really secondary (and should be defined ambivalently as “identity without substance” like “moving waves” etc.). The key function of the ālayavijñāna is the epistemic role it plays in the process of liberation. However, since we are dealing with the Chinese perception of the issue and the Mencian problematik, we will present the traditional evaluation of the schools uncritically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ti-lun school (Daśabhūmika Śāstra)</th>
<th>northern branch under Bodhiruci</th>
<th>ālayavijñāna not identical with (pure) suchness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>She-lun school (Mahāyāna Saṃgraha)</td>
<td>ālayavijñāna is a mixture of the pure and impure</td>
<td>amalavijñāna, ninth consciousness above ālayavijñāna, is pure, is suchness and buddha-nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa-hsiang school (Vijñāptimatrata Śiddhi)</td>
<td>ālayavijñāna is existentially impure, does not eventually participate in pariniśpanna.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The real options are usually given as chen-shih 真識 (Ratnamati), wang-shih 妄識 (Hsüan-tsang) and chen-wang ho-ho shih 和合識 (Paramartha). And given the Mencian subcurrent in Buddhist thought, it is not surprising to note that it is the Mencian representative (the southern branch of the Ti-lun school in the form of its ideological successor, the Huayen school) that triumphed in the end. Hsüan-tsang’s following was summarily, and unjustly, denounced as Hinayanist under the wang label. His group was the “Hsün-tzu” black sheep in the fold.
7. T'ien-t'ai Versus Hua-yen: Idealism Differentiated Further

By the seventh century, in prosperous T'ang, the doctrine of a pure Buddha-nature core in all things was axiomatic and was a pillar to all sinitic schools (minus Fa-hsiang, the condemned ‘deviant’; see section 8 below). Both T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen accepted the doctrine of universal buddhahood, *pen-yu* and some form of sudden enlightenment. Both were monist schools, denying ultimate dualities, and both emphasized the idealism of the mind. The “pure versus impure” tension was or had to be much more refined when it came to their doctrinal differences. The differences touched upon three areas: (a) holistic monism and radical “Mind Only”, (b) a curious doctrine of nature as evil in T'ien-t'ai, and (c) dialectics versus dynamism. The three are interrelated and historically Hua-yen owed much to T'ien-t'ai which it sought to undermine. The following treatment has to be very preliminary and concise.

T'ien-t'ai’s Chih-i 智顎 was committed to Ekayāna 一乘 and, philosophically, to a holistic view of mind and reality. In that sense, he was less interested in “purity” than in unity. The basic doctrine in T'ien-t'ai is that Reality is a harmony of opposites: all things are simultaneously false phenomena 假, emptiness 空 and the mean 中. The mean affirms and negates the provisionally real and the illusory. Chih-i’s philosophy would not eliminate ‘evil’ (a negative reality) from consideration. In the holistic whole, even evil has a place—affirmed, negated and finally integrated, by the ‘round’ (perfect) T'ien-t'ai dialectics listed above. Consequently, T'ien-t'ai did not emphasize only the “pure mind” or “buddha-nature” (which it accepted as axiomatic) but in its realistic meditation technique, it had always placed emphasis on meditation upon the deluded mind as the primary and also major step toward attaining wholeness and purity. Since all things are interrelated in an endless dialectical matrix of relationships, i.e. all-in-one and one-in all, T'ien-t'ai accepted the presence of the saving Buddha in hell (the lowest reality). The Buddha has his mission to save the damned. However, in reverse, T'ien-t'ai also accepted the presence of hell (evil) in nirvāṇa because any one item is present in all. In its realistic humanism, T'ien-t'ai accepted a doctrine of ‘(human) nature as evil’ 性惡, precisely the term associated with Hsun-tzu, and went one step further to posit the doctrine of the ‘evil Buddha’ itself! By that is meant that the Buddha, although he had eliminated the acquired evils pertaining to physical and mental *karma*, still retains his innate *(hsing)* ‘evilness’ for the sole purpose of being able to move freely in the impure realms and save other
beings.\textsuperscript{34} This is not that difficult to visualize if we keep the above dialectics (“Buddha in hell and hell in nirvāṇa”) in mind and recall the more-cautiously-put doctrine in Christianity concerning the assumption of full humanity (minus sin, though) by Christ. Thus, the T’ien-t’ai doctrine-of (pure) buddha-nature for all notwithstanding, Chih-i or his followers had set up a subdivision of a “nature as evil” within the above axiom and thereby invited the critique from Hua-yen.

The Hua-yen school came after T’ien-t’ai and incorporated the Yogācāra tradition much more than would T’ien-t’ai, which was basically committed to Madhyamika. One of the doctrines that the Hua-yen school had was that “The three realms are created by the (true) Mind Only.” This one line, in the \textit{Hua yen ching} (\textit{Avatamsaka Sūtra}) as read through Chinese eyes (particularly Hui-yuan’s 真心),\textsuperscript{35} became the basis for a “Mind Only” philosophy that literally reduced all external realities (“three realms”) to be projections of the One True Mind. Whereas T’ien-t’ai preserved to some extent the mind-reality (\textit{citta-rūpa 心色}) tension (or ‘dualism’ 二元 although this term is misleading since all dualities are ultimately resolved by the dialectical whole or monism), Hua-yen offered unadulterated philosophical idealism: all is mind. Furthermore, all is the pure mind. By eliminating ‘evil’ as an independent reality, Hua-yen meditation had always been the meditation on the “pure mind” itself. For the same reason, Hua-yen became the Mencian apostle in its opposition to the T’ien-t’ai theory of ‘nature as evil’ 性惡. (The Ch’an school after Tao-hsin as a whole is closer to this new optimistic trend than to the guarded realism of Chih-i.)

Buddha-nature as \textit{pen-yu 本有} was no longer an issue with Hua-yen and T’ien-t’ai, but a greater differentiation again occurred. The two were doctrinally divided on the matter of \textit{hsing-chū 性具} (nature-possession, i.e. possession of full potential and actuality) and \textit{hsing-ch’i 性起} (essence-arousal, i.e. the dynamic generation of simultaneous realities). Hua-yen held the latter more radical position. Perhaps how Buddhist thought had gone beyond the classical Mencian inspiration can be illustrated by this controversy. The word \textit{chū} is similar to \textit{pei 偏} used by Mencius in the famous line “The universe \textit{is-complete-in} my mind.” By that is meant that the (ethical) universe can be encompassed by the (ethical) mind when a person fully realizes his heaven-endowed nature, \textit{hsing}. The T’ien-t’ai position is continuous with this Mencius outlook. All realities are \textit{of} the mind and \textit{complete-and-present} in the mind. The one mind penetrates all 3,000 realms or levels of reality. The realms
are possessed by the mind. However, T’ien-t’ai thought has one new element. Drawing upon the prajñā-pāramitā tradition of “form is emptiness and emptiness form” (rūpaṃ śūnyatā śūnyataiva rūpaṃ) in the Chinese formulation as se-chi-shih-k’ung, k’ung-chi-shih-se 色即是空空即是色, T’ien-t’ai also affirms the immediate identity of mind and reality, by using the term chi 青 (the copula not required in Sanskrit). This formula of A ≡ B was unknown to classical thought in China, but post-Buddhist Neo-Confucians often rephrased the Mencius pei into chi, such that the Lu-Wang 陸王 school could say that the universe is the mind 吾心即宇宙.

Hua-yen went further still. Not satisfied with just total identity of mind and reality, citta and rūpa, Hua-yen insisted also upon the creation (tso 作) of the three realms by the mind itself. None of the native Chinese philosophical schools ever, even in their most idealistic moments, regard seriously the non-existence of things (wu 物) outside or beyond the mind. Hua-yen had the benefit of the Buddhist idealism’s precedent. Furthermore, instead of chū, Hua-yen drew upon the Buddhist idea of pratitya-samutpāda, conditioned co-arising or yūan-ch’i 經起 (more specifically, ch’i 起) in producing the new hsing-ch’i 性起 ideology. However, yūan-ch’i is the co-arising of phenomena when and only when the proper condition, pratyaya 統, is present: Only when there is A, is there B. Hua-yen rejected even this necessity of an external condition outside the mind.36 The mind being the all, it shall be its own efficient cause. Hsing-ch’i, essence-arousal, does not have to wait for the (proper) conjunction of hetu 因 and pratyaya 統 to act. In the One Mind (qua) Dharmadhatu are already present the guṇas 德 and functions 用 which, as they are, will give rise to enlightenment as well as to delusion, the sentient [with consciousness] as well as the nonsentient [physical form].”37 This theory pertains to the autogenesis (自) 性(統)起 of the universe by the universe itself, in its parts as well as a whole. It is “Mind Only” causation 唯心緣起 or Suchness Dharmadhātu causation 唯如法界緣起. It implies a notion of a self-perfecting38 good, a buddha-nature already fully enlightened (pen-chūeh 本覺),39 a bodhicitta 菩提心 which once aroused 發起 will be enlightenment itself. It suggests subtly that any learning or cultivation 修 is already innate to the enlightenment 悟 (see section 9 on southern Ch’an). If we contrast hsing-chū and hsing-ch’i pictorially, then hsing-chū is like a matrix, in which all realities penetrate each other, each in each, timelessly and static-like. Hsing-ch’i is the pure essence and mind, working in the same matrix, in dynamic
moment to moment, effusion—as if millions of Athenas spring miraculously, full grown, out of the one head of Zeus. It will require a Tantric mind to appreciate this proto-tantric extravagance in sinitic Mahāyāna. Scholastic as these two theories might appear, they probably influenced the direction of the Ch’ān schism.

8. FA-HSIANG OUTLAWED: UNIVERSAL ONE NATURE VERSUS ‘PAÑCAGOTRA’

Hua-yen also took to task the Fa-hsiang school previously introduced into China by Hsūn-tsang, the pilgrim. In fact, Hsūn-tsang probably called his scholarship Wei-shih 唯識 but in the polemics of Hua-yen, representing Wei-hsin 唯心, the Wei-shih school was henceforth labelled as Fa-hsiang 法相. This phenominalist’ school of Hsūn-tsang was inferior to the Fa-hsing 法性 or hsing-tsung 性宗, the ‘noumenal’ school of Hua-yen. The basis of this differentiation had to do with the perception by the Chinese that the deluded consciousness 妄識 in Fa-hsiang (see section 6 above) was fixated with phenomenal form, hsiang 相, particulars whereas the true mind 眞心 in Hua-yen was rightly cognizant of the noumenal, universal hsin 性. In the end, it is the latter’s Mencian hsin-hsing 心性 alliance which triumphed over the shih-hsiang 識相 pair.⁴⁰

Conflicts between Hua-yen and Fa-hsiang occurred on many fronts and I will limit my observation to the tension between what Tokiwa called the Ekayāna doctrine of “all beings, with one (buddha-)nature, destined to enlightenment” 一性皆成 and the inferior doctrine of “five natures, each with distinctive (fate)” 五性各別 i.e. the pañcagotra theory held by the Fa-hsiang school.⁴¹ The Buddha-nature doctrine among sinitic Buddhists had by the seventh century been extended even to nonsentient things 非情佛性 contrary to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra’s statement to exclude buddha-nature from “tiles and stones”.⁴² Taoistic animism or the Han perception of the universe as sharing in one ether 一氣 must have influenced this Chinese innovation.⁴³ Against that universalistic pantheistic mood, Hsūn-tsang reasserted the wu-hsing 五性, five natures, doctrine. The five types of persons with their different destinies or seeds are those with Buddha-seeds, those with śravaka-seeds, those with pratyekabuddha-seeds and those with indeterminate seeds plus the icchāntika destitute of any seeds of enlightenment (agotra). This pañcagotra theory is supported by many Mahāyāna sūtras including the Ch’an-respected Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. However, since the ‘bible’ of the Nirvāṇa school has already redeemed the icchāntika ("Even icchāntikas
have buddha-nature”), Hsüan-tsang’s revival of analytical discrimination was ill-received by his contemporaries. This is one reason why the Fa-hsiang was considered by the Chinese to be crypto-Hinayana.

In our discussion so far, we have assumed that the Mencian humanism had always been the undercurrent in Chinese anthropology. Perhaps a qualification at this point is necessary. Mencius was not in the forefront of Confucian scholarship until Sung. The Buddhists might have been influenced by the Mencian problematik but they also helped to uncover and resurrect Mencian humanism. (The *Doctrine of the Mean* was in part commented upon first by Buddhist apologists). Hsüan-tsang’s proclivity toward the analysis of human natures in five groups actually had precedence in the Han analysis of human natures (e.g. in the *Ts’ai hsing lun*). The theory of the Five Elements, incidentally also referred to sometimes as *wu-hsing*, Five Natures, was applied to the study of human characters. Han thought, as we said earlier, was more interested in the quantitative *yin-yang* components and their elemental distributions in man and in the universe. It was first the Neo-Taoist and then the Buddhist who, in their greater asocial and acosmic outlook, revived the more universal discourse on one basic human nature. The Mencian problematik was, in that sense, a Buddhist rediscovery.

9. THE LEGENDARY CLIMAX: SCHISM IN THE PLATFORM SUTRA

Given the preceding history of conflict, real or latent, the split between the northern and the southern Ch’an school as depicted in the southern Ch’an scripture, the *Platform Sutra*, seems inevitable. The debate is too familiar to require a full retelling. Even if, historically, the event did not take place as alleged, it would be necessary to create it, for the moment was ripe. Hung-jen, the fifth patriarch, was looking for a successor and solicited respondents. Shen-hsiu obligingly composed this poem to demonstrate his achievement:

The body is the bodhi tree
The mind is the bright mirror
Wipe it diligently all the time
And no dust (defilements) would to it adhere.

Hui-neng, the young novice, asked someone to write this on his behalf:
The mind is the bodhi tree
The body is the bright mirror
The mirror being essentially pure
Where is the dust that adheres?

Thereupon, Hung-jen secretly passed his bowl and robe to the new (sixth) patriarch. In Shen-hui's 神會 polemics, the legendary "northern gradualism and southern subitism" 北頓南漸 was depicted as the issue.

The two poems above accept the axiom of a mirror-like mind but are divided on the status of the dust (塵 klesa, defilements). The realist Shen-hsiu is comparable to Chih-i in accepting the preliminary reality of this evil element. The idealist Hui-neng is like Fa-tsang in trusting entirely the pure mind. By accepting the independent reality of the dust, Shen-hsiu subscribed to a dualism of the pure and the impure. By stressing the necessity of daily watchfulness ('wiping the dust'), he permitted the gradualism of action. For Hui-neng, that final dualism was still a mistake and the path of gradual action, karma 業, failed to acknowledge the innate enlightenment that required only immediate (sudden) recognition. If Shen-hsiu was still seeking to remove the dust, that was a sign that he had not attained the nondual (advaya) truth. Common sense might say that Shen-hsiu was only being practical, that this was a sibling quarrel blown out of proportion precisely because of their intimate ties. Hui-neng's 'one-up-man-ship' can easily be imitated for sheer showmanship—and it has been—without necessarily producing a better or higher enlightenment. For example, the second version of Hui-neng's poem goes further in exercising the śānyavāda imperative to negate even the last positive statements:

The bodhi has no tree
Nor the mirror its stand
Buddha-nature is essentially pure
Where indeed can the dust be?

So if the northern Ch'an proposed "The mind is Buddha" 即心即佛, the southern Ch'an opted for "Neither mind nor Buddha" 無心無佛. Hui-neng's insight recalled Chuang-tzu's wisdom, that a truly bright mirror would not have dust in the first place. Yet grammatically, this poem makes little sense. The bodhi-tree was a compound and I suspect the so-called "mirror-stand" 明鏡台 was not so much "stand" but a "plat-
form" or "sanctuary". The ming-chien-t'ai 明鏡台 might go back to Chuang-tzu's notion of a ling-t'ai-(hsin) 禪台(心) or ling-fu 靈府. To split the compound is poetic license, and the resultant poem does not seem any superior in spiritual quality.

The symmetry of mind that nature, hsin and hsing (esp. in the second version) and the comparison of mind with mirror may point, in part, back to Taoist and Mencian precedents. One can even see a touch of Hsun-tzu in the northern position: watchfulness and the dissociation of the mind of men, jen-hsin 人心 from the mind of Tao, tao-hsin 道心. Still others have seen the suddenist and gradualist distinction to be recapitulating the Taoist and the Confucian stand on the Way and learning. Was this distinction not there already in Tao-sheng or in his able defender, Hsieh Ling-yün 謝靈運, author of Pien-tsung-lun 辨宗論? When all these precedents have been cited and the continuity proven or half-proven, the fact remains that the schism only became polarized and dramatized in the T'ang period and not before. The terms tun 頓 and chien 滅 (absent as issues in classical China) were employed then with fresh new vigour and power. Furthermore, whereas Tao-sheng was defeated, Hui-neng supposedly won. What this means is that the Ch'an debate could not have happened earlier, not until the philosophical categories of purity and impurity, de facto and de jure buddha-nature, incipient possession and original possession (shih-yu, pen-yu), incipient enlightenment and a priori enlightenment (shih-chüeh, pen-chüeh), principle and practice (li, hsing), nature-possession and essence-arousal (hsing-chü, hsing-ch'i) etc. had been developed, well thought out and 'dichotomized'. In short, the Ch'an schism was not a historical accident, pure polemics, or simply the genius of one man. It was in part the refinement of the tension within the Mencian problematik, a rational differentiation of options that led finally to an impasse, an Either/Or situation.

10. THE AFTERMATH: HERESIES IN SUNG T'IEI-T'AI

The Ch'an schism is the most well-known but it was not presented objectively. A little-known (among English-speaking circles) but historically well-documented debate occurred later in Sung between the orthodox T'ien-t'ai spokesmen and the heterodox opponents. The Buddhological issues are very involved and only an outline will be attempted below.

The Hua-yen and Ch'an influence dominated in later T'ang Buddhism and T'ien-t'ai fell under its sway. The doctrine of the pure mind found
in the *Awakening of Faith* was adopted into T'ien-t''ai thinking. The distinction between the two intellectual schools (see section 7 above) was being lost as T'ien-t'ài accepted the Hua-yen perspective. One result was the elimination of the dialectical tension between mind and Buddha. The Ch'an identification of mind with Buddha 心即佛 posed a threat, just as the Pure Land devotional mysticism (infiltrating the T'ien-t'ai circle in Sung) posed the opposite threat. Two disciples of Chih-li 知礼 leaned toward these two options. One regarded the Buddha to be 'absorbed' into the mind, and that Buddha-recall-meditation, *nieng-fo 念佛*, was nothing more than psychic introspection, there being no Buddha without. The other would 'turn' or 'return' the mind and made it abide in the Buddha, such that the mind would have no independent existence as such, being only a fiction derived from an objective Buddha. The former was more mystical; the latter more pious though not unmystical. Chih-li stood on the razor's edge and rejected both options. He could not accept the naive belief in a Pure Land outside the mind and yet he refused to see the mind as Pure Land (as many Ch'an-inspired pietists would). He wanted to retain the tension between *citta* and *rūpa* and he repudiated the optimist who thought evil was merely illusory. He proposed the doctrine known as "Meditating upon the Buddha through proximating the mind" 約心觀佛 on the "objectic" end and "Recalling the Buddha [in contemplation] by abiding in the mind" 即心念佛 on the "subjectic" end. He preserved that classical T'ien-t'ai dialectics of affirming, denying and finding the mean between "subjectivity" and "objectivity", "idealism" and "realism", "mystic union" and "pious detachment".\(^51\)

The Sung conflict was the last great doctrinal conflict, after which the intellectual acumen was somewhat lost and in the spirit of syncretic harmony, the sharper edges of cutting minds disappeared. It is the Neo-Confucians' turn to dominate the intellectual scene and to carve out, thanks to Buddhist precedents, their won Mencian problematik.

* * *

The above survey of the destiny of the classical Mencian concern—is human nature good or evil?—within Chinese Buddhism attempts to show the native legacy in sinitic Mahāyāna as well as how the problematik was slowly refined, deepened and transformed. Shades of classical thinkers appear among the Buddhist personages analyzed. The following diagram summarizes the possible correspondences (marked by / lines) and the internal dynamics of developments (marked by \(\rightarrow\) lines).
The ‘mystical’ position of Chuang-tzu, the ‘ethical optimism’ of Mencius represent one extreme (top), while the ‘graded mentality’ of Han hierarchial philosophers52 and the ‘moral pessimism’ of Hsun-tzu the other (bottom). In between can be placed the ‘neutral yin-yang’ analysis of Han and the ‘neutral (but not pessimistic)’ position of Kao-tzu.53 The boxes to the right represent general parallels.

RANGE OF THE MENCIAN PROBLEMATIK MAPPED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chuang tzu and Mencius</th>
<th>southern</th>
<th>Hua-yen</th>
<th>Sung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ti-lun Pure Creative Mind</td>
<td>Hua-yen Dynamic Mind</td>
<td>Sung heterodox</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramārtha amalavijñāna San-lun pure (unborn)</td>
<td>Pure Dynamic Mind</td>
<td>t'ai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'an: Ch'an: Pure or no-mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yin-yang a priori pen-yu T'ien-t'ai Holistic Mind on mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chung-yu acquired or de jure possession</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sung</td>
<td>T'ien-t'ai</td>
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<td>T'ien-t'ai Holistic Mind on mind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sung</td>
<td>T'ien-t'ai</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hsun tzu and Han hierarchy

Paramārtha ālayavijñāna

Fa-hsiang deluded human nature as evil

pāñcagotra with icchantika
In terms of the range of tension between the opponents studied above, there have been cases of great dissent with Mahāyāna spokesmen on one end and (alleged) Hinayanist traitors on the other, where the issues were relatively clear-cut. Hua-yen’s defense of Ekayāna universalism and Fa-hsiang’s arguments for pañcagotra is such a case. However there have also been controversies where the parties, heated in debate, were actually closely allied, as in the case of the Ch’an schism. The following diagram cannot pretend to have mapped the tension (measured by the ‘width’ as shown by arrows) on any absolute scale, but it would give an approximate idea of the ideological dissension involved. The winners of the seven debates, it can be seen, were generally those on the optimistic Mencian end of the scale (near the top). The Mencian humanism indeed informed much of the Chinese Buddhist appreciation of the mind, human or Buddha-nature. The “pure” tradition dominated.

In the end, the question whether the mind is pure or impure cannot simply be settled by words alone, and the loser of a debate, say, Shen-hsiu, is not necessarily without truth on his side. Answers to the ultimate existential question, “What is the nature of man?” do not reveal the objective truth as much as the particular stand a person takes toward this eternal issue. Although the above survey hardly delves into the greater significance of this human question, the generalizations may nevertheless indicate the major trends in Chinese self-understanding and self-actualization. Perhaps, in conclusion, it would be well to take a more syncretic view of the options and recall a famous dictum attributed to the Neo-Confucian thinker, Wang Yang-ming. By the Ming period, the “pure vs. impure” issue had been once more recast into the socio-ethical “good vs. evil” issue. A Mencian by conviction (as would be all Neo-Confucians), Wang Yang-ming summed up the matter in these four lines:

1. Neither good nor evil is the substance of the mind.
2. The existence of good and evil lies in the activity of the will. A
3. Knowing good and evil is (man’s) innate good.
4. Pursuing good and ridding evil is (the act) to rectify things.

The first line tells of the Ch’an influence on Wang and points back to the Taoist conception of the mind as transcending the artificial distinction between good and evil. The substance of the mind partakes in the noumenal. The second lines tells of the psychological insight into the origin of good and evil intent. Buddhist introversion excels in recogniz-
Diagram: Summary of the Seven Conflicts Analyzed

Note: The victors are marked with +

- More Hsuen-Tzu/Pessimistic

Fa-Hsiang

Ch'en-shih

Ta-ho

Lien-eril

Orthodox

Lien-eril

Paramartha Lien-eril

Ch'an

Northern Bodhiruci

Ch'in+

Hui-Ko+

Rahamati+ Hua-yen+ Hua-yen+ Southern Heerodox

More Menqian/Optimistic
ing the subtle working of the human will, beginning with Hinayāna meditation on the arousal of the evil thought down to Chih-i's meditation upon the impure mind or Shen-hsiu's alertness to the dust and defilements on the mirror. Here is the locus mediating the transcendentual substance and the eventual mundane functionings of the mind. The third line is the voice of the moral conscience of Mencius. Instinctively, the moral mind will know good from evil. It is the good conscience-and-consciousness at the heart of Wang Yang-ming's Confucian philosophy. Finally, the fourth line, with its concern for the social affairs of the world, reflects the renewed innerworldly activism of the Neo-Confucian movement. Taken as a whole, one can see how the Mencian problematik, outlined in the classical period and refined in the Buddhist era, emerged again, strengthened with introvertic insights, in the post-Buddhist times. Since it is doubtful that the psychological insights of Wang Yang-ming could have been so expressed in the Han dynasty, one may assume that sinitic Mahāyāna, in allowing itself to be defined by the Mencian concerns, defined the Neo-Confucian framework of reference in turn. The four levels of insight in Wang Yang-ming's stable synthesis, each of which possesses its own share of truth, provide us with one comprehensive vision of the essence of human nature.

NOTES

1 For this methodological perspective, I am indebted to Wilfred Cantwell Smith, my professor at Harvard.
2 Published by Meiji tzu en, Tokyo.
4 In reverse, the Chinese were less intrigued by the problem of anātman with continuity; usually they assign permanence to a higher self (buddha-nature) and impermanence to its function in saṃsāra.
5 And some that I am working on; see references below.
6 On the classical hsin g issue, I follow particularly T'ang Chun-i 唐君毅 Chung kuo che hsüeh yüan lun; yüan hsin g 中國哲學原論原性 (Hong Kong: Jen-sheng, 1966–68).
8 Mencius, ch. 6, “Kao-tzu”.
9 Hsun-tzu, ch. 23.
10 T'ang op. cit., vol. 1 (Hongkong, 1966), chapter on mind; my “Existential Pathos and Ecstasis: The Tragic Element in Chuang-tzu’s Philosophy,” paper read

11 Above and following discussion based on the insightful essay by T’ang Yung-t’ung, Wei Chin Hsuan hsueh lun kao 魏晉玄學論稿 (Taipei: Lu-shan, 1972).

12 Medieval mysticism in the Byzantine church often cultivated this angelic life of being beyond human emotions.

13 One so-called proof of arhatship, I was told, was immunity to pain.

14 Issues of hsing and ching re-emerged later with Li Ao’s Fu hsing shu.

15 Kuo Hsiang 郭象, Chuang tzu chu 註, I. Chuang-tzu intended the great roc to symbolize the freedom that the cicada cannot attain. Kuo Hsiang had the interpretation that both, in their ways, attain the Tao.

16 The most ambitious attempt to uncover the thought of Chih-tun from surviving fragments is by Tamaki Kōshirō 玉城康四郎, Chūgoku Bukkyō shisō keisei no kenkyū 中国佛敎思想形成の研究 (Tokyo: Chikuma, 1971), pp. 165–259. Not always successfully, I think.

17 Also between classical moderation and medieval asceticism.


19 See Takasaki Jikido 高崎直道, Nyōraizō shisō no keisei 如來智思想の形成 (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1974) for the most detailed treatment of this tradition.

20 The Chinese are less cautious; see note 4 above.

21 See T’ang’s monograph on Tao-sheng 瞿道生興瀚影響學 (1932) incorporated into his Han Wei Liang Chin Nan pei ch’ao Fo ch’ai shih 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 (Peking: Chung-hua resissue, 1955) pp. 601–676. 

22 See pp. 259–279. above.

23 An overview of this basic difference between Buddhist thought in the Six Dynasties and that of Hua-yen in T’ang is given by Francis Cook, Hua yen Buddhism: Indra’s Net (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1977).

24 For Taishō version, see T. 50, p. 551c.

25 T. 50, p. 552b.

26 Yanagida Seizan has analyzed both the continuity and discontinuity between Bodhidharma and Seng Ch’ou and is presently working on a still more comprehensive study of Bodhidharma.

27 See Jan Yun-hua’s article above, pp. 51–63.

28 Usually taken to mean “The Completion of Truth (of the sūtra)” instead of what is to me the obvious reading “To Establish the Real (自相) [beyond mere emptiness],” but since this school had been condemned as fixated with mere emptiness, the translation of the title had been distorted. See my “The Meaning of Ch’eng-shih: A Hypothesis” (manuscript, 1976).

29 T. 50, p. 564b.

30 For the passage in the Lotus Sūtra concerning a pervasive buddha-wisdom, see de Bary ed. The Buddhist Tradition (New York: Random House, 1969) pp. 158–160 under the traditional title “All Things have Buddha-nature.”

31 Neither T’ang Yung-t’ung nor Francis Cook has tracked down the exact origin of this re-conceptualization. Paramartha in the south also used this set: (行) 引出佛性 (理) 自住佛性(果) 至得佛性.


See my article cited and "Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories," *ibid.*, 27, no. 3 (July, 1977); see also pp. 313 above.

Ui Hakuju 宇井伯矩 contrasted the T’ien-t’ai and the Hua-yen school lucidly in *Bukkyō Hanron* 佛教汎論 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1962); see p. 658.

Paramārtha might anticipated this self-perfection buddha-nature; see note 31 above. 259


I am working on this issue in a chapter on "The Definitive Defeat of Fa-hsian (Yogācāra) in China" based on a translation of two sections in Fa-tsang’s *Wu chiao chang* 五教章.

Tokiwa, *op. cit.*, introductory chapter.


Already Tao-sheng had suggested that all beings containing the ether [in China, that would include inorganic things] have buddha-nature; see also my "Translation and Analysis of an Essay on the Immortality of the Soul by Emperor Wu of the Liang Dynasty" (forthcoming, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*).

Emperor Wu was one of the early commentary writers on this work.

See Mou Tsung-san, 卜宗三 *Ts’ai hsing yu Hsüan li* 才性與玄理 (Kowloon: Jen-sheng, 1963). Thus a ‘man of fiery disposition’ should be assigned to a post in which the fire element would be proper, etc.

Han *I Ching* scholarship was therefore interested in the particulars of hsiang 象 and *shu* 数 (forms and numbers) while the Neo-Taoist Wang Pi brushed them aside in his search for the *hsüan-li* 玄理 and the "One" behind the many.


Not absent in Indian Buddhism, see Fuse Kōgaku 布施浩岳, *Nehanshū no kenkyū* 涅槃宗の研究 (Tokyo: Sobunkaku, 1942). II, 139–171

A brief study on this particular issue can be found in Mochizuki, *Chūgoku*
The category of “Han hierarchial thinkers” has been differentiated from the general Han yin-yang thinkers category for only one specific purpose: to suggest a parallel between the former and the *pañcagotra* *wu-hsing* hierarchy in Fa-hsiang.

Kao-tzu did not say human nature is evil. In fact, he leaned toward a doctrine of potential good.

The relative positions the various figures occupy in the diagram *vis à vis* the vertical axis denote their approximate stand on the purity and impurity of the core-consciousness in man.

There is no obvious winner in the Hua-yen vs. T’ien-t’ai case and orthodox T’ien-t’ai supposedly won over the Hua-yen-influenced heretics—the one case in which the victor was not the radical but the moderate (the + sign is below).

Neo-Confucians are known to have been quite alert to psychic categories like *i* 意 (translated here as will) and *chih* 志 (aspiration).
The Study of Tibetan Ch’an Manuscripts
Recovered from Tun-huang: A Review
Of the Field and its Prospects

Daishun Ueyama
Translated by K.W. Eastman and Kyoko Tokuno

INTRODUCTION

The objective of my researches has been to clarify the character and
history of Buddhism at Tun-huang by utilizing the archaic manuscripts
recovered from that region. In the course of my studies I have sought to
document the lives and activities of two scholar monks, T’an-k’uang
冬曠 and Fa-ch’eng 法成, whose many writings preserved at Tun-
huang testify to their importance there. Despite this, they remained
unknown within the mainstream of Chinese Buddhist history.¹ The
period in which T’an-k’aung and Fa-cheng were active corresponds to
the Tibetan occupation of Tun-huang, A.D. 781-848.² Naturally the
issue which arises is their relationship with Tibetan Buddhism. This is
especially the case with T’an k’uang who in his later years became in-
volved in the Council of Tibet, i.e. the doctrinal controversy between
the Hva śān Mahāyāna (the Ch’an master Ma-ho-yen摩訶衍禪師/ mkhan
po Ma ha yan) and Kamasīla³, when he received a petition of twenty-two
questions from the King of Tibet. This issue also arises with Fa-ch’eng
whose writings are extant in both Chinese and Tibetan manuscripts from
Tun-huang. He was appointed as translator to the office of Zu chen gyi
lo tsabā = Ta fan kuo ta te san ts’ang fa shih 大蕃國大德三藏法師 which
was established for the translation of the Buddhist canon, an imperial
undertaking in Tibet at that time.

In order to clarify the Council of Tibet, in which T’an-k’uang partici-
pated, and the Tibetan translation of the Buddhist canon, in which Fa-
ch’eng was active, it was absolutely essential to investigate thoroughly
the Tibetan documents preserved at Tun-huang.

During these researches my discovery of the Tibetan translation of the
Leng chia shih tsu chi 楞伽師資記 in 1968 (see I-1 below), enabled Japa-
inese scholars to realize for the first time that Ch' an materials had been preserved among the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang. I also became aware of a considerable number of Tibetan manuscripts about Ch' an where the name of the Ch' an master Mahāyāna appears. This discovery fostered my conviction that the study of these manuscripts was necessary for elucidating the Council of Tibet. In 1970 I obtained a microfilm copy of Pelliot tib. 116. This contained a variety of well organized materials about Ch' an, and I had considered this document instrumental to my research. At approximately this time Hironobu Obata, conducting research on Tibetan Ch' an under my direction, made a discovery of some importance. This discovery was that certain passages from the Blon po bka'i thang yig section of the Bka' thang sde lha coincided perfectly with a section in P. tib. 116 which listed quotations from various Ch' an masters. The Bka' thang sde lha is a rediscovered (gter ma) text of the Rññ ma pa school, excerpts of which were published by G. Tucci in Minor Buddhist Texts II 1958.

In 1974 I published an outline of the contents of P. tib. 116 in order to solicit the co-operative efforts of other scholars. (see I:3) Obata, on the basis of P. tib. 116, also published his researches on Tibetan Ch' an (see I:4).

Also during this time a Rññ ma pa text, the Bsam gtan mig sgron, which contains material analogous to both the Blon po bka'i thang yig and P. tib. 116, was discovered. Yoshiro Imadea, while residing in France, discovered in 1973 a Tibetan manuscript corresponding to a question and answer section of the Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chüeh 頓悟大乘正理決, which is a record related to the Council of Tibet (see I:9). From these discoveries interest in the transmission of Ch' an to Tibet and the Tibetan Tun-huang documents pertaining to Ch' an escalated rapidly, and these textual discoveries gained recognition as extremely important both as source materials for the study of early Chinese Ch' an and as historical data which might clarify the actual circumstances of the early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet.

With the publication of the researches of Katsumi Okimoto, Ryūtoku Kimura, and Satoru Harada—a group of scholars investigating P. tib. 116 and other Tibetan Ch' an manuscripts at Tokyo University (see I:6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 18)—the research in this field is progressing significantly in Japan today.

Professor Lewis Lancaster, aware of the current Japanese research on Tibetan Ch' an documents from Tun-huang, requested that I contribute
an essay to this volume of the Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series titled *The Early History of Ch’an in China and Tibet*. I feel greatly honoured to have this opportunity to provide American and European scholars with an outline in English of current Japanese research in this field, and I venture to present this essay even though the time allotted was insufficient to prepare it adequately.

This essay is divided into three parts:

I) I will present in chronological order the researches in this field published to date by Japanese scholars, and provide a brief summary of their content.

II) I will discuss the nature of the Tun-huang materials on which the above studies have been based, and the value they have as source materials for Tibetan studies.

III) I will discuss the significance of Tibetan documents for the field of Ch’an studies and the possible course of future research.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor Lancaster for the opportunity to present this essay and K. W. Eastman who has mediated our correspondence and has endeavored, with Ms. Kyoko Tokuno, to translate my work.

I  STUDIES OF TIBETAN CH’AN MANUSCRIPTS FROM TUN-HUANG


In this article I discuss the contents of a Tibetan manuscript conserved among the Stein collection, the *Lin ka’i mkhan po dañ slob ma’i mdo* (S. tib. 710) (2), and demonstrate that it is a translation of the *Leng chia shih tsu chi* 梵伽師資記, a text belonging to the Northern school of Ch’an in China.

The Tibetan is a translation of only the first portion of the text. Since the Tibetan is a very literal translation of the Chinese it is possible to reconstruct the original form of the Chinese version used for the translation.

A noteworthy characteristic of this translation is the use of technical terminology that is at variance with the equivalents given in the *Mahanvyutpatti*. For example 解脫→*grol thar*, 因緣→*rgyu rkyen*, 緣起→*rkyen las g-yos*, 妄念→*myi ‘den pa’i sems*, etc. Subsequently I infer that this
translation was made prior to the standardization of terminology in the Mahāvyutpatti.


The existence of the Ch’an master Ma-ho-yen 摩訶衍禅師 and his doctrinal views are known to us through the Tun wu ta ch’eng ch’eng li chüeh 頓悟大乘正理決, even though no independent Chinese writings authored by Ma-ho-yen have been located. However, among the Tibetan documents from Tun-huang there are texts bearing titles such as Mkhan po ma ha yan gi bsam tancig car ‘jug pa’i sgo[The Discourse of the Master Ma ha yan on the Sudden Experience of Dhyāna] and Mkhan po ma ha yan bsam gtan gyi shin po bstan pa [Explaining the Essence of Master Ma ha yan’s Dhyāna]. In this essay I collect five such texts, S. tib. 468, P. tib. 116, 117, 812, and 813 and, providing a resume of their content, I have verified that they do in fact contain the writings of the Ch’an master Ma-ho-yen.


P. tib. 116 is a manuscript of 124 folios written continuously on either side of paper in accordion folds. Although the manuscript has been mended in places, it appears well cared for and complete. There are nine other fragmentary documents, P. tib. 21, 118, 813, 817, 821, 822, 823, and S. tib. 706 and 708, corresponding in part to the contents of P. tib. 116, which indicates that the text was widely read. I have judged this manuscript to be the one Tibetan document from Tun-huang which has the greatest significance for the study for the study of Tibetan Ch’an, and the purpose of this essay was to present an outline of this manuscript, and provide information on those portions of it which have been identified.

The contents of the manuscript are arranged as follows:

I, recto, ff. 1–21.

The Tibetan translation of the Bhadracaryāprāṇidharaṇ āja (identified with Peking ed. No. 716).

II, recto, ff. 21–108.
The Tibetan translation of the \textit{Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāmahāyānasūtra} (identified with Peking No. 739).


(begitting)\(//\) theg pa che chuṅ gyi khyad bar daṅ/ 'jug pa'i sgo daṅ/ so so'i mtshan ŋid mdo tsam du bstan no// [Instructions in summary of the distinctions between the greater and lesser vehicles, the gate through which one enters (them), and the characteristics of each . . .].


(begitting)\(//\) ita ba mdor bsdus pa las 'byuṅ ba'i don// . . . [The meaning of the ‘Summary of Views’ . . .].


(begitting)\(//\) thog med pa nas dños po daṅ sgra la mñoṅ bar žen pa rnams kyi rgol ba'i lan brjod ciṅ// ita ba de las bzlog pa daṅ/ gzung 'dzin daṅ bal bar sbyor ba'i // rnal 'byor chen po pa rnams la dgos pa'i don mdo tsam žig brjed byaṅ du byas pa . . . [In response to the contentions of those who have been attached to language and objects from beginning-less time, and in order to turn them from such views, the requisite meaning for those of the Mahāyoga who are apart from what is grasped and grasping is here taught briefly as a mnemonic aid . . .].

Following the above are 14 questions and answers; within the answers appear quotations from 16 sutras, including the \textit{Laṅkāvatārasūtra}, \textit{Suvāraśprabhāsasūtra}, and the \textit{Sandhinirmocanasūtra}.

\textit{VI}, \textit{verso}, \textit{ff.} 23²–47³.

a) In this first section are 23 questions and answers illustrating the Ch’an conception of non-prehension \textit{pu kuan} 不覲 (mi rtog pa). Among the answers are citations from 19 sutras and sūtras.

b) The second section contains quotations of the following eight \textit{mkhan po} (preceptors): 1) na gar ju na, 2) bo de dar ma ta la, 3) bu cu, 4) \textit{bdud} ‘dul gyi sẖiṅ po, 5) a rdan hver, 6) ‘gva lun, 7) ma ha yan, 8) \textit{Arya de ba}. However, Okimoto believes that the last sentence of verso folio 40 is not complete, and that in fact (a) and (b) are different texts. (see I:7)


Sayings of the Ch’an master Ma ha yan.

\textit{VIII}, \textit{verso}, \textit{ff.} 50³–67⁴.


IX, verso, ff. 68¹–119².

(title) // Cig char yâñ dag pa'i phyi mo'i tshor ba // rdo rje rab spyad pas phar ol du phin pa'i chos kyi sgo mo ge s pa]// The Tibetan translation of the Tun wu chen tsung chin khang p'an jo hsiu hsing ta pi an fa men yao chüeh 頓悟真宗金剛般若修行達彼岸法門要決 (= Tu wu chen tsung yao chüeh 頓悟真宗要決).
X, verso, ff. 119³–122⁴.

(beginning) // nor du dogs pa lha la // ston par myi lta bas chad par ma soñ/ . . . [In the five apprehensions of error, one does not advance toward cessation through viewing [things] as non-substantial. . .].
XI, verso, ff. 123¹–123⁴.

(title) // Chos kyi byiñs ŋid bstan pa'i mdo // [A text of instruction on the Dharmadhātu].

In addition to the identification of ma ho yen 摩訶衍 and ma ha yan in article I:2 above, I have made the following identifications of Ch’an masters who are listed, along with their recorded sayings (yü lu 語錄), in sections VI–VIII of the above text¹²: bsam brtan gyi mkhan po bu cu = Wu-chu ch’an-shiḥ 無住禪師, bsam brtan gyi mkhan po bdud ’dul gyi sñiñ po = Chiang-mo tsang ch’an-shiḥ 降魔護禪師, gva lun šan ši = Wo-lun ch’an shiḥ 臥輪禪師.

Portions of the Bion po bka’i than yig section of the Bka’ than sde lha agree with sections in P. tib. 116 (P. tib. 116, v. ff. 41²–44⁴ = MBT II pp. 70²⁷–71¹⁴), and I have discussed the probability that they are based on a common source.¹³

In conclusion I have asked the following questions: Since this compilation contains Mahāyoga texts and elements of Indian thought (which have been portrayed as being in opposition to the doctrines of Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna at the Council of Tibet), does this text represent a stage of Tibetan Ch’an that postdates its confrontation with Indian Buddhism? Could the mere existence of a text such as the one represented here indicate that historical circumstance is actually different from the legend of Ma ha yan’s exile after his defeat at the Council of Tibet?


In this essay Obata discusses the lineage of the Pao T’ang School 保唐宗系 on the basis of the Sba bzad¹⁴ and P. tib. 116, 117, 812, and 813. This lineage of the Ch’an master Wu-chu 無住禪師 is preserved in
the *Li tai fa pao chi* 历代法寶記, and had developed in the Chien-nan 劍南 district of Ssu-ch’uan. The school had arrived in Tibet via the kingdom of Nan-chao 南詔, and was established there prior to the Council of Tibet. Obata cites as further evidence that the Ch’an lineage recorded in the *Li tai fa pao chi* was present in Tibet, the Tibetan translations of the Chinese apocryphal sūtras, such as the *Ta fo ting ching* 大佛頂經, the *Chin keng san mei ching* 金剛三昧經, and the *Fa wang ching* 法王經, which are found in the *Lden kar* catalogue and the Tun-huang manuscript finds.


In a previous essay (see I:4) Obata had established the existence of Chinese apocryphal sūtras in Tibetan translation and used the sūtras to substantiate the presence of the Ch’an school associated with the *Li tai fa pao chi* in Tibet. This article is an extension of that research. In it he evaluates nine of these sūtras, which had been introduced into Tibet with the Northern Ch’an school.


This essay is a study of the content of section V of P. tib. 116 (r. ff. 119¹–v. ff. 23²). It attempts to evaluate what relevance P. tib. 116 may have to research on the Council of Tibet. This section of P. tib. 116 contains a list of 14 questions and answers similar in content to the *Tun wu ta ch’eng cheng li chüeh*. However, there is no correspondence between the questions and answers given here and those in the *Cheng li chüeh*. Portions of the text which precede and follow the exchange indicate that adherents of the doctrines of Mahāyoga (*rnal ’byor chen po pa rnams*) have given response to the queries of those who accept the doctrine of characteristics (*mtshan ma la dad pa rnams*). Kimura concludes that the material represented here is not related to the Council of Tibet. Even though sections V-VIII are authored from the standpoint of the sudden school and are thereby relevant to the Council of Tibet, it is not conceivable that the text is a systematic presentation of the doctrines of the Ch’an master Ma ho yen.

Following the publication of my research on P. tib. 116 (see I:3) Okimoto conducted further studies on this text. In this present essay he presents some new discoveries and revisions of my previous work.

First, Okimoto infers that portions of the text between verso folio 40 and verso folio 41 have been lost, and what I had considered to be two parts of a single text, designated VI(a) and VI(b), should instead be understood as two distinct works successively designated VI and VII. Thus after section VI, each numerical designation should be increased by one and the document as a whole should be regarded as containing twelve separate texts.

Among the various Ch'an masters given in the text, mkhan po dehu lim san si is identified as the Ch'an master Niao-k'e tao-lin 鳥窠道林禪師 (A.D. 741–824), and bsam brian gyi mkhan po sin ho is identified as the Ch'an master Shen-hui 神會禪師.

Okimoto also reports that S. tib. 703 corresponds to P. tib. 116. He feels that P. tib. 116 could not have been constructed before the 9th century; therefore it could not be directly connected with the debates at bsam yas. Yet the existence of a work of this character could indicate that the scope of the Council of Tibet was in fact much greater than we had previously assumed. Furthermore, the author emphasizes the importance of the Rñih mapatexts, the Blon po bka'i thang yig and the newly discovered Bsam gtan mig sgron, for the study of the relation between this manuscript and the rdzogs chen system.


The Li tai fa pao chi is the earliest text in which P'u-t'i ta-mo to-lo 菩堤達摩多羅 (Bodhidharmottāra) is recorded as the initial patriarch of the Ch'an school in China. That he is mentioned as being the first patriarch is a characteristic of the Pao-t'ang school's lineage. Obata notes that in Tibetan documents the Ch'an master Bodhidharmottāra is cited as the first patriarch of the Ch'an school, and not the Ch'an master Ta mo 逹摩. The author therefore reviews the context in which the name of this patriarch appears in nine Tibetan Tun-huang texts, including
P. tib. 116, 699, and 813. He then attempts to ascertain the unique transformation the Ch’an lineage of the Pao-t’ang school recorded in the *Li tai fa pao chi* underwent when it came into contact in Tibet with other Ch’an patriarchal successions. The following passage from the *Blon po bka’i thang yig* is typical: *de nas dha rmo ttā ra la sogs nas / rgya nag sprul bdun brgyud pa brgyud pa’i tha / hva saṅ maḥā yā na ṇid la thug /; “Then [the teaching] reached Hva saṅ Mahāyāṇa, the last / of the lineage, the lineage of the sevenfold Chinese emanations [descended] from Dharmottarala [sic], etc.”* In this case Hva saṅ Mahāyāṇa is appended as the eighth patriarch, which is a peculiar emendation of the Ch’an succession recorded in the *Li tai fa pao chi*. Obata also notices that the doctrine of *li-ju shuo* 理入說, associated with the Northern Ch’an school, is attributed in Tibetan sources to Dharmottarala. He feels this may indicate a coalescence of the Northern school and the Pao-t’ang school.


Although this study was published in Paris, I would like to summarize it here because of its significance for the study of the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-Huang.

Imaeda has discovered P. tib. 823 to be a Tibetan translation of part of the “old question” (*chiu wen* 諸問) section of the *Tun wu ta ch’eng cheng li chüeh*. Although the Tibetan manuscript is fragmentary, twelve of the thirteen questions it contains have been identified in the *Cheng li chüeh*, and a romanized edition of the text is published in this essay. The author makes the following statements in regard to the text: This manuscript would appear to be the record of a doctrinal discussion intended for the King of Tibet who was sincerely interested in the doctrinal controversies of his time. These doctrinal discussions were carried out via three epistles. The present text would seem to be the first in that series. The Chinese editor of the *Cheng li chüeh* compiled these three exchanges, designating portions as old questions (*chiu wen* 諸問), new questions (*hsin wen* 新問), etc. The sections of the Tibetan text that correspond to the *Cheng li chüeh* are literal translations of the Chinese.

Imaeda has found in P. tib. 996 that Ye ṣes dbyaṅs of Spug is cited as the author of the *Mdo sde brgyad bceu khuns* (The Origin of the Eighty Sūtras); this differs from Bostun who in his *History of Buddhism* attributed this work to Hva ṣaṅ Mahāyāṇa. He also verifies that P. tib. 818 is a fragment of this text. Bostun’s pseudography may be the result of sectarian bias, and the description of the actual confrontation of
Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla is of doubtful historicity. The author then concludes that Kamalaśīla and Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna probably never actually met.


Since the three documents, P. tib. 116, the Blon po bka’i thān yig, and the Bsamgtan mig sgron contain sections of the same narrative, scholars have recognized their importance as sources for the study of Tibetan Ch'an. In this essay Okimoto makes a comparative study of these texts and attempts to assess their validity as historical source materials. The author also discusses the problems created by a few of the Ch'an masters recorded in the texts, and speculates that the disciple of Ardan hwer, man hva saṅ, is the same person as the Ch'an master Ma-ho-yen who participated in the Council of Tibet. At the end of this essay the author has compiled a comparative chart of all the Ch'an masters listed in each of these three texts.


The Cig car’jug par nam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don (Peking ed. No. 5306) is attributed to Vimalamitra, one of the founders of the Rāñī ma pa school. An outline of this text was published by G. Tucci in Minor Buddhist Texts II, where he indicates that its content is similar to the Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla. In this essay Harada re-examines this text after having discovered that the latter portion corresponds to a section of P. tib. 116.

The author first conducts a detailed comparative analysis of the śamatha-vipaśyana section of this text with those in the Bhāvanākramas and finds that the Cig car’jug par nam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don contains passages taken from the second and third Bhāvanākramas. Turning to the latter portions of the text, although Tucci regarded Vimalamitra as the author of this section, Harada shows this section corresponds for the most part to sections V-VII of P. tib. 116.

Harada feels this section of the Cig car’jug par nam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don was based on P. tib. 116 or a similar text, and proposes the
following general deductions: The present text does not take issue with the doctrines of the *Bhāvanākrama*, a treatise of the gradualist school. On the contrary it adopts the ideology of the *Bhāvanākrama* as conducive to the non-discriminative samādhi (*rnam par mi rtog pa’i tiṅ né ’dzin*) which is the ultimate position of the sudden school. In this context the text exhibits an adaptive tendency which sought to resolve the conflict between the ‘sudden’ and ‘gradual’ approach.


S. tib. 709 of the Tibetan manuscripts collected from Tun-huang by Sir Aurel Stein also contains materials related to Ch’an. In his essay Kimura examines this manuscript with the following results: The manuscript contains nine successively written texts. Among these texts are found portions of the *Samādhiṃropacanasūtra* and sections paralleling the *Bhavana-nākrama*. The author also finds a criticism of northern Ch’an authored by Shen-hui 神會 which is recorded in both Tibetan transliteration and translation. These verses are *Ning hsin ju-t’ing* 凝心入定, *chu-hsin k’an-ching* 住心看靜, *ch’i-hsin wai-chao* 起心外照, *she hsin nei cheng* 攝心內證, and are not in their original order. The term *de bžin gṣegs pa’i bsam gtan* is also found in this text and corresponds to the term *ju-lai ch’an* 如來禪.

Kimura concludes that this manuscript was written after the Council of Tibet, and, from the ultimate position of the sudden school, combines the doctrines of the sudden and gradual schools. This coalescence of the two doctrinal positions is also characteristic of the *Blon po bka’i thaṅ yig* and the *Bsam gtan mig sgron*.


Many Ch’an masters, not found in P. tib. 116, are cited in the *Blon po bka’i thaṅ yig* and the *Bsam gtan mig sgron*. and these sections are shown in this essay to have been translated from the *Erh ju ssu hsing lun chang chüan tzu* 二入四行論長卷子. The author also publishes these portions of the Chinese text in apposition to their Tibetan translation from the *Bsam gtan mig sgron*.

14) Obata, Hironobu. “Kodai chibetto ni okeru tonmonha (senshu) no nagare 古代チベットにおける頓門派 (禅宗)の流れ[The Development
of the Sudden School (or Ch'an school) in Ancient Tibet].” *Bukkyōshi gaku kenkyū* 佛教史學研究 18 (March 1976): 59–80.

It was the Ch'an school that confronted Indian Buddhism at the Council of Tibet. This Ch'an school was not representative of the Northern school, the Southern school, or the Pao-t'ang school, but was unique to Tibet. The Ch'an school of Tibet was not involved in the disputation between the Northern and Southern schools, nor are there any signs of contention with the Dharma Ch'an school. Thus Obata calls this school the Sudden school (*Tun men p'ai* 頓門派) to distinguish it from the Chinese schools of Ch'an. The author examines, on the basis of the *Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chüeh*, the doctrinal content of Ch'an in the Sudden school of Tibet. Obata concludes that the Ch'an represented by Ma-ho-yen is only superficially like the Northern school; it is doctrinally affiliated with the Pao-t'ang school, with borrowings from both the Southern school (in Shen-hui's lineage) and the Dharma school. Perhaps Ma-ho-yen, a Ch'an master of the Northern school, was motivated in his adaptation of the Pao-t'ang school's *Li tai fa pao chi* by its recensions of Shen hui's doctrines and the miraculous hagiography of Dharmattāra that it contains. These are not found in the Northern school, but would have been useful in converting the Tibetans.


This article, written for the general reader, is published as an appendix to Professor Seizan Yanagida's edition, translation, commentary, and annotation of the *Li tai fa pao chi*. Obata, on the basis of his research to date, discusses in this essay the transmission of the *Li tai fa pao chi* to ancient Tibet and the significance of its influence there.


In P. tib. 116 verso ff. 41–67 (VI(b)-VIII; Okimoto VII-IX) there are 27 instances of names and sayings cited under such titles as *mkhan po*, *bsam gtan gyi mkhan po*, *šen si*, etc. In his article Obata publishes a romanized version of this portion of P. tib. 116 and provides a Japanese translation. The author has collected the corresponding data on individ-
ual Ch'an masters from the *Blon po bka'i than yig* and the *Bsam gtan mig sgron*, and he supplements this information with a summary of recent scholarship on each individual Ch'an master.


P. tib. 116 verso ff. 68¹–119² is a Tibetan translation of the *Tun wu chen tsung chin kang p'an jo hsiu hsing ta pi an fa men yao chüeh* 頓悟真宗金剛般若修行達彼岸法門要決 which is itself a Ch'an document recovered from Tun-huang. The translation of this text is complete and, like the *Leng chia shih tzu chi* translation, does not employ the standard equivalent terminology of the *Mahāvyutpatti*; moreover it agrees with the doctrinal position of the Ch'an master Ma-ho-yen. I have therefore published a complete romanized version of the Tibetan text, the Chinese text, and a Japanese translation in this study.

From an analysis of the translation method exhibited in this text, I have concluded that the translation was made around the middle of the eighth century. This would be before the compilation of the *Mahāvyutpatti* and at a period when translations of Buddhist canonical works from India and China were being conducted independently.

It is evident from an examination of the content that while the author of this text is apparently interpreting the *Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitā*, he is in fact explaining the doctrine of *k'an wu so ch'u* 瞻無所處 (myed pa'i gnas bltas), a typical doctrine of the Northern school. *K'an-wu so-ch'u* is equivalent to *k'an-hsin* 看心. I have verified that the concept of *k'an-hsin* is found in the writings of both the Ch'an master Wo-lun 臥輸禪師 and the Ch'an master *Ma-ho-yen* 摩訶衍禪師.

18) Okimoto, Katsumi. "bSam yas no shūron (3), nishu no makaen ibun; bSam yas の宗論 (3) 二種の摩訶衍遺文 [The Religious Debate of bSam yas (3), Two Writings by Ma-ho-yen]." *Nihon chibetto gakkai kaihō* 23 (March 1977): 5–8.

Understanding the necessity to clarify the doctrinal stance of the Ch'an master Ma-ho-yen before the Bsam yas debate can be completely elucidated, Okimoto has endeavored to collect in this essay all the extant writings of Ma-ho-yen from Tibetan sources. Aside from the writings of Ma-ho-yen that I had previously given notice of, the author has discovered two additional texts. One of these is P. tib. 21, which is a summary of
a reply to an 'old' question from the *Cheng li chüeh*. The second work is S. tib. 709, which is a continuation of S. tib. 468, i.e. the *Mkhan po ma ha yan gi bsam gtan cig car 'jug pa'i sgo* (see 1:2).

II THE CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TIBETAN MANUSCRIPTS RECOVERED FROM TUN-HUANG.

As may be seen from the various articles reviewed above, our perspective on Tibetan Ch’an began with researches on the Tibetan Tun-huang manuscripts, and has continued to develop with these materials as the primary source. I would like to discuss here the character of the Tibetan materials from Tun-huang and their role in Tibetan studies.

For the Chinese manuscripts from Tun-huang there was from a very early period much to gain the interest of Chinese and Japanese scholars, and one could almost state that the investigations of these finds and the methodology of the research have been exhaustive.\(^{18}\) However, excepting the catalogues of M. Lalou and L. de la Vallee Poussin,\(^{19}\) the study of the Tibetan manuscripts in comparison with research on the Chinese materials lags quite behind, and especially so with respect to the Buddhist literature which comprises a large majority of the Tibetan finds.\(^{20}\) In addition to this, the Tibetan Tun-huang materials are rarely employed in general studies of Tibet. Perhaps this has been due to an absence of criteria that would place in perspective the viability of these materials as sources for the study of Tibetan religion and culture. The Tibetan writings date from the Tibetan occupation of Tun-huang (A.D. 781–848), and because they have remained unrevised through the intervening years their value as historical source materials is quite high. Among these Tibetan works are found Buddhist scriptures not contained in the present recensions of the Tibetan canon, administrative documents, and chronological records.\(^{21}\) While it is evident that these materials are indispensable for reconstructing the history of the Tun-huang region in the eighth and ninth centuries,\(^{22}\) the value of these materials for Tibetan historical studies has gained recognition rather slowly in preference to the indigenous historical records of Tibetan literature. Reasons for this are perhaps the location of Tun-huang on the periphery of the Tibetan kingdom, and the fact that the area was a Chinese city occupied only temporarily by the Tibetans. Why the manuscripts were left at Tun-huang, and the scope of the collection, have remained rather obscure. The general assumption seems to have been that they were ancillary to
the mainstream of Tibetan literature, wherein they exerted little influence and were, therefore, neither equivalent to, nor as valid as, the orthodox Tibetan literary tradition.

The first step toward correcting the above notions came in 1952 with the publication of the Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chüeh by Paul Demiéville. This text proved that the Tibetan religious debates, which had been thought to be legendary, did in fact take place. We also discovered with the publication of this text that events occurring in central Tibet (such as Lhasa and Bsam yas) were recorded in documents preserved at Tun-huang.

Since the events reported by Tibetan historians were confirmed by contemporary records, the reliability of Tibetan historians was certainly enhanced. However there was no clear resolution of the discrepancies between the Tibetan historical tradition and this contemporary account. For example; the Tibetan historians report that Hva šañ Mahāyāna lost the debate, while the Cheng li chüeh reports that he won. Also, Tibetan historians state that Ch'an doctrines and practices were prohibited and vanished from Tibet, while the Ch'an texts among the Tun-huang manuscripts would lead us to conclude otherwise. Regarding the former problem, Demiéville first speculated that Ma-ho-yen had in fact lost the debate but the Chinese redactor of the Cheng li chüeh had rewritten the account to portray Ma-ho-yen as the victor. Later, I proposed that there were two debates, one in which Ma-ho-yen was victorious and another in which he was defeated by Kamalsila. In addition I had suggested that Ch'an had continued in the geographically remote outpost of Tun-huang even though it had been banished from Tibet proper. In this manner I accepted the separate variant accounts as equally valid and did not critically examine the sources. At that time we had little knowledgeable basis for ascertaining the historical validity of either the Tibetan tradition or the Tun-huang manuscripts.

Now, discoveries in the course of Tibetan Ch'an researches have advanced our understanding of the importance of the Tun-huang manuscripts for Tibetan studies to a second stage.

One such discovery is the similar content of the Tun-huang text P. tib. 116 and the Bsam gtan mig sgron, a Rāṇī ma pa text transmitted in central Tibet. Another important discovery is the attribution of the authorship of a text by Ye šes dbyaṅ to Hva šañ Mahāyāna in later Tibetan histories.

These observations allow us to consider the Tibetan historical tradi-
tion and the Tun-Huang manuscripts in the following manner: It is possible that, under various circumstances, Tibetan historical accounts were altered by later generations of scholars. Historical facts prior to such re-writings are preserved in both the Tun-huang manuscripts and texts belonging to the Rnīṇ ma pa school. In this way discrepancies between the Tibetan historical tradition and the Tun-huang texts are not only due to the provincial nature of the Tun-huang area but also to later distortions by Tibetan historians. The Tun-huang texts are reliable contemporary accounts of ancient Tibet and provide a basis for the critical study of Tibetan history.

As these above circumstances have become quite clear, the role of Tun-huang materials will be far more important for future Tibetan studies.

Looking from the present state of our knowledge, I would like to point out the following issues in research on the Tibetan Tun-huang materials. 1) Central Tibet and Tun-huang are geographically quite remote, and were also culturally distinct. By analogy, the same distinction would apply to the Chinese culture of the central provinces of China and that of Tun-huang. What these Tibetan cultural differences were is not clearly understood at the present stage of Tun-huang research. Therefore, even though we are able in some instances to verify the historicity of the Tun-huang materials, we are still unable to conclude that all they record is applicable to central Tibet. 2) The Tun-huang manuscripts do not represent a complete collection of contemporary Tibetan literature, and the reason the remaining manuscripts were left at Tun-huang is not clear. For this reason, working with these fragmentary materials presents the danger of mistakenly reconstructing the whole of which the remaining literature is but a few scattered parts.27

In the future, if the methodology for the study of the Tibetan Tun-huang manuscripts advances, and if our understanding of the cultural circumstances at Tun-huang improves, we should then be able to accurately use the Tun-huang materials in our investigation of early Tibetan Buddhism, including Tibetan Ch’an. Such conditions would mark the third stage for the application of Tun-huang materials to Tibetan studies.

III THE PROSPECT OF TIBETAN CH’AN STUDIES

It is a most surprising discovery that Ch’an, which had been typified
as ideologically Chinese, was translated into Tibetan and received by the Tibetan people. And that Ch’an doctrines, supposedly prohibited after the Council of Tibet, were a continued tradition is also quite unexpected. Now, reconstructing the history of Tibetan Ch’an is an important and unavoidable task, both for Ch’an studies and for the study of early Tibetan Buddhism. Following are three perspectives on the significance of research in this newly defined field, and the directions this research should take. 1) The very valuable documents of the early Ch’an schools, such as the *Leng chia shih tsu chi* and the *Li tai fa pao chi*, were lost in China. These texts were rediscovered among the Chinese Tun-huang manuscripts and there was consequently great progress in reconstructing the early history of Ch’an. It has now become possible to seek, among the Tibetan Tun-huang documents, materials of this status. Lost texts, such as the sayings of the Ch’an master Chiang-mo-tzang and the latter portion of the *Tun wu chen tsong yao chüeh* that were not found among the Chinese materials from Tun-huang, may now be restored on the basis of their Tibetan translations. In instances where both the Chinese text and the Tibetan translation are extant, it has been possible through their comparative study to restore a more accurate version of the text, identify personal names in the Tibetan, and so forth. To date there has been some success in collecting these texts from the Tun-huang finds (see I:1, 13, 16, 17), and further efforts would possibly be rewarded if the Tun-huang manuscripts and the canons of the Rñīṇ ma pa school were examined in greater detail.

2) By documenting the transmission of Ch’an to Tibet and its development there, we have been able to gain further insight into the character of the early Ch’an in China and the extent of its dissemination. For instance, Obata (see I:4) reconstructed from Tibetan sources the process by which the Ch’an lineage of the *Li tai fa pao chi* was transmitted to Tibet, and thereby we have added to our knowledge of the Pao-t’ang school at that time. It may also be possible to discern, from the tendencies of the Tibetan Ch’an school, information concerning the contact between the Northern and Southern schools and their fusion.

3) Ch’an studies have been conducted in the past within the regional divisions of Chinese Ch’an and Japanese Zen; now, a new field of Tibetan Ch’an has emerged. The earliest stage of Tibetan Ch’an was transmitted through the texts and teachers of the Northern, Southern, and Pao-t’ang schools of Ch’an that had formed in China. However once in Tibet, the Ch’an school was uniquely transformed under the influ-
ences of Indian Mādhyamika and Tantrism, which were flowing into Tibet during this period. The unique development of Ch'\an in Tibet under these circumstances is now in need of clarification, and in so doing, the reason and scope of the historical misrepresentations of the early period of Tibetan religious history may be discovered, as well as the nature of Buddhism at Tun-huang in the 8th and 9th centuries.

The following is a list of issues concerning Tibetan Ch'\an that need to be researched at this stage:

a) The doctrinal content and lineages of Ch'\an documents, and the manner in which they were transmitted to Tibet in the early period should be clarified.28

b) A definitive study of the Council of Tibet.29

c) An explication of the Buddhist tantric doctrines, such as Rdzogs chen and Mahāyoga, and their fusion with Ch'\an.30

d) A clarification of Tibetan Ch'\an.31

e) An analytical study of the distortions in traditional Tibetan histories and related records.32

Finally, although this is beyond the field of Tibetan Ch'\an, I would like to mention one additional course that Ch'\an studies of the future will predictably follow. In the same way that we have defined a new field of research on the basis of Ch'\an materials found in Tibetan, and which we have designated Tibetan Ch'\an, it is probable that similar research will follow suit in the field of Uigur and Tangūt studies. The literature of the Uigur and Tangūt languages is somewhat later than early Tibetan literature, but contemporary with the popularity and spread of Ch'\an. Although few in number, the existence of Ch'\an documents in Uigur and Tangūt translation has been confirmed.33 If this research proves fruitful, the scope of Ch'\an studies will be tremendously enlarged, and should illuminate much of Ch'\an's unknown history.

NOTES

1 Researches on T'an Ku'uang:

Reviews:

Research on Fa-ch'eng:


Review:


2 Japanese scholars such as Akira Fujieda consider the Tibetan occupation of Tun-huang to have been from A.D. 781-848; however, Demiéville and others would date the Tibetan occupation from A.D. 787.

An excellent study of the conditions at Tun-huang during this period has been published by Akira Fujieda; "Toban shihaiki no tonkō 吐蕃支配期の敦煌." *Tōhō gakuhō* 31 (March 1961): 199-292.

3 The phrase 'Le Concile de Lhasa' was first used by Paul Demiéville to describe the religious debate between Hva ṣaṅ Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla recorded in Tibetan history. (v. P. Demiéville. *Le concile de Lhasa.* Paris, 1952.) The phrase was revised to 'the council of bSam yas' by Giuseppe Tucci (v. Minor Buddhist Texts II, Rome, 1958, p. 32). Demiéville was later to revise the designation for this debate to 'the Council of Tibet' (v. Demiéville's review of *Minor Buddhist Texts II, Tooung Pao* 46 (3-5) (1958): 408).

At first, I was inclined to follow Tucci (v. Donkō to Tonkō no bukkōgaku), but as my research progressed I realized that the doctrinal controversies were rather large in scope and should not be limited to a debate at Bsam yas. Henceforth I have designated the controversies 'the Council of Tibet'. Okimoto and others continue to refer to this exchange as 'the Council of bSam yas'. (see I:7 etc.)

4 In Europe Tibetan Ch'an was recognized by scholars quite early:


Although the above studies had been published, their importance was not recognized in Japan.

5 With the materials gathered from this microfilm copy, I presented a paper to the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies on December 6th, 1970, titled 'Tibetan Ch'an Documents from Tun-Huang.' In this paper I outlined the contents of P. tib. 116, 121, 812, 813, S. tib. 710, 468, and 709.

6 The *Bka' thān sde lha* is stated to have been removed from its place of concealment at Śel gyi brag in Yar lung by 0 rgyaṅ glin pa (born A.D. 1323). The fifth section
section of this work (volume ca), the Blon po bka' i than yig, contains sections that discuss the gradual school (rise men rim gyis pa'i skabs) and the sudden school (ston mun cig car 'jug pa'i skabs). Tucci published a romanized edition of these sections and a English translation in MBT II, pp. 68–81 and 81–192.

7 The Bsam gtan mig sgron, also known as the Rdzogs chen gyi man nag bsam gtan mig sgron, the Rnal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan, and the Sgom gyi gnad gsal bar phye ba bsam gtan mig sgron, was authored by gNubs chen safa rgyas ye sê, a scholar monk active in the 9th century. It was published by S. W. Tashigangpa of Leh, Ladakh, as volume 74 of the Smamtsis Shesrig Spendzod Series in 1974. Y. Imaeda obtained this publication from E. Gene Smith in 1974 and informed Japanese scholars of its existence. Judging from the colophon of the text it seems to be a very valuable source of information for this period; however, as Okimoto has noted (see I:10), the text has probably been subject to emendation by later scholars.

8 Imaeda gave an oral presentation of this material at the 29th convention of the International Congress of Orientalists in Paris, July 16th–21st. His research was published in JA, 1975. (see I:9).

9 This Tibetan text has not been published yet. For a review of this article see Demiéville, “Récents travaux sur Touen-houang,” TP 56, 46–47. I have also published one essay attempting to analyze the formation of the Chinese version of the Lengchia shih-tzu chi on the basis of the Tibetan translation: “Chibetto yaku kara mita 'Ryôga shishi ki' seiritsu no mondai ten チベット譯から見た楞伽師記成立の問題点 Indogaku bukkôgaku kenkyû 21(2) (March 1973): 597–602.

10 As mentioned already in note 4, Demiéville had recognized in 1952 P. tib. 116, 117, and 812 to be the writings of Hva sañ Mahâyana; however, at the time of this article I was not aware of his discovery.

11 According to Okimoto, S. tib. 703 contains the same material as P. tib. 116. (see I:7)

12 The identification of 'gra lun san si (= Wo lun ch'an shih 臥輪兼師) and the record of his sayings (yü lu 語錄) was reported by Wu Chi-yu in a paper presented to the 29th International Congress of Orientalists at Paris in July of 1973, titled “Une citation de 'gra lun can çi dans le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 116.” However, I have not seen a copy of this research.

13 The first scholar to notice the parallel passages in the Blon po bka' than yig and P. tib. 116, was Obata, a graduate student at Ryukoku University.


15 Okimoto identifies dehu lim sen si with Tao-lin 道林 (A.D. 741–824). Thus he establishes a terminus ante quem for the compilation of P. tib. 116 at A.D. 824, and demonstrates that this text is not a contemporary record of the Council of Tibet. There is, however, insufficient evidence for the identification of Dehu lim with Tao-lin. Also, the various documents that make up P. tib. 116 were not all composed at the same time. For example, the Tun wu chen tsung yao chieh was translated into Tibetan in the late 8th century. (see I:17) It is probably accurate to suppose that the various documents, composed at different times, were later collected together in the form of the present text. In this case, even if materials contemporary with the Council of Tibet were included in P. tib. 116, there would be no conflict with texts of a later period that had been included in this compilation.
18 G. Tucci. *MTB II*, pp. 68 and 81.


Louis de la Vallée Poussin. *Catalogue of the Tibétan Manuscripts from Tun-Huang in the India Office Library*. Oxford, 1962. This is a catalogue of the 765 Tibetan texts collected by Sir Aurel Stein, and now kept in the India Office Library in London. The abbreviation *S. tib.* # is in reference to this catalogue.

The following is a partial bibliography of research on the Buddhist manuscripts recovered from Tun-huang, excluding my study of Fa-ch‘eng and the Ch‘an studies presented in this essay.


Other miscellaneous studies of the Tibetan Tun-huang materials other than Buddhist include the following:


The following historical study is based on Tun-huang sources:
21 R. A. Stein presented a general survey on the nature and content of the Tibetan Tun-huang documents to the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies during his visit to Japan in November of 1968. "Tonkō no chibetto bunken 敦煌のチベット文献 [The Tibetan Tun-huang Documents]." *Nihon chibetto gakkai kaihō* 16 (March 1970).
22 In order to give an accurate account of Tun-huang under the Tibetan occupation of A.D. 781–848, it is necessary to utilize the Tibetan manuscripts left there. Akira Fujieda and I feel that historical studies based solely on Chinese or indigenous Tibetan sources are not justifiable. Fujieda's *Toban shihaiiki no Tonkō 吐蕃支配期の敦煌 [Tun-Huang at the Time of the Tibetan Occupation], and my research on Fa-ch'eng were attempts to employ the Tibetan Tun-huang documents in this field.
23 P. Demiéville. *Le concile de Lhasa*. This work contains a photographic reproduction of the *Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chüeh* and a copiously annotated French translation. This epoch-making publication marks a turning point in Tun-huang and Tibetan studies.
24 Tucci in chapter 1 of *MBT II*, "The Debate of bSam yas according to Tibetan Sources", confirms that the personages listed in the *Chos byun* of Dpa'o gtsug phreña agree with those given in the *Tun wu ta ch'eng cheng li chüeh*, which lends validity to the indigenous Tibetan historical records.
25 Tucci questions the validity of the Tibetan account (v. *MBT II*, p. 46).
26 I drew attention to this issue in my research on P. tib. 116. (see I:3)
28 I had thought that Ch'an would have come into Tibet with the Ch'an master Ma-ho-yen when he was invited to Lhasa via Tun-huang. Obata believes that, previous to Ma-ho-yen, the Pao-t'ang school entered Tibet via the Nan-chao kingdom. Now, I believe other alternatives might be suggested: a) Even after the Council of Tibet, there was an influx of Ch'an materials into Tibet by various routes. b) This influx may also have come through Central Asia, as evidenced in P. tib. 996.
29 There is much that remains to be clarified about the Council of Tibet, such as the date of the event and the manner in which it took place. Imaeda questions whether Hva san Mahāyāna and Kamalaśīla ever met, and reasons that the Council of Tibet is something apart from the picture given in Tibetan history (see I:9). Tucci, in stating, "Briefly I suppose that traditional accounts of the debate of bSam yas should be accepted with some caution" (*MBT II*, p. 153), indicates that it is difficult to accept at face value the Tibetan descriptions of the Council of Tibet.
It is my opinion also that the actual circumstances and results of the religious controversies are somewhat different from what is reported in Tibetan history.
I now feel that Ch’ an may have been merged with the Mahāyoga of Rdzogs chen, which was appearing in Tibet at approximately the same time, and continued to be practiced there. Certainly there was a confrontation between Ch’ an and Indian Buddhists at the Council of Tibet; however, it is possible that the doctrines of the sudden and gradual schools were synthesized by a third party, the rdzogs chen school of Tantrism. Ch’ an and Mahāyoga texts found in association with each other are some indication of this, and it is possible that individuals such as Vimalamitra and Dpal dbyaṅs were instrumental in such developments. None the less, this is a very rough estimation and needs to be clarified by future studies of the Raṅg ma pa school’s writings, such as the Bsam gtan mig sgron, a re-examination of Tibetan historical sources, and the Tun-huang materials. I have approached this problem in the following essay: “Peruyan cho no daiyoga bunka: P. tib. 837 ni tsuite ベルヤン著の大瑜伽文献 P. tib. 837 について [A Mahāyoga Document Composed by dPal dbyaṅs: P. tib. 837].” Bukkyo bunka kenkyūsho kiyō 16 (June 1977).

Obata emphasizes that Ch’an, once in Tibet, followed a unique course of development (see I:14), which is a position I accept. I anticipate that what is characteristic of Tibetan Ch’an will become more definite as research in this area progresses, and two issues toward this goal that need to be elucidated are the lineage recorded in P. tib. 116, i.e. Nāgārjuna, Bodhidharma, Bu cu (無住), Budu ‘dul gyi snī po (降魔藏), Ardan hver, ‘Gva lun (臘輪). Mahayan, and so forth, and the significance of the transmission recorded in P. tib. 996.

During the later spread of Buddhism in Tibet, Indian Buddhism was considered superior to other forms, and Z. Yamaguchi sees the story of Hva šan Mahāyāna’s defeat at the Council of Tibet as evidence of this phenomenon. In this environment the Raṅg ma pa school was hesitant to make public any texts that contained evidence of association with Chinese Buddhism, and would propagate such materials only after a veneer of Indianism was applied. Yamaguchi feels Buston’s history is characteristic of the prevailing attitude during this later period. (see Yamaguchi, Zuihō. “Chibetto bukkyō to shiragi no kin ōsho チベット仏教と新羅の金和尚 [Tibetan Buddhism and Chin Ho Shang of Hsin Lo].” Shiragi bukkyō kenkyū 新羅仏教研究 1973.)

Imaeda has also found that a text authored by Ye šes dbyaṅs was attributed to Mahāyāna in Buston’s history. (see I:9)

On the basis of these observations I suspect that the history of Ch’an was excluded from Tibetan historical records as heretical during the period after Atiśa, when Indian Buddhism was fashionable and accepted as an absolute orthodoxy. During this period the victory of the Indians at the Council of Tibet was formulated. Even though there is much in the doctrine of Rdzogs chen that is similar in content to early Ch’an doctrine, the fact that the Raṅg ma pa school was active in the denial of this view would indicate that the above conditions prevailed.


'Meditation' Trends in Early Tibet

Herbert V. Guenther

While it will be readily admitted that 'meditation' has always played a major role in what is generically termed Buddhism, what the Buddhists themselves understood by 'meditation' is not so readily apparent. Of course, it may be argued that the word for 'meditation' used by the Buddhists is dhyāna (as if the use of a foreign word for a problem would explain the problem away); that in the Buddhist texts there is plenty of talk about what is referred to by the term dhyāna (to such an extent that the very meaning of dhyāna is lost in a welter of terms, some extremely technical, others less so); and that a whole movement developed which made dhyāna its central topic, and which has become known by the Japanese pronunciation of Zen which reflects the shortened Chinese pronunciation (ch'an) of the Indian word dhyāna. It is the latter movement that has attracted considerable attention even in Western circles, partly because of its deceptively easy emphasis on 'instantaneousness' or 'sudden awakening'. Even if one were to accept such a superficial labelling (which arouses associations with instant soup or instant coffee, if not with other 'instant' indigestibles), the implication would remain that, provided that 'awakening' is the goal, there also is a more laborious way, a moving up to the goal in a 'gradual' manner. As a matter of fact, this difference between a 'gradual' and an 'instantaneous', 'all-at-once' realization is said to have been a contentious issue which is supposed to have been resolved in a debate, held sometime around 792, between the Indian Kamalaśīla and the Chinese Hva-šaṅ Mahāyāna. However, contemporary sources discovered from Tun-huang have cast serious doubts on what previously was held to be an unassailable fact. Additional support for these doubts as well as for the fact that the alleged victor, Kamalaśīla, did not make such an impact on the intellectual life as is claimed by the later 'all-India' protagonists (inside and, not surprisingly, outside Tibet), is provided by Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas yešes' Bsam gtan mig sgron. According to Bdud-'joms 'jigs-bral ye-šes rdo-rje's (Dudjom Rinpoche) Bods na rabs pa gsañ chen rñin ma'i chos 'byuñ legs bsdg gsar pa'i
**dga’ ston dro**, Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas ye-šes *alias* Rdo-rje yañ-dbañgter was born in 772 (‘water-male-rat year’) at Sgrags-phu in Central Tibet.³ 'Gos lotsāva in his *Deb ther sūn po*⁴ is less specific and states:

In regard to the time of the appearance of this Sañs-rgyas ye-šes, some say that he lived in the time of Khri-sroñ Ide-tsan, some say that he lived in the time of Rañ-pa-can, and again some say that he lived in the time of Khri Bkra-šis brtsegs-pa-dpal. It seems it would be correct to say that having been born in the reign of (king) Rañ-pa-can, he lived until the time of Khri Bkra-šis brtsegs-pa-dpal.⁵

Ral-pa-can, *alias* Khri gtsug Ide-brtsan, was born in 805 and ascended the throne in 815. Khri Bkra-šis brtsegs-pa-dpal succeeded to the throne after the assassination of Glañ-dar-ma (born c. 830) in 842. If Dudjom Rin-po-che’s account is correct, Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas ye-šes must have been a very old⁶ man when he wrote his *Bsam gtan mig sgron* because he refers to the decline of Buddhism in Tibet, which (according to a gloss probably already in the manuscript from which the blocks for printing were prepared) refers to the persecution of Buddhism by Glañ-dar-ma. While Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas ye-šes refers to several controversies about various topics he is silent about any debate and actually mentions Kamalaśīla only in passing as representative of the ‘gradual’ realization process which, he says, is based on the works that did not deal with the direct meaning of what the Buddha had to say and which therefore were not ‘the last word’ on the matter.⁷ On the other hand, the teaching of the Hva-šang Mahāyāna who is said to be the seventh in the transmission—from the Buddha to Kāśyapa to Bodhidharma (variously spelled in the present text as Dharmora, Bod-dedarmotāra, Bodhedamotara, Darmodhara, Darmotara), to Mahāyāna (also spelled Mahāyan)—is based on works that are assumed to have been ‘the last word’ in the matter.⁸ It is interesting to note that this distinction between ‘suggestive’ (drañ-don) and ‘ultimate’ (nes-don) presentations was already firmly entrenched and has remained so to this very day, each follower of any of these two categories claiming that the one he accepts is the ‘final word’.

From an historical point of view it is noteworthy that Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas ye-šes still uses the Tibetan and Chinese terms for the ‘gradual’ and the ‘instantaneous’, ‘all-at-once’ realization concurrently—rim-gyis-pa/tsen-min (漸斷) and cig-car-bal/ston-mun (頓斷) respectively
—with a slight preference for the Chinese terms which later on disappear completely. But while he is conversant with the rdzogs-chen teaching which he links with the Atiyoga as contrasted with the Mahāyoga, he does not use the specific rdzogs-chen terms such as khregs-chod and thod-rgal which therefore seem to be a specific Tibetan contribution. From a linguistic point of view, making allowance for the erratic spelling in Tibetan manuscripts (in the case of tsen-men, tsen-min we even find tsen-man, obviously a careless omission of the e- or l- signs), the Tibetan transliterations of the Chinese terms tsen-min, ston-mun reflect a tendency towards ‘vowel-harmony’ (e-i/i) and (o-u).

The term bsam-gtan by which the Sanskrit dhyāna is rendered in Tibetan, has at least two different usages. The one refers to the traditional four stages as they are known from the Pāli Canon. The other is used in connection with distinct attitudes as they develop with the growth of man from the infancy of his naive (and concretistic) beliefs to what may be called ‘spiritual maturity’. This growth itself is a process that heals man’s dividedness against himself which has come about by succumbing to the thematic aspect of experience.

In order to effect this healing process in which bsam-gtan plays an important role, the nature of the thematic aspect or, more properly speaking, since we are dealing with processes rather than with a shuffling around of mechanical items, the ‘thematizing’ activity within experience must be known. Saṅs-rgyas ye-šes has the following to say:

First, (the nature of) the thematic will be discussed. It has to do with what is presenting itself and with what is not making its presence felt (in experience). The thematizing of what makes its presence felt is of three varieties: (i) the thematizing of what makes itself felt as factual (is itself of four kinds): (a) thematizing what makes its presence felt into some thing ‘given’ [as existent or non-existent, ‘presence’ or ‘openness’]; (b) thematizing what makes its presence felt into something which will counter (the hold this thematic nature has on us) [such as the eradication of the emotions]; (c) thematizing what makes its presence felt into something (ultimately) ontic [as claimed by philosophical systems], and (d) thematizing what makes its presence felt into an achievement [having reached a goal and now holding to it].

(ii) The thematic ness of observable qualities, which is the thematizing view taken with respect to what is commonly accepted.
(iii) The thematicness of what is present (in experience) as constituting the indivisibility of factualness and quality. This is the individually selective appreciativeness as found in the thematizing view as to what is ultimately real and valuable. Furthermore, there is the thematizing of ‘factuality’,\(^\text{16}\) of worldly (commonsense),\(^\text{17}\) of axiomaticness,\(^\text{18}\) and of consecutiveness.\(^\text{19}\) Each of these has its corresponding non-thematic aspect. The non-thematic aspect (of experience) is of (three varieties): worldly, transworldly, and supreme.

(i) The ‘worldly’ non-thematic (aspect of experience) is the (four dhyāna and the (four) samāpattis.\(^\text{20}\)

(ii) The ‘transworldly’ non-thematic (aspect of experience) is the (trance-like) suspension (of all psychic activity) of the Śrāvakas and the holistic feeling of calmness of the Pratyekabuddha. This is also known as the ordinary person’s ‘approximation meditation’.

(iii) The supreme non-thematic (aspect of experience) is (realized in the) Mahāyāna. It is a wider perspective as (grounded in) an attitude that discerns what is (existentially) valuable and derives from an individually selective appreciativeness as sustaining cause factor. The attitude in which the ultimate is its objectified content is an attributeless calmness. The attitude that (reflects) the presence of the ultimate (throughout) is the unity of calmness and wider perspective. These (attitudes) are also spoken of as a ‘fading away of an objective reference’\(^\text{21}\) having come about by dedication, ‘a fading away in a very intense manner’, and ‘a fading away (lingering on) as an after-effect.’ Since this is easily understandable, it will not be further explicated.

As to the non-thematizing (phase in experience) there is (i) non-thematizing as to what is present (i.e., presenting itself, making its presence felt in experience) and (ii) non-thematizing as to what is not making its presence felt. The former is (a) the non-thematizing of what is going to present itself as (observable) ‘quality’. It is the non-thematic cognitiveness that relates itself to the contextuality of the experience (situation)\(^\text{22}\) [the relatedness of the sensory capacities to their respective ‘objects’ without, however, being a cognition which holds to ‘a nothing’]. (b) The non-thematizing of what is present as ‘substantive entity’ is of three kinds: (i) The non-thematizing of what is present as an ‘existent’ substance is the cognitive activity of the Yogācāra (philosopher) which organizes\(^\text{23}\) the contextuality of experience (as a contextuality), and the cognitive activity of the Tīrthikas
that organizes (this contextuality) into a self (Atman). (ii) The non-thematizing of what is present as an ‘open-dimension’ substance is the attention of the Yogācāra (philosopher) to the ‘encompassing background of contextuality’.24 (iii) The cognitive process contemplating the ‘middle’25 way is a wider perspective. In it the previously (mentioned) ‘fading of objective references’ are here complete. Superior to and distinct from these (forms of non-thematic procedures) is the non-dual non-thematicness (as represented by the) Mahāyoga, and the spontaneously present non-thematicness (as exemplified by the) Atiyoga.26

This distinction between the ‘thematic’ and ‘non-thematic’ in experience makes it possible that attention can be directed to either the ‘thematic’ with its determinate-sensed or introspected differentiations or qualities (which give rise to the constructs of ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ as in traditional Western philosophies) or to the ‘non-thematic’ which, as the above quotation makes quite clear, is as yet undisturbed by thematic considerations.27 This ‘non-thematic’ is not an utter blankness or ‘emptiness’ (a favourite notion of many Westerners and their Eastern imitators—a notion which does not tell us anything about Buddhism but quite a lot about the state of mind of those who entertain this notion).

Attention to the ‘thematic’ has a restricting effect which is felt to be such as to necessitate the attempt to ‘get out of it’. This attempt involves a laborious manoeuvering and is, therefore, aptly termed ‘gradual’ (rim-gyis-pa/tsen-min). Saṅs-rgyas ye-šes declares:28

Just as one labours step by step to climb a mountain, so also, in order to realize the chos-kyi sku29 of the Victorious One, one climbs the (spiritual) levels one after the other when one has gradually cultivated and refined the ‘two truths’,30 inner calm and wider perspective.

More specifically this ‘gradual’ approach to the ‘non-thematic’, which has a higher value by being able to provide for the differentiation of the ‘thematic’ which, in turn, seems always to come to a ‘dead end’, is described by Saṅs-rgyas ye-šes as follows:31

The gradual or tsen-men approach is to enter the non-thematic after having given up, one after the other, the four thematizing determinations of the given. As is stated in the Mi rtog pa’i gzuḥs:32
A man who wants the Wish Fulfilling Gem must dig with his mind below the hardest and most solid rock. Gems are such that in a rock one finds three minerals: silver, gold, diamonds. But if one digs under the fourth and hardest layer one finds the Wish Fulfilling Gem that grants all that is needed for oneself and others. Similarly, a person who wants the non-thematic must rid himself of the thematizing determinants of the given, its counteragent, its ultimacy, and its attainment, and he must contemplate without absolutizing the three determinants.

This is the gradual contemplation or, more specifically, the gradual contemplation by (proceeding through the) three gates of 'ston-pa-ñid', 'attributelessness', and 'non-preference,' as well as the contemplation of calmness and wider perspective and so on.

The whole approach is epistemological and remains 'conceptual' in the sense that without concepts, not only can we not do anything, but we cannot even say what we are talking about. The first of the three 'gates' mentioned in the text, may be likened to what in mathematics is called the empty set. The two latter gates may be viewed as implications of the 'application' of the empty set. And as should be well known, the empty set is not a 'nothing' nor 'emptiness'. In the case of the epistemological approach here, 'things' do not really 'exist' as such. Thus, if we let U denote the 'thematic set', that is, the set of those things (chos thams-cad) to which we are naively accustomed, and if we denote the empty set by \( \emptyset \), then closer (epistemological) investigation reveals that \( U = \emptyset \). This is to suggest that the 'thematic set' is equal to (not different from) the empty set. Thus, the 'gradual' meditation seems to be merely an entertaining intellectual game.

However, even the 'instantaneous' approach does not fare much better. The reason is that it emphasizes the non-thematic over and against the thematic without realizing that experience is made up of both the thematic and the non-thematic, though not in a juxtaposed manner. Still, the superiority of the 'instantaneous' approach to the 'gradual' one lies in the fact that the 'instantaneous' is aware of the 'primacy' of the non-thematic. In relation to the latter the thematic is secondary, if not second-rate, and, as it were, represents a loss or deficiency. The emphasis on the 'primary' factor in experience, which is not necessarily temporal, still remains epistemological and entitative ('ontic') in character. Sañs-rgyas ye-šes declares
The *ston-mun* or instantaneous approach is to learn directly about the ultimate as being such as to have never come into existence, without resorting to expectations or aspirations. As is stated in the *Šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i mdo*:\(^{39}\)

After first having developed an attitude (directed towards spiritual awakening) one should think about (what is meant by) being sensitive to all and everything.

And in the same work:

The beginner must start with the development of an attitude (directed towards spiritual awakening) and has to learn about the fact that all that is is such as not to exist in a state of objectification.

And in the *Gtsug gtor gyi mdo*

Once an attitude (or ‘mind’) to which the categories of origination and cessation do not apply, has been developed, the goal which, in the end, is such that the categories of origination and cessation also do not apply, will be realized.

Further passages to this effect will be given later on.\(^{40}\) Although each teacher of the ‘instantaneous’ approach has his own method, the great master Bodhidharma states:

Dismiss any (thematizing) thoughts about the real. When your mind is utterly happy there is neither an I nor a Thou; the low and the high become alike and one. When you firmly stay in what does not change, you need no longer run after words and teachings. This is to have become tuned in to the real; it has nothing to do with a thematization into a determinate aspect, nor is there any busybodying involved. But being tuned in to the real is not the process of entering into this state.\(^{41}\)

The meditation master ’Dug-pa says:

Not to intend is (self-) discipline; not to focus (on something determined) is composure; not to have a mind (engaged in the) magic show (of the world) emerge, is appreciative discrimination.\(^{42}\)

The meditation master Bdud-’dul sāniñ-po says:

Not to focus on anything (specific) is to focus on Buddhahood. When in view of this the mind has been stilled, it is the very existence of Buddhahood.

And the meditation master Aṅha-na-her\(^{43}\) says:

To the extent that the mind becomes balanced, it becomes the sure way of tuning in.

The master Mahāyāna declares:
Let the internal logic of Being which is not reducible to the demands of the thematizing mind, reside in the non-thematic.\textsuperscript{44} Since the intrinsic awareness of him who contemplates (this) is such that it has never come into existence (as an awareness), something that has never come into existence cannot be made the focus of attention. (One can) enter there (only) directly. There are instructions and reasons that enable a beginner who has never done anything of this before, to enter there (i.e., have a direct experience). These will be mentioned in detail later on.\textsuperscript{45} To illustrate a reason: In the presence of a white object the perceiving consciousness seems to take on a white character. Similarly, in the absence of any intention the cognitive capacity is bright in its non-intentionality.

The last sentence in this quotation reveals the ‘conceptual’ character of the ‘instantaneous’ approach. To speak of something as never having come into existence is to have a concept of something, to which we may then make attributions. This is precisely to be back in the thematic aspect of experience, and this the follower of the ‘instantaneous’ approach will not admit. As Sañs-rgyas ye-šes so aptly declares:\textsuperscript{46}

For the ston-mun all that we call self and other is such as never to have come into existence at all, but to busy himself with this ‘unoriginatedness’ as the ultimate, is to fool the mind. He will never see the Real. A duck, despite all its activity, will not stir up the ocean.

From all that has been said so far it is obvious that, like the ‘gradual’ approach with its preoccupation with thematic entities, the ‘instantaneous’ one remains equally ‘ontic’ in the sense that its inquiry is about an ‘entity’ which in this case is the ‘non-thematic’. The above critique of both these procedures marks a shift from ‘epistemological’ investigation to ‘ontological’ analysis. As has been shown in modern times, a merely epistemological investigation overlooks the fact that experience which is the life of ‘meditation’ (whatever this threadbare term may mean in the contemporary context), is not an entity. The ‘ontic’ approach, whether ‘gradual’ or ‘instantaneous’, deals with what something is, it never asks about how something has come to be or what it means to be. This new question, however, was posed by those whom for want of a better term I shall provisionally call ‘existential thinkers’ and whose literary sources are the Mahāyoga and Atiyoga texts.\textsuperscript{47} Even here there is a pro-
gression from a ‘lower’ level ontological perspective to a wider one. More important, while on the level of the epistemological inquiry the ‘non-thematic’ remains ontically ‘thematic’ and hence postulational; the level of existential inquiry, however, deals with experience qua apodictic. The ‘lower’ level, as exemplified by the Mahāyoga, is both ontic in being aware of its being and ontological in attempting to understand itself as being, but fails to look behind the scene, as we might say. In other words, the mind\(^48\) reflects on itself as existing, but does not look for what makes this way of existing possible. The apodictic as contrasted with the ‘postulational’, approach is well brought out in Saṅsrgyás ye-śes’s characterization of the Mahāyoga position:\(^49\)

The non-thematic for the ‘insider’ is the ‘very being so’\(^50\) as explicated in the Mahāyoga works to the effect that all that is is a lucency in experience where the two truths are not (existing entitatively), and which is not made by a creator, but comes as a sheer lucency, and where the continuum of Being and its pristine cognition are not two (facets). As is stated in the Gsaṅ ′dus (Guhyasamājā):\(^51\)

In the absence of a particular existent there is no cultivation concerning it;
That which is to be cultivated, is not something to be cultivated. Thus in the absence of a particular existent and (what is) not a particular existent
Cultivation does not have anything for its objective reference.
This non-dual ‘very being so’ is not found anywhere else. The pristine cognition of it, which does not objectify the continuum (of which it is the cognition), is such as to be free from any observable quality without having had to leave it behind.\(^52\) It is a self-luminous self-experience.\(^53\) This is also stated in the Sgyu ′phrul dra ba:\(^54\)

This very self-experience divested of any subject or object (constructs)
Presents itself (to itself) in a non-objectifying manner.

It is true, experience does not come in ready-made determinants of subject and object, and any ‘subjectification’ into a transcendental self even as the Self (ātman) remains a postulate which has little or no relevance to him who wants to understand himself in his being. Any objectification into some (thing) is made possible through the dynamic character of experience which in its dynamic is already on the brink of falling
apart into the dualism of the ‘thematic’ versus the ‘non-thematic’ as developed epistemologically. But it is precisely this attempt to preserve the unitary character of experience as an interiority in which there is neither a ‘within’ nor a ‘without’ that prevents the experience from coming to grips with that spontaneity which—here language geared to ontic ways fails—is experience or the Being of experience, not behind nor in experience, but ‘pure’ experience. Saṅs-rgyas ye-šes summarizes the Atiyoga as follows:56

This very being, spontaneously present and complete in every respect, (as pointed to) by the Atiyoga, is such that all that which makes its presence felt and is interpreted, has been shining in its own lucency since a beginning without beginning, without there having been anything that had to be removed, in the expanding centre of a self-existing pristine cognition. This spontaneity and completeness which is just there without one’s having to look for a cause or effect, is being experienced by the experiencer in utter ease and lucency without having to postulate an experience (of itself as existing), without upsetting (the experience), without vitiating (it) or entering (into it) because there is nothing to upset, not even a name (for it). There is nothing that could be made a thematic focus, it is just ‘not existing’.57

Who could appropriate it (for himself)? In this ‘non-thematic’, that has been since a beginning without beginning, there is no ‘presence’ to end (it), there is no thematization of it, and (the term) ‘non-thematic’ is used only to give a name. As is stated in the Khyuṅ chen:58

Presence is like the great ocean
Non-thematicness is vast like the expanse of sky.
The difference (between the various facets of the non-thematic) is like the steps on a ladder.59 There are higher and lower ones, and so it is with the non-thematic.

It would lead too far away from the limited topic of ‘meditation trends’ to go into a detailed discussion of what is indicated in and by the Atiyoga and what may be termed ‘pure experience’. The important point to note is that the problem of ‘meditation’ is not (and has not been) so much the epistemological analysis or an alleged controversy between the ‘gradual’ (thematic-orientated) and ‘instantaneous’ (non-thematic orientated) approach, but the shift from epistemology to ontology, from
the question of ‘how and what do we perceive’ to the question of ‘how have things come about’ and ‘what does it mean to be’.

NOTES

1 See the penetrating research by Y. Imaeda, ‘Documents tibétains de Touenhouang concernant le concil de Tibet,’ (in Journal Asiatique, tome 263, Paris 1975), pp. 125–46. It may be pointed out that such early writers as Bsod-nams rtse-mo (1142–1182) in his Chos la 'jug pa'i sgo (= Sa-skya Bka'-bum, Tokyo 1968, vol. 2, fol. 55a ff) and Kloṅ-chen rab-'byams-pa (1308–1364 [the date 1363 as the year of his death refers to the beginning of the Tibetan lunar year whose end, when Klongchen-pa died, fell into the beginning of 1364 of our era]) in his Chos 'byun rin po che'i gter mdzod thub bstan gsal bar byed pa'i ni 'od (written in 1362), do not mention this event. The argument that an event detrimental to one's side may have been suppressed, therefore, is inadmissible. The ‘debate’ was more on the order of a series of discussions, of which there seem to have been at least three (Imaeda, loc. cit., p. 129). By Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s time the alleged ‘debate’ (singular) was used as an anti-Chinese (and by implication anti-Rājñama) rallying point.

2 The title page of the photostatic edition of this work reads: Rnal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan or Bsam gtan mig sgron. A treatise on bhāvanā and dhyāna and the relationship between the various approaches to Buddhist contemplative practices by Gnubs-chen Saṅs-rgyas-ye-shes. Reproduced from a manuscript made presumably from an Eastern Tibetan print by 'Khor-gdon gter-sprul 'Chi-med-rig-'dzin, Leh 1974. The manuscript exhibits all the defects of Tibetan calligraphic works: misspellings, omissions, etc., some of which will be pointed out in the following.


6 Kloṅ-chen rab-'byams-pa, loc. cit. p. 28, informs us that Saṅs-rgyas ye-shes died 120 years old.

7 Bsam gtan mig sgron, p. 23.


10 The terms ‘thematic’ and ‘non-thematic’ (for rtog-pa and mi-rtog-pa respectively) are borrowed from Calvin O. Schrag, Experience and Being. Prolegomena to a Future Ontology. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1969. Reference should
also be made to F.S.C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*. An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), who terms the two aspects of experience ‘the differentiated aesthetic continuum’ and ‘the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum’ respectively. While Northrop’s analysis remains epistemological (he even introduces the term ‘epistemic correlation’), Schrag’s investigation brings out the ontological character of experience as well. The lexical translation of the Buddhist technical terms by ‘perception with images’ and ‘perception without images’ is philosophically unintelligible and psychologically unsound.

11 *Bsam gtan mig sgron*, pp. 53ff.

12 snaṅ-ba. Lexical translations with their studied disregard for the philosophical problems involved in philosophical discussions render this term by ‘appearance’ and fail to tell the reader whether they use ‘appearance’ ontologically or epistemologically. The term snaṅ-ba cannot be equated with a ‘correlate’ to an unknowable thing-in-itself nor be identified with ‘semblance’; it is a process-term—‘becoming present, presenting itself, making its presence felt’.

12a This is glossed as ‘holding what is non-existent as non-existent’.

13 The text uses the term ho-bo which in later usage is quite distinct from dḥos-po. This latter term in conjunction with mtshan-ma corresponds to our concepts of ‘substance’ and ‘quality’ as discussed in traditional philosophies. Here, however, ho-bo is used together with mtshan-ma, as is also exemplified by a gloss to this passage. Since ho-bo is used here ‘ontically’, referring to an ‘entity’, I have rendered the term by ‘factual’ or ‘factualness’ and not by ‘facticity’ which is an ontological term, not an ontic one. It is of utmost importance to keep in mind the difference between an inquiry about an entity which is ‘ontic’, and an inquiry about what it means to be, which is ‘ontological’. This difference between ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ which has become the corner-stone of Tibetan Buddhist thought, has interestingly emerged in modern Western philosophy in the writings of Martin Heidegger who has had the rare ability to ‘think’. See Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*. New York: Harper Torchbooks 1970, pp. 19 ff.

14 raṅ-bzin. The ‘given’ is a term taken from phenomenology. It refers to what is otherwise also known as ‘essence’ and what is ‘ontic’ in the strict sense of the word. This ontic character is elucidated in the gloss to this term which is here put in brackets. All bracketed material hereafter is based on glosses which appear in this text. See also the following note.

15 de-kha-na-nil. Traditional philosophy, both in the East and in the West, has tended to consider the object of its inquiry as an entity and to confer on it an absolutistic or essentialist status. Traditional philosophy thereby forgets about ‘experience’ which is the very source of its ‘thinking’ and consequently is caught in what C.G. Jung so aptly termed ‘the thingness of thought’ and turns as barren and dead as a thing.

16 ho-bo-nil. The gloss indicates that whatever has presented itself is thematized into something factual.

17 ’jig-rten. The gloss explains this as the belief in the independent existence of things as entertained by ordinary persons.

18 ’hes-par ’jog-pa. The gloss refers to philosophical systems (grub-mtha’), each claiming its tenets to be axiomatic.
19 *rjes-su dran-pa*. According to the gloss the consecutiveness of inspection contents is meant.

20 I have retained the Sanskrit terms because these ‘entities’ were simply taken over from the Indian sources and were not further developed or interpreted by the Tibetans. On these terms see for instance *Abhidharmakosa* VIII, p. 144 in Louis de la Vallée Poussin’s rendering.

21 *mi-dmigs-pa*. The problem indicated by this term and the following ones (*śin-tu mi-dmigs-pa, rjes-su mi-dmigs-pa*) is that of ‘pure sensation’. While these three terms in the text refer to the process leading up to pure sensation and its after-effect, the phenomenon itself is discussed by C.D. Broad in his *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1951, p. 216.

22 *gzan-dbaṅ*. On this idea see my *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, Shambhala, Boulder & London 1976, pp. 99 ff., where I used the term ‘the relative’ in order to indicate that by this term the fact that everything is relative to everything else, is meant. This relative nature is here rendered by ‘contextuality’ in the light of recent research into the nature of experience. See Calvin O. Schrag, loc. cit. The gloss also makes this contextuality and relativity clear.

23 *yid-la byed-pa*. This term makes it quite clear that ‘ontic’ considerations are predominant, hence the rendering of *no-bo* in this context by ‘substantive entity’.

24 *yohs-su grub-pa*. See also my *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice*, pp. 100 ff., where the entitative character of what is referred to by this term has been rendered as ‘ideally absolute’ in conformity with the mentalist position of the Yogācāras.

25 This is a reference to the Mādhyamika philosophy. *Saṅs-rgyas ye-ses*, loc. cit. p. 72, approvingly presents the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika view, but is silent about the Prāsaṅgikas who in later writings are extolled beyond measure. See also Y. Imaeda, loc. cit., pp. 133–135.

26 It is interesting to note that Saṅs-rgyas ye-ses is silent about the Anuyoga. This would suggest that the classification into Mahāyoga, Anuyoga and Atiyoga was a later development.

27 See Calvin O. Schrag, loc. cit. p. 47.

28 *Bsam gtan mig sgron* p. 65.

29 This is one of the most complicated ideas in Buddhist philosophy and the interpretation varies from one philosophical trend to another. Some of the problems connected with it I have discussed in my *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, part I pp. 111 ff., 219, 223 ff., 251 n.7, 268n. 18, 276 n.10, 286 n.17; part II pp. 32 ff., 98 n.5; part III p. x. Because of the many hilarious nonsense associations which the Sanskrit term *dharmaṇāya* arouses, it seems preferable to retain the Tibetan term and to state in each case what the Tibetans understood by it. They were thinking in terms of hermeneutics, not of legislation!

30 The conventional truth and the ultimately valid one.

31 *loc. cit.* pp. 55 ff.

32 I have not been able to identify this text or the quote.

33 On these four thematic contents see also the passage quoted above, reference note 11.

34 Also known as the ‘three emancipating gates’, inasmuch as *stoh-pa-ñid* points to what cannot be captured by the ‘categories’ of substance and qualities or any
other category, 'attributelessness' (mtshan-ma-med) makes it impossible to 'qualify', and 'non-preference' (mon-med) prevents biasedness.

33 Saḥs-rgyas ye-ses, loc. cit., p. 122 quotes the following statement of Hva-śang Mahāyāna:

In taking a close look at (what there is) one must by means of an appreciative discrimination analyze all the without and the within, one's body and mind, as to its 'essential' characteristics (raḥ-gi mtshan-ḥñid) [the raḥ-byuṅ in the text is obviously a copyist's error] and its 'general' characteristics (spyi'i mtshan-ḥñid). The 'essential' characteristics are transitoriness and frustratingness; the 'general' characteristics are 'vacuousness' (stoṅ-pa) and the 'fact (that things) have nothing about them to give them a status of their own' (bdag-med-pa).

How one is to understand the operational character of this 'vacuousness' in its relation to the empty set (ston-pa-ḥñid) is unambiguously brought out by the meditation master Kha (mkhan-po Kha ṣan-ṣi), [ṣan-ṣi is the Tibetan transliteration of the Chinese ch'ān-shih (禅師),] loc. cit., p. 122: stoṅpa-ḥñid kyaṅ ston-pa yin-no, where yin is glossed by bya-ba raḥ yan ma yin-no. Although admittedly, elliptical, this may be rendered tentatively as "although (we may speak of) an empty set, it is empty in the sense that it is not predicatably functional." That the problem of 'exists' as a predicate was here recognized at this early date is interesting in view of the fact that, much later, the Indian Buddhist Ratnakirti (who in all likelihood was unaware of mkhan-po Kha's writings) tried to develop a 'logic' for using 'exists' as a predicate. See Charlene McDermott's valuable contribution to this problem in her An Eleventh Century Philosophy of 'Exists'.

36 Saḥs-rgyas ye-ses, loc. cit., p. 118 says:

The ston-mun or instantaneous approach claims that when one has reached the peak of a mountain, even if one looks by taking in everything, in view of the fact that that which one encounters and the agent who encounters (his world) are such that they never have come into existence, this very fact is understood without looking for anything. If one has reached the peak of a mountain the hillocks are clearly understood (i.e., seen) without looking for them.

Significantly Saḥs-rgyas ye-ses uses the term go-ba for 'understanding' which is always used in the sense of intellectual understanding. Nevertheless, on p. 185 he avers that the instantaneous approach is superior to the gradual one by ten ways.

37 Saḥs-rgyas ye-ses, loc. cit., pp. 173 ff. quotes the Bsam-gtan ṛgya-luṅ chen-po of Hva-śang Mahāyāna as saying that there are four ways of going about one's way. One way is by responding to the frustration one encounters and involves the awareness that one has discarded the real (yaḥ-dag-pa'i ḥo-bo-ḥñid) and by chasing after the external objects one roams about in various life-forms, constantly reaping frustration as the result of one's actions. The second way is the growing awareness of the co-operation of various conditions which set up frustrating situations. The third way is the awareness of attachment and addiction leading to frustration, and the fourth one is to go about one's life in a meaningful way.

38 loc. cit., p. 57.

39 The term mdo seems to be merely classificatory, rather than to indicate a particular Sūtra.

40 This points to the content of the fifth chapter, pp. 118–186, which is devoted to
the ‘instantaneous’ approach. Here, Sañs-rgyas ye-ses quotes more than thirty meditation masters and elaborates on the rigorous training involved.

41 This is the strongest statement against the opinion that the ‘instantaneous’ approach needs nothing. What is involved, sitting in a specific posture and letting the mind become settled, is discussed at length by Sañs-rgyas ye-ses, loc. cit. pp. 144 ff.

42 This statement mi-sems ni tshul-khrims/mi-dran-pa ni tiñ-he-dzin/sgyu-ma'i sems mi ‘byun-ha ni šes-rab-bo sums up the three ‘pillars’ of Buddhist spiritual growth: šīla (self-discipline), samādhi (composure engendering a holistic feeling which serves as the basis for the exercise of) prajñā (appreciative discrimination by which that which is valuable for one’s existence is separated from that which makes one suffer).

43 The same statement is quoted on p. 150, but here the name is spelled A-rdan-wor.

44 chos-ñid bsam-du med-la mi-rtog-par bţag-go. chos-ñid, as distinct from chos or chos-can, is related to ye-ses ‘pristine cognition’ or, as the Tibetans hermeneutically explain and understand this term, a cognition (šes) that has been since a beginning without beginning (ye). Since cognition has to do with ‘meanings’, not with ‘things’ which are the constructs of a reflective-thematic ‘mind’, I have tried to retain meaningfulness (as against the robot mechanism of a subjectivistic ‘objectivism’) by rendering this term by ‘internal logic of Being’. As to the multiple meanings of the single word chos (dharma in Sanskrit) see for instance The Collected Works of Kun mkhyen ’Jigs med gling pa, vol. III section I, p. 365, quoting from the Rnam par bṣad pa’i rigs pa (= Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti), which are discussed with reference to the ground of man’s Being (gži), its unfolding as a life-process (lam), and its actualization in meaningfully felt experience (bras-bu).

45 Sañs-rgyas ye-ses refers here to his detailed exposition in chapter 5, pp. 118–186.

46 loc. cit. p. 61.


48 The term is not to be understood in the sense of a ‘mind-entity’ but merely as a pointer. In Tibetan the ‘mind-entity’ is sems, ‘mind’ as a pointer is sems-ñid. The Sanskrit language has not made this distinction, hence to read Tibetan texts as replica of Sanskrit texts is plain obscurantism.

49 loc. cit. p. 59.

50 de-bţin-ñid. In Tibetan ñid is an emphatic particle and bţin a continuative particle. This linguistic feature has to be taken into account when dealing with ontological problems.

51 The copyist has misquoted the verse by mixing line one and two; he writes:

dhøs-po bsgom-pa-med-pa'i dhøs/
bsgom-par bya-ba bsgom-pa med/
del-tar dhøs-po dhøs-med-pas/
bsgom-pa dmigs-su med-pa'o/
The proper version is given in Rññ-ma rgyud-'bum, vol. 17, p. 15:
\[ \text{dnos-po med-pas bsgom-pa med} \]
\[ \text{bsgom-par bya-ba sgom-pa min} \]
\[ \text{de-ltar dnos-po dnos-med-pas} \]
\[ \text{sgom-pa dmigs-su med-pa'}o' \].
The Sanskrit version is, according to Yûkei Matsunaga, *The Guhya-samâja-tantra; A new Critical Edition*, Koyasan University n.d., p. 9:
\[ \text{abhâve bhâvanabhâvo bhâvanâ naiva bhâvanâ} \]
\[ \text{iti bhâvo na bhâvah syâd bhâvanâ nopalabhâyate} \].
Those conversant with Tibetan and Sanskrit will note that the Tibetan rendering does not tally with the Sanskrit version.

52 Here we have a clear case of the copyist omitting a word. The text should have read *ma-spanš-bral* instead of *spanš-bral*. The proper reading is found on p. 187.

53 The term 'self' in self-experience may create difficulties for someone, be he a Westerner or Easterner, who merely thinks 'ontically'. Self-experience experiences itself as *existing*, not as a 'thing' labelled 'self'.

54 This passage is found in *Rññ ma rgyud 'bum*, vol. 14, p. 513.

55 Sañs-rgyas ye-šes, loc. cit., p. 187, quotes from the *Sgyu'phrul dra ba* to this effect. The quotation is found in *Rññ ma rgyud 'bum* vol. 14, p. 68.

56 loc. cit. pp. 60 ff.

57 *med-pa*. The term is used here not in contrast to 'existing' but as being beyond existence and non-existence which are 'categories' while *med-pa* is 'existential' in an ontological, not ontic, sense.

58 This is the *Khyuñ chen Lðins pa*. The quotation is found in *Rññ ma rgyud 'bum*, vol. 1, p. 422; Vairocana rgyud 'bum* vol. 2, p. 369; vol. 5, p. 312.

59 I have changed the imagery slightly. A ladder in Tibet and its border areas, consists of the notched trunk of a tree. The 'steps' are the notches.
'The Great Perfection' in the Tradition of the Bonpos

Per Kvaerne

One of the most fascinating—and least known—aspects of Tibetan religion, is the system of meditation known as 'The Great Perfection', rdzogs-pa chen-po, or rdzogs-chen for short.1

Rdzogs-chen is of considerable interest for the study of Buddhist meditation, as well as for the study of mysticism in general, being a system of spiritual training and realization which is practised to this day by Tibetan adepts. However, it is also interesting from a historical point of view. It is generally recognized that for the study of the complex question of the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, a better understanding of this meditational tradition is of crucial importance. Giuseppe Tucci puts it in the following way (Tucci 1970 p.19):

"The development of Tibetan Buddhism in its initial phases is by no means as uncomplicated as the orthodox tradition would have us believe. Only systematic research in the history and beginning of the rdsogs c'en may permit one to judge the extent to which the tradition must be revised as regards these events”.

Accordingly there should be no lack of incentive to study this tradition. However, as far as conventional scholarship goes, relatively little has been done so far, and in this connection 'relatively little' means two or three short articles, a similar number of textual excerpts which have been published and translated, and in addition a scattering of incidental observations.2

The study of Rdzogs-chen raises a number of questions which have far-reaching consequences for the history of Tibetan religion. The first question, which is perhaps of the greatest immediate interest in the context of the present volume, is the relationship between Rdzogs-chen and the Chinese meditational school known as Ch’an. It is a well-known fact, of course, that Chinese monks belonging to Ch’an were extremely active in Tibet in the 8th century, and that they came into conflict with representatives of Indian Buddhism. This conflict, which had not only
religious, but also political implications, culminated in the famous debate in which exponents of the Chinese ‘instant path’ were pitted against the Indian ‘gradualists’ who advocated the more orthodox view of a step-by-step approach to Enlightenment.³ Whatever the actual outcome of this debate (the Chinese party claimed that they were the victors), or whether an actual debate ever took place or not,⁴ the later Tibetan tradition, as recorded, for instance, by Bu-ston, adopted the view that the Chinese were roundly defeated, and any doctrine advocating an ‘instant path’ of ‘no-effort’—or which could be construed as advocating such a path—ran the risk of being branded as ‘Chinese’ and hence unorthodox. This fact is significant for the study of Rdzogs-chen, for many of its Tibetan critics accused it of being precisely such a ‘Chinese’ doctrine, an innovation not sanctioned by the orthodox Indian Buddhist texts.⁵ The Ch’an element in Rdzogs-chen has also been stressed by Tucci,⁶ and we shall return to this question at the end of the present paper.

The second question of general significance for the study of the history of Tibetan religion, concerns the relationship between the varieties of Rdzogs-chen found in the Nyingmapa and the Bonpo traditions respectively. As pointed out by David L. Snellgrove (Snellgrove 1967 p. 15), a comparative study of their literature would be extremely important for elucidating the whole question of the relationship between the two schools in general, and hence for coming to grips with the problem of how the essentially Buddhist tradition, styling itself Bonpo, arose after the collapse of the national dynasty in the 9th century; but before a comparison of this kind can be carried out, we have to know what to compare. Accordingly, what I propose to do in the present paper is to present a small contribution to our knowledge of Rdzogs-chen by focusing on one particular tradition. Only when this kind of basic work has been undertaken on a much larger scale, will it be possible to compare Nyingmapa and Bonpo doctrines, and to approach the question of possible connections between Ch’an and Rdzogs-chen with greater confidence.

The Bonpos recognize not only one, but three different traditions of Rdzogs-chen, which are considered to be quite distinct, at least as far as their respective lineages are concerned. In the characteristic Tibetan shorthand fashion, these three traditions are known as a-rdzogs-sñan gsum (Karmay 1975 a p. 215):

1. A-khrid, “The System Leading to the Ultimate (= A)”
2. Rdzogs-chen, “The Great Perfection”
3. Žan-žuñ sñan-rgyud, “The Oral Tradition of Žan-žuñ”.
I shall deal briefly with the second and third of these, before going into detail concerning the first.

The second, which is explicitly styled Rdzogs-chen, has been less explored than the other two. Its basic text, *Rdzogs chen yaṅ rtse'i kloṅ chen*, was discovered by the gter-ston (‘Treasure-Discoverer’) Gzod-ston dṅos-grub grags-pa in 1088 as part of the gter-ma (‘Treasure’) known as Lho-brag-ma i.e. the ‘Treasure’ discovered at the temple of Khom(s)-mthiṅ in Lho-brag (Karmay 1972 pp. 154–56). It is apparently very closely connected with the Rdzogs-chen of the Nyingmapas, Gzod-ston being an important gter-ston in the Nyingmapa tradition also, under the name of Grub-thob dṅos-grub (ibid. p. 154 n. 1). Perhaps it is significant (although this is mere conjecture) that this particular ‘Treasure’ is said to have been found “behind the statue of Vairocana at Khom-mthiṅ” (Kvaerne 1971 p. 230), in view of the important role which the 8th-century Tibetan Buddhist monk Vairocana is supposed to have played in the introduction of Rdzogs-chen into Tibet, at least according to the later tradition.7 The *Rdzogs chen yaṅ rtse'i kloṅ chen* is supposed to have been composed by Sña-chu li-śu stag-riṅs, one of the siddhas who according to later Bonpo tradition were active in Tibet during the religious struggles of the 8th century. It is included in the Tenjur of the Bonpos (T 225).8 Sña-chu also hid the text in the temple of Khom-mthiṅ, and Gzod-ston is regarded as his emanation (Karmay 1972 p. 154 n. 1.)

The basic text of the third tradition enjoys the status of bka'-ma (‘Belonging to the Word’), i.e. of uninterrupted transmission without having been hidden as a ‘Treasure’. This term further implies that it was originally proclaimed by Ston-pa Gšen-rab himself, and it is thus included in the Bonpo Kanjur (K 108). The Žaṅ žuṅ sňan rgyud is supposed to have been brought from Žaṅ-žuṅ and introduced into Tibet by the Žaṅ-žuṅ siddha Gyer-spuṅs snaṅ-bzer lod-po in the 8th century.9 In recent years it has been published twice, together with a biography of the lamas of the lineage written by Spa bstan-rgyal bzaṅ-po (15th cent.).10

It is worth noting that the Bonpos have, without hesitation, included Rdzogs-chen texts not only in their Tenjur, but also in their Kanjur; in both collections, such texts constitute separate sections, and are regarded as expressing the supreme doctrines (Kvaerne 1974, passim). While certain Rdzogs-chen texts are included in the Buddhist Tenjur (Tucci 1958 p.122 et seq.), and a single Rdzogs-chen tantra is to be found in the Kanjur (Karmay 1975b), the Rdzogs-chen literature of the
Nyingmapas is on the whole to be found outside these collections, above all in the great collections of Nyingmapa texts like the *Vairo rgyud 'bum*, the *Rhin ma'i rgyud 'bum*, and the *Rin chen gter mdzod*.11

Turning, finally, to the first tradition, the A-khrid, we shall study it in greater detail. There are two reasons for focusing on this tradition. The first is practical: a certain amount of ground-work has already been done and the results published (Kvaerne 1973a), while the second reason is one of method: the basic texts of the A-khrid are neither *bka'-ma* nor *gter-ma*, but have been written by certain lamas whose biographies are available, so that the tradition can be traced back to a historically identifiable source. Once again we are led back to the 11th century, i.e. a crucial period in the formation of Tibetan Buddhism, a period when the various schools and centres of religious life arose which gradually developed into the so-called ‘sects’, one of these being the Bonpos.

The founder of A-khrid is Rme'u dgoñs-mdzod ri-krod chen-po, Rme'u “The Meditation-Treasury, the Great Hermit, of (the family of) Rme'u”, who lived from 1038 to 1096. He is regarded as a person of exceptional sanctity, and he is therefore often referred to simply as *dam-pa*, “The Saint”. As I have translated a version of his biography elsewhere, I shall only mention a few points of his life-story here.12

Having in his youth left his family in order to devote himself to the religious life, he stayed with various lamas and was finally ordained as a monk at the age of twenty-four. Thereafter he lived as a hermit in various places in his native province of Gtsañ, attracting to himself many disciples, teaching and ordaining. Although he composed several works dealing with the practice of meditation (for example a *Sgom-rim*, Kvaerne 1973a p. 33), his energies were on the whole directed towards the practice of meditation, rather than literary activities, and he was, at least as a young man, emphatic in rejecting scholastic studies. Thus his biography relates that having studied for some time with two lamas,

Reflecting carefully, he thought: “As for those two, they will exercise the abbatial function, so the teaching of the Word is firmly estalished. However, in this there is no profit for me; I require the spiritual realization (*dge-sbyor*)13 resulting from the full comprehension of the (esoteric) Sense of the Word (Kvaerne 1973a p.31).

His continuous practice of meditation is especially stressed, but so are the supernatural powers which ensued:
Having instantaneously traversed all the stages (*sa thams-cad dus gcig-la non-nas*), he strode forth in the sky, went through mountains without being impeded, and, firm stone becoming like mud, the master left clear imprints of his hands and feet at Brag-spyan thag-mo (ibid. p. 32).

His disciple Sgom-chen 'bar-ba is perhaps the most colourful and unconventional personality of the A-khrid lamas. His impetuous (or is it ironic?) rejection of worldly life, following impulsively upon his meeting his future guru, is characteristic:

Upon arriving at the bank of the river Nañ-chu, violent disgust with samāra was born, and he threw his trousers and carrying-frame into the water and said: “Go down from here! I will go upwards—our period of companionship has been (too) long” (ibid. p. 37).

After he had become the disciple of Dgoñs-mdzod, there followed a period of three years in which he unsuccessfully strove for spiritual realization (*dge-sbyor*), his mounting frustration being increased by his guru’s reluctance to impart spiritual counsel. His realization was reached in a remarkable way, through sudden, violent physical movement:

Thereafter, having one day said: “Come up from here!” and having brought him to a grassy bog, he (i.e. Dgoñs-mdzod) said: “‘Bar-ba! As you are said to have been very strong when young, make a leap here!’ ‘Bar-ba, acting accordingly, slipped and fell, and his body tumbled down very violently. Spiritual realization arising at that very instant, he cried and laughed without stopping (ibid. p.39).

For a student of Ch’an, this episode certainly presents an interesting parallel to the attainment of ‘sudden Enlightenment.’ The rest of his career was apparently of a rather conventional kind, consisting of teaching, distributing alms, and exhibiting various miraculous powers. It is perhaps noteworthy that he did not receive ordination, but remained a layman and “showed great respect to the monks”; he died at the age of seventy-six (ibid. p.40).

A third lama in the A-khrid lineage must be mentioned, Bru-chen rgyal-ba g.yuñ-drüñ (1242-90). He is an example of the kind of monk-scholar—learned in a wide range of disciplines, active as a teacher and writer, but at the same time proficient in the art of meditation—who
is, (if I may intrude with a personal opinion) perhaps the most attractive kind of *homo religiosus* in Tibetan Buddhist civilization. From his biography we shall note two points: first, that he also figures in the spiritual lineage of Žaṅ-žuṅ (ibid. p.21); second, that he is the author of the basic, authoritative text of the A-khrid tradition, the *Man ṇag khrid kyi rim pa lag len thun mtshams daṅ bcas pa*, usually known as the *A khrid thun mtshams bco lña*, “The Fifteen Periods of A-khrid”. Our investigation of the A-khrid system will be based on this text, which, together with various ancillary texts and an auto-commentary, is considered to be sufficiently authoritative to be included in the Bonpo Tenjur (T 284). This text is a typical work of systematization and codification, and it is stated in the colophon (p.115 1.6) to have been written “in accordance with the practice of Dgoṅs-mdzod”. It was, however, certainly not without predecessors; thus we know that a text styled *G.yas ru'i a khrid chen mo* was composed by 'Gro-mgon g.yor-po me-dpal (1134–68) (Kvaerne 1973a p.24). It has also continued to retain the attention of Bonpo lamas up to our own times, as the commentaries written by Šar-rodza bkra-šis rgyal-mtshan (1859–1935) testify.17

We shall now study the actual system of meditation as outlined in the *A khrid thun mtshams bco lña*, restricting ourselves, however, to a general survey of this text and reserving the detailed discussion of its terminology for later and more comprehensive treatment.

The text is divided into three main parts. The first part, which covers the first four ‘periods’ (1)–(4), deals with the ‘preliminary procedures’ (*sṅon-'gro*). It is sufficient to mention these briefly, the important thing being to note that although they are preliminary, they are also indispensable, as they serve “to ripen the unripe consciousness (*rgyuḍ)*. The preliminaries, then, are as follows:

1. The meditation on transitoriness to counteract desire.
2. Resolution to gain Enlightenment, the taking of the Refuges, the confession of sins.
3. The accumulation of merit.
4. The offering of prayers and request for benediction.

There exists a commentary to this section written by Šar-rodza bkra-šis rgyal-mtshan.18

The second part contains the ‘basic subject-matter’ (*dṅos-gżi*), showing how the “ripened consciousness is set free”. It is perhaps the most interesting part, in which the characteristic traits of the actual meditational
procedure are clearly set forth. It consists of six 'periods',\textsuperscript{19} divided into three major steps: "grasping mentally that which has attributes" (5); "equipment (the mind) on that which is without attributes" (6)–(7); "confronting (the mind) with the meaning of Ultimate Nature (gnas-lugs)" (8)–(10).

(5). Meditation, then, initially focuses on a concrete, visible object, for example the outline of the Tibetan letter \( A \),\textsuperscript{20} "written on a piece of indigo paper" (p.79), and fastened on a stick in front of the disciples who are seated in rows in a quiet and secluded spot. The cross-legged posture of meditation is described in detail, and it is said that "by virtue of this control of the body, the humours are balanced, the consciousness assumes its natural state; . . . psychic veins, wind and seed are brought under one's control—such is its virtue" (p. 79).

Thereafter the way in which the eyes should be controlled is described:

One should staringly, unblinkingly, without looking up or down or to the right or to the left, directly in front regard the \( A \) without opening fully nor closing the eyes, without being distracted by thoughts of the past or imaginings regarding the future, by sudden reflections or thoughts or recollections of good or evil. . . staring down uninterruptedly as if boring a hole, being straight like the shaft of a spear, being tense like the string of a bow, being insensate like a corpse: without wavering, without recollection, without forgetfulness, without mental vacancy, without thinking of anything in particular, without being tired even for a moment (p.80).

The length of each session is indicated as being initially equal to the time required to recite the mantra \( a \text{ om } h\text{um } a \text{ a-dkar sale} 'od a ya\text{n } o\text{m} 'du \) two hundred times. After two or three days of assiduous practice, certain signs (\textit{rtags}) of spiritual progress will manifest themselves. These are the "signs" (\textit{nimitta}) which in Theravāda Buddhism are said to ensue from the practice of "mindfulness" (\textit{sati}), and which appear before the entering into the first stage of trance (\textit{jhāna}).\textsuperscript{21} Our text differentiates, in what appears to be a very empirical manner, between 'internal signs' and 'external signs'. The internal signs are, among others:

Like a tortoise placed in a basin, one is unable to move; like the wind hitting a small bird, shuddering slightly and feeling cold, one's mind
becomes (as it were) numb; like water drawn from an iron pipe, the mind, subtle and even, continuously gushing forth, remains one-pointed . . . (p.81).

External signs are, in the best disciples, “absence of bodily movement or unsteadiness. In the others, a strong desire to weep, laugh, dance and run will occur; turning the face away, not shutting the mouth or eyes, feeling a pricking sensation, sweating, shuddering, and falling to the ground” (p.82).

These symptoms are of course well known from other sources in connection with the initial stages of meditation, particularly as a result of exercises regulating the breath, and it is interesting to note that although nothing is said about regulating the breath, the explanation offered in our text is that the ‘mild wind’ has entered the avadhūti (the central psychic channel).

(6). The next stage is continued meditation, but now without any fixed or defined object of meditation. Bodily posture and gaze are as before: “without forcing it, without relaxing it, (the body) is simply equipoised entirely in its own natural disposition . . . abandoned, stupefied, and relaxed like a corpse” (p. 84). Likewise the gaze is as before, but no longer focused on an object: “One should look straight ahead, emptily, unblinkingly, staringly, without looking up or down or near or far” (p.85). Thus the consciousness (śes-pa) comes to rest “and samādhi void of discursiveness (nirvikalpaka-samādhi) is produced spontaneously” (p. 84).

Accordingly the attention now shifts from the body and the gaze to the mind itself, which is viewed in its natural state of an ‘eternal now’:  

Without effacing former traces, without interest in the future, one equipoises one’s present mind (da-ltar-gyi rig-pa) ever fresh, shining and even . . . The mind having no support, grasping is loosened by itself, mental restlessness disappears by itself; one equipoises (the mind) in its spontaneous self-nature (ma-bcos ran-lugs). [So] the mind is equipoised intently without support, without depending on anything at all; without being covered by the notion of object and subject, it is equipoised unveiled and naked; isolated without being corrupted by discursive thought, it is equipoised brightly; not bound by the ego, it is equipoised unhurriedly according to its own disposition; without discursiveness through mental activity, it is equi-
posed relaxedly and clearly; without being obscured by darkness, it is equipoised shinningly in luminosity (p.86). \(^4\)

Or again:

Shining, discerning, and firm; deep, luminous and bright; shining, without root; stunned in its own luminosity; naked, without discursiveness; unblinking, without grasping; spontaneously balanced; freely sparkling in its own arising—let it always remain in that condition (p.89). \(^4\)

Our text, which is a manual for giving instruction in meditation, written, in other words, for the guru rather than for the disciple, is careful to give precise indications: “If the sessions of meditation are long, he will become languid and indifferent; if they are short, there being no stability (gnas-chad), he will not grasp his innate nature (rañ-so)” (p. 87). \(^k\) He gradually extends the sessions of meditation, from the time it takes to recite one hundred to the time it takes to recite three or four hundred times the mantra a om hūṃ a dkar etc., and he reduces the interval between the sessions, being careful to avoid sinful, violent, or exhausting actions, abstaining from speech, his mind being “like a corpse”, keeping away from excessive heat and cold, “beer and pungent herbs”; nor should he feel joy at improvement or dismay at diminishment of success in meditation. Constant diligence in meditation is all-important, for thereby—thus concludes the sixth ‘period’—ensues the threefold “tranquility” (zi-gnas, šamatha): first the ‘mind-created tranquility’ is born, then the ‘tranquility of one’s innate nature’ arises, and finally ‘the firmness of ultimate tranquility’ is obtained. (p.88). \(^4\)

(7). There follows the description of a procedure whereby the mind, thus equipoised in meditation, is identified with the universal void. This process has three elements or phases—“Example” (dpe), “Meaning” (don), and “Sign” (rtags):

When the bright sky is without cloud or wind, let him assume the the gaze and the bodily posture set forth above. Fixing the mind on empty space, the sky and the mind become indistinguishably intermixed, gradually harmonious with one another, undivided without separation. . . . At that time, externally the sky does not consist of any substance, form, colour, dimension, direction or characteris-
tics at all that can be discerned, it is perfectly stainless, freely sparkling in the Void—this is the Example.
Internally, this constantly discerning, lustrous one called ‘the mind of the self’ regards blankly and discerns clearly outwards and inwards without distinction—that is the Sign.
The identity of those two . . . this state of non-dual Great Equality . . . is the Meaning (p.90).

(8). The eighth ‘period’ introduces the third stage, the ‘confrontation with the Meaning of Ultimate Nature’. This consists—somewhat surprisingly in view of the preceding emphasis on ‘blankness’ etc.—of a particular yogic procedure involving the visualization of three psychic channels connected with the imagery of masculine/feminine polarity, and the performance of certain breathing exercises. It is not necessary to go into this in detail; we may, however, note that the procedure is stated to “separate the pure and impure aspects of the consciousness” (p.93), whereby “Spontaneous Wisdom” (rañ-‘byun-gi ye-šes) arises. This Wisdom is nothing but the mind itself, in its essential purity and luminosity,

without recollection of former propensity to passion, without anticipation of what is to come; unmoved by mental flash-backs; not overpowered by drowsiness; without making the mind itself an object; without the six ‘perceptive groups’ following the five senses; without attachment to the taste of samādhi; the present consciousness being bright in its own luminosity, without grasping, with joy it shines steadily (p. 93).

We note that the disciple is now admonished not to be attached to the ‘taste of samādhi’, which is, obviously, nothing but a particularly subtle form of desire and attachment, and hence is known as ‘the internal Māra’ (p. 96). Any conscious effort to meditate is a hindrance; indeed, what is felt to be a painful absence of meditation is—provided the mental anguish becomes sufficiently acute and all-embracing—nothing but Spontaneous Wisdom itself:

Accordingly, the constant hoping for the arising (of realization) through one’s own practice of and meditation on that which one’s guru has taught and instructed, the great and vociferous insistence on
the need of it (i.e. of realization) when it does not arise—*that* is precisely That; it is not elsewhere. Impress this on your mind; strive spiritually; make a firm resolution! (p. 94).

The text adduces several quotations in this connection which merit being reproduced in full:

Thus also the *Luṅ drug* says: “It is That; feel it and look at it. Looking, there is nothing to be seen. By means of That, That itself is seen.” *Li-šu* has said: “As it is nothing but precisely This itself, why do you say ‘I do not know it’?” The *Bum* says: “The Wisdom of Self-Knowledge does not arise from without, nor does it arise from within; it arises by itself in itself.” (p. 94).

Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the visualizations referred to above involving psychic channels etc., far from being a superfluous interpolation, seem to play a crucial role in turning ‘tranquility’—which might otherwise become mere stupor (*Ideñs-po*)—into a dynamic process of spiritual liberation; for “one session of visualization of psychic channels and wind is swifter and more beneficial than innumerable precious and profound methods” (p. 95).

(9). The mind has thus returned to a state of being which is perfectly quiescent, natural, luminous and equipoised, and the text now returns to the theme of doing away with the very consciousness of being in a state of meditation, for “by seeking it is lost, by regarding it is obscured, by meditation it is corrupted” (p. 96), and “by contemplation on the thought ‘I meditate’, the bodhi-mind is obscured” (ibid.). In other words, the time has come to dissolve, once and for all, the false dichotomy between ‘I’ and ‘it’, between subject and object. So, “dissolving it relaxedly, all that which was meditated upon is dissolved so that it becomes non-meditated upon” (p. 96). This mental state is neither the stupor to which meditation might lead, nor the equally ‘profane’ state of mental dispersion, for one should “exert oneself spiritually without letting the thought wander” (p. 95). Yet this exertion is really a non-exertion, for it simply consists in the effort to “relax it (i.e. the consciousness) unconcernedly, dissolve it unhurriedly, loosen it completely, like one who having carried on his back a heavy load of wood, is able to put it down at last.” (p. 96)

The consciousness having been ‘relaxed’, After dissolving, one should,
without purposely meditating, spontaneously extend the string-of-recollection (‘stream-of-consciousness’) and retain it without either meditating or letting the thoughts wander (p. 97). After relaxing, loosening, and dissolving, rest in your consciousness without meditating or letting your mind wander, without thinking discursively or grasping (ibid.).

Neither meditating nor inattentive, one should simply rest uninterruptedly in the spontaneous flow of one’s consciousness; thus all mind-produced defilements are destroyed and the first stage of the spiritual quest, the practice of “periodical meditation” (thun-sgom), is brought to its conclusion.

(10). The adept now enters the second stage, that of “permanent meditation” (ṇaḥ-sgom) in which Wisdom free from defilements is realized. Permanent meditation, which is not an “ordinary” (tha-mal) state, being neither meditation nor inattentiveness, involves, in a certain sense, the return to the ‘ordinary’, everyday life. For while the adept, while training himself in the basic skill of equipoising, was enjoined to avoid violent or exhausting movements, passions, even speech itself, he may now indulge in any activity at all, provided his ‘permanent meditation’ is not interrupted.

In other words, the basis for what follows is a dialectical movement from dispersion (lack of balance) to equipoise, i.e. samādhi, which, unless meditation on psychic channels etc. is resorted to, may become prolonged indefinitely in the form of ‘stupor’. Both dispersion and equipoise are, however, in different ways, ‘ordinary’ conditions; their synthesis, so to speak, is a state of ‘neither meditation nor non-meditation’, and involving a return to the world of human activity.

The text deals with this ‘synthetic stage’ under the conventional headings of ‘body’, ‘speech’, and ‘mind’, which are now, no matter how they are engaged, regarded as “the body of a god”, “the sound of sacred recitation”, and as “Wisdom” itself. Thus all actions, words and thoughts whether pure or not, are “raised to the Path” (lam-du sloṅ-ba), i.e. transmuted into Means towards Enlightenment, provided one remains in a state of continuous spiritual realization (dge-sbyor-gyi ṇaṅ-du) (p. 98). The text is at this point so explicit as to merit being quoted at length:

Firstly, on the basis of the above ‘knowledge of retaining’, he will accompany it with looking upwards and downwards, moving hither
and thither, being twisted, unsteady, and careless. If this does no harm, he rises gently and accompanies it with salutations and circumambulations, which is pure. Thereafter he will accompany it with rendering them (i.e. these ‘pure’ actions) energetic. Thereafter he accompanies it with various actions like leaping, running, etc., which is neutral. Thereafter he accompanies it with actions like beating, furious anger, etc., which is impure. Engaging even in all these actions, all pure and impure physical acts and behaviour are raised to the Path while in a condition of spiritual realization.

Secondly, again while in a state of spiritual realization, he should recite the formulas, the Refuge, the bodhisattva’s vow, prayers and sûtras, which is pure. He accompanies (realization) with speech and chant of every sort, benign and fierce. If this does no harm, he accompanies it with the speaking of nonsense, loose talk, jokes, questions, and abuse etc. of every sort, which is neutral. Thereafter he purposely utters shouts, harsh words, lies etc., which is impure. If one raises all this to the Path, there is accompaniment of speech (by spiritual realization).

Thirdly, while in a state of spiritual realization, he accompanies it with the turning of his own body into that of a tutelary deity. . . . He accompanies realization with various thoughts and reflections, which is neutral. Thereafter he accompanies it with all the impurities like the Three Poisons, the Five Poisons, etc. If all these are intermixed, mind and spiritual realization are likewise intermixed (pp. 98–99).

We have come a long way from the bodhisattva’s vow and the simple taking of the Refuge referred to at the outset. The adept plunges right back into the whirl of life, not only in external mode of life, but in his very thought and feeling. I shall quote a rather lengthy passage:

He indulges in feelings of fear and terror, fright and anguish, disgust and aversion, disease and pain, anger and fury, worry and shame, desire and passion, misery and suffering, joy and happiness, etc. Discursiveness, doubt, hope and fear, suffering—unsuitable and disagreeable unfavourable circumstances; from eating and chewing, walking and sitting, all actions and behaviour at the present moment right up to, finally, death—with regard to these the mind’s essence does not escape (rig-pa’i gnad ma-šor); one is not separated from the potential friends, viz. recollection and grasping, and they are carried to the path
in a condition of spiritual realization; they are cut off just as they are; they are accepted unquestioningly; defeat and victory are intermixed (p. 95).

In short:

When in the condition of the Great Vehicle, the Foundation, one can carry everything to the Path, acts of body or speech, behaviour pure or impure, virtuous or non-virtuous, good, bad, or neutral—whatever one has done goes towards spiritual realization (p. 100).

Thus is completed the ‘confrontation with Ultimate Reality’.

The third section of the text is styled “the consummation” (mthar-phyin-pa): it is the “instruction in bringing the liberated consciousness to its final end” (p. 100). A summary of the salient features of this process must suffice.

(11). The eleventh ‘period’ has the heading ‘suppressing the psychic-impressions (bag-chags, vāsanā) in the evening’; in other words, the psychic forces which until now have operated independently of spiritual realization are now also brought under control. So, lying down at night in the sleeping posture of the Buddha, full of compassion and faith in one’s guru and tutelary deity, one visualizes one’s mind (rig-pa) in the form of an A from which rays of light shoot forth and are re-absorbed; thereby the entire body is felt to be suffused by light. Concentrating on the A and suppressing the shooting-forth and the reabsorption of light, one lies down (as it were) in the Void, having no particular sensation. The best disciple, mixing sleep and contemplation (bsam-gtan), goes straight off to sleep; he is not separated from spiritual realization for a single moment, and while in sleep he experiences nothing but pure luminosity, i.e. mind itself in its absolute mode of being. Disciples of medium capability recognize their dreams as such, so their dreams and wishful imaginings are ‘raised to the path’ and their spiritual realization increases even more at night than it did during the day. Even the least skilled disciples will gradually learn to recognize their dreams as such (p. 101). Likewise all sensations are to be regarded as dreams, and all dreams as sensations, so that everything appears as dream or illusion (p. 103). Whatever mental form the psychic-impressions create, to whatever place the mind wanders, whatever sensations may arise—all is
to be regarded as the illusory appearances of dreams and hence ‘raised to the Path’ (p. 140).

(12). The heading of the following ‘period’ is ‘training the reflective-power (rtsal) on the sensations during the day’. The ‘reflective-power’ is “the consciousness consisting of thoughts and recollections” (p. 95); and while previously, for the purpose of attaining samādhi or ‘equipoise’, this ‘reflective-power’ was to be rendered unmoving (pp. 95–96), it is now to be ‘exercised’ or ‘purified’ by being allowed to play freely on all the objects of sensation, without discriminative thought, without acceptance or rejection (for thereby it would escape back into an ‘ordinary’ condition).

In the best disciples, who are in a state of continuously seeing (the truth), the ‘reflective-power’ will arise in itself and dissolve in itself, like snow and rain falling on a lake; in those of medium skill, who are in a state of meditation, it will be seen in its nakedness and dissolve in its nakedness, like a long-sought-for person whom one finally meets; while in the least skilled ones the ‘reflective-power’ will be exercised, the string-of-recollection, one’s constant companion, being like water gushing forth from an iron pipe (p. 105).

It is possible to remain unruffled by all appearances,

For appearances (snan-ba) are mind (sems), and mind appearance: hence appearances and mind are not-two; in appearance itself is Emptiness, and in Emptiness itself is appearance: hence appearance and Emptiness are not-two—they arise luminously without being hindered, they dissolve sparkingly having no own-nature, and their arising and dissolving are simultaneous. So in the best disciples they arise in themselves and are dissolved in themselves; in the medium ones they are seen in their nakedness and are dissolved in their nakedness; in the least skilled ones the grasping recollection is (as it were) a friend whose form is seen (as) Emptiness, whose voice resounds (as) Emptiness, whose smell is smelt as Emptiness, whose taste is enjoyed as Emptiness, whose touch is put on as Emptiness, whose Doctrine is recollected as Emptiness, etc.—one strives spiritually, leaving everything just as it is (p. 106).

Summing up this ‘period’, the text states:
One exercises the ‘reflective-power’ with regard to the appearances (caused by) the six sense-fields, but that is not enough: no harm must result. Harm not resulting is not enough: they (i.e. the appearances) must arise as friends. Arising as friends is not enough: one must enjoy their flavour as not-two (with regard to Emptiness) (p. 106).\textsubscript{kk}

(13). The adept is now approaching the final goal, and must train himself to ‘raise, at morning and at night, his discursive-thoughts to the Path’. So whatever illusions or discursive-thoughts trouble his consciousness (rgyud), he lets them arise and dissolve without any feeling of there being anything to suppress or any intellect to suppress it (p. 107).\textsubscript{kk} for just as waves do not ruffle the essential tranquility of the ocean nor a rainbow that of the sky, thus that which arises as the mind (sems) is essentially at rest in the mind-itself (sems-\textit{\textsf{\textbf{\textsubscript{\textstyle{\text{-}}}n\textsubscript{\text{\textstyle{\text{-}}}id)}}})—“everything is ‘great tranquility’, everything is ‘great spontaneity’” (ibid.).\textsubscript{ll}

(14). Finally one lives in a state of ‘perpetual confrontation’ (rgyud-du ra\text{\textdagger}-\text{\textdagger}ho sprad-pa) which reaches its consummation in a final dialectical movement: all appearances are ‘confronted’ as mind (sems); the mind is ‘confronted’ as limitless; limitlessness is ‘confronted’ as the ‘three bodies’ (p. 109).\textsubscript{mm}

As for the first phase, there is nothing except mind; everything is the magic-appearance (cho-\textit{\textsf{\textstyle{\text{-}}}phrul}) of the mind, yet apart from appearances there is no mind. According to the psychic-impressions of their mind, beings experience hell, the state of the tormented ghosts, etc.; likewise in this life, humans experience illusory sensations due to sleep, the intermediate state, possession by spirits, medicine, or food; and by illusion of the senses one may see two moons, take a rope to be a snake, etc. All these appearances are nothing but mind (pp. 109–10).\textsubscript{nn} In fact, whatever appearances arise in a being who has been corrupted by the sleep of ignorance, is false, like a dream or an illusion. So all appearances should be seen simply as mind, and left as such, mind and appearance having one single flavour (p. 111).\textsubscript{oo}

But the mind, thus recognised, has neither beginning nor end; sparkling, brilliant, naked, pliant, it is the producer of Buddha and of beings, pure and impure, inner and outer; although various things arise, it remains unborn in its own-nature; its play arises unhindered, its essence is non-dual, being limitless it has no characteristic, it surpasses all speech, all thought (p. 111).\textsubscript{pp}

Thirdly, this limitless mind which permeates everything, itself being
neither great nor small, many nor few, good nor bad, coarse nor subtle, exists internally in the “heart” (tsi-ta) as the ‘three bodies’: the Mother, the ‘universal foundation’, the Void, is the “absolute body” (bongs sku); the mind, self-luminous, non-grasping, shining and unmoving, is the “perfect body” (rdzogs sku); the ‘reflective-power’, self-arising, self-dissolving, is the “illusory-body” (sprul sku) (p. 112). Or again: the absolutely pure Wisdom of one’s own-mind (rañ-rig) is the ‘absolute body’, the combination of body and mind (sems) is the ‘perfect enjoyment-body’, and all actions are the ‘illusory body’. Thus externally the essential emptiness of all the sense-fields like form etc. are the ‘absolute body’, the luminosity of their unhindered shining is the ‘perfect body’, the instability of their ‘magic-appearance’ is the ‘illusory body’—these three bodies, gathered into a single essence, exist inseparably. Internally, whatever instability there is due to sudden thoughts or recollections, their emptiness is the ‘absolute body’, their appearance is the ‘perfect body’, their luminosity is the ‘illusory body’—whoever knows this, is the Lord of the ‘three bodies’ (p. 113).

This instruction—thus we may terminate our resumé—one first learns and understands, thereafter impresses on one’s mind, and finally experiences for oneself (p. 114).

Having reviewed the fifteen ‘periods’ of the A-khrid system of ‘Great Perfection’, there remains only to make a few concluding observations.

Firstly, it is quite clear that the term Rdzogs-chen is an ambiguous one, covering a variety of doctrines and meditational procedures. Our text, for instance, makes no mention of the emanation of phenomenal existence in the form of five rays of light of different colours from the original, universal Luminosity, a feature of Nyingmapa Rdzogs-chen texts to which Tucci has drawn attention (Tucci 1958 p. 106 n. 1; 1970 p. 102). After all, this diversity is not so surprising, for both of the two schools of Tibetan Buddhism in which Rdzogs-chen is to be found are characterised by the absence of an institutionalised magisterium and by the predominance of an open, individualistic spirit, more ready to assimilate than to reject. As far as Rdzogs-chen is concerned, it is simply too early to generalize; we can only, as in the present case, say that such and such a doctrine is to be found in a given text. Perhaps if research could be undertaken on a wider scale, with the indispensable aid of Tibetan scholars, a more comprehensive and coherent picture—both in the historical and the systematic sense—might gradually emerge. However,
if Buddhist studies are to benefit from the precious aid of learned Tibetans, it must be stressed that time is running out, as adepts of Rdzogs-chen, trained in Tibet itself, become increasingly fewer.

Secondly, we are, obviously, very far from being in a position to solve all questions concerning the historical origins of Rdzogs-chen. However, certain preliminary conclusions may nevertheless be ventured. Thus it seems that the main features of Rdzogs-chen—certainly this would seem to be true of the text we have studied here—may be explained in terms of Indian Buddhism. In particular, the doctrines of the Buddhist siddhas, as expressed in the Dohākosas of Saraha, Kāṇha and Tilopa, with their background in the main philosophical systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism, would seem to provide sufficient material out of which Rdzogs-chen could be developed. I say ‘developed’, for there can hardly be any doubt that a specific Rdzogs-chen system is a Tibetan creation (indeed, this point is made the most of by its Tibetan critics), and in the case of the present text at least, one has the feeling that its author has been animated by a desire to be as comprehensive and inclusive as possible, welding together elements from a number of different sources. This conclusion is, I believe, all the more sound as Tucci, in spite of his repeated assertions (Tucci 1958 pp. 21, 45, 60) that Ch’an elements are to be found in Rdzogs-chen, nowhere demonstrates that these elements must necessarily, or even preferably, be interpreted as emanating from Ch’an. Nevertheless, subsequent writers, when dealing with the question, speak of Ch’an elements in Rdzogs-chen as if this were an established fact, and refer to Tucci 1958 (Neumaier 1970 p. 136; Stein 1972 p. 22). The possibility of specifically Ch’an elements having contributed to the development of the ‘Great Perfection’ cannot, of course, be ruled out a priori, and Stein 1971 pp. 23–28 and 1972 p. 23 n. 3 has pointed out some striking parallels in the field of vocabulary and concepts; however, it is extremely difficult to positively identify such traits on internal, textual criteria, as Ch’an has to a large extent the same Indian sources as those which, through the siddhas, may be taken to have influenced Rdzogs-chen. The question of the continued presence of Ch’an in Tibet after the 8th-9th centuries, would therefore seem to be more appropriately dealt with independently of Rdzogs-chen. Discussing this question, S. G. Karmay concludes (Karmay 1975a p. 215) that “even though in rDzogs-chen there may be parallel ideas and practices to those of Chan, rDzogs-chen must be considered as of Indo-Tibetan origin
whilst the tradition of Chan in Tibet may be studied as an independent movement.”

*Thirdly,* limiting myself to the present text (although it clearly holds true for Rdzogs-chen as a whole), I would point out that it is of considerable general interest for students of mysticism, being a manual intended for gurus engaged in guiding others on the Path, and disclosing a coherent, dynamic, and profound method of spiritual development and liberation. One may note that while this system does involve, at a certain stage, a quietistic mode of life, it nevertheless leads, finally, to a life of mental and physical activity where even the emotions are ‘raised to the Path’, and where the paraphernalia of tantric ritualism plays no necessary part.

More specifically, the present text indicates a particular kind of spiritual development which may be taken to be closely related to that motivating the highly unconventional behaviour of the Tibetan smyon-pa (‘madmen’), the ‘holy fools’ who have been, down through the centuries, a typical—and highly cherished—part of the religious scene in Tibet.\(^2\) Some of these engaged (usually with impunity!) in the kind of ‘violent’ or ‘impure’ behaviour mentioned in our text—“leaping, running, beating, anger, nonsense, loose talk, jokes, abuse, shouts, lies” (p. 98). Even a mind apparently clouded over by all kinds of passions, doubts, and delusions, by “anger and fury, worry and shame, desire and passion, joy and happiness” (p. 99), may become the vehicle of profound spiritual realization, or so our text maintains.

NOTES

1 Guenther 1975 p. xvii adopts the translation “absolute completeness’.
2 Karmay 1975a pp. 213–15; 1975b; 1975c; Kvaerne 1973; Neumaier 1970; Snellgrove 1967 pp. 226–55; Tucci 1958 pp. 60–64, 128–39. There is in addition the work of Herbert V. Guenther, in particular Guenther 1975, which is, however, difficult to evaluate fairly in the present context, at least for the present writer. No-one would contest the fact that Guenther has an exceptional degree of familiarity with a wide range of Tibetan philosophical and meditational texts; however, his constant effort to restate their contents in what to the present writer, at least, is an inaccessible terminology, has, unfortunately, not permitted me to make use of his work to any significant extent. I willingly admit that the fault here most probably is mine.
3 The Chinese dossier has been brilliantly studied by Paul Demiéville (Demiéville 1952); the Tibetan sources have been studied by Tucci 1958. The Bhavanākrama of Kamalaśīla, summing up the ‘Indian’ point of view, has been studied by Tucci
1958 and 1971 (with further references). See also Imaeda 1975 (with references to all previous works dealing with the debate).


5 For some examples of such accusations, see Karmay 1975a pp. 214h–15 and 1975b p. 152; Stein 1971 p. 9, 1972 p. 23. Other writers have criticised it for being “nothing but a blend of the doctrines of the Mu-stegs-pa (tirthika) in India and that of the Bon-po in Tibet,” Karmay 1975b p. 155.

6 Tucci 1958 pp. 21, 45, 60; 1970 p. 27.

7 Concerning Vairocana, see Tucci 1958 and Karmay 1975b. The reference to “the statue of Vairocana” is probably to the deity (Rnam-snañ), as the Tibetan monk is, as far as I know, always styled Bai-ro(-ca-na) etc. On the subject of gterma literature in general, see Tucci 1948 p. 727, and 1970 pp. 52–53; Neumaier 1969, and Kvaerne 1974 pp. 18–40.

8 Texts are numbered according to Kvaerne 1974.


10 Lokesh Chandra (ed.), History and Doctrine of Bon-po Nispanna-yoga, Satapitaka Series vol. 73, reproducing a xyl. from the monastery of Sman-ri in Tibet; and Bonpo Monastic Foundation, Dolanji, H. P., 1974, reproducing a ms. from Dolpo. For further references, see Kvaerne 1974 pp. 109–11. The collection of biographies is entitled Rdzogs pa chen po Žan žuñ sñan rgyud kyi brgyud pa'i bla ma'i rnam thar (History and Doctrine . . . pp. 1–130).

11 Neumaier 1970 p. 133 states that the Bonpos follow the Nyingmapas in basing their Rdzogs-chen doctrines on the writings of Klañ-chen rab-'byams-pa (1308–1364), but does not give any source for this statement which is clearly erroneous, the Bonpo Rdzogs-chon being founded on texts which are, beyond all doubt, considerably older, and which in some cases (as the one to be discussed in detail in this paper) may be dated with a high degree of certainty.


13 ñeṣ-sbyor is an important term, having a wide field of application, something like “success in meditation.” Stein 1972 p. 430 translates it “(la vérité) vertu en méditation.”

14 His biography is found in Rto gs ldan ñams brgyud . . . pp. 14–19, translated Kvaerne 1973a pp. 36–41, and in Man nag rin po che. . . fol. 4b2–6b3 (see n. 12).

15 His biography is found in Rto gs ldan ñams brgyud . . . pp. 39–42, translated Kvaerne 1973a pp. 41–44, and in Man nag rin po che. . . fol. 14b3–16a3, finally in Rdzogs pa chen po Žan žuñ sñan rgyud kyi brgyud pa'i bla ma'i rnam thar, pp. 98–104 (see n. 10).
Published in the same volume as the Togs-lidan ōams brgyud... (A tri thun-
sham cho na dan cha lak che shuk so, Delhi 1967), pp. 64–117. Of its fifteen ‘periods’,
os. 5–10 have been translated in Kvaerne 1973a pp. 247–332. Three commentaries
to it are available: 1) No sprod rin chen gsal ’debs rgyab skyor gyi gdams pa,
likewise by Bru-chen rgyal-ba g.yun-druṅ, pp. 117–85 in the same volume; 2) Man
ṅag rin po che a khrid thun mtshams bco lha pa’i snone’gro’i bsags byaṅs skor gyi
gsom rin thar lam myur bgrod, xyl. 18 fols., EFEO T. 0278; commenting on the
first part of the text (the snone’-gro’); 3) Man ṅag rin po che a khrid thun mtshams bco
lha pa’i dnos gzi’i yan tig rdzogs pa chen po sku gsum raṅ sar, xyl. 44 fols., EFEO
T. 0302, commenting on the second part (the dnos-gzi’i). The latter two texts are
written by Śar-rgaṅs bbra-sis rgyal-mtshan (see n. 12).

See n. 16.

See n. 16.

Text and translation in Kvaerne 1973a pp. 252–319. References are to the Delhi
edition of the text (relevant passages may thus be easily localised in Kvaerne 1973a).

A dot, a swastika, etc. may also be used (p. 80). Attention may also be focused
on syllables like hām-hri, hū-hām, hi-hīh, etc. which are described as “non-sexed”
(ma-niṅ). This may either imply that the sounds are neutral, without any significant
meaning, or, on the contrary, that they represent ultimate truth, cf. Sudhanāmātā
vol. 2 p. 505 where napumṣaka (= ma-niṅ) is explained as the union of śūnyatā and
karuṅā.

See Visuddhimagga 8 (3) (Nyanatiloka’s translation, Konstanz 1952, p. 326).

See also Karmay 1975b p. 154.

This fact is stressed by Tucci 1958 p. 102. The similarity—both in doctrine and
terminology—between Ch’an and the Indian siddhas was pointed out by Watts
1957 pp. 78–79. However, as pointed out by Stein 1971 pp. 5–6, Ch’an is earlier than
the Indian siddhas, so that a parallel development is more probable than a direct in-
fluence.

Concerning the smyon-pa, see Stein 1972, particularly pp. 8–10. Stein stresses
(p. 10) that the smyon-pa were not generally characterised by amoral behaviour.

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a mtshan-bcas-la sne smd o dañ/ mtshan-med mñaam-par bžag-pa dañ/ gnas-lugs-kyi don-la fn-o-sprod-pa’o/
b lus-gnad de’i yon-tan gyis ’du-ba cha s findAll/ yes-pa rañ-sa zin/ rus-tshig khrom-bu sdebs/rtsa luñ thig-le thams-cad gnad-du ’chun-pa’i yon-tan yod-do/
c had-de hrig-ge-ba la gyen-lta thur-lta g.yas-lta g.yon-lta ma-yin-pa/ thad-du ’byed-btsum med-par a-la/ phub-thog-tu mduñ sgril-ba’am/ khab-mig-tu skud-
gyi ɲaɲ-nas lam-du khyer/ thad-du gcd thog-tu 'gel pham-rgyal sre-ba-ste/
cɢi theg-chen-gyi ɲaɲ-nas thams-cad lam-du khyer thub-na/lus-ɲaɡ-gi bya-byed/  
spyod-lam dag ma-dag dge mi-dge bzaɲ-ɲan-'briɲ gsum ci-byas-pa thams-cad  
dge-sbyor-du 'gro-ste/
dɔn saɲs-rgyas-ki yid-gzuls-khul bya-ste/ . . . raɲ bla-ma yid-dam gǎn mos-su skyed- 
pa ʒiɡ sdim/ gǎn mos-gus sfiɲ-rje ɲaɲ-nas ag-ʃo 'khor-lo'i dbus-su rgi-pa a'i raɲ-  
bzǐn 'od-zer-gyi 'phro-'du daɲ ldan-pas/ rtsa-mig sgyu-lus 'od daɲ thig-les gǎn- 
bar bsam-ʒiɲ dran-pa a-la gtaɲ-de/ phyi-ru mi-spro naɲ-du mi-sdu rgi-pa-la 'du-' 
phro rtog-pa skad-tsam yaɲ med-pa'i stɔn-ɲid-kyi ɲaɲ-nas hrig-ge-ba-la ʒiɫ-bas/  
. . ./ raɲ-la gǎɲ bsam-gtang 'dres-nas gniɲ-du ni soɲ/ dran-pas ʁtsiɲ ni ziɲ/  
dge-sbyor daɲ skad-gcig-tsam yaɲ ma-bral-ba de-la/ gniɲ-'thug-na 'thug-pa'i  
'i ʃd-ɡsāl/ saɲ-ba saɲ-pa'i ʃd-gsāl-du 'char-la'/ 'briɲ rmi-lam-gyi snaɲ-ba rmi- 
lam-du ɲo-ʃes-pa 'byuɲ/ de-tʃe ʃaṁs-len dran-pa'i sgon-pas rmi-lam th-a-maɫ  
raɲ-ɡda'i  'khrul-ʃes thams-cad lam-du bslaɲs-nas/ ʃiɲ-bas kyaɲ mtshan dge- 
sbyor 'phel/ bɔk kyaɲ 'gyur-gyi che-bas dran-thag mi-cbad ʃaṁs-len pa-i gil-
che'of/ tha-ma kyaɲ rmi-lam rnaɲ kha ma šar-ba'i skab-su ɲo-ʃes ʃaṁs-len  
dran-pa re-re tsam 'byuɲ/ sbyaɲs-pas je-rgyas-la 'phel-ʒiɲ mthar legs-par ɲo- 
zin-pa 'byuɲ/ 
eɛ des-na 'di-ltar snaɲ-ba-ka rmi-lam/ rmi-lam-kə snaɲ-ba yin-te/ . . . thams-cad  
rm-i-lam sgyu-ma lt-a-bur 'char-ro/
ff don-la bag-chags-ki yid-gzugs gǎn-du yaɲ sprul nus-ʃiɭ/ʃid-la dran-pa tsam-gyis  
'gyur-ba daɲ/ 'gyu-byed-kiɭ ʃes-pa gar khrid-du 'gro nus-te/ bsam-pa tsam-gyis  
gnaŋ gǎn 'dod-du phyin-pa daɲ/ 'di-ltar-gyi snaɲ-ba gǎn-du yaɲ bsɡyur-du bub- 
ste/ yid-la ci-ltar byas-pa ltar 'gyur-ba daɲ/ gsum byuɲ-na/ rmi-lam-gyi 'khrul-  
snaɲ-lam-du sloɲs-pa'oi/
gg rtsal bsam-dran-gyi ʃes-pa
hh raɲ ʃt-a-ba'i ɲaɲ-nas raɲ-ʃar raɲ-ɡrol mtʃo-naɲ-du kha-char ʃaɲ-ba ʃt-a-bu/ 'briɲ  
sgom-thog-nas cer-ʃt-a cer-ɡrol ʃnär  'dris-kiɭ mi daɲ 'phrad-pa ʃt-a-bu/ th-a  
gʃen-po'i dran-thag lcags-sbuɠs nas chu 'dren-pa ʃt-a-bu'i rtsal sbyaɲs-te/
ii des-na snaɲ-ba yaɲ sems sems kyaɲ snaɲ-ba yin-pa snaɲ-sems ɡnɨs-med/ snaɲ  
tsam-ʃid-na stɔn stɔɲ tsam-ʃid-na snaɲ-bas snaɲ-stɔɲ ɡnɨs-med ma'veg-par  
lhag-lhag ʃar raɲ-bzǐn med-paɾ kḥril-khrol grol-ba/ ʃar-grol dus-mʃam-ste/ 
de-yaɲ raɓ-kiɭ raiɲ-ʃar raɲ-grol  'brin-gi cer-ʃt-a cer-ɡrol th-a-ma dran'- dzin-gyĩ  
gʃen-po'i gʒuʈuʃ m thermoʃ sgra grags stɔɲ ʃri tʃoɾ stɔɲ ro myoɲ stɔɲ reɡ  
ʃtoɲ bon dran stɔɲ-las sogʃ thag rbad-rbad ʃcaɲ-la ʃaṁs-su blaɲ-ste/
jj des-na tʃhoɡs-drug-gi snaɲ-ba 'di-dag kyaɲ/ doɲ-ʃed-du rtsal sbyaɲ/ 'bgyoʊs  
tsam-gyi mi-chog-ste/ de-dag-gis mi-gnod-pa ʒig dgoʃ/ bar-du mi-gnod-pa tsam- 
gyiš kyaɲ mi-chog-ste groɡ-su 'ʃar-ba-ʒig dgoʃ/ th-a-mar groɡs-su ʃar-ba tsaɲ- 
gyiš mi-chog-ste gnom-ʃe du ro-myoɲ-ʒig dgoʃ .
kk rgyu-d-la 'khrul-pa ɲoɲ-moɲs rnam-rtoɡ phra-raɡs ci-g.yos kyaɲ/ ʃt-a-ba rtoɲs- 
pa'i rtsal daɲ ldan-pas raɲ-'byuɲ raɲ-ʃar raɲ-ɡrol ɡen-po ʃrɛn-pa'i sɬaɲ- 
byed med/ ʃpaɲ-bya/ spon-pa'i ʃlo ʃtʊsl ʃad-pa-ʒig yin-te/
ll rgya-my sho chen-por maɭ-yos-ɬab ni ʃtɔɲ 'naɲ-ʃi/ nam-ɲkha'i  
ɲaɲ-du ɡza'-'skar ʃi/ sems-ʃid ɲaɲ-du sems-'byuɲ ʃi/ thams-cad ʃi-ʃa chan-po/  
thams-cad l hun-grub chen-po/
mn de-la ɲo-sprod-kiɭ man-ɲaɡ-lə gsum-ste/ snaɲ-ba sems-su ɲo-sprod-pa daɲ/
sems mtha'-bral-du ŋo-sprad-pa dañ/ mtha'-bral sku-gsum-du ŋo-sprad-pa'od/

oo ma-rig gñid-kyis bslad-pa'i 'gro-ba gañ-la gañ-snañ de ni rdzun-te sgyu-ma rmi-lam ita-bu 'dod/


rr de-ltar-gyi gdams-pa-öl mañs dañ-por /ņos-zin-ciñ go-ba/ bar-du rgyud-la 'byor/ tham-ma ñams-su myøñ/
Indian Materials on the Doctrine Of Sudden Enlightenment

Luis O. Gomez

Any steps to be taken in the direction of investigating the Indian roots of Ch’an are hindered by the thicket of legends in which the tradition shrouded itself. The Ch’annists must also be blamed for the fact that the question of what was the original form of this peculiarly Chinese version of Buddhism remains open, still obscured by the fallacious assumption that Ch’an was a monolithic, clearly defined school or tradition. Progress in this area is further hampered by the fact that in both India and China the early history of the movements that gave rise to Ch’an belongs to mystical traditions existing on the margins of the scholarly establishment of Buddhism. On the other hand, the broader question of contacts, connections, agreements and disagreements between Ch’an and Indian Buddhism can now be the object of documented study thanks to the indefatigable efforts of Buddhist scholars in Russia, France and Japan, who have attempted to verify the facts and meaning of an incident known as the “Council of Lhasa.”

As is to be expected, there has been some disagreement among scholars regarding the history of this incident. Some have debated the question of the “Council’s” site, or date; others have even questioned the historicity of the “Council.” Some see the “Council” as perhaps only one example of a complex, prolonged encounter between several factions of Buddhist missionaries.

Contemporary erudition notwithstanding, Tibetan historical tradition refers to only one “Council,” without questioning its historicity. This “Council” purportedly took place during the reign of King (btsan po) Khri-sroñ-lde-brtsan, son of Sroñ-brtsan-sgam-po, the legendary first patron of Buddhism in Tibet. This traditional version of the encounter between Indian and Ch’an monks was first made known to the west in 1932 by the Russian scholar D. Obermiller in his translation of Bu-ston’s Chos ’byun. According to Bu-ston’s account, written in 1323, the “Council” pitted the talents of Kamalaśīla, a scholar from the
University of Nālandā (at the time India’s greatest seat of learning), against the erudition of a nondescript monk from the provincial Buddhist center of Tun-huang (the crossroads of Buddhism on the Sino-Tibetan Central Asian frontier, but still a frontier town, far removed from the great centers of the ecclesiastic establishment). According to Bu-ston, this unfair match was an easy victory for the Indians: the followers of the Ch’an monk were defeated and banished. Unable to bear their humiliation, they sent four Chinese thugs who disposed of the defenseless Kamalaśīla by “squeezing his kidneys.”

The Chos ’byun tells us that the leader and spokesman for the Chinese side, called the Hva-śaṅ Mahāyāna, taught that since both good and evil deeds tie living beings to the cycle of transmigration, and since all deeds have their origin in discrimination, only by stopping all actions and all thoughts can one be liberated from rebirth. Furthermore, by simply stopping the process of apperception (upalabdhi), one can enter the tenth stage (bhāmi) instantly. Accordingly, it would seem that for the Hva-śaṅ, good actions, the accumulation of an equipment of merit and gnosis, and the gradual practice of analytic meditation were not only unnecessary but also a hindrance in the path. It would appear, therefore, that he advocated doctrines diametrically opposed to some of the basic notions of classical Indian scholastic Buddhism. The contrast between the two approaches was summarized in the notion, purportedly held by the Hva-śaṅ, that it was possible to attain Buddhahood instantly by merely not thinking. Thus, if we are to believe Bu-ston’s characterization, the Ch’an Buddhists favored a quietistic and antinomian approach to enlightenment. That is, they would have defined the path as not thinking, not acting, and making no distinction between good and evil.

It was also Obermiller who, three years after the publication of his translation of the Chos ’byun and only a few months before his death, published an article in which he identified the source of Bu-ston’s characterization of Ch’an Buddhism. As one could have guessed, Bu-ston’s interpretation was based on a work by no one else but the Indian rival of the Ch’anists, Kamalaśīla himself. This work is the third of three essays, purportedly written immediately after the “Council” for the benefit and at the request of the King, and all bearing the title Bhāvanākrama (Bsgom-pa’i Rim-pa: Method of Gradual Cultivation). Thus it may very well be that Bu-ston’s version of the Council is colored not only by his own biases, but by those of Kamalaśīla. His account, moreover, most probably contains many fabrications and accretions
introduced in the course of more than five centuries of Buddhist history in Tibet. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Obermiller, it is Bu-ston’s account that gives us the first clue as to who could be the unnamed opponents attacked in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas.

Yet, the information gathered by Obermiller was a mere first step in the elucidation of the great Tibetan controversy (or controversies) of the eighth century. There are still many unanswered questions, even after forty years of progress in the historical and textual study of the debate. It is quite obvious, moreover, that Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas are not anything close to an account or “dossier” of what actually took place at the meeting (if there ever was a face-to-face meeting).¹⁰ We do have, it is true, a text claiming to be the Council’s “dossier”, titled Tun wu ta ch‘eng ch‘eng li ch‘ieh. 頓悟大乘正理決 or “Verification of the Greater Vehicle of Sudden Awakening,” and apparently edited, if not composed by the Chinese monk Wang-hsi 王錫. This document purportedly gives a word-by-word account of the proceedings.¹¹ In it we find, in the form of detailed questions and answers, a summary of the main issues separating Indian and Chinese Buddhists. In spite of striking correspondences between Kamalaśīla’s tracts and Wang-hsi’s account, a number of important issues are ignored or have no correspondent in one or the other of the two works. For instance, the important question of innate Buddha Nature is not mentioned even once by Kamalaśīla, in spite of the fact that it is one of the main arguments used by the Ch’an followers to prop their doctrine of sudden awakening, and in spite of the fact that the doctrine was not wholly alien to the Indian scholar, as he dedicates a section of his Madhyamakāloka to the important question of the function of the tathāgata-garbha as innate Buddhahood.¹² The Bhāvanākramas likewise ignore altogether the use of the so-called “apocryphal” sutras (wei-ching: 僞經) by the Chinese debaters.¹³ This type of omission is certainly more significant than the more striking absence of any explicit mention of the doctrine of “sudden enlightenment.”¹⁴

The Chinese dossier, on the other hand, is silent with regard to some of the most important issues raised in the Bhāvanākramas. 1) Although one of Kamalaśīla’s references to the bhūmi theory seems to be acknowledged in the Chêng li ch‘ieh¹⁵ it is surprising that the Chinese do not take up the question of the bhūmis in any other connection. Moreover, 2) there is no mention of the Great Compassion and the production of the Thought of Enlightenment (bodhicitta) both of which, like the bhūmis, are an integral part of the foundation for Kamalaśīla’s position. It
is equally surprising that there is no allusion to (3) Kamalaśīla’s analysis of the fundamental stages of meditation according to the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Sandhinirmocana Sūtras*.

Omissions on both sides may be easily explained as parts of the normal subterfuges of the zealous debater. But I would like to surmise that these omissions rather reflect something of the nature and structure of the “Council.” We are probably dealing here not with a council, perhaps not even with an exchange or encounter, but rather with a haphazard series of indirect confrontations. Be that as it may, what the documents do show is that the literature of the “Council” or debates, however important these may have been for the political history of Tibet, has to be used with great care as a source for the history of Buddhist doctrine.

It is also apparent that communication between the two parties could not have been very effective. After all, the two leading contenders had no knowledge of each other’s language. Accordingly, the documents reflect important linguistic difficulties, the most important of which is no doubt the problem of the terms *asmṛtī* and *amanasikāra*, but neither of which would be renderings of the Chinese *pu-ssu* 不思 and *pu-kuan* 不觀 of Wang-hsi, but which appear in the sermons of Shên-hui 神會 adequately rendered with the equivalents: *wu-nien* 無念 and *pu-tsu-yi* 不作意. It is not at all clear who raised the *amanasikāra* issue or who mistranslated whom; but the fact that such an important text as the *Shen hui yü lu* 神會語錄 uses the terms *wu-nien* and *pu-tsu-yi*, and then so frequently, would seem to suggest that knowledge of these basic Ch’ān concepts may have reached Kamalaśīla from a source different from the Chinese arguments depicted in Wang-hsi’s account, or at least, that Wang-hsi’s knowledge of what actually transpired at the debate was perhaps not as accurate as he would like us to believe.

Be that as it may, Kamalaśīla’s tracts have an intrinsic value, both as general expositions of Mahāyāna Buddhism and as warnings with regard to the weak links in the chain of Zen doctrine. Kamalaśīla’s attack on antinominaism is particularly interesting and exceptionally clear, especially as developed in the Third *Bhāvanākrama*. Taken as a judgement of Ch’ān Buddhism, however, it does seem somewhat rash, if not superficial. But rather than assume that Kamalaśīla was writing with only the Ch’ānists in view, we must surmise that in his criticisms he was lumping together a great variety of “heretical” doctrines, probably including some that were known to him from India or including mere log-
ical possibilities of error. The documents in fact alude to some of the non-Ch’an rivals of Kamalasila. Some of Kamalasila’s harshest attacks could very well be directed against someone like the Tantrist Dpal-brts-segs, said to have participated in the debates. According to Tucci, this radical Tantrist claimed that the ultimate object of the Buddhist path “is beyond good and evil; no action, no gift, no ritual are therefore needed.” To this he added that “since good actions are a distraction” there is no point in forbidding sin.¹⁹

Kamalasila’s concern over the “excesses” of some Tantrists is also reflected in another work of his which until now has not been recognized as another important document bearing on the debates of Tibet. This work is a commentary (ティカ) to a late Mahāyāna Sūtra, the Avikalpapraveśadāraṇī. Kamalasila’sティカ seems to have been written shortly after the Bhāvanākramas, as it incorporates rather awkwardly some materials from the latter, yet it is clearly written with the same opponents in mind. Moreover, the Avikalpapraveśa is quoted twice in the Bhāvanākramas, once in an explicitly polemic passage, a second time in a context that is implicitly an attack on Buddhist “quietists.”²⁰

The same passages from this Sūtra are quoted in a work by another of the participants in the debates of Tibet, a treatise on sudden enlightenment by Vimalamitra found in the Tanjur under the title of Cig car ’jug pa’i rnam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don. This fact is no doubt significant, even after we discard one of Vimalamitra’s quotations as not being original to him. In its present state Vimalamitra’s treatise contains extensive passages copied verbatim from the three Bhāvanākramas. It seems obvious that the Cig car ’jug pa’i rnam par mi rtog pa’i bsgom don has been irreparably disfigured by later interpolations wrought by the partisans of gradual enlightenment. One of the quotations from the Avikalpapraveśa is incorporated into Vimalamitra’s treatise within the body of a verbatim reproduction of a passage from the Third Bhāvanākrama. But the other quotation is found in a section of Vimalamitra’s tract where no traces of interpolation or contamination from the Bhāvanākramas is discernible. Although there are reasons to believe that this quotation and its context have been borrowed from a third source, in this case the Avikalpapraveśa passage actually serves to bolster Vimalamitra’s position against the gradualists.²¹

As a step in understanding the type of “sudden enlightenment” theories which may have developed in India and which came under attack in Tibet, in the following pages we will (1) outline the context of Vimala-
mitra’s use of the *Avikalpa-praveśa*, (2) clarify the position within the Sūtra of the passage quoted by him, and (3) summarize Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of the Sūtra as an exposition of the gradual enlightenment theory.

As mentioned above, one of the bones of contention during the Tibetan debates was the question of the meaning and the means of attaining a state of no-thought. Both the Chinese and the Indian documents agree on this. Certain terminological differences notwithstanding, at least one technical term referring to this state seems to correspond in the three languages of the debates: *nirvikalpa* (or *avikalpa*), *rnam par mi rtog pa*, *wu-fēn-pieh* 無分別. They all agree that this is a condition to be sought, but they differ in their interpretation of this state of mystical attainment. For Vimalamitra this is the all-important means and goal of Buddhist meditation. “He who would obtain swiftly all-knowledge,” he tells us (7a7), “should cultivate the samādhi which is free from discrimination” *(rnam par mi rtog pa'i tīn ne 'dzin: nirvikalpa-samādhi)*. The core of this practice is serenity and insight (*samatha, vipaśyanā*). These two methods, which in Kamalaśīla are very specific techniques of samādhi and analytic understanding, are defined by Vimalamitra as follows:

Not to dwell on signs-and-notions (*nimitta*) (7a8) is the samādhi of serenity. That which is not separate from signs-and-notions is the samādhi of insight. Not to produce signs-and-notions is serenity. Not to stop signs-and-notions is insight. The end-and-limit of existing-objects is serenity. Not to fall into the end-and-limit of existing-objects is insight. (7b1). It is as if someone stood on a high mountain and looked below, he would see everything clearly. In the same way all samādhis can be seen clearly in the two samādhis [of serenity and insight]. Someone who stands firmly in these two [samādhis] is able to perceive the end-and-limit of existing objects, as a man sitting inside a crystal house (7b2) sees everything clearly, inside and outside.

The pairing of insight and serenity is in no way unique to Vimalamitra. The dichotomy represented by this pair is well known. Buddhist tradition in general, but particularly in late Mahāyāna, tries to combine the two concepts of closing or stopping, and opening or transforming the mind. On this there is little disagreement; it is one of the leitmotifs of the *Bhāvanākramas*. The controversy begins once the Buddhist tries
to define and outline the theoretical and practical implications of such a difficult marriage: on the one hand the blockage of sense perception, desire and the discursive operations of the mind, and, on the other, the perception and understanding of plurality and change. They are indeed specific techniques in Vimalamitra—a point misunderstood by the gradualist critic. But they are techniques for the direct uprooting of all human operations and transaction, and thus, unlike Kamalaśīla, Vimalamitra understands the processes of serenity and insight as simply the stopping of all ideation followed by the abandonment of non-ideation.

The passage quoted above is followed by three fragments from the Sūtras presented as proof that Buddhahood is a state of nonconception or nondiscrimination.24 The first two quotations are from the Lāṅkāvatāra:25

“Existing-objects are not brought to rest by means of activity or marks (laksāna). Nirvana is the opposite from the discriminating consciousness.” “When one does not perceive discrimination and does not perceive the Buddha, then, if one perceives that the Buddha is the absence of process (jug med: apravṛtti), he is truly Buddha.”

Then, quoting the classical lines from the Vimalakīrti, “absence of discrimination, absence of apperception is Bodhi,”26 Vimalamitra concludes, “therefore, one should cultivate this samādhi of non-discrimination.”

The next folio represents an extensive interpolation of passages from the Bhāvanākramas, no doubt introduced here in a vain attempt to render Vimalamitra’s radicalism harmless. At the end of folio 9a Vimalamitra’s argument is taken up again with a very brief explanation of how the yogi generates the state of non-discrimination, apparently through the simultaneous application of serenity and insight:

[The yogi] analyses and considers correctly all dharmas, those considered real, as well as those considered mere conventional appelations. [He considers] the person, the five skandhas, the sense spheres, the sense basis, the Buddha-bodies, [everything] from ultimate cognition to the hells, from the oceans to Mount Meru. Then he understands their absence of intrinsic reality, their emptiness.
Then, he perceives these with the thought: “completely deprived of intrinsic reality, from the beginning empty, beyond the spheres of thought and speech, nirvāṇa is ungraspable, samsāra is unrenounceable. They have no more substantiality than empty space.” Then the mind will be distracted no more.

Passages from scriptures are then brought in support of Vimalamitra’s position.27 These textual proofs are certainly not presented with erudite comments and sophisticated arguments like the ones developed by Kamalaśīla in his Bhāvanākrama, but they are in general ingeniously selected for their impact and conciseness. They all illustrate different aspects of the Indian concept of “sudden enlightenment.” To quote only a few:

According to the Mañjuśrī-vihāra-sūtra, “there is no decrease in Suchness, nor is there any increase. There is no decrease in the sphere of living beings, nor is there any increase. There are no blemishing perturbations (kleśa), nor is there any purification [from them].” In the same text it is said: “Discrimination is agitation, non-discrimination is rest (nirvāṇa). He who knows this as the nature [of things] is considered wise.”

The conception of the goal and of its dialectic underpinnings is here the same as that of the sudden enlightenment schools of China: illusion and reality coincide in time, space and constitution. Therefore, paradoxically the goal may be reached by the simple act of removing all notions of duality, that is, removing the illusory barrier that separates illusion from enlightenment. To illustrate this point Vimalamitra quotes from the Viśeṣacintā-Brahma-paripṛcchā:” . . . dharma and adharma are both nondiscrimination. To abandon all marks is the way to cultivate the path.” Further on in his treatise (11a3) he will quote a line from the Perfection of Wisdom which summarizes this position even more concisely: “Non-apperception (mi dmigs pa) is the path. Non-apperception is the goal.” But already in folio 9b the gradualist interpolator has become impatient. Beginning with 10a a section from the Third Bhāvanākrama has been inserted in order to clarify the meaning of nirvikalpa-samādhi.

Several passages from Kamalaśīla’s work follow, including the section from the Third Bhāvanākrama with the quote from the Avikalpa-
*praveśa* referred to above.\(^{28}\) Then, when Vimalamitra’s text seems ready to continue (with the words, “Therefore one should cultivate non-discrimination.”), a few lines (10b5–7) are taken up by Kamalaśīla’s instruction on what to do if bodily or mental discomfort develops during concentration. This is just another clumsy interpolation, which has hardly been introduced when it is abruptly interrupted by what is apparently the continuation of the *Cig car*’s line of argument:

(10b8) It is said that in the cultivation of non-discrimination, the highest unconditioned dharmas and the conditioned dharmas come together. Then, in terms of this Dharma of non-discrimination of the Great Vehicle, what is the Production of the Thought of Enlightenment? According to the *Vajracchedikā* (11a1) “to abandon all notions (*saṃjña*) is to produce the Thought of Perfect Enlightenment.”

In order to define further the concept of Mahāyāna (here used in the quasi-metaphysical sense of the correspondence of goal and means), the *Cig car* quotes a passage from the apochryphal *Vajrasamādhisūtra*: (11a2) “If there is no conception or fancying, [thoughts] do not arise, nor do they cease. Like reality, [the mind] is free of agitation. This is the Great Vehicle.”\(^{29}\) The significance of these lines in broad theoretical terms is confirmed by the *Cig car*’s next quote, the lines from the Perfection of Wisdom mentioned above: “Non-apperception is the path. Non-apperception is the goal.”

Here, as in the simile of the crystal house, the removal of all “concepts” is supposed to be the precondition for the actual perception of the world as it is. The fact that the proponents of sudden enlightenment perceive this precondition as in fact equivalent to the goal (granted that in a rather esoteric way), is no doubt one of the main reasons for their disagreement with the gradualists. Vimalamitra may insist, with the Ch’*an* tradition, on the fact that the complete equation is circular: destruction of boundaries, reunion of dharmas, unimpeded wisdom, acceptance of boundaries. The gradualist is still unconvinced. Both are in agreement that after withdrawal and rejection there is some kind of recovery and transformation of the world of illusion. The gradualist, however, carefully maintains the distinction between the realm of the absolute and that of conventional reality. To confuse the two is patently absurd and dangerous. But for Vimalamitra and his camp, this distinc-
tion is precisely the basic obstacle to enlightenment. As long as it remains, the deluded mind and enlightenment cannot meet, thus, no enlightenment, gradual, immediate, or instantaneous can occur.

Also at issue, and inseparable from the previous question, is the problem of the actual method or technique for abandoning the net of false imagination or discrimination (vikalpa). In this, Vimalamitra seems to hold the position held by most Ch'annists even to this day. There is, strictly speaking, no method or technique, insofar as there are no “false” imaginations to be classified, separated, picked out and eliminated. It is in this connection that both the Cig car and Kamalaśīla quote the Avikalpapraveśa-dhāraṇī in their respective treatises. The same passage also inspires the most important section in Kamalaśīla’s Tīkā of the Avikalpapraveśa.

In the Cig car’s version, the quotation reads as follows: (11b3) “How is it then that one comes to abandon all signs (nimitta:mtshan ma)? One abandons these [signs] by not bringing to mind (yid la mi byed pas: amanastikāratah) any representation (mñon du snañ ba).” This is not a literal quotation of the Sūtra as we know it, but it does reproduce the theme of roughly one folio of the Tibetan translation preserved in the Peking Kanjur. A passage similar to the above, and occurring several times in this section of the Sūtra, is clearly the Cig car’s source. The original reads (words quoted in the Cig car are italicized): “. . . mtshan ma de dag yohns su spon zhe na/snañ bar ‘gyur ba’i tshul gyis mñon du gyur pa dag yid la mi byed pas yohns su spon no//” “How does one give up then all signs. . .? One gives them up completely by not bringing to mind the [signs] which appear in it as mental imprints of representation.”

As quoted by Vimalamitra, this passage seems to bolster the position of his school. But Kamalaśīla, in the First Bhāvanākrama presents the same lines as an example of an expression which, though referring to the process of gradual enlightenment, can be misinterpreted. Kamalaśīla seems to acknowledge the fact that some take this passage to express the opposite doctrine of “sudden enlightenment”, that is, that one becomes free from the bondage of conceptual signs by simply casting them aside, a feat which he considers altogether impossible. Accordingly, the First Bhāvanākrama, presenting the same line of argument followed by the Ṭīkā to the Avikalpapraveśa, states:

This seeing of the ultimate reality is precisely that non-seeing which
takes place when there is vision through right knowledge, and in a person who follows all dharmas with the eye of discernment. Accordingly, when the Sūtra says: “What is this seeing of ultimate reality? It is not-seeing all dharmas,” it refers to this non-seeing [of knowing through the eye of discernment], not to the non-seeing resulting from a lack of the necessary conditions [for perception] or from the lack of an act of attention (manasikāra) that occur in the case of someone who is blind by birth or of someone who shuts his eyes.

Also, what is said in the Avikalpapraśadhārāṇī, “One gives up the signs of form and the rest, by not bringing [them] to mind,” refers to that absence of an act of attention which [characterizes the specific form of] non-apprehension which pertains to those who know with discernment, and which is not bare non-apprehension. For one does not abandon mooring in dharmas (material, immaterial, etc.) by merely casting attention aside, as [one is able to do temporarily in the higher] contemplative attainments, such as the attainment of non-apperception (asamjñīsamāpatti).

Kamalaśīla is not only criticizing the Cīg car’s use of this particular passage from the Avikalpapraśa, he is likewise attacking those who would construe the “non-seeing” of the Prajñāpāramitā literally as a state of unknowing. This may be a caricature of the opponent’s views but a doctrine similar to this is propounded in another of Vimalamitra’s works. In his commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom in Seven Hundred Lines we are told that this Sūtra—which contains statements equivalent to Kamalaśīla’s quotation on “non-seeing”—insists on the necessity of perceiving the ultimate by means of non-perception. There are several such assertions in the commentary, but the most explicit one is found in connection to a passage in the Sūtra proclaiming the identity of enlightenment and the five ānantarya sins.

The selection of this particular point in the commentary to develop the concept of non-seeing is significant, since the notion of “sudden enlightenment” presupposes a negative rhetoric which is formulated not only in terms of non-seeing, but also in terms expressive of the doctrine of the coextension of delusion and enlightenment. Kamalaśīla’s comments on the same passage from the Saptāsatikā, ignore completely the later doctrine. Though this issue is discussed elsewhere in his commentary, it is done rather superficially.32 Vimalamitra, on the other hand,
exploits the passage to the utmost, certainly going well beyond the surface meaning of the text:23

(54b4) “Blessed one, in fact the [grave sins, those] five which entail immediate retribution (pañcānantaryāṇi), are indeed of one nature (rañ bţin: prakṛti) with enlightenment, because they are non-existent (abhāvatvāt).” (54b5) Why is this said here? Because their very own being (ňo bo ŋid) is of the nature of enlightenment, it is said that they are of one nature with enlightenment. But, what is this nature? When [the Sūtra] says, “because they are non-existent,” (54b6) existence (dños po) means becoming (‘byuṅ po), therefore, it is because there is absence of this [becoming] that they are said to be non-existent. [In other words,] they are not produced (ma skyes pa: anutpanna). This is the reality (ňo bo) [which they share]. Therefore they are unproduced insofar as the intrinsic reality (rañ gi ŋo bo) of [actions] such as matricide and the other [four grave sins] is non-existent (54b7). All dharmas have as their nature [this] non-existence. Accordingly, enlightenment is of one nature with the five grave sins entailing immediate retribution. (54b8).

Having elucidated in this way the Sūtra passage, Vimalamitra goes beyond metaphysical theory to drive home a point which obviously has important implications for the practice of the Buddhist path:

(54b8) Moreover, it is said that enlightenment can be defined as complete awakening to the non-existence of the five grave sins. Enlightenment is also to be understood as complete awakening to all those dharmas which make up the five grave sins, (55a1) because they are of one nature [with enlightenment].

Following this statement, Vimalamitra elaborates by countering an objection which seems to hinge in part on the ambiguity of the term we have translated as “complete awakening.” The expression found in the Tibetan text is mños par rdzogs par rttogs pa, presumably a translation of abhisamaya, a term used in the technical language of Buddhism as a designation for the perfect gnosis and understanding of enlightenment, but which no doubt retained much of its etymological meaning (“encounter, agreement, correspondence”) even in technical usage. It is therefore understandable that Vimalamitra’s statement could seem a
Vimalamitra is presenting what he considers to be a *samvrti* definition of enlightenment: “where the five sins are not seen.” Accordingly, he considers this understanding of non-existence or non-perception as incomplete.

However, as a definition of the non-perception (*mthon pa med pa*) of all dharmas, it has been said many times, (55a4) “not to perceive dharmas is indeed perceiving in reality.” When one says “desire,” non-desire is excluded; therefore, if one says that the appearance (*mthon du gyur ba*) of dharmas is not enlightenment, (55a5) then to engage in the realization (*mthon sum du bya bar sbyor ba: sākṣātkāraṇa-prayoga*) of what is not appearance [must be regarded as] the production of appearances. That is, if one practices the perception of any mental imprint (*rnam-pa*) [positive or negative], all dharmas are made manifest (*mthon sum du byed pa*), and (55ab) this is not enlightenment.\(^{34}\)

In this manner Vimalamitra draws the parameters of the apophatic element in relinquishment. In a round-about way he has stated that the negation of the positive—be it perception, *darsāna*, or the act of bringing to mind (attention), *manasikāra*—does not imply affirmation; in other words it is not *paryudāsa*, rather it is a case of *prasajyapratisedha*. Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, understands that the negations used to refer to the manner in which the absolute is to be apprehended are examples of *paryudāsa*. Consequently, the gradualists conceive of a specific form of perception (*darśana*) implied by the term non-perception, and a special practice of bringing to mind (*manasikāra*) implied in the term not-bringing-to-mind.

The formula “non-perception is indeed perception in the ultimate
sense" does not appear in exactly the same form in both authors. Kamalasila claims that it is from scripture ("tathā coktam sūtre"). Although I have not been able to identify his source, the passage does follow the typical question and answer pattern of many Sūtras: "katamaṃ para-
mārthadarṣanam/ sarvadharmānām adarṣanam" ("don dam pa mthoṅ
ba gaṅ že na/chos thams cad mthoṅ ba med pa gaṅ yin pa’o"). Vimalamitra, on the other hand, is probably offering an indirect quotation as he adds, after the žes quotation particle, "it has been said many times"
("zes lan maṅ du bstan to"). The formula itself takes a slightly different form: "the non-perception of dharmas is indeed to perceive in reality (tattvataḥ)" ("chos rnams ma mthoṅ ba ŋid de kho na mthoṅ ba yin no").

Obviously, though Kamalasila may be referring to teachings such as Vimalamitra’s, he knows of authoritative Indian sources which contain such statements. This is clearly not a case where he has only the Ch’annists in mind. The doctrine that true perception of reality is a form of non-perception may seem favorable to the defenders of sudden enlightenment, and it may have originated with them (in Prajñāpāramitā circles most probably), but this fact does not make it less Indian in origin. What is more, Kamalasila is not alone in being concerned over the possible misinterpretations that this formula may engender. Haribhadra, in his Āloka, refers to the same expression—in a form closer to Vimalamitra’s indirect quote—in the context of his discussion of the nature of omniscience. The specific reference in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is the sentence, “Blessed one, if all dharmas are unknowable and imperceptible, how is it that the Perfection of Wisdom reveals the world to the Tathāgatas...?” ("yadā bhagavan sarvadharmā ajānakā apāśyakāḥ
tadā kathām... prajñāpāramitā tathāgatānām... asya lokasya sam-
darṣayitrī?”). Haribhadra’s explanation runs as follows:

In reality (tattvataḥ) how can there be perceived, perceptron and per-
ception if there is no origination of entities? With this question in
mind, the Sūtra says, “Blessed one, if etc.” [Here, it is said that] they
are unknowable, because they cannot be delimited by mental con-
sciousness; that they are imperceptible, because they are free from any
apprehension by sense consciousness. With the clause, “how is it, etc.” it is reiterated that there is an apparent inconsistency. Since all
dharmas in reality (tattvena) lack origination, are empty, and lack any
basis—since the relation between perceivable and perceived does not obtain, therefore, they are unknowable and imperceptible. This is the
literal meaning (arthā) of this passage. Its purport (bhāva), [however, cannot be overlooked]. When one refers to the Perfection of Wisdom, [that is, when speaking] in terms of the full understanding of the true nature of dharmas, the non-perception of the world is indeed perceiving in reality. But, from the point of view of conventional truth, things are as they are commonly known.

This non-perception, however, is seen by Haribhadra as only one aspect (adṛṣṭārtha darśaka) of one of the three types of omniscience to be achieved by a Buddha (sarvākāraṇaḥ). His interpretation of the Prajñāparamitā texts is, of course, nowhere near that of Vimalamitra. But the point we are trying to make is that the conception of enlightenment as a form of non-perception was already a problematic doctrine for the scholastic commentators in India. We do not have to assume, nor does the text of Kamalaśīla warrant such an assumption, that the Indian scholastics in Tibet were facing for the first time this type of issue and that they were attacking it only on the basis of the arguments of their Chinese opponents.

The evidence presented so far, and what will be surmised below from our consideration of Kamalaśīla’s Tīka on the Avikalpapraṇevaśa, suggests that Vimala’s ideas or works were known to Kamalaśīla, directly or indirectly, and that the former’s position must be considered one of the important elements in the formation of the latter’s view of the “heresy” of sudden enlightenment. Furthermore, it is highly probable that, together with Vimalamitra, Ch’àn, and other persons or groups he became familiar with in Tibet, Kamalaśīla lumped together other “erroneous conceptions,” either actually known to him in India, or simply constructed as mere logical possibilities. In other words, Kamalaśīla’s treatment of the issues of the “council” cannot be understood as a review of specific questions raised in a direct encounter with specific opponents. Unlike the king of Tibet, Kamalaśīla was probably concerned with the broad issues of religious truth, the meaning of the scriptural tradition of Mahāyāna, and establishing the position of his own school, without directing his attacks against only one group, school or nationality.

It is quite obvious that Kamalaśīla’s concern over misinterpretations of the Sūtra texts was general. He was equally concerned with “errors” known to him in Tibet, “errors” known to him in India, and the cruces of Buddhist hermeneutics, passages that could lend themselves to misinterpretations, regardless of whether there was or not any actual propo-
ment of a specific misinterpretation. After all, the very works which
deserved his attention as a commentator are the ones that could create
problems for his gradualist position. Thus, the *Avikalpapra
veṣa-dhāraṇī*, the *Vajracchedikā*, the *Saptasati
kā*, and the *Heart Sūtra*, all were
the object of careful commentaries by Kamalaśīla. Kamalaśīla’s preoc
cupation with these texts is further confirmed by the fact that quotations
from them are presented in the *Bhāvanākramas* as problematic passages
that may lead to error.38

The problems that these Sūtras presented to the gradualists are
obvious. One has only to consider the vast edifice of scholastic inter-
pretation and restructuring that had to be produced to bring the
Prajñāpāramitā within the bounds of the classical official categories of
the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra map of the path. In Kamalaśīla’s commen-
tary on the *Avikalpapra
veṣa-dhāraṇī* the same preoccupation appears
transparently. It is obvious that, although the commentary is a model
of complete, careful and, most probably, faithful hermeneutics, the
main purpose of the same is to attack the same errors which were criti-
cized in the *Bhāvanākramas*. Thus, at the outset it is stated that the
purpose or practical implication of the Sūtra (the *prayojana*) is to give
up completely the net of *vikalpa*, but that this has to be accomplished
by means of *smṛti* and *prajñā*. It is also stated that this purpose can only
be fully realized when the initial entrance into the realm of no-differen-
tiation (*nirvikalpadhātu*) is developed by gradual cultivation and per-
fected by the attainment of all-knowledge.

The core of the commentary is reserved for a discussion of the proper
method of giving up the net of *vikalpa*. Kamalaśīla has divided the Sū-
tra into fourteen topics, the seventh of which is described as the yoga of
correct relinquishment (*yañ dag par yoṅs su spoṅ sbyor ba*), and corres-
donds to the one folio from which both Kamalaśīla and Vimalamitra
take the quotations discussed earlier in this paper. This folio represents
only one sixth of the Sūtra, but Kamalaśīla dedicates one fourth of his
commentary to this particular passage. It would be worthwhile, there-
fore, to consider this section closely in search for additional insights into
Kamalaśīla’s position vis-à-vis the proponents of sudden enlightenment.

This section of the *Avikalpapra
veṣa-dhāraṇī* presents a systematic
and thorough, yet pithy summary of all the categories of “signs” (*nimitta*)
that have to be abandoned by the Bodhisattva in his quest for enlighten-
ment. In order to fully appreciate the difficulties that the Sūtra may have
presented at one time to either of the two contending parties, gradualists
as well as defenders of sudden enlightenment, the reader should not overlook the fact that the expression “gradually” (rim gyis) occurs twice in the Tibetan translation (the basis of our rendering), but is not attested in the Chinese version of the Sutra.39

The passage begins by enumerating the first level or more gross type of signs:

Sons of Good Families, the Bodhisattvas Mahāsattvas, having heard the Dharma which generates the power of non-discrimination, (2b3) having reflected on non-discrimination, give up all the signs (mtshan ma: nimitta) of discrimination. At first they will proceed as follows: They will give up all signs of discrimination with respect to self-subsistent realities (rañ bēzin: svabhāva), whether of the apprehended [object] or of the apprehending [subject]. (2b4) The sign of discrimination with respect to self-subsistent realities is here the sign of impure (sāsrava) realities (dīnos po: vastu). Impure realities are the five aggregates of grasping (upādānaskandha); (2b5) to wit, the aggregate of grasping of form, the aggregate of grasping of sensations, the aggregate of grasping apperception, the aggregate of grasping of karmic tendencies, and the aggregate of grasping of consciousness. How (2b6) does one give up completely the signs of discrimination of self-subsistent realities? One gives them up by not applying the mind (yid la mi byed pas: amanasi-kārataḥ) to the [signs] which appear [in it] as mental imprints (tshul: ākāra) of a representation (snañ bar ‘gyur ba’i: abhāṣṭbhāva).

The next layer of delusive signs includes the highest virtue of the Bodhisattva:

If one gives up [gradually]40 in this way the sign of discrimination with respect to self-subsistent realities, (2b7) there arise and appear nonetheless all the signs of discursive discrimination as mental imprints of representation. [These signs occur now] with respect to the counter-agents [used in giving up the signs of self-subsistent realities]. That is, the signs of discrimination brought about by the discursive consideration of giving, (2b8) through the discursive consideration of morality, through the discursive consideration of acceptance (kṣanti;), through the discursive consideration of energy, through the discursive consideration of contemplation, (3a1) through the discursive consid-
eration of discernment. In other words, there is discursive consideration] of their intrinsic reality (ṅo bo ṇid), of their properties (yon tan), or of their essence (sniṅ po). One will also give up these [signs] by not applying the mind to them.

But the Bodhisattva is not free yet from the bondage of signs. There is still another level of attachment to signs:

(3a2) If one gives up completely these [signs], there arise and appear nonetheless signs of discursive discrimination as mental imprints of representation. [These signs occur now] with respect to reality, that is, the signs of discrimination brought about by the discursive consideration of emptiness, (3a3) by the discursive consideration of suchness, by the discursive consideration of the apex of reality (yaṅ dag pa'i mtha': bhūtakoṭi), by the discursive consideration of the signless (ānimitta), by the discursive consideration of the ultimate object (paramārtha), by the discursive consideration of the foundation of all dharmas (dharmadhātu) (3a4). In other words, there is discursive consideration of their particular characteristics (svalakṣaṇa), of their properties, or of their essence. These signs of discursive discrimination bearing upon reality the Bodhisattva also gives up (3a5) by means of not applying the mind to them.

The Bodhisattva must still push forward in his practice of detachment, as the aspiration to Buddhahood, and the accomplishments of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas alike become a bond:

If one gives up completely these [signs], there arise and appear nonetheless signs of discursive discrimination as mental imprints of representation. [These signs now occur] with respect to attainments (thob pa: prāpti), that is, (3a6) the signs of discrimination brought about by the discursive consideration of the attainment of the stages (bhūmi), from the first to the tenth, by the discursive consideration of the attainment of the acceptance of the non-origination of dharmas (anutpatti-dharmakṛṣānti)... of the prophecy (vyākaraṇa), (3a7) of the purification of the field (buddhakṣetrapariśuddhi)... of the maturation of living beings (sattvaparipacana) (3a8) of the empowerment (adhiśṭhāna), and by the discursive consideration of the attainment of omniscience (sarvākārajñāna). In other words, there is discursive
consideration of their particular characteristics (3b1), of their properties, or of their essence. These signs of discursive discrimination bearing on attainments the Bodhisattva also gives up by means of not applying the mind to them.

With this final relinquishment, the Bodhisattva is ready to enter the realm of non-discrimination:

If the Bodhisattva (3b2) Mahāsattva abandons in this way, by not applying the mind to them, all aspects of the sign of discrimination, his practice is acting in the sphere of non-discrimination. Even if he should not come to touch the sphere of non-discrimination for some time, (3b3) he has the correct samādhi that will touch the sphere of non-discrimination. If he proceeds in this correct practice, by means of dedication (sevana), cultivation (bhāvanā) repetition (bahulikaraṇa), (3b4) and a correct application of mind (samyag-manasikāra), he will touch the sphere of non-discrimination in which one courses without preconceived effort (anabhīsāmāṅskāra) and without exertion (anābhoga) and he will give up all of these (gradually).41

Immediately, the Sūtra proceeds to define the realm which is the object of all this striving in relinquishment:

Why is the sphere of non-discrimination (3b5) called non-discrimination? It is called non-discrimination because it is wholly beyond all the discriminations of discursive thought, beyond all the discriminations of speech, of analogy, of the senses, beyond all the discriminations with respect to the (3b6) sense spheres, beyond all the discriminations of ideation (vijñāpti), and because there is no foothold in it for the veils produced by mental perturbations (kleśāvaraṇa) and for those produced by [wrongly grasping] the cognizable (jñeyāvaraṇa), (3b7). But, what is non-discrimination? Non-discrimination is the [condition where] there is no form, no speech, no basis (3b8) no representation, no ideation, and no abiding.

The Sūtra’s emphasis on the non-discursive aspect of the process of enlightenment is not an obstacle for Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of the text as a confirmation of his gradualist position. The most important aspects of Kamalaśīla’s exegesis are developed in the section on “the
yoga of correct relinquishment"; although his analysis is brilliant, abounds in valuable insights and detailed arguments, and, in my opinion, is essentially correct, the passage's length does not allow for a complete translation in the present paper. Therefore, only a few direct quotations are included below, the greater part of the passage being presented by way of paraphrase.\(^42\)

The first lines of the passage offer the first argument for Kamalāśīla's view of the path. For the Sūtra explains that only after he is well-established in the wisdom of learning and reflection (ṣrutamāyī and cintāmāyī prajñā) does the Bodhisattva engage himself in the wisdom of cultivation, in order to give up completely all signs (nimitta: mtshan-ma). The passage in question, constituting the seventh topic of the Sūtra, deals with the correct practice of giving up all signs by means of contemplative cultivation, that is bhāvanā.

Now, as shown in the Sūtra, there are four kinds of signs: (1) vipakṣa-nimitta: that is, the sign which is an obstacle to the path; (2) pratipakṣa-nimitta: that is, the sign which is a counteragent to those obstacles (but, which must eventually be given up too), (3) pratipakṣa-ālambana-nimitta: the sign generated once the counteragents bring about the vision of the ultimate object of gnosis—that is, the sign of paramārtha. 4) pratipakṣa-bhāvanā-phala-nimitta: the sign generated by the final fruits of cultivating the counteragents, that is, the higher fruits of the path.\(^43\) The four are to be given up, but in the manner in which dirt is washed from a soiled garment, gradually from the gross to the more subtle impurities.

All signs of the first class are generated by the force of beginningless ignorance and involve the belief in a self-subsistent intrinsic reality (svabhāva). In brief, they can be classified into signs with respect to the perceiver and signs with respect to the perceived. This is why the Sūtra passage says: "having heard the dharma, having reflected on it, they will give up all the signs of discrimination...at first they will abandon all signs of discrimination with respect to own-being, whether of the apprehended or of the apprehending."

Now, what is meant by the apprehended and the apprehending? Of these two, the skandha of form is the apprehended and the other four aggregates are the apprehender that acts upon the apprehended. What is meant by saying that these five aggregates of grasping are "impure realities"? They are impure because of their grasping activities. These activities are the kleśas, which are the root of all impure (sāsrava) conditions.
The commentary explains the process by means of which one is freed from these activities:

(156b5) Now, how can one abandon these if the sign of their own-being has been produced since beginningless time by the power of ignorance? One certainly cannot throw them out of the mind as one would pull out a thorn [from the hand]. This is the full import of the question asked in the Sūtra. The Sūtra replies with its use of the word mṣon du, “being present,” (156b6) that is, “[a representational image] becoming manifest,” (snañ bar ‘gyur ba). The meaning is that one should abandon [the sign of own-being] by not applying the mind to the sign when it is made present by means of a representational image.

But, since the issue is precisely what this “non-application” means, the conflict between the sudden enlightenment and the gradual enlightenment theories is clearly behind Kamalaśīla’s following explanation: “(156b7) Now, here not applying the mind does not mean mere absence of mental application [or activity]. Because [the mere] absence [of something], lacking as it does any reality (dños po med pa) is not fit to be the real cause of anything.” In other words, absence of mental application cannot in itself be the cause for such an absence. Otherwise the process would be circular, therefore logically and practically impossible. The nature of this “non-application” is conceived by the gradualists in terms that could be paraphrased thusly: When we speak of the thought process moving spontaneously upon its object, free from any strenuous or purposeful bending of the mind towards its object, we refer only to the highest stage of signlessness. This condition, in the first place, is attained by the development of very specific mental states, which may be described as “non-application of mind” only in the sense that they are antidotes or counteragents to the unwholesome and misdirected fixing of the mind upon mental representations or imprints of the own-being of the aggregates of grasping. In the second place, the signless condition itself may be considered a state of non-application of mind but not in the sense of a mere mental void, rather in the sense that the mind is free from the habit of obstinately mooring in signs (abhiniveśa), free from the dictates of attachment of false representations of reality. These points are explained by Kamalaśīla himself with the following words:
(156b7) [Further, "not applying the mind" cannot mean merely stopping all mental activity,] because without correct examination of the real (156b8) it is not possible to stop the mind's application to the representational signs of form and the other (skandhas). For [otherwise, if correct examination of the real were not necessary,] we would be lead to the absurdity (prasaṅga) of [having to accept] as suitable any non-application of mind [that may take place] with respect to things other than form and the other [aggregates of grasping]. (157a1) But, these [other objects do not have to be abandoned, and consequently] need no counteragent. Non-application of mind, therefore, means only that non-application which is characterized by correct examination and is contrary to application of mind [to the objects to be counteracted]. (157a2) Since this [term, "non-application"] involves a negation implying [the affirmation] of the opposite [of the object negated], it is like the words "unfriendly" and "untruthful." Furthermore, since this non-application of mind is the fruit [of the meditative process], (157a3) one uses the word "non-application" to refer to correct examination [in its perfection]. Although the term denotes the fruit, by connotation it expresses the process that leads to the [fruit]. [This is the sense in which it is used in the Sūtra.] In this way, [by non-application of mind as correct examination,] one is able to abandon completely the signs. (157a4) Because one abandons Obstinate mooring (abhiniveśa) [in the conflicting opposites of being, non-being and the rest] when there is non-apprehension (anupalambha) [of their mental imprints, and this non-apprehension is achieved] when the yogi examines thoroughly the representational signs of form and the other [skandhas penetrating] into the way in which they have been distorted by the force of ignorance. (157a5)

Kamalaśīla's interpretation, of course, is backed by a long tradition of Buddhist meditation. Accordingly he proceeds to present scriptural evidence, quoting from the Ratnamegha, Ratnakūṭa, Sandhinirmocana and Samadhirāja Sūras. These passages, most of which are also quoted in the same connection in the Bhāvanākramas, emphasize the importance of examination (pratyavekṣaṇā), as the key element in the process of insight necessary for the abandonment of signs (nimitta). Kamalaśīla is well aware of the fact that examination must be a form of discrimination, and therefore a type of vikalpa. Accordingly, though the scriptural passages do not deal with this issue, he is willing to grant that
the definition of non-application of mind (amanasikāra) as correct examination of the real (samyag-bhūta-pratyavekṣā) implies paradoxically that non-application of mind is of the nature of vikalpa. But when properly understood this apparent paradox involves no contradiction, because the fire of true knowledge which arises from the discrimination (vikalpa) of examination will consume that same vikalpa, as the fire produced by rubbing two sticks consumes those very sticks. Therefore, “if one wishes to produce the supreme knowledge, which is free from all discrimination, one must first cultivate insight which is characterized by correct examination. Only in this way is one able to abandon all signs.”

Obviously, Kamalaśīla seeks to fix parameters for effort in the quest for non-discrimination. In his search for the specificity of the path and the goal, he is, so to speak, cutting at the edges of the all-encompassing experience of the ineffable, in an effort to arrive at the conceptual and practical definiteness which he claims is altogether lacking in his opponents. His rivals would propose an instantaneous encounter with non-discrimination by way of mere non-discrimination. Kamalaśīla proposes a gradual penetration into a non-discrimination which is in fact a very specific mode of discrimination, and by way of very specific practices that alter the normal, perverted modes of discrimination.

It is precisely because he must insist so much on the specificity of the path that he devotes so much of his Bhāvanākramas to the details of the actual technique of meditation. Likewise, in his commentary to the Avikalpapraveśa he enters into a similiar discussion, though the Sūtra itself mentions nothing in this respect. Kamalaśīla seems to be saying “it is absurd that you read the Sūtra passage as enjoining mere practice of specific techniques for calming the mind.” He describes these techniques in a passage which is clearly taken from the Bhāvanākramas, and which we prefer to omit here to avoid overextending ourselves.44

Having explained how one is to achieve calm by assuming the posture and fixing the mind, Kamalaśīla proceeds with his discussion of insight, that is, the practice of examination. It is obvious from the beginning that this insight, though discursive and investigative, is not the free exercise of examination which Westerners associate with critical investigation. Its object is prescribed and defined rather explicitly by scriptural tradition. This is presumably why the Sūtra speaks of hearing and reflecting on the dharma of non-discrimination as the initial step to be taken in the path of relinquishment. But, what are some of the objects prescribed, and how are they to be examined? “One may cultivate the
pratityasamutpāda; or examine coming and going; or analyze non-origina-
tion from the thing itself, from another, or from both [itself and
another thing]; or one may practice analysis into atomic parts." All of
these are not only topics of analytic meditation, but likewise topics of
Buddhist philosophical speculation. There is, therefore, no room for
doubt as to what is Kamalaśīla’s intended meaning: the accuracy of
philosophical reasoning and the certainty of scriptural tradition guar-
antees the genuineness of experience. In this way the pitfalls of blank
negation of all mental processes are supposedly avoided.

If the Avikalpapravēśa seems to support the followers of sudden
enlightenment, however, it is not only because of this line enjoining
“non-application of mind.” After all, in this connection, at least the
Tibetan text has the expression “gradually” (rim gyis). The Avikalpa-
pravēśa is a text on sudden enlightenment not so much in the sense of
“instantaneous” as in the sense of “immediate” enlightenment. This
Sūtra does leave the reader with the impression that the realm of non-
discrimination is coextensive with the world in its bare essencelessness;
that it is to be apprehended directly and not by means of specific path
elements. Accordingly, Kamalaśīla must also face the task of explaining
why the Sūtra speaks of the higher attainments of the Bodhisattva path
as signs to be abandoned.

It is with this end in view that he explains how the Bodhisattva, as he
progresses in the path, falls into the temptation of constructing new
signs to which he can hold on, as he had done before with the five
skandhas:

(158a7) Thereupon, when he gives up [in this way the signs of discrim-
ination] the yogi reflects many times in the following manner:
“Although form and the other five groups of grasping do not arise
in the ultimate sense, [158a8] I should produce the perfections, be-
ginning with giving. Otherwise, the Blessed one would have not ex-
plained these [perfections] as counteragents to the Bodhisattva’s self-
ishness, as [the cause of] attainments such as the Great Joy, (1581b)
or as the equipment [necessary] for enlightenment.”
Because there is this thought [which is not wholly mistaken], the [yogi]
produces new vikalpa and will not enter the avikalpa-dhātu in its full-
ness. (158b2) Therefore, this vikalpa too must be abandoned by the yogi
by means of non-application of mind. This is why the Sūtra speaks of
the “sign of discrimination produced through discursive consideration
of giving. . . of morality, etc.,” of which the Sūtra says that “these the Bodhisattva also abandons by means of not applying the mind.” [However,] in the passage beginning with “If one gives up (gradually) in this way the sign of discrimination with respect to self-subsistent realities. . .” (158b3) we are to understand that the pāramitās are the counteragents (gñen po: pratipakṣa); because they counteract selfishness and other [passions] and they counteract the veils of the kleśas and the jñeya. How can [this statement] agree [with the previous one]? If the yogi is established in his practice (158b4) he will not engage anymore in an obstinate mooring in the substantial reality of dharmas, [knowing] that they are all unproduced. Having given up this discrimination, it is not proper that he should engage in it [again]. Therefore, according to the Sūtra, (158b5) “Bodhisattvas should practice [the perfections,] giving and the rest as the counteragent to all the veils and as the equipment (sambhāra).” Otherwise (158b6) if one were not to practice the perfection of contemplation and the perfection of discernment, how could one abandon the veils (āvaraṇa)? The yogi would hinder his own practice of the perfections and achievement of the stages (bhūmis) and thus contradict many Sūtras. Without its proper causes (158b7) all-knowledge would be unobtainable.

Thus Kamalaśīla parries his opponent’s objection by pointing out the obvious distinction, implicit in the Sūtra, between the practice of the perfections and attachment to subtle forms of discrimination that may impair their function as counteragents. This new impediment is a repetition of the original misapprehension of seeing a self-subsistent reality where there was none. Since this misapprehension is a well-ingrained habit, it can occur even with respect to the higher stages of the path. The fact that it may occur then, does not imply, according to Kamalaśīla, that those higher states and virtues are on this same level with the gross delusion of seeing an intrinsic reality in the five skandhas.

This obstinate habit leads even the Bodhisattva into the mistaken view of perceiving the perfections by means of a discursive process still based on the concepts and mental imprints of being and non-being, substantial reality, etc. The habit is so strong that even after it has been given up in the context of the perfections it persists in other forms:

(159b3). . . then the yogi will think: “Although giving and the other perfections lack a self-nature (svabhāva), emptiness and other [desig-
nations of the absolute] (159b4) must have substantial reality, as defined by their particular characteristics (svalaksana). . ., otherwise, if the ultimate object had no reality, the ascetic practices (brahmacaryya) would be pointless.” (159b5) This type of discursive discrimination should be abandoned also by the Bodhisattva. The particular characteristics of emptiness and the rest do not constitute a substantial being (vastu), rather they constitute only the marks of mere absence of self in the person and in the dhammas. Otherwise, if emptiness and the rest had some kind of intrinsic reality, such as existence [non-existence] or the like, (159b6) how could one put an end to vikalpa?

When the Ratnamegha Sutra (159b7) says: “If the ultimate object (paramarthha) did not exist at all, Son of a Good Family, then the ascetic practices would have no purpose,” these words do not mean that the ultimate object (don dam pa) is the intrinsic reality (svabhava-vastu) of the particular characteristics (svalaksha) [which describe emptiness and the rest]. (159b8) What happens is that all dhammas are like a magical creation upon which one imposes the characteristics of selfhood of dhammas and selfhood of persons, although these do not exist in an ultimate sense. When this superimposition takes place, (160a1) foolish people imagine that there is in reality a person or dhammas. Thus, all common people, because they moor in the ideas of self in persons and in dhammas, (160a2) believe these to be substantial entities.

Thus, it can be said that the Avikalpa pravesadharaṇī explains how different types of marks may lead to the false idea of substantial being. It is evident that the representational images which arise from such discursive considerations of emptiness as the one presented in the Ratnamegha may just as well arise with respect to the particular characteristics, (svalaksana), the qualities (guna) and the essence (śniṇ po) of emptiness and the rest. Here “discursive consideration with respect to the particular characteristics” means, according to Kamalaśīla, to assume the ultimate existence of the distinguishing characteristics of emptiness. Or, rather, it means to assume that there is some kind of substantial being constituting or underlying the distinguishing characteristics of emptiness. “In reality these characteristics are nothing but the absence of selfhood in persons and dhammas, and exist only as magical creations, or the like.” Therefore, if one thinks that these are substantial
entities, one is simply taking the distinguishing characteristics expressed by each word as a sign for the mooring in being and non-being. When the Sūtra says “the bodhisattva abandons these by means of not applying the mind,” one should understand this to refer to these signs of substantial being and non-being etc.

But the denial of an ultimate reality does not imply a nihilistic view:

(160b2) Because here the only distinguishing characteristic is absence of selfhood in persons and dharmas. (160b3) Yet the operational idea (prajñāpti) of a dhārmatā is also established. This dharmatā is free from the selfhood superimposed on persons and dharmas; like a magical creation, it is neither substantial nor non-substantial. Therefore, non-being is also an inappropriate category to describe this ultimate.

Having understood this, one should abandon all discrimination of an own-being (svabhāva) with respect to this [ultimate object]. (160b4) This is called abandoning the sign generated by the ultimate object of cultivating the counteragents.

The fourth sign to be abandoned follows, this is the sign of the fruits of cultivation:

(160b5) The yogi now thinks: “Although the counteragents which are the perfections, and their object, (dharmatā), are ultimately without any self-nature, the different stages (bhūmis) which result from their cultivation must be real entities, otherwise, how could the Bodhisattvas enter into the stage?” (160b6) At this point, the yogi should also abandon this kind of discrimination. The bhūmis also are unproduced from the point of view of the ultimate truth...  

At this juncture Kamalaśīla fails to explain what this sign of vikalpa is in the case of the bhūmis. Presumably it would not be very different from the sign arising with respect to the ultimate object. Our commentator does remark in one final attack on the sudden enlightenment that “some consider the bhūmis themselves as the sign of vikalpa.” Purportedly the same opponent would think that enlightenment could be attained outside the bhūmis. But this, according to Kamalaśīla, is a mistake arising from a misunderstanding of the meaning of concepts such as effortlessness (anābhoga) which are said to characterize the bhūmis.
After this, Kamalaśīla devotes a long section to a description of the characteristics and virtues of each stage, presumably in order to show that they represent real and important differences in the mastery of non-discrimination. This section of the commentary concludes with a passage in which Kamalaśīla presents the Mādhyamika position in a form dangerously close to the teachings of his opponents:

(162a6) When the Sūtra says that “one should abandon these completely by non-applying the mind,” it means abandoning all mooring in existence (bhavābhīniveśa), because all dharmas (162a7) are of one taste from the absolute point of view, and, as it has been said, “the Tathāgata has never pronounced any dharma,” and “all dharmas are equal to the Sugata.” But the childish (162a8) who grasp at signs simply practice a non-existent dharma. Therefore, one should abandon all signs by non-application of mind.

Then, Kamalaśīla ends his comments on amanasikāra with a brief statement:

(162a8) When the text says that the Bodhisattva who practices this non-application of mind strives to attain the avikalpadhātu, the meaning is that he practices non-application in order to (162b1) set his efforts on the path that leads into the avikalpadhātu. Thus the yogi will abandon the net of the signs of discrimination of being, non-being, etc. by means of prajñā. (162b2) He remains seated [in the lotus position] cultivating this truth until it becomes perfectly clear and effortless, free from imagination and discursive examination, ineffable, of one taste.

The section that follows in the commentary returns to the question of the practical side of the path. This is done in a detailed exposition of the pitfalls to be met in meditation, which parallels the sections on the same topic found in the Bhāvanākramas. Finally, again paralleling the Bhāvanākrama, the commentary explains the proper manner of concluding each session of dhyāna.

Kamalaśīla’s analysis of the Avikalpa pravesadhāraṇī leaves no doubt regarding where he stands on the questions of “immediate” enlightenment and the nature of non-discrimination (nirvikalpa). It is therefore all the more regrettable that neither the Īkṣa nor the Bhāvanākramas
contain explicit statements on two questions that seem fundamental to us today: the identity of his opponents, and the exact relation between philosophical necessity and practical feasability. It almost seems that Kamalaśīla is obstinately refusing to reveal the names of his opponents, or even refusing to outline their views explicitly. This is hardly what we would expect in “dossiers” of a “Council” held by kingly command. But the second point we would have liked to have seen discussed in Kamalaśīla’s works can hardly be considered the kind of question that would have arisen among Indian scholastics. Thus we may be disappointed, but we should not be surprised at the fact that no distinctions are drawn between prescription, theoretical desirability, logical possibility and factual description of practice. But these distinctions should not be overemphasized. We must make an effort to understand in which ways their fusion or confusion could be relevant to the Mādhyamika-Yogācāra position of Kamalaśīla.

Thus, Kamalaśīla states that the object of the path though ungraspable is definable and discernible, because absence of svabhāva does not entail absence of svalakṣaṇa. Here he makes use of a philosophic distinction which is not mentioned in the Bhāvanākramas. This is a perfect example of the combination of philosophical argument with prescription for practice: the perfectly apophatic goal is to be sought by very specific means. This overlapping of spheres that we consider clearly distinct is characteristic not only of the Bhāvanākramas and the Avikalpapraveśatikā, it is the distinguishing mark of most Indian hermeneutics of the path. In this case Kamalaśīla is applying to the realm of meditational experience a fundamental ontological distinction which is rooted in traditions foreign to Mādhyamika. But this is nevertheless a distinction which is relevant to the Mādhyamika conception of the ultimate goal of the path.

A similiar application of philosophic concepts and distinctions, this time borrowing from the Yogācāra, is utilized in the First Bhāvanākrama—and has been the object of a forthcoming paper by Prof. Kajiyama on Kamalaśīla’s analysis of the so-called “four levels of meditation” of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. It is worth noticing that the Avikalpapraveśatikā ignores completely this fourfold system, while the Bhāvanākramas also ignore the fourfold system of the Avikalpapraveśa. No correlation between the systems is suggested, nor are they compared in any sense. A third meditational schema (curiously enough, also a fourfold system), based on the Sandhinirmocanasūtra is discussed in the Third Bhāvanā-
Krama, mentioned in passing in the Second Bhavanakrama, but ignored in the First and in the Avikalpapraveśatikā. From this fact one could conclude that these so-called systems of meditation are mere academic reconstructions of what meditation should be if it is to agree with the ontology of the late-Mādhyaṃika school or with the prescriptions of the Sūtras. But, perhaps we should give Kamalasila the benefit of the doubt and assume that his analyses of meditational practice and experience represent materials collected from heterogenous, but living sources. I am inclined, however, to favor a mixed hypothesis that would explain why Kamalasila, unlike other scholastics, can give such clear and definite accounts of practice, yet at the same time, take notice of the changes that his accounts may suffer in different hermeneutical or metaphysical contexts. Kamalasila himself gives us the answer when, following a long established tradition, he tells us that meditational practice must be preceded and directed by scriptural study and philosophic reflection. It is obvious then, that while being himself a practitioner of at least some of the techniques he described, Kamalasila used scriptural tradition and philosophical analysis as guidelines and correctives, as well as considering that the scholastic tradition behind his own school had the key to the correct interpretation of his own experiences in meditation. In the last analysis Kamalasila may be showing greater wisdom and sincerity than his opponents in acknowledging the important role of tradition and interpretation in defining the nature of practice, no matter how radical or anti-conceptual the goals of the latter may appear to the outside viewer or to the fully awakened.

Be that as it may, Kamalasila’s concern for the problem of amanasi-kāra, or the proper technique for abandoning those conceptual signs which form the basis of attachment, is of course shared by other mystics. For, after all, in the topic heading he has given to the section of the Avikalpapravesadhāraṇi considered above is summarized the key problem of Buddhist mysticism: “what is the proper yoga for correct relinquishment.” It is a well-known fact for those who have once attempted to practice some of these techniques that it is not possible to abandon the suffering, anxiety and confusion of the ever-moving stream of consciousness by a mere act of will, as one would pull a thorn out of the hand, to borrow one of Kamalasila’s favorite expressions. On this point Kamalasila seems to confirm a rather common experience, and also simply reiterates a basic Buddhist tenet that in order to remove sorrow one must find its cause and remove the cause by means of the
path. However, it is also true that within Buddhism itself there are many techniques of proper relinquishment, and it is also obvious that the fact that there must exist a means for removing the cause does not preclude the possibility of an “immediate” approach to the completion or realization of relinquishment, or of a means which is wholly undescrivable. The question will always be how much variation is acceptable if a system is to preserve its individuality and if a technique is to lead to a specific goal. Kamalaśīla does bear witness to the great variety of techniques acceptable to the Buddhists of his days.

From the point of view of the sudden enlightenment school, on the other hand, the problem is not whether there are different approaches, short cuts, or valuable sidetracks apart from a specific system of levels of relinquishment. The Ch’annists, for instance, have to live with another spectre. For them the question is whether “sudden,” or rather “immediate” enlightenment admits of any process, procedure, method or technique. As it is practiced today, Japanese Rinzai includes of course different devices or techniques for bringing about proper relinquishment. But in other forms of Zen such devices seem to be rejected. In Sōtō Zen there is ultimately nothing apart from Zazen itself; in Bankei’s Zen even that is rejected. There is much in the Ch’an of T’ang times, the one that Kamalaśīla probably knew, to indicate that his criticism of Ch’an for its belief in the possibility of relinquishing without any meditational devices is justified. In the masters of the southern school of the early T’ang dynasty there is much to suggest the unfettered, iconoclastic Taoist sage, at least as compared with the scholar from Nālandā. There is also strong evidence to suggest that they regarded meditational techniques rather lightly. Rarely do they mention those techniques for proper relinquishment so dear to Kamalaśīla, and when they do it is usually only to disparage them.50

One does not necessarily have to assume that the maverick style of some of these masters and their refusal to recommend any special technique proves that they were no longer teachers of meditation (ts’o-ch’an or zazen). It may be also that their uncommitted stance with respect to techniques and devices was itself a device for destroying the disciples’ attachment to meditational systems. However, there can be no doubt that we will seek in vain in the teachings of the masters of the southern school for definite advice on how to go about relinquishing the objects of attachment. Their insistence on “no-thought” and nothing else will still leave us confused, as it probably left Kamalaśīla when he first heard of
it. How is one to relinquish attachment, how is one to enter the realm free of discursive thought? It is obvious that Kamalaśīla thought that since stopping discursive thought is the problem, the answer cannot be "stop discursive thought." But not all Buddhists found this possible answer so disconcerting, as some of the Prajñāpāramitā texts do suggest. Thus, Vimalamitra, with the Ch'annists, thought that since the problem is discursive thought, then there can be no solution within discursive thought itself.

One would have thought that both Kamalaśīla and his opponents would have perceived the fact that the problem is more complex than they dared imagine. A few decades after the "Council" the great Huayen Ch’an scholar Tsung-mi 宗密 (780–841) pointed out that among the various teachers of meditation in China some taught sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation, others gradual cultivation followed by sudden enlightenment, still others gradual cultivation and gradual enlightenment, others sudden cultivation and enlightenment, etc. This is of course a much fairer picture of the complexities of the problem and the complexities of Chinese Zen than what we can get from the "Council", though Kamalaśīla’s assessment of the weaknesses of Ch’an "as he knew it" is probably still relevant.

One should not lose sight, however, of the fact that Kamalaśīla’s work is not eminently or primarily a critique of Ch’an. It is worthwhile noting that in Kamalaśīla’s exposition of the Avikalpapraveśa, no mention is made of the distinction between gradual and sudden enlightenment. Such an opposition is also absent from the Bhāvanākramas. It is true that the title of the latter already suggests Kamalaśīla’s gradualist preferences, but not once do we find an allusion to the so-called "subitistic" doctrines of Zen. Although the inconceivable length of the Bodhisattva career is mentioned several times, no point is made of refuting sudden enlightenment as such. Throughout the three Bhāvanākramas and the Avikalpapraveśadhārani-ṭīkā, the attack is limited to proving the necessity of upāya and bhūtapratyavekṣā. The question is not whether enlightenment is sudden or gradual, but rather whether the different elements of the path should be analysed, defined and practiced separately. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, as Kamalaśīla believes it to be, then it is quite obvious that upāya, the altruistic aspect of Buddhahood, is not merely an automatic fruit of understanding or enlightenment, and that it should be practiced separately. It is also quite natural that meditation should include at least an initial element
of discursive analysis and consideration before there can be any entrance into a "thoughtless," or rather "signless" realm.

However, this should not be taken to mean that Kamalaśīla’s arguments and view of the path have no relevance whatsoever for the gradualist-subitist controversy. On the contrary, his two main points in fact do summarize the fundamental issues, and they may be taken as guideposts in any attempt at clarifying the difference between sudden enlightenment schools and the schematic mystic paths of the traditional Indian schools. These two points also bring out the most characteristic traits of the sudden enlightenment theory, which has less to do with the "instantaneous" nature of the enlightenment experience, than with the immediate, synthetic character.

In spite of the many problems raised by a careful comparison of Wang-hsi’s dossier and Kamalaśīla’s works, one simply cannot avoid the conviction that the latter must have had the prototype of the former in mind when criticizing “errors” of unidentified authorship. Still, Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākramas and Avikalpatīka cannot be understood as simple summaries of a Council, nor as accurate criticisms. They stand as independent works, conceived on the one hand as complete expositison of the path and, on the other hand, as general refutations of mistaken views of the path. Thus, it is quite obvious that, aside from questionable interpretations of Ch’an doctrine, there is much in Kamalaśīla’s works which is directed against a more general type of “error” which he must have known or have been taught about in India.

Moreover, as the foregoing discussion attempts to show, it is more reasonable to assume that even in Tibet Kamalaśīla’s knowledge of sudden enlightenment doctrines came by way of Indian, and not Chinese, proponents of those practices and beliefs. Although it is too early to determine who is reacting to whom, there can be no doubt that there was some contact between Vimalamitra and Kamalaśīla. Vimalamitra, therefore, may be the prototype of Kamalaśīla’s Indian opponents.

In conclusion, in measuring the force of Kamalaśīla’s critique of sudden enlightenment schools one should not forget the three points made in the foregoing analysis. (1) Firstly, it is important to remember that Kamalaśīla’s concerns are not wholly practical, nor are they scientific; Indian philosophical polemics are often behind his “descriptions” of meditational practice. His penchant for metaphysics may have distorted his view of his opponents or carried him away from the main issue. (2) Secondly, there is much in his work to suggest that he is attacking
doctrines other than those of Ch'an, of Indian origin, and by his time probably integrated with Tantric Buddhism. These he regarded as 'heresies' equal to Ch'an. (3) Lastly, one should not overlook the fact that some of the teachings of the Sūtras and much in the spirit of the Madhyamaka already lean Buddhism towards radical teachings closer to Ch'an than to the scholastic disciplines in which Kamalaśīla had been so well trained. Thus, his concern with the Vajracchedikā, the Saptasatīkā, the Hṛdaya and the Avikalpaprāveṣa is not fortuitous, as seen in the way these texts are used by his contemporary Vimalamitra.

NOTES


2 In e.g., Tucci, op. cit., Demiéville, Concile, and in Ueyama Daishun, “Donkō to Tonkō Bukkyōgaku,” TG 35 (1964), pp. 141–214; also Demiéville’s review of Tucci and “Récents travaux. . .”


4 Imaeda, op. cit.


6 Loc. cit. Strictly speaking, this is not the first allusion to the “Council” in Western writings: L. Austine Waddell’s Tibetan Buddhism (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1895) mentions the controversy in p. 31. It is also mentioned, of course, by Sum-pa Mkhan-po, whose chronicle, the Dpa’-bsam-ljon hzahn, was published by Sarat Chandra Das in 1908 (Pag Sam Jon Zang: Part I, History of the Rise, Progress and Downfall of Buddhism in India, Calcutta: Presidency Jail Press, pp. 173-4).


8 Chinese ho-shang 和尚, see Demiéville, op. cit., p. 9, note 1.

9 “A Sanskrit Ms. from Tibet . . .” above, note 1.

10 The idea that the Bhavānākramas are some kind of “minutes” of the “Council” is proposed, but not documented, by Demiéville, and accepted by other authors. In note 1 to page 13 of his Concile Demiéville suggests that only the Third Bhavānākrama is a dossier, the other two essays of the same title he explains by saying, “El est probable que Kamalaśīla ne se contenta pas de publier sa mise en œuvre des ‘actes’ de la controverse, mais multiplia les traités d’inspiration polémique: d’où ce triple Bhavānā-krama.” Later, however, he is less careful and refers to the three essays as “le dossier indien de la controverse” (Concile, p. 333; Reivew of Tucci’s Minor Buddhist Texts). Snellgrove and Richardson speak of “contemporary dossiers” without specifying, but presumably speaking of Kamalaśīla’s works (David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson, A Cultural History of Tibet, London: G. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., 1968, p. 79). On this point I believe the Tibetan tradition recorded by Dpa’o-gtsug Phreñ-ba is closer to the truth. According to Tucci (pp. 40–41) the Chos-bhun of Dpa’o-gtsug Phreñ-ba states that after the controversy “the king ordered the sons and wives of the žaṅ blon should learn the Law and he
requested Kamalaśīla to write down the essentials of the doctrine which by the triple method of learning, reflection and meditation . . . explains the unsubstantiality of all notions. So the first Bhāvanākrama was written. He then wanted to know how, having realized that there is only one Vehicle, this doctrine can be meditated upon; and so the second Bhāvanākrama was composed; finally in order to explain the result of this meditation the third Bhāvanākrama was compiled." Obviously our author had never read any of the three essays, as his description of their contents is completely inaccurate, but the notion that Kamalaśīla wrote these essays as an introduction to Mahāyāna Buddhism for Tibetans and not as a dossier of a controversy fits the style and contents of the works perfectly. There is no question that the works contain long polemical passages, and that the controversy (or controversies) taking place in Tibet at the time are reflected with great accuracy in these and other writings of Kamalaśīla; in fact, the nature of the polemical undercurrent in different works of Kamalaśīla may form the basis for making clear distinctions between writings composed in Tibet and those composed in India. However, the main thrust of the three Bhāvanākrāmas is better described with the words "didactic" and "apolitical," than with "polemical." This becomes obvious when we consider the Bhāvanāyogāvatāra, a summary of the main topics of the Bhāvanākamas (Peking Vol. 102, No. 5313, and Vol. 103, No. 5451).

11 Published and translated by Demiéville in Concile. Properly speaking, Wang-hsi claims only to have written the preface and to have found a title for the work, which presumably is by his teacher, the Ho-shang Mahāyāna, (p. 42). But this may very well be an example of the disciples self-effacement before his teacher.


13 On the "apocryphal" literature, see Concile, pp. 43–58 and passim, and Obata, op. cit. in IBK 23.2.

14 In fact, the suddenness of enlightenment is not at issue; the real question is the "immediacy" or "mediacy" of enlightenment. That is, whether the reality to which one awakens in enlightenment is or is not apprehended directly, without the gradual cultivation of specific techniques or the step by step refinement of certain states of mind. Ontologically, there is also the question of the correspondence, coextensiveness or identity of delusion and enlightenment. This latter issue, however, is not brought up explicitly, in spite of its obvious importance, and the controversy proceeds at a highly technical level, as if the issues were merely minor problems of exegesis and meditation techniques. On the distinction between 'sudden' (subit) and 'immediate,' see Stein, op. cit. The use of the term "quietism" to refer to the Ch' an side is an unfortunate legacy of Demiéville's otherwise impeccable scholarship. I have taken up this issue, though rather cursorily, in my "Ultimo tratado del cultivo graduado," Diálogos: Revista del Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad de Puerto Rico, VIII.23 (1972), pp. 89–92.

15 Concile, 80–81, corresponding to the First Bhāvanākrama, p. 195 in Tucci, op. cit. This apparent parallel, however, presents several difficulties, the most important of which is the fact that according to the Ch’ ang li ch’ ueh the Indian side is claiming at this point that the Dasabhūmika places a Bodhisattva's attainment of "absence of discursive examination" (pu-kuan 不觀) in the Eighth Bhūmi. But no matter how we take the term pu-kuan (nirvikalpa (?), amanasikāra (?) Concile, p.
79), nothing close to it is mentioned in the Bhāvanākramas in the context of that Bhūmi—unless it is the the anādhagānimitatvavāhāra referred to in Tucci, p. 227 (Cf., Concile, notes in pp. 80, 98–99, 129, 135). Also, if this pu-kuan refers to anything close to the nirvikalpa-jñāna, then it should be placed in the First Bhūmi, as done by Kamalaśīla himself in his three Bhāvanākramas, following earlier Yogācāra maps of the path.

16 This problem is in fact the main issue of the polemical passages in the three Bhāvanākramas, and, as we will see below, of the main section of Kamalaśīla's Avikalpapravesadharani-Tikā. Cf., Tucci, pp. 211–214; Second Bhāvanākrama, Sde-dge edition (Tōhoku 3916), folios 49b–50a; Third Bhāvanākrama (ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III Serie Orientale Roma, XLIII, Rome: Is.M.E.O., 1971), pp. 15–17. Unfortunately the First Bhāvanākrama—the only one of the essays for which we have a Chinese translation—uses only one of the two terms, so that we have an equivalent in Chinese for only one of the pair: amanasikāra, rendered with wu-tsu-oy 無作意 (Yoshimura, Indo Daijō . . . p. 499).

17 Concile, pp. 78–80, and passim. Also Yanagida, Rekidaihōbōki, pp. 143, 159, 164, 200, 239, and passim.

18 See, e.g., the Yū-lu, 語錄 (that is, the Nan yang hoshang wèn ta tsa chêng i, 南陽和尚答雜微義) and the Tun wu wu shēng po jio sung 唐悟無生般若頌, both edited by Hu Shih in his Shen hui ho shang i chi, (Taipei: Hu Shih Chi Nien Kuan, 1971—photomechanic reprint of the 1930 Shanghai edition with Hu Shih's handwritten correction). For instance, in p. 101 of the Yū-lu, wu-nien is defined as pu-tsu-oy. The terms are used passim, but see especially pp. 117–118, 123, 133. In pp. 102 and 132–133, both terms are explained with concepts such as wu-wang, 無想 (āvīparāśa? wu-fen-pieh, 無分別 (nirvikalpa), and wu-chu, 無住 (apratiṣṭhitā). The Tun-wu, p. 193, also uses fei-hsiang-nien, 非想念 and wu-su, 無思 as proximate equivalents of wu-nien. Cp., also, note 5, pp. 12–13 in Jacques Gernet, Entretiens du Maître de Dhyaṇa Chen-houei du Ho-tsö, (Publications de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Vol. XXXI-Hanoi: E.F.E.O., 1949). The Tun-huang documents contain fragments of Tibetan translations of the Chêng li chüeh and the Li-tai fa-pao chi, these fragments give the following equivalents to the Chinese terms discussed above: the line 無想即是無念是的定 of the Li-tai fa-pao chi (Yanagida, p. 143) is rendered in folios 43–44 of Pelliot 116 by “myi sems pa ni tshul khrims so, myi dran pa tīnh ne ‘dzin,” almost identical to a line from the Bka’ thān sde lha quoted by Tucci (Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II, p. 71): “mi sems tshul khrims mi dran tīnh ne ‘dzin’; in folio 50–51 of the same Tun-huang fragment we find the same phrase, but with wu-nien in place of wu-yi, still rendered myi sems pa, (see Obata, “Chibetto no Zenshū . . .”). Pelliot 116, fol. 64–67 offers sems-myed for wu-nien. The fragments corresponding to the Chêng li chüeh (see Imaeda, op. cit., p. 128, concordance tables, and pp. 142–145, texts) are from Pelliot 823, they offer the equivalents myi rtag and myi bsam for pu-ssu, 不思 and pu-kuan, 不觀 respectively. Now, the two terms used by Kamalaśīla are asmṛti and amanasikāra, rendered into Tibetan with mi dran pa and yid la mi byed pa. It would seem therefore, that there is no way we can establish the simple correspondences that an actual exchange between the two parties would require. What is more, the further we move back in time away from the “Council” the closer we get to a proximate Chinese equivalent to the Sanskrit terms. In the light
of these facts, I am inclined to think that the Ho-shang Mahāyāna was cognizant of neither Kamalaśila’s terminology nor that of Shen-hui.

19 Tucci, op. cit., p. 139, Tucci’s paraphrase of a passage from the Lta ba’i rim pa (Tōhoku 4356), unavailable to me. Contrast, however, Concile, p. 76, which is clearly parallel to the passage in the Third Bhāvanākrama (Tucci, pp. 13–14) used by Bu-ston in his summary (p. 193).

20 First Bhāvanākrama, p. 212, and Third, p. 11.

21 Peking No. 5306. Interpolations in the Cig-car were first noticed by Tucci (Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II, pp. 117, 120–1), who also summarized the contents of this work (op. cit., pp. 115–121). A complete listing of the interpolated passages, which are taken from all of the three Bhāvanākramas, was made by Harada Satoru in his “bSam-yas no shūron igo ni okeru tonmon-pa no ronsho”, NCGG 22 (1976), pp. 8–10. I fail to see, however, what basis Harada has for concluding (p. 9) that these interpolations prove that the Cig-car is not criticizing the gradualists. Harada assumes that these passages have been included in the Cig-car by its author, but this is obviously the most unlikely of the hypotheses at our disposal. It would be more reasonable to assume that such clumsy interpolations, which obviously interrupt the main lines of argument of the text, are the result of later tamperings with an original, shorter essay on “immediate” enlightenment (cig car jug’ pa, “immediate” or “simultaneous entrance,” on the term cig car, see Stein, op. cit., and Wayman’s review of Tucci in JAOS, loc. cit.). Harada even goes to the extreme (note 10) of claiming that the Cig-car could be considered a work written in opposition to the “sudden enlightenment” school of Vimalamitra. There can be no doubt that in its latter Tibetan development the literature produced by the “sudden enlightenment” currents of thought clearly shows a strong gradualist influence. But one must distinguish works in the genre of the Bsam gyan mig sgron, where a concession is made to the gradualists by accepting their system as an imperfect, yet effective means of following the path, from texts where the gradualist position is not integrated or woven into the fabric of the argument, but rather incorporated piecemeal, disrupting a recognizable underlining argument in the original text into which it has been inserted. In this latter type of text it makes more sense to assume interpolation, than it does to presuppose some kind of influence.

Harada also presents evidence for a second conclusion: by showing that a good part of the section of the Cig-car which does not correspond to the Bhāvanākramas is also found in a Tun-huang fragment (Pelliot 116), he believes it can be concluded that the corresponding section is not original to the Cig-car. If his first conclusion appeared to be unacceptable because it is not supported by the internal logic of the text, his second conclusion seems to me much more suggestive, though perhaps a bit premature. Pelliot 116, first described in Lalou’s catalogue (pp. 39–41; see also Concile, p. 14), was first studied by Ueyama in his “Tonkō shutsudo Chibetto-bun . . . .”, his analysis has since been corrected or expanded on several minor points by Kimura (“Tonkō shutsudo Chibetto-bun shahon . . . .”) and Okimoto (“bSam yas no shūron (ichī)—Pelliot 116 ni tsuite”). This manuscript is clearly a medley of texts that have been put together merely because the scribe considered them important or necessary for the scriptural study or recitation of his particular community. It is also obvious that this community leaned heavily towards the “sudden enlighten-
ment’ school. (Among other Ch’an works, it includes fragments from the Chêng-li-chüeh equivalent to Pelliot 823). The collection also contains several lists of questions and answers, purportedly to be used as guidelines in debating with the gradualists, (see, e.g., Okimoto, pp. 6–7). One of the texts contained in this manuscript (verso, folios 23–47 in Ueyama, numbered 147–170 by Okimoto) corresponds almost word for word with the second part of the Cig-car, the question and answer section; a second text (recto, folio 119 to verso, folio 23—Okimoto 119–147), also contains a few additional questions and answers corresponding to passages in the Cig-car (Harada, op. cit.). Harada would have these correspondences prove that the second half of the work attributed by Vimalamitra could not have been written by him. There is, however, a problem, the Tun-huang document does not contain all the questions found in the Cig-car, and vice-versa. In the present state of our knowledge, I believe it is more reasonable to assume that there was a common, floating reservoir or repertory of issues, answers and scriptural references created and developed during the course of the Tibetan Tun-huang controversies. Vimalamitra is either contributing to or borrowing from this reservoir. But the evidence available is still not solid enough to suggest that Vimalamitra did not compile the second half of the Cig-car. The only thing that the Tun-huang fragment tells us is that the Cig-car’s question and answer section (proof of its use in debate??) shares a common source with a catechism well known in that Central Asian outpost.

There are other problems in the area of the Cig-car and its author, the least of which is not the biography of Vimalamitra. Demienville, in a footnote to his review of Tucci (p. 408) has the following comments to Tucci, p. 10: “... le Sûtras Bye-malla de la chronique tibétaine est évidemment le P’i-mo-lo du dossier chinois (Concile p. 41), en sanscrit Vimala; c’était un Tibétain d’apres le dossier chinois. Dans une note de mon Concile [p. 41, note 3] j’écartais la possibilité d’identifier ce personnage de l’histoire du concile avec le Vimala(mitra) auteur et traducteur bien connu du Tanjur, où il est donné comme un Indien. Mais tout ce que M. Tucci rapporte de ce dernier (pp. 53, 115–121) me paraît remettre en question son origine indien. Le traité tibétain dont il est l’auteur et dont M. Tucci donne une longue analyse, porte un titre qui a tout l’air d’être traduit ou inspiré du chinois ... . Ce traité, dit M. Tucci, est présenté dans le colophon comme une traduction du sanscrit. Il me paraît inavouable, inconcevable qu’un Indien ait pu être conquis par le Tch’an au point de citer dans une de ses compositions sanscrites un texte chinois [le Vajrasamâdhì], fût-ce d’après une version tibétaine comme le suggère M. Tucci (p. 119, n. 1). Vimala(mitra) aurait-il été tibétain? ou ce traité du Tanjur lui est-il attribué par abus?? Now, Bus-ston, p. 190, considers him an Indian, the Blue Annals (trans, G. N. Roerich, Calcutta: R.A.S., 1949), however, give no nationality (pp. 167, 191–192). I would give more credence to our Tibetan witnesses (the Tanjur considers him an Indian consistently) as long as we have only the testimony of a single Chinese document to contradict them. Moreover, the other works of Vimalamitra are written in a distinctly Indian scholastic style. This bring us back full circle to the question of the attribution of the Cig-car to this “Indian scholastic.” What Demienville is saying in this connection can be understood in two ways, either he considers it an empirical (statistic) fact that Indians do not accept Chinese doctrines, or he considers it an analytic judgement of the essence of Indian idiosyncracy. The first is clearly begging
the question. With regard to the second possibility, I can only say that we should remember that Vimalamitra was clearly a maverick yogi and a radical tantrist (see \textit{The Blue Annals}, loc. cit.), and that, after all, how are we to know that he did not believe the \textit{Vajra-samādhi} to be an authoritative Indian text? Was he not involved precisely in a movement that was then engaged in the production of a new dispensation? Still, Demiéville’s intuition may prove correct, as usual, as it could be that the Indian Vimalamitra is not the original author of the section where the \textit{Vajrasamādhi} is quoted.


23 References to the \textit{Cig-car} are given in folio and line numbers to the Peking version.

24 Kamalaśīla, following most Indian texts, prefers nirvikalpa. But there is no question that the \textit{Avikalpapraśaṇa’s Tibetan} \textit{rnam par mi rtag pa}, Chinese \textit{wu-fēn-pieh} 無分別, stands for \textit{avikalpa}. The Tun-huang Mss. have \textit{pu-kuan 不觀}, as well as \textit{wu-fēn-pieh}.


26 “\textit{mi rtag pa daṅ mi dmigs pa ni byaṅ chub po}” (7b4); cp. \textit{Taishō} 474, 524a: 無比貳佛一切造業無為貳佛一切不惑 (??);

\textit{Taishō} 475, p. 542b: 不觀是菩提自正諸緣故,

\textit{Taishō} 476, p. 565a: 不增是菩提，一切所緣不增益故；

Lamotte, \textit{Enseignement de Vimalakīrti}, p. 194, the \textit{Chêng li chüeh} has \textit{pu kuan} for \textit{mi rtag}, (\textit{Concile}, p. 80); Obata, “Kodai Chibetto . . . .”, p. 69; and Yanagida, pp. 200, 241–242, also 211–212, indirectly. The Kanjur text (\textit{Peking} Vol. 34, No. 843, p. 81, folio 198b7) reads: \textit{byaṅ chub ni dmigs pa thams cad kyi sgro btags pa med pa’o} (“sarvālambaneśv(-ānām) asamāropo bodhiḥ”). This passage is not borrowed from Pelliot 116 or the \textit{Bhāvanākramas}.

27 Folios 9a–10a are relatively free of interpolation, but insertions from the \textit{Bhāvanākramas} will break the series of quotations again after 10a. It is with 9a, however, that the second part of the \textit{Cig-car} begins, with a clear break from the previous section. This second part includes the questions and answers section (beginning with 10b), introduced with a short paragraph (10b8 translated below in this paper) which is paralleled in Pelliot 116, folios 146–147, see note 21 above.

28 \textit{Cig-car} folio 10b4, from Third \textit{Bhāvanākrama}, p. 11.

29 The \textit{Vajrasamādhi} quote presents several problems. Tucci, pp. 119, reads: “\textit{bsam žiṅ mod pa med na ldaṅ du mi skye ste yaṅ dag pa ji lta ba bžin du mi gYo ba’o},” but \textit{Peking} (\textit{Cig-car}) reads: “\textit{bsam žiṅ mno ba med na ldaṅ dub (read: sub)} . . .” which seems to me closer to the Chinese text (\textit{Taishō} 273, p. 366c 22–23): 若無思慮, 則無生滅, 如實不起, 諸識安寂, 流注不生, 得五法淨, 是謂大乘. Clearly the subject is the \textit{p’u-sa} of lines 19 and 20, whose state of mind is being described here. His inner calm is homologized with reality itself (\textit{tathatā}), thus the \textit{Mahāyāna} (Path and practice) is the \textit{Mahāyāna} (\textit{tathatā}).


31 Tucci, pp. 211–212.
32 Peking Vol. 94, No. 5215. The Saptaśālikā passage on the ānantaryya sins is found in p. 341 of P. L. Vaidya's Mahāyānasūtra-saṁgraha, Part I (Darbhanga, 1961), Kamalaśīla's comments to this specific passage are in p. 224 of the Saptaśālikā-ṭīkā (Peking 5215, folios 149b ff.). Other passages on the concept of no-knowledge or non-seeing are, e.g., folios 115a–b, 124b, etc.

33 Peking Vol. 94, No. 5214.

The expression mhon sum du byed pa corresponds to Sanskrit āmukhi-kr (“to render present”) and may refer to mental representation or visualization, as well as to physical manifestation.

35 Tucci, p. 212 and 261.


37 Ibid., p. 444, (Wogihara 565–566).

38 E.g., Vajracchedikā in Tucci, p. 197–198.


40 Cf. note 39 above.

41 Ditto.

42 Kamalaśīla’s Arya-āvikalpa-praveśadhārani-Ṭīkā is Peking No. 5501, and extends from folio 146b6 to 174b1 of Mdo-tshogs ’grel-pa, Ji (Otani reprint, Vol. 105, pp. 114–5–6 to 126–1–1). Kamalaśīla has divided the topics of the Sūtra under fourteen headings, the seventh being the Yan-dag yohs-su spon sbor-ba, folios 2b3–3b3 of the Sūtra, corresponding to folios 156a5–163b7 of the commentary.

43 This is a paraphrase of Kamalaśīla’s analysis, not of the Sūtra. The terminology is his, (folio 156a6–7).

44 Folios 158a and 162b, Third Bhāvanākrama, pp. 3, 9–11, etc.

45 Cf. note 44 above.

46 Folio 163a3, Third Bhāvanākrama, pp. 11–13.

47 Folios 159b3–6 and 160a6.


49 Third Bhāvanākrama, pp. 1–3. This system is also mentioned in passing in the Second Bhāvanākrama and known, with some variations in interpretation, to Asaṅga and Sthiramati.

50 Cf., e.g., Shēn-hui (in Hu Shih, op. cit.), pp. 148–152, 175–176. See also references to the T’ an ching 六祖大師施法壇經 and to the Li tai sa pao chi 歷代法寶記 in Gernet, op. cit., pp. 57, 80, 92, 94. Also, Hu shih, pp. 129–130.

51 Cf. e.g., Concile, pp. 100–103, note 7. See also the passage from the Sarradhar-mavaipulya quoted by the three Bhāvanākras (e.g., Third, pp. 26–27) and known also to Śāntideva.

Of course, Tsung-mi’s schema cannot be accepted as an accurate description of fact, but it is a useful heuristic structuring of logical and psychological possibilities.

There are, for instance, cases of clear correspondences that cannot be ignored or explained away, such as the one pointed out in note 19 above.
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