

**STUDIES
IN CH'AN AND
HUA-YEN**

Edited by
Robert M. Gimello
Peter N. Gregory

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII PRESS
Honolulu

Published by University of Hawaii Press in association with the Kuroda Institute
for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values

© 1983 Kuroda Institute
All Rights Reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America

The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values is a non-profit, educational corporation, founded in 1976. One of its primary objectives is to promote scholarship on Buddhism in its historical, philosophical, and cultural ramifications. The Institute thus attempts to serve the scholarly community by providing a forum in which scholars can gather at conferences and colloquia. To date, the Institute has sponsored five conferences in the area of Buddhist Studies. The present volume is the outgrowth of the first such conference, held at the Institute in May, 1980. Volumes resulting from other and future conferences, as well as individual studies, are also planned for publication in the present series.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen.

(Studies in East Asian Buddhism ; no. 1)

1. Zen Buddhism—Addresses, essays, lectures.

2. Hua-yen Buddhism—Addresses, essays, lectures.

I. Gimello, Robert M., 1942- . II. Gregory,

Peter N., 1945- . III. Series.

BQ9266.S78 1983 294.3 '927 83-18188

ISBN 0-8248-0835-5 (pbk.)

CONTENTS

Foreword	vii
Preface	ix
Early Ch'an Schools in Tibet	1
Jeffrey Broughton	
The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyāna: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen	69
Luis O. Gómez	
The Ox-head School of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism: From Early Ch'an to the Golden Age	169
John R. McRae	
The Teaching of Men and Gods: The Doctrinal and Social Basis of Lay Buddhist Practice in the Hua-yen Tradition	253
Peter N. Gregory	
Li T'ung-hsüan and the Practical Dimensions of Hua-yen	321
Robert M. Gimello	
Contributors	391

THE DIRECT AND THE GRADUAL APPROACHES OF ZEN MASTER
MAHAYANA¹: FRAGMENTS OF THE TEACHINGS OF MO-HO-YEN

by

Luis O. Gómez

This essay has the modest goal of introducing the reader to a small group of manuscript materials belonging to the formative stage of Ch'an Buddhism. These documents are the putative work, or contain the teachings, of an eighth-century Ch'an Master who assumes one of the most radical positions on the side of sudden enlightenment in the sudden vs. gradual enlightenment controversy. Yet these texts are also a good example of how early Ch'an did not exclude (1) rigorous meditational practice, (2) the possibility of a gradual approach, and (3) conceptual schemata to explain the relationship between (1) and (2) and the ineffable, indivisible state of enlightenment. The teachings in question are those of the Chinese Master Mahāyāna (Chinese: Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen 和尚摩訶衍) which are preserved in Chinese or Tibetan translation in several manuscripts from Tun-huang. These texts--seen as Ch'an teachings, and not simply as curious manuscripts from Tun-huang--can offer some insight into the internal dialectics of Zen.

Master Mo-ho-yen is known to us not only through these fragments. The Tibetan chronicles tell us that he was a Teacher of Meditation at the Tibetan court for a short period towards the end of the eighth century A.D. At that time he participated in a controversy that tradition presents to us as a "Council" held under the aegis of the King of Tibet. The first account of this debate to be known in the West was

that of the seventeenth-century Tibetan chronicler Sum pa mkhan po, but Obermiller's translation of Bu-ston's Chos-'byun introduced more detailed information on what Tibetan tradition claims to have been the actual proceedings of a "Council." It was Obermiller himself who suggested that the source for Bu-ston's exposition of the issues of the controversy was Kamalaśīla's Third Bhāvanākrama, the manuscript of which he had brought back to Leningrad from Tibet.²

The complexity of the issues, doctrinal and historical, did not become apparent until, under the title of Le concile de Lhasa, Paul Demiéville published and translated a Chinese manuscript from Tun-huang (Pelliot 4646), the Tun-wu ta-sheng cheng-li chüeh 頓悟大乘正理決, which purports to be the actual "dossier" or minutes of the debates.³ It is of some interest and perhaps significant that of all the issues discussed in this work the only two that are unquestionably explicit points of conflict with the Bhāvanākramas are the two chosen by Bu-ston from the polemic section of the Third Bhāvanākrama as a summary of the conflict.⁴

Bu-ston's exposition of these two points is very concise, and is worth reproducing here--as they recur in another form in the fragments that occupy us. According to this account from the fourteenth century, the Ho-shang's first thesis was:⁵

As long as one carries out good or evil acts, (kuśala-akuśala) one is not free from transmigration as [these acts] lead to heaven or hell [respectively]. It is like clouds which cover the empty sky irrespective of their being white or black.

The second thesis explains the Ho-shang's alternative to the path of action:⁶

Whoever does not think of anything, whoever does not reflect, will be totally free from transmigration. Not thinking, not pondering, non-examination, non-apprehension of an object --this is the immediate access [to liberation], it is the same as the Tenth Stage (bhūmi) [of the Bodhisattva].

Spokesmen for gradual enlightenment were the masters Kamalāśīla, Śrīghoṣa, and Jñānendra, who took issue with both theses. For them there could be no direct access to liberation. To leap into no thought is to sink into quietistic indifference and insensitivity. Although the highest experience is a state of non-discrimination or non-conceptualization (rnam-par mi rtog pa: avikalpa), it is the result of very specific causes. These causes have to be cultivated gradually. They can be discerned or defined rationally, and have distinct moral and practical implications.

* * *

These were points at issue not only at the Tibetan Court in Lhasa and not simply as a result of the theoretical insight of a handful of hermits. The question of the non-discursive character of the Buddhist religious experience was a burning issue in the cultural milieu in which early Ch'an Buddhism--and consequently, early Tibetan Buddhism--developed. The same questions--of stages and degrees, of sudden and gradual--were of great concern in China at that time,

as can be seen in what remains of the monumental work of Tsung-mi. Through recent research into other Tibetan and Chinese materials it has now become obvious that the controversy raged well beyond the confines of what is today political Tibet. It is too early to pinpoint the exact chronological or geographic focus of the controversy, as it seems that various sets of questions similar to, but independent of, those collected in the Cheng-li chüeh circulated in the Tun-huang area as well as in the Tibetan heartland. There are, for instance, the famous Twenty-two Questions on the Mahāyāna by T'an-k'uang, studied by Ueyama and more recently by Pachow.⁷ There is also Pelliot 116, which contains what could be described as a manual for debate, as was suggested by Okimoto. Several pericopes found in the latter text seem to have been used in the composition of a work attributed to Vimalamitra, Cig car 'jug pa.⁸ The Tun-huang manuscripts have yielded other interesting fragments and pericopes which also point to an extended controversy that cannot be adequately described even by Demiéville's revised terminology, "les conciles du Tibet."⁹

Among the texts discovered in Tun-huang, and again researched mostly by Japanese scholars, there are several fragments of the teachings of the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen preserved in Tibetan translation. The content of four of these fragments was summarized systematically by Ueyama Daishun in a short article published in 1971.¹⁰ He worked with four manuscripts: Pelliot 116, verso ff. 171b¹-173b²; Pelliot 117, verso ff. 5.1-7.5; Pelliot 812, complete, one folio; and Pelliot 813, ff. 8a1-8b2. Number 813 contains the first two parts of 117, while number 116 only contains

the third topic covered in 117, and one line from its beginning (see chart III below). Ueyama also identifies 812 with the beginning of 117, but the correspondences are only approximate. I rather take Pelliot 812 as a summary, but this is getting ahead of my own argument.

Ueyama also mentions a fragment from the Stein Collection, number 468, which is likewise attributed to the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen, but he does not discuss its contents in detail. This text seems to me most probably another fragment from the same work which yielded the other fragments discussed by Ueyama. It bears the same title as the fragment in Pelliot 117, Mkhan-po Ma-ha-ya-na-gi Bsam-gtan cig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo.¹¹ It is unfortunately fragmentary, but it seems to overlap with the other fragments at its very end, suggesting that Stein 468 is the beginning of the work that continues with Pelliot 117.

If this is the case, we may be on our way to reconstructing a sizable portion of a work of Mo-ho-yen--or at least of a collection of his "sayings" or yü-lu 語錄. Thematically, the reconstructed work can be analyzed as follows: (1) a description of perfect samādhi or the dhyāna without examination or conceptions--this is the sudden approach (cig car 'jug), the path to liberation (grol thar pa'i lam sgo); (2) a description of the five meditational stages or processes (thabs, standing for Chinese fang-pien 方便), through which one may pass if one fails to reach the non-conceptual state by the direct method;¹² and (3) an explanation of how the ten perfections can be achieved by the single practice of non-discrimination.

The importance of Stein 468 was pointed out by Mark Tatz in an article in the Tibet Journal, but his observations unfortunately were based exclusively on la Vallée Poussin's extract in the India Office Catalogue.¹³ Tatz' observations show that even a cursory glance at the catalogue entry confirms the relevance of Stein 468 to the Tibetan debates of the eighth century, a point proven more rigorously by Okimoto.¹⁴ Its importance should become more evident as we summarize the contents of the whole fragment (only two folia, recto and verso, are translated).

The root cause for human suffering (samsāra), says the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen, is the mental construction of false distinction (vikalpa-citta; rnam par rtoq pa'i sems).¹⁵ This type of thought is moved by the force of beginningless habits. Its movements affect our perception of the world and our actions in it. In this sense everyone--from Buddhas to the denizens of hell--is magically generated (sprul cin) from vikalpa. Consequently, if the mind did not move, dharmas would not obtain.

Therefore, in order to put an end to the discriminating mind, and thereby stop samsāra, one should sit in a lonely spot in the lotus posture, keeping the back straight. Once one has entered dhyāna, as he then looks into his own mind, he does not conceive of any living being whatsoever. If he finds himself driven to consider and ponder with his discursive faculties, he should become aware of it (tshor 覺). In the agitated mind itself he does not discriminate (myi brtaq) agitation or non-agitation, being or non-being (yod-pa dan-myed-pa), good or bad, blemishing afflictions or purification; he does not discriminate a single dharma. When one becomes aware of the mind's

movements in this fashion, then no self-nature (rañ b'zin myed) is discovered in it.

After a detailed discussion of the nature of this knowledge, the text explains that one cannot obtain even that perception of the moving mind which is the awareness sought by the meditator. It is the boundless thought that does not think. One becomes free from attachment even to no-thought.

With this the fragment concludes. Okimoto Katsumi, in his "Bsam-yas no shūron (III)--nishū no Makaen ibun,"¹⁶ claims that the two folios of Stein 468 are in fact the beginning of another fragment from Tun-huang--Stein 709 (which begins with folio 4). The two manuscripts seem indeed to be written by the same hand and are quite close in size and format. This hypothesis is suggestive, for, as pointed out above, the title of Pelliot 117 is the same as that of Stein 468. Therefore, if Okimoto's presumption is correct, we must have an even larger portion of this particular work of Mo-ho-yen. Since Pelliot 116 also overlaps with Pelliot 117 and Pelliot 813, the fragments must fall together somehow to form at least part of the original text of Mo-ho-yen's Bsam-gtan cig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo (*禪頓入門).

Unfortunately, Stein 709, though extensive and marred by only a few lacunae, is still a pastiche of pericopes and not a full text, as shown by Kimura Ryūtoku.¹⁷ This difficulty notwithstanding, the fragments could be assumed to link together; probably by admitting Stein 486 as part of the introduction to the treatise of the Ho-shang, followed by Stein 709, and completed by the fragments studied by Ueyama. In this way Stein 468 would serve as a bridge between the main issues discussed in the Cheng-li chüeh and the

Bhavanakramas and the discussion on the five upayas and the ten perfections. Stein 468, as we have seen, begins by taking up the same controverted point as the "third new question" of the Cheng-li chüeh, namely, whether the transmigration of living beings is due to vikalpa irrespective of the nature of their actions.¹⁸ After answering in the affirmative the fragment attempts to justify its theory and method of meditation on the basis of this doctrine. The connection suggested is very similar to that found in the Cheng-li chüeh, that is, since all conceptions lead to transmigration they are all equally pernicious and therefore should be abandoned. The path is consequently understood to consist exclusively in the elimination of vikalpa. Of course, very much like the Cheng-li chüeh, Stein 468 falls into a circle that it fails to explain and that would take us by surprise if we were not familiar with it in other writings: the abandonment of vikalpa is not brought about by active suppression of vikalpa, but rather by acknowledging its presence. This is what the Ch'an Master Mo-ho-yen calls at the same time "looking into one's own mind" (sems la bltas 看心) and "the unthinkable" (bsam gyis myi khyab pa), or "not thinking" (myi sems).

* * *

The positions of Stein 709 and Pelliot 812 within the puzzle deserve a more careful scrutiny. Pelliot 812 is clearly another work, or simply a summary of Mo-ho-yen's works. We shall return to this text; for the time being let us turn our attention to Stein 709 which would appear to be more problematic. Though Okimoto's suggestion of a link with Stein 468 is attractive, and on the face of it quite plausible, what he presents as arguments are insufficient to

prove his thesis.¹⁹ There would seem to be important differences in style, content, and intended audience between Stein 468 and Stein 709, as well as between the latter, on the one hand, and Pelliot 116, 117, 812, and 813, on the other. The first of these (Stein 468) presents constructive or systematic arguments, describing the direct (or "sudden") approach to enlightenment. Pelliot 117, 812, and 813 describe the indirect or mediate ("gradual") approach, intended for those who cannot enter directly into no-mind or no-thought. The two approaches clearly balance each other perfectly and form a logical unity that could easily be interpreted as one continuous text. Stein 709, on the other hand, does not provide a smooth transition between these two sets. It is primarily a polemic text, sometimes almost in the style of the Cheng-li chüeh, and clearly alludes to many of the issues in the Bhavanakramas.

Finally, one must point out the fact that most Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang are pastiches or agglutinations of pericopes or mere fragments, and Stein 709 evidently is no exception to this.²⁰ Even assuming that Stein 468 was originally the beginning (folia 1-2) of a manuscript that continued with Stein 709 (f. 4, lacuna, ff. 7-23, lacuna, f. 25, lacuna, ff. 27-45, lacuna) nothing would guarantee that the work or fragment of a work beginning on f. 1 of Stein 468 did not end on folio 3.

There is no doubt that folio 4, and at least part of folia 7-11 of Stein 709 represent fragments from the teachings of Mo-ho-yen. But Okimoto has proposed that the pericopes in Stein 709 formed one single work, which originally began with f. 1 of Stein 468. In light of the preceding discussion, his

position would not be as strong if it were not for an additional piece of evidence which he has mustered in his paper.²¹ The Bsam-gtan mig sgron, a Tibetan compilation attributed to the Nin-ma-pa eighth-century Master, Gnubs-chen Sans-rgyas-ye-ses, contains several fragments attributed to Mo-ho-yen.²² One of these is identified as belonging to the "Ma-ha-yan-gyi Bsgom lun."²³ Following this is another fragment introduced with the expression "de nid las," which generally is synonymous with our ibid. Now, the first passage is taken verbatim from the same text as Stein 468 (ff. 28b1-29a3), the second corresponds to Stein 709 (f. 4a2). The Bsam-gtan mig sgron thus completes the web of evidence that suggests that Stein 468, Stein 709, and Pelliot 116, 117, 812, and 813 contain different portions of what was originally a single text, the Bsam-gtan cig- car 'jug-pa'i sgo.

Now that (1) Stein 468 and 709 are linked by the above reasoning, (2) the connection between Stein 468 and Pelliot 117 is confirmed by a similarity in title, and (3) the connection between Pelliot 117 and Pelliot 116, 813 and part of 812 is established by contents, one may further relate Stein 709 to all of the above by the following exercise in hypothetical reconstruction. If one places Stein 468 as the opening passage of Mo-ho-yen's Bsam-gtan sgo, the next step would have to be the placing of the fragments from Pelliot 116, 117, and 813 relative to Stein 468 and 709. Now, the latter can form the frame of reference for the location of the other fragments as represented in Chart I on the following page.

There would thus seem to be three slots (A, B, C) for the fragments from Pelliot 116, 117, 812, and 813. Upon closer analysis, however, it appears that

Chart I

Structure of a Presumed Manuscript Stein 468/709

<u>Extant Fragments</u>	<u>folia</u>	<u>Topic</u>
Stein 468	1-2	Introduction: the way of immediate access.
Lacuna A	*3	?
Stein 709	4	Polemics: response to objections
Lacuna B	*5-6	?
Stein 709	7	The perfections are all included in the one practice of immediate access.
Stein 709	8a-8b	The highest perfection, wisdom.
Stein 709	8b-9a	Immediate access to the meditation of a Tathagata.
Stein 709	9a-11a	The Madhyamika position and non-conceptual meditation.
Lacuna C	?	?

these fragments do not form a unit. The first part of Pelliot 117--identified by title as part of The Gate--corresponds to Pelliot 813 and to the second part of Pelliot 812 (see Appendix I).

The second part of Pelliot 117, however, is clearly marked by what appears to be the title of another work: Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gyi Bsam-brtan myi-rtog-pa'i nang-du / pha-rol-tu phyin-pa drug dang / bcu yang 'dus-par bshad-do //. The first lines in Pelliot 116 (f. 171b1) confirm this: Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gis // Bsam-brtan myi-rtog-pa'i nang-du pha-rol-tu phyind-pa drug dang / bcu 'dus-pa bshad-pa'i mdo //.²⁴ This means that Pelliot 116, verso 171.1-173.2, and Pelliot 117, verso 6.4-7.6, probably belong to or constitute another work of Mo-ho-yen, another "record" of his sayings.

The first part of Pelliot 812 (recto 6.2-8.2) belongs to still another work--as will be explained below.

We are therefore seeking to locate within the matrix of the fragments of The Gate, as represented in Chart I, only a short passage from Pelliot 813 (f. 8a2), the second part of Pelliot 812 (recto 8.3-10.1), the first part of Pelliot 117 (verso 5.1-7.6), and possibly an additional two lines from the Bsam-bgtan mig sgron (see the chart in Appendix I, nos. III-IV). This amounts to approximately 185 syllables. Now, each folio (recto and verso) in Stein 468 and 709 has approximately 220 syllables. Therefore, any of the available slots in Chart I could be the location of this passage in the original text of The Gate, so that any arguments for its placement would have to be contextual.

There is, unfortunately, no decisive argument favoring any one of these three positions. I would like to suggest, nevertheless, that the most intelligent guess on the basis of what is available to us is to assume that the passage in question best fits as the missing portion identified above as lacuna A. The first fragment of the passage can be understood to continue the thoughts expressed at the end of Stein 468, while the main body of the passage--dealing as it does with the five fang-pien 方便 (or "upayas")--would seem to be the most likely object for the qualifications expressed in f. 4a of Stein 709. The composite picture of the extant portions of The Gate and its thematic structure could be represented then in an outline such as the one suggested in Chart II, on the following page.

This hypothetical reconstruction gives us something approaching the fabric of an integral text. I have attempted to translate this hypothetical text in an appendix to the present paper (Appendix II). The translation is as provisional as the reconstruction, for there are still many obscure passages--mostly in the characteristic syntax of Tun-huang Tibetan translations of Chinese texts. Still, I believe this exercise to be a necessary step in trying to understand the teachings of Mo-ho-yen as a system, and not simply in terms of its opposition to the gradualists.

To this end I have included other fragments in Appendix II. Pelliot 812 begins with the words "Mkhan-po / Ma-ha-yan // Bsam-gtan-gyi snin-po /," a clause that Demiéville interprets as a title, which he renders into Chinese as Ch'an-yao 禪要 or "Essentials of Meditation."²⁶ It is not clear, however, whether this fragment should be considered part

Chart II

Hypothetical Original Structure of "The Gate"²⁵

<u>Extant Fragments</u>	<u>Actual Folio Number</u>	<u>Hypothetical Folio Number in Reconstructed Work</u>	<u>Topic</u>
Stein 468	1-2	*1-2	I. Introduc- tion: The way of immediate access
Pelliot 812	8a3-4	*3a	II. Transition
Pelliot 813	8a2		
Pelliot 812	8a5-10a1		III. The possi- bility of means
Pelliot 813	8a2-b2	*3a-b	
Pelliot 117	5b1-6b4		
<u>Bsmi</u>	165.4-5	*3b	IV. Transition
Stein 709	4a	*4a	V.1. Still, no means is the ultimate doc- trine of Mahayana
Stein 709	4a-b	*4a-b	V.2-3. It is not like the teach- ing of <u>tirthikas</u> and <u>sravakas</u>
Lacuna B ₂	X	*6b (part)	[*transition]
Stein 709	7	*7	The perfections are all included in immediate access
Stein 709	8a-8b	*8a-8b	The highest perfection-- <u>prajna</u>

Chart II, page 2

Stein 709	8b-9a	*8b-9b	Immediate access to the medita- tion of a Tathagata
Stein 709	9a-11a	*9a-11a	The Madhyamika position and non-conceptual meditation
Lacuna C	X	*11b-?	?

* * *

of a work of Mo-ho-yen, or simply a brief compendium of Mo-ho-yen's ideas written by one of his followers.

Pelliot 812 is evidently a composite text, falling into three parts: (1) an introductory section of twelve short lines (recto 6a1-8a2 in a format of 7 X 12.5 cm), (2) a two-line pericope corresponding in part to Pelliot 117 (f.5b1) and 813 (f.8a2), and (3) a nine-line fragment with a truncated list of the five "means of approach" (thabs) (see Chart III). It becomes evident that (2) and (3) do not constitute part of (1) through two independent pieces of evidence. First, in Pelliot 812, section (2) is introduced with the phrase, "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-ya-na'i / bsam-btan ci la yañ..." (f. 8a2-3), which presumably could not be part of the preceding text, because it has been introduced before as a quotation from the teachings of Mo-ho-yen. Second, a passage parallel to section (1) can be found in Stein 706 verso, a valuable text of which, unfortunately, only one side of one folio is preserved (Stein 706 recto is in a different hand). The passage in question (five lines in a 19.5 X 8.7 format) begins with the third line of Pelliot 812, but continues without interruption beyond the end of section (1), showing that sections (2) and (3) of Pelliot 812, and the break appearing in f. 8a2-3 of the same ms. are not part of the original text of the "Essentials."

In light of the above I would rather consider the latter two fragments part of an independent text.²⁷ The same can be said of Pelliot 21 titled The Meaning of Non-conceptualization.²⁸ In spite of some correspondences to the Cheng-li chüeh, established by Okimoto,²⁹ this is not an abbreviated or truncated version of that text. The differences are greater

than the similarities. Furthermore, it is evidently not meant to be a catechistic list or an account of a polemic exchange, as the Cheng-li chüeh is.

In the latter genre falls another Tibetan fragment, Pelliot 823, whose correspondences with the Cheng-li chüeh were established by Imaeda.³⁰ This fragment, translated below from the Tibetan, corresponds to the Chinese in all but one of its sets of questions and answers.

Two other short pericopes from Pelliot 116 have been included in the translation. One of them (Pelliot 116 verso, f. 167.4) is a quotation from Mo-ho-yen's basic doctrine of no-mind found on Pelliot 813. The other fragment (Pelliot 116 verso f. 187.2) --for which I have not been able to find a proper location in the "hermeneutical grid" constructed in the chart in Appendix I--introduces Mo-ho-yen's views on the identity of samsara and nirvāṇa.

Finally, one must mention three pericopes from the Bka'-thañ sde lña, at least two of which are of doubtful attribution.³¹ The longest one of the three is a Tibetan translation of an unknown Chinese recension of the "Two Entrances and Four Practices" (Erh-ju ssu-hsing lun 二入四行) traditionally attributed to Bodhidharma.³² The other two contain obscure allusions to theories that most probably were foreign to our Chinese Ch'an Master--to wit, the distinction between individual and universal characteristics of entities (svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa),³³ and the attribution of a depressed mind to the elements earth and water, and an agitated mind to the elements fire and wind.³⁴ I have omitted from my translation all three of these passages as they are either not Mo-ho-yen's teachings or expressive of aspects of his

doctrine for which we lack enough materials to understand their significance.³⁵

* * *

On the basis of the documents examined and translated here, we can assume that there were in the late eighth century at least five works attributed to Mo-ho-yen, or containing his sayings and teachings: 1) Tun-wu Ta-sheng cheng-li chüeh 頓悟大乘正理決), compiled by Wang-hsi. Pelliot 4646, Stein 2672. Pelliot 823, although containing one passage not found in the Chinese manuscripts, is most probably a translation of parts of the Cheng-li chüeh, or at least of one of its principal sources. Pelliot 21, though in several respects close to Pelliot 4646, cannot be considered another fragment of the same work.³⁶ The Tibetan portions in Pelliot 823 are translated below under XI.

2) Bsam-gtan cig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo (* 頓入禪門). Stein 468, Stein 709, Pelliot 117, Pelliot 813, and parts of the fragments attributed to Mo-ho-yen in Pelliot 116 and Pelliot 812. This is the text we have called The Gate. Its title is found in Pelliot 117.5bl: "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gyi // Bsam-bstan chig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo dañ // bśad-pa'i mdo' //" and in Stein 468.1al: "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gi Bsam-gtan cig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo //." The available fragments of this work are translated below under nos. I-VIII.

3) Bsam-gtan-gyi sñiñ-po (* 禪要).³⁷ Stein 706 and part of Stein 709 and Pelliot 812, below IX.

4) Myi-rtog-pa'i gžun (* 不觀義 or perhaps even 不觀語). Pelliot 21--I am not inclined to identify this work with the fragments in Pelliot 116 and 117, as suggested by others.³⁸ The similarities seem to me to be superficial--see translation below, fragment X.

5) Finally, one important pericope in the set we have analyzed begins with an introductory phrase which could be construed as a title. The passage on the ten perfections in Pelliot 116 (f. 171b¹) begins: "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gis // Bsam-brtan myi-rtog-pa'i nañ-du pha-rol-tu phyind-pa drug dañ / bcu 'dus-pa bśad-pa'i mdo //." Almost the same phrase occurs in the parallel passage from Pelliot 117 (6b4-6): "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gyi Bsam-brtan myi-rtog-pa'i nañ-du / pha-rol-tu phyin-pa drug dañ / bcu yañ 'dus-par bśad do //." This suggests to me the following hypothetical Chinese title: Ch'an-wu-kuan nei liu-shih-po-lo-mi she-lun 禪无觀内六十波羅密攝論 .

Other words used to allude to or quote from the sayings of Mo-ho-yen are probably not titles at all. The expression bsgom lun, for instance, is used in the Bsam-gtan mig-sgron (145.5) to quote a passage from Stein 468, a manuscript which, as discussed above, certainly contains part of The Gate. The Bsam-gtan mig-sgron (146.4) also refers to a passage from Stein 709--which we have also identified with The Gate--with the expression "Ma-ha-yan-gyi mdo-las." Do we have two works, lun and mdo, or do we have one work referred to by two different, but only generally descriptive names? I prefer the latter theory.³⁹

Be that as it may, one point seems evident to me: Bu-ston's account, and therefore his knowledge, of the works of Mo-ho-yen is most probably inaccurate. The "titles" of five of Mo-ho-yen's works are mentioned by the Tibetan historian. None corresponds to the titles mentioned or suggested by the Tun-huang manuscripts.⁴⁰

* * *

Chart III

Summary of Manuscript Correspondences

<u>S.</u> 486	<u>S.</u> 706 verso	<u>S.</u> 709	<u>P.</u> 116 verso	<u>P.</u> 117 verso	<u>P.</u> 812 recto	<u>P.</u> 813	<u>Bsmi.</u>
1a1-b1							145.5-146.3
1b1-2a3							
2a3-b5		4a1-3 4a3-b5 7a1-11a3					146.3-4
	8b1-b4 8b4-5	42b1-5		6a1-2 6a2-8a2			121.4-122.2
				8a2-4	8a1-2		
				5b1-3 5b3-6b3 6b3-4	8a2-b1 (9a6...)		164.6-165.3 165.3-4
			171b1-172b3 172b3-173b2 167.4	6b4-7b6			150.2-3

The total picture of Mo-ho-yen as a "Dhyāna Master" that we can derive from these fragments does not contradict the generally held view that he espoused a radical sudden enlightenment position (second only to figures such as Shen-hui and Matsū).⁴¹ The Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen affirms the immediate character of enlightenment--an immediacy that is reinforced by the simplicity of his teaching:⁴²

The state of sāmsāra is merely the result of deluded thoughts (myi-bden-pa'i 'du-ses 妄想). Enlightenment is achieved by not grasping at these thoughts and not dwelling on them (ma-blans ma-chags: 不取不住), by not bringing them to the mind (myi-sems 不思), by not inspecting the mind (myi-rtoq 不觀), but by merely being aware (tshor-ba 覺) of all thoughts as they arise.⁴³

An important corollary of this teaching further reinforces the need for the simplest possible principles of conduct. For if all thought, good or bad, clouds the mind, then the cultivation of good thoughts is as counterproductive as the cultivation of evil ones. By necessity, then, one has to postulate a "spiritual life"--if so it may be called--that is not followed by cultivating any virtue or spiritual discipline.

All conceptual constructs are considered false, "from the hells below to the Buddhas above" (l33b), but it would be a rather superficial interpretation of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen if one were to assume that this type of claim was meant merely as some kind of ontological or epistemological statement. It is

evident, from the context of the debates and from the Tibetan fragments, that the central doctrines of Mo-ho-yen are prescriptions for the practice of meditation and belong to the spheres of interest and discourse that so typically characterize the Ch'an/Zen tradition. The sole effective method of spiritual cultivation is an allopathic prescription, an antidote, the exact opposite of the cause of samsāra:

(134a) Living beings cling to the dharmas of good and evil [created by] their false conceptualizations (妄想), [only] because for ages without beginning they have made false discriminations (妄想分別). At times, good is on the increase; at other times it is evil that grows. Because of this, [living beings] are conditioned to birth and death and cannot escape. This is why the sutras insist that all conceptions (想) without exception are false. If one sees conceptions as no conception, one sees the Tathāgata.⁴⁴

This is the one and only method to achieve liberation:

(134a) To understand this single thought is in itself the greatest merit, surpassing by far all the merits that one could obtain by cultivating good dharmas for innumerable cosmic periods. You claim that one should not follow this method if one is still in the stage of a common person; (134b) [but] all buddhas and bodhisattvas, after practicing the good dharma during innumerable cosmic periods and reaching

perfect awakening, have left behind their teachings to be practiced and cultivated by beings of future generations, who have been born in this latter period of the decay of dharma (末法). You claim that common persons should not follow this method. For whom, then, were these teachings left by the buddhas? And in what sutras is it taught that this method should not be followed by common people?...

The defect in conceptualization (想) is that it has the power to hinder the original omniscience (本來一切智) of all living beings, and thus make them turn about in the endless cycle of the three evil destinies. This is their defect. It is also taught in the Vajra[cchedikā Sūtra] that one calls buddha those who abandon all signs.⁴⁵

The gradualist objects that one cannot become a Buddha merely by getting rid of discursive thought (129b).

(134b) There are certain occasions when one should produce and foster conceptual [processes] and there are occasions when one should not produce them. In the case of those who are still in the stage of common persons, or when they are only at the beginning of their practice, they should not try to do away with conceptual [processes].

Mo-ho-yen replies that his method is no different from that of all Buddhas--to remove the cause of suffering,

for:

(134b) all the sutras of the Great Vehicle say that all living beings are carried around by the currents of birth and death, because they cling to the false concepts of birth and death on account of the false concepts and distinctions they construct. (135a) [They also say that living beings] will be released the moment they stop clinging to the false concepts of birth and no-birth. From which sutra text do you conclude that common living beings should not try to do away with conceptual thought?

Mo-ho-yen leaves no room for doubt regarding the superiority of his method of liberation--it is the only effective method, and the only one that is required, a true panacea:

(146b) According to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, there is a certain medicinal herb that will cure all diseases in those who take it. It is the same with this absence of reflection and inspection. All false conceptualizations associated with the three poisons arise from modifications in the discriminatory faculty of reflection.... We ask you, therefore, to get rid of all wrong views and false conceptualizations; in this way, by not engaging in any reflections, you will become free in one instant from all the habitual tendencies to engage in false conceptualizations born from the three poisons and the afflictions.

At this point the text returns to the question of the actual method to be followed in meditation--a point with which the first set of questions and answers had begun (129a), but which since then had been forgotten:

(135a) [Gradualist] question: What do you mean when you speak of "contemplating the mind" (看心)?

Reply: To turn the light [of the mind] towards the mind's source, that is contemplating the mind. [This means that] one does not reflect on or observe⁴⁶ (不思不觀) whether thoughts (心) are in movement or not, whether they are pure or not, whether they are empty or not. It is also not to reflect on non-reflection.⁴⁷ This is why the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains: "Non-observation is enlightenment."

Here Mo-ho-yen is trying to secure his position as a non-dualist by a dialectical procedure--logical and contemplative--common among his Indian predecessors. It is quite evident that he must have been aware of the fact that his preference for the pāramārthika point of view could be construed as some subtle form of dualism, for a second manuscript of the Cheng-li chüeh supplies us with the text of a lacuna in which the questioner presents what is perhaps the strongest argument of the gradualist. The questioner's reasoning is the following:⁴⁸

Perhaps there might be someone who could argue: "[There is indeed a non-conceptual state, but] it must follow [the proper use of] concepts, as we have explained above.⁴⁹ Moreover, if the wisdom of the Saints is [totally] without concepts, it is not [truly] non-dual." If someone argued this way, what would you respond?

This passage reveals the polemical background of the section on the two truths in the First Bhāvanākrama, for the above quotation can be glossed with a charge of partiality to the absolute truth. That is to say, in the view of the gradualist, the defender of sudden enlightenment falls into a curious dualism--by rejecting conceptualization and favoring the non-conceptual realm, he could be reifying the latter.

A similar argument had been presented before (147b) by the gradualist, except that the emphasis there is more on the issue of the role of means (upāya)--a theme discussed repeatedly in the Bhāvanākramas. The question runs as follows (Cheng-li chüeh 147b):

In all the sutras of the Mahayana it is said that non-duality is reality; that non-duality is wisdom, and discrimination is means, but wisdom cannot exist in isolation [from means]. This the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains in full detail.⁵⁰ One should not discriminate between the two by saying that one is indispensable and the other is not. If one were to make such discriminations, then

one would be discriminating between grasping and relinquishing [something you yourself admit to be contrary to Mahayana teachings].⁵¹

The reply of the Ho-shang is of great interest as behind its apparent tautology and petitio principii it suggests that the sudden enlightenment of the Ho-shang belongs to the type described by Tsung-mi as sudden enlightenment followed by gradual cultivation. In Mo-ho-yen's view the proper sphere for the cultivation of the discriminating mind is the practice that follows enlightenment (pr̥ṣṭhalabdhajñāna):

(147b) After numberless kalpas, all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, become free from false conceptualizations associated with the three poisons and from discriminations associated with the afflictions. This is why they reach enlightenment, (418a) and obtain non-dual, non-discriminating knowledge (无二无分别智). It is by means of this non-dual, non-discriminating knowledge that they are able accurately to discriminate the marks of all dharmas. This is not the discrimination of false conceptualizations, in which fools engage. For this reason, wisdom and means cannot exist in isolation from each other. If you claim that [in this] there is [still] grasping and relinquishing, [I ask:] in the state of non-duality what [sort of] grasping and relinquishing could there be?

Still, it is impossible to maintain consistently such a radical position, trying to keep it truly and uncompromisingly non-dual, without allowing at some point for the realities of human psychology. Unqualified suddenism is as impossible to maintain as unqualified gradualism. Master Mo-ho-yen must concede:

(158a) As long as one [is not capable] of practicing meditation (坐禪), one has recourse to the perfection of morality, the four immeasurable states of mind (āpramānya), and other such practices. Further, one cultivates meritorious [actions] and renders service to the Three Jewels. [One hears] the teachings of all the sutras and the instructions of the masters. Having heard them, one must practice according to these teachings. Only this is their goal--to cultivate all meritorious [actions]. As long as one is not able to practice non-examination one dedicates his merit to living beings, so that they all may attain buddhahood.

These statements could be construed as an honest attempt to grant a legitimate place to some form of gradualism in the plan of sudden enlightenment; but they could also be understood to be at best a reluctant concession to the social realities of the religious life. Mo-ho-yen's arguments in the Cheng-li chüeh would seem to indicate that the former is the case, although it is not at all clear how the gradualist elements--means, merit, etc.--can form an integral part of Mo-ho-yen's system.

For instance, in the Cheng-li chüeh Mo-ho-yen seems to assert and deny at the same time the need for gradualist practices. When his opponent asks (136b) whether the six perfections are or are not necessary, Mo-ho-yen replies that they are necessary, from the point of conventional truth, as means to the manifestation (顯) of ultimate truth. The gradualist presses the question further by expressing his doubts in a form that encapsules rather transparently one of the key bones of contention between the two parties (137b):

Since these are means for the manifestation of ultimate truth, are they necessary [only] for beings of dull faculties (鈍根) or are they necessary for both beings of dull and sharp (利根) faculties?

The underlying assumption in the gradualist's question seems to be that at one time beings of sharp faculties also have access only to conventional truth, and then need the "means" that reveal or manifest the ultimate reality. Mo-ho-yen, however, does not see it that way. For him, it would seem, "sharp faculties" (利根) allow direct access to ultimate truth. Still he is not willing to concede that this creates a special class of persons for whom the six perfections and all other gradual practices become unnecessary. Accordingly, he claims (137a) that one cannot talk about (論) necessity or non-necessity when it comes to beings of sharp faculties.⁵² Presumably, these superior beings, having understood that "need or the lack thereof, being and non-being, identity and difference, are all ungraspable" (不可得),⁵³ do not

concern themselves with this issue of the role of means.

Still, this does not answer the objector's questions. The inconsistencies in the Ho-shang's position are quite evident. He tells us at one point that the question of the value or need of the pāramitās is a non-question from the viewpoint of ultimate truth (141a), that the duality of need or no-need--like other dualities--has meaning only in the relative realm (154a). This condition beyond need and no-need is explained in more than one way: it may mean that one could just as well practice or not practice virtue (141a), but it could also mean that there is no need to practice it! The latter interpretation is expressed as follows (137a):

As regards beings of sharp faculties, one cannot talk about necessity or no-necessity. It is the same as medicine, which is necessary for the sick, and a boat which is necessary for someone who wishes to cross a river, but for a person in health one does not speak of need or no-need, and when one has crossed the river he needs no boat.

A fatal slip indeed! Clearly Mo-ho-yen has driven himself into a corner, and one is tempted to conclude that his last word is in fact an unconditional denial of the value of means for those who can have a direct access to ultimate truth. This is, in fact, the theme of several of the Tibetan fragments, most notably II.1.

It is also stated more than once in the Cheng-li chüeh that the gradual way is that of the common

man, that the various practices of the path are only necessary for those who have not reached, or cannot achieve directly, the non-conceptual stage (154a-b, 156b, 158a). Yet Mo-ho-yen also insists that in the sutras the sudden approach has been taught for the common man (凡夫 prthagjana) as well (134a-b, 135a-136a, 137b-138a, 140a-b). Although his teaching is fundamentally pāramārthika, Mo-ho-yen claims, when he teaches the common man he makes use of means and enjoins the practice of the perfections (155b).

Demiéville has already pointed to the obvious contradiction between insisting on the primacy and accessibility of the direct, non-conceptual approach, and then proposing alternate paths for those who are not able to practice it;⁵⁴ but I am here interested in other, more fundamental implications of Mo-ho-yen's wavering. If the distinction between means and wisdom, relative and absolute, error and truth, is the pristine error (133b, 155b, 156a, 147b-148a), then it follows that the goal must be a state of freedom from these dualities, rather than any strengthening of the mental habits that they presuppose. In this Mo-ho-yen stands on firm ground. However, his position becomes no less dualistic by assuming that the direct access excludes the gradual elements of the path. To try to avoid the pitfall of a onesided view of "non-duality" Mo-ho-yen claims that there is an automatic or all-at-once attainment of all virtues when one gives up all conceptualizations (133b, 137b [=XI.6], 138a, 140b [=XI.10], VI.2a). This is Mo-ho-yen's idea of "the practice that is no practice" (131 bis b, 133b, 150a-b, 154a, etc.)--the opposition of practice to non-practice, virtue to non-virtue does not obtain, cannot be found (不可得) in the non-conceptual

state (136a). Even the opposition between gradual and sudden becomes meaningless here (133b 2-4). What is more, the experience of the ungraspability of dualities is enlightenment--as the dualities are delusion.

If it were left at that, however, the position of the perfections as actual religious or ethical practices would still be obscure. Mo-ho-yen therefore has made a major concession to the gradualists: the perfections should be practiced--without expectation of reward--as long as one is not able to carry out the non-conceptual practice, but once there is no-thought the perfections are practiced without conscious effort (自然圓滿) (138a). However, the explanation of this "automatic practice" leaves much to be desired. From his short tract on the ten perfections (VIII) it becomes obvious that such a view requires a redefinition of the perfections, by virtue of which they are deprived of much of their specific moral contents.

The key to these issues may be in the Ho-shang's doctrine of "internal" and "external" perfection, which, unfortunately is only treated cursorily in the Cheng-li chüeh (137b = XI.6) and in one of the Tibetan fragments (Stein 709 = VI.2). The latter source identifies internal pāramitā with wisdom, and external with means. The internal is directed at liberation for oneself, the external at benefiting living beings (137b).⁵⁵ If both sources are combined, and their schemas represented in tabular form, one would have the following chart:⁵⁶

external practice--benefiting others (<u>upāya</u>)
worldly
supramundane
supra-supramundane
internal practice--liberating self (<u>prajñā</u>)

all perfections subsumed or
achieved simultaneously in
non-conceptual practice

In spite of all the above, Mo-ho-yen's position is ultimately that of the "absolute point of view" (pāramārtha). The pair of external and internal is not presented as a comprehensive or integral definition of correct practice, but as a distinction between two independent types of practice. Mo-ho-yen's preference among these is quite evident (VI.1-2, especially 2b), but the fact that he makes allowances for the other (IV, VIII) confirms the obvious demands of human psychology and the scriptural tradition--to say nothing of the political pressure that must have been exerted on Mo-ho-yen after the arrival of the Indian missionaries. Even the staunchest suddenist--given the nature of human discourse and the nature of the Buddhist tradition--must qualify his position so that the continuity and the fruits of the mystical process can be explained in some way, no matter how rudimentary the explanation may be. Thus, Mo-ho-yen cannot erase completely the six perfections. He must account for them in his system. He must also concede that not everyone can enter directly into the highest stage of contemplation.

The Tibetan fragments translated below show that his position is not as uncompromising as it would seem from the polemical Cheng-li chüeh. In the latter work most of Mo-ho-yen's gradualist statements appear as reluctant concessions or grudging lip service to the religious dressing of Buddhist meditation. In the Tibetan fragments, on the other hand, Mo-ho-yen's

cultivation that is no-cultivation loses some of its iconoclastic sting, when one sees the importance of rigorous meditation (tso-ch'an/zazen) in his teachings (I.2 and I.8).⁵⁷ His single method of no-reflection, no-observation, and no-conceptualization seems more complex once we examine a sample of the form in which he would present it to his disciples, not in the heat of debate.

Mo-ho-yen still simplifies the path to liberation by discarding the wisdom (prajñā) that grows from study and reflection, and retaining only meditation (VI.3). Yet, the practice of tso-ch'an is clearly presented as spiritual discipline amenable to analysis and explanation. In spite of its unique and ineffable character, the experience that has no means of approach (V) can be seen as a five-stage process (IV.1-5).⁵⁸ It can be defined by contrast with the teaching of non-buddhists (II.2) and Hinayanists (II.3 and VII.9), and evidently is not to be understood as the mere suppression of thoughts (V).

It is also possible to see in these passages the germs of a more subtle theory of the nature of enlightenment as a religious goal--or a "Buddhology," if you will accept this barbarous neologism. In other passages Mo-ho-yen begins a full development of a theory of merit and the dharmadhātu (VI.10)--only to be interrupted by the end of the fragment.

Another tantalizing and suggestive fragment (VII.11), reminiscent of gradualist analyses, discusses the two basic defective states of concentration that may hinder the normal course of meditation, and how to overcome them. One sees in this passage the difference between the Ch'an Master's day-to-day advice on the practical problems of the spiritual

life, on the one hand, and, on the other, his ex cathedra statements on the "true" nature of "the ineffable," and the experience of encountering it directly, without intervening methods or theories.

Separated from the polemical context of the Cheng-li chüeh, it is therefore easier to see, from the internal perspective of the system itself, the dialectical necessities and limitations of a sudden enlightenment position. One is thereby freed from the caricature of Ch'an that both devotees and critics often draw. The inconsistencies and the tensions reveal a real human phenomenon, a religious ideal, and a spiritual practice more conscious of human needs than the rhetoric of the system itself is willing to recognize.

APPENDIX I
Synoptic Chart of the Tibetan Fragments

To clarify the interrelation between the various fragments and the translations, I have appended a table on which each translated text is identified by a roman numeral (topics), and an arabic numeral (paragraphs in the translation). These numbers are placed in separate columns corresponding to the manuscript fragment in which each text can be found. Numbers on the same horizontal line represent versions of the same text or, if quoted in parentheses, approximate parallels.

The order of the fragments on this chart corresponds to the numeration of the translations, and not to the order in the original manuscripts. The latter is indicated in Charts I-III, and by folio numbers inserted in parentheses in the translations.

This chart, like the translations that follow, is only meant as a provisional means of understanding the texts. It awaits revision following further study of these and other fragments from Tun-huang.

<u>The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation</u>					<u>On the Ten Perfections...</u>		
(Identified by Title)			(No Title)				
<u>S.468</u>	<u>P.117</u>	<u>S.709</u>	<u>P.813</u>	<u>P.812</u>	<u>Bsmi</u>	<u>P.116</u>	<u>P.117</u>
1.1							
1.2					VII.3		
1.3					VII.4a		
1.4					VII.4b		
1.5					VII.4c		
1.6			(IV.2)				
1.7-8							
1.9							
		II.1			VII.5		
		II.2			VII.6		
		II.3					
			III.1	III.1	(VII.1)		
	III.2						
	IV.0				VII.9		
	IV.1		IV.1	IV.1	VII.9a		
	IV.2-4		IV.2-4	IV.2-4	VII.9b-d		
	IV.5		IV.5	(frag.)	VII.9e		
					V.=VII.9f		
		VI.1					
		VI.2a					
		VI.2b					
						VIII.1-6	VIII.1-6
						VIII.7-10	

<u>The Essentials</u>		<u>The Meaning...</u>	<u>Other Fragments</u>		<u>Parallels in the Cheng-li chüeh</u>
<u>S.706</u>	<u>P.812</u>	<u>P.21</u>	<u>P.823</u>	<u>P.116</u>	<u>P.4646</u>
		(X.1)	(XI.3)		(134a3-b3) (135b4-5)
		(X.2)			(129a4-6) (156a) (135a2-4)
					(134a,134b-135a)
					(142a-b)
				(XII.1)	(132a)
					(135b)
		(X.3)			(135b3-5)
					(136b2-5) (141a1-142b3) (137b6-138a3)
					(137b1-4,156a4-5)

APPENDIX II

English Translation of the Tibetan Fragments

Introductory Note:

The following translations of the fragments cannot claim anything more than a very provisional value. Many passages remain obscure, and, as explained above, the interconnections among the fragments are still problematic. However, this being a first attempt at translating the fragments as Chinese texts, and not as Tibetan works with an Indian prototype, I trust the exercise fills a need and will bear fruit in future researches.

All paragraph headings and divisions are the translator's. For the titles of each fragment or set of fragments, consult the main body of the article.

Reference to folia inserted in the translations are only for the convenience of the reader. They cannot but be approximate cross-references.

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 1: Fragment I. Stein 468:¹ "The Sudden Path."

I.1. The cause of transmigration.²

(1a1) The root of the wheel of birth and death in the world is the discriminating mind.³ (1a2) Why is this? The discriminating mind arises from habitual tendencies [that have grown since] beginningless time.⁴ (1a3) Because of this, one perceives [everything] in accordance with the [conceptualizations] that arise [in the mind], and one acts in accordance with that perception, producing fruits that agree with such actions.⁵ (1a4) Therefore, from the highest

Buddha down to the lowest hell, (1a5) one perceives only what is magically generated by one's own discriminating mind. [On the other hand], if the [discriminating] mind does not arise, one cannot find even an atom of a dharma [on which to settle].⁶ (1b1)

I.2. Sitting in meditation.

A person who understands that this is so should give up other activities, sit alone in a place that is isolated and free from noise, (1b2) cross his legs, and keep his back straight, without sleeping morning or evening.⁷ (1b3)

I.3. No-mind.⁸

When he enters a state of deep contemplation, he looks into his own mind.⁹ There being no-mind,¹⁰ (1b4) he does not engage in thought. If thoughts of discrimination arise, he should become aware of them.

I.4. Practice of no-mind: no-examination.¹¹

How should one practice this awareness? (1b5) Whatever thoughts arise, one does not examine [to see]¹² whether they have arisen or not, whether they exist or not, (2a1) whether they are good or bad, afflicted or purified.¹³ He does not examine any dharma whatsoever.¹⁴ (2a2)

I.5. The "path of dharma."¹⁵

If he becomes aware in this way of the arising [of thoughts, he perceives] the absence of self-existence.¹⁶ This is (2a3) called "The Conduct of the Path of Dharma."

I.6. Erroneous meditation.¹⁷

If one fails to have this awareness of the arising of thoughts, or if the awareness is incorrect, one will act accordingly, (2a4) cultivate meditation in vain (or, cultivate an inexistent object!),¹⁸ and remain as a common man.

I.7. Conceptualizations.¹⁹

When a person who cultivates meditation for the first time looks into the mind, (2a5) there arise conceptualizations. To this one should apply the same principles as above.

I.8. Awareness.²⁰

After sitting [in this manner] for a long time, the mind will become tame, and one will realize that his awareness (2b1) is also discriminating mind. How does this occur? It is comparable to becoming blemished by bodily actions, (2b2) it is only on account of the blemish that one knows that one is blemished. In the same way, one has an awareness due to the blemish of the arising of thoughts. (2b3) It is on account of this [arising] that we know that we have an awareness.²¹

I.9. Awareness is to be abandoned too.

Awareness itself is without name or form, one cannot see the place whence it originally (2b4) came, nor can one discern whither it will finally go. The awareness and place where it occurs (2b5) cannot be obtained by any search.²² There is no way of reflecting on the inconceivable.²³ Not to cling even to this absence of thought is [the immediate access of] the Tathagatas.²⁴

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 2: Fragment II. Stein 709. "Response to Several Objections."

II.1. There are no means of approach to sudden enlightenment.²⁵

(4a1) Still, if someone is not fit to enter into contemplation without some means of approach,²⁶ how then should he produce the means of approach to contemplation?²⁷ (4a2) To abide in no-mind²⁸ by giving up all states of contemplation is in fact the only means of entering the contemplation of the Great Vehicle. (4a3)

II.2. The sudden path is not like the meditation of the non-Buddhist.

Still, there may be some who raise doubts as to whether there is here something of the contemplation of the outsiders.²⁹ (4a4) But all of the outsiders, because they adhere to the view of a real self,³⁰ confuse the permanent and the impermanent, (4a5) and fail to accept the fact that the three world-realms are only mind. As they rely on their own great teachers, (4b1) they hold views such as the rejection of causality, and they are grieved and terrified by their own preconceptions.³¹ They find joy in nothingness, so that they practice a contemplation which is nothing whatsoever. (4b2) In this way they create the view that there is no form. Therefore, even after spending many kalpas [practicing this type of contemplation], still there arises in them the idea that they have not reached nirvana, (4b3) so that they fall into hell like any common mortal and suffer greatly.³²

II.3. It is not like the meditation of the Auditors (śrāvakas).

(4b4) Still, there is also the suspicion that [non-conceptual practice] is like the contemplation of cessation of the auditors. Although the contemplation of the auditors has many forms, (4b5) in brief, it is based on [insight into] the absence of a self in the human person, the impermanence of all conditioned things, and...(lacuna).

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 3: Fragments III.1 and III.2. Pelliot 117, 812, 813: "Direct Access."

III.1. The "inconceivable."³³

(Pelliot 812) One who does not examine any state of contemplation, when he is also free from reflection (8a4), is established in the inconceivable.

III.2. Immediate access to contemplation.³⁴

(Pelliot 117) If one is able to practice it thusly, then it is called the direct access, the short-cut (5b2), the secret door, the door to the path of liberation.

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 4: Fragment IV. Pelliot 117, 812, 813: "The Five Means of Approach."

IV.0. The five means of approach.³⁵

(Pelliot 117) If one is not (5b3) able to practice it thusly, then there are five means of approach.³⁶ Which are these? They are the following:

IV.1. First approach.³⁷

(Pelliot 117) At the time of entering non-examination (5b4),³⁸ by direct awareness of the arising of deluded thoughts³⁹ one does not have assurance⁴⁰ of enlightenment.

IV.2. Second approach: the common man.

(Pelliot 117) If after becoming aware of the arising of deluded thoughts (5b5), one examines and pursues this awareness,⁴¹ one is still a common man.⁴²

IV.3. Third approach: cessation.⁴³

(a) Pelliot 117 version:

If one [becomes] aware of the arising of deluded thoughts (6b1) and, because one understands the disadvantages of this arising, one prevents (6b2) their arising by this awareness, this is cessation.

(b) Bsmi version:

If, by becoming aware of the arising of deluded thoughts and, having understood the disadvantages of this arising, one prevents [them from arising], this is the cessation of the auditors.

IV.4. Fourth approach: serenity and emptiness.⁴⁴

(Pelliot 117) If one becomes aware of the arising of deluded thoughts, and [perceives] no intrinsic

being [in them], this is called the unity of serenity (6b3), and [also] propensity toward emptiness.

IV.5. Fifth approach: the highest contemplation.

(Pelliot 117) If after becoming aware of the arising of deluded thoughts, (6b4) one no longer examines or pursues this awareness, and every instant of thought is free,⁴⁵ this is the highest contemplation.

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 4: Fragment V. Bsmi: "Summary of the Method."

V.0. Conclusion.⁴⁶

Therefore, one should not repress conceptualizations. Whenever they arise, if one does not contrive any [new thoughts],⁴⁷ but rather lets them go by, as one lets them go, though they may remain, they come to rest by themselves, (165.5) and one no longer pursues them.

The Gate of Immediate Access to Meditation

Part 5: Fragment VI. Stein 709: "Various aspects of the sudden path."

(Stein 709, second fragment)

VI.1. Non-duality applies to the antithesis of good and evil.

(7a1) (xxxx)⁴⁸ One should practice the six perfections as much as possible. At the time of sitting in contemplation, (7a2) if there is something like the propensity to discriminate even dualities such as

avarice against [the perfection of] generosity, one should abandon, by way of non-attention,⁴⁹ even the duality [of the opposition between] the practical aspect of the six perfections⁵⁰ and contemplation (7a3). It is like the sun, which is equally obscured by white and dark clouds (7a4).⁵¹

VI.2. Still, there are levels of perfection.⁵²

(a) The three kinds of perfections.

Fundamentally, there are three levels of perfection: the worldly, (7b5) the supramundane, and the supra-supramundane.⁵³

The supra-supramundane perfections are devoid of apperception⁵⁴ (7b1), devoid of examination.⁵⁵ A mind that is free from examination accomplishes the six perfections simultaneously in an instant.⁵⁶

Otherwise, if dualities are examined (7b2) and discriminated at the time of abiding in contemplation, one is overcome by feelings.⁵⁷

(b) The two kinds of perfection.

(7b2) There are two kinds of perfections: first, (7b3) there are the practical perfections, which are practiced as means. Secondly, there is the perfection of wisdom, which is the inner state in which thoughts no longer arise (7b4).⁵⁸

Therefore, even if one does not display the explicit conduct of the perfections of means (7b5), one can be effortlessly in possession of the perfection of wisdom.⁵⁹

VI.3. True seeing is no-seeing.

Still, there are some who will say that one should cultivate great learning and only thereafter

(8a1) enter contemplation.⁶⁰ Someone who is regarded as very learned may impress on his mind the non-arising of all dharmas (8a2). He may be called a man of great learning; but simply to study words and syllables is not true learning.

Why is this so? (8a3) One cannot see the Dharma by seeing, one cannot hear the Dharma by hearing, one cannot become aware of the Dharma by becoming aware, one cannot understand the Dharma by understanding (8a4). Therefore, those who seek by seeing, hearing, becoming aware, or understanding (8a5), though they seek, they are not really seeking the Dharma.⁶¹

VI.4. Response to another criticism.

(8a5) These [principles] are expressed by way of summary, but [our opponents] have reproached us for [practices that they claim can lead only to] doubt and lack of faith (8b1).⁶² They say that there are numberless living beings who are not equal to the task of the path, and that these beings cannot understand this [immediate] cutting through the doubts caused by one's own conceptual examination (8b2). In the end, in every way, they will lose their faith and fall prey to doubts. [We reply that] if you are deceived by your own conceptualizations, there is no true cultivation of the meditation of former Tathagatas (8b3). Therefore one should not mind⁶³ any of these [conceptual examinations], (8b4) but [simply] be aware [of them].

VI.5. A simile for the sudden approach.

(8b4) When one enters directly into the contemplation of the Tathāgatas, one is not overpowered in any of the [sense] bases by the mere arising of

thoughts (8b5).⁶⁴ If this is so, how much less is there cultivation of the unerring.⁶⁵

This may be compared (9a1) to the lion cub that even before it has opened its eyes brings terror to other animals, or to the young of the kalaviṅka bird who upon leaving their eggs (9a2) are able to fly like their mother.⁶⁶

The qualities of this contemplation cannot be easily compared with other things in this world (9a3). Its qualities are powerful and effective.

VI.6. Thinking is not mental cultivation.

(9a3) In this contemplation one ought to exert oneself in cultivating at all times faith in the Dharma of the Mahāyāna (9a4), and the conviction that all dharmas are mind only. If one expects to gain all its benefits without cultivating [these] (9a5), [one's efforts] will be fruitless--as one does not become wealthy by merely counting in the mind all the wealth of a rich man (9b1).

VI.7. The Dharmadhātu.

As for the means of the approach which consists in cultivating the [one] object of the Middle Way of the Great Vehicle, it is briefly stated:⁶⁷ From the point of view of relative truth (9b2) all dharmas, external or internal, are from the outset seen as illusions fashioned by one's own conceptual examination, or they are like magical productions, arisen by conditioned origination (9b3). Still, in an absolute sense, they are without any substantial reality. (9b4) Having no substantial reality, they do not arise; not arising, they do not cease. That which

neither arises nor ceases is the dharmadhātu. (9b5)
The dharmadhātu is the body of dharma.⁶⁸

VI.8. Effortless practice of non-examination.

(9b5) Therefore, since the inherent being of all dharmas is like this, one should by all means practice the cultivation (10a1) of non-examination. The discriminating mind itself no real substance,⁶⁹ it does not arise, it does not cease. With this very same body, which is the dharmadhātu, (10a3) one should not contrive [conceptualizations], rather, one should not pursue them, one should not oppose them. (10a4) It should be so that there is no artificial construction [of conceptualizations].⁷⁰

«Why is this? When the mind abides in them no more (10a5), it should then not be made not to abide. When the mind does not examine, it should then not be made not to examine. (10b1) To do so would be to contrive [further conceptualizations].»

VI.9. Scriptural evidence.⁷¹

(10b1) In the sutras too it is said:

Arising from dharmas without a self,
Buddhas achieve buddhahood (10b2).

They cultivate firmly the thought of
awakening,

Which cannot be apprehended by conceptual
examination.

(10b3) It is also said in the sutras:

Dharmas are a reflection in the mind.
The mind too cannot be apprehended.

(10b4) It arises not and ceases not--it is

beyond understanding,
Like serene empty space, free from
concepts.

VI.10. Perfection of Buddhahood.

Cultivating in this way (l0b5), he does not remain in samsāra like the outsiders. Possessed of means and wisdom, he is said to be free from impurity and the afflictions.⁷²

(11a1) He accumulates the double equipment of merit and knowledge and also perfects a variety of attainments for the benefit of himself and others (11a2). This is the body of merit. In the second level⁷³ he obtains the body of dharma, after which he enters supportless nirvāṇa, and (11a3) until the end of samsāra remains active for the sake of living beings.

Fragments from the Bsam-gtan mig-sgron

VII.1. Bsmi. 58.5.⁷⁴

According to the teachings⁷⁵ of Master Mahayana, when one is free from reflection on the nature of all dharmas, he is established in non-reflection and non-examination.

VII.2. Bsmi. 122.3-4 = Bka'-than, Tucci p. 74/91.⁷⁶

(Meditation Master) Mahāyāna says: "By correct vision one discerns (with the discernment of wisdom) the general (and the specific) characteristics of body and mind (--that is [what pertains to] the external and the internal, dharmas and self). One should understand that the specific characteristics are

impermanence and sorrow, the general characteristics are emptiness and no-self.

VII.3. Bsmi. 145.5-6 = I.2.⁷⁷

VII.4. Bsmi. 145.6-146.3 = I.3-5.

VII.5. Bsmi. 146.3-4 = II.1, only fol. 4a2.⁷⁸

VII.6. Bsmi. 146.4-5.⁷⁹

According to the sayings of Mahāyāna:

By relying on their masters, the outsiders fall prey to the view of a real self, thereby confusing the permanent and the impermanent, and assume that there is nothing to be done, thereby producing the idea of no-fruit.⁸⁰

The whole sphere of no-thought should be abandoned. How is this to be done? While not thinking and not examining, one abides not in non-examination.⁸¹

VII.7. Bsmi. 146.5-146.6.

Mahāyāna says:

For the mind to abide in bliss in this manner is for it to be free from⁸² examination.

VII.8. Bsmi. 146.6-147.2.

And in the same place:⁸³

The proper method of holding the mind firmly is to look into the mind and its objects and, seeing that [there is] not [a thing] to be found [in them], cultivate correctly the non-apprehension [of all things]. If one examines non-apprehension itself without attachment to [the mental representations] that

appear, [then] the person who examines in this way is skillful in means.⁸⁴

VII.9. Bsmi. 164.6-165.5 = IV (Pelliot 117 verso ff. 5.3-6.4; Pelliot 812 recto ff. 8.5-10.1; Pelliot 813 ff. 8a2-8b2).

VII.10. Bsmi. 165.5-166.1.

The same [master] states that⁸⁵ one should not fall into the extreme of the peace of srāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, which is attained by the practice of no apprehension and by visualizing an image of light.⁸⁶

However, he does not apprehend this knowledge, he does not fall into [the extreme of] the non-existence of conceptualizations. When these do not arise, he will not examine with an absence of examination that conceives of perfect clarity. He will not fall into the [extreme of] dying away by abstaining from thoughts, he does not apprehend even the non-apprehension of a substantial reality of dharmas.⁸⁷

VII.11. Bsmi. 166.1-166.3.

The same [master] states that,⁸⁸ if there are deluded thoughts when one is in a state of equanimity, and then one examines them,⁸⁹ one should understand them as lacking in any permanent intrinsic being. One should not pursue them by grasping at signs. If he sees a fault he should earnestly suppress it.⁹⁰ He is not to pursue awareness of arising. If one sets himself in apprehension by not abiding in self arising and self cessation, then one makes effort to bring about cessation.⁹¹ When there is dullness or excite-

ment, he only cultivates [then] the clear comprehension that there is no dullness in dullness.

VII.12. Bsmi. 177.3-5.

According to the [Discourse on] Contemplation of Mahāyāna,⁹² if one practices contemplation in this manner for an extended period of time, now and then there will appear many Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Now and then one will produce various higher states of consciousness--[such as] the five extraordinary faculties. Now and then, one will see great variety of marvels associated with [higher states of] concentration--such as the light of a great lotus. All of these are activities of conceptualization. At once, one should not conceive of any of these, or become attached to them.

Short Treatise on the Six and the Ten Perfections in Non-conceptual Practice

Fragment VII. Pelliot 116: 171b1-173b2 and Pelliot 117: 6b4-7b6

VIII.0. Title.¹⁰²

(171b1) Master Mahāyāna's Sayings Summarizing the Practice of the Six and the Ten Perfections in Non-conceptual Contemplation.

VIII.1. Generosity.

(171b2) When one enters non-examination, he brings to perfection great generosity, because he has renounced the three world realms.

VIII.2. Morality.

When one enters non-examination, (171b3) he brings to perfection great morality, because there is no arising of any faults in any of the three doors [of conduct].

VIII.3. Patience.

When one enters non-examination, (171b4) he brings to perfection great patient acceptance, because there is acceptance of the non-origination of concepts⁹³ in the mind.

VIII.4. Energy.

In non-examination, he brings to perfection great energy, (172b1) because there is no interruption [of effort], like a river that continues to flow.

VIII.5. Meditation.

(172b2) He brings to perfection great concentration,⁹⁴ because non-examination is concentration.

VIII.6. Wisdom.

(172b3) He brings to perfection great wisdom, because only non-examination is supramundane wisdom.

VIII.7. Skillful Means.

(172b4) He also brings to perfection great means, because non-examination is the only means to reach the highest condition.⁹⁵

VIII.8. Powers.

When one enters non-examination, he brings to perfection great powers, because he is able to overpower the three world spheres.

VIII.9. Vows.

(173b1) He brings to perfection the great vows, because non-examination is the only vow, the vow to enter the Tathāgata's vows.

VIII.10. Knowledge.⁹⁶

(173b2) He brings to perfection great knowledge, because only the non-conceptual is the sphere of the Tathāgata ['s knowledge].

The Essentials of Contemplation

Fragment IX. Pelliot 812: 6a2-8a2, Stein 706: b1-b5, and Stein 709:42b.

IX.0. Title.

(812: 6a1) Master Mahāyāna's Essentials of Contemplation (6a2) state that:⁹⁷

IX.1. The Nature of Immediate Access.

Although there are many texts on meditation in the Great Vehicle, (6a3) the highest of all methods taught (6a4) is that of the immediate access to the Middle Way. (6a5) In immediate access there are no means of approach. One meditates [directly] (7a1) on the true nature of dharmas.

In this connection, "dharma" (7a2) means the mind, and the mind is without origination. What has no origination (7a3) is empty, like space. This emptiness is called "direct awareness," (7a4) because it is not the object of the six senses. (7a5)

By practicing direct awareness, direct awareness itself ceases. (8a1) Therefore, one should not dwell in the wisdom of study and reflection, (8a2) but

rather meditate directly on the sameness of all dharmas.

IX.2. Non-dwelling.⁹⁸

(706: 8b4) A Great Being,⁹⁹ when he cultivates this mind as non-production, (8b5) cultivates non-dwelling in any sign whatsoever. Being aware of this non-dwelling, he does not examine his non-dwelling in any way....

The Meaning of the Practice of Non-examination¹⁰⁰

Fragment X. Pelliot 21 recto.

X.1. Neither accepting, nor rejecting thoughts.

It is not a matter of whether one should accept or reject all dharmas or anything else, rather it is a matter of not giving rise to concepts of acceptance or rejection. If one has understood this and turns the six gates [of the senses] to an approach to the cultivation of contemplation and looks into the mind,¹⁰¹ then whenever a single false concept arises, he [again] feels inclined to produce karma that will lead to transmigration.¹⁰²

X.2. Non-duality in practice.¹⁰³

If concepts arise, then one [should] not think¹⁰⁴ anywhere of being or non-being, purity or impurity, emptiness or the absence thereof, etc. One does not think of non-thinking either. Not to experience this non-examination and to continue to act according to these thoughts is transmigration.

X.3. Liberation in every moment of thought.¹⁰⁵

But if one were to experience non-examination and does not act according to these concepts, or accept them, or become attached to them, then every instant of mind is liberated at each moment. By cultivating the mind in this way, one awakens¹⁰⁶ perfectly as soon as one is free from all false concepts and all past habitual tendencies.

X.4. Colophon.

Thus concludes "The Meaning of Non-examination."

Parallels to the Cheng-li chüeh

Fragment XI. Pelliot 823 recto.

XI.1. Quotation from the Lankāvatāra.

fol. 1.1 = Pelliot 4646, 133b5-134a1 = Concile 75-6.

(1.1) Therefore, according to the Lankavatara, all dharmas have no self-nature, yet they are all perceived on account of false conceptualizations.¹⁰⁷

XI.2. The defects of conceptual thought.

fol. 1.2-3 = Pelliot 4646, 134b3-5 = Concile 77

(1.2) Question: What is so wrong with conceptual thought?

Reply: The problem with it is that it carries omniscience¹⁰⁸ away from all living beings, and obscures it. (1.3) It is also a problem in many other ways, such as being the cause for rebirth in the three evil destinies, and for prolonged transmigration. The

Vajracchedika also says: "Abandon conceptual thought."¹⁰⁹

XI.3. Looking into the mind.

fol. 1.4-2.2 = Pelliot 4646, 135a2-4 = Concile 78-80.

(1.4) Question: What sort of activity is this "looking into the mind"?

Reply: It is to turn back the six sense doors and then look into the mind. If concepts stir, one does not consider whether they exist or not, whether they are pure (2.1) or not, whether they are empty or not, etc., and one does not consider even one's state of non-examination and non-consideration. In the Vimalakīrti it is (2.2) also said: "Non-examination is awakening."

XI.4. The means for removing conceptual thought.

fol. 2.2-4 = Pelliot 4646, 135b3-5 = Concile 82.

Question: If one removes conceptualization and the habitual tendencies, by what sort of means does one do so?

Reply: If one is aware of false conceptualizations when they arise, (2.3) being aware of birth and death, one does not carry out actions in agreement with these conceptualizations, one does not abandon them, nor does one remain attached to them. The mind is free at every instant of thought. In the Vajracchedikā, the Mahāratnakūṭa, (2.4) and other sutras it is said: "If one has no apprehension of even the minutest dharma, that is the unsurpassable awakening."

XI.5. The need to practice the perfections.

fol. 2.4-3.3 = Pelliot 4646, 136b2-5 = Concile

85.

Question: Is it or is it not necessary to practice other dharma-gates (3.1) such as the six perfections?

Reply: From the point of view of covering all of the six perfections, they are said to be means for the sake of teaching the ultimate truth, (3.2) and one should practice them in every way possible. [On the other hand], from the point of view of the ultimate truth, the true meaning is regarded as being beyond speech and thought. Therefore, one can neither say (3.3) that one should nor that one should not practice any other dharma-gates such as the six perfections; how much less can one speak about not practicing them. This has been explained in detail in the sutras.

XI.6. The two types of perfection.

fol. 3.3-4.3 = Pelliot 4646, 137b1-4 = Concile

87-88.

Question: If one engages in [the practice of] the six perfections and the like, how is he to practice these means?

(3.4) Reply: Even as one is engaged in the practice of the six perfections, there are two, the internal and the external. By the internal, one liberates himself. By the external one benefits living beings. (4.1) As to these means [which are] the practice [of the perfections], in the Perfection of Wisdom, the Laṅkāvatāra, and the Viśeṣacintā, it is said that if one does not examine or consider any dharma at all in the practice of the six perfections

(4.2) and other [virtues], then the triple sphere¹¹⁰ is purified, and one acts without thinking or appropriating anything, regarding [all dharmas] as a mirage. (4.3)

XI.7. Liberation.

fol. 4.3-5.1 = Pelliot 4646, 138a5-138b1 = Concile 89.

Question: If one practices this dharma-gate, how does one obtain liberation by means of it?

Reply: According to the Laṅkāvatāra and the Vajracchedikā, (4.4) if one abandons all conceptualizations, one is a Buddha.¹¹¹ When one cultivates like this, according to the sharpness or dullness of one's faculties, all false conceptualizations and habitual tendencies (5.1) are abandoned, and one obtains liberation.

XI.8. The perfection of wisdom and its merit.

fol. 5.1-8.2 = Pelliot 4646, 138b1-139a6 = Concile 93-98.

(a) Incalculable merit of the perfection of wisdom.

Question: By practicing the gist¹¹² of this dharma, is any merit gained?

Reply: The merit of non-examination and non-consideration, (5.2) cannot be counted by judgments resulting from consideration or examination, one should regard them as no different than the thought of a Buddha.¹¹³ If one should speak of only a fragment of this....¹¹⁴ Also, according to the Perfection of Wisdom, (5.3) all living beings, gods and men, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, if they transfer (their merit) to the attainment of unsurpassable awakening,

their merit is not worth a fraction of the merit of listening to and believing in the (5.4) gist of the Perfection of Wisdom. Why is this so? Men, gods, śrāvakas, (6.1) private buddhas, and unsurpassable awakening all arise from the perfection of wisdom, but the perfection of wisdom does not arise from awakening or from any human being, (6.2) no matter how many.

(b) Definition of the perfection of wisdom.

Now, what is this perfection of wisdom? Absence of signs, (6.3) non-apprehension, not abandoning, and not seeking, this is called the perfection of wisdom.

(c) Its merits again: two scriptural references.

According to the Tathāgatācintyaḡaṇāvātāra Sūtra, (6.4) if someone would worship as many Tathagatas as there are atoms in three thousand great chilocosms for an incalculable kalpa with offerings and prayers, purifying for (7.1) these Buddhas, after their nirvāṇa, three thousand great chilocosms of stūpas adorned with the seven kinds of precious things, (7.2) and if they did this for an incalculable kalpa, the merit of cutting all doubts with regard to the dharma of no-thinking¹¹⁵ (7.3) would be an incalculable thousand times more.

Also, according to the Vajracchedikā, if someone fills three thousand great chilocosms with the seven precious things (7.4) and offers them, and gives up his own body for as many times as there are sand in the Ganges, someone who keeps four lines [of this sūtra] has even more merit, (8.1) it cannot be compared. Similar expressions occur, in full detail, in all the Mahāyāna Sūtras, stating how it is impossible for anyone but a Buddha to have this merit.¹¹⁶ (8.2)

XI.9. Non-examination and omniscience.

fol. 8.2-9.1 = Pelliot 4646, 140a2-5 = Concile
94-96.

Question: How can (8.3) omniscience be obtained by abandoning conceptualizations and practicing non-consideration and non-examination?

Reply: If false thoughts do not stir, and all conceptualizations have been abandoned, the knowledge that arises from the true self-nature appears by itself all at once. (8.4) In sutras such as the Gāṇḍavyūha and the Laṅkāvatāra it is said that it is like the sun appearing from behind the clouds, (9.1) turbid water becoming clear, a mirror wiped clean, or silver separated from its ore.¹¹⁷

XI.10. Benefiting living beings.

fol. 9.1-4 = Pelliot 4646, 140b5-6 = Concile
97-99.

Question: How is it possible to benefit living beings with non-conceptual knowledge? (9.2)

Reply: How one can act for the sake of living beings when one is free from reflection and examination has also been explained in full detail in the (9.3) Tathāgatācintyaḡaṇāvātāra. It is said that it is like the sun or the moon shining everywhere, or the wish-fulfilling jewel (9.4) that grants everything, or the vast earth from which everything is born.

XI.11. The three forms of grasping.

fol. 9.4-10.2 = Pelliot 4646, 141a1-2 = Concile
100.

Question: In your teaching you speak of grasping at objects, grasping at consciousness, (10.1) and

grasping at what is in between. What is the basis¹¹⁸ for such talk?

Reply: This is said on the basis of the fundamental meaning¹¹⁹ of the Mahāyāna (10.2) which is the unthinkable¹²⁰ Perfection of Wisdom, so that there is no grasping, even at one single thing, [how can you speak of three, then?] any form, not even one. This is explained in detail in the Perfection of Wisdom.

XI.12. The message of the sutras.

fol. 10.2-11.1 = Pelliot 142a1-3 = Concile 107.

Question: If this is the fundamental meaning of your doctrine, (10.3) how can you say that this is explained in full detail by the sutras?

Reply: Indeed this is all that the sūtras speak about. They only speak of the false conceptualizations of living beings. (10.4) If one abandons all conceptualization, there is no dharma about which one could speak. Therefore, it is also said in the Laṅkāvatāra that all the sūtras speak about the conceptualizations of living beings (11.1) and that there is nothing in a single sutra about the absolute truth.

XI.13. The Buddha's freedom from conceptualization.¹²¹

fol. 11.1-4 and lacuna; no equivalent in Pelliot 4646.

Question: How can a Buddha speak of the conceptualizations of living beings?

Reply: A Buddha's (11.2) omniscience, and the range [of his knowledge] are inconceivable, never to be understood by understanding. It cannot be grasped

by any form of human understanding, and cannot be understood by [human] wisdom. (11.3) Thus, it is not to be measured by examining what should be done or pondered. According to the Mahāyāna sūtras, (11.4) if one abandons all conceptualizations, he is a Buddha. Therefore, by turning to look into the mind, one abandons all conceptualizations and habitual tendencies. Why is it that you ask for the meaning [of this]....

Miscellaneous Fragments

Fragments XII.1. (Pelliot 167.4) and XII.2 (Pelliot 116:186.4-187.2).

XII.1. Non-examination.¹²²

According to the teachings of Master Māhāyana, when one is free from reflection on the nature of dharmas, he is established in non-reflection and non-examination.

XII.2. Identity of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa.

In the texts on meditation of Master Mahāyāna¹²³ it is said: Since birth and death, and nirvāṇa are not two [separate realities], there is no meeting or having to part, nothing pleasurable or unpleasant. Why? The identity of samsāra and nirvāṇa is [true] nirvāṇa.

APPENDIX III

Glossary

This glossary is meant as an aid to understanding the texts translated above, and the approach used in that translation. In addition to the materials presented below, I have relied heavily on the glossaries published by Ueyama Daishun as part of his "Chibetto-yaku Tongo shinshū yōketsu no kenkyū," Zenbunka Kenkyū Kiyō VIII (1976) 33-103.

The following list of Tibetan terms with Chinese equivalents is based exclusively on those fragments for which there are close Chinese parallels or equivalents, namely, part of Pelliot 21 (references indicated by the arabic numeral 21 followed by folio and line number) and Pelliot 823 (folio and line numbers alone). The Tibetan reference is followed by folio number in the Cheng-li-chüeh. Cross references to the translation and the notes appended to this article are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.

kun rdzob ltar (3.1; 136b / XI.5): 如世諦 (法)

bkañ (7.4; 139a): 滿

bkod pa: see thug pa

skye śi (21:2, 21:5; 135b): 生死

skye śi tshor te (2.3; 135b): 生死變意 (reading 若 for 名 at the beginning of the phrase)

bskal pa (6.4; 139a): 却

'khor ba (1.2-3, 2.2-4; 134b, 135b): 生死·輪

'khor ba'i rgyur gyurd pa (1.3; 134b): 輪迴故有

'khor sum (4.2; 137b): 三業

- gañ ga (7.4; 139a): 恒河
- grañs myed pa (6.4; 139a): 无量
- grañs su smos pa (6.1-2; 138b): ?
- grol thar (2.3, 21.5; 135b): 解脱
- grol thar pa (4.3; 138a):
 ---see also s.v. thañ re
- dgoñs: see ma dgoñs
- dgos (3.1, 7.2; 136b, ??): 要
 ---see myi dgos
- bgrañ źiñ (5.4; 138b): 數
- sgo:
 ---chos kyi sgo (3.1; 136b): 法門
 ---sgo drug bzlog ste (1.4, 21.2; 135a // X.1, cf.
sems la bltas in I.3): 返照心原
- brgyan pa:
 ---bzañ du brgyan pa (7.1; 139a): 莊嚴
 bsgoms (4.4, 21.5-6; 138b): 修習
- nañ soñ gsum (1.3; 134b // XI.2): 三惡道
- cha śas (5.2): ?
- chags pa myed pa (6.3; 138b): 无著
 ---see also ma chags
- chad myi gzuñ (5.2; 138b) 不可測量
- chu rñog (9.1; 140a): 蜀水
- chu bo (7.4; 139a): 河沙
- chuñ zad (kyañ) (2.4; 135b): 少
- chos (2.4; 135b): 法
 ---chos kyi sgo: see sgo
 ---chos kyi gźuñ: see gźuñ
- mchod (6.4; 139a): 供養
- mchod rten (7.1; 139a): 塔
- 'jug pa (9.2; 140b): 入

nañ thos (passim): 聲聞
 ñes pa (1.2; 135a): 過
 mñan pa (7.2; 139a): 聞
 sñed (7.4; 139a): 數

gtogs: see ma gtogs

gtoñ: see myi gtoñ ba

btañ ba:

---yoñ su btañ ba (7.4; 139a): 布施

---see myi gtoñ ba

rtog: see brtags pa, ma brtags, myi rtog, and myi brtag

---rnam par rtog pa ('i sems): seems to stand for 妄
 想分別 as in I.1 and 134a, but the term is not
 found in our two fragments

lta ba:

---see myi rtog

---ltos síg (5.2; 138b): 應 --- 見

---bltas pa: see sems la (b)lta(s) (pa)

stañ zil:

---stañ zil las dnul (9.1; 140a): 銀離鎔

stoñ (6.4; 139a): 千

stoñ ba

---stoñ pa dañ myi stoñ pa (2.1, 21:4; 135a): 空不空

brtag:

---brtags pa (5.2; 138b): 觀照

---see also ma brtags and myi brtag

bstan pa (3.2; 136b): 顯

thag: see ma thag tu

thañ re:

---sems thañ re yañ grol thar re re (2.3, 21:5; 135b

// Cf. X.2-3; XI.4 and Cheng-li chüeh 147b,

- Concile p. 125, n. 6, 158, n. 7; Demiéville 1961,
p. 22): 念念即是解脫般若
thabs (2.2, 3.1; 135b, 136b): 方便 (Cf. II.1, IV,
n. 12 to article, n. 26, 67, 84 to translation)
---thabs ji ltar (3.3; 137b): 如何修行
---spyad pa'i thabs (4.1; 137b): 修行方便
thams cad (passim): 一切
---thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes (1.2; 135a): 本來一切智
(8.2-3; 140a): 一切種智
thar(d) (3.4; 137b):
---see: grol thar(d)
thug pa:
---thug pa bar du bkod pa ba (5.3; 138b): 盡證
thob (4.3; 138a // cf. I.1): 得
---(7.4; 139a): read thos: 解
---thob pa myed (2.4; 135b): 不得
thos (5.4; 138b): 解 (also 7.4; 139a where thob
should be read thos)

dag pa (9.1; 140a): 淨
de bzin du (21.5; 138b): 如是
dogs (7.2) read dgos
don:
---don dam par (3.1-2; 136b): (如)勝義
---sems can gyi don...mdzad (9.1-2; 140b): 利益 ---
bdag:
---bdag gi sems la bltas: see sems la bltas
---bdag thard (3.4; 137b): 自度
bden:
---bden pa: see myi bden pa and yañ dag pa'i bden pa
'das pa (3.2; 136b): 離
'du śes (1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 4.4, 8.2-3; ??, 134b, 135b,
138a, 140a): 想·妄想
---'du śes g-yos na (1.4; 135a): 想若動

---'du śes b'zin (21:5; 135b): 隨妄想

---'du śes b'zin du ma spyad (2.3; 135b): 不隨妄想作業

---see also myi bden ba'i--

'dra źiñ (4.2; 137b): 如

rdul sñed (6.4; 139a): 微塵

rnam par rtog pa: see note under rtog

rnam par śes pa:

---rnam par śes pa 'dzin (9.4; 141a): 執識

rno rtul (4.4; 138a // cf. Sba-b'zed: rnon po and
stul ba): 利鈍

dpe:

---dpe dañ chad myed (8.1; 139a): 不可比喻

span:

---spanś te (8.2; 140a): 離

---spon (1.3; 134b): 離

spyad (3.3; 137b // I.1): 修行 (2.3; 135b): 作
(5.1; 138b): 行 (21.5; 135b): 作業

---spyad pa'i thabs (4.1; 137b): 修行方便

---spyod (4.3; 138a): 修

---spyod pa na (4.2; 137b): ?

---see also ma spyad

pha rol du (tu) phyin(d) pa (passim): 波羅蜜

phan gdags:

---sems can la phan gdags (3.4; 137b): 利益

phyan pa (6.2): read phyin pa

phyi dañ nañ gi (3.4; 137b): 內外

bag chags (2.2, 4.4, 21:6; 135b, 138b // I.1): 習氣

bag tshags (4.4): read bag chags

byañ chub (6.1; 138b): 菩薩 (passim): 菩提

---bla na myed pa'i byañ chub la thug pa (5.3; 138b):

證无上菩提

byas pa (7.2; 139a): ??

byuñ (6.2; 138b): 出

---see myi byuñ

bye ma sñed (7.4; 139a): 沙數

bral (21:6; 138b): 互歇

bral na (4.4; 138a): 離住

bla na myed pa'i byañ chub (passim): 无上菩提 see

also byan chub

blañ(s): see ma blans

dbañ po (4.4; 138a): 根性

dbu ma 'dzin pa (10.1; 141a): 執中

sbyañ (2.2; 135b): 降

sbyin:

---sbyin ba byin pa (7.4; 139a): 用布施

ma:

---ma dgoñs (9.2; 140b): 不思

---ma chags (2.3, 21:5; 135b): 不住

---ma gtogs par (8.2; 139a): 除

---ma brtags (9.2; 140b): 不觀

---ma thag tu (5.1; 138b): 歇即

---ma spyad (2.3; 135b): 不...作 (21:5; 135b): 不作業

---ma blañs (2.3, 21:5; 135b): 不取

---ma tshags (2.3): read ma chags

---ma tshor (21:4; 135b): 不覺

---ma g-yos (8.3; 140a): 不起

---ma bslabs (2.3; 135b): read ma blañs

mya ñan las 'das (6.4, 7.1; 139a): 滅度

mya lstsogs (6.1; 138b)--read "myi la stsogs"?: ??

myi (passim): 人

myi:

---myi dgos (3.1-2; 136b): 不要

- myi gtoñ ba (6.3; 138b): 无捨
 ---myi rtog (1.4; 135a): 不觀
 ---myi rtog pa (2.2; 135a): 不觀
 ---myi rtog pa'i ye śes (9.1; 140b): 若 (read 不
 觀智)
 ---myi rtog myi sems (4.2; 137b): 无思 无觀
 ---myi rtog myi bsam pa (5.1; 138b): 无觀 无想
 ---myi brtag (21:4; 135a): 不觀
 ---myi bden pa'i 'du śes (1.1, 2.2, 4.4, 10.3, 21:2,
 21:6; 134a, 135b, 138b, 142a, 135a, 138b): 妄想

 ---myi bden ba'i sems (8.3; 140a): 妄心
 ---myi 'byuñ ño (8.2; 139a): 无有
 ---myi lañ bar che'o (5.4; 138b): 不能
 ---myi len pa (4.2, 6.3; 137b, 138b): 不取 · 无取
 ---myi sems (4.2; 137b): no Chinese equivalent
 ---myi sems myi rtog pa (8.2; 140a): 不思 不觀
 ---myi bsam (1.4, 21:4; 135a): 不思
 ---myi bsam bar yañ myi bsam (1.4, 21:4; 135a): 不思者
 亦不思
 mye loñ:
 ---mye loñ dag pa (9.1; 140a): 鏡得明淨
 smos su yañ myed (3.3; 136b): 不可說言
 smyug rgyu ba (4.2; 137b): 陽炎
 smra:
 ---smra bsam las 'das pa (3.2; 136b): 離言說

 gtsañ:
 ---gtsañ ba dañ myi gtsañ ba dañ (2.1, 21:3; 135a):
 淨不淨
 tsam śe:
 ---tsam śe dag byas te (7.2; 139a): ?
 brtsir:
 ---brtsir myi lañ bar che'o (5.4; 138b): 數所不能

stsog:

---(Imaeda, following mss., reads lstsogs for la
stsogs) passim

---cf. also tshog

tshags: read chags

tshig:

---tshig gi nañ na myed (11.1; 142a): 不名 (read 不
在) 言說之中

tshigs:

---tshigs bñi pa'i le'u (7.4; 139a): 四句偈

tshog (4.2; 137b): 一切

---(Imaeda's so tshog is the mss.' so chog, and should
read so cog, stshog, or stsog) chos stshog la
(1.1; 134a): 諸法 (Cf. X.1)

tshor (I.1, Concile pp. 125, 158 and notes; Demiéville
1961, p. 22)

---tshor na (2.3, 21.5; 135b): 不覺 (correct 不 to
若)

---see also ma tshor

mtshan ma:

---mtshan ma myed pa (6.2; 138b): 无想 (read 相?)

'dzim pa (9.4; 141a): 執

gñan:

---gñan su las kyañ myi 'byuñ (8.2; 139a): 无有...者

gñuñ (3.2; 136b): ?? (10.2; 141a): 義

---chos kyi gñuñ (5.1, 7.2; 138b, 139a): 法義

---gñuñ ltar na (3.2; 136b): ?? 如

---gñun thos (5.4; 138b): 聞 --- 義

gñun (10.1; 141a): 宗 (7.2; 139a): 義

bñin (21.4-5; 135b): 隨

---bzin du spyad na: see 'du śes--and bsam--

gzun

---gzun du myed (10.2; 141a): 不立

bzan:

---bzan du brgyan pa: see brgyan

bzlogs:

---sgo drug bzolgs (pa): see sgo

'og du (7.1; 139a): 後

yañ dag pa:

---yañ dag pa'i bden ba (11.1; 142a): 真如

---yan dag pa'i rañ bzin ye nas (8.3; 140a): 真性本

yd:

---yd ches pa (5.4; 138b): 敬信

yun:

---yun riñ por (1.3; 134b): 久遠

yul:

---yul 'dzin (9.4; 141a): 執境

ye śes (8.3-4; 140a): 一切種智

yoñs su:

---yoñs su dag pa (4.2; 137b): 清淨

yod:

---yod pa dañ myed pa dañ (1.4, 21.3; 135a): 有無

yon tan (6.3, 9.2; 139a, 140b): 功德

yon gsol (6.4; 139a): ???

g-yos (2.2; 135b): 起

---cf. 133b5: 想者心念起動

---g-yos te tshor na (2.2-3; 135b): 起若覺

---g-yos na (1.4, 21.3; 135a): 若動

---see also 'du śes g-yos na and ma g-yos

rañ bzin (8.3; 140a): 4生

---rañ bzin myed (1.1; 134a): 無自性

---see yañ dag pa'i rañ bzin

rañ sañs rgyas (passim): 緣覺

rin po che (7.1; 139a): 寶

la la žig (6.4; 139a): 或有

lañ:

---see myi lañ

len: see myi len pa

lus (7.4; 139a): 身

sañs rgyas (passim): 佛

sems (2.3; 135b): 心 (but sems can also stand for
念 and 思.)

---see rnam par rtog pa'i sems, myi rtog myi sems,
myi bden ba'i sems, myi sems and myi bsam(s)

---sems thañ re yañ....: see thañ re

---sems la blta(s) (Cf. I.7, notes 43, 58 to article,
9, 101 to translation; also, Concile pp. 43,
51-2, 78, 125, and 125 n.6; 158, Demiéville 1961,
pp. 26-7):

---sems la blta ste (1.4, 21.2; 135a): 看心

sems can (3.4, 9.1-2; 137b, 140b): 眾生

bsam:

---see also ma bsam, myi rtog myi bsam (pa), and
myi bsam

---bsam gyis myi khyab par (6.3, 9.2-3; ??, 140b): no
Chinese equivalent

---bsam du myed pa (10.1; 141a): 无思 (7.2; 139a):
no Chinese equivalent, see n. 115 to translation

---bsam ba (5.2; 138b): 思

---bsam bzin du spyad na (21.4-5; 135b): 隨思·作業

bsod nams (5.1, 7.2, 7.4, 8.2; 138b, 139a): 功德·福德

bslabs: see ma bslabs

lhun:

---lhun kyi(s) 'byuñ ba (8.4; 140a): 自然顯現

NOTES

1. This paper was not presented at the conference that gave rise to the present volume. A less developed version was read at the first meeting of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University in September of 1978.

It would take too much space to express my appreciation for the support and assistance that I have received since then from various friends and colleagues, but I do want to mention J. Broughton, G. Houston, Mimaki Katsumi, G. Schopen, and Tokiwa Gishin for several bibliographic references or copies of essential articles. I also wish to express my gratitude and admiration for those indefatigable Japanese scholars who have opened this field for modern research, especially to the following, who kindly have provided me with off-prints of some of their articles: Prof. Ueyama Daishun of Ryūkoku University, Prof. Okimoto Katsumi of Hanazono College, and Prof. Obata Hironobu of Ryūkoku University.

2. Eugene Obermiller, History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung) by Buston, 2 vols., Heidelberg, 1931-32, Part II (1932) pp. 191-196. Eugene Obermiller, "A Sanskrit Ms. from Tibet--Kamalaśīla's Bhāvanā-krama," (Journal of the Greater India Society, II.1 (1935) pp. 1-11). However, the Third Bhāvanākrama could not have been Bu-ston's only source; he is evidently indebted to sources similar to those of the Sba bzed, or he must have known at least some of the pericopes from the work of Mo-ho-yen; see below, notes 5, 6 and 50.

3. Paul Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa: une controverse sur le quietisme entre bouddhistes de l'Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l'ère chrétienne, Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, VII; Paris: Imprimerie Nationale de France, 1952. No critical edition exists, as Demiéville's work contains the Chinese text only in the form of a photographic copy of the Tun-huang manuscript. However, his extensive and erudite commentary and scholarly apparatus serve the purposes of an edition. Demiéville analyzes another Chinese fragment of this text (Stein 2672) in "Deux documents de

Touen-houang sur le Dhyāna chinois," Essays on the History of Buddhism Presented to Professor Zenryū Tsukamoto, Kyoto, 1961, pp. 1-27; reprinted in Choix d'études bouddhiques par Paul Demiéville, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973, pp. 320-346.

A Tibetan fragment from Tun-huang, Pelliot 823, contains twelve pericopes that correspond exactly to as many passages from Pc. 4646. This fragment has been edited and analyzed by Imaeda Yoshiro, in "Documents tibétains de Touen-houang concernant le Concile de Tibet," Journal Asiatique, CCLXIII.1-2 (1975) 125-146.

The field of the history of Ch'an in Tibet has expanded rapidly since the publication of Demiéville's Concile. I shall not attempt to outline here the bibliography on this subject. The reader will find an almost exhaustive discussion by consulting the following: (a) Paul Demiéville, "L'introduction au Tibet du bouddhisme sinisé d'après les manuscrits de Touen-houang (Analyse de récents travaux japonais)," in M. Soynié, ed., Contributions aux études sur Touen-houang--Centre de Recherches d'Histoire et de Philologie de la IVe Section de l'École pratique des Hautes Études, II. Hautes Etudes Orientales, 10--Genève-Paris: Librairie Droz, 1979, pp. 1-16, (b) Ueyama Daishun, "The Study of Tibetan Manuscripts Recovered from Tun-huang: A Review of the Field and its Prospects," in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, ed. Lewis Lancaster and Whalen Lai, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, No. 4, forthcoming, and (c) L. O. Gómez, "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment," in the same volume.

4. See my "Indian Materials on the Doctrine of Sudden Enlightenment." Six years have now elapsed since I wrote that paper, and my views have changed significantly since then. I am less sanguine than I was on the main thesis of that paper, though I would still defend it in a less strong formulation. I also feel now that the correspondences between the Cheng-li chüeh and the works of Kamalaśīla are greater than I suggested at that time, and merit a closer scrutiny.

5. Compare the English translation in Obermiller, History, II, p. 193. My translation is from The Collected Works of Bu-ston, ed. Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971, Part 24 (Ya), fol. 888.3. This passage corresponds to the second of the two opponent's theses presented in the polemical section of Kamalaśīla's Third Bhāvanākrama (Sanskrit text, ed. by G. Tucci, in

Minor Buddhist Texts. Part III: Third Bhāvanākrama, Serie Orientale Roma, XLIII; Rome: IsMEO, 1971; henceforth IIIbHk), pp. 20-29. The passage in IIIbHk has not been identified or marked properly by Obermiller and Tucci. The same issues, though less obviously marked, occur in several works of Kamalaśīla, including, of course, the First and Second Bhāvanākramas--see, L. O. Gómez, op. cit., especially notes 10-11 and 24, also "Último tratado del cultivo graduado," VIII.23 (1972) 85-137, and "Primer tratado del cultivo graduado (Parte I)," Diálogos, XI.29-30 (1977) 177-224, and Parte II, forthcoming Diálogos, XVII (1983).

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this summary of Mo-ho-yen's views is derived from the IIIbHk. Here Bu-ston is evidently working on the basis of a source very close to the extant version of the Sba bzed. This and the following summary of Mo-ho-yen's main doctrinal theses find close parallels in the Sba bzed (R. A. Stein, Une chronique ancienne de bSam-yas: sBa bzed, Publications de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Textes et Documents, 1, Paris, 1961, ff. 57.16-58.7). Bu-ston's version seems more rational than the rather confused passage of the Sba-bzed, and may reflect an attempt to adapt the traditional account of Mo-ho-yen's position to the structure of the arguments in the IIIbHk.

This and the following of Bu-ston's summaries of Mo-ho-yen's main doctrinal theses are extracted from the Sba bzed (R. A. Stein, Une chronique ancienne de bSam-yas: sBa bzed, Paris, 1961, ff. 57.16-58.7). It may be useful to quote and translate the passage in full (numbers identify the two topics into which Bu-ston has divided the rather confused passage of the Sba bzed):

thams cad sems kyis rnam par rtogs pas bskyed pa
/ dga' mi dga'i dbaṅ gis /
(1a)--las dge mi dges mtho ris daṅ naṅ soṅ gi
'bras bu myoṅ ziṅ 'khor ba na 'khor te-- /
(2a)--gaṅ žig ci la 'aṅ mi sems ci yaṅ yid la mi
byed pa de 'khor ba las yons su thar bar 'gyur ro / de
lta bas na ci yaṅ mi bsam mo-- / sbyin pa la sogs pa'i
chos bcu spyod pa ni / skye bo dge ba'i 'phro med pa
blo žan pa dbaṅ po stul ba rnams bstan pa yin / snon
blo sbyans pa (rnon po) dbaṅ po dag la /
(1b)--sprin dkar nag gan gis ni ma sgrib pa ltar
dge sdig gñis kaṣ sgrib pas-- /
(2b)--ci yaṅ mi sems mi rtog / mi spyod pa ni mi
dmigs pa'o // gcig car 'jug pa ni sa bcu pa dan
'dra'o--gsuns....

"Everything is constructed by the conceptualization mind. Through the power of [our idea of] the pleasant and the unpleasant, (1a) there is karma, good and bad. One experiences its fruit in the heavens and the evil destinies, and one wanders in transmigration. (2a) Whoever does not reflect, whoever does not fix the mind on anything, will be completely liberated from transmigration. Therefore, do not reflect on anything.

"As to the practice of the ten [good] dharmas--generosity and the rest--it has been preached for those persons who are of inconstant virtue, weak minds, and dull faculties. For those who already have purified their minds and have acute faculties, (1b) sin and virtue alike veil [the mind], just as clouds, whether they are white or dark, veil the sun. (2b) Consequently, they do not reflect on or examine anything, they do not practice anything, and do not apprehend anything. [This] immediate access is equal to the tenth stage (bhūmi)."

6. Op. cit., fol. 888.3-4, corresponding to IIIBhK pp. 13-20; see n. 5 supra.

7. Ueyama Daishun, "Donkō to Tonkō bukkyōgaku," Tōhōgaku, XXXV (1964), 141-214, and W. Pachow, "A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahayana Buddhism," The Chinese Culture, XX.1 (Taipei, 1979)--unfortunately I possess what appears to be a reprint (no place or date) of this study, and the pagination is not that of the journal article.

8. Analysis of Pelliot 116 in Okimoto Katsumi, "bSam-yas no shūron (1)--Pelliot 116 ni tsuite," Nihon Chibetto Gakkai Kaihō, 21 (1975) 5-8, following Ueyama Daishun, "Tonkō shūtsudo chibettobun zen shiryō no kenkyū--P. tib. 116 to sono mondaiten," Bukkyō Bungaku Kenkyūjo Kiyō, 13 (1974) 1-11. Analysis of its connection to the Cig-car of Vimalamitra, by Harada Satoru, "bSam-yas no shūron igo ni okeru ton-mon-pa no ronsho," Nihon Chibetto Gakkai Kaihō, 22 (1976) 8-10.

The Cig-car is found in the Tanjur as no. 5306, vol. 102 of the Japanese reprint of the Peking version. Its full title there is Cig-car 'jug-pa rnam-par mi-rtog-pa'i bsgom don.

Also see Gómez, "Indian Materials," and "La doctrina subitista, de Vimalamitra," forthcoming in Estudios de Asia y África del Norte. The latter paper is in part a response to Harada's study, and reaches the following conclusions (quoting verbatim the English Summary at the end of the paper): "The

present paper argues against Harada Satoru's thesis that the Cig-car 'jug-pa'i rnam-par mi-rtog-pa'i bsgom don, attributed by the Tanjur to Vimalamitra is not a treatise of the Sudden Enlightenment School, and possibly not by Vimalamitra. It is proposed that we take all Bhāvanākrama passages in the Cig-car as interpolations, and not as instances of plagiarism or concessions to the gradualists. It is also proposed that, although the parallels from Pelliot 116 found in the Cig-car are of obvious significance, it is still too early to evaluate them."

9. I prefer "the Tibetan controversies of the eighth century" as the most accurate description of the historical realities behind these texts. In the past I have exaggerated, however, the poor correspondence between the Cheng-li chüeh and the BhK. My statements to that effect in "Indian Materials..." should be qualified with a discussion of passages such as....

10. "Tonkō shutsudo chibettobun Mahaen Zenji ibun" in Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū, XIX.2 (1971) 123-126. These fragments were first brought to the attention of Western scholars by Demiéville in a long note on pp. 14-17 of Concile. The first pioneer in this field, however, was Marcelle Lalou, who assisted Demiéville in the preparation of this note, and described the fragments cursorily, but accurately, in her catalogue of the Pelliot collection--Inventaire des manuscrits tibétains de Touen-houang conservés à la Bibliothèque Nationale (Fonds Pelliot tibétain), Tome I, Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1939, Tome II, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1951, Tome III, Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1961. It was Lalou also who first published and analyzed a Tibetan Ch'an text--"Document tibétain sur l'expansion du dhyāna chinois," Journal Asiatique, CCXXXI (1939) 505-523.

11. Pelliot 117 verso ff. 5.1-7.5. The title of the work is given in this fragment as "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gyi Bsam-b(r)tan chig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo dan bsad pa'i mdo," which Demiéville (Concile, p. 14) reconstructs in Chinese as shih tun-ju-men ch'an ching. Okimoto Katsumi suggests: tun-ju ch'an-men ching, in "Makaen no shiso," Hanazono Daigaku Kenkyūkiyō, 8 (1977) p. 15. In Stein 468 the work is titled "Mkhan-po Ma-ha-yan-gi Bsam-gtan cig-car 'jug-pa'i sgo." Only these two fragments give us a title. I have used the shorter name as the standard title throughout this paper. For the author I prefer the Chinese version of

his name. The earliest analysis of some (Pelliot 116, 117, 812, and 813) of these fragments is, of course, from the erudite pen of Demiéville--Concile pp. 14-17 note. For a synoptic view of the various fragments and their relationship, see the chart presented as Appendix I to this paper.

12. The method of no method. The word fang-pien is rendered in this paper by "approach" or "means of approach." For the meaning of this term Demiéville suggests upāya, prayoga, and paryāya (Concile, pp. 17, note, 82, note, and pp. 85 and 357). As will become obvious in the passages translated in the appendix to this paper, Mo-ho-yen's use of the term is not as far removed from Indian usage as is the meaning given to it in the Northern School of Ch'an. Both Demiéville (loc. cit.) and Takasaki Jikidō ("Some Problems of the Tibetan Translations from Chinese Materials," L. Ligeti, ed. Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Memorial Symposium, (Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, 23), Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978, pp. 459-67) have observed that fang-pien can translate terms such as yoga and prayoga, but they have not noted the fact that one of the meanings of upāya is precisely the "methods and practices" that lead to enlightenment (see, for instance, the passage from Bodhisattvabhūmi analyzed by E. Lamotte in his translation of the Vimalakīrti, pp. 116-117, n. 68 (L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti, (Bibliothèque du Muséon, 51), Louvain: Publications Universitaires--Institut Orientaliste, 1962).

13. Mark Tatz, "T'ang Dynasty Influences on the Early Spread of Buddhism in Tibet," The Tibet Journal, III.2 (1978) 3-32.

14. Okimoto Katsumi, "bSam-yas no shuron (3)--nishū no Mahaen ibun," Nihon Chibetto Gakkai Kaiho, 23 (1977) 5-8.

15. Strictly speaking there is no basis for claiming conclusively that rnam par rtog pa'i sems stand in the works of Mo-ho-yen for any Sanskrit term (cf., e.g., Demiéville, Concile, p. 22, 127 n.1, 128-135). In light of the equivalences in Pelliot 823 and Pc. 4646, one can ascertain that the Chinese original must have been either wang-hsin or wang-hsiang, both standard equivalents for the Sanskrit term. Insofar as possible, I have tried to base my interpretation on equivalences such as these--see notes and vocabulary to the translations in Appendix II.

16. See note 14 above.

17. Kimura Ryūtoku, "Tonko shutsudo chibetto-bun shahon Stein 709," Nihon Chibetto Gakkai Kaihō, 22 (1976) 11-13.

18. Cf. Bu-ston's summary of the "debate," above, notes 11 and 12.

19. Okimoto, "bSam-yas no shūron (3)," argues on the basis of the calligraphic and material similarity of the manuscripts (p. 7, column b). The leaves are approximately identical in size (26 x 8.7 cm. for Stein 468, and 26 x 9 cm. for 709). Both manuscripts are written in the same hand.

20. Kimura, op. cit.

21. Op. cit., p. 7, column a.

22. Gnubs-chen Sañs-rgyas-ye-śes, Rnal-'byor mig-gi bsam-gtan or Bsam-gtan mig-sgron, (Smanrtsis Shesrig Spendzod, 74--Leh, Ladakh: S. W. Tashigangpa, 1974), ff. 145.5-146.4. This work is also known under the following two variant titles: Rdzogs-chen-gyi man-ñag bsam-gtan mig-sgron and Sgom-gyi gnad-gsal-bar phye-ba bsam-gtan mig-sgron. Japanese and Western scholars prefer the shorter title Bsam-gtan mig sgron, sometimes abbreviated SMG. Below we have used the shorter title or the abbreviation Bsmi.

23. This is either a general term for works such as the "Gate" ("sayings on mental cultivation"), or a variant title for the work. In the latter case lun would be a different translation for the original of mdo, and bsgom for bsam gtan. The latter seems unlikely to me.

24. Bśad-pa'i mdo in Pelliot 116 suggests to me that bśad-đo in Pelliot 117 is a mistake for bśad-mdo. Note also the title of The Gate in Pelliot 117: -sgo dañ bśad-pa'i mdo (dañ perhaps for par).

25. The similarities between the actual and the hypothetical folia numbers of Pelliot 117 are purely accidental, the mss. being materially and contextually different.

26. Concile, p. 17. This passage may be by 'Gal-yan.

27. Cf. Ueyama, "Tonkō shutsudo chibetto-bun Makaen Zenji ibun."

28. Rnam-par myi-rtoq-pa'i gzuñ, reading the last word in the title as synonymous with gsun or lun (Chinese: lun). Cf. the Brda-dag miñ-tshig gsal-ba of Dge-bses Chos-kyi Grags-pa (rev. ed., Peking: 1957), sub voce. But it is possible to see in this word an equivalent for Chinese yi--see Okimoto in "Makaen," p. 15, and translation notes 112 and 119.

29. Okimoto Katsumi, "bSam-yas no shūron (3)," pp. 5-6.

30. Op. cit.

31. Chapter Thirteen, "The Ston-mun-pa." I have used the edition of the relevant sections in Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II, pp. 68-81. There is a very rough, and often misleading translation in pp. 81-101.

32. Tucci, pp. 79-80. Studied by Okimoto in "Chibetto-yaku Ninyū Shigyō ron ni tsuite," Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū, 24.2 (1976) 992-999. John Jorgensen's study of the "Long Scroll"--The Earliest Text of Ch'an Buddhism: the Long Scroll, M.A. Thesis, Australian National University--which has been unavailable to me, presumably deals with this text.

33. Tucci, p. 74.

34. Tucci, p. 77. Okimoto Katsumi in his "Makaen no shisō," p. 17, accepts the attribution of this passage on the basis of what he considers correspondences with Stein 468, but the only parallel is in the fact that both passages describe the method of tso-ch'an, and many texts relating to the Tibetan controversies--including the Bhāvanākramas--have very similar descriptions. In fact, it is only on the physical posture of dhyāna that all of these texts seem to agree.

35. I have also omitted from all consideration four other fragments relevant to the study of the ideas of Mo-ho-yen, but belonging to a different genre. These are Pelliot 121, 699 and 827, and Stein 689. Part of Pelliot 121 (ff. 36-40) seems to be traceable to Mo-ho-yen and his circle. Stein 689 is a fragment of Pelliot 121, and Pelliot 699 a complete commentary of the same work. These materials seem to

be of some importance, unfortunately, I still have not been able to secure photographic copies of the manuscript fragments. Cf. Okimoto, "Mahaen no shisō," p. 17, and "Tonkō shutsudo...(1)," p. 461, and Kimura Ryūtoku, "Le dhyāna chinois au Tibet ancien après Mahāyāna," Journal Asiatique, CCLXIX (1981), pp. 190-91. Also, cf. the corresponding entries in the catalogues of Lalou (cited above, n. 10) and Louis de la Vallée Poussin--Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

36. Okimoto, "Mahaen no shisō," p. 16, suggests this identification.

37. Ueyama, in "Tonkō shutsudo," p. 123 suggests: "shuo ch'an hsin sui."

38. Okimoto, loc. cit., Harada, op. cit.

39. Okimoto, loc. cit., lists lun (sic), m̄do as possible titles, but does not seem to distinguish lun from lon.

40. Bu-ston, ff. 887.6 (p. 192 in Obermiller) mentions five works as Mo-ho-yen's. His list can be traced to earlier sources, such as Sa-pan's Skyes-bu dam-pa rnam-la sprin-ba'i yi-ge--see Samten G. Karmay, "A Discussion on the Doctrinal Position of rDzogs-chen from the 10th to the 13th Centuries," Journal Asiatique CCLXIII.1-2 (1975) pp. 152-54. The five titles are: (1) Bsam-gtan ñal-ba'i khor-lo, (2) Bsam-gtan-gyi lon, (3) yañ lon (Is it simply "another lon," or another Bsam-gtan-gyi lon?), (4) Lta-ba'i rgyab śa, (5) Mdo-sde brgyad cu khuñs.

Obermiller attempts to interpret these titles as Sanskrit terms (cf. Karmay pp. 153-54). The same mistake is made by G. W. Houston in his Sources for a History of the Bsam Yas Debate, Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University Uralic- Altaic Department, 1976.

Similar lists occur in the Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston and the New Red Annals--respectively, Mkhas-pa'i dga'-ston of Dpa'-bo-gtsug-lag, ed. Lokesh Chandra, New Delhi, 1962, Part 4 (Ja), f. 116a, and as Deb T'er Dmar Po Gsar Ma: Tibetan Chronicles by bSod nams grags pa, ed. G. Tucci, Vol. I, Serie Orientale Roma XXIV, Rome, 1971, f. 27, translation p. 155.

Only (2) and (3) could represent one of the works we have identified above (perhaps The Gate). As to the rest, Kimura, in "Le dhyāna chinois..." pp. 185-186, has shown that (5) is not one of Mo-ho-yen's

works. Also, in the light of Karmay's "A Discussion..." p. 153, title (1) probably should be attributed to a different author. As observed also by Karmay loc. cit., Pelliot 117 recto, folia 1-6, ends (623-4) with the colophon "Bsam-brtan-gyi lon rdzogs so"--however, this is no reason for assuming that the fragment is by Mo-ho-yen.

41. On Mo-ho-yen's affiliations see the survey of the literature by Demiéville in "L'introduction au Tibet..." (supra n. 4), and the article by Broughton in this same volume.

42. The following is a paraphrase of paragraphs I.1, X.1 and XI.4 in Appendix II. Throughout this section references are made to the translations in Appendix II by a Roman numeral (sometimes followed by an Arabic numeral), and to the Cheng-li chüeh by only an Arabic numeral (often followed by the letters "a" or "b" to indicate recto and verso).

43. A number of terms in this summary present major translation problems--see notes 12, 15, and 46. The Tibetan-Chinese equivalents for these terms are available to us in Pelliot 21 and 823 (see translation X.2, and XI.4 and 12, and cf. Cheng-li chüeh 134a): (a) myi bden pa'i 'du śes--clearly synonymous with the myi bden pa'i sems and ma rig pa'i sems of IV.1 ff.--stands for wang-hsin which can be considered an approximate equivalent of vikalpa, but which evidently overlaps with nimitta and mithya-samjñā or the like. The occasional expansion of the term in Chinese (e.g., 134a) with the addition of two characters--into wang-hsiang fen-pieh--is primarily an attempt to focus the meaning of the term, as suggested by Demiéville, Concile p. 76 n. 5: "...ce double composé ne doit représenter, en fait, qu'une idée unique..." but it may also be a way of indicating the mental activity as distinguished from the object or result of discrimination. (Cf. op. cit. p. 132 n. 5) (b) ma blaḥs and ma chags are quite straightforward and represent concepts shared by all Buddhists. Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct Sanskrit equivalents, the concepts themselves would present no difficulty to the gradualist were it not for the way they are applied in the context of meditation--for ma bslabs and ma chags are meant to define myi sems (or myi bsam(s)) and myi rtogs, respectively. (c) myi sems (pu-ssu) myi rtog (pu-kuan) can only stand for concepts such as vitarka and vicāra--respectively, "to consider, to bring to mind" and "to look into, to

examine." They could correspond to smṛti and manasikāra only in a very general sense. (Cf. Concile pp. 78-9 n. 3, and "Indian Materials..." n. 7,8.) (d) tshor ba, which translates vedanā in the classical terminology after the Mahāvīyūtpatti, stands in the fragments of Mo-ho-yen for chüeh. The concept is implicitly defined in Cheng-li chüeh 147a-b:

Question: From which sutra text [do you derive the idea of] looking into the mind, and becoming aware of false notions when these arise?

Reply: In Section 18 of the Nirvāna Sutra it is said: "What do we call Buddha? We call Buddha one who is aware (or awake), that is to say, one who awakens himself, as well as being able to awaken others. ...it is like someone who becomes aware that there is a thief, the thief then cannot [enter his home]. The Bodhisattva Mahāsattva is able to become aware of all the innumerable perturbations (kleśa), the moment he is fully aware of them, there is nothing that these can do to him...." This is why if one looks into the mind while sitting in meditation, and every time that false conceptualizations and thoughts arise he becomes aware of them and [does not] hold onto or abide in them, and does not act according to the perturbations, then this is called liberation in each thought [moment].

Note that in this passage the Sūtra and Mo-ho-yen both play on the ambiguity of the term chüeh ("understand," "realize," but also "wake up"). Thus, he wakes up and realizes that there is a thief in the house, etc. (Cf. Translation IV.5 and IX.2.)

44. On the sources and the reading of these two sentences, see notes 6, 7, and 8 in Concile, p. 76.

45. Tibetan parallel below, XI.2.

46. We have chosen to translate kuan and pu-kuan at face value, although the former's Tibetan equivalent (rtog) and the contexts of its usage in the gradualist's arguments in the Cheng-li chüeh would indicate that it stands for vikalpa. Whereas whenever the gradualist speaks of pu-kuan as the ultimate end of the practice (e.g., in 132b--cf. 135a) we can surmise that this refers to nirvikalpa. When the context

is the proper method, pu-kuan must stand for a denial of pratyavekṣanā (kuan-ch'a in 148a). (Cf. the notes in Concile 73, 79, 81, 97, and 130.) Since Sanskrit has two words for what Chinese expresses with only one, it seems reasonable to assume that--in spite of the obvious overlap which made the dispute possible--the terms do not correspond fully. This terminological ambiguity was no doubt an important contributing factor--if not a major cause--for the controversy. See my "Indian Materials..." n. 6.

47. Tibetan parallels below, I.4, X.2.

48. Demiéville, "Deux documents...", p. 12.

49. See Cheng-li chüeh 132b-133a, and Concile pp. 72-74, 130-140.

50. Compare the use of the Vimalakīrti in this same connection in the BhK--this is another example of an implicit dialogue between the Cheng-li chüeh and the BhK.

51. Concile pp. 91 n. 1, 109 n. 5, and 127 n. 1.

52. More literally, "persons of sharp faculties do not discuss whether they are necessary or not." In Concile p. 86, Demiéville translates, "pour ceux qui ont des facultés aiguës, la question de leur nécessité ou de leur non-nécessité ne se pose pas," and in p. 87, "pour ceux dont les facultés sont aiguës, la question de nécessité ou de non-nécessité ne se discute pas." Evidently the passage means that "need" is applicable only in the sphere of the relative. One should compare, however, the Tibetan rendering in Appendix II, XI.5, for what appears to be a different understanding.

53. "Pu-k'e-te" corresponding to Sanskrit anupa-lābhya, or the like; that is, they cannot be found anywhere, they cannot be obtained or attained.

54. Concile 157 n. 3; cf. 76-77.

55. Cf. Concile 87 n. 3 and 158 n. 13. In the first of these notes Demiéville assumes that the "inner perfection" of Mo-ho-yen is "définie justement comme celle du Petit Véhicule, 'utile à soi.'" If this were the case then the passage would contradict Cheng-li chüeh 156a (Concile 158) where it is said that the precepts and perfections of the bodhisattvas

are internal(ized) virtues. Demiéville sees such a contradiction ("les épithètes sont inversées"). I suspect, however, that Mo-ho-yen's distinction of internal and external is less scholastic than it seems, and the categories more inclusive than the terms chosen by Demiéville as a key to understanding the concept. Mo-ho-yen may be accused of using the terms loosely, but there is no contradiction: the selfcentered practices of the śrāvakas are "external," though they benefit only oneself, and the altruistic practices of the bodhisattva are also "external" (that is, "mere externals") if they lack in wisdom.

56. Cf. the discussion in Okimoto, "Makaen."

57. The physical aspects of sitting in meditation are among the few elements shared by both gradualists and suddenists. In this emphasis Mo-ho-yen differs from the Southern School.

For the critique of ts'o-ch'an in the Southern School see: T'an-ching section 19 in P. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967, also pp. 117, 135-36, 140-81 of the same; for Shen-hui see Hu Shih, Shen-hui ho-shang yi-tsi, Shanghai: Oriental Book Co., pp. 97-98, 116-17, 134, 175-77; and the Vajrasamādhi, Taisho 273, vol. IX, 368a.

58. These are not the "five upāya" of the Northern School, and Mo-ho-yen may be purposefully separating himself from that tradition. Notice also his use of k'an instead of kuan to describe the process by means of which one becomes aware of the mind. See n. 9 to translation, I.3.